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

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

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NAVAL INVESTIGATION

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON NAVAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE

SIXTY-SIXTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION

IN TWO VOLUMES

Vol. 1

Printed for the use of the Committee on Naval Affairs

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1921

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NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

TUESDAY, MARCH 9, 1920.

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NAVAL AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met pursuant to the call of the chairman, at 10.30 o'clock a. m., in room 235, Senate Office Building, Senator Frederick Hale, presiding.

Present, Senators Hale (chairman), McCormick, Pittman, and Trammell.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. On January 17, at a meeting of this committee which was being held on the question of awards in the Navy, a letter was read from Admiral William S. Sims to the Secretary of the Navy, dated January 7, 1920, and without objection, that letter will be inserted in this record at the present time.

(The letter referred to is here printed in the record as follows:)

JANUARY 7, 1920.

From: Rear Admiral William S. Sims, United States Navy.
To: The Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: Certain naval lessons of the Great War.

1. Upon the conclusion of a war in which large naval forces have been engaged, and after a sufficient time has elapsed to permit of a careful estimate of the manner in which the war was conducted, it is of the first importance that the lessons to be derived from this experience be recorded in order that they may serve as a guide in future wars.

2. This is especially true of a naval war of such a peculiar character that the experience of former wars was of little assistance in determining the proper policy and in developing the unusual tactics that were rendered necessary by the number, geographical position and resources of the countries involved, and by the enemy's method of submarine attack upon merchant shipping in disregard of the tenets of international law and the laws of humanity.

3. In this respect it is particularly important that a just estimate be made of the errors of policy, tactics, strategy, and administration, that were committed by our Navy.

4. It is to this end that I submit the following account of what appears to me to be the most serious of these errors, and the circumstances that led up to them, followed by a brief summary of the lessons to be derived therefrom.

5. This is not presented solely from the viewpoint of the commander of our relatively small naval forces in Europe, but specifically as a result of the experience necessarily gained in the unusual and very responsible position of the Navy Departments' representative in the naval council of the Allies, where only all allied plans and policies could be continuously discussed, and where only all essential information, both current and general, was at all times available.

6. In the latter part of March, 1917, in response to a request from the American ambassador in London, expressing the desire of the British Government that a naval officer of high rank be sent to secure the closer cooperation which our Navy Department had suggested, I was ordered abroad on barely 48 hours' notice.

7. Brief orders were delivered to me verbally in Washington. No formal instructions or statement of the Navy Department's plans or policy were received at that time, though I received the following explicit admonition: "Don't let the British pull the wool over your eyes. It is none of our business pulling their chestnuts out of the fire. We would as soon fight the British as the Germans."

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8. I assumed that my mission was to confer with the heads of the allied navies to learn the actual situation and to discuss means for naval cooperation in case the United States declared war against the Central Powers. A lieutenant commander accompanied me as aid. We were directed not to take uniform and to travel under assumed names, I expected to return and supplement my cables by reporting the situation in person. I had no idea that I would be designated to command the naval forces in Europe in case of war.

9. I arrived in Liverpool on April 9, and in London on April 10, 1917, and went immediately to the admiralty, where the naval situation was fully explained by the responsible officials. This explanation showed that the Navy Department did not understand the seriousness of the submarine situation; that its information was very incomplete and inaccurate. This was due to the insufficient scope of its intelligence service, very few naval officers having been sent to Europe for information before we entered the war.

10. A review of the cables sent to the department in April, 1917, shows that the situation was very serious and that the enemy was rapidly winning the war by destruction of merchant shipping. Throughout the following year numerous cables and letters of the most urgent possible character were sent with the object of impressing upon the department the vital necessity of our maximum effort being exerted in the European waters with the least possible delay, but without producing the desired results.

11. Attention was frequently invited to the fact that shipping was being sunk much faster than it was being built, and that it was a matter of simple arithmetical calculation to determine when the Allies would have to sue for peace if the rate of loss continued.

12. It may be well to state here that the delays in taking action, and the lack of support, involving the efficiency of the United States naval assistance in the war, can be fully understood only through an examination of the communications exchanged between the department and the naval headquarters abroad.

13. For some reason which has never been explained, the Navy Department, during at least the first six months of the war, failed to put into actual practice a wholehearted policy of cooperation with the Allies—the policy required for winning the war with the least possible delay.

14. The headquarters in Europe was not infrequently left in ignorance of the department's policies, plans for operation of United States forces, and its intended action upon my many dispatches. Not until July 10, 1917, did the Navy Department outline a policy as regards naval cooperation with the Allies—in a cable quoting a letter to the State Department.

15. As usual in such cases, the policy thus set forth was academically sound, but that it was not carried out, or was not understood by the department, is shown by the fact that for 10 months after its receipt I was still urgently recommending an increase of forces—still trying to convince the department that the war was in the eastern Atlantic; that the United States naval "front" was off the European coast and not off the United States coast; that it was there only that the naval enemy was operating; that it was there only that United States shipping, let alone allied shipping, could be protected with the maximum efficiency.

16. A review of the dispatches makes it apparent that the department did not accept my reports and recommendations with the seriousness that the critical situation demanded. There are many instances that illustrate this. One that may be cited is the case of our battleships that were requested as reinforcement of the Grand Fleet.

17. Following a conference with Admiral Jellicoe, then first sea lord, or "chief of naval operations," of the British Admiralty, and Admiral Beatty, the commander in chief of the Grand Fleet, it was strongly recommended, on July 21, 1917, that four of our coal-burning battleships be sent at once. There was great delay before there was even an acknowledgment of this request. This naturally subjected me to much embarrassment. The request, though repeated, was finally refused.

18. In the following November the chief of naval operations arrived in England with the Col. House mission. After discussing this question of the necessity of sending our battleships, with the same officials with whom I had discussed it, he cabled at once recommending that they be sent. The result was that it was over four months after the original request (Nov. 28), that the four ships sailed from the United States.

19. This is but one of a number of examples of a similar kind and strikingly illustrates the nature of the delays caused by the department's insistence upon trying to understand the intricate details of rapidly changing conditions 3,000 miles away. As it was, of course, a physical impossibility to keep the department fully and accurately informed, and as the department insisted upon making decisions concerning both the disposition and the actual operations of the European forces, the inevitable result was unsound decisions, and in some cases long delays before the depart-

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ment was induced to accept the original recommendations that were based upon exhaustive discussions of the actual conditions with the heads of the allied navies.

20. Judging from the actions that were finally taken, after extensive cabled and written communications, and consequently long delays, it is apparent that if I could have appeared daily in Washington to explain fully my recommendations, and the discussions before the conferences upon which they were based, they would undoubtedly have been carried out from two to six months earlier. The point is that if the department considered that there was anyone in Washington more competent to form just conclusions, he should have been sent to Europe for that purpose; but, failing this, the recommendations of the Navy Department's representative, based upon conferences with the allied commanders, should have been accepted and immediately acted upon. The action of the department in this respect was a violation of a fundamental principle of warfare—see Mahan, or any authority—and it was continuous throughout the war. It added greatly to the burden of my work.

21. There was great delay and reluctance in accepting the indisputable fact, which should have been apparent to anyone, that the critical sea area was in the eastern Atlantic in the so-called submarine war zone; that the submarine campaign could be critical and could affect the ultimate decision of the war only in that area.

22. This attitude in Washington greatly slowed the sending of the necessary assistance, and necessarily resulted in prolonging the war.

23. It would seem to be self-evident that the department could not possibly have been kept completely informed in detail, by cable code messages, of the actual situation in the war zone, and, particularly, of the rapidly changing conditions during the critical period of the war in the summer of 1917.

24. As a matter of fact this was a physical impossibility during all of that most critical period. The work of collecting the necessary information, or even the purely mechanical work of transcribing it, would have been away beyond the physical capacity of one man assisted by the one aid I was allowed during that time. The best that could possibly be done was to keep the department informed by cable in a general way of the conclusions reached by the various discussions with the allied commanders at the "front," and of the decisions based thereon.

25. In cases where the department declined to approve such decisions, the only recourse was to try to explain by letter, as fully as time and insufficient assistance would permit. The result was, of course, long, embarrassing, and dangerous delays.

26. If the department had promptly accepted the recommendations made, beginning four days after my arrival abroad, and continuing for some months, and had sent at once all the destroyers and other craft which were finally sent in the next four or five months, it follows that the United States naval intervention would have been much more efficient.

27. I realize that it is difficult at the present time to believe that any policy involving such delays could have been persisted in, particularly when combined with a failure to comply with my requests for additional staff officers to assist my one aide; but a review of the dispatches and letters exchanged with the department during this period (the first four months of the war) will show that the department insisted upon the impossible, that is, upon full and detailed substantiation of every proposition advanced, even many of those concerning the disposition and handling of the naval forces in actual contact with the enemy.

28. For example, in the above-mentioned statement of policy, from the Navy to the State Department, a copy of which was sent me, it is clearly set forth that readiness completely to cooperate by sending our light forces abroad was dependent upon the condition that the Allies should keep the department fully informed through me of their plans and intentions.

29. In other words, while the department's first statement of policy (which was dated July, 1917, or three months after we entered the war) was what I had recommended since the beginning, it nevertheless withheld putting it into effect, apparently because of a conviction that the Allies were not keeping it fully informed of their plans.

30. The truth of the matter was that nothing was being withheld, and that all policies and plans which were in writing, which were actually of an official nature, and which in any way affected United States naval cooperation, had been transmitted to the department as completely as long distance communication—coded messages—permitted.

31. Certain suggestions were made by the British Admiralty as to uses of our forces in the campaign. For example, in April, 1917, there was anxiety lest the enemy should attempt a raid in the Channel with a heavy force and get away before he could be intercepted by a force from the Grand Fleet, the nearest base of which was at Rosyth, near Edinburgh. Accordingly, the Admiralty suggested that a squadron of our battleships be based on Brest or in the Channel. No reply was made to this sug-

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gestion. Also, the value of submarines in the campaign was first explained April 19, 1917. None were sent until October, 1917, when five arrived in Ireland, followed by seven more in January and February, 1918.

32. In spite of the numerous messages sent in April, the only information received up to April 27, 1917, was that six destroyers only would be sent. The situation was then so very critical that I appealed to the American ambassador in London, who sent a most urgent message to the President, and on May 3, 1917, the first definite information was received of the department's intention to send more than six destroyers—that ultimately 36 and two repair ships would be sent.

33. Most earnest requests were made for tugs because of the urgent need for them in the submarine zone. These requests fully explained how many torpedoed ships could have been beached and salvaged if these tugs had been available. Experience has shown that such vessels could be repaired and put in service again in a short time—a very short time compared to that required to build new ships—thus resulting in a great saving of tonnage.

34. A year after we entered the war but four tugs had been sent, and two of these were specifically allocated to Italy by the department. Nine more were eventually sent at various times, but none before April 23, 1918.

35. The department caused serious embarrasment and delays in putting into effect the convoy system which was the most important of all the measures used in defeating the submarine war against allied shipping.

36. The department was repeatedly assured that the Allies at all times had remarkably accurate information as to the movement of submarines, and that it was practically certain that they could not reach our coast, or even leave European waters, without advance information being supplied. Subsequent events proved this assurance to be correct.

37. No submarines visited our coast until May, 1918, and the department was in all cases informed when they started across, and often as to their exact destination—where they were to lay mines, etc.

38. My dispatches show that with all possible emphasis I tried to induce the department to view the campaign as a whole; to consider our naval forces as but one relatively small item of an allied naval team; that our mission was the protection of all allied lines of communication and not the United States lines of communication alone; that, particularly in the early part of our campaign, the strictly United States lines of communication, as compared to allied lines, were inconsiderable; and that it was quite possible to give our relatively small commerce quite superior protection at the expense of losing the war by denying essential protection to the vastly greater allied commerce upon which the success of our common cause chiefly depended.

39. There was naturally a strong inclination on the part of the various powers, including the United States, to resist this policy in favor of a disposition of forces that would afford superior protection to their respective commercial vessels.

40. War is always a dangerous game. Military operations conducted by several allied powers should never be based upon a policy of "safety first" as regards the interests of any particular ally. This is especially true where success depends upon the maximum possible protection being given to the allied commerce as a whole.

41. As the possession of adequate shipping was an imperative requirement in this war, it follows that the essential policy was to pool all antisubmarine forces and use them to the best possible advantage for the protection of all shipping, regardless of the flag that it happened to be under. As the winning of the war was the paramount object, and as our antisubmarine forces and those of the Allies were always inadequate, and as it was consequently impossible to prevent a certain amount of loss, it is apparent that the game was to reduce the combined loss of allied shipping below a point which would defeat the objective of the enemy and thus insure victory of the common cause as a whole.

42. It was repeatedly explained that if we could actually entice the enemy into shifting his submarines to our coast it would be greatly to the advantage of the common cause, even granting that our shipping would suffer somewhat more severely; that the chances of the enemy shifting any of his operations to the United States coast without our having advance knowledge, while remote, was a fully justifiable risk, and therefore that such considerations should not deter us in any way from throwing every possible bit of naval strength into the fight on the actual "front"; that is, in the "war zone" in European waters. Moreover, that the risk was slight, as vessels could be sent back, if necessary, before submarines could reach our coast or could do much damage. In making long passages submarines necessarily steam at slow speed—from 5 to 6 knots.

43. Submarines attacked almost exclusively merchant vessels, thus cutting off supplies essential to the armies. This was their correct mission, and they wisely

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avoided conflict with allied naval vessels. It was, therefore, our mission to adopt such tactics as to force the submarines into contact with the Allies' military vessels, while protecting the merchant shipping. This meant antisubmarine craft in such numbers that the submarines could not reach their prey without encountering them. It was for this reason that it was continuously urged that everything be sent, not only destroyers, which are preeminently the best antisubmarine craft, but also yachts, gunboats, tugs, etc., in fact, any craft that could steam across the ocean or be towed across.

44. It is quite true that there were many naval activities outside of the eastern Atlantic, such as in Caribbean, south Atlantic, Pacific, and Asiatic waters. But, considering the rapidity with which at the time in question we were losing the war in the submarine zone, these forces were of little importance—practically none as regards ultimate success. A great deal of unnecessary effort was expended in these areas. It was repeatedly pointed out that we could afford to lose some antisubmarine craft, but could not afford to continue the loss of merchantmen at the rate then being sustained.

45. It was realized, of course, that if a considerable number of antisubmarine vessels was not kept on our coast there would be risk of public criticism which, in time of war, must be based upon inadequate information, because to inform the public would be to inform the enemy. But I strongly advised that this risk be accepted; that we should not be influenced in our war measures by the possibility of such adverse criticism: that the situation made it imperative that every possible means be used to defeat the enemy as speedily as possible, regardless of other considerations, and thus save many valuable lives.

46. Perhaps the most remarkable situation disclosed by the correspondence with the department is that during the most critical period—the first four months after we entered the war—I had but one aid, and that for more than the first year I had a wholly inadequate staff.

47. With all the insistence possible it was explained, in numerous cables and letters, for four weary and anxious months, the absolute necessity of further assistance in order to handle the situation effectively, but only to receive always the same answer, namely, that officers were "not available."

48. Finally, in July, 1917, my only aid was unable longer to support the continuous strain of the past four months' work, including the very anxious task of planning for and handling the troop convoys then arriving. And it was only after this fact had been cabled that three officers were sent out, though the department still declined to provide the adequate staff that had been requested, with full explanations of the types of officers required and the necessity for each. I urged the department to give me at least the staff that the commander of one flotilla of destroyers would have in time of peace. But all in vain.

49. As it gradually became apparent that support in this matter need not be expected, I began slowly building up a staff by detaching officers from some of the ships. This was, of course, regrettable, as many of the ships were at that time short of officers; but it was necessary, on pain of the whole force becoming ineffective through the rapidly growing and essential administrative work getting beyond the capacity of the headquarters' force. Ultimately this force consisted of about 60 regular and 140 reserve officers and 1,000 enlisted men and clerical force for the administration, supply, and operation of widely dispersed forces of about 370 ships of all classes, 5,000 officers, and 75,000 men. Its necessity was finally, I believe, tacitly recognized by the department, but not until near the end of the war, when a few officers were sent for staff duty. If it had been recognized from the beginning, as well as the necessity of sending all possible antisubmarine forces, there can be no doubt that the end of the war would have been hastened and hundreds of thousands of tons of shipping and many lives would have been saved.

50. It needs little explanation to understand what I and my single aid were up against. For the efficient handling of such a difficult and complicated situation I should have had a staff capable of:

(1) Obtaining complete information of the various phases of the naval campaign which had been in operation for over two years.

(2) Keeping up to date with the developments which were rapidly changing almost from day to day.

(3) Efficiently administering, supplying, and operating the entire force.

(4) Coordinating our work with that of the allies.

51. The work of such a staff not only involved attempting to survey the disposition of all enemy forces, but also of all allied forces operating in the North Sea, Atlantic, and Mediterranean. It was also necessary to keep track of the results of the naval campaign in all its details both from the side of the Allies and from that of the enemy, and to solve the problems of supply, repairs, etc., which would affect any United

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States naval forces that might be sent abroad. The above, to say nothing of having to solve problems relating to the entirely new forces introduced into this war, such as aviation—a tremendous problem in itself.

52. It would take many pages to set forth all the activities and information which were to be studied and reports of which, of course, could have been transmitted to the department if the staff had been adequate.

53. If the department realized these conditions, it is made clear by the records that it was not influenced by them. The correspondence shows that I was trying to get the department to understand that I was confronted with an impossible task—that it was actually physically impossible for me and one aid to carry on efficiently the necessary operations of the forces, let alone comply with the department's demands for the details of information concerning all the various plans of the Allies, the details of all methods and appliances used, etc. All this not to mention the details required concerning new construction, new types of vessels, new methods of gunfire, etc.

54. In a word, it would hardly be possible to conceive of a more complete misunderstanding by the department of the actual situation that confronted me on the other side, particularly during the critical period of the war.

55. On a number of occasions I invited the department's attention to the fact that it was impossible intelligently to direct the operation of our forces from Washington; that if we were to cooperate with the allied navies, which was the only efficient way of participating in the war, it was essential that we keep in close personal touch with the heads of the allied navies in the war area.

56. To this end it was pointed out that our organization abroad should be considered as the department's advance headquarters in the field, similar to the general headquarters of the Army in the field; that the personnel of the organization at these advance headquarters should be more than adequate rather than inadequate, in order to avoid the great danger of basing the Navy's part in the war upon incomplete information.

57. When Gen. Pershing arrived in Europe in May, 1917, he was accompanied by a nucleus staff, consisting of 5 colonels, 6 lieutenant colonels, 16 majors, 18 captains, and 8 lieutenants, or 53 commissioned officers in all, besides many writers and orderlies. Ultimately this staff was expanded to about 1,500 commissioned officers.

58. As was repeatedly pointed out, such was the necessity for an adequate organization abroad that the term "not available" should have been applied to other activities of vastly less importance; that the headquarters organization abroad, as well as that in Washington, should be adequate, even if it meant laying up a couple of old ships, especially those of a class which could not possibly be used in the war.

59. The policy indicated by the dispatches in question may be summed up by the statement that ships as well as troops in the field, no matter what their individual skill, would be very heavily handicapped if their combined efforts were not coordinated and directed from the most central source of all available information.

60. The department frequently omitted to keep its naval representative abroad informed of its plans, intentions, and sometimes even the movements of forces in the European area, and there was at times embarrassment caused by lack of general information concerning the Navy's activities in other areas, such as the South Atlantic, Pacific, etc. As foreign forces and shipping were also operating in those areas, it was embarrassing not to be able to answer in conference with the Allies all questions concerning our actual naval activities as well as prospective plans, the carrying out of which would necessarily influence allied plans.

61. It requires little imagination to understand the great embarrassment of my position. It was, of course, impossible even to attempt any explanation of the evident fact that the Allies were not receiving the easily possible naval support in ships and that I was not receiving adequate assistance in personnel.

62. Apart from the resulting lack of coordination, it was very difficult—I fear sometimes impossible—to avoid the impression conveyed thereby to the heads of the allied navies that I was not being supported or was not in the confidence of the department.

63. Delays and confusion were caused by the department's dealing directly from Washington with European naval officials in Europe without using its own representatives there to investigate conditions at the "front," discuss all details with the allied navies, and thus coordinate effort.

64. For example, on May 8, without previous explanation, the department announced its intention to establish naval bases at Bordeaux and Brest, although on May 5, it had been informed of the results of a conference with the Fernch naval authorities and their agreement that our forces should remain concentrated at that time in the area of greatest enemy activity.

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65. Delays and confusion were also caused by dealing with representatives of foreign countries stationed in America, who made independent and strenuous demands for ships, coal, and other supplies, etc., without reference to the demands or necessities of others. The department thus ignored its own representative who was manifestly abroad for the paramount purpose of investigating the details of all such requests, and determining, after conferences with the allied navies, their relative merits, and particularly their relation to the necessities of the antisubmarine campaign.

66. I realized, of course, that a correct policy would have placed a heavy responsibility upon me, but as it was impossible to decide such questions efficiently and rapidly without access to all the information, and without opportunity for personal conferences, either this policy should have been adopted or else the person or persons in Washington assumed to be competent to decide such matters from a distance should have been transferred permanently to headquarters in Europe where personal contact, all available information, and continuous conferences would have been possible.

67. It is essential clearly to understand the vital importance of continuous conference with those officials of the allied navies and Governments who were directly concerned that nothing should be neglected to render decisions sound.

68. In many cases such was the mass of details involved in a decision—not only the details of the actual situation, but those based upon actual experience in similar cases and discussed at former conferences—that it was, of course, impossible for officers sent abroad to attend special conferences to acquire this information in time to make use of it. The almost inevitable result in such cases would be unsound opinions presented by them at the conferences.

69. There was insistence by the department upon finding new naval plans—a royal road to victory—such as blocking the enemy in his ports. The objection to radically new plans was that the situation was critical and their preparation would delay striking quickly with all available forces. This insistence assumed that the department, incompletely informed as it necessarily was, and without previous experience in the war, was more competent to decide upon practicable plans than their own representative in continuous conference with the leaders of the allied navies who had had nearly three years' experience. This attitude was maintained until after the commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet and the Chief of Naval Operations had visited Europe and learned something of the situation.

70. During the first year of the war the department refused to permit me to enroll in the Naval Reserve capable Americans who had special knowledge and who offered their services. Many of these men possessed special European experience which could not be obtained at home. Some of them felt so impelled to do their part that they actually returned to the United States in order that they might be enrolled there.

71. Throughout the war the department refused to trust to my discretion in the promotion of reserve officers, both for gallantry in action with the enemy and for conspicuous ability. Many of these officers were performing services the value of which was out of all proportion to the rank they held, and were far junior to the corresponding officers of allied services with whom they necessarily worked.

72. This was not only a grave injustice to these fine men, but the policy deprived me of the great advantage of increasing the morale of my forces by prompt rewards, instead of obliging me to assume the attitude of indifference to their demonstrated merits, thus inevitably decreasing their morale.

73. These officers for the most part did not care for the increase of pay, but it was a serious handicap, as well as an embarrassment, not to have the insignia corresponding to their age, experience, and the services they were actually performing, and corresponding to those of the foreign officers with whom they were officially associated.

74. At no time during the war was I permitted to select my subordinate flag commanders and but very few of my other subordinates.

75. Efficiency in war depends so much upon complete mutual confidence and sympathy between subordinates and their superiors, that it seems hardly necessary to state that I should at least have been consulted as to these important assignments, and of course held responsible for the results attained.

76. In the course of time, in the ninth month after our entry into the war, the lack of support referred to above, particularly in respect of the lack of adequate personnel for necessary staff duties abroad, became known in Washington. This was brought to my attention by the following cable messages.

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DECEMBER 22, 1917.

From: The Secretary of the Navy.
To: Vice Admiral Sims, London.

1732. At House committee hearing of conduct of Navy, Representative Britten said "I would like to have copy of complaints which have come from Admiral Sims on the other side." If you desire to make statement of action of department in reference to sending and supplying force under your command since war began, please send in code.

DANIELS.

DECEMBER 22, 1917.

From: The Chief of Naval Operations.
To: Vice Admiral Sims, London.

Effort being made to credit impression you have been hampered by failure of Navy Department to meet your request for various things, particularly personnel. I feel that a strong positive statement on this subject from you is highly desirable.

BENSON.

77. I was thus confronted with a situation, not uncommon in warfare, that demanded a decision that no military commander should hesitate to make; that is, such a decision as would be most likely, while avoiding conflict, to advance the common cause through the loyal support of superior authority by making the best of existing conditions, no matter how unsatisfactory. As the subject was one the public discussion of which in Congress would have supplied valuable information to the enemy, not to mention increasing his morale and decreasing that of our own fighting forces, it was manifestly desirable that it should be discouraged, and particularly that no information should be supplied that would render the discussion inevitable. The following cablegram was therefore designed to accomplish this purpose:

DECEMBER 23, 1917.

From: Vice Admiral Sims.
To: The Secretary of the Navy.

2366. Your 1732. I strongly deprecate any effort to create an impression that our naval forces in European waters have been avoidably hampered by failure of the Navy Department to comply with my recommendations for various things. particularly personnel.

It is of course well known that the antisubmarine campaign and the protection of allied shipping have been and still are hampered to a considerable extent by insufficient numbers of certain types of vessels, especially destroyers, and by certain classes of personnel, and I have repeatedly made recommendations in accordance with the requirements on this situation. To these recommendations the department has always responded with the assurance that reinforcements of both vessels and personnel were being sent to the maximum extent consistent with the many other requirements of the department in these respects.

The decision as to the relative importance of the employment of our naval vessels and personnel in the theater of actual war operations in European waters and at home must necessarily rest with the department, and I consider it the first duty of those at the front loyally to accept such decisions and to make the best of conditions which are at present admittedly unsatisfactory and must so remain until the energetic measures now being taken to increase our antisubmarine forces produce the necessary reinforcements.

SIMS.

78. The above brief account of the manner in which our naval operations were conducted clearly shows that the following grave errors were committed in violation of fundamental military principles; and it is manifestly desirable that such violations should be avoided in future:

(1) Although war with Germany had been imminent for many months prior to its declaration there were nevertheless no mature plans developed or naval policy adopted in preparation for war, in so far as its commander in Europe was informed.

(2) The Navy Department did not announce a policy until three months after war was declared—at least, not to its representative and the commander of its forces in Europe.

(3) The Navy Department did not enter whole-heartedly into the campaign for many months after we declared war, thus putting a great strain upon the morale of the fighting forces in the war area by decreasing their confidence in their leaders.

(4) The outbreak of hostilities found many important naval units widely dispersed and in need of repairs before they could be sent to the critical area.

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Destroyers arriving in the war zone had been cruising extensively off our seaboard and in the Caribbean and when war was declared were rushed through a brief and inadequate preparation for distant service.

(5) During the most critical months of the enemy submarine campaign against the allied lines of communication the department violated the fundamental strategical principle of concentration of maximum force in the critical area of the conflict.

(6) The department's representative with the allied admiralties was not supported during the most critical months of the war, either by the adequate personnel or by the adequate forces that could have been supplied.

(7) The department's commander in the critical area of hostilities was never allowed to select his principle subordinates and was not even consulted as to their assignment. A fundamental principle of the art of command is here involved.

(8) The Navy Department made and acted upon decisions concerning operations that were being conducted 3,000 miles away, when the conditions were such that full information could not have been in its possession, thus violating an essential precept of warfare that sound decisions necessarily depend upon complete information.

(9) Instead of relying upon the judgment of those who had had actual war experience in this peculiar warfare, the Navy Department, though lacking not only this experience but also lacking adequate information concerning it, insisted upon a number of plans that could not be carried out.

(10) Many of the department's actions so strongly implied a conviction that it was the most competent to make decisions concerning operations in the war zone that the result was an impression that it lacked confidence in the judgment of its representative on the council of the Allies and its responsible commander in the "field."

It is a fundamental principle that every action on the part of superior authorities should indicate confidence in subordinates. If such confidence is lacking, it should immediately be restored by ruthlessly changing the subordinate.

(11) "To interfere with the commander in the field or afloat is one of the most common temptations to the Government—and is generally disastrous."—The Influence of Sea Power upon History, Mahan.

The Navy Department did not resist this temptation, and its frequent violation of this principle was the most dangerous error committed during the naval war.

WM. S. SIMS.

The CHAIRMAN. At the conclusion of the reading of the above letter I stated that as there were certain matters contained in this letter which Admiral Sims had read at my request, with the contents of which I was not familiar, I should ask the chairman of the full Naval Affairs Committee, at a meeting to be held, to determine what action this committee should take in regard to this letter.

The Naval Affairs Committee met on the following Monday and the following resolution was passed:

That the subcommittee heretofore appointed to investigate the matter of awards made by the Navy Department for distinguished and heroic services be, and it hereby is, authorized and directed on making its report on the matter referred to, to investigate and report on the matters referred to in the letter of Admiral Sims to the Navy Department, in criticism of its action touching operations during the war, introduced before the Senate committee.

The committee has made its report on the matter of awards and is now ready to go ahead with the letter of Admiral Sims of January 7. As the majority report of the subcommittee on the question of awards stated, the committee is not here to determine personal differences between officers of the Navy or between officers of the Navy and officials of the Navy Department. In this case we are here to act upon the matters contained in Admiral Sims's letter of January 7.

Admiral Sims will now take the stand.

NOTE.—It has been the custom of the subcommittee in the case of each witness heard before the subcommittee to submit the testimony to the witness for correction. This has been done in the case of every witness. Witnesses have made numerous corrections and before allowing these corrections, the subcommittee feels that all such corrections should be agreed to by the full subcommittee. The volume of testimony

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is very great and owing to the pressure of work in the last days of the session, there has been so little time in which to go over the correction of the testimony that the subcommittee has decided to make up the reports of the hearing in preliminary form without correction, with the understanding that at a later period the proper corrections will be made and the records put in permanent form. These records as they now appear are a verbatim copy of the evidence as published by the stenographer and necessarily are subject to errors both on the part of the stenographer and of the witnesses, errors which will be corrected in the finished report.

STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL W. S. SIMS, UNITED STATES NAVY.

Senator McCORMICK. Mr. Chairman, I wish to remark before we proceed with the hearing that I believe it will occur to those other than the committee, who are present, that approbation and disapprobation directly or indirectly should not be indicated at a hearing of a judicial character, and if there are other manifestations, either of applause or disapproval, I shall ask that the room be cleared.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that the Senator's request is entirely reasonable, and I hope that the audience will not make demonstrations.

Senator PITTMAN. I want to suggest that, at least for to-day, we adjourn when the Senate convenes. The reason for that I believe is quite obvious. There is going to be some very important discussion take place in which each Senator is interested, and I therefore move that we adjourn at noon to-day.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Nevada moves that we adjourn at 12 o'clock to-day until to-morrow morning at 10 o'clock. Without objection that will be done.

Senator PITTMAN. I would like to make this suggestion for the consideration of the committee, that each witness be permitted to finish his direct testimony before any cross-examination takes place, or anything in the nature of cross-examination, and that thereafter any member of the committee be permitted to cross-examine, and that his cross-examination be finished before being interrupted by any other member of the committee, so as to have an orderly process of examination. That is a suggestion.

The CHAIRMAN. I have no objection. Does that appeal to you, Senator McCormick?

Senator McCORMICK. I am satisfied.

Senator TRAMMELL. It is agreeable to me.

The CHAIRMAN. And that the witnesses be allowed to complete their direct testimony before being questioned, if they so desire?

Senator PITTMAN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Sims, will you hold up your right hand and swear that the testimony you are about to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Admiral SIMS. I do, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any statement to make in relation to your letter of January 7 to the Secretary of the Navy?

Admiral SIMS. Yes, sir. I am particularly glad that the witness will be allowed to complete his entire testimony before there shall be any cross-examination.

The preliminary statement I have prepared is as follows:

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I. REASONS FOR THIS PRELIMINARY STATEMENT.

With the permission of the committee, I deem it important to make a brief preliminary statement before proceeding with my testimony in substantiation of my letter of January 7, 1920, which is the subject of the investigation by the committee.

I consider such a statement important and necessary, because of the importance of attempting, in the very beginning, to clearly define, beyond chance of misinterpretation, the real issues which are involved. The entire object of my letter and, in my opinion of this investigation, in its national aspect, will be jeopardized if we are led off into side tracks, if, for example, personalities, having no bearing whatever on the subject in hand, are allowed to confuse the issue.

I take it, gentlemen, that any subject worthy of the attention of a senatorial investigation is a large one, involving solely national interests. Such, and such only, is the subject-matter of my letter. The issues raised therein are far above personalities or local controversies within the naval service. Such questions have not been initiated by me, nor will I initiate them voluntarily. It must be recognized that my letter was not prepared for the consideration of this committee. It was prepared for the sole consideration of naval officers who, owing to their training and their knowledge of the intricate naval activities of the war, their familiarity with the sequence of events, and the great mass of relevant facts upon which the questions raised depend for their true evaluation, are in a better position to understand and determine the merits of the case.

It is manifestly difficult for me to convey the comprehensive picture which is necessary as a background to the points I aimed to bring out in my letter.

These difficulties have been increased by numerous fundamental misapprehensions which have been indicated, either by direct statement or by implication, in testimony presented to this committee in connection with naval awards, and by numerous statements anticipating the present investigation.

In this connection I would invite attention to what appears to be a campaign of deliberate propaganda (at least, so it is believed to be by the naval service), aimed at prejudicing this case by wholly irrelevant subjects prior to its investigation by this committee.

To take but one example. In the testimony before this committee on awards it was seen fit to introduce personal correspondence of mine on a subject quite remote from that issue, and, further, with a full knowledge of the publicity which would attend it. Its introduction was of course camouflaged under the implication that thereby my recommendations on awards were to be in some way invalidated.

My views as to who should have been the commander of the Atlantic Fleet at that time, or, in fact, my differences with Admiral Wilson, regardless of their individual merit, had the most remote, if any, bearing on that case or this.

If the methods of making awards did not affect the morale of the Navy, this instance certainly was calculated to do so. Not content with the publicity which was sure to follow in the press, and to make the case infinitely worse, it was also broadcasted by the Navy Radio Press through high-powered wireless stations to every ship and every naval station in the service.

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Imagine the effect upon discipline of the fleet when this governmental wireless announcement was posted on every bulletin board for the information of every man, from officers to the last apprentice boy, this information—whether true or not—casting reflections on the ability of their leader, the commander in chief of the fleet, information which through its method of dissemination actually made invidious comparisons between many higher officers of the Navy.

This was a manifest outrage against the efficiency of the fleet, against Admiral Wilson himself, as well as against the proper investigation of the important issues of national safety before this committee.

It is for the above reasons that I find it necessary, solely with a view of facilitating the task of this committee in reaching correct conclusions, to present this statement prior to my testimony.

II. NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR PUBLICITY.

My position has been embarrassed in the first instance by numerous accusations of impropriety and insubordination and by calculated impugning of my motives.

I think it is hardly necessary for me to comment at length upon the impression that has been given that I was responsible for the publicity of the letter here under investigation. It appears from the press that a resolution has actually been introduced into the Senate censuring my action in making this letter public. As I have stated before, no copies of this letter were at any time out of my personal possession until it was called for by this committee. Presumably the letter was called for because the department had published the fact of its existence and general nature.

I understand that it is my duty to reply to queries of this committee and that I am not justified in withholding any knowledge of my own which they request. I do not see how I can in any way be held responsible for any publicity of testimony which this committee calls upon me to offer.

III. PROPRIETY OF SUBMITTING THE LETTER.

I wish also to establish very clearly that there is no question whatever as to the propriety of my submitting this letter to the department and, furthermore, as to my duty to do so.

(1) *In accordance with Naval Regulations and custom.*—Such a letter is not only in accordance with Naval Regulations, article 1534, but is in accordance with a recent general order of the Navy Department accentuating these regulations.

(2) *Duty to submit the letter.*—As to the question of my duty in writing such a letter, the fact will be established, I believe, to the entire satisfaction of this committee that throughout the war I was in every sense of the word an integral part of the departmental organization. My original mission assigned by the department was to act as its representative abroad, and this remained my paramount mission throughout the war.

Throughout the war I was just as much a member of the departmental organization, whose errors I now consider it a duty to establish, as any official with a desk and a chair in the Navy Department Building in Washington. The testimony will leave no doubt in anyone's mind upon that point.

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(3) *My position and responsibilities in the war explained.*—The impression has been conveyed that my official position abroad was a purely local one, and at least implying that our naval participations in the war was in nowise dependent either upon my recommendations or on my being kept informed of departmental general policies and plans. This is entirely erroneous, as I will make clear to the committee before the conclusion of my testimony.

In justice, however, to myself, as well as to the insurance of proper conclusions by this committee, it seems necessary to make a few preliminary comments on this subject.

It is unnecessary to point out that success on the sea as well as on the land was wholly dependent upon teamwork between the allied navies or, in a phrase, upon unity of command. All allied navy departments, except the United States, were in constant personal touch, both by personal conferences, by telephone, and through a constant exchange of officers who could move back and forth in a matter of hours. Such were the means of obtaining teamwork between the allied navies. Our department, on the contrary, was 3,000 miles away. It was, therefore, my principal mission to represent our department in these allied councils with the sole object in view of teamwork. It was not my mission merely to obtain and transmit statements from allied leaders and from the department. Any well-equipped clerk could have been picked up who could have performed that task as efficiently as I could. On the contrary, it was my mission to speak for the department and to keep in daily touch with allied leaders, and, with the knowledge which I was supposed to have of the state of readiness of our service and our plans and intentions, to give the department the benefit of conclusions thereby formed on the spot.

The difficulty of coordination—of teamwork—between nations is proverbial. Nations, more than individuals, are prone to be selfish and put their own individual national interests ahead of the interests of a common cause.

An allied leader remarked to me during the war that his experiences in the war had greatly diminished his admiration for Napoleon's successes, simply because Napoleon had never had anyone opposing him but allies.

In view of the impoverishment of all of the allied nations from over three years of war, and of our relatively enormous untouched resources and strength, it was natural and to be expected that, when we entered the war, all allied nations should commence to flood us with individual requests for cooperation and assistance. Many of them gave insufficient consideration to the "cause" as a whole, or to the interests of others. It was, therefore, my duty to attempt, by personal conferences and actual presence on the scene, to establish a just balance between the various individual requests, with the object of making our cooperation as effective as possible.

Still another part of my mission was that of attempting on the spot to collect and digest the previous three years' war experience of our Allies. During that period a most effective wall of secrecy had been maintained around the activities of the allied navies. We had a great fleet at home; in fact, our entire service was then at home, and it was therefore of the utmost importance to the efficiency of our participation that we should accumulate and digest in the quickest

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possible time all of these previous actual war experiences, not only to find out how to do it but, what was equally important to us, to find out how not to do it. This involves a long story, upon which I could spend many days. It started with big questions of strategy and tactics and went clear down into the most minute of technical questions; as to the efficiency of weapons, and even to such details as to methods of clothing and feeding and caring for men, as developed under real war conditions.

Operations in the south Atlantic, Pacific—everywhere—depended, for their effectiveness in insuring victory, upon teamwork, upon the simple requirement that all hands should work for a common end, that there should not be the slightest duplication of effort, and that not a single ship or man should be unnecessarily used, or a single dollar or life needlessly sacrificed. As I repeatedly pointed out to the department, the greatest efficiency would have been attained if we had bodily moved the planning and directing end of our Navy Department over to Paris or London, leaving behind in Washington only the organization for insuring support and coordination of home material effort. All departments of our Government vainly attempted to bridge over this gap by sending commissions abroad at intervals of many months, and only history will tell how much the war was thereby prolonged, and what needless sacrifices of life and of national wealth were thereby involved, through delays in understanding the necessity for various measures, and the resulting inevitable misunderstandings and misdirecting of effort. All of these efforts, regardless of their individual excellence, were delayed, or failed in complete effectiveness, simply because they were either nullified or diminished in efficiency by not being coordinated with the efforts of other members of the team.

Herein, therefore, lay my major and paramount mission, beginning with my original orders and continuing to the end. The task was mine of trying to be the connecting link between our naval directing organization—the Navy Department at home—and that of our fellow team workers; of trying to convey, over a 3,000 mile cable, the experience, efforts, and aims of our Allies from day to day. In other words, trying to keep the department in Washington informed of the situation as fully as if it were on the scene where only "up to date" information was available, and was under constant discussion.

About six weeks after undertaking this task, with the assistance of one aide, I was given the additional task of being responsible for the actual operation of our first real contribution to the allied naval team, namely, six destroyers. This added responsibility gradually (very gradually, as will be shown) grew until, at the end of the armistice, it involved a responsibility for the operations of about 80,000 officers and men, and over 300 ships, whose activities were scattered in 47 different localities, extending from the Arctic Ocean all the way around to the Black Sea. But even apart from this additional responsibility, there were a multitude of others, as members of all governmental war services can attest. The Navy performed many services yet to be disclosed. I would not venture at this time an estimate of how much the Shipping Board, the petroleum, food, grain, and other governmental commissions, and the various relief organizations, all of which contributed their share to victory, are indebted to the Navy for valuable and essential assistance.

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Another grave and additional responsibility which developed later was that of the safety of our troops on the high seas. The war zone routes followed by every American troop ship, every United States Government ship of any description, naval as well as merchant, the specific plans which permitted the certain joining up of our destroyers in the war zone with all of these ships, all without exception emanated from our naval headquarters abroad. Not one of these routes or plans originated in any other place. Anyone, from doughboy to diplomat, who crossed the ocean during the war, can testify as to his prayers of thanksgiving when these destroyers turned up in the war zone. I am now merely stating facts, in order that there can be no question as to the true conditions of the war, and the fact that I was not only justified, but in duty bound to comment upon the lessons of the war which should govern us in the future.

As to the question of the responsibility for the safety of our ships and troops in the war zone there can be no question whatever as to whose throat would have been justly cut if any of these routes selected and laid down, or plans for destroyer meetings, had resulted in disaster. As I have repeatedly reiterated, this was the work of my assistants. To them belongs the credit. But it was all done in my name, and I necessarily bore the responsibility.

(4) *Relations to Atlantic Fleet at home.*—For some reason not known to me, the statement has been made that, on paper at least, I was a subordinate of the commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet, and that the forces under my command were at all times a part of that organization. I would not have brought this point up myself, and dislike to even touch upon it now for fear of my remarks being construed in any way as a reflection upon the fleet at home and its great and essential work in the prosecution of the war.

It is quite true that throughout the war the forces in European waters were carried, on paper, as a part of the Atlantic Fleet in home waters.

For reasons which it is unnecessary to discuss at this time, it was deemed by the department a wise course to maintain at all times a broad organization of our entire Navy upon which we could fall back in case of need. Fortunately, such a contingency never arose, but, as far as this inquiry goes, it should be sufficient to set forth the following facts with which I am certain the commander in chief will be in full accord:

First. At no time during the war did I receive any order from the commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet at home affecting actual operations, disposition of forces, or plans for the forces under my command in European waters.

Second. By specific orders of the Navy Department, all of my communications were made direct to the department, and all orders were given to me direct from the department. It is therefore apparent that I was in actual command of all of the forces abroad, and was solely responsible to the Navy Department for their successful operations.

(5) *My orders.*—It is true that, if anyone be so included, the fact can be brought out that the exact letter of my specific orders did not fully and comprehensively specify the functions which I was called upon to perform abroad. It is for this reason that I saw fit to point out in my letter of January 7, 1920, how vague and unsatisfactory

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were my original instructions. I am confident, however, that before my testimony is completed, there will be no question whatever left in the minds of the committee as to the spirit of my instructions, or as to what the department expected of me, and, therefore, as to what was my real mission in the war.

I might refer here to one more point in this connection, and that is that from the very moment we declared war there was in being a central allied direction whose function it was to attempt to produce team work between the different navies. During the early months of our participation in the war, this organization was not graced with a definite name, although it existed and functioned constantly. It consisted of the Secretaries of the Navies and Chiefs of Naval Operations of the different allied navies, and formal meeting between them occurred throughout the war practically monthly. Some time in 1917 it was thought wise to give this organization a definite name and draw up something in the nature of a constitution. The name selected was "The Allied Naval Council," and the constitution required that the members should be, as stated above, the Secretaries and Chiefs of Naval Operations of the various Navies. Owing to the distance away of our Navy Department, I received definite and specific orders to serve as a member of this Allied Naval Council, representing our own Secretary of the Navy and Chief of Naval Operations. I had, of course, been so serving from the very moment of arrival in Europe, and I continued so to serve until the signing of the armistice.

I trust that I have made it clear that my position abroad was far from being a local one. I was in every sense of the word a responsible official of the Navy Department organization. My status corresponded closely in nature to that of Gen. Pershing and Gen. Bliss combined, although naturally the aggregate of their duties were of far greater magnitude than mine. It was a mere incident—although a very unfortunate one for the efficiency of our naval part in the war—that my office was located over 3,000 miles away from the Navy Department, instead of a few city blocks or flights of stairs.

(6) *As to accusations of failure to recognize mission of troop protection.*—I can not pass by the implication which has been given out that I failed at the proper time to recognize that the primary mission of the Navy's task was the safe transport of troops abroad. As stated above, the troop movements during the period covered by my letter were very small.

And incidentally let me state right here, with all possible emphasis, that my entire letter of January 7, 1920, refers to this early period of the war. Practically all of it refers to the first six months. Hardly any of it refers to anything out of the first year, 1917. It has practically nothing to do with the efficiency of the Navy and the Navy Department in 1918.

I expect, during the course of my testimony, to make that statement a number of times, because I want it to be definitely understood that my criticism has nothing to do whatever with the very marked efficiency that the Navy Department exhibited and that the Navy exhibited in the latter part of the war, after they really got into it.

I have stated that the troop movements during the period covered by my letter were very small. There can be no argument on this point. The facts speak for themselves. Our troops always received a larger

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measure of protection than any of the allied troops on the high seas, and from three to ten times as much protection as merchant ships. Our troops were transported to the war area, in so far as our own Navy was concerned, without any loss from enemy action.

I put that statement in this preliminary statement to counteract the statement that was given out semiofficially at least, that my principal anxiety abroad was the protection of merchant ships and not troop ships. That is the way the issue that is now before this committee has been camouflaged.

But let me point out that, although the safety of our troop was our greatest concern, nevertheless there was another concern which, although it took second place, could never be disregarded for a moment. Whether we liked it or not, we were confronted with the dilemma which, briefly stated, was that we ran the danger at all times of being caught with a larger army, either at home or abroad, wholly impotent to have any effect in obtaining victory. It is unnecessary for me to go into a long explanation as to the dependence of our Army abroad on food, ammunition, and a myriad of other supplies. We were at all times confronted with the danger of finding ourselves with an Army abroad which could not be supplied. In the early months of the war those cargo ships, regardless of the flag at their stern, were carrying the stuff necessary to keep the Allies going until our Army could be gotten across. Throughout the entire time that our Army was moving, as the Army authorities will attest, we were confronted with the gravest anxiety as to whether we could save enough ships to supply the Army after it got over there. In the vernacular of the street, we had to beware of having an Army all dressed up, but no place to go.

It was not United States shipping upon which the outcome of the war was dependent during that first critical year, but allied shipping.

The Allies' fate was our fate. As I will show you in the testimony, there was grave danger of enemy success before American military effort could be brought to bear at all; and, as I will further show you, particularly in those early days, the American cargo carriers were an infinitesimal part of the available shipping, allied and neutral, that was necessary to prevent the enemy from winning.

IV. LOYALTY TO AMERICAN INTERESTS AND TO THE NAVY DEPARTMENT.

(1) *Accusations of being pro-British and sacrificing identity of our own Navy.*—I can not avoid reference to repeated assertions to the effect that I am not a natural-born American, or that my allegiance was ever in the slightest degree divided. My father was an American citizen whose family has been continuously resident in the United States since before the Revolution. I chanced to have been born in Canada because my mother was, at the time of my birth, on a visit to her father, who was a Canadian. I notice, of course, also that I have been called pro-British. I would not stoop to answer any of these charges were it not that they bring up a very important point in connection with this investigation. In reply to a letter from a friend during the war who wrote to warn me of accusations of being pro-British, I suggested that he ask his informants what sort of a man they did want as a representative in the council of the Allies,

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and I said that if pro-British and pro-French proclivities were undesirable, why not send over a pro-German with a trunk full of bombs. Strangely, I have apparently never been accused of being pro-French, although, as a matter of fact, I speak the French language perhaps better than I have ever been able to master the British, and if anything, I believe that my relations on the whole were even more cordial and harmonious with the French than they were with the British. Perhaps this was due to the greater similarity of our methods to those of the British. Possibly we knew each other too well. Once the war was on, it was the duty of every public servant, and particularly those of the military services, to do his level best to subordinate all local and selfish interests to the one great task before them—that of defeating a common enemy. We were confronted with an enemy acting under the most perfect unity of command. The requirements to obtain victory on our part can be summed up in the one word "teamwork." It was absolutely essential to naval efficiency and victory that all naval services on the side of the Allies be merged into one team, with one mission—that of defeating the common enemy.

There was no danger whatever of our losing our identity. Anyone who took part in the war, which involved joining with foreign navies, can testify to the fact that our identity was accentuated day by day, and never diminished. If there was no other reason for making us out, I would say that the principal one was our unreserved determination to promote team work. It was the talk of all other services in Europe. It attracted more attention perhaps than any other part we played in the war.

In a great and complicated game, such as that of the joint operation of four navies, it was to be expected that all sorts of sources of friction would arise. Each service was proud of its own individual methods, which it had developed at the cost of long and serious labor in time of peace. If everybody had refused to play unless their methods were adopted, or had pursued their methods in the face of the different methods of the forces with which they were operating, there would have been nothing but confusion, and that would have been a direct contribution to the enemy campaign. It was no simple or easy task to attempt to reconcile these conditions. As far as my own forces were concerned, I preached, from the very beginning, the doctrine that the one test to be applied, whenever any difference arose, was how we could best "get on with the war;" what course would eliminate friction and speed up the day of victory. I laid down the doctrine that, as a general rule, the minority should give way to the majority, and that if we believed our methods to be better, as they were in many cases, the best course was not to be stubborn and insist upon their immediate adoption by men who had been using different methods for three years, but to prove their efficiency to the other fellows in such a way as not to interfere with the operations in hand. This in itself is a long story, but I am safe in asserting that, whether the score as to who gave way the most is on our side or not, all allied services will admit that we led in setting an example of subordinating everything to "getting on with the war." And furthermore, that all allied services to-day will agree that they learned just as much from us as we did from them.

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(2) *Loyalty to the department, and lack of departmental confidence in me.*—As to the imputation that I was not duly obedient to the department's orders and intentions, which are accusations that have been given out from time to time, during the progress of the war, I will leave this entirely to the committee's own judgment, after they have considered the facts which I will proceed to submit. After the wholehearted support of the Navy for allied team work had been obtained, the Secretary of the Navy said, in his annual report, dated December 1, 1918, as follows:

> Abroad the American Navy has given a demonstration which can be characterized only as wonderful, of its readiness to join with our associates in teamwork for the common end and the common good.

Let me state here the fundamental military principle that loyalty is as necessary down as up. Confidence can not be onesided. It must be mutual. There is no question of justice to me. The fact is indisputable that as long as I was left in the position assigned me, the efficiency of every phase of our naval activities with which I was connected, was diminished and endangered by any lack of confidence in me. Personalities should be ruthlessly eliminated from war problems. If the department lacked the slightest confidence in me, it was reprehensible not to have summarily replaced me with someone in whom they did have confidence.

During the trying period—as will be covered in the testimony—when I was so sorely embarrassed by lack of departmental confidence and backing up, I repeatedly pointed out in personal correspondence with officials of the department that if I had lost the confidence of the department in any way I hoped no hesitancy would be felt in replacing me.

It is instructive to contrast the practice of the Navy Department in this respect, and its general relations with its commander in the "field," with the practice of our War Department. The following is quoted from page 8 of the last report of the Secretary of War, addressed by the Secretary of War to the President of the United States:

> The communication between Gen. Pershing and the War Department was of course constant and voluminous. It dealt, however, with details of men and supplies. The authority conferred upon him by his original orders (which clearly outlined general policies) was never in any particular modified or diminished, and the fundamental view expressed in his orders as to the character of American participation was steadily adhered to under your direction to the end. Gen. Pershing left America with your full confidence and that of the War Department. Throughout the strenuous and sometimes terrible months of our participation, this confidence supported and sustained him, and when he returned to America it was to close a great military undertaking, during which no shadow of misunderstanding had arisen between him and his Commander in Chief. The theory of these orders of course was that our field of operations was necessarily removed a great distance from Washington, that it was quite impossible for us to form accurate judgments of the varying incidents in the field of operations, and that imposing the tremendous responsibility for the success of the expedition upon its commander we could not do less than give him full authority and leave him untrammeled by attempts to formulate plans of action which, made at a great distance, could not be informed with knowledge of the situation which the commander at the front had when the plans reached him.

Had such methods been practiced by the Navy Department, the naval part of the war would have been greatly furthered.

(3) *Relations with the British.*—Let me clear up another point in this connection, which has been subject to considerable comment and misunderstanding. Pronounced criticism has appeared recently

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because of the fact that an admiral of the British Navy controlled the operations of American destroyers at Queenstown. I will attempt to state very briefly what this particular situation was. The admiral at Queenstown not only commanded the local forces based on that port, but also the British naval station located there, and the entire British and, in fact, allied naval command of the seas approaching Great Britain, both to the southward and the northward of Ireland. Other forces stationed in the north of Ireland were also under his general direction. His control of our forces was limited solely to their actual operations at sea, in which they were employed in conjunction with British forces. The administration of this American force, its wants and needs, its discipline, was exercised by me through my local representative, Capt. Pringle. The same principle was adopted by our Army in France, where American brigades, divisions, or other units served under the operational control of British or French general officers. Furthermore, this principle was applied generally and properly throughout the allied navies irrespective of nationality. Frequently in Irish waters alone, British and American vessels acted under American command. In the mine-laying operations in the North Sea, British destroyers furnished the escort. On the French coast, French vessels frequently served under the immediate command of our own officers. In the Mediterranean, the French admiral exercised control over all allied forces, British and otherwise. Again, in the North Sea our division of dreadnoughts, under Admiral Rodman, frequently engaged in detached operations with British forces of light cruisers and destroyers under his command. Moreover, in this case, as Admiral Rodman was not given a rank commensurate with his duty, it was necessary in many cases for military precedent to be disregarded, and by merely a gentleman's agreement upon the part of the British, British admirals in command of these forces assigned for operations under Admiral Rodman actually accepted his command, although they were senior to him.

I will not take the time to explain the system by which orders were originated and transmitted to our forces whether under allied operational command or our own. Suffice it to say that such orders as did not issue directly from our own naval headquarters, were either prepared in conference with representatives of those headquarters, or else were based upon definite plans which those representatives had taken part in preparing.

Copies of every order issued to our forces, no matter how trivial or detailed, were immediately and automatically forwarded to our own headquarters for information, and complete and detailed summaries of them were furnished weekly to the Navy Department. No detail was too small to be followed up by our own organizations of command.

(4) *Undue British dominance in naval war.*—It has frequently been asserted that the British exercised an undue control and influence upon the naval operations of the war. Even granting that they did, or whether they did or not, such a course should be expected when we consider that they outnumbered any other naval forces in Europe about 10 to 1, in anything you wish to consider—guns, men, ships, shore stations, etc. The French, Italian, Japanese, and our naval forces abroad were small in comparison. The department in its announced official policy of July 10, 1917, acknowledged this fact.

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The following is a quotation from the Navy Department's instructions:

As the primary rôle in all offensive preparations must perforce belongs to the allied powers, the department announces as its policy that in general it is willing to accept any joint plan of action of the Allies deemed necessary to meet immediate needs.

Furthermore, owing to the strategic situation of England, and her extensive maritime interests prior to the war, she was, in fact, the maritime center of information of the world. All the war lines of communications led there, and it was only there that the most complete information concerning operations of the war and merchant shipping of the world was available. It was therefore, as I have stated, to be expected that the British voice in naval affairs should be heard above the other voices of the team, just as the French command influenced greatly the operations of all land forces. However, there were ample safeguards against undue British domination. These were furnished by the principles of command previously explained, and further by the fact that all big questions of naval policy were supervised by the Allied Naval Council, in which each nation had an equal vote, and in which unanimity was required for any decision.

(5) *The Navy not attacked.*—I find that I am being represented in many quarters as initiating an attack upon the part that the Navy played in the war, or, stated more briefly, that my object is to belittle the efforts of the Navy in the war. Therefore, let me most clearly state a few salient facts:

First. I have raised no question whatever as to the efficiency of our naval operations in the war, when viewed in their entirety and without regard to the time element.

Second. Speaking of the Navy itself—that is, its personnel and ships apart from the organization which directed it—I am in the fullest accord with the country in being unable adequately to express my admiration for its work. That work will grow larger and larger in public estimation as the facts slowly come out. I am proud to say, without fear of contradiction, that in so far as the Navy was permitted by the machinery which controlled and directed it, it not only lived up to all traditions of the past, but as a matter of fact it excelled its former traditions. Without any disparagement of actual results accomplished, I believe that its greatest accomplishment was the example set and the spirit which it infused into the naval war through its exhibitions of Americanism; for example, in its irrepressible enthusiasm, its indomitable initiative and versatility, its absolute refusal to be balked by obstacles, real or imaginary, its ruthless disregard of precedents, and, above all, in its absolute confidence in victory.

V. PERIOD OF THE WAR COVERED BY THIS LETTER.

I now come to a very essential feature of my letter which seems to have failed in being clearly recognized and understood.

It is very important. An examination of the letter will show that the period which it covers is almost wholly concerned with those critical months immediately preceding our entry into the war and for about the first year or less of our participation. In considering the letter, therefore, the case must not be confused with the conduct of the war as a whole.

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That is what I tried to accentuate a little while ago. In all of the criticisms that have appeared in the press since this controversy started that is the most insistent one, that Admiral Sims is throwing mud at the Navy. And then they expose the fact that we did the greatest stunt in all naval history, that we transported 2,000,000 troops across to Europe without any loss; that we put the barrage across the North Sea, etc., all of which we did; all of which has no concern at all with this investigation of my allegations as to the conduct of the Navy Department in this war during the first six months, or, at most, during the first year.

The period in question is those critical days when our control of the sea was threatened and when the enemy was rapidly winning the war by cutting our essential lines of communication on the high seas. It was then that prompt and whole-hearted naval assistance from America would have been of the greatest value to the common cause. This point is of such importance that I beg to illustrate it by a comparison with the conditions in France in 1914.

We are all familiar with the situation confronting the French during the first month or two of the invasion of Belgium and northern France. Whether or not the German tide could be stemmed was impossible to predict and depended greatly upon what reinforcements the British could send and how soon they could arrive. A relatively small force and a difference of a few days or weeks in its arrival might easily have changed the balance between victory and defeat. Furthermore, advance knowledge of the strength of the reinforcements to be sent and of the time of their arrival was of great moment to the French, as it would affect intimately their plans for the distribution and operation of their own forces. Nothing could be more apparent than these elementary facts.

The naval situation when we entered the war was almost precisely analogous in its general features to the situation on land during the first weeks of 1914. The enemy's "unrestricted submarine campaign" was at the apex of success. Shipping was being sunk at the rate of over 10,000,000 gross tons annually. Had this rate of sinking been continued but a few months the available tonnage would have been reduced much below the minimum requirements. The military effort of the Allies would then have shriveled to ineffective limits for lack of military supplies, and the civil populations of our allies would have been reduced to desperation. Had the available tonnage then been so reduced, as was so nearly the case, it would have been impossible to send an American Army of respectable size to France or to support it afterwards until a lapse of many months had permitted the Allies to regain control of the sea and replace lost merchant tonnage; if, indeed, it could ever become possible to do this before defeat on land.

In view of this situation the highest allied officials were exceedingly apprehensive as to their ability to weather the crisis. Their available antisubmarine forces were exceedingly small compared to the size of the vital areas to be protected, and most of the antisubmarine vessels and their personnel were badly war worn. The urgency of the need for reinforcements could not be exaggerated. To safeguard the allied cause it was imperative that every possible vessel suitable for antisubmarine or salvage work be dispatched from America with the utmost haste to the area of submarine operations. What

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I believe to be our failure to meet this emergency, with the means then available to us, is the principle, which I once more accentuate; the failure of our Navy Department to act promptly in this part of the war.

Repeatedly, in fact, almost daily, during April and May, 1917, I represented these essential facts to the department in lengthy cablegrams, couched in the most emphatic language of which I was capable. Apparently the department then believed that the allied officials and I were overestimating the gravity of the situation. Not until the first visit of the Chief of Naval Operations, about six months after we entered the war, did the department seem to be convinced of the salient facts and adopt policies and plans previously recommended by me and begin to engage in the war wholeheartedly

I am convinced that our failure to give adequate support with the means at our disposal during these first six months seriously and unnecessarily jeopardized the outcome of the whole war. In my opinion, it undoubtedly resulted in lengthening the war by several months, through the increased losses in merchant shipping that resulted therefrom. I believe that this failure, combined with the equally grave one of neglecting to prepare adequately during the first months previous and the first few months subsequent to our declaration of war, probably postponed victory four months. Since the average loss of life per day was about 3,000 and the total daily cost of the war was $100,000,000, it can be appreciated what this delay meant to humanity and how serious was any fault that resulted in materially prolonging hostilities.

I wish particularly to emphasize that it is this early period to which my letter principally refers.

MOTIVE FOR LETTER.

Let me point out, in the simplest and clearest possible manner, the paramount motive upon which my letter was based. It is this: We entered a great war. The war was won, thanks to a combination of circumstances which it would be entirely unsafe and unwise to depend upon in the future. From the United States naval standpoint, the prosecution of the war involved numerous violations of well-recognized and fundamental military principles with which every student of naval warfare is familiar.

Briefly stated, they were:

First. Unpreparedness, in spite of the fact that war had been a probability for at least two years and was, in fact, imminent for many months before its declaration.

Second. That we entered it with no well-considered policy or plans and with our forces on the sea not in the highest state of readiness.

Third. That, owing to the above conditions and to the lack of proper organization of our Navy Department, and perhaps to other causes with which I am not familiar, we failed, for at least six months, to throw our full weight against the enemy; that during this period we pursued a policy of vacillation, or, in simpler words, a hand-to-mouth policy, attempting to formulate our plans from day to day, based upon an incorrect appreciation of the situation.

The Great War lasted 1,500 days. Five million lives were lost, or about 3,000 daily. This, to say nothing of wealth and resources.

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If my assertions of vacillating policy and unnecessary delays are true, I indeed had a compelling motive in taking steps to preclude their recurrence in the future.

I believed, therefore, in view of the unusual position which I held during the war, as an integral part of our departmental organization, that it was my duty to point out at least some of the reasons for the fundamental errors which were committed.

My sole object in submitting my letter to the department was not to demonstrate who was right and who was wrong, but rather to insure so thorough an appreciation of our errors, before time had obscured them, that the chances of repeating them would be minimized, if not eliminated, in the future.

In other words, gentlemen, let me state, as forcibly as I can, that in this entire question I have no object other than that of the future efficiency of the naval services and the safety of the country. I am at the end of my career. I have everything to lose and nothing to gain. There is no possible question of my having a grievance. There is absolutely no question of personalities. I have no further ambitions whatever. When this inquiry is over I return to the simple duties of my profession, to finish out the very short remaining time before my retirement.

Reference to my letter of January 7, 1920, will indicate clearly that its object is, first and last, constructive. This object is impossible of accomplishment without a consideration of such mistakes as may have been committed.

The subject is one which vitally affects the future efficiency of what must always be our first line of national defense, the Navy; and the great danger is that because of our ultimate success in this war, we may fail to realize that we very narrowly escaped defeat on the sea, that our state of preparedness when we entered the war was dangerously inadequate, and that our administrative methods, especially during the early stages of our participation, were seriously at fault. Such defects, in a war in which the enemy is not already so seriously occupied at sea as he was in this war, must inevitably jeopardize gravely our national security.

Under these circumstances, expressions of opinion concerning such matters were in no sense an attack, and it is most deplorable that they should have been made so to appear. They were, on the contrary, impersonal, official representations submitted for the consideration of the Navy Department in preparation for future campaigns. They were actuated by motives of duty; they were constructive, and I believe them to be entirely in accord with the teachings of accepted authorities on the art of war. Should this discussion unfortunately assume the character of personal recrimination or political controversy, the effect may well be so to obscure the issue that no lasting good will result. On the other hand, if these opinions are given careful consideration in connection with the preparation of plans for future wars, by the officers detailed to these duties, as was intended and as would ordinarily have been done, very great benefit would accrue to the Navy.

It is nothing but self-evident camouflage to convey the impression in these modern days that such an issue as this one raised by me is an attack on civilian control of our naval service. A civilian head of the military branch of a democratic government is essential. There

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is not the slightest danger of militarism in this country. The public rules. We in the Navy are servants of the public and aspire to nothing else. The Navy claims to be as representative a national organization as the Congress itself. It is for this very reason that I have had the temerity to risk my personal fortunes at the very end of my career, and lay before the responsible heads of the Navy such radical criticisms of their own conduct of the public's interests.

In view of the public presentation of this case, which has resulted from no intent on my part, I am perhaps handicapped by lack of any connection with the press or experience in manipulating that important instrument of public opinion.

I can only present my case in the vocabulary of my profession, and trust to the sagacity of this committee to perceive the only essential issues at stake, namely, a just appraisal of those questions which in any way endanger the public interest.

VII. SUMMARY.

To sum up in the briefest possible manner, I hope that this statement, and the testimony which will be introduced, will establish conclusively the following salient points which were raised in the letter which I addressed to the Navy Department on January 7;

First. That there was no impropriety whatever in submitting this letter; that its preparation and submission was in accordance with naval customs and regulations; and that I am in no wise responsible for the publicity which it has received.

Second. That the submission of the letter was a duty which devolved upon me, because of the unusual and very responsible position I held during the war, and because our victory seemed liable to blind us to the mistakes we committed and the lessons we should have learned therefrom.

Third. That my position was in no sense a local one; that it was not comparable to that of any other naval official outside of the Navy Department; and that it was twofold in nature. My first and paramount duty was that of acting as the department's accredited representative in the naval council of the Allies. In other words, in this capacity I was in every sense of the word an integral part of the departmental organization. Secondly, my duties included the active and independent command of all of our naval forces in European waters, and the additional responsibility of insuring the safety of our troops in passing through the war zone.

Fourth. That the period of the war covered by my letter, which I propose to substantiate by my present testimony, is encompassed almost wholly in the first six or eight months thereof, during which period the Allies barely escaped defeat.

Fifth. That during this early period the department violated numerous well-recognized and fundamental principles of warfare, and that, as a result, the full effect of our naval participation was seriously delayed, and that this delay is susceptible of conversion into very serious and unnecessary losses of national wealth and lives.

Sixth. That, to state the case in its briefest form, the only purpose which I have in mind is that, in the interests of national defense, we may make clear those lessons of the war which we dare not lose sight of, and which must govern our future naval policy if the fullest measure of insurance against future disaster is to be provided.

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Seventh. That the policies and plans adopted by the department and their activity, in the last half of our participation in the war, were identical in substance, and generally in letter, to recommendations which they had disregarded or failed to act upon in the early months.

Eighth. That the main issue is not the determination of personal responsibilities, but the recognition of the delays and unsound methods incidental to the adoption and execution of our war policies and plans, in order that the fundamental causes thereof may be removed.

Ninth. That if I am wrong, and we were prepared, and if we had plans before and at the beginning of the war similar to those announced on paper some time after we declared war, and if such plans were in accordance with the policy which was actively and actually pursued at the end of the first six or eight months of the war, then is it not a grave error that all the forces of men and ships which were actively engaged in the war zone at the end of this six months' delay, were not there at the end of the first month?

Tenth. Granting that the work of our Navy was necessary, and was based on sound policy and military principles, it is indisputable that if any delay occurred in putting that policy into effect, the war was thereby prolonged, and as a consequence lives and resources needlessly sacrificed.

If such is not the case, that is, if the work of our Navy was not necessary, then our naval contribution did not amount to much.

It did amount to a great deal, as everyone agrees, and hence it is the motive of my letter to show that unsound methods caused such delays, and that they should be recognized to such an extent as to make them impossible of recurrence in the future.

The issue is that of national safety.

Eleventh. And, finally, may I be permitted to add the following: It is not an easy or an enviable task for an officer to expose the fundamental errors of his own service, particularly after a war that has been won.

It was of course to be expected that, if such exposures were given publicity, a storm of criticism would descend upon me, including accusations of belittling the services of our gallant naval men who have made so many sacrifices.

It is submitted, however, to the judgment of this committee that if any one of my assertions are true, I would have betrayed the trust imposed upon me if I had allowed any considerations, personal or otherwise, to have deterred me from submitting my criticism officially to the Navy Department.

Mr. Chairman, I am ready at any time to go ahead with my attempt to substantiate the allegations made in my letter of January 7, 1920.

The CHAIRMAN. In view of the fact that it is nearly 1 o'clock, and you have finished your preliminary statement, the committee will now stand adjourned until 10 o'clock to-morrow morning.

(Thereupon the subcommittee adjourned until to-morrow, Wednesday, March 10, 1920, at 10 o'clock a. m.)

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NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 10, 1920.

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON NAVAL AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 o'clock a. m., in room 235, Senate Office Building, Senator Frederick Hale, presiding.

Present, Senators Hale (chairman), McCormick, and Trammell.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Poindexter, having resigned as a member of this subcommittee, Senator Page has appointed in his stead Senator Ball of Delaware. I offer for the record Senator Poindexter's letter of resignation and the letter of Senator Page to me notifying me of the appointment of Senator Ball.

(The letters referred to are as follows:)

MARCH 9, 1920.

Hon. CARROLL S. PAGE,
Chairman Committee on Naval Affairs,
United States Senate.

MY DEAR SENATOR: I have found it necessary to be absent from the city for a few days and shall therefore be unable to give consideration to the investigation of matters referred to in the letter of Rear Admiral William S. Sims, United States Navy, to the Navy Department, in criticism of its operations during the war.

In view of the importance of the work assigned to the subcommittee, I believe it essential that another Senator be appointed in my place, as a member of that subcommittee, and I therefore tender my resignation to take effect to-day.

Cordially, yours,

MILES POINDEXTER.

MARCH 9, 1920.

Hon. L. HEISLER BALL,
United States Senate.

MY DEAR SENATOR: Senator Poindexter, of the subcommittee of the Committee on Naval Affairs of the Senate, having to do with the "investigation of matters referred to in letter of Rear Admiral William S. Sims, United States Navy, to the Navy Department in criticism of its actions touching operation during the war," has found it necessary to retire from that committee and therefore tenders his resignation, which has been accepted, and I have appointed you to fill the vacancy in the subcommittee caused by Senator Poindexter's resignation.

I hope you will find it convenient to serve as a member of the subcommittee.

I have notified the chairman of the subcommittee, Senator Hale, of your appointment.

Very cordially, yours,

CARROLL S. PAGE.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Sims, will you proceed?

STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL W. S. SIMS, UNITED STATES NAVY—Resumed.

Admiral SIMS. In presenting the following testimony it will be necessary, in order to make a clear and understandable presentation, to depart from the sequence of my letter of January 7.

I have no intention whatever in going outside in any way of the text of that letter. The letter was not prepared with a view of

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discussing it with such a body as this committee. It was addressed officially to the Navy Department, which has all the facts and their relative sequence and importance in mind.

It follows that, in order to make these matters clear to this committee, it will be necessary to make certain explanations and give certain details that would not be necessary in considering such questions before a body of naval officers.

The first part of the testimony is intended to explain the seriousness of the military situation at the time that this country declared war; to clearly show that the situation was not only critical, but that the Allies were at that time in fact losing the war; that the Navy Department was furnished with complete information concerning this critical situation; and that I put forth every possible effort to acquaint them with all the facts concerning the situation; that, in accordance with the mission assigned to me, and based upon constant conference with the heads of the allied naval services, I set forth the specific nature of the part which we should have taken; that I was wholly unable to get satisfactory replies from the department and, further, that if the department appreciated and understood the situation, they failed to take action commensurate therewith.

I wish here to state that there is no issue whatever as to whether the information I sent and the recommendations I made were accurate or exaggerated, no issue as to whether I was right and everybody else in the Navy at home wrong, as will be shown later in the testimony. It will be clearly established that by the end, say, of six months, the department accepted and adopted the policies and recommendations that I had made from the very beginning, and hence that there is no disagreement whatever between me and other naval officials as to the United States naval policy in the war, provided the time element is not considered; that is, provided we disregard the first four to six critical months of war, the occurrences during which are, almost exclusively, the issues I have seen fit to raise.

I will adhere in my testimony to the different subjects as they are raised in my letter of January 7, 1920. This will result in not following the chronological order, because as each new subject is taken up I will have to step back to the beginning and sketch what occurred in connection therewith.

In beginning, I wish to read in full my first two reports submitted to the department—one a cable sent four days after my arrival abroad and the other a letter submitted five days later.

Although these two documents will touch on various subjects, it is necessary to read them in full, simply to establish the fact that all of the communications which followed during the next six or eight months were mere elaborations and reiterations thereof, that these two reports were very comprehensive, and that, as a matter of fact, there was no time up to the signing of the armistice when any cause arose for changing any of these original recommendations as made therein.

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To Secretary of the Navy, through State Department.
Sent April 14, 1917.

I want to emphasize that fact particularly. This reply and this letter contained the policy suggested and the plan for the suppression of the submarine campaign, which was the whole issue of the war so far as our Navy was concerned. This was the first cable, sent April 14, 1917:

The situation is as follows:

The submarine issue is very much more serious than people realize in America. The recent success of submarine operations and the rapidity of construction constitute the real crisis of the war.

The morale of the enemy submarine is not broken, only about 54 are known to have been captured or sunk and no voluntary surrenders have been recorded. The reports of our press are greatly in error. Reports recently circulated concerning surrenders are simply to depreciate enemy morale and results are very satisfactory.

The word "satisfactory" appears in the cable, but it was a mistranslation. The word used was "unsatisfactory." That should read:

The word "satisfactory" appears in the cable, but it was a mistranslation. The word used was "unsatisfactory." That should read:

Reports recently circulated concerning surrenders are simply to depreciate enemy morale and results are very unsatisfactory.

Supplies and communications of forces on all fronts, including the Russians, are threatened, and control of the sea actually imperiled.

German submarines are constantly extending their operations further into the Atlantic, increasing areas and the difficulty of patrolling. Russian situation critical. Baltic fleet mutiny; 85 admirals, captains, and commanders murdered, and in some armies there is insubordination.

The amount of British neutral and allied shipping list in February was 536,000 tons; in March, 571,000 tons; and in the first 10 days of April, 205,000 tons. With short nights and better weather losses are increasing.

I invite attention to the fact there that in April the loss was over 800,000 tons.

The British forces could not effectively prevent the escape of some raiders during the long nights, but the chances are better now.

The Allies were notified that the chances are that hospital ships will continue to be sunk, this in order to draw destroyers away from operations against submarines to convoy hospital ships in this way causing a demand for large convoy forces in all areas not before necessary and also partially immobilizing the main fleet.

On account of the immense theaters and length and number of kinds of communication and the material deterioration resulting from three years' continuous operation in distant fields with inadequate base facilities the strength of the naval forces is dangerously strained. This applies to all of the sea forces outside the Grand Fleet. The enemy has 6 large and 64 small submarine mine layers; the latter carry 18 mines; the former 34, also torpedoes and guns. All classes submarines for actual commission completed at a rate approaching three per week. To accelerate and insure defeat of submarine campaign immediate active cooperation absolutely necessary.

The issue is and must inevitably be decided at the focus of all lines of communication in the eastern Atlantic; therefore I very urgently recommend the following immediate naval cooperation:

Maximum number of destroyers to be sent accompanied by small antisubmarine craft, former to patrol designated high sea area westward of Ireland based on Queenstown with an advance base at Bantry Bay, latter to be an inshore patrol force. Destroyers, small craft, should be of light draft with as high speed as possible, but low speed also useful. Also repair ships and staff for base. Oil and docks available, but advise sending continuous supply of fuel. German main fleet must be contained demanding maximum conservation of the British main fleet. South of Scotland no base is so far available for this force.

At present our battleships can serve no useful purpose in this area except that two divisions of dreadnoughts might be based on Brest for moral effect against anticipated raids by heavy enemy ships in the channel out of reach of British main fleet.

The chief other and urgent practical cooperation is merchant tonnage and a continuous augmentation of antisubmarine craft to reinforce our advanced forces. There is a serious shortage of the latter craft. For towing the present large amount of sailing tonnage dangerous areas sea-going tugs would be of great use.

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The cooperation outlined above should be expedited with the utmost dispatch in order to break enemy submarine morale and accelerate the accomplishment of the chief American objective.

It is very likely the enemy will make submarine mine laying raids on our coast or in the Caribbean to divert attention and keep our forces from the critiaal area in the eastern Atlantic through effect upon public opinion. The difficulty of maintaining submarine bases and the focusing of shipping on this side will restrict such operations to minor importance, although they should be effectively opposed principally by keeping the Channel swept on soundings. Enemy submarine mines have been anchored as deep as 90 fathoms but majority at not over 15 fathoms. Mines do not rise from the bottom to set depth until from 24 to 48 hours after they have been laid.

So far all experience shows that submarines never lay mines out of sight of landmarks or lights on account of the danger to themselves if location is not known. Maximum augmentation merchant tonnage and antisubmarine work where most effective constitute the paramount immediate necessity.

Mr. Hoover informs me that there is only sufficient grain supply in this country for three weeks. This does not include the supply in retail stores. In a few days Hoover will sail for the United States.

That is the end of that telegram. That was a plan proposed or policy proposed, and it was adhered to throughout the war, that is, to send all possible antisubmarine craft immediately to the place where the fighting was going on. Five days later I amplified this with the following letter:

LONDON, ENGLAND, *April 19, 1917.*

From: Rear Admiral William S. Sims, United States Navy.
To: The Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: Confirmation and elaboration of recent cablegrams concerning war situation and recommendations for United States naval cooperation.

1. *Reception.*—My reception in this country has been exceptionally cordial and significant of the seriousness of present situation and importance to be attached to the United States entry into the war.

I was met at Liverpool by Rear Admiral Hope, R. N., a member of Admiral Jellicoe's staff, and the admiral of the port, the former having been sent by the Admiralty to escort me to London. A special train was provided which made a record run, and within a few hours after arrival in London I was received by the first sea lord (Admiral Jellicoe) and his principal assistants in a special conference.

2. *Conferences.*—More or less hesitancy was noted at first in presenting a full statement of the true situation, particularly (as it developed later) on account of its seriousness, combined with a natural reluctancy against appearing to seek assistance and a hesitancy in taking chances of allowing information indirectly to reach the enemy, and thereby improve enemy morale.

I therefore positively took the position that I must be considered a part of the Admiralty organization and that it was essential to safe and efficient cooperation that I be trusted with a full knowledge of the exact situation.

They finally consented, only after reference to the Imperial War Council, to my exposing the true state of affairs both as regards the military situation and rate of destruction of merchant shipping.

I have had daily conferences with the first sea lord (Admiral Jellicoe) both at his office and residence, and also have been given entire freedom of the Admiralty and access to all Government officials. I have freely consulted with such officials as the following: Prime minister; first lord of Admiralty (Sir Edward Carson); ministers of munitions, shipping, trade, and other cabinet officials; first sea lord and his assistants; chief of naval staff; directors (corresponding to our chiefs of bureaus) of intelligence, antisubmarine operations, torpedoes, mines, mining, etc.

3. *General statement of the situation.*—Since the last declaration of the enemy government, which from intelligence information was anticipated, the submarine campaign against merchant shipping of all nations has resolved itself into the real issue of the war, and, stated briefly, the allied Governments have not been able to and are not now effectively meeting the situation presented.

4. As stated in my first dispatch the communications and supplies to all forces on all fronts, including Russian, are threatened, and the "command of the sea" is actually at stake.

5. My own views of the seriousness of the situation and the submarine menace have been greatly altered. My convictions and opinions, as probably those of the department also, had been largely based upon press reports and reports of our attachés

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and other professional Americans who have been abroad during the war. All of this information has been either rigidly censored or else has been given out in such form that it would be of minimum assistance to enemy morale.

6. The necessity for secrecy which the British Government has experienced, and which I repeatedly encounter in London, and even in the Admiralty itself, is impressive. There have been remarkable and unexpected leakages of information throughout the war. Certain neutral legations of smaller countries are now under strong suspicion.

The extent to which the submarine campaign is being waged is in itself excellent evidence of the importance attached to it by the enemy, and of the degree to which they counted, and still are counting, upon it.

The intelligence department has reliable information (as reliable as can be) that the enemy really reckoned that the Allies would be defeated in two months through shortage of supplies.

8. With improved weather and the shorter nights now coming on, we may expect even more enemy submarine success.

9. The commander in chief of the Grand Fleet was yesterday in conference in the Admiralty as to what greater extent destroyers and auxiliaries of the fleet may be utilized without endangering its power in the remote possibility of another fleet engagement.

The consensus of opinion seems to be that the latter will not occur, but there is not complete unanimity in this belief, and of course, in any case, the possibility must be adequately and continuously guarded against.

GENERAL DISCUSSION OF SITUATION.

10. I delayed forwarding my first report of the situation with a view of obtaining the maximum information consistent with the importance of the time element. I was also somewhat deterred by a natural reluctance to alter so radically my preconceived views and opinions as to the situation.

11. The evidence is conclusive that, regardless of any enemy diversions such as raids on our coasts or elsewhere, the critical area in which the war's decision will be made is in the eastern Atlantic at the focus of all lines of communications.

The known number of enemy submarines and their rate of construction, allowing liberal factors for errors of information, renders it inevitable that the main submarine effort must continue to be concentrated in the above critical area.

12. Even in this critical area it is manifest that the field is relatively large for the maximum number of submarines which the enemy can maintain in it. For example, with the present Admiralty policy (explained below) they are forced to cover all the possible trade routes of approach between the north of Scotland and Ushant.

13. From consideration of the above and all other essential information available, it is apparent that the enemy could not disperse his main submarine campaign into other quarters of the globe without diminishing results in this and all areas to a degree which would mean failure to accomplish the mission of the submarine campaign, which can be nothing else than a final decision of the war.

14. Considerable criticism has been, and still is, concentrated upon the Admiralty for not taking more effective steps and for failing to produce more substantial and visible results. One of the principal demands is for convoys of merchant shipping, and more definite and real protection within the war zone.

The answer, which manifestly is not publicly known, is simply that the necessary vessels are not available, and further that those which are available are suffering from the effects of three years of arduous service.

15. It is insistently asked (was asked by myself) why shipping is not directed to and concentrated at various rendezvous and from these convoyed through the dangerous areas. The answer is the same—the area is too large; the necessary vessels are not available.

16. However, I am now consulting with the director of shipping as to the practicability and advisability of attempting some approach to such a plan in case the United States is able to put in operation sufficient tonnage to warrant it.

17. After trying various methods of controlling shipping the Admiralty now believes the best policy to be one of dispersion. They use about six relatively large avenues or arcs of approach to the United Kingdom and Channel, changing their limits or area periodically if necessity demands.

Generally speaking, one is to the north of Scotland, another to the north of Ireland, and three or four others covering the Irish Sea and Channel. Individual ships coming into any of these areas of approach are instructed, generally before sailing, to cross the twentieth meridian at certain and different latitudes and thence steer certain courses to port.

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At times in the past they have found one of these avenues of approach free of submarines under such conditions as to lead them to concentrate shipping therein, but invariably the enemy has become aware of the course pursued.

18. The great difficulty in any method of shipping control is communication with the shipping itself and full cooperation by the merchant personnel. The moment a ship is captured the code either becomes dangerous or useless. The merchant code is being continually changed and at all times it can not be counted upon for more than a fortnight. The immense difficulty of changing the code and keeping shipping all over the world in touch with changes is apparent.

19. Continual trouble is experienced with some merchant captains taking the law into their own hands and exhibiting contempt, or at least indifference, for Admiralty instructions. The American liner *New York*, upon which I took passage, furnishes a typical example. She was advised to make Fastnet Light at daylight but she passed it about 9 p. m., thus passing in daylight through the most dangerous area.

20. The Admiralty has had frequent conferences with merchant masters and sought their advice. Their most unanimous demand is "give us a gun and let us look out for ourselves." They are also insistent that it is impracticable for merchant vessels to proceed in formation, at least in any considerable numbers, due principally to difficulty in controlling their speed or to the inexperience of their subordinate officers. With this view I do not personally agree, but believe that with a little experience merchant vessels could safely and sufficiently well steam in open formations.

I might state in this connection that my opinion as to the ability of merchant seamen to handle their ships in convoy came from the fact that I had been associated at one time for three years in instructing young men in navigation and merchant seamanship and I thought I knew those men better than the average officer has an opportunity to know them. At any rate, that opinion turned out, in the end, to be correct. Merchant skippers found no difficulty, under the guidance of a convoy commander, in handling their ships even up to the number of 40, in close formation, 500 yards apart, 1,000 yards between the lines, or maneuvering those ships simultaneously like a school of fish, zigzagging back and forth, in order to get out of the way of submarines. [Continuing reading:]

21. The best protection against the submarine menace for all classes of ships, merchant as well as naval, is speed and zigzagging, not more than 15 minutes on a course. Upon this point no one disagrees, but on the contrary there is absolutely unanimity of opinion.

22. In the absence of adequate patrol craft, particularly destroyers, and until the enemy submarine morale is broken, there is but one sure method of meeting the submarine issue upon which there is also complete unanimity—increased number of merchant bottoms, preferably small.

"More ships! More ships! More ships!" is heard on every hand.

23. It is also significant that until very recently the admiralty have been unable completely to convince some members of the cabinet that the submarine issue is the deciding factor in the war. The civilian mind, here as at home, is loath to believe in unseen dangers, particularly until the pinch is felt in real physical ways.

24. The prime minister only two days ago expressed to me the opinion that it ought to be possible to find physical means of absolutely sealing up all excape for submarines from ther own ports. The fact that all such methods (nets, mines, obstructions, etc.) inherently involve the added necessity of continuous protection and maintenance by our own naval forces is seldom understood and appreciated. I finally convinced the prime minister of the fallacy of such propositions by describing the situation into which we would be led, namely, that in order to maintain our obstructions we would have to match the forces the enemy brought against them until finally the majority if not all of our forces would be forced into dangerous areas where they would be subject to continual torpedo and other attacks, in fact, in a position most favorable to the enemy.

25. Entirely outside of the fact that the enemy does and always can force exits and thereby nullify the close blockage, the weather is a serious added difficulty. The heaviest anchors obtainable have been used for nets, mines, and obstructions, only to have the arduous work of weeks swept away in a few hours of heavy weather. Moorings will not hold. They chafe through. In this respect we could be of great assistance; i. e., in supply of moorings and buoys.

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26. The channel is not now, nd never has been, completely sealed against submarine egress, let alone the vaster areas of escape to the north. Submarines have gone into mine fields and have succeeded in unknown ways in evading and cutting through nets and obstructions.

27. In addition to submarines, heavy forces are free to raid and in fact escape through the channel at any time when the enemy decides that the necessity or return will justify the risk. Hence the suggestion that two divisions of our fast dreadnaughts might be based upon Brest primarily for the resulting moral effect against such possible raids.

I was told yesterday by an important Admiralty official that while he thought the chances of raids in or escape through the channel by heavy enemy forces out of reach of the Grand Fleet (north of Scotland) were very remote, nevertheless the possibility existed and was principally thwarted on moral grounds; that is, the uncertainty in his mind of the opposition which would be encountered. He agreed with others, including the first sea lord, that the addition of some of our heavy forces to those maintained in southern channel approaches by the French and British would undoubtedly entirely preclude the possibility of such raids.

28. *Submarine losses.*—It has been found necessary to accept no reports of submarine losses as authentic and certain unless survivors are captured or the submarine itself definitely located by dragging. No dependence even is placed upon evidence of oil on the surface after a submarine has been attacked and forced down as there is reason to believe that when an enemy submarine dives to escape gunfire she is fitted to expel oil for the particular purpose of conveying the impression that she has been sunk and thereby avoid further pursuit.

It has been shown that the amount of damage a submarine can stand is surprising and much more than was anticipated before the experience of the war. Upon a recent occasion a British submarine was mistaken for an enemy and though struck by several shells, dove and escaped to port.

The submarine losses which are certain since the outbreak of war are as given in attached cablegram.

It is estimated that between 30 and 40 submarines operate at a time in the waters surrounding the British islands and French coast. At least one is now known to be on White Sea trade lanes.

The next heading is "Best antisubmarine weapons." This and the next two headings in this letter cover purely technical details, which, with the permission of the committee, I will not read, but simply let them go into the record.

I might say in connection with the last statement that between 30 and 40 submarines were operating to the westward, that it was believed to be true at that time, the belief being based upon what experience they had had; but it turned out later that that estimate was at least twice too large. There were seldom more than 25 submarines that were away from the base at any one time, and the average number of submarines that operated to the west of Ireland was between 8 and 9. I have known it to be as high as 15, and sometimes down as low as 1, 2, or 3. The reason that false estimate was made was because nobody in any navy in the world knew what the submarine was going to be able to do. Admiral von Tirpitz explains in his book that they had to carry out very careful experiments to prove that the submarine could stay out for 10 or 11 days. He did not imagine that they would be able to stay out 30 days to 3 months, nor did anybody in our Navy or any other navy. We had it all to find out.

(The remaining portion of the preceding letter, not read by Admiral Sims, is here printed in the record as follows:)

29. *Best antisubmarine weapons.*—One of the most efficient weapons now used by all destroyers and patrol craft against submarines is the so-called "depth charge," sample and drawings of which have been forwarded by our naval attaché. These are merely explosive charges designed to explode at a certain depth, formerly 80 feet, now about 100 feet. They are dropped overboard where a submarine that has submerged is assumed to be and are counted upon to badly shake up and demoralize it they do not actually cause serious damage.

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Howitzers and bomb throwers of large caliber are under construction designed to throw similar depth charges to distances of about 2,000 yards. Details will be forwarded.

30. *Torpedo protection.*—This subject may be summed up by the statement of the captain of a British dreadnought who said in effect that after a year's experience he did not fear being sunk by a torpedo. Unless struck by several the worst to be anticipated is damage to shafts or rudder thus necessitating towing. Cruisers have often been struck and been able to reach port. Vital water-tight doors are kept continuously closed at sea.

Destroyer officers have been heard to express the curious opinion that the enemy ships were more or less unsinkable. This is probably to be axplained by the fact that they carry very few supplies; that they have their storage spaces compartmented or filled with wood or other water excluding material; and that, when in port, they quarter their crews in barracks and when leaving for a cruise carry the minimum amount of berthing and supply facilities. These points, however, are not positively known.

On the contrary, all vessels of the British fleet must be kept fully supplied and fueled at all times for extended cruising. This is particularly true of battle cruisers and cruisers.

31. All officers of rank and actual experience consulted are convinced that the enemy have no unusual methods of protection or in fact any surprises or ordnance or other fighting equipment.

32. All are agreed that the best protection against torpedoes is speed and zigzaging.

33. It is a common experience of the naval as well as merchant service that torpedo wakes are reported where none exist. Many reports are received of torpedoes barely missing ships. This was true in the Jutland battle. The captain on one battleship said that he received numerous reports of torpedoes passing just ahead and just astern, nearly all of which he had reason to believe did not exist.

Streaks of suds, slicks, etc., are very deceiving and are easily mistaken for torpedo wakes, particularly when the danger of torpedoes is present. This accounts for many reports by passengers on liners and other merchant craft of seeing many torpedoes just miss their mark.

34. *Submarine versus submarines.*—There has always been opposition to using submarines against submarines principally on the grounds that the possibilities of their accomplishments would not be sufficiently great to justify the risk involved of mistaken identity and resulting damage to friends.

The director of antisubmarine warfare believes, however, that such operations promise well and the experiment is now being tried with as many submarines as can be spared from the Grand Fleet. Some enemy submarines have been destroyed by this method, usually torpedoed. One valuable feature of this method lies in the fact that as long as our submarines are not so used, the enemy submarine is always perfectly safe in assuming that all submarines sighted are friends. If this certainty is removed, the enemy will be forced to keep down more and to take much greater precautions against detection. This is an advantage of no small amount.

In addition to the possible offensive work that may be accomplished by our submarines on such duty, the plan furnishes us with more reliable information as to the limitations and capabilities of enemy vessles under the actual conditions existing in the areas in which they operate. Without this knowledge based on actual experience too much is left to conjecture, which is liable to lead to a great deal of misdirected effort.

WM. S. SIMS.

Before reading selections from my reports to the Navy Department, during the first four months of our participation in the war, it is necessary that I should stop here and present a few facts and figures which will establish the critical tonnage situation which existed at the time we entered the war. These statistics are susceptible of substantiation in the archives of numerous Government departments in Washington, and if there is any inclination to question them, they can be further substantiated by a long train of witnesses of prominent Government officials.

In my letter of January 7, paragraphs 38, 41, 20, 21, and 22 I referred to the tonnage situation which I am about to explain.

I submit here certain charts showing the situation, which can be included or not. There are certain curves which show what the

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situation was at that time and the result of a summary which gives the figures.

The CHAIRMAN. Do I understand that you wish to have these papers appear in the record?

Admiral SIMS. I think those had better appear in the record, as they show very clearly what the situation is. This is an advanced statement of what the tonnage situation was at the time and how very serious it was. [Reading:]

Statistical analysis of results of delays in getting the United States Navy into action.

	Tons.
Tonnage available to Allies, 1914 (American tonnage not included).....	31,500,000
Total imports of Europe, 1914 (not including imports of Russia and Central Powers) (annually).....	170,000,000
Tonnage required for these imports.....	25,000,000

TONNAGE LOSSES.

Allied net losses, Aug. 1, 1914, to Jan. 1, 1917.....	400,000
Net losses, first quarter, 1917.....	1,300,000
Net losses, April, 1917.....	800,000
Minimum imports required by Europe (annually).....	100,000,000
Tonnage required for these imports.....	18,000,000
Tonnage required for military and naval uses (in addition to tonnage required for imports).....	8,500,000
Absolute minimum of tonnage necessary to allied cause.....	26,500,000
Tonnage available to Allies, Jan. 1, 1917.....	31,100,000
Net losses Jan. 1 to May 1, 1917.....	2,100,000
Tonnage not available because of damage or repairs.....	2,000,000
Net tonnage available to Allies May 1, 1917.....	27,000,000
(I) Average monthly tonnage losses Feb. 1, 1917, to Aug. 1, 1917.....	640,000
(II) Average monthly losses Aug. 1, 1917, to Feb. 1, 1918.....	390,000
(III) Average monthly losses Feb. 1, 1918, to N9v. 11, 1918.....	250,000

That, for reference, will give you a general summary of the situation.

Admiral SIMS. I am submitting to the committee an estimate based upon the data available of the losses caused the Allies and the United States by the delays in getting American naval forces into action against the enemy submarines.

The figures which I have before me show clearly that in April, 1917, the allied cause seemed doomed on account of the losses of tonnage. In the first four months of the year there had been a net loss of over 2,000,000 tons, or 7 per cent of the total allied and neutral shipping, and the rate of losses had been increasing every month. In the month of April alone the net loss amounted to 800,000 tons, or twice as much as in the whole period of the war before January 1, 1917. It was apparent that these losses, if continued, would soon reduce the tonnage to such an extent that military requirements, and requirements of the population of the allied countries, could not longer be maintained. The imports had already been reduced by 40 per cent from the prewar figures. They could not be reduced further without starving the armies or the civil populations of the allied countries. Any further reduction at the rate then existing would have made it impossible to have transported an American army or to maintain it when once across.

With the adoption of the convoy system, and the antisubmarine measures put into effect by the Allies with our assistance in 1917, the

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losses were gradually reduced until in October, 1918, they amounted to only 100,000 tons. The period between the beginning of the German unrestricted submarine campaign and the armistice can be divided into three phases so far as losses of merchant tonnage are concerned:

First. The period from February 1, 1917, to the end of July, 1917, when American aid was lacking and when shipping was not being convoyed. Average losses, 640,000 tons per month.

Second. The period of August 1, 1917, to February 1, 1918, when there was a partial employment of the convoy system and moderate assistance from America. Losses, 390,000 tons per month.

Third. The period from February 1, 1918, to the armistice, when full cooperation was given by America, and consequently full use could be made of the convoy system. Losses, 250,000 tons per month.

As will be noted, each of these successive phases of the unrestricted submarine campaign is marked by the degree of naval cooperation received from America. An analysis of the situation, therefore, shows that if the United States Navy had been prepared for war when war began, and if a whole-hearted policy of cooperation with the Allies had been followed from the beginning, the first period mentioned above would have come to an end within a month after we entered the war; that is, by May 1, 1917. The second period would probably have ended by August 1, as by that time the full weight of our cooperation would probably have been felt. An estimate of the amount of tonnage that would have been saved by prompt action on our part, shows, therefore, that, if the first period had ended on May 1, and the second period on August 1, 1917, a million and a half tons of shipping would have been saved to the Allies in 1917. Similarly, at least another million tons would have been saved in 1918.

It can thus be said that the failure of the Navy Department to enter the war immediately and whole-heartedly cost the allied cause as a whole 2,500,000 tons of shipping sunk unnecessarily. While this is of course an estimate only, it is based upon actual results obtained when our help became effective, and there is no reason to doubt that it is a conservative estimate.

The loss of this amount of shipping can also be translated into a definite prolongation of the war and unnecessary sacrifice of blood and treasure in accomplishing the victory. As Gen. Pershing clearly shows in his report to the Secretary of War, the primary consideration limiting the number of American troops that could be sent to France was that of tonnage. The tonnage losses of 1917 made it impossible at the time to transport any considerable American Army and, at the same time, continue the absolutely essential military supplies and food for the civil populations of the allied countries. It therefore became necessary to limit the number of American troops that could be sent abroad during the first year to an average of approximately 25,000 men per month. If the additional million and a half tons sunk unnecessarily in 1917 had been saved by prompt cooperation of our Navy, the number of American soldiers sent to France could have been doubled or trebled. If the tonnage had been available and the additional American troops had been sent to France, and the new drafts called more promptly in this country, America could have had a million men in France by March, 1918, instead of 300,000.

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A review of the various books by military experts and of the available information concerning the German campaign of 1918, shows that the earlier defeat of the submarine campaign would have had the effect of very greatly shortening the war. The Germans had hoped, and continued to hope until the beginning of 1918, that the submarines would force the Allies to peace. The offensive of 1918 on land was only projected and undertaken when the German staff realized that the submarine could not bring them victory. If, therefore, the tonnage losses had been so reduced by August, 1917, that the defeat of the submarine campaign could have been accomplished, it would, without a doubt, have reacted upon the morale of the German population at that time as it did actually in 1918. The German high command would then have been forced into its desperate military venture earlier than March, 1918, when the offensive was actually launched against the Allies, or would have been forced to endure the victorious assault of the Allies in the early spring of 1918, which, as a result of the losses suffered in the first months of the German offensive, and because of the delay in getting American troops in sufficient number, actually did not begin until the middle of July, 1918. In either of these cases, the presence of a million Americans in France on March 1, and the arrival of another million within another three months, would undoubtedly have brought a victory by July, if one may judge from what actually happened when these American forces did become available, and thus tip the military scale in favor of the Allies.

The loss unnecessarily of the two and a half million tons of shipping, therefore, in all probability postponed the end of the war at least four months. The average loss of life per day to the Allies during the war was 3,000 men. This prolongation of the war, therefore, cost half a million lives. Similarly, as the war cost the allies $100,000,000 a day on the average, this prolongation resulted in the unnecessary expenditure of $15,000,000,000, of which at least one-third was expended by the United States directly or loaned to the Allies.

I have made this statement not because I assume or pretend that it is complete, but in order to present to you some estimate of what such a policy as that of the Navy Department in the first six months of the war, and of such delays and military errors as those committed by the department in this same time cost the Nation and the Allies. I merely wish to call your attention as vividly as possible to the fact that the questions under discussion are not purely academic, but have the vastest consequences that must inevitably be suffered unnecessarily if such mistakes are committed in time of war. It is no light matter which cost the cause for which we were fighting half a million lives, fifteen billions of dollars, and two and a half million tons of shipping.

I will now read to the committee selections from my various dispatches sent during the first four months, together with certain dispatches from other important Government officials, for the purpose of clearly establishing that the department was fully informed of the unprecedented and critical nature of the war situation at the time this country decided to enter.

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I wish to point out that the official documents I am about to read are but a few of those which I sent and which are available in the records. An attempt has been made merely to select typical messages. These messages which I shall now read you are in substantion of paragraphs 10, 11, 12, 13, 26, and 27 of my letter, which is the subject of this inquiry.

I would like to say in connection with these dispatches that in order to take a certain subject and discuss it it is necessary, of course, to introduce the dispatches which substantiate the statement. Almost all of those dispatches contain remarks on different subjects. To include and read the whole dispatch would unnecessarily lengthen the record and would be very boring.

It is also my intention to include only any portion of a dispatch which bears on the subject in hand, but if, after I finish my testimony, the committee desires to have a complete file of these dispatches so that they can read any dispatch in its entirety, I can submit them. That will add considerably to the length of the record, but they may be submitted if desired.

The CHAIRMAN. We can determine that afterwards.

Admiral SIMS. Yes. To give you an idea of the magnitude of the job, I may say that I do not know how many dispatches there were, but they are in the hundreds of thousands. I asked my statistician some time ago how many there were, and he said that if they were bounds up in boards and set on a shelf that shelf would have to be 140 feet long in order to contain them. Of course, the committee does not want them all.

Senator TRAMMELL. They are all dispatches that are on file in the department?

Admiral SIMS. Yes, they are all on file in the department.

Senator TRAMMELL. And your references will refer to the particular numbers, so that they can be found?

Admiral SIMS. Out of those miles of dispatches I am only selecting representative ones, and out of those representative ones I am selecting those that illustrate the point in question; and of all of those dispatches, of which there are probably 200,000, I am only selecting a certain number, and those can be included; and if, after my testimony is concluded, you decide that it would be advisable, you can put them in in full; but in the meantime there are only extracts from these dispatches.

Senator TRAMMELL. Will you refer to them under the file number so that they can be identified?

Admiral SIMS. I will refer to them by dates, and will give you the file numbers also, if you need them, and by numbers also.

On the same day that I sent my first dispatch to the department, covering the whole situation, I also sent a second dispatch to emphasize the exactness of the information and the importance of the recommendations given in the first cable. This second dispatch was as follows:

[Cable to Department, April 14, 1917.]

The dispatch referred to gives the exact truth of the situation, and the information given is not even known to the majority of British officials. I have absolutely insisted upon the importance of a complete and accurate statement of the true situation, and the authorities have finally given their consent, but only after reference to the Imperial

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War Council, this because of the manifest advantage to enemy morale if the information were disclosed. I request with all possible urgency your immediate consideration of these recommendations.

SIMS.

I may say with reference to the importance of keeping your information away from the enemy, that I read a dispatch in the paper in which the Government officials in Berlin read aloud the account of my interview with Admiral Jellicoe, and the statement in a magazine article as to what the situation was, and they listened to this language with melancholy interest.

After sending this disptach, I learned by accident on the following day, while in Admiral Jellicoe's office, that the Navy Department had made an agreement, as I will point out later in my testimony, with the local representatives of the British and French Navies in Washington with regard to the extent of American naval cooperation. I never received from the department any information concerning this agreement, as I will point out later in my testimony. At this point I merely wish to emphasize the fact that one clause in the agreement shown me by Admiral Jellicoe was to the effect that the Navy Department would send a division of destroyers to base either upon a French or British port. I thereupon sent to the department on the 16th of April the following message:

APRIL 16—*11 p. m.*

To: Secretary of State, Washington.
For: Secretary of Navy.

Strongly advise that any destroyer or other patrol forces sent this side do not base on French coast but as far to westward as practicable, preferably south coast Ireland, to operate principally in designated high-sea area in zone to westward and southward, which is present critical area.

SIMS.

Two days later, on April 18, in replying to a suggestion of the Navy Department as to the feasibility of blocking the German submarines in their bases, which will also be taken up later, I again pointed out the importance of immediate naval cooperation.

[Cablegram to Navy Department, April 18, 1917.]

The destroyer has shown itself to be to a great degree the most efficacious enemy of the submarines attacking commerce. All possible means are taken by the enemy to force their being assigned to other duty, even to sink ships on hospital service. With the exception of the minimum number required by the Grand Fleet, for carrying troops and their supplies, all destroyers are now so used. These vessels are being constructed as expeditiously as possible, but their number is quite insufficient to meet the existing submarine crisis, particularly as it affects merchantmen.

In view of the seriousness of the situation I urgently repeat the recommendations that we send at once every destroyer that can reach Ireland as well as all light draft ships of whatever speed, able to perform any patrol service.

In other dispatches of about this same time, on April 15, 17, 22, 23, and 24, I again called attention to my early recommendations and repeated requests for forces.

On April 16 I had received from the Navy Department a message requesting technical information, at the end of which was the following sentence:

Yours of noon 14th April will be given earnest and serious attention.

In spite of this assurance from the department, the only messages that I received concerning the sending of forces abroad in April

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were the two messages which I shall now read you, which were both received on April 22:

From: Operations.
To: Rear Admiral Sims.
Received April 22, 1917.

Six destroyers are ready to sail immediately upon receiving information as to desired port and best route to follow as they approach the Irish coast. Give full information.

BENSON.

From: Secretary of the Navy.
To: Rear Admiral W. S. Sims.
Cablegram received: April 22, 1917.

The United States has been requested by the Russian Government to send four patrol vessels and four destroyers to the Arctic coast for the defense of that region. It is understood that assistance is urgently required at the earliest possible moment. Please confer with the British authorities as to the situation and wire what you advise.

DANIELS, *Secretary of Navy.*

It is to be seen from the second of these messages how little importance the department had apparently given to my recommendations. In my first dispatch and in later dispatches I had emphasized the absolute necessity of concentrating all available American antisubmarine craft in the critical area of the submarine zone south of Ireland. Yet the department entertained the possibility of sending four destroyers and four patrol vessels to the Arctic coast at a time when, so far as I knew, they were intending to send only one division of destroyers to the critical zone.

I immediately replied to this message with my dispatch of April 24:

Sent April 24, 10 a. m.
To: Secretary of the Navy.
Through: State Department.

Strictly confidential. Replying to department's April 22: Have consulted Admiralty. Conclusion reached is that our destroyers and patrol forces should operate concentrated in same area, based on Bantry Bay, with all possible repair and supply facilities. Effort would be diminished by separation and necessary establishment additional bases. If this is done, Admiralty can augment submarine defense Russian coast from their present bases. Submarines and decoy vessels already sent this duty. Situation continues critical. Nine vessels sunk yesterday. Recommend that all destroyers now available be sent earliest possible date, if necessary in advance their repair and supply vessels. Admiralty can supply and repair temporarily.

SIMS.

On April 26 I received a message announcing the sailing of six destroyers from Boston on April 24, but containing no further information with regard to other forces.

My despair can be imagined.

I felt there was no way to explain the situation any more clearly than I had already done in dispatches to the department. Nevertheless, I did send one more message, which follows:

[Cable to department.]

Sent April 27, 1917.
To: Secretary of the Navy.
Through: State Department.

The information which follows must be guarded with the greatest secrecy. In spite of the effort of all destroyers and patrol vessels which are available, the situation is increasingly critical. Eighty-eight ships, amounting to 237,000 tons (not taking into account the fishing vessels), of British, Allied, and neutral nationality were sunk during the week ending April 22. There is a greatly increased number of ships which are unsuccessfully attacked by enemy submarines. This indicates that there is a correspondingly increased number of submarines operating.

SIMS.

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I had no reason, however, to believe that this one additional message would bring the action necessary. But something had to be done. The issues at stake were too great for me to be satisfied with the action so far taken.

One other course seemed to be open. My representative capacity abroad in a sense placed me under the ambassador. Throughout my service abroad I always considered it a duty to keep the State Department representative generally informed of the military situation.

In this case I made an urgent appeal to the ambassador, asking him to support me in an attempt to get our Government to realize the necessities of the situation. I submitted a memorandum to the ambassador, from which I might read the following extracts:

Memo. for Ambassador Page, April 27, 1917.

During week ending April 22, 88 ships, 240,000 tonnage, lost; number of vessels unsuccessfully attacked show marked increase in number of submarines operating. Every available destroyer and other suitable vessel now employed, even to point of reducing superiority of British Grand Fleet over enemy Grand Fleet. Allies do not now command sea. Transport of troops and supplies strained to utmost, and maintenance armies in field threatened.

Regardless of any form of cooperation by United States in future, including increased shipping and reinforcement of armies in field, it is imperative that we supply at the earliest possible date all destroyers and other craft suitable for opposing submarines and able to reach this side. Opportunity presented for United States to prove deciding factor in war by immediate maximum cooperation in suppressing enemy submarine campaign.

On the same day—i. e., on April 27—the ambassador sent the following message to the State Department:

From: Ambassador Page.
To: Secretary of State.
Sent: April 27, 1917.

Very confidential for Secretary and President. There is reason for the greatest alarm about the issue of the war caused by the increasing success of the German submarines. I have it from official sources that during the week ending April 22, 88 ships of 237,000 tons, allied and neutral, were lost. The number of vessels unsuccessfully attacked indicated a great increase in the number of submarines in action. This means practically a million tons lost every month till the shorter days of autumn come. By that time the sea will be about clear of shipping. Most of the ships are sunk to the westward and southward of Ireland. The British have in that area every available antisubmarine craft, but their force is so insufficient that they hardly discourage the submarines. The British transport of troops and supplies is already strained to the utmost, and the maintenance of the armies in the field is threatened. There is food enough here to last the civil population not more than six weeks or two months.

Whatever help the United States may render at any time in the future or in any theater of the war, our help is now more seriously needed in this submarine area for the sake of all the Allies than it can ever be needed again, or anywhere else. After talking over this critical situation with the prime minister and other members of the Government, I can not refrain from most strongly recommending the immediate sending over of every destroyer and all other craft that can be of antisubmarine use. This seems to me the sharpest crisis of the war and the most dangerous situation for the Allies that has arisen or could arise. If enough submarines can be destroyed in the next two or three months, the war will be won, and if we can contribute effective help immediately it will be won directly by our aid. I can not exaggerate the pressing and increasing danger of this situation. Thirty or more destroyers and other similar craft sent by us immediately would very likely be decisive. There is no time to be lost.

PAGE.

I immediately followed this up on the next day by sending to the Navy Department another long dispatch covering the whole situation and repeating again the urgent necessity of immediate naval cooperation:

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APRIL 28.

Owing to the gravity of the submarine situation, although I am unaware of the situation as regards our forces available and their material condition, I can not avoid urging the importance of the time element, and the fact that the pressing need of the moment is numbers of vessels in the danger area. We can not send too soon or too many. If the rate of losses given last week is continued, any other further means of cooperation including shipping may be too late. The intensity of the submarine campaign shows now, and within the next two months, is the critical time. Military opinion all points to the breaking of enemy submarine morale as the immediate mission. Since the British are concentrating more forces in the critical zone, I can not exaggerate the importance of our force being immediately followed by adequate facilities for supply and repair, especially for all needs and for all special repairs. At Queenstown and the neighboring bases because of the volume of work and lack of labor, facilities will be greatly overstrained.

With regard to submarines entering and leaving their bases and their approximately whereabouts while operating, the admiralty is able to maintain information that is fairly exact.

Of the 34 mine U-boats, two for some days were not located, and the Admiralty was on the point of informing us of the probability of their being en route to the United States when their whereabouts were discovered. It is the Admiralty's belief now that at present none are likely to be sent over and that the present effort of the submarine which is successful will be kept up off the channel entrance. All of the destroyers which can be freed from duty with the fleet are being employed. It has been shown by experience that 50 per cent of the destroyers can be maintained on patrol. The area covered by destroyers is practically untenable by submarines but this area is ineffective as it is too small. Yesterday the war council and Admiralty decided that cooperation of twenty-odd American destroyers with base at Queenstown would no doubt put down the present submarine activity which is dangerous, and keep it down.

That, of course, refers to that particular area.

The crisis will be passed if the enemy can be forced to disperse his forces from this crucial zone.

I believe our Navy has an opportunity for glorious distinction and I seriously recommend that there be sent at once maximum possible number destroyers. Depth charges and all supplies necessary will be furnished the six destroyers now en route and there will be assigned to the staff of our senior officer an expert destroyer patrol officer.

SIMS.

A little bit later I was able to inform the department that I could give them more accurate information about the movements of submarines, and when we come to consider the question further along of the defense of our coast, I think I can show you some of the most remarkable examples of secret intelligence work that ever have been recorded in any military history. I will explain to you, there, to a certain extent, how it was that I was able to assure the department that no submarine would leave the other side without the department being warned; and it turned out to be so. No submarine left the other side without the Navy Department having at least two weeks warning. and being told where she was at least every two or three days, and being told what her name was, what her number was, and in one case what the name of her commanding officer was; where she was going and what she was going to do; and it all turned out to be perfectly correct.

On the following day I received orders placing me in command of the forces which were being sent, namely, six destroyers, in addition to my other duties as the department's representative abroad.

On May 3, a whole month after we declared war, apparently as a result of the dispatches sent on April 27 and 28, the department sent me the first message giving me any intimation as to the extent of the forces they intended to send. This message was as follows:

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From: Secretary of the Navy.
To: Rear Admiral Sims.
Received May 3, 1917.

Berehaven suggested by the British commission in Washington as a base for the United States destroyers which are operating with the Allies. Ultimately there will be 36 destroyers sent, as well as the *Melville*, and also the *Dixie* should the latter be required. Send recommendations after investigating the place as to what equipment it would be necessary to furnish for use on shore for housing stores, and whether the equipment is obtainable there. Is there available any floating equipment or storage for oil? What kind of stores can be obtained there? Report in general what kind of stores should be shipped from here in addition to the stores which are generally carried by the destroyer tenders. Can oil be obtained from any nearby fleet base for the destroyers? We could replenish the stock used by sending our oil tankers, or must the supply be from tankers sent from this side to Berehaven?

The *Dixie* was a mother ship.

In reference to that dispatch I should like to call attention to the fact that the first real decision that came from the Navy Department as to participation in the war was not until one month, nearly, after we entered the war.

I would call attention to a few features of this dispatch:

First. Its indefiniteness. The fact that ultimately 36 destroyers would be sent was little satisfaction. Time was everything. Did it mean weeks or months?

Second. That the majority of the information requested therein should have been thoroughly worked out in our war plans.

Third. I wish to indicate to the committee the nature of the task presented to me, with one aid, with no data or record as to our own forces of any description at hand, to attempt to obtain this information in the time available from the various parts of the British Isles.

I will take up, of course, the question of personnel as a separate matter later.

I replied to this message on May 7 with the following dispatch:

[Cables sent to Department May 7, 1917.]

Berehaven is now established, defended, and used as advanced base, and is suitable for our purpose in the present area of main activies of submarines. The British and French agree that our destroyer force should remain concentrated upon its own supply and repair ships; that it should remain essentially a mobile force ready to follow shifting of area of main submarine activity. The British will give us any necessary supplies and assistance, but their facilities for repair and supply are strained nearly to the limit. Therefore I urge that our force be as self-contained as possible; that both the *Melville* and *Dixie* be sent with complete stores as for extended West Indian cruise; also that supply ships be sent with meat, provisions, and stores to replenish the repair ships. In addition to usual stores carried by our repair ships, we should send in supply ships such stores as our experience indicates will be necessary, such as boiler and condenser tubes, spare parts, piping, repair material, etc.

Depth charges as per drawing forwarded about 8th April should be made and forwarded as soon as practicable to relieve present drain on British supply for their destroyers and patrol craft. Oil will be supplied from small oilers from British oil stations to our destroyers wherever based. Oil situation becoming critical. We should therefore maintain a continuous supply from our large oil tankers discharging into their main tank stations, so as not to detain large tankers at advanced bases. The essential requirement is that our force should be not only as self-sustaining as possible but also mobile. There are no special equipments necessary for housing stores ashore.

During the first week in May I went to Paris, at the request of the British and French naval authorities, to attend a conference with regard to naval cooperation, which was held in connection with a meeting of the allied military council. I informed the Navy Department of the result of these conferences in a dispatch sent on May 5 from Paris.

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This dispatch is as follows:

[Cable sent Navy Department, May 5, 1917.]

Relations with the French Navy Department very satisfactory. Conference with minister and chief of staff and French attaché London and attaché Paris and first Sea Lord resulted in unanimous agreement that our destroyer force should remain concentrated and should attack the enemy submarines in whatever area they may be operating in the greatest numbers. Probably principally in the area from the South to the West Northwest of Fastnet.

SIMS.

The next intimation which I received from the department of their probable plans was in a dispatch of May 8:

Cablegram, from Secretary of the Navy.
To: Rear Admiral Sims.
Received May 8, 1917.

The French have requested and United States Navy Department contemplates, establishing temporary bases at Bordeaux and Brest, with one line officer, one pay officer and one engineer officer. You are requested to advise on this and it is requested that your reply be expedited.

DANIELS.

I replied to this on the same day.

Sent May 8, 1917.

To: Secretary of State, Washington.
Through: State Department.

Following from the Admiral to Navy Department:

Establishment of temporary bases Brest and Bordeaux very desirable but should not divert in any way necessary repair supply and fuel vessels from mobile destroyer base. Urgent that destroyer force remain concentrated with mobile base ready to follow any movement of main submarine activity on high sea trade routes.

SIMS.

Throughout the remainder of the month of May, and for the first three weeks of June, I continued to send, at frequent intervals, cables reiterating recommendations made from the time of my first cable, but received no further reply from the Navy Department regarding their plans and policies and forces to be sent abroad until June 20, although throughout this period I was in daily conference with the heads of the allied navies. You can imagine my embarrassment in all discussions, owing to my inability to make any positive statement whatever as to what the United States Navy proposed to do; and, as I will point out at a later time, in dealing with the department's direct negotiations with allies during this period. I was receiving most of my information with regard to American naval plans and the disposition of American naval forces accidentally through information seen in the Admiralty or related to me by visiting armed guard officers.

In this series of messages which I now propose to read, I must in order not to confuse the situation adhere to the point we are discussing. There are a great many very important things which I will take up later, for example, the convoy system, which at this period was pressing hard, but I wish now to deal only with the question of reinforcements.

From among the many messages sent during May and June, in which I was pointing out the increasingly critical character of the situation and repeated my recommendations for the sending of anti-submarine craft, I will read portions of my dispatches of May 14, May 31, June 7, June 14, and June 20:

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I am giving portions of these dispatches in order (1) to save time, and (2) in order to avoid confusion. Many dispatches referred to a number of subjects. It is therefore better to read only the portion which refers to the subject now under consideration. I can, however, if the committee desires, submit a separate list of all dispatches and letters from which these extracts were taken. Of course, these cables and letters are only a few representative ones to give you an idea of the situation in each case. It would take literally months to read all the cables. They are up in the hundreds of thousands. If bound into books the cables alone would occupy about 140 feet of shelf room. As for the letters, they would fill 100 letter-file cases of 4 long drawers each.

[Cable sent Department May 14, 1917.]

Every effort is being made to increase the British patrols. The measures we take must be carried out with utmost dispatch in view of the critical degree of enemy submarine successes and the general allied military and political situation. The element of time is all important. The need is for destroyers, antisubmarine craft, tugs, and mine layers in the greatest possible numbers. The British Government deeply appreciate the evidence of America's desire to assist in putting down the submarine menace.

Incidentally, that can be considered as only as instance of international politeness, because they are thanking us for sending 6 destroyers at this late date.

The primary necessity is numbers of patrol craft, and as previously reported, too much stress can not be laid upon the urgency of reinforcing the allied antisubmarine forces to the extreme possible limit.

SIMS.

These are only extracts from a few of these cables.

[Cable sent to Department May 31, 1917.]

With the increase of the available antisubmarine craft, the enemy is being forced to attack by torpedo instead of gun fire, and this results in shorter cruises and more uncertain dates of return to bases, and difficulty in maintaining definite prearranged programs. Hence we may expect from now on alternative periods of greater and lesser activity. The Admiralty desires to report officially that the United States destroyer forces working on Atlantic approaches are rendering most efficient and valuable services.

[Cable sent to Department June 7, 1917.]

Request information of any further additions to our forces here or in France and prospective dates sailing. The great necessity is numbers of antisubmarine craft the greater the number the more effective the offensive campaign. Also request general information as to department's policy concerning fleet and other service vessels. Nothing now under consideration as regards their use this side, but would like to be generally informed in case future development or emergencies should bring the question up.

SIMS.

From: Vice Admiral Sims.
To: Secretary of Navy.
Via: Naval attaché, Washington.
Through: Admiralty.
Sent: June 14, 1917.

Following for United States Chief of Naval Operations from Vive Admiral Sims begins general situation and prospects for immediate future very grave. All fuel, food, and other supply and Army assistance which we can render is entirely dependent upon ability to insure safe passage through dangerous submarine areas this side. The prospects of the immediate future and available vessels for escort duty is cause for great concern. Whatever is done to meet the situation must be done immediately. Our help is very much needed. The difficulties confronting the entire convoy situation are serious and primarily depend upon the question of escorts through submarine

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zones. There are not now sufficient vessels available for escort duty to ensure safety of all vital supplies and also prospective movements of our troops and their supplies. As our troops and their supplies will approach European coast outside of zones used by shipping and shipping convoys it is mandatory that information be given immediately as to the probable numbers and times of sailing of all Army shipping in next three months as on this depends the programme of merchant ship convoys which must be arranged some time ahead. The approach of our first Army convoys will seriously embarrass the shipping situation as it will require all destroyers based on Queenstown thus necessitating entire suspension of patrol and escort duty in that area. I can not lay too much stress upon the urgent necessity of increasing the destroyer and other patrol forces here with utmost despatch. Can not other craft be sent also? Anything armed which can make above 12 knots and keep the sea will relieve the situation. Our shipping and our coast is better protected in the field of enemy activity than in any other place.

Urgently request answer in next 24 hours if possible as to prospective movements of all Army shipping in next two or three months. This information is of vital importance. Also request information as to probable additions to antisubmarine forces these waters. The Admiralty informs me that present prospect is that if oil supplies are protected food supplies can not be. I again urgently recommend that all destroyers that can be brought to the coast of Ireland be sent at once.

SIMS.

Sent: June 20, 1917.

To: Secretary of the Navy.
(Through Admiralty.)

The immediate dispatch to this area of all possible destroyers and antisubmarine craft of any description is mandatory if the submarine issue is to be effectively met. During absence of destroyers for escort duty with troops transports the forces in this area reduced to only 10 destroyers and 10 sloops, only 6 of each in operation at a time. This requires five days at sea with two days in port, which can not be continued with reliability. Other areas are similarly short of sufficient forces to meet the situation. Yesterday the majority of these forces were engaged in escorting individual inward-bound valuable ships, thereby leaving all shipping following them unprotected. Ships sunk yesterday as far west as 17:30. It will seem suicidal if the convoy system as proposed by the British Admiralty is not put into immediate operation and applied to all shipping, thus forcing submarines to encounter antisubmarine craft in order to attack shipping. It is impossible to carry on partial convoy and partial patrol system. Both can not be done. The former much better than present system, which is not succeeding. Urgently request information of department's action on this dispatch and upon previous similar dispatches. A decision is necessary before decisive action can be taken on this side.

SIMS.

That refers largely to the convoys. I will show you later, when I take up the convoys as a separate subject, the opposition of the United States to the introduction of the convoy system.

In reply to the increasingly urgent series of messages in June, I finally received a message from the department, on June 20, which I will now read to you:

Received: June 20, 1917, via Admiralty.

To: Commander in Chief; Queenstown.
Following for Admiral Sims:

Begins. There will be no additional movements before August of troops. You will be furnished fully with information as to sailing of Army supply ships as far as possible in advance, and the actual sailing intended route and probably dates of arrival will be reported. We hope to sail four Army supply ships now fitting out in about 10 days' time. The 32 destroyers, which are all that are available, have sailed; 110-feet chasers, which are to be sent to France, should begin to deliver in August. Fishing vessels, 12 in number, will sail in August for France. There are no other small craft available at present, although work on yachts is being pushed, probably ready 15th July. In regard to convoy, I consider that American vessels having armed guards are safer when sailing independently.

DANIELS.

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I would like to invite particular attention to that last paragraph:

In regard to convoy I consider that American vessels having armed guards are safer when sailing independently.

And that was signed "Daniels."

Well, I can assure you that I was about ready to jump overboard when I got that last message. After all the information that had been sent, as to the nature of the antisubmarine campaign and as to the nature of the submarine campaign, to be informed officially by the Navy Department:

In regard to convoy I consider that American vessels having armed guards are safer when sailing independently.

It will be noted that the previous promise of 36 destroyers had now dwindled to 32, and that this message gave me no hope of receiving any more forces. To anyone who had spent any time at all on the American coast and in our harbors, it was pretty difficult to accept the statement here made that there were no other small craft available. I felt that if the department realized the situation as it really existed, which I had tried so hard to explain, it certainly could have produced more results. Surely a country, that raised our great Army in the time that it did could have produced more naval effort in the space of two and one-half months than this message would indicate.

It should also be noted in passing because I will deal with the subject more at length later, that in reply to my numerous and repeated cables, pointing out that the only way to protect shipping was by the use of the convoy system, the Secretary now replied in the final sentence of this message:

I consider the American vessels having armed guards are safer when sailing independently.

As a matter of fact, two of the first American ships with armed guards on board were sunk at this time, the steamship *Vacuum* and the steamship *Campania*.

When this message came I realized once more that the department did not appreciate the situation, or such a message would have been impossible.

I therefore sent, in the following week, another series of messages, in which I expressed, in the clearest language of which I am capable, the situation as it then existed. I will read you my dispatches of June 21, June 22, and June 23:

Sent June 21:

To: Secretary of the Navy.
(Through Admiralty.)

I trust I have made the critical nature of the military situation entirely clear. I consider it my duty to report that if we can not offer more immediate actual assistance even to the extent of sending the majority of the vessels patrolling our own coast lines, which can not materially affect the general situation, we will fail to render the service to the Allies cause which future history will show to have been necessary.

My recommendations concerning the convoy system were not based upon American vessels, but upon all allied shipping, for it is upon the preservation of the remainder of this shipping that our success against the enemy is entirely dependent. It is assumed here that the comparative immunity of American shipping from submarine attack is due to German hopes that such a policy will strengthen the peace propaganda in America. This is apparently clearly indicated by the German press. Actual and extended experience has shown that arming merchantmen does not protect from attack, but simply forces the submarine to attack without warning, thus obliging her to use up her torpedoes and shorten her cruise.

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Armed merchantmen are being sunk daily off this port. The success of the convoys so far brought in shows that the system will defeat the submarine campaign if applied generally and in time. The system is merely a plan that obliges the submarine to fight antisubmarine craft in order to attack merchantmen. The present campaign is not succeeding. The necessity is again presented of sending all destroyers, tugs, yachts, and other craft which can reach the critical area by themselves or towed part way by reserve battleships or any naval vessels. If the situation is not made clear I hope the department will indicate the further information desired. Time is a vital element in any measures taken. Ends.

SIMS.

Sent June 22.

To: Secretary of the Navy.
(Through Admiralty.)

I again submit the necessity for increase of antisubmarine forces based on Queenstown in order to insure safe passage of convoys and shipping through this area. This is best area in which all our naval cooperation can be concentrated. It is through this area which the vast majority of mercantile shipping from United States must continue to pass throughout war. All seagoing protection on our own coast line is futile as long as enemy does not attack shipping from our ports in that area. Enemy area of attack must remain in East Atlantic waters to be successful. All material assistance from United States will be dependent upon safe passage of shipping through war zone.

SIMS.

Sent June 23, 1917.

To: Secretary of the Navy via British Admiralty.
From: Vice Admiral Sims, Queenstown.

No. 874. From Vice Admiral Sims for Secretary Navy. Begins. Mystery ships are of little use without motive power. In any case they must simulate merchantmen perfectly in rig and all respects, and should be as nearly unsinkable as possible. The great need is for any type of craft which can keep sea and carry gun and radio. The need is immediate. Losses are not decreasing, while demands on antisubmarine craft are steadily increasing. Numbers of craft in time are the necessities of the situation.

SIMS.

These messages called forth from the department another message, giving the first statement of any policy and the first definite information about the department's plans which I had yet received in two and a half months. This message was as follows:

From: Secretary of Navy.
To: Alusna, London.
For: Vice Admiral Sims, No. 37.
Received: June 24, 1917.
This is a reply to your various letters and cables.

The need of reserve of personnel for such active forces as may be engaged on duties of particularly arduous kinds under conditions permitting of little respite is recognized by the department. This refers particularly to destroyers on active service. There is a limit of the number of trained personnel enlisted and commissioned that can be spared for the reserve indicated above owing to the very heavy demands for this type of men needed for other active operations of most important kinds. However, the department will endeavor to maintain a personnel reserve in your destroyer forces, consisting of something like one-fiftieth of the destroyer complement. This to be supplied from our naval reserves.

Another thing that the department recognizes is the necessity of sending all antisubmarine craft which can be spared from the home waters into active European waters, and when such craft become available will send them. In making the local assignments abroad of such forces, the department requests and will be guided by your advice, which should be given after consultation with the various Admiralties concerned as to priority of requirements.

The department is strongly of the opinion—based on recent experiences—that the question of supplying adequate guns and trained gun crews to merchant ships is one which can in no wise be treated as a minor issue. Coupled with a rigid system of inspection, this method is believed to constitute one of the most effective defensive submarine measures.

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After all the dispatches and information, after three years of war, to have a dispatch like that come from the Navy Department was one of the most discouraging things in my career. I thought that the average citizen on the street who had been reading the newspaper reports would have known better than to make a statement of that kind. I continued:

It announced, moreover, as its policy its willingness to cooperate in every way, and will consider the question of supplying additional naval forces of types other than antisubmarine craft whenever the advisability of so doing is justified. The department is also considering the outline of a scheme which it is hoped will allow of a greater degree of cooperation and ability to supply escort to vessels through the danger zone without interfering with the destroyers' other duties as much as does the present system of individual escort, and it will not displace the present method of handling merchant shipping from United States ports. Details when prevented (?) will be cabled.

Evidently the word "prevented" means "perfected." (Continuing reading:)

In the matter of construction, the department recognizes the necessity of pushing to the utmost the type of destroyer of the general specification recommended by you, and this it will do. 19023.

DANIELS,
Secretary of the Navy.

I would also call attention to the last sentence of the second paragraph of this dispatch, particularly in view of many public statements to the effect that my position abroad was a purely local one. The quotation referred to is this:

In making the local assignments abroad of such forces, the department requests and will be guided by your advice, which should be given after consultation with the various admiralties concerned as to priority of requirements.

When I received this message I was at Queenstown, commanding the Irish station during the absence of Admiral Bayly on leave; and, in view of the critical losses of ships which were being experienced every day off Queenstown, I felt once again that it was my duty to report to the ambassador the situation and the apparent unwillingness of the department to credit my reports and act upon my recommendations. In addition to sending further cables to the department, I therefore wrote the following letter to the ambassador, asking him once more to present the situation to the State Department.

Cable dispatch sent June 26, 1917:

To: American Ambassador, via Admiralty.
From: Admiral W. S. Sims.

No. 912. Admiral Sims requests delivery following message to American ambassador:

In view of serious character of statements contained in my correspondence forwarded to you by mail to-day suggest that it be confirmed by Cabinet officials before communicating to Washington, with a view of insuring support of British Embassy in Washington in case British Ambassador there is consulted in connection therewith.

[Letter to Ambassador Page.]

QUEENSTOWN, *June 25, 1917.*

MY DEAR AMBASSADOR: I consider it my duty to send you herewith for your information copies of a letter and certain messages which are typical of what I have been sending to the Navy Department.

You will see from the department's only reply, dated June 20, that I am not having any success in getting more vessels sent over into the critical area here.

All of the material assistance being organized by our Government will be futile if we do not take immediate steps to insure safe passage of such essential supplies through the submarine zone, that is, through the enemy's lines.

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It is useless for us to manufacture, grow, and build munitions, foods, and ships, and assemble and train soldiery, unless at the same time, and in time, we also take effective steps to insure that such measures will safely reach the points where it will help to defeat the enemy. If we attempt to furnish this help in a larger degree than the enemy can sink it, we might perhaps eventually accomplish our purpose, but the grave danger is that the Allies will be brought to terms before such a course could be carried out.

It remains a fact that at present the enemy is succeeding and we are failing. Ships are being sunk faster than they can be replaced by the building facilities of the world. This simply means that the enemy is winning the war. There is no mystery about that. The submarines are rapidly cutting the Allies lines of communication. When they are cut, or sufficiently interfered with, we must accept the enemy's terms.

It is a poor plan, indeed, that does not involve attacking the enemy's war craft or forcing them to attack ours. Stated briefly, the unsuccessful plan we are now pursuing is about as follows:

(*a*) Allowing the enemy to concentrate his efforts exclusively against wholly inadequately protected shipping (our necessary lines of communication) in a zone through which our supplies now pass and must continue to pass.

(*b*) Maintaining a relatively large number of our available antisubmarine forces on the great stretch of American coast lines which lie over 3,000 miles away in areas in which the enemy not only is not operating, but can not profitably operate.

The enemy is perfectly content to have us protect our great stretch of unattacked coast lines as long as he will never have to, and in fact could not afford to, approach these distant lines in order to defeat us.

Mr. Lloyd George was perfectly right in saving that what we needed was ships, ships, ships, and more ships, but he didn't explain that those ships needed are of two kinds, namely:

First. Ships to oppose the enemy's war vessels.

Second. Ships to carry the supplies we must have.

The necessity for both in adequate numbers is vital, but either one alone is unavailing.

The fact must be thoroughly realized that the war is being, and must continue to be, fought exclusively on this side of the Atlantic, and that it will be won by us, or lost, within the next few months.

It can not be won by any accumulation of naval forces on our coast lines or in any other areas except those in which the war is being fought, and must continue to be fought.

It must be lost, or very unsatisfactory terminated, if there is not an immediate and sufficient accumulation of antisubmarine forces here in the ctitical areas. This for the simple reason that, if the shipping losses continue at the present rate—the Allies can not win.

I feel that I would fail in my duty if I did not continue to keep you informed of the situation.

SIMS.

Practically the same information as was given the ambassador in this letter was transmitted to the department in two cables of June 28, and in the further cable of June 29, which are as follows:

Sent June 28, 1917:

To Secretary of Navy, through Admiralty.

Protection of all allied shipping in time—I repeat in time—is present mission. Whatever efforts we can exert must be put into operation at once if they are to be effective. Reliable submarines would be of great use to strengthen British submarine patrols and also as scouts ahead of convoys. All submarines we send to Irish Coast in time will therefore be invaluable in insuring success of convoy system and hence success of war, provided these submarines are supplied from America and based upon their own mother ships.

SIMS.

Sent June 28, 1917:

To Secretary of the Navy, through Admiralty, from Queenstown.

I submit that if submarine campaign is to be defeated it must be by offensive measures. The enemy submarine mission must be destruction of shipping and avoidance of antisubmarine craft.

Concerning department's reference to a scheme for protection of merchant shipping which will not interfere with present escort duties, I submit that the time element

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alone prevents utilization of any new antisubmarine invention. The campaign may easily be lost before any such schemes can come into effective operation. The enemy is certainly counting on maximum effort being exerted before long nights and bad weather of autumn, that is in the next three months. Heaviest effort may be anticipated in July and August. I again submit that the protection of our coast lines and of allies shipping must necessarily be carried out in field of enemy activity if it is to be effective. The mission of the Allies must be to force submarines to give battle. Hence no operations in home waters should take precedence over or be allowed to diminish the maximum effort we can exert in area in which enemy is operating, and must continue to operate in order to succeed.

SIMS.

Sent June 29, 1917:

To Secretary of Navy, through Admiralty.

No. 54. The situation is now not only critical but dangerous. I now recommend sending immediately in addition to all destroyers, yachts, and tugs, also gunboats of *Denver* and *Paducah* and *Austria* and similar classes. The necessity is to force the submarine to fight and divert it from shipping if Allies main forces, naval and military, are to be preserved for action.

SIMS.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Sims, it is about 5 minutes of 12 o'clock. I suggest, if you will, that we suspend here until to-morrow.

Admiral SIMS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will stand adjourned until 10 o'clock to-morrow.

Thereupon, at 11.56 a. m., the subcommittee adjourned until to-morrow, Thursday, March 11, 1920, at 10 o'clock a. m.

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NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

THURSDAY, MARCH 11, 1920.

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON NAVAL AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 o'clock a. m., in room 235, Senate Office Building, Senator Frederick Hale presiding.

Present: Senators Hale (chairman), Ball, and Trammell.

The CHAIRMAN. the committee will come to order. Admiral Sims, will you proceed.

STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL WILLIAM S. SIMS—Resumed.

Admiral SIMS. At the close of my testimony yesterday I had been considering the seriousness of the situation on the other side, and I had just read a letter which I thought necessary to submit to the American ambassador in London so that he could transmit it to the Government.

In connection with a number of cablegrams which have been submitted, you may have noticed that some of those were sent via the Admiralty in London. I think it might be well to explain that the reason of that was that because at that time we did not have any secret code in which we had confidence, we had codes in operations that had been in operation for many years and codes that were not as well constructed as they should be, and pending the formulation of proper codes we sent a number of cablegrams through the Admiralty, but with our own key so that they were just as secret.

Continuing my testimony, there was one cable of June 28, 1917, to the Secretary of the Navy, which I had not read at the close of the session of yesterday. It is as follows:

To: Secretary of the Navy.
(Through Admiralty.)
From: Queenstown.
Sent: June 28, 1917.
Admiralty for Secretary Navy, Washington, providing it meets Admiralty's full approval.
From: Admiral Sims.

Referring to department's opinion reported in last two cables to the effect that adequate armament and trained crews constitute one of the most effective defensive antisubmarine measures I again submit with all possible stress the following based on extended war experience. The measures demanded, if enemy defeat in time is to be assured, not defensive but offensive defensive. The merchantmen's inherent weakness is lack of speed and protection. Guns are no defense against torpedo attack without warning, which is necessarily the enemy method of attack against armed ships. In this area alone during the last six weeks 30 armed ships were sunk by torpedoes without submarine being seen, although three of them were escorted each by a single destroyer. The result would of course have been the same no matter how many guns these ships carried or what their caliber. Three mystery ships heavily manned

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by expert naval crews with much previous experience with submarine attack have recently been torpedoed without warning. Another case within the month of mystery ship engaging submarine with gunfire at 6,000 yards, but submarine submerged and approached unseen and torpedoed ship at close range. The ineffectiveness of heavy batteries against submarine attack is conclusively shown by Admiralty's practice always sending destroyers to escort their men-of-war. The comparative immunity of the relatively small number of American ships, especially liners, is believed here to be due to the enemy's hopes that the pacifist movement will succeed. Cases are on record of submarines making successful gun attacks from advantageous sun position against armed ships without ship being able to see submarine.

I submit that if submarine campaign is to be defeated it must be by offensive measures. The enemy submarine mission must be destruction of shipping and avoidance of antisubmarine craft. Enemy submarines are now using for their final approach an auxiliary periscope less than 2 inches in diameter. This information just acquired. All of the experience in this submarine campaign to date demonstrates that it would be a seriously dangerous misapprehension to base our action on the assumption that any armament on merchantmen is any protection against submarines which are willing to use their torpedoes. The British have now definitely decided the adoption to the maximum practicable extent convoys from 16 to 20 ships. This is an offensive measure against submarines as the latter will be subject to the attack of our antisubmarine craft whenever they come within torpedoing distance of convoyed merchantmen. Moreover, it permits of concentrated attack by our forces and obliges the enemy to disperse his forces to cover the various routes of approach.

Concerning department's reference to a scheme for protection of merchant shipping which will not interfere with present escort duties, I submit that the time element alone prevents utilization of any new antisubmarine invention. The campaign may easily be lost before any such schemes can come into effective operation. The enemy is certainly counting on maximum effort being exerted before long nights and bad weather of autumn, that is in next three months. Heaviest effort may be anticipated in July and August. I again submit that protection of our coast lines and of allied shipping must necessarily be carried out in field of enemy activity if it is to be effective. The mission of the Allies must be to force submarines to give battle. Hence no operations in home waters should take precedence over or be allowed to diminish the maximum effort we can exert in area in which enemy is operating, and must continue to operate in order to succeed.

SIMS.

Similar cables to those just read were sent on June 30, July 1, and July 2. The following message was then received from the department. Only that part of the message dealing with the sending of reenforcements is here quoted:

Cablegram May 1.
From: Secretary of Navy.
To: Alusna, London.
For: Vice Admiral Sims. No. 44.
Received: July 2, 1917.

With reference to your previous cables, the Navy Department is fully aware of the urgency of sending all possible antisubmarine craft to European waters, and is doing its utmost to meet demands. Five destroyers will sail about the 1st of August from Asiatic waters, whence they have been ordered to duty in European waters. The Navy Department will assign seven cruisers for convoy duty in accordance with Admiralty's request.

There is little to comment on this message. I still was unable to believe that the department could possibly be aware of the urgency of the situation and still take no more action than was taken. The fact that five old destroyers would start a long cruise from the Asiatic station about a month hence was little satisfaction. As will be brought out later, the statement that seven cruisers would be assigned to convoy duty was the first intimation of cooperation in this work, the necessity of which had been impressed upon the department for more than two months previously. In fact, the convoy system had been in operation at this time for over a month, to the extent that British cruisers were available.

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I therefore again pointed out in a message of July 3 that any character of light craft would be suitable for antisubmarine work, and that the primary consideration was that of time. [Reading:]

From: Vice Admiral Sims.
To: Secretary of the Navy.
Through: Admiralty.
Sent: July 3, 1917.

No. 73. Your No. 44. If enemy submarine pressure anticipated in July, August, and September is to be thwarted, the necessity for additional craft immediately is imperative. The additional craft are needed not only for actual offensive duty but to insure safety of troop and other convoys. Can not all destroyers Atlantic coast be sent and all revenue cutters? Are there no armed tugs available? Even the small number of fleet tugs would help. I fully realize the pressure on department to allocate forces to France, Mediterranean, and other localities, but am particularly anxious that such effort as we can exert should have maximum effect in meeting the general allied situation. The ocean approach routes to channel and Irish Sea are critical areas, and with *Dixie* at Beregaven and *Melville* at Queenstown and our personnel in that locality thoroughly familiar with situation, methods of operation, and administration, and all using same codes and methods of communication, it will be conducive to maximum efficiency and effectiveness of new forces joining to concentrate them in same area, keeping all United States forces together.

SIMS.

Many more messages could be quoted among those which were sent in July and August, dealing with the same subject in almost tne same terms, but it is believed that it would be merely unnecessarily taking up the time of the committee to read them.

A message received from the Navy Department, on July 5, indicated that they were at last beginning to perceive that there was a war being fought in European waters. This message of July 5 was as follows:

[Cablegram.]

From: Navy Department.
Via: Commodore Gaunt.
For: Vice Admiral Sims.
Received: July 5, 1917.

Eight patrol boats under Capt. Fletcher due to arrive French coast 5th July. Ten more yachts will sail about 15th July to join them. Five coal-burning destroyers, *Preston* type, will sail in short time to base temporarily on Azores. Seven vessels, *Denver* class, detailed to assist British merchant convoy operations from this side. Notice will be given as far in advance as possible of dates of departure of troop ships and convoy. Twelve trawlers and one yacht under Capt. Magruder will leave for European waters about 10th August. Department is strongly impressed with the necessity for adequate antisubmarine patrol in and off entrance to Gibraltar. Ten vessels, *Birmingham*, *Chester*, *Salem*, *Sacramento*, *Yankton*, *Machias*, *Castine*, *Paducah*, *Wheeling*, *Marietta*, are available to send across if considered that they can be of value. Could they perform sufficiently valuable service to warrant sending over? Where would they base? What duty would they perform? Would they require coal from this side? Department is prepared to supply two or four 14-inch guns similar to those on *New York* as per Admiralty's request. Guns can be delivered ZT slides at once. So far no intimation as to any definite plans for future operations of naval forces. In view of requests made and our efforts to respond must insist that any plans operation under consideration be submitted for our study.

As has been observed, the letter sent to the Secretary contained the plan that was proposed for the suppression of the submarine campaign, and it remained the same throughout the war, so that the statement that is made in this telegram that they do not know what the plans are, is, to say the least, extraordinary.

Five days after this message was received, on July 10, 1917, the Secretary of the Navy sent me in a cable dispatch the first full state-

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ment of the Navy Department policy which had been received. This message was as follows:

From: Secretary of Navy.
To: Vice Admiral Sims, U. S. S. *Melville.*
Received: July 10, 1917.

The following letter from the Secretary to the Secretary of State is quoted for your information and guidance as an index of the policy of the department in relation to cooperation of our naval forces with those of our allies: "After careful consideration of the present naval situation, taken in connection with possible future situations which might arise, the Navy Department is prepared to announce as its policy, in so far as it relates to the Allies: First, the most hearty cooperation with the Allies to meet the present submarine situation in European or other waters compatible with an adequate defense of our own home waters. Second, the most hearty cooperation with the Allies to meet any future situation arising during the present war. Third, the realization that while a successful termination of the present war must always be the first allied aim and will probably result in diminished tension throughout the world, the future position of the United States must in no way be jeopardized by any disintegration of our main fighting fleet. Fourth, the conception that the present main military role of the United States naval force lies in its safeguarding the line of communications of the Allies.

In pursuing this aim there will be generally speaking two classes of vessels engaged, minor craft and major craft, and two rôles of action, first offensive and second defensive. Fifth, in pursuing the rôle set forth in paragraph 4 the department can not too strongly insist that in its opinion the offensive must always be the dominant note in any general plans of strategy prepared. But as the primary rôle in all offensive preparations must perforce belong to the allied powers, the Navy Department announces as its policy that in general it is willing to accept any joint plan of action of the Allies deemed necessary to meet immediate need. Sixth, pursuant to the above general policy, the Navy Department announces as its general plan of action, the following: "One, its willingness to send its minor fighting forces, composed of destroyers, cruisers, submarine chasers, auxiliaries in any number not incompatible with home needs, and to any field of action deemed expedient by the joint allied admiralties which would not involve a violation of our present State policy. Two, its unwillingness as a matter of policy to separate any division from the main fleet for service abroad although it is willing to send the entire battleship fleet abroad to act as a united, but cooperating unit when after joint consultations of all admiralties concerned the emergency is deemed to warrant it and the extra tension imposed upon the line of communications due to the increase of fighting ships in European waters will stand the strain imposed upon it. Three, its willingness to discuss more fully plans for joint operations."

JOSEPHUS DANIELS.

I will discuss this message more fully later, and then will read my reply when the general question of policy is taken up. I wish here merely to state that the policy, as herein stated, is only to be judged by actual results in carrying it out and they speak for themselves. I particularly wish to stress the point that this first definite statement of policy was received on July 10, a few days over three months after we had declared war, as stated in my original letter of January 7. The astounding features of this policy, however, were that, while it stated our intention to cooperate to the fullest degree, still such cooperation was conditioned upon, first, an adequate defense of our own waters; and, second, the future position of the United States after this war was finished. I am wholly unable to conceive of any war policy, particularly in a world war of this nature, which was certain to exhaust all participants, with the possible exception of ourselves, being based upon the requirements of any possible future war.

As an illustration of the fact that the department was kept fully informed at all times of the progress of the submarine war, I will read you one cable, that of July 5, which is typical of the continuous

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flow of messages which were sent with regard to the actual operations of submarines and the losses of merchant ships.

Sent: July 5, 1917.
To: Secretary of the Navy.
Through: Admiralty.
No. 81.

Total losses British, allied, and neutral week ending July, 128,500 tons. Apparently 16 large submarines have been out, but so far impossible to draw conclusions as to reasons for diminished activity. Isolated cases are reported of ships attacked longitude 29° and 26°. Submarine mine layers not very active. Seventy-seven mines have been picked up, which is way below weekly average. Fifteen reports of encounters with enemy submarines in British waters, two by destroyers, three by special-service ships, one by submarine, four by auxiliary patrol, one by seaplain, four by merchant vessels.

SIMS.

It is my recollection that a similar telegram was sent every day.

Thus far I have quoted only from my cables to the Navy Department, with the exception of the first letter of April 19, which I read, in order to show completely the situation was covered from the very beginning. Because of the delays inevitable in letter correspondence, all important matters had been dealt with through the medium of cable dispatches, during these first critical months. My letters to the department were, therefore, only confirmatory. As a letter can, however, often give a better general résumé of the whole situation than a cable, I propose now to read you parts of some of my letters sent during this same period to the department.

As I said before, if after the conclusion of my testimony the committee would like to have complete copies of all the records that I refer to here by their paragraphs, I will be prepared to give them to them.

In a personal letter to the Secretary of the Navy, on the 8th of May, for example, I gave an account of the conferences held during my visit to Paris in the first week of that month. I will quote only one or two of the paragraphs, the remainder being merely an elaboration of messages already read:

MAY 8, 1917.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Ever since I arrived here I have been wanting to write you personally concerning certain details of my duties on this mission, but, as I am sure you will understand, I have been most strenuously occupied, both in my military duties and with the unavoidable official functions, which are, however, of importance as a means of getting in contact with those who have access to various lines of information.

In view of the critical condition created by the submarine campaign, I have, as you directed, used the cable liberally, and I have taken pains that these cables give as clear idea of the situation as possible, I believe there is little to add to them.

Twice within a short period the prime minister has visited Paris, the last time from May 3 to May 6. He was accompanied by Lord Robert Cecil, Field Marshal Robertson, the first sea lord of the Admiralty, Admiral Jellicoe, and many other officials.

There can be no doubt that there is a great anxiety as to the final outcome of the war. This anxiety is caused by the present success of the German submarine campaign. If that could be put down or diminished, all other difficulties without exception, could be met.

This, I believe, can be done only by an increase in the number of vessels operating against the submarines. Great Britain is turning out destroyers and antisubmarine craft to their maximum capacity, and also building 1,000 bomb-throwing guns and other appliances, but these will take some time to complete.

You will, I am sure, be pleased to know that my visit to Paris was very successful, as it resulted in a complete agreement between the French and British Navy Depart-

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ment as to the manner in which our destroyers and other forces should be employed in the campaign against the enemy. Our force and its supply train should act as a unit in the area of the greatest activity of the submarines.

Very sincerely, yours, ——— ———.

Hon. JOSEPHUS DANIELS,
Secretary of the Navy, Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

In my letter of April 27 I had pointed out:

The military situation almost daily grows more critical, as is indicated by my cabled reports of merchant tonnage lost. The critical area continues to the southward and westward of Ireland.

Similarly, there are certain paragraphs in my letter of May 11 of interest in this connection:

12. I have considered it vitally important, and in this decision am in complete agreement with both the French and British Admiralties that our destroyer forces should not only remain concentrated and operate together but, what is more important, that they should remain essentially mobile. The destroyer is by far the greatest enemy of the submarine; and I am particularly anxious that our forces should be used to the greatest possible effect in assisting in putting down the enemy submarine campaign. I am prompted in this decision not only because it is manifestly the most effective assistance which we can render at this time to the common cause, but also the secondary reason that such a course is certain to be productive of the greatest distinction for the United States naval service.

It is therefore my aim, as reported to the department, to keep our forces, to the extreme possible degree, independent of any shore station, in order that the entire force with its mobile base can be moved at will and follow the center of enemy submarine pressure.

13. As reported by cable dispatch, the situation remains critical, owing primarily to the enemy submarine campaign. The question at issue is, and must remain, the control of our lines of communication. It is of course true that the primary naval mission should always be the destruction of the enemy's fleet, but this must not blind us to the fact that its destructions may often not be an effective form of pressure in itself, but merely a means to an end.

The only apparent solution to the submarine issue lies in numbers of antisubmarine craft with a view to sufficiently dispersing the enemy submarine effort so that shipping losses will be reduced below the critical point.

And again I said:

29. It is in view of the above and of the large amount of supporting evidence obtained that I have so urgently recommended that our primary military effort should be concentrated in getting the maximum number of antisubmarine craft of all description into the enemy's main area of activity.

In my general reports of June 1 and 15, I again especially emphasized the importance of immediate full cooperation with the Allies in meeting the submarine menace. I will read you those paragraphs of interest in this connection. [Reading:]

It is gratifying to be able to report that the operations of our forces in these waters have proved not only very satisfactory but also of marked value to the Allies in overcoming the submarine menace. The equipment and construction of our ships has proved adequate and efficient, and the personnel has shown an unusually high degree of enthusiasm and ability to cope with the situation presented. It is hoped that the destroyer force operating in these waters can be greatly increased in the near future, as this will unquestionably prove to be the most effective assistance which we can afford to the allied cause at the present time. As previously reported, it is considered of the utmost importance to the success of the operations of our forces that they remain concentrated. The material difficulties and resulting interference with efficient operations which would be involved if they were concentrated beyond reach of their own floating bases would seriously impair their military efficiency.

During three years of war the other allies have gradually established advanced bases suited to their requirements, and hence they are in a better position to operate over widely dispersed areas. By keeping our forces concentrated with a view to their being self-sustaining to the maximum degree, they will not only be able to render the greatest possible assistance to the allied cause, but also the future distinction accruing to our service of such special work as they may perform will be better assured. Our

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forces based on Queenstown continue operations as previously reported. Their program has now been changed to five days out and three days in, which will result in better care of the machinery, and hence greater reliability of service.

A considerable share of the time on duty is now spent in escorting the most valuable ships through the danger zone. Prior to the arrival of our forces, it was impracticable to meet the demands of the offensive campaign against submarines, and also to escort all valuable cargoes. The larger the force, the more the valuable cargoes which can be escorted.

As far as possible the escorting is done in relays, as previously reported, thereby not leaving any areas without patrol craft. Valuable cargoes are escorted by a single destroyer, but especially valuable ones require two and sometimes three escorts, and it is apparent that it is very difficult to handle such escorting duty and maintain any prearranged program of patrol.

My letter reports of June 8, 15, and 20, I will be found to contain almost similar paragraphs, with the exception of their possibly being more forcibly worded. I believe it to be unnecessary to read them at this time, as they are a repetition of the dispatches or letters already read you.

In a letter of June 29, however, I made a complete review of the situation at that time, with the Allies rapidly losing the war. It shows also the urgency with which I was recommending the concentration of our forces in the war zone. I will therefore read this letter in full:

LONDON, *June 29, 1917.*

From: Commander United States naval forces operating in European waters.
To: Secretary of the Navy (Operations).
Subject: General report concerning military situation.

I feel that there is little to add to my recent cable despatches which, in view of the importance of the time element, have been made full and detailed.

2. To sum up my dispatches briefly, I would repeat that I consider that the military situation is very grave indeed on account of the success of the enemy submarine campaign.

If the shipping losses continue as they have during the past four months, it is submitted that the Allies will be forced to dire straits indeed, if they will not actually be forced into an unsatisfactory peace.

The present rate of destruction is very much greater than the rate of building, and the shortage of tonnage is already so great that the efficiency of the naval forces is already reduced by lack of oil. Orders have just been given to use three-fifths speed, except in cases of emergency. This simply means that the enemy is winning the war.

3. My reasons for being so insistent in my cable despatches have been because of my conviction that measures of cooperation which we may take will be inefficient if they are not put into operation immediately—that is, within a month.

There is every reason to believe that the maximum enemy submarine effort will occur between now and the 1st of November (1917), reaching its height probably during the latter part of July, if not earlier.

4. There is certainly no sovereign solution for the submarine menace except through well-established methods of warfare based upon fundamental military principles.

5. It is submitted that the cardinal military principle of concentration of effort is at present being pursued by the enemy and not by the Allies.

6. We are dispersing our forces while the enemy is concentrating his. The enemy's submarine mission is and must continue to be the destruction of merchant shipping. The limitations of submarines and the distances over which they must operate prevent them from attacking our naval forces, that is, antisubmarine craft. They can not afford to engage antisubmarine craft with guns; they must use torpedoes. If they should do so to any considerable extent their limited supply would greatly reduce their period of operation away from base and the number of merchantmen they could destroy. Their object is to avoid contact with antisubmarine craft. This they can almost always do, as the submarine can see the surface craft at many times the distance the surface craft can see a periscope, particularly one less than two inches in diameter.

Moreover, the submarine greatly fears the antisubmarine craft because of the great danger of the depth charges. Our tactics should therefore be such as to force the submarine to incur this danger in order to get within range of merchantmen.

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7. It therefore seems to go without question that the only course for us to pursue is to revert to the ancient practice of convoy. This will be purely an offensive measure because if we concentrate our shipping into convoys and protect it with our naval forces we will thereby force the enemy in order to carry out his mission to encounter naval forces, which are not embarrassed with valuable cargoes, and which are a great danger to the submarine. At present our naval forces are wearing down their personnel and material in an attempted combination of escorting single ships, when they can be picked up, and also of attempting to seek and offensively engage an enemy whose object is to avoid such encounters.

With the convoy system the conditions will be reversed. Although the enemy may easily know when our convoys sail, he can never know the course they will pursue or the route of approach to their destinations. Our escorting forces will thus be able to work on a deliberate, prearranged plan, preserving their oil supplies and energy, while the enemy will be forced to disperse his forces and seek us. In a word, the handicap we now labor under will be shifted to the enemy; we will have adopted the essential principle of concentration while the enemy will lose it.

8. The most careful and thorough study of the convoy system made by the British Admiralty shows clearly that while we may have some losses under this system, owing to lack of adequate number of antisubmarine craft, they nevertheless will not be critical as they are at present.

9. I again submit that if the Allied campaign is to be viewed as a whole, there is no necessity for any high-sea protection on our own coast. The submarine as a type of war vessel possesses no unusual characteristics different than those of other naval craft, with the single exception of its ability to submerge for a limited time. The difficulty of maintaining distant bases is the same for the submarine as it is for other craft. As long as we maintain control of the sea as far as surface craft are concerned, there can be no fear of the enemy establishing submarine bases in the Western Hemisphere.

10. To take an extreme illustration, if the enemy could be led or forced into diverting part of his submarine effort to the United States coast, or to any other area distant from the critical area surrounding the coast of France and the United Kingdom, the antisubmarine campaign would at once be won. The enemy labors under severe difficulties in carrying out his campaign even in this restricted area, owing to the material limitations and the distances they must operate from their bases, through extremely dangerous localities. The extent of the United States coast line and the distances between its principal commercial ports, preclude the possibility of any submarine effort in that part of the world except limited operations of diversion designed to affect public opinion, and thereby hold our forces from the vital field of action.

11. The difficulties confronting the convoy system are, of course, considerable. They are primarily involved in the widely dispersed ports of origin of merchant shipping; the difficulty of communication by cable; the time involved by communications by mail; and the difficulties of obtaining a cooperation and coordination between Allied Governments.

As reported by cable dispatch, the British Government has definitely reached the decision to put the convoy system into operation as far as its ability goes. Convoys from Hampton Roads, Canada, Mediterranean, and Scandinavian countries are already in operation. Convoys from New York will be put in operation as soon as ships are available. The British Navy is already strained beyond its capacity, and I therefore urgently recommend that we cooperate at least to the extent of handling convoys from New York.

12. The dangers to convoys from high-sea raiders is remote, but, of course, must be provided against, and hence the necessity for escorting cruisers or reserve battleships. The necessity is even greater, however, for antisubmarine craft in the submarine war zone.

13. As stated in my dispatches, the arming of merchantmen is not a solution of the submarine menace, it serves the single purpose of forcing the submarine to use torpedoes instead of guns and bombs. The facts that men-of-war can not proceed safely at sea without escort, and that in the Queenstown avenue of approach alone in the past six weeks there have been 30 armed merchantmen sunk, without having seen the submarines at all before the attack, seems to be conclusive evidence. A great mass of other evidence and war experience could be collected in support of the above.

14. The week ending June 19 has been one of great submarine activity. Evidence indicates that 15 to 19 of the largest and latest submarines have been operating, of which 10 to 13 were operating in the critical area to the west and southwest of the British Isles. The above numbers are exclusive of the smaller and earlier type of submarines and submarines carrying mines alone. Two submarines are working to

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the westward of the Straits of Gibralter. A feature of the week was the sinking of ships as far west as 19°. Three merchant ship convoys are enroute from Hampton Roads the last one, consisting of 18 ships, having sailed on the 19th of June. One hundred and sixteen moored mines have been swept up during the week.

Twenty-two reports of encounters with enemy submarines in waters surrounding the United Kingsdom have been reported during the week—three by destroyers, two by cruisers, two by mystery ships, one by French gunboat, three by submarines, nine by auxiliary patrol vessels, one by sea plane and one by merchant vessel.

There is attached copy of report of operations by antisubmarinecraft based on Queenstown.

WM. S. SIMS.

That is just a sample of similar letters that were sent in.

All of my letter reports, throughout the rest of the war, continued to give, week by week, a full statement of the military situation, and of the progress of the campaign against submarines; these but would add but little to the points already emphasized. I, therefore, propose to read passages from only one or two more letters, dealing with specific phases of the situation.

My letter of July 7 emphasized the fact that the war was being lost:

Letter No. 18, July 7, 1917:

I can add little to my cable dispatches concerning the general military situation. Briefly stated, I consider that at the present moment we are losing the war. This is due to the success of the enemy submarine campaign, the demands which it places upon our available Allied forces in the protection of essential lines of communication and the wholly inadequate number of forces of all descriptions both to meet the submarine menace and at the same time to insure readiness for any other unsuspected developments.

I submit that if we are to fulfill our obligation to the allied cause, we should sacrifice every other interest to placing in the critical areas, the maximum number of ships which can possibly be assembled.

At the end of July I attended a conference of the heads of the Allied navies, held in Paris, at the time of the meeting of the Supreme War Council of the Allies, attended by the premiers of the Allied countries by the and heads of their respective armies. My report of these conferences brings out some significant features of the extent of the cooperation which was then not being given by the United States to the Allied cause as a whole.

Letter No. 52:

JULY 30, 1917.

From: Vice Admiral Sims.
To: Chief of Naval Operations.
Subject: Naval and military conferences at Paris, July 24 to 27.

At the request of the French and British Admiralties, I attended certain naval and military conferences in Paris between July 24 and 27.

The naval conferences consisted in general discussion and exchange of information concerning the prosecution of the allied antisubmarine campaign.

There were present at these conferences, the French minister of marine, the French chief of naval staff, and other leading officials of the French Admiralty; Admiral Jellicoe with staff, representing the British Admiralty; an Italian admiral with staff, who is both the commander in chief afloat and the chief of the Italian naval staff. Japan was represented by the Japanese naval attaché, Paris.

The first question before the naval conference was a revision of the agreements made sometime ago at a conference held at Corfu. At that conference it was decided that each Nation should be assigned certain zones in the Mediterranean, the senior allied officer commanding in each zone.

The nature of the enemy campaign has shown the necessity for a more central allied organization, and hence the proposal at this conference was made by the French minister of marine that all antisubmarine operations should be put under the general command of the British vice admiral commanding at Malta. The plan was intended in no wise to interfere with the various allied commands, particularly of

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heavy forces. The proposal submitted was merely that one officer should take general charge of the antisubmarine operations and that all other allied flag officers in the Mediterranean should cooperate with him and furnish him all assistance possible. The area under discussion did not include Gibraltar, which is under a British admiral who commands the waters in that neighborhood.

This suggestion of the French minister of marine received unanimous approval.

As both France and England felt that the forces of Italy available for antisubmarine work were not being employed to the best advantage, this point was then taken up for discussion. That is, particularly as to whether Italy could not allocate more forces to antisubmarine work.

It was recognized that all submarines operating in the Mediterranean now base on Pola or Cattaro at the head of the Adriatic, and that hence every effort should be put forth toward preventing their egress from, and ingress into, that sea. England has over 100 drifters operating at the mouth of the Adriatic attempting to maintain what might be called a mobile barrage. That is, they constantly patrol across the Otranto Straits using their nets for the purpose of intercepting submarines. That the work of these drifters is of concern to the enemy has been proven by the raids made upon them by Austrian cruiser forces. The primary demand is therefore for destroyers and similar craft to protect the drifter service.

All French destroyers in the Mediterranean which can possibly be spared from vital escort duty are entirely available for duty with the Otranto barrage.

The demand for British destroyers in the North Sea and on the approach trade routes to France and the United Kingdom was so great that it is impossible to assign any British destroyers to Adriatic duty in spite of the fact that British as well as French lines of communication in the Mediterranean are constantly harassed by enemy submarines operating from the Adriatic.

Out of 100 British destroyers, which is the maximum number which can be considered as available for the British Grand Fleet in case of a general action, 55 are on constant patrol duty in the North Sea, an average of 15 are at all times under repairs, leaving but 30 in what might be called a constant state of readiness with the Grand Fleet, though some of these on patrol duty could join the fleet before an action took place, though not with full supply of fuel oil.

Against this number the German High Sea Fleet probably has not less than 140 destroyers available for a high sea action. It has been necessary in the last few days to withdraw destroyers from the Grand Fleet to protect new mine barrages created near Ostend and Zeebrugge for the purpose of protecting the monitors and other naval forces which are assisting in the general combined military and naval attack on the above mentioned German bases.

A general discussion occurred as to a permanent material barrage to be attempted across the Straits of Otranto but it was unanimously agreed that such a barrage would be wholly ineffective if it could not be adequately protected by surface craft.

The Italian admiral stated definitely that he could not allocate any destroyers for this service on account of the danger of a high sea action between the Austrian and Italian fleets. For this reason he dared not risk a single destroyer, and furthermore must keep them in the highest state of readiness at all times for fleet action. He said he realized fully the pressing need for antisubmarine operations, but that he was forced to view the other considerations as paramount.

In the general discussion it developed, and in fact the Italian admiral admitted, that he was prompted in his naval policy primarily by the political pressure which is constantly brought to bear upon him in his own country. The fact was pressed upon him that destroyers on duty in protecting the barrage would be in no sense immobilized for duty in case of an action with the Austrian fleet, and this for the simple reason that they would be at all times between the enemy and their own fleet. It was also pointed out that the Italian admiral in his discussion had not taken into consideration the French destroyers who were always available for any combined fleet action.

As stated above, however, it was apparent that the principal consideration governing the Italian admiral's statement was the political pressure under which he must operate.

The effect of raids on the eastern Italian coast, and the effect on public opinion in case even a single vessel should be lost, were considerations, which, to him, in view of the conditions existing in his country were paramount.

It was finally agreed, however, that the British admiral from Malta—who was present at this conference—would, after consultation with the French admiral in the Mediterranean and other allied flag officers afloat in that area, proceed to Italy and attempt to reach an agreement as to the employment of such forces as were available.

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The Italian admiral suggested the desirability of an offensive against the Austrian bases, particularly Catarro. He agreed that the waters in that region were too deep for mining and that the relative strength of heavy forces available with those of the enemy were not sufficient to warrant sacrifices in a purely naval attack upon land fortifications. He stated that he thought the attack would be primarily in the air. This question, of course, depends entirely upon the number of available aircraft, which are wholly inadequate.

Italy stated that she intended to make attacks on Catarro from the air, but it is apparent that the number of craft available will never result in effective success.

The Italian point of view seems to be one of considering her own forces solely and not of considering the other allied forces available, particularly the fact, for instance, that the British drifter squadron is, in effect, an allied scouting force for the Italian fleet.

The question of a fixed material barrage across the Straits of Otranto depends entirely upon the availability and transport of material. Even if the material were available it was estimated that it would take at least 40 weeks to transport it to Italy from England by rail.

The Italian admiral also showed an inclination to view destroyers as a type of craft which must be constantly husbanded. They could not be considered as effective weapons unless they were kept constantly under overhaul and repair. I called attention to the fact that while this was to a certain extent a view held before the war, still that the developments of the war had shown the view to be unsound.

I pointed out the duty being performed by American destroyers (which was taken up immediately after the cruise across the Atlantic) and stated that in spite of their constant and strenuous duty at sea, I nevertheless considered them available at any time for the duty for which they were primarily created; that is, offensive duty in connection with high sea action.

In this connection I may state that barring the expression of professional opinion such as that just indicated, I took no part in the discussion of the political or military relations governing the operations of the various antisubmarine forces in the Mediterranean.

It was impossible to obtain any promises at all from the Italian admiral concerning the use of his destroyers for other than holding them in reserve in case of a high fleet action, and it was apparent, as stated above, that the primary consideration governing his opinions were of a domestic-political nature.

In connection with the above it was brought out in the conference that 14 Italian destroyers remained at anchor at Brindisi for extended periods during the month of July.

As stated above, the only definite decision reached by the conference was that the British admiral at Malta would take over the direction of the anitsubmarine operations in the Mediterranean subject to general approval of, and coordination with, the French commander in chief in those waters.

It was brought out that the relative allied situation as regards destroyers in the Adriatic or in waters immediately adjacent thereto is 34 Italian, 10 French, and 22 Austrians. As compared with this situation, in case of unexpected high sea action in the North Sea, England could probably not count upon more than 50 destroyers against about 140 German destroyers. England has already sent to Italy two monitors, three submarines, and a large quantity of aviation material.

A general discussion followed concerning various questions in connection with the antisubmarine campaign. The first point considered was the problem presented by the use by the enemy of large type submarines of the nature of the *Deutschland* class carrying two 5.9-inch guns and a large number of torpedoes—perhaps 30. It is understood that a number of this class are under construction and that four will be ready for sea toward the last of this year. As reported to the department, one vessel, something of this type has been operating in the general vicinity of the Azores for some time, using captured neutral or other merchant vessels as a floating base. It is believed that the only answer to such a move on the part of the enemy (which could not be an extensive one for sometime) is the convoy system of escorting each convoy by a cruiser which would prevent the above type of submarine from using their guns, and hence force them to a restricted role with torpedoes only.

The available destroyers of the allied powers are wholly insufficient to attempt any more extensive high sea escort work than that now, or soon to be, in operation. Even the extent to which this duty is being carried on now greatly restricts all contemplated strictly offensive plans. That is, against submarines themselves at, or near, their bases, and to the exclusion of immediate protection of trade.

Concerning this new type of submarine, we only need consider their operations outside of the areas which are now commonly termed the submarine zone, because within that zone the destroyer escorts will prove effective, providing the convoy system can be put into full operation.

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The relatively small numbers of the new type and the large areas over which they must operate outside of the submarine zone, will greatly restrict the menace which they will present.

If shipping is concentrated in convoys, the routes of which, the submarine can determine only by scouting, it is believed that success on their part will occur only in isolated instances, and, in the presence of a cruiser (which will prevent the use of the submarine's guns) it is not believed that the losses they can inflict will be critical. For example, a submarine of this nature might be able to approach a convoy during daylight and fire two or three torpedoes, but the cruiser which would immediately proceed in that direction on a widely zigzagging course, would prevent succeeding attacks in the same arc of approach. At night fall, if the cruiser has thoroughly kept the submarine under in the direction of its approach and if the convoy makes a radical change of course for some hours, it is doubted whether a second torpedo attack could be carried out the same day or night.

England has sent a mystery ship and two submarines to the Azores, and it is hoped that the United States will also send two submarines and a mystery ship to this locality at least for the time being.

The advisability of the United States sending one of her older battleships with perhaps one or two small auxiliary craft to the Azores to prevent the use of those islands as a base during the coming winter should be considered. The needs of the situation in more vital areas however should be given full weight.

It is believed that no destroyers should be kept in the Azores as their operations are much more seriously needed closer to the European coast from whence they can be sent out for important escort duty.

England has at present four convoys every eight days across the Atlantic. In order to cover all trade it will require at least eight convoys each eight days, but this extension can not be realized for some time. There is no prospect in sight of ability to convoy outgoing ships.

It was stated that the Gulf of Helgoland is sufficiently mined to leave the submarines but two safe channels of access—that is, close to the shores principally in territorial waters. An attempt is being made to stop the ingress and egress of enemy submarines in these two channels with England submarines, but the numbers available are very inadequate.

The question of mining territorial waters is a very serious one involving all of the Allies, and is of such a nature that a decision must necessarily be based upon diplomatic and military as well as upon naval considerations. This subject has naturally been under consideration for some time, but I am not able to report anything definite as to its present status.

Considerable discussion occurred as to whether any nation had developed effective means other than the use of surface craft for protecting mine fields from sweeping operations. Nothing of an effective nature has been developed to date.

The question of mine fields which would be dangerous to submarines whilst submerged but safe for surface craft was discussed. No entirely satisfactory designs have been developed to date. England is attempting to modify some of her older mines so that they will be dangerous below a depth of 45 feet from the surface, but will disarm themselves in case they drag or in any other way rise above 45 feet in depth.

Both England and France are attempting to develop a design of mine of this nature. The French stated that they were manufacturing some small floating mines for use by merchant ships when being pursued by a submarine. They were designed to float for one hour and then sink.

The British have considered various designs of such mines, but none of a satisfactory type have been developed.

The use of kite balloons were discussed. The British have had some success by using these balloons with a small group of destroyers on the outgoing routes of the submarines. The use of kite balloons for merchant convoys was considered questionable, as they might attract submarines which otherwise would not sight the convoy. If kite balloons can be provided and handled by merchant convoys, their use is well worth serious consideration. It is probable that they will be tried.

The naval conference was requested to meet on one day with the military conference for a general discussion of the shipping situation, particularly as it affects the forces in the field.

I might say there that from time to time the prime ministers of the various countries got together for a discussion of the situation, and they always asked the military and naval people to get together also. Upon this occasion it was evident that there was not sufficient cooperation between the military and naval people, so that Gen. Foch

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invited the allied naval council to meet with the allied ilmitary council in this discussion, and that is referred to in this letter. [Continuing reading:]

This combined conference was led by the French military chief of staff, Gen. Foch. It was apparent that the French are very much concerned as to the military support which they can count upon from the United States. Their urgent need of assistance is unquestionable. Their need of definite assurances, particularly as to the numbers and character of troops and their time of availability, is extremely desirable from a standpoint of morale if nothing else.

I might state here that I am not butting in at all into military affairs, but it came down later to a question of shipping, if our troops were to cooperate with the Allies. [Continuing reading:]

Aside from their desire for definite knowledge of military support, their principal concern seems to be as to whether there is full realization of the demands which will be placed on oversea lines of communication in maintaining over-seas military forces. They apparently have no doubt but that the United States is planning to support its troops in France, but there seems to be considerable concern as to whether the United States realizes the extent of the supply sustem which armies of today demand. They apparently feel that it is not only necessary for them to have definite knowledge of our troops movements, in order that their military plans may be governed accordingly, but also they seem to fear the demands which our troops may make upon our own resources will be over and above the supplies which will be sent from home.

I may state there that there are but few people, I think, who have any understanding of what it means to supply a million men, at a distance. It requires 50,000 tons of sea-borne freighting. [Continuing reading:]

They also seem to fear that the shipping which will be taken for the supply of our military forces may seriously affect, either directly or indirectly, the shipping which is necessary to maintain the allied forces. For example: Both British and French shipping necessarily works from the nearest ports and there is probably a large amount of material coming from the United States which has been brought by United States shipping from South America and other countries. There therefore seems to be concern over the possibility of our withdrawing a considerable amount of our shipping in the western hemisphere for troops and troop supply uses which will at once throw greater demands on British and French shipping.

As stated in my telegram of yesterday, the British Minister of Shipping appeared before the combined conference and made a general statement concerning the shipping situation from his standpoint. It was to be noted particularly that in all of his calculations he had necessarily not taken into account generally the assistance which the United States will probably render. This is on account of lack of definite information as to America's plans. He stated that a movement was on foot to withdraw about 80,000 skilled British workmen from the western front to increase the output of merchant shipping construction in England, and that if this was, done it was hoped that by November, 1918, England's construction program would commence to yield about 3,000,000 tons per year. He stated that until that time the present entirely essential needs of England, together with the present support which she is giving to the Allies, could probably be met. He stated clearly, however, that England could not exceed at all the support she is now giving the Allies and that his estimates would also involve considerably more privations in the United Kingdom than were now being experienced. His estimates also were dependent upon the supply of the necessary steel and other material. In other words, it is hoped that for the period extending to October, 1918 the continually diminishing

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available tonnage will suffice for imperative needs, that is, providing the destruction of shipping does not increase above its present average rate of about 500,000 tons per month. At present, 585 ships, or over 1,200,000 tons of British shipping is allocated to supplying France exclusively, and also large amounts for the supply of Italy and other European allies.

It is apparent from the above that the situation can only be counted upon to begin to improve from November, 1918, and that there are many important considerations upon which depends the ability of the Allies to tide over the present critical shipping prospects.

It was also made very apparent that closer coordination of effort should be immediately established between the United States and the Allies. All military future plans are certainly largely dependent upon America's action. Although America's military support is urgently needed, it is nevertheless absolutely necessary that such support should not place any new demands upon the allied shipping situation considered alone. It is also very evident that the general campaign against the enemy, both military and what might be called a "shipping campaign," is really dependent upon America's support, and hence that the efficient prosecution of the war requires a closer coordination of effort between the United States and the European Allies than now exists. By this is meant that the Allied War Councils, both military and in other fields, should be supplied immediately, and should be kept supplied with more definite information of America's plans and intentions. All experience clearly shows that this can not be done by long distance communication. It can be done efficiently only by sending responsible representatives of the United States to Europe for consultation. It is also vitally important that all branches of war activity should be coordinated, and hence that such representatives as we send abroad should be formed into one organization. It is also considered important that such an organization after their first visit to Europe and their preliminary consultations should return to the United States preparatory to a further European visit in order that their information may be kept strictly up to date without depending entirely upon cabled communication.

It is for the above reasons that the combined naval and military conference were unanimous in hoping that the United States would be fully represented for both military and shipping questions at the approaching council to be held in London about August 10.

It never was held, by the way. [Continuing reading:]

In general it may be said that the conferences in Paris both naval and military fully confirmed the general tenor of all of the dispatches which I have sent concerning the general allied war situation. I was present at all of these conferences and nothing developed at any time which would warrant modification in any way of recommendations which I have previously made.

On that I think it right to say that there were no plans made for coordination, either in a military sense or in a shipping sense.

In my report of August 20, I pointed out that, while it was true that the war could not be won on the sea, it might very easily be lost thereon, and, in fact, up to this time, was being lost:

AUGUST 20, 1917.

The demands on the available destroyers are even now very difficult to meet. Precedence must, of course, continue to be given to troop ships and troop supply ships, but at the same time if the demand for destroyer escort for such shipping becomes so great as to jeopardize the safety of mercantile shipping which is essential to our Allies, a serious danger is thereby involved which may easily do more harm that if our troops actually remained at home.

Allied success in the field depends upon maintaining the lines of communication over seas, and it is of vital importance, therefore, that the shipping which is now being used and which will gradually increase with the transport and supply of United States troops must be carefully considered in connection with other essential mercantile shipping.

The war can not be won on the sea, though it may very easily be lost thereon. The campaign at sea resolves itself into protection and maintenance of lines of communication. Generally speaking, it may be said that the plan of campaign on the sea in this war must take one of two general courses. First, the actual prevention or destruc-

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tion of the submarine itself, either at its base or en route to or from its base. Second ' the protection, control, and coordination of allied shipping and shipping construction in such a manner as to defeat the submarine's mission, granting that it can not be prevented from gaining access to the high sea.

In the absence of a campaign based on the first course, it is vital that every effort should be put forward to insure the success of the latter course mentioned.

The moment a sufficient number of antisubmarine vessels were available, to make possible even a partial convoying of shipping, the losses of merchant tonnage began immediately to decrease in the danger zone. I commented on this in my letter of the 15th of September:

Letter 864, September 11, 1917. General:

With reference to the antisubmarine campaign, generally speaking, the losses since April have not increased but, on the contrary, appear to be on the decrease. This, coupled with the fact that the number of submarines operating has, if anything, increased, is difficult to explain. There is considerable difference of opinion as to the causes for the above. The most reasonable opinion as to decrease in submarine losses and upon which there is the greatest degree of unanimity is as follows:

(*a*) The gradual extension of the convoys system, together with increasing experience of both the merchant shipping and escorting craft.

(*b*) Increase of antisubmarine craft and constant increase of experience thereof, coupled with the more extensive use of the depth charge.

(*c*) Effect on enemy submarine morale from the above, and particularly from the more extensive use of depth charges. It is wholly impossible to estimate the number of actual submarine losses caused by depth charges, but the fact that depth charges are used liberally whenever a submarine is encountered unquestionably has a marked effect upon morale.

(*d*) Difficulty the enemy must be experiencing in maintaining an adequate supply of efficient torpedoes.

I continued throughout the remaining months of 1917, and, in fact, practically up to the time of the armistice, to point out that the number of forces available was still insufficient to meet the requirements of the military situation. Thus, for example, in the concluding paragraph of my general report of December 31, 1917, I said:

Letter, December 31, 1917. General:

Speaking generally of the campaign, it must be recognized that the situation is still very serious, if not critical. The force commander feels that his dispatches, from the very beginning, including the one sent four days after his arrival in Europe, have been fully confirmed by subsequent events. Of course, with the losses being experienced in April, when the force commander arrived, the situation looked even more critical than at present. If the enemy could have maintained the losses inflicted on essential shipping during that month, the consequences would have been disastrous.

A great deal of talk is heard in public, and has also been disseminated by the enemy, indicating a concentration of enemy submarine effort on American troop movements. Speaking generally, however, it is to be noted that the enemy have not succeeded to date in increasing the number of their submarines actually operating at sea. It is not believed that they can materially increase them, owing to many conditions outside of the mere question of construction. There can be no question but that the resources of the world are on our side, and ultimate victory is therefore merely a question of whether these resources can be made available and transported. If the enemy diverts his submarine effort to troop movements, he can only do it at the cost of his efforts against the supply lines of communication.

Speaking generally, it may safely be said that the enemy's best chance of making the submarine campaign the deciding feature, is to concentrate it on these supply lines. As long as we keep our troop movements well clear of the supply lines, the enemy will be forced to divide his effort in case he wishes to concentrate on troop movements.

When I come to take up the convoy, and so forth, I will explain that more fully, and I think you will find it very interesting to see just how much or how little the danger was that troop convoys were in.

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The need for additional vessels was again pointed out in my letter report of January 8, 1918:

Letter 6044, January 8, 1918. Need for additional vessels—

The need for additional destroyers and antisubmarine craft is just as urgent today as described in all the Force Commander's dispatches beginning from four days after his arrival in Europe.

The force commander believes still that the demands of the common campaign against the enemy warrants sending all antisubmarine craft which can reach this coast either under their own power or in tow.

It has been the policy for some time to send to the French coast every ship available. The last 10 destroyers that were added to the forces have been sent to Brest, but this number is wholly inadequate. The U. S. S. *May* has been sent from Gibralter to Brest, and all yachts now en route will be diverted to the French coast. Unfortunately these yachts will add little to the efficiency of the coast, because they can not keep up with the convoys and hence must be restricted to special uses. The U. S. S. *Alwin* is now en route and on her arrival another destroyer will be added to the forces on Brest. It is evident that the most important part of our work in Europe will be on the French coast, and steps are under way to provide adequate oil supplies and repair facilities on that coast. Additional destroyers are badly needed in order to provide proper protection to our transports and storeships. Every new destroyer arriving from the United States will be sent to Queenstown, and a reliable destroyer sent immediately from Queenstown to Brest. This plan has many advantages, the principal of which are:

1. The destroyers sent to the French coast will be the most reliable ones, and hence require the fewest repairs.

2. New destroyers can better learn methods in Queenstown than at Brest, and defects developing in new destroyers can be better handled at Queenstown than at Brest. What is urgently needed is six or eight destroyers for the French coast.

I might say incidentally, there, that Brest was strategically the best place to base destroyers, but unfortunately it had but a tiny little navy yard and a capacity of only 7,000 tons of oil. We increased that to 28,000 tons, and we had plans on hand to make it 50,000 tons of oil. That is the reason that they were not sent there earlier.

On the same day I had cabled to the department, in my No. 2751:

Need for destroyers in all areas is as critical as in past. Can additional destroyers be furnished, and if so, request prospective dates of arrival.

That is, even in the middle of January, nine months after we had entered the war, I had still received no definite information from the department as to the probable increases in the forces abroad, or as to the program upon which the department was working in sending such forces abroad.

As a matter of fact, however, because the contracts for the war destroyer program were not made until about six months after we had entered the war, the new vessels were not available in any number until the submarine campaign was practically over. The repeated promises of the department to supply additional forces at definite times were not kept, and I often found myself seriously embarrassed in dealing with the Allies because, acting upon the information furnished by the department, arrangements had been made for the dispostion of these new forces, which involved rearrangement of Allied forces, and these could not be made because of the failure of the new forces to arrive. This I pointed out to the department in my letter of the 23d of April, 1918. The official statistics mentioned in the letter I am about to read were brought over and furnished to my staff, as well as to Allied Admiralities, by the Chief of Naval Operations himself, at the time of his visit in November, 1917, and in numerous cases it was the Chief of Operations himself, and not me, who made promises, or at least afforded the Allied Admiralties

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reason to understand them as promises, but which unfortunately did not materialize.

Letter 15230, April 23, 1918. Arrival of new forces.

The increase of forces in European waters has been very disappointing. But three new destroyers will apparently have been added to the force up to May 1, 1918, that is, *Manley, Stockton, and Caldwell.* The difficulties which have been experienced with the new destroyer program at home are realized, but it is hoped that even greater efforts than have heretofore been thought possible can be put forward to expedite arrival of new destroyers.

Unfortunately, based on official figures obtained from the completion lists of Bureau of Construction and Repair, as far back as November, 1917, the French and British Admiralties were notified of prospective additions to forces in European waters of submarine chasers, mine craft, aviation material, and Ford and other destroyers. This was necessary in order to take up for discussion and begin preparations for the necessary regular docking and overhaul of the additional vessels and provide for the repair of damages due to accidents, etc. Although it is realized that the delays could not have been avoided, still it has been very embarrassing that various programs have fallen so far short of predictions.

This is not meant to be in any sense a criticism or a complaint, but merely to point out that the Force Commander has necessarily felt reluctant in advancing and supporting various measures involving changes in operation under way and program for inauguration of new operations, as suggested by our Planning Section, and from other sources at home, until the number of our own forces engaged had reached a higher point.

Similar reports were made to the Navy Department in the letters of August 24 and September 19, 1918:

Letter August 24, 1918. Need for and enquiries for destroyers.

The prospective additions to European forces of new destroyers is extremely disappointing. The need for an increased number of destroyers on the French coast and at Gibralter is apparent from study of the reports from the commanders of these bases and a general survey of the submarine situation, and particularly the Army's lines of communication. It will also be of the utmost importance that the moment the listening device is developed to a point of practical use by destroyers, there should be a force ready in all respects to take advantage thereof. This requires a great deal of preliminary training and experimenting which can only be obtained by actual trial operations at sea. Unfortunately, it is impossible, except at very infrequent intervals, to set aside any destroyers for this purpose. The importance of applying the listening device to the antisubmarine campaign, the moment it can be used on destroyers, can not be overestimated. The force commander is keenly anxious that the United States Navy should be the first in the field with such a radical development in the antisubmarine campaign.

I might explain there that what we wanted to do, as you were developing the listening devices on this side to be used in connection with the depth charge, we wanted to put those into operation. At the same time I was subsequently informed that I bore the sole responsibility of getting our troop transports over and getting our troops through the danger zone safely; and also that I bore the responsibility for getting merchant ships through the danger zone, and I could not suddenly divert destroyers from the transport of troops to go and hunt submarines. That shows you why it was so necessary to get more destroyers over there. [Reading:]

Letter September 19, 1918. Disposition of forces:

The urgent need for increasing the escort forces, based on Brest and Gibralter, continues as previously reported. As the harbor facilities on the French coast improve, permitting an increased movement of the ships on the Army's lines of communication, the necessity for even greater increase of escort forces will be accentuated.

If the winter weather and ice reduces submarine activity in the western Atlantic and causes submarine activity on this side to come closer inshore as is anticipated, it is urgently recommended that the maximum number of escort ships be transferred to the forces of this command.

The necessity for an increase in the number of tugs and barges in French ports has been conveyed by cable.

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In repeated cables to the department, in the spring and summer of 1918, it was continually pointed out that all arrangements for the protection of American troop convoys on the coast of France were absolutely dependent upon an increase in the number of destroyers available for this escort duty. This was made necessary by the greatly increased number of troop convoys which had to be escorted, when the number of troop movements from the United States was suddenly increased from an average of about 25,000 a month, for the period up to March, 1918, to an average of nearly 300,000 a month, from the 1st of April on. Thus, in a cable to the Navy Department of April 3, 1918 (my 5976), I pointed out that "the increased demands on destroyers, due to the increased number of troop transports, makes it necessary to coordinate sailings, but priority is given to transportation of troops. Every possible effort should be made to expedite the arrival of additional destroyers."

When the submarines began operating on the Atlantic coast, a number of destroyers, which had been designated for service abroad, were held on the coast for escort duty from Atlantic ports, and the progress of arrivals in Europe was therefore further delayed.

I am at this point introducing testimony so far into 1918 along in the game merely to clearly bring out the accumulated effect of not having thrown our utmost into the war at the very beginning. The inevitable consequence of a sort of hand-to-mouth policy, merely meeting the situations piecemeal as they arose, was that time was afforded the enemy to take advantage of such opportunities and to introduce such diversions as those on our own coast.

I would also like to add here a point which will be covered more fully later on, namely, that it would be impressive, indeed, if I could lay before the committee in any comprehensive, and at the same time, condensed form, the nature of the requests that poured in upon me from my various subordinate commanders for additional forces. Admiral Wilson at Brest, Admiral Niblack at Gibraltar, and even such an outlying force as that of the Azores, never failed in reports to point out the crying necessity for increase of their forces. Although each of them did his best with the forces he had, still I have no doubt that, at the same time, each of them felt that if no more forces could be sent from home, other areas should be reduced to meet their demands. The situation was such that, as a general rule, about all that I could do was to pass on the appeals of these various local commanders to the department, and back them up with urgent recommendations of my own, having already made a distribution of the available forces to meet the situation as a whole, as fully as these forces permitted.

Incidentally I might say that I once asked Admiral Jellicoe what trouble he had in that respect, and he told me that his difficulties were entirely similar, and that he had recently compiled the requests from their various stations where destroyers were based, and in all cases there was a loud outcry from each one of them for more force, and that he made a compilation of that and sent it to each of the stations so that they could see what his difficulties were.

To sum up, that is to say, to sum up this particular section, I trust that I have fully substantiated those portions of my letter which cover (1) the seriousness of the war situation at the time of our entry; (2) the manifest and crying necessity for our cooperation; (3)

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the clearness and completeness with which it was presented to the department; and (4) the department's hesitating methods and lack of policy in meeting the situation thus so clearly presented. I hope also that I have demonstrated a point which will be brought out more clearly in testimony, still to be introduced, as to the nature of my duty abroad, and the fact that I put forth every effort within my power to carry it out with the personnel and means available.

As I have stated, the situation was so serious, and the consequences of failure so terrible, that I went beyond the channels which the Navy afforded me, and enlisted the services of such men as Ambassador Page.

No one in this country can yet realize the great part which that man played in the war, but I hope that I have to-day indicated at least one phase of his varied and important activities, showing that, whenever the occasion arose, he was willing to join with the Navy, or any other Government work, provided it would help along the Nation's interest.

The importance of a proper realization of the extreme crisis in the allied cause as a whole in the spring of 1917 is so vital to an understanding by the committee of the issues that I have raised that I feel that the committee should hear, from other independent sources, corroborative evidence on this point..

From my standpoint the greater part of the criticisms of the action of the Navy Department's conduct of the war are based upon their failure to take decisive action in the first few months, and this can have been due only to their failure to realize the seriousness of the situation and to accept the testimony of their own accredited representative abroad.

Of the many men who could speak with intimate knowledge of the situation in Europe in 1917 there is one at present in Washington who gave me, when I arrived in London, one of my first realizations of the possible defeat of the Allies in a short time. He pointed out to me then this very fact which I am emphasizing, that is that the shipping situation was such that it would soon be impossible for the Allies to obtain the essential military supplies and the food to keep them going until American effort could become effective. The one man above all others who has been familiar with the world's food and shipping position in the last five years, and who administered the food resources of this country during the war, is obviously in a position to state with authority what the situation was in this respect in April, 1917, and I should, therefore, like the committee to call Mr. Hoover at its convenience, in order that there may be no doubt in my mind that I have substantiated the part of my letter in which I describe the gravity of the crisis which we faced in 1917, and pointed out how near to a disaster the lack of action by the department at that time brought us. The Allies, indeed, barely escaped a peace without victory.

I had word from Mr. Hoover this morning that he will be in Washington on Saturday and will be willing to appear before the committee if the committee so desire. It is immaterial to me as to when he should come, but I would suggest that as he is an extremely busy man——

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, we will ask Mr. Hoover to appear before the committee on Saturday, and you will suspend your testimony while we hear from him?

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Admiral SIMS. Yes, sir.

Now, I should like to take up the question of the lack of reinforcements, and to state specific instances.

It has thus far been established:

1. That the Allies were losing the war at the time the United States entered as a result of mercantile tonnage losses, as this practically amounted to cutting the allied lines of communications.

2. That the department was fully informed of the fact that the one vital issue to be faced was this submarine campaign.

3. That whatever plans the department or the Government in general may have had in mind in future operations, it was pointed out at the time, and subsequent events established the fact, that the execution of any other plans depended absolutely upon first meeting the submarine menace.

4. That at the present time there is no issue whatever as to the correctness or soundness of my recommendations during this critical period. There is no truth whatever in the assertion that I am now claiming that I was right and everyone else was wrong. This fact is amply demonstrated by the extent to which my recommendations, particularly in the matters of dispatch and employment of antisubmarine forces, were ultimately adopted by the department. As I shall show later on, certain recommendations made by me were never adopted, but, with one or two possible exceptions, every plan for the employment of our forces in the war zone which was finally adopted was in accord with my recommendations.

5. That the primary fault of the department was the initial delay in putting into effect measures which they later adopted, and which delay resulted in the prolongation of the war and in the unnecessary expenditure of at least half a million lives and $15,000,000,000.

Thus far I have dealt more particularly with my requests for the sending and employment of antisubmarine forces. I now desire to consider in a general way the action taken upon various recommendations, some covering the dispatch of antisubmarine forces, but principally relating to other subjects, in order to show that these recommendations were either disregarded altogether, were adopted after a delay of some months, or were accepted only when recommended by Admiral Mayo and Admiral Benson during their visits abroad in August and November of 1917, respectively.

I will also introduce testimony to show that, as a result of the wrong estimate of the situation upon which the Navy Department acted, and, incidentally, as a result of its failure to adopt the recommendations made by its representatives abroad, after a full and intimate study of the situation, the department concentrated its efforts upon plans which were either of minor importance or were impossible of fulfillment in view of the time element, or were completely and entirely impracticable.

I want to bring this point out to show the great evil and the great danger of trying to manage the military operations of war by cable from a distance of 3,000 miles.

To take up, for a moment, the question of the department's disregard of specific recommendations, it is only necessary to refer back to the cases which I instanced in my letter of January 7. As I pointed out in paragraph 31 of that letter, I suggested in my first cable and in my first letter, which I have read to you, that American

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dreadnoughts would be very useful, if based on Brest, in meeting any possible raids by German battleships or battle cruisers in the Channel, or in forestalling such raids by the mere moral effect of their presence, which would, of course, be known to the enemy. Thus, in my cable of April 14 I said:

Cable April 14, 1917:

At present our battleships can serve no useful purpose in this area except that two divisions of dreadnaughts might be based on Brest for moral effect against anticipated raids by heavy enemy ships in the channel, out of reach of British main fleet.

Then in my letter of April 14, I said:

27. In addition to submarines, heavy forces are free to raid, and in fact escape through the channel at any time when the enemy decides that the necessity or return will justify the risk. Hence the suggestion that two divisions of our fast dreadnoughts might be based upon Brest primarily for the resulting moral effect against such possible raids.

I was told yesterday by an important admiralty official that while he thought the chances of raids in or escape through the channel by heavy enemy forces out of reach of the Grand Fleet (North of Scotland) were very remote, nevertheless the possibility existed and was principally thwarted on moral grounds; that is, the uncertainty in his mind of the opposition which would be encountered. He agreed with others, including the First Sea Lord, that the addition of some of our heavy forces to those maintained in southern channel approaches by the French and British would undoubtedly entirely preclude the possibility of such raids.

No answer was ever received from the department to either of these recommendations, although as I had specifically stated, this assistance had been requested by the Allies. As will be shown in later testimony, this is but one of a series of obstacles which I encountered in carrying out my mission assigned by the department—obstacles which were caused by the action of the department in leaving me ignorant of their plans, if they had any, or at least of their understanding of the various recommendations which they sent me abroad to make.

While we are dealing with the question of the use of American battleships abroad, I will also take up the case of those battleships which actually did get into the war zone, and which attracted such universal attention by the excellent work they performed.

Let me say right here that while some people think, unfortunately, those battleships never had a real opportunity to come to grips with the enemy, still the extent of the cooperation of those five battleships under Admiral Rodman was one of the best pieces of work of the kind that I had ever seen. It was a question of cooperation, it was a question of adopting the system which was being employed in the Grand Fleet. Perhaps it is difficult for a civilian to realize that the addition of four battleships to a fleet that is already organized makes that fleet weaker than it actually was before they arrived, because they can not cooperate together, and new arrivals may ball up the game.

The consequence is that they have got to learn the methods that the big fleet used; and actually, after that fleet arrived, we put our methods, our code books and our flags, down in the hold, we adopted those of the British, they sent men to instruct our signalmen, and in four days they went to sea with the fleet, and in a little while they were able to cooperate with them. It was one of the finest stunts I have ever known. It has been reported to me—in fact I remember now that when I visited the fleet on one occasion Admiral Rodman

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said, at his mess table, "In all the time that I have been here I never received a single order from you as to how I was to handle this force." That is giving the initiative to the other man. Of course I replied that the reason I did not give him any orders was that he would not obey them if I had; but that was just a mild joke.

While I had not specifically recommended the sending of a division of our battleships as a reinforcement to the Grand Fleet until July 21, I had repeatedly recommended in letters to the department that, in accordance with the policy of regarding the whole of our naval forces as a reinforcement to the combined allied naval forces, our battle fleet should be kept prepared for distant service at a moment's notice in order that, to quote from my letter of May 11, "their use if the opportunity should occur will not be in any way delayed."

In my letter of June 15, I again recommended the maintenance of our fleet in readiness for action in the following paragraph:

Except in one of my first cablegrams, I have not mentioned the above considerations in dispatches or reports, because, as stated above, they have not been discussed officially; and as the submarine campaign is at present the vital issue, and also as I am not aware of the department's policy or plans regarding any forces except those now under my command, I have not thought proper to discuss such subjects upon my own responsibility. The fact can not be overlooked, however, that sound strategy calls for the concentration of our maximum forces as close as practicable to the probable theater of war, provided they can be supplied there without requiring the services of tonnage now vitally necessary.

Again in my letter of July 7, I said:

Letter to department No. 18, July 7, 1917.

11. I would also urge that all coal-burning dreadnoughts be kept in a constant state of readiness for dispatch to European waters, purely as a measure of preparedness. There are no definite plans in view involving such forces, but the uncertainties of the present situation are tremendous, and hence my recommendation.

The oil situation in Europe is now so critical that it would be impossible to send oil-burning battleships, even if sufficient oil carriers should be available to supply the necessary oil, it would be impossible to insure adequate and safe destroyer escort through the submarine zones.

It was at about this time that the question of reinforcing the Grand Fleet, with a division of our coal-burning battleships, was taken up with me by Admiral Jellicoe. At his request, I went with him to the Grand Fleet on July 19 for a conference with Admiral Beatty. As a result of this conference I sent the following message to the Navy Department:

Cablegram sent July 21, 1917:
To Secretary of the Navy (operations). Serial No. 120.

No. 120. Visited Grand Fleet 19 with Admiral Jellicoe for consultation with commander in chief. The result is that admiralty request that the four strongest coal-burning battleships with six destroyers be sent join Grand Fleet now in Firth of Forth. Also that our submarines could be very usefully employed in antisubmarine campaign.

The reasons for this request is that five *King Edward* class must be placed out of commission and their place taken by four dreadnaughts to provide officers and gunnery and torpedo rating for light cruisers, destroyers, submarines, etc., to be commissioned. Shortage of officers will be found 100 after advancing reserve officers from motor boats, etc. to fleet. Our oil-burning battleships could not be supplied, and more than four would unduly increase burden on coal supply and would necessitate additional screening vessels not now available.

The conference agreed that moral effect would be very great, also mutual benefit of exchange of ideas and methods. The intelligence service thereby created between the two fleets would be superior to any service which exists or could be established. Carefully selected expert staff should be sent. Also recommend temporary detail representative our commander in chief on Admiral Beatty's staff.

SIMS.

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No answer was received to this message. After waiting for four weeks, believing that an answer to such an important recommendation would ultimately come, I finally sent a second message, on August 17:

[Sims, Admiral United States, 285.]

AUGUST 17, 1917.

Referring to No. 120. Need becoming urgent for the four coal-burning dreadnaughts and their six destroyers; shortage of personnel has necessitated putting one *King Edward* out of commission. One goes out next month and five by end of year. In their absence, reinforcements are requested; these vessels must be replaced by older type of dreadnoughts from Grand Fleet. Request information as to department's decision. 18217.

SIMS.

That requires a little explanation as to why they would have to be replaced with more than one. This *King Edward* was employed elsewhere. They had to keep a certain number in the neighborhood of the Thames and the Humber to guard against raids, and if they put them out of commission they would have to be replaced from the older dreadnoughts from the Grand Fleet. That is why they wanted us.

In reply, the Navy Department cabled me on August 20 their refusal to approve this recommendation. Their dispatch was as follows:

Received: AUGUST 20, 1917.
For: Admiral Sims.
From: Chief of Naval Operations.
Opnav 198.

Replying to your 285, United States believes that the strategic situation necessitates keeping battleship force concentrated (that is our battleship force), and can not therefore consider the suggestion of sending a part of it across. The logistics of the situation would prevent the entire force going over, except in case of extreme necessity. The department desires that you discuss situation with Admiral Mayo upon arrival. 10019.

ADMIRAL BENSON.

In a letter of September 1 to Admiral Benson I again urged the sending of this reinforcement:

To: Admiral Benson, September 1, 1917.
Admiral Sims's personal file.

There is one thing about which I am really anxious, and that is as to the final decision of the Navy Department in sending to this side the battleship reinforcement which the situation in the Grand Fleet requires. As you know, I do not understand what is really meant by the disintegration of our fleet. I do not see how it will ever be possible for it to engage in a combined operation, as a unit, with the naval forces of the Allies. For example, in all of the schemes that I have seen proposed for aggression against the enemy, the naval forces of the Allies have been distributed according to types. The scheme proposed by Winston Churchill required the organization of two fleets, each composed of certain types of British, French, and American vessels. Another proposal for blocking the enemy fleet in port would require the sacrifice of certain of the older battleships and cruisers of all three nations, to block the channels leading to German ports.

I have explained in my cables and letters why it is that the British Fleet needs a reinforcement of some of our dreadnoughts. I can not see that the sending of this division of ships would be any disintegration of our fleet, but merely an advance force interposed between us and the enemy fleet.

No man can tell what the outcome of this war will be. But whatever the outcome proves to be, we must at the end find ourselves in a position which can be justified on sound military principles. Can we afford to have history record that the Allies asked for reinforcements and that we declined to send them?

Admiral Benson replied on the 24th of September. I will read you the extract of his letter with regard to the battleships:

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From: Admiral Benson, September 24, 1917.

We are not willing to send a portion of the battleship force, and do not intend to unless very much stronger arguments are produced than have so far been set forth. It has been a surprise and disappointment that no definite plan of operation of the combined forces of the allied naval powers has been taken up and decided upon long ere this. I consider this most urgent, and it certainly should be done at the earliest possible date, and if nothing can be done this fall or winter, preparations should be actively under way to carry out some definite plan of operation as soon as spring of 1918 opens.

When Admiral Benson himself arrived in November, 1917, this was one of the first subjects discussed with him, and after he had conferred with the British naval authorities and satisfied himself, which he did inside of a few hours, he sent, within two or three days, his No. 13683, department, recommending that a division of four coal-burning dreadnaughts be sent immediately. This was on November 8.

On November 13 the reply was received by Admiral Benson from the Secretary of the Navy granting his request, without discussion, and stating that the ships, after docking, would be ready to sail about November 25. This cablegram speaks for itself. (Reading):

[Cablegram received November 13, 1917.]

SIMS, Admiral, United States:

1093. From Secretary of Navy for Admiral Benson: After consultation with Admiral Mayo that following coal-burning dreadnoughts were selected to form divisions to be dispatched to England: U. S. S. *New York*, U. S. S. *Florida*, U. S. S. *Delaware*, U. S. S. *Wyoming*.

These ships, after docking, should be ready to sail about November 25. Rear Admiral Rodman will command this division. 17012.

BENSON.

That is the message I received on November 13, 1917.

It was the practice of the Navy Department for cablegrams coming from the department to be signed "Benson." He was on the other side, but this was signed "Benson." It might be interesting to state the fact that all of those vessels were of different types. One of them had 14-inch guns and the others 12's. They could just as easily have selected a homogeneous squadron, but it was not done. The reason was that they were not ready for sea service.

The action of the Navy Department on the recommendations for the use of submarines shows exactly the same hesitancy, delay, and the final adoption, months later, of the policy I had repeatedly outlined. You may recall that in my first letter, that of April 19, I said in the concluding paragraph that the use of submarines in anti-submarine operations "promises well, and the experiment is now being tried with as many submarines as can be spared from the Grand Fleet. Some enemy submarines have been destroyed by this method, usually torpedoed."

I might say there that nobody knew much about what submarines could do when this war started. I have been surprised, in looking up the data on that subject for a certain article which I wrote recently, to see the officially recorded opinions of prominent naval officers of various navies, including the German, British, and others, as to what the submarine could do. We did not know. It was generally supposed that the submarine was of no use to chase another submarine. Somebody failed to reason out the thing, or he would have seen that

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it was the most effective of all means of attacking and destroying a submarine. I have explained that in the articles referred to. I pointed out at this time that such use of our submarines would be very advantageous, not only in attacking the enemy submarine, but in giving us reliable information as to the operating condition of enemy submarines, through the experience of our own vessels in the war zone.

The reason that it is the best means of destroying submarines is due to the same difficulty that I have spoken of before, that the submarine can always see a surface vessel miles away and avoid her; but when we send out a submarine to hunt submarines, the advantages are equal if they are both operating on the surface—or submerged, for that matter; but as a German submarine has to stay on the surface all the time except when he dives for business, because he has to keep his batteries fully charged, it follows that our submarine can go out and remain under the surface all the time, showing his periscope only once in a while for 10 or 15 seconds; and that gives us a great advantage, and our submarines can do that because they are no German destroyers on the surface that they are afraid of, and the consequence of that is that in proportion to the number of submarines and destroyers operating, the submarines destroyed from three to five times as many enemy submarines as any other type.

In a cable of June 28 I specifically recommended that all submarines available should be sent. My message was as follows:

Sent 28 June, 1917:

To: Secretary of Navy.

Protection of all Allied shipping in time—I repeat in time—is present mission. Whatever efforts we can exert must be put into operation at once if they are to be effective. Reliable submarines would be of great use to strengthen British submarine patrols, and also to scouts ahead of convoys. All submarines we send to Irish coast in time will therefore be invaluable in insuring success of convoy system, and hence success of war, provided these submarines are supplied from America and based upon their own mother ships.

SIMS.

You can not base a submarine on anything but its own mother, because they are so different.

In my letter-report of July 14 I again emphasized the value of submarines as antisubmarine craft.

Letter No. 29, 14 July, 1917:

There is also no question but that submarines themselves will prove of the greatest value as antisubmarine craft. They constitute the one type of ship that can see the submarine as far as the submarine can see them, and hence their use as scouts ahead of convoys in those areas in which the enemy submarine must approach if a successful attack is to be assured.

In a cable of July 13, referring to the submarine operations in the Azores region, I transmitted to the department a request from the Admiralty for the sending of some of our submarines to the Azores for operations there. I received no reply to any of these recommendations.

When Admiral Mayo arrived in England in August, 1917, the question of sending some submarines was taken up with him, and he accordingly cabled the Navy Department recommending that sub-

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marines be sent. Almost immediately, on August 24, the following reply was received from the department:

AUGUST 24, 1917.

For: Admiral Sims.
From: Chief of Naval Operations.
Opnav. 228. It is possible that about middle of October five submarines, K class, will arrive England followed about two weeks later by five of the L class. Tender accompany. What will be their prospective duties and where based? 17023.

ADMIRAL BENSON.

After discussion with the various Allies represented at the naval conference in London in September, it was agreed that a division of these submarines should be based on the Azores for operations against enemy submarines in that area, and that the second division, to be composed of the L submarines, should base on Berehaven, Ireland.

At the end of October the K boats arrived at the Azores, approximately six months after I had first called the attention of the department to the value of submarines as antisubmarine craft. The L submarines did not arrive at Berehaven until the end of January, or six months after I had specifically recommended in July that they be sent.

I might add here, as a mere matter of information for the committee, that not only do the final records show that in proportion to the numbers engaged, submarines were the most effective antisubmarine craft, but also, as was pointed out in many letters and dispatches which I have not read, they had a very marked strategic and moral effect on the submarine campaign. Before they were used in waters frequented by the enemy, the enemy submarines always had an easy mind as long as no surface ships were in sight. On the contrary, when the allied submarines were put into the game, and every now and then the enemy was attacked by an unseen foe, it is easy to see that his nerves were bound to be upset. This was the principal reason for recommending submarines in the Azores region. We would have made it a point to allow the enemy to know of their presence at once.

Much the same fate met my recommendations with regard to the sending of tugs as in the cases I have just referred to. Thus, in my letter of Jauuary 7, paragraphs 33 and 34, I pointed out that from the beginning I had specifically recommended the sending of tugs and that none were actually sent until nearly a year after we had entered the war.

America is, I believe, the country of tugs.

The only reason, to my knowledge, that was ever advanced for not sending tugs was that in some way there was a legal technicality in the laws, which were passed for commandeering privately owned craft, which prevented the department from securing tugs. The only comment that I have to make on that point is that, in view of the other feats of this country in the war, and of the previously supposed insuperable obstacles which were overcome, it is hard for me to accept the explanatian that a small technicality in the law should have prevented us from rendering this extremely important assistance to the Allies.

In my first cable, that of April 14, I had informed the department that "for towing the present large amount of sailing tonnage through dangerous areas, seagoing tugs would be of great value."

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There are a number of cables concerning tugs here, which it would only worry you to read. I have summarized these here, and I will only submit them for the record.

The summary submitted by Admiral Sims is here printed in the record, as follows:

Op–11. JANUARY 28, 1917.
Confidential.

Present assignment of seagoing tugs other than district tugs.

At bases 7 and 8 (France).

Sweepers: *Hinton, Edwards, Cahill, Bauman* (sunk), *Hubbard, James, Douglas, Courtney, Anderton, City of Lewes, McNeal.*

Tugs: *Genesee* en route base 6 with submarines; *Barnegat, Concord,* at Azores, will be sent to base 7 with French chasers.

These are the three tugs Admiral Benson promised Admiral Sims to send to France.

At base 9 (Gibralter): *Nahant, Penobscott,* at Azores. Admiral Sims has orders to send them to Gibralter.

Assigned to escort duty for submarine chaser: *Gypsum Queen,* at Azores, will return to United States; *Momtauk* en route Azores, will return to United States from Bermuda with submarine chaser *173. Conestoga, Lykens, Mariner, Hackett,* ready at New York. Ordered New London. *Wilmot, Henlopen,* ready at New York. Ordered New London (originally bought by French Government). *Arctic* en route to Hampton Roads from Puget Sound.

Confidential.

Fitting out to be assigned as escort for submarine chasers: *Cherokee,* navy yard, Philadelphia, completion February 1; *Edwards,* navy yard, Boston, completion indefinite; *Sea Rover,* navy yard, Mare Island, completion February 9; *Dreadnaught,* navy yard, Mare Island, completion indefinite; *Undaunted,* navy yard, Mare Island, completion indefinite; *Goliath,* navy yard, Mare Island, completion February 9.

With fleet: *Uncas, Wando, Tavernilla, Gorgona, Chemung.*

With mine force: *Patapsco, Patuxent, Sonoma, Ontario.*

Port au Prince, Haiti: *Potomac, 785.*

Yard tugs suitable for outside work: *Arapaho,* 575 tons, 800 horsepower, Mare Island; *Apache,* 650 tons, 550 horsepower, Iona Island; *Fortune,* 450 tons, 340 horsepower, Tutuila; *Iroquois,* 702 tons, 1,000 horsepower, Pacific Fleet; *Mohave,* 575 tons, 800 horsepower, Puget Sound; *Navajo,* 800 tons, 935 horsepower, Honolulu; *Osceola,* 571 tons, 800 horsepower, Guantanamo; *Piscataqua,* 854 tons, 2,000 horsepower, Guam; *Tillamook,* 575 tons, 800 horsepower, Mare Island; *Wompatuck,* 462 tons, 650 horsepower, Asiatic.

NOTE.—Recommend they be sent to east coast.

The *Allegheny* and *Sagamore* are icebound in the St. Lawrence River and will not be available until spring.

Construction and Repair have reported that six new tugs will be completed in a few months.

Of the 36 mine sweepers under construction, 8 will be completed by March 15 and 25 by July 1.

In a second message, sent on April 23, this recommendation was repeated, with the statement that "ocean-going tugs are needed for towing sailing vessels and for bringing in steamers that have been torpedoed and often float for some hours. * * * Large tugs now doing harbor work can be released if small tugs are sent. Tugs should have portable salvage pumps, and be fitted with radio and tydrophones. The tugs may be built either of wood or steel. The salving of even two or three ships would have invaluable results. Therefore cable what can be done in regard to the supply of tugs."

No reply was received to either of these messages.

On April 29, 1917, I sent another cable to the department, urging that four big Navy tugs be sent, and again pointing out the importance of the salvage work they could accomplish.

Still no reply was received from the department.

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On May 8 I sent the following dispatch:

MAY 8, 1917.

To: Secretary of State, Washington
(Through State Department).
6166.

May 8, 2 p. m. Following to be transmitted confidentially to Secretary of the Navy. Begin. Situation continues critical. Total loss last week 113 vessels of 248,000 tons, including 15 vessels of 28,000 tons, of week before not previously reported. Many steamers and sailing vessels being lost which would be saved if tugs were available and strategically located. Therefore urgently recommend that as many seagoing tugs as possible, at lease 10 immediately, be added to our naval forces here. Tugs should be commissioned and armed.

All the figures with reference to the loss of tonnage which appear in my testimony are taken from the official records. Those figures which were published from time to time during the war, and a great many of those which have been published since, have been taken from newspaper file records and are not correct.

This request was repeated in other dispatches sent on May 14, May 24, June 20, and June 21, and in my letters of June 1, June 20, July 14, and August 9.

In my cable of May 24, I said:

Cable sent May 24, 1917.

To: Secretary of the Navy (Operations).

All Navy tugs, or commercial seagoing tugs, with naval officer in command, which could be sent would be of incalculable value in rescuing torpedoed and mined ships. The salvage and rescue work being done in this area by the limited number of tugs and trawlers and cruisers from antisubmarine work is astounding. The number of torpedoed and mined ships which these vessels have beached or brought into port is surprising. Derelicts are a most constant source of danger to both shipping and naval vessels. Numerous lumber vessels are adrift bottom up. All vessels so employed are necessarily diverted from antisubmarine work, and hence all tugs or similar craft which could be sent for this work will amount to an actual increase of antisubmarine forces.

SIMS.

No answer was received to any of these cables.

On April 27, the naval attaché in London had sent to the Office of Naval Intelligence a long and detailed statement of the reasons that tugs were needed in the war zone, and the duties which they could perform. This letter also forwarded detailed plans by the British for employment of tugs, which clearly set forth the manner in which all tugs would be employed. But the only reply received was in a letter from the Director of Naval Intelligence, dated May 22, of two brief paragraphs, stating simply that the department was prepared to cooperate with the Admiralty authorities to the fullest extent possible; that they were experiencing difficulty in securing tugs and in building new ones, and also, the rather remarkable statement, in view of our lack of cooperation, to the effect that American sailing vessels would be advised to accept a tow in the war zone.

One point about the necessity for tugs was this, that so many damaged vessels went down at the end of a certain number of hours, or sometimes at the end of a certain number of days, which could have been brought in and in a very short time could have been repaired and put back in service; a short time compared with the length of time it takes to build a new ship.

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To anyone who has visited our Atlantic ports, to say nothing of Pacific ports, or who has cruised up and down our coast line, it will be hard to understand the fact that, in such a crisis as that with which we were confronted at the time here under discusssion, the United States Government was unable to produce for a period of one year more than four tugs.

Finally, on August 8, 1917, the following dispatch was received from the Navy Department:

Date: 8 August, 1917.
From: Chief of Naval Operations.
To: Admiral Sims.

Opnav. 192. It is the department's intention to take over 12 seagoing tugs from commercial service and fit them for distant service. They will not be ready to sail abroad for approximately two months' period. Should they be fitted with mine-sweeping gear? Their draft is 15 to 18 feet. 13108.

ADMIRAL BENSON.

To this the following reply was sent:

No. 314. Referring to Opnav. 192, mine sweeping gear not desired. Recommend depth charges be fitted after arrival this side.

SIMS.

Nothing more was heard from the department about these tugs, and I cabled again on December 18, requesting the probable sailing dates of these same 12 tugs. To this message I received no reply.

In the meantime I had, in letters and cables, continually pointed out the continuing need for such craft, as, for example, in my letter of December 17, 1917, when I said:

Letter 4844, December 19, 1917:

15. Necessity for tugs.

As has been reported, in previous correspondence and cables, the urgent need of sea-going tugs still exists. A great deal of shipping could be saved if tugs were available for towing. In fact, it would be important and invaluable if a sea-going tug could accompany the escort of all convoys through the danger zone, the tug serving as an additional escort ship when not in use for towing.

There is also urgent need of salvage tugs and equipment and personnel.

The salvage companies in England were badly broken up in the early part of the war, their personnel and craft being absorbed into the naval service and scattered. Since then urgent need for their services has developed and every effort has been made to reassemble them for salvage work, and there is a large and useful field for any assistance which could come from the United States under either Government or private control.

There is also a need at all of our bases for the services of tugs. Every effort is made to increase the amount of time that our destroyers and patrol craft can keep the sea and hence it is important the moment that they enter port they be allowed to let fires die out to facilitate overhaul and repair. This creates the necessity for tugs to move the ships about the harbor and alongside the docks.

At the time of the naval conferences in London in September, 1917, the Italian representatives had requested that two tugs be assigned to the Italian Government fror use on the Italian coast. The department, in October, announced that these tugs were to be sent, and they finally arrived at Genoa at the end of February, 1918.

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That the department realized the value of tugs for antisubmarine work is fully shown by a letter sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to the Shipping Board on December 5, 1917:

DECEMBER 5, 1917.

Op-28.
From: Chief of Naval Operations.
To: Chairman of Shipping Board.
Subject: Tugs—steam trawlers—fishing craft.

1. The great demands that have been made upon this country, and coming under naval notice, to furnish tugs and trawlers to be used in the following general manner:
(*a*) For general naval and military service abroad.
(*b*) For strictly naval service at home in coast defense—patrol and sweeping.
(*c*) For general service at home—coast towing—harbor towing, fish trade, etc., have led this office to consider the probable future necessity for an adequate supply of this type of useful small craft.
2. No other types, save, perhaps, destroyers, submarines, and high-class cargo and troopships are quite so useful now, and it is a type which this country will continue to need in the future.
3. For the above reasons this matter is brought to your attention. The Navy is attempting to meet its own needs in the matter of tugs, but even with those laid down and planned for, the demand will greatly exceed the supply.
4. There is inclosed a copy of letter containing a few characteristics of a type which Great Britain is finding useful. Also inclosed is a letter from Mr. Hoover to Navy Department, on subject of vessels for fish trade.

W. V. PRATT, *Acting*.

A copy of that letter was supplied to me by the Navy Department when I was over on the other side.

It is a rather curious commentary upon the department's attitude toward supplying recognized needs, that this letter is dated December and not April, 1917.

On receiving the letter from the department, inclosing a copy of this letter to the Shipping Board, I sent, on January 12, 1918, the following cable, again emphasizing the urgency of the need:

JANUARY 12, 1918.

Paraphrase.
From: Sims.
To: Opnav.

Your 1693 and general subject tugs. Admiralty letter of January 12 urges importance tugs in connection naval work these waters. Letter says now very difficult to obtain tugs, and as large force American vessels now operating European waters and increasing number United States transports using European ports, corresponding increase number tugs available is necessary. Admiralty letter further states: It is possible that a considerable number of large seagoing tugs might be constructed in the United States, and I am to ask whether any help could be given toward the provision of additional tugs in European waters by the building of tugs in United States. I have in reply given all the information in my possession regarding tugs, and I wish again to urge on department the very great importance of sending all available tugs to these waters. As the number of tugs now in existence is probably insufficient for the war needs, the question of constructing additional tugs warrants serious consideration.

SIMS.

In reply to this message, I received the following cablegram from the Navy Department:

Copy of cable sent Shipping Board with letter. Matter was taken up, early in December, of advisability of the inclusion of an extensive tug program in their building program.

And this was on the 18th of January, 1918. In my letters of December 31, January 8, January 14, and in many later letters, I continued to emphasize the need for tugs.

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In a departmental memorandum furnished to me, dated January 28, 1918, the following tugs were then available, none of which had been constructed since war was declared, and hence all of which must have been available from the beginning of our entry into the war. Here is this list of tugs:

Three then en route, 1 with submarines, 2 bound for Gibraltar for assignment to the Italian Government, 2 escorting submarine chasers, 6 ready at New York, 1 en route to Hampton Roads from Puget Sound, 6 fitting out for submarine chaser escort duty, 9 with home fleet, 1 in Haiti, 10 in navy yards, but noted suitable for high-sea work, 2 noted to be icebound in the St. Lawrence River.

The CHAIRMAN. It is nearly 12 o'clock now, Admiral, and if you have no objection the committee will stand adjourned until to-morrow morning at 10 o'clock.

Admiral SIMS. Yes, sir.

(Thereupon, at 12 o'clock m., the subcommittee adjourned until to-morrow, Friday, March 12, 1920, at 10 o'clock a. m.)

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NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

FRIDAY, MARCH 12, 1920.

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON NAVAL AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met pursuant to adjournment at 10 o'clock a. m., in room 235, Senate Office Building, Senator Frederick Hale presiding.

Present: Senators Hale (chairman), Ball, and Trammell.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will be in order. Admiral Sims, will you continue?

STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL WILLIAM S. SIMS—Resumed.

Admiral SIMS. In going over my testimony of yesterday, I note two points that may have been susceptible of misinterpretation. My reference to the volume of communications of our naval headquarters referred, of course, to all official communications for the period of the war, from which I am now introducing selections in substantiation of my letter of January 7. My only object in making the reference was a further attempt to give the committee an idea of the extensive and complicated background of the issues now being investigated, and of the great difficulty confronting me in presenting the case in brief form to a body which was not in a position to be familiar with such a background.

My reference to armed United States merchantmen sunk should have read that among the first ships to be sunk, after we entered the war, were two which were well armed. I have not the records to substantiate whether they were sunk on their first or second voyages. The essential point is that their armament was not and could not be an effective safeguard against submarine attack without warning.

When the committee adjourned yesterday, I had just finished reading a cablegram from the Navy Department, saying:

> Copy of cable sent Shipping Board with letter. Matter was taken up, early in December, of advisability of inclusion of an extensive tug program in their building program.

This was on the 18th of January, 1918. In my letters of December 31, January 8, January 14, and in many later letters, I continued to emphasize the need for tugs. I then mentioned the fact that a departmental memorandum had been furnished to me, dated January 28, 1918, giving a list of the tugs available, and I presented that list for the record.

This was to say nothing of the multitude of tugs which were in sight on every hand on our coast lines.

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In my cable No. 4137, of February 19, 1918, in reply to a request from the department, I made specific recommendations as to the tugs required.

Cablegram sent February 19, 1918:

Prep. by Cs. NCT. 25 ADR.

4137. Your 2873, tugs desired for duty as follows:

British waters, 12; French waters, 6; Azores, 2; Mediterranean, 16, of which 12 for Italy. Number of tugs that could be used advantageously is not limited to the numbers specified, but these are very much needed under present conditions and would be constantly employed to advantage if now available. This cablegram is not to be construed as changing my previous recommendation made in my 3042 of January 18 regarding convoying and towing submarine chasers.

SIMS.

Many other similar dispatches and letters could be quoted, but it is believed that enough has been said to show that in this specific case where recommendation was made for the sending of forces urgently needed—a need which the department themselves recognized, as is shown by their letter to the Shipping Board—no tugs except the two assigned to the Italian Government actually reached European waters for duty until April, 1918—that is, one year after war was declared. Up to the time of the armistice the Navy had less than a dozen tugs in European waters.

Apart from the tremendous value of tugs as an auxiliary antisubmarine craft (through their ability to thwart submarine losses by towing ships in before sinking), we had to have them for many other essential purposes—for example, moving our naval ships about in harbors, handling barges, assisting the Army in discharging our troops in harbors without docks, etc.

The supply was always less than the demand. I have already stated that the Allies were woefully short of such craft. I wish I could take the time to paint the picture of how our officers hunted in England and France for any old harbor tugs or barges which could be repaired and pressed into this service. It was from such sources that our essential tug assistance came during the early months of the war. Such tugs worked constantly in support of our naval forces and transports on the French coast.

At sea we were largely dependent upon British tugs. It was such tugs who first reached and towed in the large transport *Covington*, torpedoed off the French coast; also the *Westbridge* and other United States Army supply ships.

If this was naval preparation or naval cooperation from a country of such great resources as ours, I do not know the meaning of the words.

As the department not only failed to approve my recommendations, but did not even inform me of their disapproval and kept me in suspense all the time, I naturally assumed that they were proceeding to carry out the recommendations, but had merely failed to inform me.

In a way these last two cases that I have given may be considered details; and so they were, but they were details which show all the more strikingly the relations which existed between the Navy Department and their representative in the councils of the Allies.

A case, however, infinitely more serious in its consequences was the delay of the department in accepting the recommendations for the convoy system, in delaying its establishment for some months, with

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the direct result that some hundreds of thousands of tons of shipping were lost unnecessarily to the allied cause as a whole.

I think that in my first day's conference with British naval leaders the first thought that occurred to my mind was the ancient convoy system, such as that pursued in Napoleonic and many other wars. This point naturally came to everyone's mind. I found, of course, that it had received the fullest consideration by the British authorities. I was confronted with a great mass of data which had caused them to delay so far in resorting to this measure. Principal amongst the arguments against the convoy system, I might cite two: First, the merchant service itself was violently opposed to any such system. They claimed that it would greatly slow down the movements of ships, which, of course, it would, and also they proclaimed loudly their inability to steam in close formation. Second, the shipping companies were almost unanimous in resisting anything approaching to the convoy system. Figures could easily be given to show that in the space of a year the slowing down of ships by the convoy system would constitute in itself a serious loss of essential supplies.

For myself, I could not agree from the first with these objections, and I took my place on the side of those who favored this measure. Nevertheless, I fully appreciated all the obstacles.

I kept the department fully informed of all developments in regard to the convoy system. It is rather a long story, but it is sufficient to say that the situation became so critical that in May, 1917, the allied leaders were simply forced to do something different from what they had been doing, and they therefore overruled all of the objections which had been advanced against the convoy system, and started in to carry it out.

I will show, from the dispatches I am about to read, that, beginning about the 1st of May, I tried to get a promise from our Navy Department as to the cooperation of our Navy, which was essential to put this convoy system into effect whole-heartedly. Here I again met with the same experiences described above, in regard to requests for other forces.

Having been informed by the admiralty that they were about to try the convoy system, I sent the following cable to the department on the 30th of April:

Sent: April 30, 1917.
To: Secretary of the Navy, through State Department.

Admiralty making study of convoy system for shipping. Tentative plan proposes two general rendezvous American coast for assembly every four days all ships under 15 knots. Similar action Gibraltar and other trade routes. Escort one war vessel against raiders. Destroyers meet convoys at war zone. Two escort ships resting each end about eight days. Plan would require our furnishing some escort vessels and additional destroyers this side, and would necessitate abandonment present patrol against raiders. Not yet decided by admiralty. This advance information for department's consideration.

SIMS.

The day following my first dispatch I again cabled the Navy Department in the following dispatch:

Sent: May 1, 1917.
To: Secretary of the Navy.

British Admiralty has decided to give trial to the convoy scheme described in my last dispatch. Instead of present plan of naval forces operating independently against raiders, there will be a high-sea convoy against raiders, such convoy to be established as quickly as possible on all main trade routes, and on approach to dangerous areas

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on this side will be met by destroyers and escorted into port. Hampton Roads and New York have been proposed as assembly ports for east bound vessels on our coast and Gulf, with convoys sailing every fourth day. Plan decided on after long consideration by admiralty and war council, and is considered absolutely necessary. It will strain British resources of personnel and ships to the limit and we must assist by taking one route, at least, if the plan is to be carried out. Admiralty desire to be informed whether we can provide escorts for convoys sailing from the rendezvous at New York. British estimate about 14 ships will be required for New York service, and larger numbers for other routes, including Mediterranean and South America. Escorts should have sustained sea speed of at least 12 knots and 6-inch guns. I very urgently recommend favorable action. Through British naval representative at Washington details of plan will be communicated from time to time as necessary.

SIMS.

At the same time the British naval officers who had accompanied Mr. Balfour on his trip to America, had endeavored to secure the approval of the Navy Department to the convoy plan. As I was informed by Admiral Jellicoe, a complete and definite proposal for convoying all Atlantic shipping was given to the Navy Department by these officers on the 5th of May.

I received no answer to the message I had sent on the 1st of May, and, in fact, no communication whatsoever from the Navy Department with regard to the convoy proposal until June 20, nearly two months later.

In the meantime I learned from the Admiralty, some time in May, that the Navy Department were formulating a plan of their own for handling shipping from American ports, and were building up an independent organization for the routing of American shipping. Realizing the importance of securing immediate action I cabled a request to the naval attaché in London while I was at Queenstown, at the end of May, to inquire of the department what action had been taken.

He cabled on May 25 as follows:

Sent: May 25, 1917.
To: Nav. Intel., Cl.

The principle of convoying merchant ships in accordance with general plan is approved by the Admiralty. The British would like to know if we could provide cruisers for all convoys leaving New York Harbor. They are willing to convoy all ships from Hampton Roads. Be so good as to reply to this cable.

MACDOUGALL.

No reply was received from the department.

On May 31 I again cabled, urging an early reply. This cable was as follows:

Sent: 31st May, 1917.
To: Secretary, Naval Operations, through State Department.

With reference my two previous dispatches concerning convoy system of handling merchant shipping. Scandinavian and North Sea convoys now in force over a month have proved very successful. First ocean convoy from Gibraltar arrived safely on May 20. Second ocean convoy from Hampton Roads of 12 merchant ships escorted by British cruiser sailed May 24. They will be met outside and escorted through submarine danger zone. The department's cooperation with the plan set forth in my dispatch of May 1 is urgently recommended. Early reply important in order that Admiralty plans may be governed accordingly.

SIMS.

In all the cables and letters which I have read to you heretofore, and which were sent at the end of May and throughout June, I continually emphasized the vital importance of adopting immediately the convoy system, in order to save enough shipping to make possible the continuation of the war.

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In my letter of June 13 I outlined the method of handling convoys in the war zone, which was ultimately adopted by the department. This letter is long and technical, as it deals with the detailed methods of handling convoys, and I will therefore not read it, unless, of course, the committee desires it. read.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it would be well to put that letter in the record.

Admiral SIMS. Very well.

Letter No. 1.

OFFICE VICE ADMIRAL COMMANDING
U. S. DESTROYER FORCES, EUROPEAN WATERS,
London, June 13, 1917.

From: Vice Admiral William S. Sims.
To: The Secretary of the Navy (Operations).
Subject: Convoy operations in submarine danger zone.
Reference: Department's cable 21009.

1. With reference to the department's cablegram 21009, concerning methods of protecting future convoys of troops or supplies for our Army and Navy forces while in submarine danger zone.

2. The governing considerations in the question of escorting through the submarine zone are:

(1) Latest information concerning enemy activity.

(2) The question of not entirely abandoning our own offensive campaign in favor of escorting duty, and

(3) The question of the number of craft available for such duty and their disposition.

If, for example, enemy activity is concentrated to the westward of Ireland and convoys are coming in well to the southward of this area, it manifestly is important to concentrate our offensive campaign in the area in which the enemy can be most effectively attacked.

In deciding as to the number of types of ships to be diverted from offensive operations preference is always given, of course, to convoys carrying troops. Convoys carrying material, whether it be munitions, animals, or food supplies are escorted whenever necessary; but such escorting duty is not allowed materially to interfere with the offensive campaign in operation at the time in question.

3. In those areas which are constantly being covered by destroyers or other antisubmarine craft, such as sloops (specially built antisubmarine vessels, about 1,200 tons), the attempt is made to avoid taking such vessels out of their designated patrol squares. The vessel or vessels which first picks up a valuable cargo escort it through her square, notifying the patrol vessel on the next square inshore, and turning over to her as soon as the meeting of the ships is effected. If by reason of thick weather, etc., contact is not made, the convoying vessel continues on the next square.

4. The routes which will be followed by our troop and supply ships bound for France are, generally speaking, outside of the main areas of submarine activity, and hence outside of the areas continuously patroled by destroyers and other antisubmarine craft, except for a short distance off the west coast of France.

5. For the purpose of handling such convoys and also the merchant shipping convoys which are now in operation from Hampton Roads to the Mediterranean, the Admiralty have established, for convenience in their own administration, a comparatively large number of rendezvous well out to sea, and encircling the British Isles and west coast of France. Also a comparatively large number of locations on the Irish, English, and French coasts have been given designating figures or symbols. It will, therefore, be the practice each time that one of their convoys sails from a foreign port, to designate a rendezvous which they are to pass through and a point on the coast which they should steer for after passing through the rendezvous.

This requires a notification well in advance giving as closely as possible the time that convoys will pass through the rendezvous points designated. Escorting destroyers will then be able to intercept the convoys at some point on the route between the rendezvous and the point designed on the coast, the position of interception depending primarily upon enemy activities at the time. It manifestly must also be possible to communicate in cipher with convoys at sea and divert them from one rendezvous to another if occasion demands.

The above mentioned lettering and numbering of rendezvous and points on the coast are, as stated, primarily for convenience of reference in administration in the Admiralty itself.

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The significance of such symbols if circulated even to our own allied officers abroad must necessarily be limited to the maximum extent in order to preclude any possibility of the enemy becoming aware of them.

6. If the greatest possible degree of safety for convoys is to be insured, it is entirely necessary that their movements should be under control of one source, and therefore as all enemy activity is concentrated on this side of the Atlantic and his main effort must necessarily remain in its present zone, it follows that selection of rendezvous routes and other directions in regard to movements of convoys should be controlled and directed from this side; that is, in the Admiralty itself. It is for this reason that the Admiralty has requested, and I strongly recommend, the immediate detail of a competent and tactful officer whose duties in the Admiralty under my general direction will be confined to those above indicated.

7. The following procedure in regard to convoys is therefore recommended:

(1) Early advance information regarding prospective sailing of convoys and their character.

(2) Immediate information as soon as definite hours of sailings can be foreseen.

As soon as this information is received, and after consultation with the Admiralty, a rendezvous and route to be included in sailing orders will be selected and given. Definite information should then be given when convoy sails, as to its prospective speed and time of passing through rendezvous designated.

8. It is urgently requested that only British Admiralty codes be used for such communications, addressed to the Admiralty, the first word of the message being "Sims."

9. Under no circumstances, if convoys are divided into groups, should these groups use the same rendezvous and the same routes after reaching the danger zone, as in such a case if the enemy should become aware of their movements he would be able to concentrate for successive attacks.

10. Ships of convoys should zigzag together from two to four points irregularly. Organized irregularity is one of the principal requirements in opposing submarine attack.

11. Escorting destroyers should be allowed the maximum independence of movement and the exercise of initiative. They should not be held to strict formations in reference to bearings and distances from the convoy. This procedure is necessary in order that full advantage may be taken of their experience in operating against submarines and their later information in regard to enemy methods, which are continually changing.

12. It is mandatory that the wireless should be used as little as possible. In fact, it would be better not to use it at all, except for important directions which may have to be sent from shore as to changes of routes. Evidence indicates that the enemy have been successful in the use of radio direction finders, particularly in locating large forces or radio work of an unusual or distinctive character.

13. It is apparent that once a convoy enters the danger zone an escorting cruiser is of little or no protection against submarines, and virtually becomes one of the convoy itself, also requiring protection.

14. Up to April 1 there is no evidence to indicate that any German submarine carried beam tubes, and this is one of the principal reasons why they have never attempted attacking a formation from ahead—that is, approaching from ahead and firing as they pass through the formation. With bow tubes they would be forced to use the helm before reaching the formation, with considerable danger to themselves, which they seldom if ever incur. Hence the principal arc for destroyer protection is the bows and wings of formations.

15. The two principal requirements of formations of a considerable number of ships for defensive purposes against submarines, are:

(1) Minimum depth of formation—that is, minimum length of formation in the direction of course. This in order to reduce the arcs on the bows and beams, which must be protected by destroyers.

(2) The second consideration is to concentrate the formation as much as possible—that is, it is also necessary to reduce the dimension of the formation at right angles to the course.

This not only reduces the range of visibility of the force, but also restricts the advantageous positions of attack which the submarine desires to attain.

It is for the above reasons that line of divisions formation is generally adopted, with the distance between columns as small as consistent with zigzagging evolutions.

I cite that merely to point out that, as in all other cases, I put forth my utmost endeavor to keep the department fully informed of all Allied war experience, and that, in the particular case under discus-

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sion—that is, the convoy question, they had the fullest possible information of every phase of the problem.

In cables of June 14, 15, and 17, 1917, I repeated my recommendations with regard to convoy. My message of June 15 will probably convince you of the urgency of these recommendations:

Sent: June 15, 1917.
For: Secretary of the Navy.
From: Vice Admiral Sims.

No. 30. Strongly urge our putting convoy system into effect immediately from Philadelphia. Boston, New York, and North Atlantic ports as previously recommended. British propose to assemble Canadian convoys to join ours. Convoy system is an offensive measure. At present our fuel is being expended and machinery trained in seeking an enemy whose primary object must be to avoid action and attack merchant shipping. We are also necessarily attempting to combine escorting duty with independent offensive operations, escorting such individual ships as the situation combined with our limited number of vessels permit.

If shipping were grouped in convoys, we would thereby force the enemy to seek us, and thus impose upon him the necessity of dispersing his forces in order to locate us, while we obtained the benefits of the principle of concentrated attack upon his dispersed line. A study of the convoy system shows that, even if a few ships of each convoy were sunk, our losses would be much less than at present. The enemy has marked limitations, owing to his distance from bases, and limited ammunition and offensive power. It is manifest that the enemy can not afford to expend much effort against our antisubmarine craft. Experience indicates that submarines have not attempted concentrated attack in numbers, owing to difficulty of coordination and danger to themselves. Such attacks, if attempted, would facilitate offensive operations of escorting destroyers.

If diverted from attacks on shipping the objective of the enemy campaign is lost. Request that department consult with British commodore in charge of assembling convoys, Hampton Roads. If the plan proposed is to be adopted at all, it is mandatory that it be put into force without delay, and while the campaign is most severe. Request early information as to department's action. A convoy may be started at any time, the larger number of ships the better, escorted by cruiser or reserve battleship and preferably with naval officers and signalmen on each ship.

SIMS.

I began in the beginning of May, and it was not until the latter part of June that I got any reply whatever, and the last sentence of the reply was this:

"In regard to convoy, I consider that merchant vessels having armed guards are safer when sailing independently."

DANIELS.

I would have supposed that anyone who had even casually read the Sunday newspapers would have known that the arming of merchant vessels would have just the opposite result, as it obliges the submarine to torpedo without warning instead of sinking a ship with its own gunfire.

In my cable of June 20 I said, in substance: It will seem suicidal if the convoy system is not put into immediate operation and applied to all shipping, thus forcing submarines to encounter antisubmarine craft in order to attack shipping. It is impossible to carry on partial convoy and partial patrol system. Both can not be done, the former much better than present system, which is not succeeding. Urgently request information of department's action on this dispatch and upon previous similar dispatches. A decision is necessary before decisive action can be taken on this side.

I think I have explained further along that until a decision was made on the American side, it was extremely difficult for the people on the other side to put a convoy system into operation.

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With regard to the arming of merchant ships, I replied to the Secretary's assertion in my dispatch of June 21. This was sent from Queenstown. [Reading:]

Cable sent June 21, 1917.

I trust I have made the critical nature of the military situation entirely clear. I consider it my duty to report that if we can not offer more immediate actual assistance, even to the extent of sending the majority of the vessels patrolling our own coast lines, which can not materially affect the general situation, we will fail to render the service to the allied cause which future history will show to have been necessary.

My recommendations concerning the convoy system were not based upon American vessels, but upon all allied shipping, for it is upon the preservation of the remainder of this shipping that our success against the enemy is entirely dependent. It is assumed here that the comparative immunity of American shipping from submarine attack is due to German hopes that such a policy will strengthen the peace propaganda in America. This is apparently clearly shown by the German press. Actual and extended experience has shown that arming merchantmen does not protect them from attack, but simply forces the submarine to attack without warning, thus obliging her to use up her torpedoes and shorten her cruise. Armed merchantmen are being sunk daily off this port.

That is, Queenstown.

The success of the convoys, so far brought in shows that the system will defeat the submarine campaign if applied generally and in time. The system merely is a plan that obliges the submarine to fight antisubmarine craft in order to attack merchantmen. The present campaign is not succeeding. The necessity is again presented of sending all destroyers, tugs, yachts, and other craft which can reach the critical area, by themselves or towed part way by reserve battleships or any naval vessels. If the situation is not made clear, I hope the department will indicate the further information desired. Time is a vital element in any measures taken.

SIMS.

Again, on June 22, I urgently advised the supply by the United States of necessary convoy escorts for the convoys from New York, and explained the arrangements made by the British: If anybody has had the curiosity to read Admiral von Tirpitz's book, he will see in there that everything I had to say or will have to say about the convoy system or the patrol system is entirely sustained by the opinion of that admiral. [Reading:]

To: Secretary of the Navy.
Sent: June 22.

The British Admiralty have now adopted the convoy system and will put it into full effect as fast as ships can be obtained for high sea convoy against raiders and destroyers for escort duty in submarine zone. As previously reported, convoys are in successful operation from Mediterranean and Hampton Roads. Plans are in hand for total of eight convoys a week as follows: Two from Gibraltar, two from Hampton Roads, two or three from New York, one from Canada—the latter preferably being combined with the New York convoys. One a week from New York will be put into operation as soon as possible with British cruisers, in absence of our support. I again urgently advise our full support, assisting and cooperating in assembly of convoys, and furnishing one cruiser or reserve battleship a week for high sea escort. Reserve battleships are admirably suited for this duty, which will not interfere with personnel training, for which I understand they are now being used.

In reply to these cables a message was received from the department on June 24, which has been previously read. [Reading:]

[Cablegram.]

From: Secretary of Navy.
To: Alusna, London.
For: Vice Admiral Sims, No. 37.
Received: June 24, 1917.

This is a reply to your various letters and cables.

Another thing that the department recognizes is the necessity of sending all antisubmarine craft which can be spared from the home waters into active European

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waters, and when such craft become available will send them. In making the local assignments abroad of such forces, the department requests and will be guided by your advice, which should be given after consultation with the various admiralties concerned as to priority of requirements.

The department is strongly of the opinion—based on recent experiences—that the question of supplying adequate guns and trained gun crews to merchant ships is one which can in no wise be treated as a minor issue. Coupled with a rigid system of inspection, this method is believed to constitute one of the most effective defensive submarine measures.

That is exactly the same thing as was said in the cable from the Secretary of the Navy. There was the opinion formed in America, necessarily without the information that should have been considered in connection with it, which was holding up a convoy system, and which held up for two or three months, and which cost the loss of a number of hundreds of thousands of tons of shipping and some lives. [Continuing reading:]

It announces, moreover, as its policy, its willingness to cooperate in every way, and will consider the question of supplying additional naval forces of types other than antisubmarine craft whenever the advisability of so doing is justified. The department is also considering the outline of a scheme which it is hoped will allow of a greater degree of cooperation and ability to supply escort to vessels through the danger zone, without interfering with the destroyers' other duties as much as does the present system of individual escort, and it will not displace the present method of handling merchant shipping from United States ports. Details when prevented (perfected) (?) will be cabled.

DANIELS, *Secretary Navy.*

That is a scheme that is proposed in the last paragraph of that telegram, some royal road to victory scheme, which was never presented, so far as I know.

It will be noted that in this cable the department reiterates the opinion expressed by the Secretary, four days before, that the arming of merchant ships constituted one of the most effective defenses against submarine measures, and implying thereby that it merited more consideration than the convoy system, or, at least, that until it was further developed, it was unnecessary to take the convoy system very seriously. In any case it is difficult to construe these answers from the department, to my specific and urgent recommendations concerning the convoy system, as anything less than what they considered justifiable substitutes for the convoy system. The committee can perhaps imagine my state of mind when confronted with this situation. It was impossible for me, 3,000 miles away, assisted by only one commissioned officer, to know just what was in the department's mind. I could assume nothing less than that they failed to understand the issue which I had attempted to present. I, therefore, made one more attempt to put forth the case of the convoy system, in the following dispatch sent from Queenstown on June 28, to which I invite the committee's particular attention?

Sent: June 28, 1917.
To: Secretary of the Navy.
From: Queenstown.

Referring to department's opinion, reported in last two cables, to the effect that adequate armament and trained crews constitute one of the most effective defensive antisubmarine measures, I again submit with all possible stress the following, based on extended British war experience. The measures demanded, if enemy defeat in time is to be assured, are not defensive, but offensive-defensive. The merchantmen's inherent weakness is lack of speed and protection. Guns are no defense against torpedo attack without warning, which is necessarily the enemy method of attack against armed ships. In this area alone, during the last six weeks, 30 armed ships

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were sunk by torpedoes without submarine being seen, although three of these were escorted each by a single destroyer. The result would have been, of course, the same no matter how many guns these ships carried or what their caliber. Three mystery ships, heavily armed, manned by expert naval crews, with much previous experience with submarine attack, have recently been torpedoed without warning. Another case within the month of mystery ship engaging submarine with gun fire at 6,000 yards, but submarine submerged and approached unseen and torpedoed ship at close range. The ineffectiveness of heaviest batteries against submarine attack is conclusively shown by Admiralty's practice always sending destroyers to escort their men-of-war.

The comparative immunity of the relatively small number American ships, especially liners, is believed here to be due to the enemy hopes that the pacifist movement will succeed. Cases are on record of submarines making successful gun attacks, from advantageous sun position, against armed ships, without ship being able to see submarine. I submit that, if submarine campaign is to be defeated, it must be by offensive measures. The enemy submarine mission must be destruction of shipping and avoidance of antisubmarine craft. Enemy submarines are now using, for their final approach, an auxiliary periscope less than 2 inches in diameter. This information just acquired. All of the experience in this submarine campaign to date demonstrates that it would be a seriously dangerous misapprehension to base our action on the assumption that any armament on merchantmen is any protection against submarines which are willing to use their torpedoes. The British have now definitely decided the adoption, to the maximum practicable extent, convoys from 16 to 20 ships. This is an offensive measure against submarines, as the latter will be subject to the attack of our antisubmarine craft whenever they come within torpedoing distance of convoyed merchantmen. Moreover, it permits of concentrated attack by our forces, and obliges the enemy to disperse his forces to cover the various routes of approach.

Concerning department's reference to a scheme for protection of merchant shipping, which will not interfere with present escort duties, I submit that the time element alone prevents utilization of any new antisubmarine invention. The campaign may easily be lost before any such schemes can come into effective operation. The enemy is certainly counting on maximum effort being exerted before long nights and bad weather of autumn, that is, in next three months. Heaviest effort may be anticipate in July and August. I again submit that protection of our coast lines and of allied shipping must necessarily be carried out in field of enemy activity if it is to be effective. The mission of the Allies must be to force submarines to give battle. Hence no operations in home waters should take precedence over, or be allowed to diminish, the maximum effort we can exert in area in which enemy is operating, and must continue to operate in order to succeed.

SIMS.

All of this time I was keeping in close touch with the opinion of the French navy department, and hence it came to my notice that the department was calling upon the French, by direct communication, for their opinion concerning the convoy system, and doing so without my knowledge. This was, of course, quite within the province of the department, but I mention the fact merely to show the confusing situation created by such methods.

The French reply, of which I here have a copy, shows their complete agreement with all that I had been recommending:

From: French naval general staff, first section, Paris.
Date: June 26, 1917.
To: French naval attaché, Washington.

[Translation.]

Replying to your telegram, at the request of Admiral Benson, we have considered, in concert with the British Admiralty, before the entrance of the United States into the war, the principle of the grouping in convoys of merchant ships across the Atlantic with protection by cruisers.

The cruisers are intended to protect the ships against pirates and the new large submarines. They shall conduct the convoys to the approach entries, where destroyers will assure the exscort to the port of discharge. Admiral Grasset has received instructions to make arrangements with the British admiral at the Bermudas, and have these cruisers perform escort duty.

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We are quite ready to consider, in concert with the American Admiralty, a new distribution of the allied cruisers for the protection of merchant ships and transports. We will, moreover, communicate to Capt. Jackson all the information we possess on the matter.

Capt. Jackson was my representative in Paris.

It is unnecessary, I am sure, to point out to the committee how this message, which is but one of many similar incidents, demonstrates the wide gulf which existed between the methods the Navy Department pursued and that which we all understand by the phase unity of command.

The department in the meantime was apparently still working on their independent plan for the control and routing of shipping, of which I had learned accidentally in May.

On June 28 I cabled the department (in reply to a number of requests as to the control of American merchantmen), recommending that American efforts should be coordinated with those of the Allies in the control of this shipping. My message was as follows:

Sent: June 28, 1917.
To: Secretary of the Navy.
From: Queenstown.

Reference department's notification of sailings of American merchantmen. If same measure of protection is to be afforded American as other allied merchantmen, their movements should be handled in same manner. Therefore coordination with British shipping officer New York is necessary. Communications with London, and steps taken to establish routes and protection in dangerous zones, would be simplified, and safety better assured, if all communications were made in same codes and from same sources as for British and other allied shipping. Separate communications via naval attaché or me means confusion and are not safe. The essential information is character of cargo, times of sailings, times of arrival at the rendezvous, and call letters. It should be understood that there are not sufficient ships available in submarine zones for escort or other protection of even all specially valuable cargoes, not to mention so-called valuable and other cargoes.

SIMS.

No direct reply was received to my recommendation, but on July 1 the department outlined a complete plan of their own in the following cablegram:

Received: July 1, 1917.
To: Alusna.
From: Secretary of the Navy, Washington.

Sims' No. 42. Navy Department is inaugurating shipping intelligence offices under naval officers at customhouses in United States ports, where British admiralty now has similar offices. Navy Department desires to cooperate with British and other admiralties in shipping intelligence service along following lines. United States offices to furnish service in United States ports, British in British ports, French in French, Italian in Italian. Foreign assignments in United States offices welcome. Consuls in neutral countries to cooperate. Navy Department will keep cooperating admiralties fully informed of dangerous routes, rendezvous, and regulations, concerning vessels approaching United States ports, and will expect similar confidential information to be furnished from abroad. Routes rendezvous and convoys in danger areas will conform in all respects to directions of admiralties responsible for these areas. Consult admiralty and arrange details. Department will approve if above general principles adhered to. 19030.

DANIELS, *Secretary Navy.*

To this message I replied as follows:

Sent: July 3, 1917.
To: Secretary of the Navy.

No. 71, referring to your No. 42. In view of present critical stage of war, with probability of decisive developments in next few months, which will be entirely dependent upon preservation of shipping, I submit that it would be a fundamental military error to attempt in any way to change present established administration personnel, or methods of communication in connection with control of shipping.

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Undoubtedly the most serious military handicap of this war, as of all allied wars, has been difficulty in coordination between allies. It would manifestly be the safest military policy to allow any one ally to control and direct all operations, but as this can not be done, we should certainly subordinate every interest possible to such an end. To attempt at this time to establish new shipping offices, with new personnel, introducing necessity for increased number and different methods of communication, would certainly involve delays, misunderstandings, and confusion which would be direct assistance to enemy.

If success is to be assured and accelerated, there should be no lines of distinction, or introduction of complication. The shipping to be controlled is all of the allied and neutral shipping, which should be treated as a whole. It needs protection only in field of enemy's campaign. We may, and should, assist by adding extra personnel to present established system of control, but under no circumstances should we attempt to supplant or take over any shipping offices now in efficient operation. I submit that central control for all shipping should be concentrated here in London, in center of war area, where all information of enemy methods is constantly available, and from whence daily control of naval forces should originate. British Admiralty has been consulted and is in complete agreement with this dispatch. It is impossible to adequately present this case by cable, and it is therefore hoped that department will accept these recommendations, based on one consideration only, namely, our interests in the one cause against common enemy.

SIMS.

I am going into this thing at some length because it is the most important measure that was taken during the war, and consequently the continuous resistance for a number of months to the introduction of that convoy system by the Navy Department is the most serious error that was committed.

For the information of the committee, I should perhaps very briefly explain what the point at issue here really is. The only routes followed by convoys which were vital and which involved great danger, were in the so-called submarine zone; that is, off the coasts of France, Great Britain, and Ireland. In this area not only were convoys confronted with the danger of submarine attack, but what in the minds at least of merchant captains was considered an even greater danger was that of collision with other convoys, as all ships were running without lights. It must be remembered that convoys were not only coming from Canada, New York, and Hampton Roads, but also from the Mediterranean and from South Africa—the latter being ships from Australia and other localities. To add to this congestion, we always had the outgoing convoys to consider. The routes followed by convoys outside of the submarine zone were, of course, not of particular consequence, as the amount of sea room there caused little fear of collisions.

It was for this simple reason, together with the fact that the latest information as to submarine whereabouts was available only in London, that it was essential—in fact absolutely necessary—that the routings and control of convoys in the submarine zone be handled from one source and not from many.

The plan proposed by the department, to suddenly displace the extensive system of offices which the Allies had built up in order to supply shipping with its routings, war warnings, and secret intelligence, was apparently based largely upon sentiment. I submit, without fear of contradiction, the assertion that no reason whatever, except that of increasing efficiency, could warrant, in the very height of a war of this nature—a period in which victory was doubtful and defeat quite possible—the throwing out of gear of an extensive organization which was working and upon which the safety of shipping depended. It must be noted, too, that this system, while

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largely operated by the British, was an allied system for the protection of all allied shipping and had been prefected, and was in successful operation many months before the United States entered the war.

In spite of these recommendations, the fact remains that it was found necessary to keep the British offices going throughout the war, and that the department set up an independent duplicate organization in the principal ports of the United States, thereby wasting both officers and money. Many American officers who came abroad, including merchant captains, described the ridiculous procedure which they had to go through with in New York, traveling about the city from building to building to get their instructions.

I want to stress here the point that there is now no question as to the efficiency of the routing system then in force, because it is the identical system pursued throughout the war in handling all shipping whether single ships or convoys. In spite of this fact, however, the department seemed intent upon changing the plans, which could do nothing less than introduce confusion. For example, on July 2 I received the following message from the department, which I will read, together with my reply:

Cable received: July 2, 1917.
To: Alusna.
For: Vice Admiral Sims.
No. 44.

Referring to your previous cables. The following method for routing merchant ships across the Atlantic is suggested for discussion with the Admiralty. That the Admiralty predict for each week ahead, and nominate the days on which it will escort ships through danger zone. That Admiralty select rendezvous at which it will meet and escort merchant shipping. That their instructions be cabled to their agents here. That the United States authorities, working in connection with British agents here, from same office direct all belligerent shipping to rendezvous set by Admiralty, timing arrivals at rendezvous to fit dates predicted by Admiralty. That the make-up of convoy at the points of rendezvous be arranged for by classifying ships according to speed, the alphabetical classification to be plainly marked on the sides of the ship in place of a name. Or to adopt some other system of speed classification, if the alphabetical marking be too conspicuous to the enemy. That the United States authorities appoint rendezvous for incoming vessels to United States ports, in case the submarine efforts on this side render escort in these waters a necessity. It is believed this method has advantage of not slowing up the flow of merchant tonnage across the ocean, while, except for protection against raiders, it meets most of the requirements of continuous convoy. It has further advantage of making fewer demands on the Allies' coal supplies in European waters. 13001.

DANIELS.

My reply was sent the following day, July 3. [Reading:]

Sent: July 3, 1917.
To: Secretary of the Navy.

No. 72. Your 44 concerning convoy system. Have fully discussed with Admiralty the suggested modification of convoy system now in operation. The department's proposals have been subject of previous study and partial trial.

The disadvantages are as follows: First, great difficulty, and in fact impossibility, of efficiently assembling merchant convoys at distant rendezvous on the high seas. Even when convoys are assembled before departure, and are operating on definite prearranged schedule, the convoy's arrival at a rendezvous can not surely be predicted within from 30 to 40 hours. Second, the necessity for excessive amount of wireless communication on high seas in assembling convoys. This feature alone a vital objection. Third, difficulty of handling convoys information which have not had previous drill and experiments. The cruiser escort, in a addition to protection against raiders is very necessary as flagship of convoys, drilling them from day of departure in zigzagging and evolutions necessary if attacked. All merchants wireless codes are unsafe. It is therefore desirable that escorting cruisers should handle all communications in latest secret codes and that merchant ships should not use wireless at all.

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It should be possible to divert convoys, if necessary, before escorting destroyers join.

This is now accomplished by broadcasting from Poldhu, on high power, to cruisers who don't reply, and in fact even beyond wireless sending range of cruisers. Four convoys from Hampton Roads have arrived safely 350,000 tons. Convoys are now being loaded and grouped according to European destination.

Not speed.

For instance, all cargoes bound for eastern British ports are grouped in one convoy. Convoys from Hampton Roads include cargoes from Chili, Panama, Gulf ports, Baltimore, and Philadelphia. Two convoys a week are now being started from Hampton Roads and one from Cape Breton, Canada.

In view of information available here, and present stage of development of convoy system, I strongly recommend that we cooperate to the maximum extent for some time at least. Can our escorting cruisers leave convoys outside of submarine zone and return without refueling? The plan is to escort outgoing empty ships clear of submarine zone and then disperse them. It is undesirable to add the cruisers to convoy in submarine zone, if it can be avoided. Admiralty desires information immediately as to whether first convoy can be started from New York on July 8. Again urgently recommend that carefully selected commander be sent immediately for duty under me in British Admiralty in connection with convoys. Admiralty particularly desires this.

SIMS.

The only explanation I can give—the only guess I can give—as to the proposal put forth in the cablegram, for the handling of the shipping, is that it was done by some one who had never been to sea or seen the sea.

In the cables and letters which I have been reading to you, it should be emphasized that, from the 1st of May, I had endeavored to convince the department of the necessity of assigning a sufficient number of cruisers for convoy escort duty to provide for the mercantile convoys from New York. On May 1, in my cable, I had estimated that 14 would be necessary for this duty. The first intimation I had from the department that they intended to take any action on this recommendation was on the 2d of July when, in its cable No. 44, the department stated that they would assign seven cruisers for convoy duty, in accordance with the Admiralty's request.

There was a delay from the 2d of May to the 1st of July, during which time they resisted helping out to the extent that they finally did in the convoy system.

This was confirmed by their dispatch of July 5, in which they stated that seven vessels of the *Denver* class would be detailed to assist in convoy operations. As I have previously pointed out, the Admiralty had been using the convoy system for six weeks, at the time when this first assurance from the department was received by me. As I had pointed out to the department in the letters and cables that I read you, it was practically impossible to attempt to handle commercial merchant shipping partially by convoys and partially by independent sailings, in view of the number of ships to be escorted, and the lack of antisubmarine craft.

It was absolutely necessary that so far as possible all important shipping should be immediately placed in convoy. Yet at this time, six weeks after the first convoy had successfully arrived, the British Admiralty had yet no information to the effect that the United States was willing to cooperate in this matter, and the cables I had received from the department indicated that they were considering many plans to avoid adopting the convoy system, but had not decided to cooperate fully with the Allies in convoys. Something of the distress and confusion resulting from this attitude of the depart-

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ment may be inferred from the following letter, which I received from Admiral Jellicoe on the 11th of July. [Reading:]

I am very much disturbed about the convoy question. As you know, we are making great efforts to get it going, but it is quite impossible to organize the system unless we know absolutely what vessels are available as escorts through the submarine zone, and we can not know this unless the whole system of sailings from ports abroad to British and French waters is organized some way ahead, and by some way ahead I mean that we should know at least a fortnight before ships requiring escort leave ports on the other side, the reason being that convoys have to be arranged about three weeks ahead.

At the present time we have arranged four distinct convoys, namely, two from Hampton Roads every eight days, one from Canadian waters every eight days, and one from New York every eight days.

The first three of these convoys are escorted through the submarine zone by British sloops or destroyers, but we are absolutely dependent upon United States destroyers for the convoy coming from New York. Therefore, we must be certain of having 11 United States destroyers for this sole duty. Do you think you can guarantee that we shall have these destroyers, and that you can inform your Government that you have given the guaranty?

The next step that will be necessary will be to make it perfectly clear to the United States Navy Board that they must give a fortnight's notice before it is proposed to sail ships requiring escort in anything but the smallest numbers. We have, for instance, been informed within the last few days of troops being sent over in two White Star liners, of a hospital unit coming over in another vessel, and of four ships with valuable Government cargoes—all requiring escort; and we received the notice as the ships were sailing. As it happens, we also have troop convoys arriving at about the same time, and there will be the very greatest difficulty, I am sure, in providing adequate escorts for all these vessels, whereas, if a little notice were given, we could suggest the possibility of deferring the sailing of some of the ships, perhaps for a few days, so that escorts would be available when they arrived.

I think the matter is so important that I would suggest to you the desirability of wiring at once to say that it is essential that you should be given notice immediately of any proposed sailings within the next fortnight. Otherwise I fear that we may be faced with great difficulties. If we know that we are pretty clear for about a fortnight, we should be able to decide definitely whether the four destroyers could be taken for the service which I mentioned to you this morning.

J. R. JELLICO.

The service which he refers to there was a proposal to send four of our destroyers into the Channel for certain operations with British destroyers in the Dover patrol service. It was my opinion about that time that continuous service of our destroyers escorting and patrolling off Queenstown would get on their nerves, and it might be desirable to have some change, so that it was proposed to make an exchange, sending some of our destroyers into the channel in the Dover patrol, and let them be replaced by British destroyers, and in that way give our people, in succession, an opportunity to see some different service. But that is one of the things in which I was mistaken. They did not get stale on the job at all, all during the war.

During this period I had been receiving occasional announcements from the department of the sailings of Army supply ships and of British liners carrying American troops, all of which required escort. In most cases I was given only a few days' notice, and it became increasingly difficult to protect shipping and provide escort for these especially valuable ships. On the 12th of July I therefor sent the following dispatch:

Sent: July 12, 1917.

97. Very urgent.

It is of utmost importance that ample warning be given of prospective sailings of all ships requiring escort, and particularly groups of ships with troops or supplies which will approach European shores outside of usual merchant routes, similar to those re-

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ported yesterday as having sailed on July 11. Every possible effort is now being made to put convoy system into full operation, and its success is dependent upon use of our destroyers in addition to British destroyers and patrol ships. At present there is prospect of severe congestion of convoys in submarine zones latter part this month, not only to United Kingdom, but also to France and from Russia.

Please cable to-day concerning any further prospective sailings of Army troops or supply ships before August 1. In case of such sailings, it will be necessary to cancel merchant convoy sailing from New York on July 14. Without advance notice of at least 15 days before sailings, there is grave danger of coincidence of arrivals in submarine zone, with necessity of inadequate protection for some convoy, and hence possibility of disaster. I again urge the importance of our not attempting to work independently, or of replacing present established British shipping and convoy officers, but that we solely cooperate in regard to all shipping, American as well as British and other allied shipping. Sailings of all British or American requiring special escort should be arranged in cooperation with British shipping officers, giving rendezvous and time. Communications should be made in accordance with their usual procedure, notifying me for information if desired. I recommend that, in future, Army supply ships join merchant convoys, in order to increase safety, relieve strain on limited number of escort vessels available, and permit plans to be made for adequate protection. This subject is of the utmost importance to allied success against enemy submarine campaign, and prevention of serious losses.

SIMS.

On the 11th of July I had received from the department a dispatch asking what steps were necessary in order to insure safe escort for troops and troop supplies. To this I replied in my message of July 14, again emphasizing the importance of coordinating troop and Army supply transports with the merchant convoys. This was as follows:

Sent: July 14, 1917.
To: Secretary of the Navy.

Unnumbered. It is impossible for me to guarantee safe escort protection through submarine zone for troops, troop supplies, and valuable Government cargoes unless the following conditions are fulfilled:

First. A schedule of prospective sailings, giving at least two weeks' warning in advance of all sailings.

Second. That such shipping be concentrated in convoys, even if delays are thereby caused.

There are not sufficient destroyers to meet demands imposed by irregular and independent sailings and insufficient warnings.

Sending troops by individual ships at brief intervals requires nearly double the number of destroyers that would be required if grouped in convoys.

All supply ships should sail with merchant convoys.

Third. It is essential to safety that my staff be increased, as previously requested. Without this assistance there is grave danger of mistakes which may indirectly cause serious losses.

I will take up especially, by and by, that question of the lack of assistance. In all the stuff I have been reading you since I came here, three days ago, I was assisted by only one man in my regular staff, and such assistance as I could get from outside, from the naval attache, and patriotic Americans who came in and worked for nothing.

The situation, as it then existed, was fully explained in my letter of July 14 to the Navy Department:

11. Convoys and valuable merchant shipping. The problem of insuring safe escort for merchant ships, either singly or in convoy, is a very complicated and serious one. Convoys are now coming from the Mediterranean, from Russia, and from various other places of origin besides America; and in view of the inadequate number of vessels available for escort duty, it is absolutely essential that this complicated and vital question of destroyer escort be coordinated in some central place.

The shipping to which I refer is not American shipping or British shipping, or any other allied or neutral shipping alone, but solely the combined allied and neutral valuable shipping which is essential to combined allied military and naval success.

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I have not intended to convey in my dispatches the idea that I consider the British methods of handling shipping as the best. Improvements are doubtless possible, but we should not attempt to improve at the cost of lack of cooperation and hence at the cost of losses which can not be afforded.

My only aim has been to attempt to point out the entire necessity for thorough cooperation.

One of the greatest dangers in handling shipping arises from the necessity for long-distance communication and the danger of the enemy thus obtaining vital information.

In order to avoid these difficulties the principal requirement is to reduce the number of officers and personnel that must handle the work and to adopt and be guided by control from some one central source. There has been cause for serious concern over the proposal by the department to establish separate shipping offices and shipping office personnel. This would mean an extra system of communication, an enlarged number of people through whom information must pass, and hence would involve grave possibilities.

I would recommend with the greatest urgency that we first merely put such extra men as may be necessary in the British shipping offices to cooperate with them, and, as a beginning, that we use the systems and precedure and lines of communication which they use. From this beginning we could gradually introduce such modifications or improvements as are considered advisable, and perhaps in the course of time take over the work entirely in our own ports.

But it is of the utmost importance for the safety of shipping, and hence success against the enemy, that such a course should be adopted gradually, and that in any case we should always utilize the central control here in London, where all information is available and from where the orders should be issued to the escorting forces. The British Admiralty will be only too glad to accept a representative from our Navy Department, with his proportionate share of responsibility, in the Admiralty. This fact has been cabled in the past.

12. Very serious embarrassment has been experienced in the last few days owing to the unexpected announcements from the United States of the sailing of an Army transport convoy and of troops or hospital units on the *Mongolia* and the *Adriatic* and *Baltic* and other British liners. It happened that the prospective arrivals of these various ships coincided with the arrivals of merchant convoys from Russia, from the Mediterranean, from Hampton Roads, and from New York.

It was also not known definitely whether the ships referred to were the British ships *Adriatic* and *Baltic*. In the case of the *Mongolia* no rendezvous was given. As stated in my dispatches, advance information of at least two weeks is essential to properly coordinate plans. Without such advance information there is danger of coincidence of arrivals in the submarine zone and the possibility of being unable to supply proper escort to all. Such a course might easily result in disaster for some convoys or valuable individual ships.

So far the plans have contemplated United States destroyers escorting only United States Government troop and supply ships and the New York merchant convoys, in addition to their offensive patrol duties in Queenstown area, which includes escort of valuable cargoes sailing independently.

With but one military aid, there has been grave danger of oversights or errors in insuring proper action on all dispatches received. The responsibilities involved, and the far-reaching importance of the duties required, are considered to warrant an adequate staff, even at the sacrifice of other important demands upon the available service personnel. This subject has been explained in full in various cable dispatches and other reports.

All I can say about that is that God was good to us that we did not have some very serious losses, with all that confusion.

On the 6th of July, in accordance with the department's request, I sent over, by an armed guard officer, a full and detailed recommendation for the handling of troop convoys.

On July 22 I received a cable from the department, in which they stated that the rules for convoy, contained in this letter, were accepted, and would govern the department's action.

This plan, although it referred only to troop convoys, was, as a matter of fact, identical with the general plan for handling all convoys, in this respect, that it involved control of the convoy routings from a central source, and that source in London. As a matter of fact, in the specific case of troop convoys, their routings were handled

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exclusively from my own office, but the officer who handled them was, of course, in the Admiralty convoy section daily, and was governed in his daily work by the merchant convoy system. This was absolutely essential. The two were interdependent.

I will refer to this question of handling troop convoys later, only adding at this time that the reason for holding the troop convoy routings strictly in my own organization was merely that of insuring greater secrecy in this all-important measure, upon which the safety of all of our troops fundamentally depended.

It was not until even later that, in the case of troop transport, the department finally accepted my recommendations as to the handling of Army and Navy supply ships. In the case of those ships sent abroad in July, so much confusion attended the plans for their sailing, and for their escort through the war zone, that it was apparent that the only way to handle them would be to sail them with the regular mercantile convoys that were being organized to sail weekly, or twice weekly, from New York and Hampton Roads. I could read you dozens of messages here, dealing with the confusion and embarrassment occasioned by sailing these ships independently, with no reference to other convoys; and in each case with the definite order from the department to me that I should, in each case, supply these ships, whether sailing singly or in groups, with danger-zone escort. What they wanted me to do in that respect was simply a physical impossibility.

In my cable of July 31, I therefore recommended that a definite policy be adopted for handling these supply ships. My message was as follows:

Sent: July 31.
To: Opnav, Washington.

No. 172. I strongly recommend that for all Government supply ships, Army or Navy, one of the following courses be pursued: First, that such ships be held and grouped in separate convoys of 12 or more, the sailings coordinated with other convoy sailings, or second, that as fast as such ships are ready they be consolidated with the merchant convoys from New York and Hampton Roads, which will be escorted through danger zone, and a detachment of destroyers will take over the escort to destination when convoy separates. Either of these plans will increase safety by permitting better concentration of protection, considering the inadequate number of destroyers available. Escort will be thereby greatly facilitated, with much less steaming and better state of readiness of destroyers.

The department on August 1 replied as follows:

SIMSADUS, *London.*

Opnav 73. Referring to your 172: This office concurs in expression of policy stated in your cable referring to the proper methods of routing cargo supply ships of the Army and Navy.

ADMIRAL BENSON.

You note the same experience; first, proposal of impracticable plans, a long discussion by cable, etc.; and a final acceptance of the simple, ordinary plans which had been suggested.

An excellent illustration of the attitude of the department toward convoy and shipping control at this time, is afforded by their message of August 10:

AUGUST 10, 1917.

Origin: Admiral Benson.
Vice Admiral SIMS, *London.*

Opnav 116. Your 197: The following is the situation in regard to American shipping. A few vessels route in the established convoys. More sail direct. Most ships confer with British shipping offices to get the latest information and routes. An

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effort is being made to induce American ships to take advantage of the protection offered by convoy. It is not possible to compel this except in Government-owned or chartered ships until the Government takes over the control of all shipping. After studying your numerous cables on the subject, this office is of the opinion that what you want now is for it to furnish, after departure, names, dates of sailing, etc., of the following class of American ships only: Those American cargo ships sailing direct and not taking advantage of convoy. In the case of all ships carrying troops, and all Army and Navy cargo supply ships, you wish the information forwarded you.

Will act along these lines unless you instruct otherwise. All other reports of sailings, except War Department reports through you, will cease. 19008.

ADMIRAL BENSON.

This was, indeed, a most discouraging message. For at least four months I had been exhausting my vocabulary in attempting in both cables and letters to explain this convoy system. I feel sure it is unnecessary for me to go any further in explaining it to this committee, after having read the previous cables. For example, note the statement, at this late date, that a few vessels were being routed in established convoys; that most ships confer with British shipping offices to get the latest information and routes. Heaven knows, I had spent many hundreds of words in attempting to explain that this was exactly what they should do, as that was the only place where safe routes were obtainable. Note also the statement that, at this late date, "an effort" was being made to induce American ships to take advantage of the protection offered by convoys, and that it was not possible to compel them to do so.

It was plainly evident to the Allies, at this stage of the war, and it should have been evident to the Navy Department, that the problem confronting us was to save shipping, whether shipping wanted to be saved or not. It made no difference whether the shipping was privately owned or Government controlled; our fate was sealed up in it either way. It was the issue of the war at that moment. I had thought that the war had demonstrated that almost anything was possible. As for this small problem, any shipping man could undoubtedly suggest many means for its quick and radical solution. For example, imagine the effect on shipping if they had been told definitely that no protection whatever would be given them in the war zone if they did not accept Governmental instructions; or how simple it would have been to issue a Governmental warning which would have threatened the insurance on every ship lost.

This is, of course, what the Allies did. Sometimes I think that the people who handled that thing there did not know anything about ships or the sea, at all.

If there is any question as to the soundness of the various recommendations I have been explaining, I would invite attention to the last paragraph of this cable, which states that, as I had repeatedly recommended, all reports of sailings, except through one channel of information, would thereafter cease.

Before leaving the question of this convoy system, I wish to clear up a misunderstanding which seems to have gotten abroad, to the effect that I was more concerned with the safety of foreign shipping than I was for that of our own. What I was after was winning the war; and, as I have clearly shown above, during the period under discussion, this question was wholly bound up in the saving of shipping. It was not American shipping, or British shipping, or French and Italian shipping, but it was allied shipping. It was the vital shipping of the team which was lined up against the enemy.

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As a matter of fact, United States shipping was a very small proportion of the whole in those critical days. For example, in July, 1917, there were a maximum of about 160 arrivals and departures per month, in the war zone, of American-owned ships. Consider this number against over 3,000 arrivals and departures of British vessels alone. Even such a comparison does not include the large number of British and French vessels which were necessarily moving in the war zone, practically all of their time, while our vessels were on the high seas a good share of their time, well clear of the submarine zone. The traffic up and down the French coast, carrying many supplies upon which the French armies were absolutely dependent, and our armies also, was never out of the war zone at all. I think it would be a safe estimate that, during those critical months, not more than 5 per cent of the arrivals and departures in the war zone were American ships.

I have before me figures showing that as late as 15 months after we entered the war, American shipping was less than 12 per cent of the total making up the allied lines of communication.

It is very difficult for me now to convey to you the atmosphere which existed at that time, and the real state of desperation in which I found myself almost daily, during those early months of the war. It should be noted that the cause of this was not a single matter, such as the failure to act upon my convoy recommendations, but that in a dozen different matters, at the same time, I was faced with the same situation, always hoping from day to day that the department would finally realize the situation, and either accept the recommendations, or send over somebody in whose judgment they could trust. And I again wish to reiterate that there is no question as to whether these recommendations were right. The fact remains that they were virtually all adopted by the department in the end.

I could read you, for the next week, copies of letters and cables sent by me in regard to the inauguration and control of the convoy system, but that would hardly contribute further to an understanding of this matter. I think that enough had been said to show that what I wrote in my letter of January 7, 1920, was a very mild statement of the serious embarrassements and delays and dangers in putting into effect the convoy system, which was the most important of all the measures used in defeating the submarine campaign against allied shipping. Paragraph 35 of letter is the one here under discussion.

NAVY DEPARTMENT MISCONCEIVED PROBLEM OF DEFENDING HOME COAST.

It became evident, in the early part of my mission abroad, that among the reasons which were keeping the department from a wholehearted and vigorous cooperation in the war was a misconception of the problem of the defense of our own home coast. As I have already pointed out, in a cable of June 24, the department had stated:

> Another thing the department recognizes is the necessity of sending all antisubmarine craft which can be spared from the home waters into active European waters, and when such craft become available will send them.

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Similarly, in the department's cable of July 10, in which they outlined their policy, it was again specifically stated that the department's policy was:

First, the most hearty cooperation with the Allies to meet the present submarine situation in Europe or other waters compatible with an adequate defense of our own home waters.

From the time of my arrival abroad I had continuously pointed out, in numerous cables and letters, that full information was available in London concerning submarine movements. Throughout the whole of 1917 and the first few months of 1918 I informed the department continually that no submarine operations should be expected on the American coast, except as a possible diversion for political purposes. The reasons have already been fully described. I need only refer again to my first letter written on April 19. The whole situation was fully summed up therein, and all my numerous letters and cables thereafter were mere repetition.

I would like to particularly emphasize that fact, that in the very first letter I wrote, nine days after I arrived in London, the whole policy that I recommended throughout the war was contained in that letter, and after these long, trying periods of resistance by the department those things were all accepted.

In my first cable of April 14 I had said:

Cable to department, April 14, 1917:

It is very likely the enemy will make submarine mine-laying raids on our coast or in the Caribbean to divert attention and keep our forces from the critical area in the eastern Atlantic, through effect upon public opinion. The difficulty of maintaining submarine bases and the focusing of shipping on this side will restrict such operations to minor importance, although they should be effectively opposed principally by keeping the channels swept on soundings. Enemy submarine mines have been anchored as deep as 90 fathoms, but majority at not over 50 fathoms. Mines do not rise from the bottom to set depth until from 24 to 48 hours after they have been laid.

So far all experience shows that submarines never lay mines out of sight of landmarks or lights on account of the danger to themselves if location is not known. Maximum augmentation merchant tonnage and antisubmarine work where most effective constitute the paramount immediate necessity.

And in the letter of April 19 I explained why the submarines could not profitably operate on the American coast:

Letter to department, April 19, 1917:

11. The evidence is conclusive that, regardless of any enemy diversions, such as raids on our coast or elsewhere, the critical area, in which the war's decision will be made, is in the eastern Atlantic at the focus of all lines of communications.

The known number of enemy submarines and their rate of construction, allowing liberal factors for errors of information, renders it inevitable that the main submarine effort must continue to be concentrated in the above critical area.

It will be unnecessary to take up your time by reading many similar dispatches or letters. It should be borne in mind, however, that at least weekly and usually more often during those first six months, this same information, or these same recommendations, were being made. Thus, on June 20, in my letter report I stated:

Letter to department, June 20, 1917:

8. As reported by cable dispatch, it would seem that the maximum protection we can give our own coast should be concentrated in the area in which the enemy is operating and must continue to operate or fail.

It is quite possible, and in fact it has been a source of surprise that it has not occurred to date, that the enemy will send one, or perhaps two or three submarines to operate on our coast for a brief period, for the mere purpose of agitating public opinion and influencing us to hold forces in home waters. All evidence indicates clearly, however, that such a course would be primarily a diversion and a temporary one.

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From cable to department, June 28, 1914:

I again submit that protection of our coast lines and of allied shipping must necessarily be carried out in field of enemy activity, if it is to be effective. The mission of the Allies must be to force submarines to give battle. Hence, no operations in home waters should take precedence over, or be allowed to diminish, the maximum effort we can exert in area in which enemy is operating, and must continue to operate in order to succeed.

Letter, June 29, 1917:

I again submit that, if the allied campaign is to be viewed as a whole, there is no necessity for any high-sea protection on our own coast. The submarine as a type of war vessel possesses no unusual characteristics different than those of other naval craft, with the single exception of its ability to submerge for a limited time. The difficulty of maintaining distant bases is the same for the submarine as it is for other craft. As long as we maintain control of the sea, as far as surface craft are concerned, there can be no fear of the enemy establishing submarine bases in the Western Hemisphere.

It should not be considered that I overlooked or minimized the importance of the defense of home waters, but, as I clearly pointed out, such defense in the first year, if not throughout the war, was best carried out in the submarine zone, where the major activities of the enemy were concentrated. It is an old and time-worn military principle that the best defense is a vigorous offense. This is as applicable to dog fights and street brawls as to military operations. There was every reason to believe, and events proved the case, that the only submarine operations which might occur on our coast would be sporadic and intended, as repeatedly stated in cables, merely as diversions which, if met with anything in excess of the minimum force required, would merely play into the hands of the enemy and accomplish the very enemy object of such diversions. In fact, from 1917 on, I submitted to the department suggestions and recommendations as to the best means of meeting such activity as might actually occur.

Actual experience had shown that we could depend upon being able to keep reasonably accurate track of all submarines at sea.

Incidentally, while not so important, that is one of the most interesting incidents that happened during the war—the extraordinary efficiency of the allied secret service. We hardly ever lost track of a submarine; and you will see presently we never failed to give adequate warning of when they left, when they would arrive here, and what they would do after they got here.

I do not mean here to convey that we knew where they were with sufficient accuracy to go out and sink them, but merely that we could at all times keep general track of comparatively restricted areas which they were occupying from time to time. Apart from secret service information, intercepted radio, and plotting by radio bearings, it is evident that the submarine could not accomplish any work at all without disclosing his presence; for example, if he sank a ship here [indicating] or if he were sighted there, knowing his average speed and having followed his operations previously, we could draw circles on the chart and be assured that for various periods he would be somewhere within those circles. This means that as long as the submarines were not too numerous in any one area, and as long as that area did not have to be traversed by ships, we could provide for safety by routing the ships around the circles. As a matter of fact, I am certain that history will show, when all the facts

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are known, that more shipping was saved through thus keeping track of submarines and routing ships clear of them than by any other single measure. That was the constant work of the staff at the headquarters in London throughout the war. As stated elsewhere in this testimony, every route, every course followed by every American ship, naval, merchant, or troop carrier, was furnished by the staff, and all diversions of routings made while the ships were in the war zone were likewise directed and controlled by the staff.

The point, however, that I wish to bring out here is that, as we were certain that we would never have to deal with but one or two submarines at a time on our own coast, it was possible to do a great deal toward providing for the safety of shipping in our home waters without the use of any antisubmarine craft at all.

SAFETY OF SHIPPING IN AMERICAN WATERS WAS GIVEN CONSTANT CONSIDERATION.

That the safety of shipping in our own home waters was always on my mind, and that I gave it full consideration in all the recommendations made, could be easily substantiated by a long series of messages, which I might quote.

To take but one example, I discovered about the 1st of September, 1917, some five months after we had entered the war, that apparently little had been done in the way of establishing and controlling a routing system in our own home waters. This information was volunteered to me by many officers coming abroad, and also by merchant captains who visited our headquarters. I shall read extracts from an official letter sent to the department under date of September 4, 1917. [Reading:]

SEPTEMBER 4, 1917.

From: Force Commander.
To: Secretary of the Navy (Operations).
Subject: Approach routes to Atlantic coast ports.

1. It is not at all inconceivable that German submarines may operate off the main harbors of America or the Panama Canal. In addition to torpedoing ships, they might make it very embarrassing by planting mines in localties not far from our principal harbors. If mines were discovered off any of our harbors, there would result perhaps an immediate closing of the ports, and allied ships bound from Europe for America would be in immediate need of information as to how to be routed to American ports to avoid danger.

2. If the subject has not already been taken up, I recommend that the department be prepared to meet this submarine situation by having lines of approach prescribed for different harbors, and by having well defined channels of entrance that will be maintained by constant sweeping, if necessary.

3. In the allied shipping office, in New York, full information, with charts, etc., can be obtained on how the situation is handled in European waters.

4. There is no doubt that submarines can not operate advantageously on our Atlantic seaboard or remain there for any great length of time, but it is quite possible that a diversion might occur, and this office would be immediately flooded with inquiries from the allied admiralties as to what instructions they should give their ships in order to permit them to enter American ports without danger.

It was, of course, in the German interest to create abroad the impression that they were about to undertake submarine attacks upon the American coast, and it is to be noted that such rumors were continually circulated by German agents in Europe and in America for the purpose of influencing the Navy Department and to retain craft on the American side. This enemy policy was very sound, and was pursued by them in other fields throughout the war.

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For example, the bombardments of a port in Liberia by an enemy submarine had no bearing whatever upon the outcome of the war, except in so far as the Allies allowed it to cause them to disperse some of their forces from the central strategical area where the enemy was trying to win. Throughout the war there were sporadic cruises by enemy submarines in the vicinity of the Azores and elsewhere far afield all for this same purpose.

The fact that such propaganda was not without effect upon the Navy Department was illustrated by the fact that I received numerous cables throughout 1917 and the early months of 1918 from the department mentioning these reports of probable submarine activities on the Atlantic coast. In my letter of October 9, 1917, I referred to this enemy propaganda and again repeated my recommendations, as follows:

REPORTS OF SUBMARINE ACTIVITY IN WESTERN ATLANTIC.

Letter No. 1254; October 9 1917:

With reference to the information which has reached the department recently from various sources concerning the possibility of a force of large enemy submarines operating off the Atlantic coast or in the West Indies, the force commander's dispatches have given practically all information available here. The force commander is strongly of the personal opinion that no extensive oversea campaign of this nature will be initiated by the enemy. He is further of the personal opinion that such a campaign is a practical impossibility.

No evidence gathered during the war indicates that enemy submarines are any more free from material casualties and the general restrictions which obtain with respect to surface craft than surface craft themselves; in fact, it is considered that submarines are much more restricted in their operations than surface craft. They require frequent docking, and hence it is not believed that even an efficient parent ship—should such a ship be available and if it were possible to maintain her in distant fields—would be able to furnish the facilities that the submarines on such duty would demand.

It is always, of course, quite possible that the enemy may send a small number of submarines to operate temporarily on our coast or in distant fields, with the object of affecting the disposition of our forces. It would be greatly to the interest of the enemy to force the removal of our antisubmarine force from the critical areas; that is, near to the enemy bases and in the local areas of allied trade, upon which the war is largely dependent.

It has been a source of more or less surprise that such an operation as this has not been undertaken before, and the only theory offered to explain the fact that it has not been undertaken has been that the enemy apparently did not consider it to their interest to arouse the American public unnecessarily.

It has been believed that the enemy hopes that peace will arrive before the military pressure of the United States has become at all serious. The population of the allied countries, now in the fourth year of the war, has reached what might be called a "bitter stage," which will react upon the enemy following the war during the reconstruction period. The theory is therefore advanced that it will be greatly to the enemy's advantage during the reconstruction period if the American public at large has not been given any cause to reach the so-called "bitter stage."

On the other hand, it may be urged that a few submarines sent to operate temporarily on the American coast, or on the trade routes from South America, particularly in the vicinity of the canal, might result in sufficient popular agitation to force the department into withdrawing either all or part of its forces from European waters. The possibility of this contingency must therefore, of course, receive serious consideration.

The fact was that the enemy was about as short of submarines for accomplishing his purpose as we were of craft for thwarting it. It was for this reason that we always were perfectly safe in assuming that these various far-flung operations, aimed at leading us to disperse our forces, could never be performed except by one or two submarines—this for the simple reason that, if at any time they had

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taken too many submarines out of the only area in which they could win, the submarine campaign would then have ceased immediately to be a critical issue

As in so many other cases of recommendations made from the beginning, the department, after some months, recognized the soundness of the policy by adopting it. (I do not know that that is very largely so, either.) And I think I am safe in saying that by about November 1, 1917, it was their well-established and adopted policy to send everything they could into European waters; but during the early months this policy had not been followed, and many vessels had been kept in Atlantic home waters which would have been extremely useful abroad; and these vessels at the same time had been kept cruising, and hence, when the policy was finally adopted they were not ready to move which involved further delay.

The fact that the necessity for complying with the recommendations for sending the maximum number of craft into the war zone was fully recognized at this time at home, is shown in a report of a board convened by the Secretary of the Navy, in February, 1918, to draw up plans for the defense of home waters, and whose conclusions, I understand, were accepted by the department.

In the report of this board, under the heading "General policy," it was stated:

> The general policy of the United States is to send the maximum possible force abroad for offensive operation in the active theater of the war. This policy the board has kept constantly in mind, to the end that there might be no weakening of it.

The board recommended, as a means of defending shipping on the American coast, the establishment of shipping control and of approach routes to the Atlantic ports, which should be put into effect in the event of submarines operating off Atlantic harbors. It should be noted that these recommendations of the board, which are too long to be read here, was substantially of the same character as those recommended in my letter of September 4, which I have already read to you. This plan was to be supplemented by various auxiliary devices, such as mines and aircraft patrols. The board decided that 9 destroyers and 12 submarines would be sufficient craft to keep on the home coast at all times, and they found that it would be possible to maintain this force "by utilizing new destroyers and new submarines during the shakedown periods before departure for European waters." It had been found by experience that all these new craft developed many defects in the early part of their cruise and had to spend time in the navy yards. It is very significant in this connection that the board decided that these craft would be considered as available as long as they were on the coast and while going through their shaking-down period, which would involve periods under repair and overhaul at the navy yards. A member of the board stated that they were governed in this decision by my numerous reports to the effect that advance warning of the approach of submarines could always be depended upon. They considered that all of the destroyers recommended, whether under repairs at the yard or not, would always have ample time to throw things together and get out in case submarines were expected.

In a cable of April 11, 1918, to the Navy Department I again referred to the areas in which submarines might operate, and indicated measures to be taken to meet possible operations on the

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American coast. In my letter of April 30, 1918 (No. 16406), I amplified the information contained in this cable.

This is what I referred to as the interesting movement of submarines.

INFORMATION OF MOVEMENTS OF ENEMY SUBMARINES.

The best proof of the fact that I had available at all times information concerning submarine movements sufficiently accurate for me to warn the department in advance of submarine movements toward the American coast is well demonstrated by what actually happened when submarines did arrive off the American coast in the summer of 1918. In my cable of April 28, 1917, I had said:

April 28, 1917.
To: Secretary of the Navy.
Through: State Department.

With regard to submarines entering and leaving their bases and their approximate whereabouts while operating, the Admiralty is able to maintain information that is fairly exact.

Of the 34 mine U-boats, 2 for some days were not located, and the Admiralty was on the point of informing us of the probability of their being en route to the United States when their whereabouts were discovered. It is the Admiralty's belief now that at present none are likely to be sent over and that the present effort of the submarines, which is successful, will be kept up off the channel entrance.

And these assurances I repeated many times in letters and cables before I cabled the information that a German submarine was en route for the United States coast, fully a year later. At the end of April, 1918, I learned that one of the submarines of the Deutschland type (U–151) had left Germany prepared for a long cruise, and that information indicated that her destination was the American coast.

The department was promptly informed, and further received numerous messages during the slow progress of this submarine, via the Azores region across the Atlantic. As I have repeatedly stated elsewhere in this testimony the department was not only given advance warning of the sailings of all submarines for our home waters, but further was given follow-up and confirmatory information, together with details, as regards the character of the submarines, their habits and methods, and even in many cases the names of their captains, with their previous records. I have before me a rather large batch of messages, all of this nature, which I will not take time to read, but I am sure that the committee would find them very interesting, and further that they would prove rather astonishing, because of the remarkably accurate and detailed information we had of enemy movements.

I will read complete or in part one group of messages concerning this first submarine, merely as typical messages.

[Dispatch sent 16-15-26. EJ134.]

Date May 1, 1918.
To Opnav.
Prepared by CS. Approved NCT. Code 34 ADR. No. 7289.
Highly secret. To Department May 1.

7289. Admiralty informs me that information from reliable agents states that a submarine of *Deutschland* type left Germany about April 19 to attack either American troop transports or ships carrying material from the States.

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So far as known the German formed conclusions that:

First. Troop transports sail from New York via Nantucket Shoals and Sable Island direct to Europe.

Second. Material transports go from Newport News to a point south of Bermuda and then to Azores and thence to destination.

I might state incidentally there that while a great deal of this information was wrong, I am trying to bring out the point that the information that the captains of German submarines did have we got. [Continuing reading:]

It is thought that the submarine is taking a northern route across Atlantic, average speed 5 knots.

Note the "5 knots." It is important in this connection now, as we could give the information as to the starting of the submarine from the other side, there was plenty of time to send all the destroyers necessary, and put them in dock, and paint their bottoms, and put them over again before the submarine got over there. [Reading:]

None of new class of cruising submarines ready for service.

That is a new, large class of submarine, similar to the *Deutschland* that they were constructing for military purposes.

Admiralty experience with Deutschland class establishes following conclusions:

They generally operate a long distance from shore, and seldom in less than 100 fathoms.

Their single hulls are very vulnerable to depth charge attack.

They rarely attack submerged.

There is but one known instance of attack against convoy, and but two of torpedo attack against single vessels, one being unsuccessful. They attack by gun fire almost exclusively.

The most effective type to oppose them is the submarine.

They shift their operating area as soon as presence of submarine is discovered.

Admiralty requests Admiral Grant be given copy of this cablegram. 26001.

SIMS.

Admiral Grant is the admiral in command in America, here. [Reading:]

[Dispatch sent 16-15-26. J13.]

Date: May 15, 1918.
To: Opnav.
Prepared by CS. Approved Code B4Ar. No. 7997.
Secret. To department May 15.

7997 my 7829. Information contained in this cable is given me by the British Admiralty, and is necessarily somewhat paraphrased for transmission, but I have every reason to believe it is authentic. There appears to be a reasonable probability that the submarine in question (referred to in cablegram just read) may arrive off the United States coast at any time after May 20, and that she will carry mines.

As a matter of fact, we had exact information as to what she was going to do, but paraphrased it in the cable, and did not give it, for fear somebody might get hold of it. [Continuing reading:]

English experience indicates the favorite spot for laying mines to be the position in which merchant ships stop to pick up pilots. For instance, for Delaware Bay, the pilots for large ships are picked up south of the Five Fathom Bank Light Vessel. This, in our opinion, is one of the most likely spots for a submarine to lay mines.

As a matter of fact, we had the exact information that that was where she was going to lay mines, but, for the reasons given, we did not want to say so. [Continuing reading:]

As regards information possessed by Germans on subject of antisubmarine patrol. They have from various neutral sources information that a patrol is maintained off

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most of the harbors, and especially off Chesapeake Bay. A neutral has reported that the patrol extends as far as Cape Skerry. (*sic.*)

It should be noted that, except for mine laying, submarines of this class always work in deep water, and that the Germans have laid mines in water in depths up to 70 fathoms. So far as is known, there is no reason why they should not lay mines in depths up to 90 fathoms.

The foregoing completes the information furnished by British Admiralty. The following is added by me.

There are circumstances which I can not explain more fully, which render it highly important that nothing whatever should be given out which would lead the enemy even to surmise that we had had any advance information concerning this submarine, even in the event of our sinking her, and that such measures as are taken by the department be taken secretly as possible, and without public disclosure of the specific reasons.

It seems, as I remember, that the department was criticised for not letting the public know that the submarine was coming over and was about to arrive, but it was absolutely essential that they should not give that information out. [Continuing reading:]

I venture to remind the department in this connection that the employment of surface vessels to patrol against this submarine would probably result, at best, in merely driving her from one area to another, whereas the employment of submarines against her might lead to her destruction. It is suggested that, having estimated her most probable areas of operation, submarines be employed in a patrol as nearly stationary as may be, some of them covering the point south of Five Fathom Bank Light Vessels, remaining submerged during the day with periscopes only showing. Of five submarines certainly destroyed in four days, three were torpedoed by British submarines. 7997. 22215.

SIMS.

[Continuing reading:]

I may say that the indications given in that cablegram as to where she would probably lay mines turned out to be entirely accurate. She did lay mines there, and those mines were responsible for the loss of the steamship *Pratt*, sunk at the entrance to the Delaware Breakwater, and also the steamship *Scapia*, and also the United States ship *Minnesota* struck a mine there, but did not sink. [Continuing reading:]

[Confidential.]

From: Department, June 4.
Simsadus.

6800. Enemy submarine commenced operation 60 miles southeast Barnegat, 2 June, 3 p. m.; sunk by bomb schooner *Edward H. Cole;* sunk by method not yet known; Jacob Haskell; U. S. S. *Preble*, reports now engaging submarine. Captain of *Cole* reports sighting periscope of second submarine.

BENSON.

That is the message of the department to me. I replied as follows:

[Confidential.]

To: Department, June 4.

9029. Your 6800. It is practically certain that there is but one submarine on Atlantic coast of United States, which is probably *U-151*. 9029.

SIMS.

I did not want to say that it was entirely certain, because we had to paraphrase those things. Then here is a cablegram received from the Navy Department, June 5, 1918. [Reading:]

SIMSADUS.

6852. Enemy submarine operating this coast, identified as *U-151*, has crew of about 75, commanding officer formerly employed Hamburg-American Line, has been off this coast. About 22 May, mine located off Overfalls Lightship; presence of more than one submarine not definitely established.

BENSON.

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It will be noted that I not only gave information that the submarine had left its port on the 19th of April to go to the American coast but that I had given the probable area in which the submarine would operate off the American coast; and these were the areas in she did operate. It is to be noted also that this submarine began its operations on June 2, 32 days after I had informed the Navy Department of the exact area and of the approximate time, as reported. In other cables as quoted I gave additional information concerning this submarine, and the areas in which it would operate.

On June 6, I sent them a full description of this submarine, in answer to a request from the department, giving even the name of the commander. I believe at this time the American public was convinced a whole fleet of submarines, or certainly more than one, was operating on our coast.

I advised the department in advance of prospective movements of other submarines which operated on the American coast. Thus, in messages of June 29, and July 5, 1918, I informed the department:

JUNE 29, 1918.

[Highly secret.]

357. Second cruiser submarine at sea. At present off west coast of Ireland. Her field of operations not yet known. Can not reach longitude of Nantucket before July 15. Shall keep department informed.

SIMS.

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655. Our 357. Enemy cruiser submarine outward bound, reported July 4 about 45 N. 30 W., proceeding southwesterly.

SIMS.

And I followed these messages by numerous other dispatches which gave them reasonably accurate information of her progress across the Atlantic. On July 6 I informed the department that a third cruiser submarine was at sea, probably proceeding to the American coast. And this information was also confirmed in a series of messages. On July 21 I informed the department that precautions should be taken against probable bombardments of certain points, which I named, along the Atlantic coast. This was in my dispatch 1543, and similar information was given in cables of a later date. In a cable of August 1, 2188, I reported that a fourth submarine, one of the mine-laying type, was on its way to the Atlantic coast. None of these submarines began operating until at least three weeks after the time of my first dispatch concerning them. I have before me here a large pack of messages which are but a few samples of the information concerning enemy operations on our own coast, with which I supplied the department at all times.

In this connection let me read you a couple of paragraphs from a letter which I wrote to Admiral Benson on May 17, 1918, summing up my whole attitude in this matter:

MAY 17, 1918.

To: Benson.

To refer again to the question of enemy submarines—which is never absent from my mind—I want to make it quite clear that it very rarely happens that the position of each submarine that comes out from the German base is not known, almost from day to day. This information is ascertained by cross wireless bearings and other means, but it is a fact that the exit and entry of each submarine is known, and that

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her track is known with sufficient accuracy from the time she leaves port until she gets back.

I tell you this so that you may have no apprehension that you will not receive warning of the approach of any submarines that may start for America. I think you will always be safe in assuming that there are no submarines there that you have not been warned about. I have no idea at all that Germany will do more than she is now doing; that is, send an isolated submarine to the other side for the effect which they believe it will have on our people. To put the extreme case, if she should send all of her submarines to the other side, the antisubmarine campaign would at once be successful.

(At this point at 12 o'clock m., the subcommittee adjourned until to-morrow, Saturday, March 13, 1920, at 10 o'clock a. m.)

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NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

SATURDAY, MARCH 13, 1920.

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON NAVAL AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met purusant to adjournment at 10 o'clock a. m., in room 235, Senate Office Building, Senator Frederick Hale presiding.

Present: Senators Hale (chairman) and Trammell.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will be in order and Admiral Sims will proceed.

STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL WILLIAM S. SIMS—Resumed.

Admiral SIMS. The largest number of submarines that ever operated at any one time on the coast of the United States was three, and generally there was only one. This was in entire accordance with what was to be expected, and I mention it merely to show what a simple matter it was to meet such operations. Quite apart from any definite offensive taken against them, it was a comparatively easy matter to route our important shipping clear to them. Their position could be kept track of from day to day. We were bound to have some losses from them, but that was merely part of our share in the campaign. These losses were not serious in the aggregate and they had no influence whatever upon the outcome of the campaign, except in so far as they influenced the department to hold forces back from the strategical center of operations. The Secretary of the Navy, in his annual report for 1918, stated:

> On the whole, the operations of the German submarines against our coast can be spoken of as one of the minor incidents of the war.

I will not take up the subject of the department's lack of information concerning the department's activities and imperfect coordination with the Allies.

In the evidence thus far submitted, I have pointed out specific cases in which the department either disregarded my recommendations or delayed greatly in acting upon them. The recommendations to which I refer, it must at all times be remembered, were all based upon consultation and complete discussion with allied leaders, in accordance with the basic instructions under which my duties were performed abroad.

I will now turn to the subject discussed in paragraphs 60 to 66 of my letter of January 7, 1920. In these paragraphs it was pointed out that I was left in ignorance of many of the departmental plans, of many of the important dispositions and movements of forces in the area of my command—as well as elsewhere—and of delays and confusion which were caused by the department failing to use me

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for the purpose for which they had sent me abroad, and attempting to carry on independent similar negotiations with local representatives of the European navies in Washington; also the embarrassment which these conditions caused me, through the impression naturally created in the minds of allied naval authorities that I was not being supported and was not in the confidence of the department. It might be pointed out that the different allied navy departments were in a measure responsible for these difficulties, because they continued at times to use these independent methods of negotiations; that is, through their local representatives in Washington.

Undoubtedly, at times, such independent negotiations resulted in direct conflict with my recommendations. It must be remembered that my recommendations did not forward merely the exact propositions of the allied admiralties, but they embodied as well my conclusions as the representative of the department, following discussions with the allied leaders. My first loyalty was always to the cause as a whole, but second was my direct loyalty to my own department at home. My mission was not merely to transmit the propositions of the allied leaders. It was up to me to act in every sense of the word as the representative of the Navy Department, and, after having the essential benefit of conferences with the allied leaders, to give the department the results thereof, together with my own recommendations based on all available information and upon the policies of my own service. It will be found, throughout my dispatches, that, wherever I was giving verbatim recommendations of allied leaders, it was so stated.

One of the great difficulties of this war, as of all other allied wars, was found to be that of securing effective cooperation among the forces of the Allies—the difficulty of getting team work out of a team made up of different nations—the difficulty of different nations subordinating many of their own national interests to a common end.

As a matter of fact, in the particular case here under discussion, the Allies carried on negotiations with our Navy Department, through their Washington representatives, partly because they found me in ignorance of plans and intentions concerning which their Washington representatives had already informed them. They also found that the department was apparently ready to deal with these local representatives.

It is little wonder that much confusion was created in the department through numerous requests and recommendations coming in from the different Allies. The grave danger of such procedure was that allied team work would be weakened and American interests suffer.

I want to stress here, however, that because other Navy departments made errors is no reason whatever for our having done the same. This is one of the principal objects I had in view in submitting my letter to the department—to invite attention to such mistakes in order that they might be avoided in the future.

It seems to me that no explanation is required to demonstrate the soundness of the proposition that, from our standpoint at least, all of this confusion and delay and misunderstanding could have been avoided by the simple process of referring all of the requests and recommendations, which came from various European sources, to the department's own representative abroad. He was in a position

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to bring the matter before the responsible allied naval leaders—and after the formation of the allied naval council, before that body—for a full discussion in all its phases, in the light of the fullest and latest information, and to cable the result to the Navy Department for its guidance. This procedure insured, so far as was humanly possible, that due consideration would be given to the cause of the Allies as a whole, rather than to the often conflicting interests of the individual countries concerned.

It was natural for the Italian Navy Department and the French Navy Department, and the British Admiralty, to continue to communicate with their attaches in Washington, as they had done during the previous three years of the war. In fact, a great many such communications were automatic and were made without the direct knowledge of the leaders themselves, although actually made in their names. For instance, one section of the British Admiralty, wanting something in America, would drive through a message to the naval attaché in Washington in the name of the head of the British Admiralty, not taking into account, of course, the fact that similar requests might be sent in at the same time from the French and the Italians.

That was correct to a certain extent before the end of the war.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Sims, Mr. Hoover is here now, and if you will suspend for a while, we will hear from him.

Admiral SIMS. Yes, sir.

TESTIMONY OF MR. HERBERT HOOVER.

(The witness was sworn by the chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Hoover, in his testimony of March 12 Admiral Sims spoke of your well-known intimate knowledge of food conditions and shipping conditions in Europe in 1917, and he suggested that he thought you would be willing to appear before the committee and give us some information on this matter. The committee will be very glad, therefore, if you will give us some information about general food conditions in Europe in the spring and summer of 1917, and also about the shipping conditions during that time.

Mr. HOOVER. My contact in the matter arises over a request that I I had from the Government in Washington to make some investigation as to the food and shipping situation in the month of April, 1917, and I made that inquiry through officials of the French, Italian, and British Governments, and at that time I came into contact with Admiral Sims, and naturally discussed the position with him.

The actual position was that owing to the intensity of the submarine war the Allies had been a great deal embarrassed over their food supplies. At that time the submarine sinkings had reached about their maximum intensity. They were at the rate, I suppose, of somewhere in the neighborhood of 600,000 to 700,000 tons of shipping a month. The actual food situation in the three countries might be summarized in that the breadstuff supply, which was the most critical of their supplies, did not exceed three to four weeks' reserve stocks. By "reserve stocks" we usually refer to the stocks outside of those food supplies that are in process of distribution, such as marketing and retail and wholesale dealing, and so forth.

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The situation of France and Italy was rather more acute than the situation in England, and the result was, of course, to create the utmost anxiety on all sides as to the situation as a whole.

The shipping position was, roughly, that at that rate of submarine sinkings the war was at a measurable end, and that, as we know, subsequently the rate of sinking was greatly diminished, and further shipping produced, and we managed to struggle through.

One of the alarming features of that situation was that the losses of shipping were largely loaded vessels. They were largely inward cargoes. So that, with the loss of that quantity of shipping, it represented a very large monthly loss of food supplies, and that accumulation had naturally diminished the existing stocks. That is, in summary, the position so far as I could describe it.

The CHAIRMAN. It is true that there was just about enough tonnage available in April, 1917, to supply the absolute needs of the Allies at that time?

Mr. HOOVER. The problem is one of a great deal of complexity, because, as desperation drives, resources were discovered that were not originally contemplated. For instance, it was found from time to time that shipping could be withdrawn from routes and localities that were considered impossible, and ships were applied to special purposes that had not been adapted to it.

We directed the shipping onto the North American market—that is, to the Canadian and American market—as being the shortest voyage, and threw the large load of food supply onto the North American States, instead of relying on the Argentine and elsewhere, where the transportation required two or three times the amount of tonnage, and by devices of that kind what might have been mathematically a desperate situation was ameliorated by degrees.

As I recollect, the total available mercantile tonnage for handling of supplies was somewhere in the neighborhood of 40,000,000 tons. I have not the accurate figures with me, but, as I recollect, we had something like 10,000,000 tons in naval and military transports, leaving somewhere about 30,000,000 tons for transportation of munitions and food supplies. That amount of tonnage would have been sufficient on the reduced supplies that resulted from the strict rationing of the allied countries and the diversion of that tonnage to North America to the shortest route, provided that there were not also continuous losses. It is very difficult to outline, in retrospect, the situation that looms up ahead in any given emergency.

The CHAIRMAN. But it was a fact, was it not, that if the food supplies had been cut off and the submarine blockade had been successful, in the end the Allies would have had to give in?

Mr. HOOVER. Oh, it is obvious that the war would have come to an end almost in a moment if the supplies had been cut off. The most desperate period, I might say, was between April and the following September. With September arrives the continental harvest, and that harvest supplied an available amount of food supplies in those countries. The French would have eight months', the Italians six months,' and the British four months' food supplies. So that, given that, it was possible to get by until the harvest came in, then there was a period of possible relaxation.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Sims has testified that in the month of April, 1917, 800,000 tons of shipping were destroyed by the enemy.

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At that rate or anywhere near that rate, would it have been possible to keep up the feeding of the Allies and the taking care of the armies?

Mr. HOOVER. Well, just my own personal opinion would be that it would not have been so; but, again, I would want to make a reservation on that, because one can not tell how far a population may itself, by its self-denial, and stricter and stricter rationing, more or less, compensate for a deprivation of that sort. The allied countries were never reduced to the final stage of privation during the war.

The CHAIRMAN. But they were on the border line at that time?

Mr. HOOVER. They were in a very serious condition, not only at that time but again in the following winter.

The CHAIRMAN. Again in the following winter?

Mr. HOOVER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And you were looking at the feeding of the allied countries and of the armies as one of the critical things in the war?

Mr. HOOVER. Certainly. I have always felt that it was one of the arms that the American people furnished that served to win the war. I do not believe that any one special effort of the American people can be credited with entire success; but certainly it was one of the great contributing factors.

The CHAIRMAN. And nothing that the American people could have done would have been of more advantage than to destroy this submarine menace, so far as it lay in their power to do so; and every attempt should have been made to prosecute this campaign with vigor, should it not?

Mr. HOOVER. Oh, most certainly; but I would not want to be taken as saying that efforts were not made, simply because I know nothing about the naval policy or procedure.

The CHAIRMAN. You are not familiar with that?

Mr. HOOVER. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You returned to America in the latter part of April, 1917?

Mr. HOOVER. Yes; I arrived here the 2d of May, I believe.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you report on conditions to the Navy Department when you arrived in this country, or soon thereafter?

Mr. HOOVER. I do not think I ever made any special report to the Navy Department. I did report to, I think it was, the Council of National Defense, and I reported to the President.

The CHAIRMAN. And to the President?

Mr. HOOVER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And you spoke to them about the importance of taking care of the submarine menace?

Mr. HOOVER. Oh, yes; that was uppermost, I think, in everybody's mind, that the submarine menace at that time looked to all of us as the most serious question with which we were confronted.

The CHAIRMAN. If we had had available destroyers and smaller boats to take care of the submarines, do you think it would have helped in shortening the war if we had used them for that purpose?

Mr. HOOVER. Well, I hardly know how to answer a theoretical question of that kind. I assume that if we had had a great surplus of available vessels of that sort and could have applied it directly on the problem, it would certainly have helped.

The CHAIRMAN. If we could have applied it, you think it would have had the effect of shortening the war?

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Mr. HOOVER. I would not want to go so far as that, because the question of the length of the war is one of the most complex questions that one can go into, as it embraces the whole plan of land operations, and the economic collapse internally in Germany, and hundreds of factors that may have been predominant in bringing the war to its end, even the propaganda that broke down the morale of the German armies. That is, I do not refer to allied propaganda but to bolshevik propaganda. So that I feel that is a problem that I would not like to express an opinion upon. It seems to me that can only be determined by history itself.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any questions to ask, Senator Trammell?

Senator TRAMMELL. Yes. The questions of the chairman are rather hypothetical, Mr. Hoover. I would like to know, as a matter of fact, did not those who were in charge, even though the situation was very acute and very alarming, meet the situation so far as supplying food supplies?

Mr. HOOVER. So far as my department was concerned—and that was my concern—I honestly believe that we made every human endeavor possible to meet the situation.

Senator TRAMMELL. You know of no great losses or any great interference with the progress so far as the supplying of food was concerned?

Mr. HOOVER. No; except the enormous destruction of food and shipping that was sunk in progress.

Senator TRAMMELL. I think that is all that I have to ask.

The CHAIRMAN. You speak of your department. Do you refer to the conditions in Belgium at that time?

Mr. HOOVER. No; I was referring to food problems; because, although the Food Administration was not created until August, I did serve as the medium of furthering the food supplies of the allies, on behalf of our Government, by request of the President.

The CHAIRMAN. And while there was no failure to send sufficient food over, you have already stated that the condition was critical and that the food supply was practically on the border line, and if it had been cut off it would have done great damage?

Mr. HOOVER. The situation was dangerous almost beyond description, and the anxiety in the whole of that period was terrific. I can not overemphasize the critical character of that position and the dangers in which the whole allied cause rested.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is all.

Senator TRAMMELL. The conditions were very critical, and there was impending danger, but those conditions were met, so that you did not suffer the disaster that was impending?

Mr. HOOVER. No.

Senator TRAMMELL. Is not that true?

Mr. HOOVER. It is manifest that the war was won and everybody was kept alive. That is the answer to that.

Senator TRAMMELL. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is all, Mr. Hoover; and the committee is very much obliged to you.

Mr. HOOVER. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you proceed, Admiral Sims.

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TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL WILLIAM S. SIMS—Resumed.

Admiral SIMS. I have previously stated that some days after sending in my first reports from London I learned, quite by accident, of an agreement as to the disposition of our naval forces in the war zone and elsewhere that had been made between the Navy Department and British and French naval representatives in Washington early in April.

It appears that Admiral Jellicoe had directed the British commander in chief of the North American station to proceed to Washington immediately upon our declaration of war and to lose no time in securing our maximum cooperation, at least in areas outside the war zone.

The agreements reached were set forth in a dispatch from the British commander in chief, which I will quote in part:

APRIL 13, 1917.

From: C. in C., N. A. and W. I., via ambassador, Washington.

Following points of agreement have been arrived at with United States Navy Department. French admiral sending telegram to Paris. Questions raised by British Admiralty.

First. One squadron immediately read to proceed from North Atlantic port on receipt of information of escape of raider. Operations of ships of this squadron will be coordinated with those of allied squadrons. Area of operations from the parallel of Cape Sable to the longitude 50 W., thence south to the parallel of 20 N.

Second. Second squadron on the east coast of South America will be provided as soon as possible in the near future. Area of operations from Brazilian coast along parallel 5 south to meridian 30 W., thence south to 15 S., then parallel with the coast to the latitude of 35 S., then along that parallel to the coast.

Third. Six destroyers will be sent over in the immediate future. These will be based on British or French port, as may be considered most necessary.

Fourth. United States will look after west coast of North America from Canadian to Columbian boundaries.

Fifth. Relations with Chile excellent. United States armed Government nitrate vessels will maintain continuous service for the present, which will be utilized.

Sixth. United States China squadron will be maintained for the present.

Seventh. United States will supervise Gulf of Mexico and Central America, as far as Colombian boundary; thence to West Point and Jamaica, along north coast of Jamaica to the east point of Virgin Islands, thence north to the southeastern limit of area referred to in first.

Eighth. If, and when, enemy's submarines appear, they will attempt to send several submarines to the Canadian coast, but this only possible if a parent ship or accommodations of men on shore provided.

Following points raised by French minister of marine:

First. Provision of small patrol vessels for French coast not yet possible owing to requirements of home defense. When available, however, they will be supplied, France escorting them over and manning, if necessary. Every possible effort will be made immediately to supply these. Too much reliance should not be placed however, in early success.

Second. Provision of armed naval transports for carrying (?) (railway material) to France. One will be furnished immediately, a second and third as soon as possible.

It will be noted that the agreements, except as to the third paragraph, relate mainly to employment of forces elsewhere than in the war zone but, until I learned of this agreement by accident, I was totally unaware that any conference had been held. I learned from Admiral Jellicoe that he did not regard the agreement as embodying the full measure of cooperation needed from the American Navy; but, on the contrary, that the specific arrangements provided for in this agreement were intended to cover only the situation outside of the critical submarine zone. How it was regarded in Washington I had no idea.

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It very early became apparent to the other naval officers on duty in Europe, that nothing but confusion could result, if each one of the allied Governments were to go independently to the Navy Department with every request that they had to make for forces or assistance. Thus, for example, the American naval attaché in Paris, Commander W. R. Sayles, came to London to see me in London at the end of April, 1917, with regard to requests being made by the French, and I found that he was in entire accord with the view that immediate concerted action was necessary to combat the growing submarine menace, and that the military necessity of the situation demanded the immediate centralization of all recommendations as to policy, made to the Navy Department by the European powers. He cabled this recommendation to the department on April 29, and, throughout the next three months, worked in complete harmony with me in an endeavor to coordinate our relations with the British and French navies.

I will say throughout the first three months, because at the end of that time I had a special representative there, who took over the duties.

In order to show clearly what confusion resulted from the method followed by the department, of acting upon recommendations from many different quarters, it is only necessary to review the cases of the establishment of naval bases in France, and the sending of our first patrol force, and our first aviation unit, to France. To these I referred in paragraph 64 of the letter which is under investigation before the committee.

As I had learned from Commander Sayles, the French naval attaché in Washington had requested the department to send patrol vessels to France, and to establish bases on the French coast. I learned of this during my visit to Paris in the first week in May. At the end of these conferences that were held at that time, I had sent to the Navy Department on May 5 the following dispatch:

From: R. Admiral Sims to Navy Department. Sent from Paris, May 5, 1917.

Relations with the French Navy Department very satisfactory. Conference with minister and chief of staff and French attaché, London, and British attaché, Paris, and first sea lord resulted in unanimous agreement that our destroyers force should remain concentrated, and should attack the enemy submarines in whatever area they may be operating in greatest numbers. Probably principally in the area from the south to the west-northwest of Fastnet.

SIMS.

Fastnet being the south point of Ireland.

As will be noted, the French navy department was in complete agreement as to the necessity for concentrating all of our effect in one area. I learned later in the month, from the naval attaché in Paris, that the Navy Department intended to send patrol vessels to the French coast. I had received no information, directly or indirectly, from the department of this intention. It should not be understood that I am criticising the department for sending vessels to the French coast, or acting with the French naval attaché in making that decision, but there were many preliminary arrangements to be made for the handling of any forces to be sent to the French coast, which required definite information. On May 15 the naval attaché in Paris cabled the Secretary of the Navy as follows:

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The French ministry of marine has asked for information to be furnished, at the earliest practical moment, giving the characteristics of patrol vessels of the Navy to be sent later to France, and inquiries also if they are to be accompanied by supply ships. Please furnish copy of this cablegram to Admiral Sims for his information.

On May 21 the department replied to the naval attaché:

MAY 21, 1917.

NAVAL ATTACHÉ, *Paris:*

In connection with wishes of the French commission, the department will send 10 or more yachts for service against submarine boats off the coast of France. Leave here about June 1. Request definite information in regard to supplying with coal and stores when based on French Atlantic or channel ports. 14020.

DANIELS.

I was informed of this only through receiving a copy from the naval attaché at Paris.

The naval attaché, on May 23, informed the department that such forces as were to be sent would require their own colliers and supply ships, and should be self-supporting.

The information thus far received from the Navy Department had not been sufficient to enable any plans to be made for receiving the forces to be sent to the French coast. In a cable of May 14 I had pointed this out, saying among other things:

It would be of assistance in work here if department could send information dispatches concerning prospective plans affecting United States forces in European waters. Information is particularly needed as to following: Number and character of antisubmarine patrol vessels which are available, or may possibly be sent this side; number and character of patrol vessels to be sent to France.

No answer was received to this cablegram. After further conference with me, Commander Sayles cabled the Secretary on the 1st of June, requesting similar information, as follows:

AMERICAN EMBASSY,
Paris, June 1, 1917.

SECNAV, *Washington:*

After consultation with French ministry of marines we are in accord in urgently requesting more detailed information regarding naval and military units en route for France. Arrangements for berthing spaces, their protection off French coast, efficient cooperation with French Navy require that ministry of marine would receive full advices as to composition of forces, intended employment, what bases to be used. If department thinks advisable, on account of possibility of enemy having my secret code, information should be sent through French naval attaché in Washington. My opinion efficient prosecution of campaign demands that French ministry of marine should receive immediately information possible. 12001.

SAYLES.

In a number of letters about this time, I repeated my request for information concerning these forces. On June 7 I cabled again:

Request information of any further addition to our forces, here or in France, and prospective dates of sailing.

Neither the naval attaché, it appears, nor I, received any reply to either of these messages. In a message which I received from the department on June 20, in reply to my many cables in May and June, no reference was made to forces to be sent to France, except for a statement that 12 fishing vessels would sail in August for France.

I wish to make clear at this point that, when I first went abroad in March, 1917, my paramount duty was to act as the representative of the Navy Department. On April 28, 1917, I was designated to command United States destroyers operating from British bases. It was not until June 14, 1917, that I received the title of commander

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of all the United States naval forces in European waters. From this date, then, June 14, 1917, I was in command of all of our naval vessels in European waters: still the department continued to carry on negotiations direct with French representatives and with our naval attaché in Paris, thereby tending to diminish my authority and hence weaken the efficiency of our naval participation in Europe.

On July 3 I received a message from Brest to the effect that the *Corsair* and *Aphrodite* had arrived there, and that eight other yachts, all under the command of Capt. W. B. Fletcher, were due to join them. On July 5, in a dispatch from the department, I was informed that "eight patrol boats under Capt. Fletcher due to arrive French coast July 5. Ten more yachts will sail about July 15 to join him." That is, the yachts had arrived at Brest three days before the first official message I had received from the department concerning their sailing. It is true that the naval attaché in Paris had been informed by the department of the sailing of the yachts under Capt. Fletcher, but no information had been given concerning their orders, or the prospective plans of the department for their operations. The result was that when they arrived, the French had made no plans for their reception; neither the French nor our naval attaché in Paris had received any information as to the character of their operations; and it had been impossible to make any arrangements for caring for these ships, or utilizing them immediately in the campaign against submarines, and it was nearly two weeks after their arrival before they were actually employed.

Much the same situation arose in connection with the establishment of our naval bases at Brest and Bordeaux. I received my first information of the plans of the department in this connection on the 8th of May, in the following dispatch:

[Cablegram.]

From: Secretary of the Navy.
To: Rear Admiral Sims.
Received: May 8, 1917.

The French have requested, and United States Navy Department contemplates establishing temporary bases at Bordeaux and Brest, with one line officer, one pay officer, and one engineer officer. You are requested to advise on this, and it is requested that your reply be expedited.

DANIELS.

To this I replied:

[Cable sent department May 8, 1917.]

The establishment of temporary bases at Brest and Bordeaux are very desirable, but should not divert in any way the necessary repair, supply, and fuel vessels from the mobile destroyer base. It is urgent that the destroyer force remain concentrated with mobile base ready to follow any movement of main submarine activity on high sea trade routes.

In later dispatches, I requested further information with regard to the plans for the establishment of these bases, and requested that experienced line officers, with a knowledge of French, should be detailed to this duty. The specific recommendations that I made were disapproved by the department. Plans were drawn up early in June by the French ministry of marine for the establishment of a shore base at Bordeaux for the American Navy. Copies of these plans were transmitted to Washington, with a request for approval, but no information was received by me or the French from the

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department as to what their plans were or their action on the French plans. Early in June I was informed that two retired officers had been designated to command the bases at Brest and Bordeaux, respectively, and that they would be accompanied by a paymaster and an engineer officer each. In spite of repeated requests, I received no further information concerning the plans for these bases until July, some six weeks later, and then only in a personal letter, dated July 13, from New York, from the engineer officer detailed for one of these bases. This letter is very illuminating as showing the confusion that existed. It is as follows:

NEW YORK, *July 13, 1917.*

MY DEAR ADMIRAL SIMS: I am writing advising you of a situation that will no doubt be of interest to you. I am to be assigned to duty in connection with the base at Brest. Just what is to be done over there is very indefinite, and no one in authority at the department seems to have any definite idea of what is expected of the place, what the French are able to do, and what should be sent over there. From the number of vessels that will probably be sent over I think a fairly well-equipped base will be essential. The Navy Department, as near as I can gather, has the idea that the French can do all the repair work that will develop. This I doubt, as they probably have their hands full with their own work.

To really cover the requirements, I think we ought to have a considerable number of our own mechanics and a thoroughly planned base organization provided; also a supply or repair ship designated for special use to supply the base.

I have suggested that the tentative order inclosed be issued to cover the situation, but it is doubtful whether this will be done, and a watchful-waiting policy may prevail instead.

However, I have thought that if you will ask for adequate facilities attention might be paid to it. There is not much planning ahead in the department and there is no one definitely charged with planning for such things as base facilities and maintenance. I have orders to sail shortly, but no information or instructions as to what I will do or what I will have to do it with. I can presee that a lot will be required, preparation for which should be started immediately, but some authority to start must be given.

The department expects to have Commander Baldwin report what is needed, but I don't know whether he has full information of the number of craft that are to be provided for, and as far as that is concerned, I can't get that completely either. I do know, however, that whatever equipment that can be made available can be used and that it will be better to have too much than too little. So if you would bring to attention of the department the need of repair facilities, preparatory action might be taken and thus time would be saved. I don't think there will be much preparatory action from this side unless you make your wants well known in advance. It may be that I am overestimating what is needed in the shape of material upkeep and repair facilities, but viewed in the light of experience covering similar situations I don't think I am proposing anything that will not be seriously needed within four months time, unless, fortunately, the war is at an end then,

Lack of material preparation and upkeep will check any proposed military action. The presence of abundant material facilities will enable much to be done: half-way action is likely to end in disaster. We have Gallipoli and the Mesopotamia expeditions to remember.

I am advising you of this situation at earliest possible date and when I get over will further communicate the details of the situation so that other wants may be provided for. Any information as to probable demand for base facilities would also assist those at the base in making proper provision.

BASE PROPOSITION.

1. Base will have to meet the requirements of 20 to 40 yachts, 20 destroyers, 40 or more trawlers, and possibly a considerable number of submarine chasers. The work required will be very much like that which was demanded of Cavite during the Philippine insurrection. The number of vessels will probably be increased.

2. The United States will have to supply everything for its vessels, except possible use of tools of French arsenal. Too much rather than too limited facilities should be provided.

3. The essential needs will be:

Material and supplies such as are required for operation and repair.

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A United States repair force familiar with United States machinery.

Such machine tools as can be found and supplied.

Hand tools in considerable quantity; drills, files, tap and dies, etc.; pipe fitting and cutting outfits, welding outfits, etc. These are also needed to replenish the articles on the vessels.

4. The quickest way to be started is to have some vessel assigned as base supply. Such vessel should have a naval crew, and should collect at Norfolk and New York yards such material, supplies, and personnel as can be made ready immediately for base purposes. This should include building material for base storehouse and base quarters for personnel.

5. As soon as a load of material is prepared send vessel across. Vessel to house mechanical personnel till such times as facilities are prepared on shore, then unload and go back for such additional supplies, tools, facilities, etc., as may have been assembled in the meantime. This vessel could keep the base supplied with most of the things it will be used for and any available cargo space could be used for any other freight. If needs become greater, more than one vessel might be assigned to the work.

6. Immediate authority is required—

(1) To have a suitable vessel assigned.

(2) To recruit a repair force, allowing navy-yard employees to volunteer, allowing their rate of pay plus subsistence, and including naval reserves in Regular Navy having mechanical training, and such men as can be collected from availables at receiving stations and districts. About 100 should be taken to begin with, numbers to be added as needs indicate.

(3) Give base commander authority to spend money as needed in France for such matters as can be procured there.

(4) Bureau of Construction and Repair, Ordnance and Steam Engineering to authorize Supplies and Accounts procure and prepare for shipment such material and supplies as may be deemed required in the near future for such vessles as are to be based abroad outside of facilities to tenders.

(5) Vessel assigned as base supply vessel to be routed as required by base commander, subject to superior authority as necessary.

7. As soon as base commander reports prospective needs, all available material and facilities should be prepared for shipment from the several navy yards.

There is attached to that letter a paper mentioned in the letter, a plan. This paper contains a remarkably accurate forecast of what was found ultimately necessary at Brest and what was actually established in the course of our occupancy of that base, and I would suggest that that be included along with the letter. This is addressed on August 10, from Bordeaux, France, to the headquarters in London. It is as follows:

BORDEAUX, FRANCE, *August 10, 1917.*

The situation in France is not quite clear to me. I suppose the trouble is that we have too few officers to attend to matters. It occurs to me to tell you of the situation at Bordeaux, so that you will know just where I need to be enlightened.

About June 1 Admiral Palmer gave me preliminary orders to go to Bordeaux in command of the American naval base. I asked him what the duties were, and he said he knew nothing about it. I asked the same question and got the same answer from all the other heads in the Navy Department. I knew there was no base at Bordeaux, not even a French naval base; and something would have to be created, and I applied for an Engineer officer and a paymaster and several yeomen. After waiting about four weeks I got orders to proceed with the following party, but still no instructions. Paymaster Colby, with two assistant paymasters, N. R.; Lieut. Bernier, N. R., engineer officer; Asst. Surg. Stevens, N. R.; and three yeomen. They all had orders to report to me at the naval base, Bordeaux. We arrived here July 18.

I have made contracts for the land and rented some buildings and contracted with the commercial wharf for handling of coal. We have 1,800 tons of coal left here by the steamship *Sioux*. I find it embarrassing to deal with the people here unless I have definite instructions about what we are going to do. If necessary Paymaster Colby can go to London to close contracts for material ordered in England, but I would prefer to do it by mail if possible.

To this letter the following reply was sent, pointing out the difficulty which was being experienced in getting action from the depart-

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ment. This extract from the letter is pertinent. The letter is dated August 14, 1917. [Reading:]

I find that the matter of the base at Bordeaux is not yet settled, owing to the department's delay in replying to a cablegram sent a week ago setting forth the situation and requesting authority to expend about $100,000 for the purpose of establishing the necessary facilities. Paymaster Colby was here at the time the cablegram was prepared for dispatch and has probably informed you of the contents before now. The cable was sent on the 7th, and we are to-day sending a follow-up message asking for prompt decision.

NOTE.—After considerable delay the department disapproved the expenditure of this money.

A full report of the situation existing at Bordeaux was sent to me on September 19. From this I will read you just a few paragraphs to show the confusion which resulted from the action of the Navy Department, and its failure to coordinate this action with other activities abroad, or to keep their representative in Europe, or the Allied Governments, informed of what they were doing. [Reading:]

AMERICAN NAVAL BASE,
No. 3. *Bordeaux, France, September 19, 1917.*

From: Commanding officer.
To: Vice Admiral W. S. Sims, United States Navy.
Subject: General report of conditions in Bordeaux.

1. The policy of the department in regard to Bordeaux is not very clear. The following history may throw some light on the subject. About June 1 the Chief of Bureau of Navigation gave me preliminary orders to proceed to Bordeaux and assume command of the American naval base. I asked for several assistants, which resulted in the following being ordered to report to me at Bordeaux: One paymaster, two assistant paymasters, one assistant surgeon, one lieutenant (engineer), and four yeomen.

2. I made diligent inquiry in the department as to their plans for Bordeaux, but learned nothing. Capt. V. O. Chase took the matter up and wrote me at New York at some length that he could learn of no plans, and that I would have to come over here to find out what was to be done.

3. The French naval attaché in Washington told me that our Navy Department had agreed to establish two bases in France.

4. Secretary Daniels stated in a lengthy article in the New York Times in June, that he had already established two bases in France.

5. The monthly Navy Directory of June 1 mentioned the American naval bases at Brest and Bordeaux.

6. Lieut. Commander Dinger, who recently arrived at Brest, told me that Capt. W. V. Pratt told him that the department would not establish any extensive naval bases in France.

7. Commandant Simon was ordered to report to me as liaison of the French Navy. He was also a member of the French commission to Washington. He gave me to understand that the French Navy Department expected that our Navy would install at Pauillac sufficient facilities to furnish coal supplies and repairs for a few patrol boats, and with that understanding the French began building a new wharf for our yachts.

A very similar situation arose in connection with the first aviation unit sent to France. I learned from Commander Sayles, while in Paris early in May, that American naval personnel was to be sent abroad by the department for training in French aviation schools. Neither I nor the naval attaché in Paris had received any official information concerning this. On May 14 the naval attaché in Paris therefore cabled to the department as follows:

SECNAV., *Washington:*

On May 6 French naval attaché Washington reported that Admiral Chocheprat stated he would send on colliers men designated for aviation training in France. French ministry of marine has requested me to ask for detailed information on this subject. How many men, what grades, what previous experience in aviation. 18014.

SAYLES.

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Nothing further was heard from the department with regard to to this detachment, except a brief message to the effect that an aviation unit was sailing on the colliers *Neptune* and *Jupiter* for France. When the unit arrived in France they found that no definite arrangements had been made for their training, as the information furnished concerning the number and composition had been insufficient to make this possible. I will read you, from the report of the commanding officer of this detachment, the results of this situation:

It being necessary to confer with the French marine relative to disposition and training of men, I departed with Paymaster Conger for Paris on June 12. We arrived on the morning of June 13 and that day made the following calls: On the American ambassador; the naval attaché; the French minister of marine; Admiral Lacaze, the chief of the general staff; Admiral de Von, the chief of the aeronautic section; Captaine de Fregate Cazenove; and the paymaster in chief of the French Navy.

A conference was immediately begun as to the disposition of our forces, the officer representing the French marine in this conference being Capitaine de Vaisseau Laborde.

It developed that there was practically no understanding as to the arrangements made in the United States whereby this detachment had been sent to France. I explained that the French authorities in the United States had stated that even though we had no trained aviators, student aviators and mechanics would be a welcome help and could be very quickly trained in France so as to be speedily available for use in the war against the Germans, in which they could be of the utmost service. The French expressed their gratitude and bade us welcome in an enthusiastic manner.

They explained that the detachment of 122 men, comprising 65 student pilots, 38 mechanics—the others being yoemen, hospital corps men, cooks, messmen, and servants—was entirely unbalanced and that for each pilot aviator there are required at least 10 men; that in addition to the pilot aviators there are required observers, who are men specially trained to observe, drop bombs, operate machine and rapid-fire guns, etc.; that there are schools in which such training is given; that besides pilot and observer aviators and mechanics there are required helpers, fabric workers, joiners, chauffeurs, motor-boat coxswains and engineers.

It is to be noted that the commanding officer of this detachment had no orders to report to me, and that much embarrassment was occasioned when the unit arrived, as can be inferred from the report that I have read you.

These cases are typical of the obstacles which I found in the first months, through lack of information concerning the department's plans and activities. As I have repeatedly stated, much of my information concerning the activities of the Navy Department at this time concerning the movements of our own naval forces I received only accidentally, by learning of them from allied navy departments, who had been informed by their attachés in Washington. Thus, while in Paris, on May 6, I learned from the French ministry of marine the following five items, of which I had no information from the Navy Department at that time:

First. That the second group of six destroyers, commanded by Commander Courtney, had sailed from Boston. I did not receive confirmation from the Navy Department until May 9, three days later.

Second. That a hundred cannon were being sent to France on the colliers *Jupiter* and *Neptune*. I had received no information at this time and, in fact, received none whatsoever until toward the middle of June, concerning the sailing of these two colliers for France.

Third. That an American aviation unit was to be sent abroad. To this I have already referred.

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Fourth. That two naval officers were to be sent to establish American bases at Brest and Bordeaux. It was not until two days later that I was informed that bases were to be established at these places.

Fifth. That a vigorous campaign was being waged in the press in America for a more energetic warfare against submarines either through a complete barrage in the North Sea or by an attack upon enemy bases. This point I will deal with later in discussing the plans proposed by the department.

Similarly, I learned from the French naval attaché in London, on May 10, that the patrol vessels for the French coast would be coal-burning and their departure was being delayed "by the question of price;" also that these 25 patrol vessels would probably leave some time between May 5 and 30, and 25 more the beginning of June, to be based on Brest and Bordeaux, and that these forces and bases would be under my command. Needless to say, I never did receive any confirmation of this information, and it was many months before there was as many as 50 patrol vessels on the coast of France. I also learned at this time that the Navy Department was arranging to turn over to the French, to be operated by the Frecnh Navy, from 50 to 100 submarine chasers, the first of which would be ready in August.

Similarly, I was constantly receiving information from the British Admiralty concerning movements of our own forces, concerning which I knew nothing, although of course the British assumed that I had received full information. Thus on a single day, May 29, I learned at the Admiralty:

First. That the fifth destroyer division had sailed from St. Johns for Queenstown.

Second. That four additional destroyers had been ordered to leave New York on May 23.

Third. That the collier *Jupiter* had sailed from New York on May 19 for France; and the *Neptune* would sail from Norfolk on May 21 for Brest. That each would have a convoy of two destroyers that would join the forces at Queenstown after arrival in France.

I had repeatedly pointed out to the department how necessary it was that I should have full information of the department's action with regard to sending of forces abroad, and of knowing what their general plans were. I have already read you my message of May 14 requesting this information. In another message of May 16 I again pointed out how important it was that my activities, and those of the department, should be coordinated, and I urgently requested that I be given the information desired, and "of the situation at home as it affects the forces and my duties of cooperation here." I pointed out in the same cable, and in a letter of the same date, how vitally important it was that the Navy Department should profit by the experience of the allied navies during the war; and how it was only possible to do so by sending over trained officers who could gather this information and transmit it rapidly to the department, in order that the department might prepare our forces for any future contingency, but no reply was received to any of these requests for information.

In my cable of May 31 I emphasized again the same point, calling attention to the difficulties of my position. Some idea of what this

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really was can be gathered from my letter to the department, of June 8. I will read you, for example, paragraph 10 of that letter:

[Letter to department, June 8, 1917.]

At times I have been in ignorance, or in doubt, as to the proposed movements of our forces, and also as to their actual movements, until information was first obtained from the British Admiralty.

I wish to make it quite clear that there is no possible objection to timely, accurate, and complete information being sent in this manner; but the point is that at times I have received my first knowledge of important information from a casual reference in a British cablegram upon another subject. The assumption of the official who sent the cablegram (usually Admiral De Chair or Capt. Gaunt) has apparently been that I had full information and had communicated the same to the British Admiralty. Such incidents are not only somewhat embarrassing, but necessarily create an unfavorable impression which is not removed by subsequent information.

Examples in point are as follows:

Department's notification of sailing of *Cushing* division received three days after vessels had sailed from Halifax, information of their sailing from the United States having been learned in the Admiralty. Information was received from the Admiralty that sailing of the "fourth flotilla" had been postponed indefinitely, but have no confirmation of this fact to date.

On May 29 received department's cable that *Patterson* division had sailed from St. Johns on May 26, having seen a previous Admiralty dispatch from British commander of this sailing.

I was sent for by French chief of staff to arrange for escort of *Neptune* and *Jupiter* through danger zone. At that time I had no information of the movements of these ships. Informed later by Admiralty that destroyers were accompanying *Neptune* and *Jupiter*, and were to join Queenstown forces later, but have no confirmation of this fact to date.

I have received repeated inquiries concerning the number and character of patrol craft to be sent to France which I was unable to answer.

Another striking case of the failure of the department to send adequate and timely information concerning their activities is illustrated by the case of the *Dixie*.

I may say that the *Dixie* was one of the mother ships of the flotilla that was coming over.

I had been notified early in May that the *Dixie* could be sent if needed, and had cabled back urgently requesting her services, to add to the repair facilities at the destroyer base. I received no further information concerning her sailing in spite of my requests. On June 10 I received a dispatch for retransmittal to the *Dixie* concerning pay accounts. A few hours after this dispatch arrived the *Dixie* herself appeared off Queenstown, and as it so happened ran right through the middle of a mine field laid by submarines a few days before. I learned later that the department had cabled me on the day of her sailing, but the message, for some reason which was never explained, was addressed to me at Petrograd instead of London, and consequently did not reach me. This serves to illustrate the consequences of failing to give sufficient advance notice of such sailing.

Similar difficulty arose concerning the arrival of the oiler *Kanawha* at the end of June, and in the case of the destroyers which accompanied the first troop convoys abroad. I had had no information concerning the number of destroyers until they actually arrived at St. Nazaire, nor did I know, for over a month after the *Kanawha* had sailed from New York, the orders under which she was operating. These illustrations should be sufficient to indicate what I meant, in my letter of January 7, when I stated that the department frequently omitted to keep its naval representative abroad informed of its plans,

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intentions, and sometimes, moreover, the movement of forces into the European area.

To illustrate the real need for such information I quote from my letter No. 29, of July 14, 1917, to the Navy Department:

4. It is very necessary that I should have advance information of movements of ships and orders under which they are operating. In the case of fuel ships, if they are not to be detained in European waters, I must arrange for their being sent to the proper destination to discharge their cargoes. In fact, if the *Kanawha* arrives at Queenstown this week, she will either have to be escorted to another port, or delayed there until there is sufficient room in the Queenstown tanks to take her cargo, as these tanks have just been filled by British fuel ships.

5. It is also very necessary that I should have a general idea in advance of the cargo being sent over by supply ship, such as the *Celtic*. Our parent ships obtain fresh provisions from shore as much as possible, reserving the cargoes in their cold storage. It is necessary therefore that they make room in their cold storage for receipt of cargoes from supply ships in order that the supply ships may not be unduly detained.

Information is just coming through this morning in Navy Secret Code concerning the *Celtic's* cargo. This will be too late to serve the purpose for which it was needed, as the *Celtic* is due to arrive in the course of the next few days. I assume from certain unofficial information received that the *Celtic* will have supplies for the yachts based in France, in addition to the *Melville* and *Dixie*, and have taken steps to provide escort if such proves to be the case.

DISPOSITION OF FORCES.

Another of the matters in which I found great embarrassment, because of the department failing to keep me informed of their decisions, was that of the disposition of forces. It is unnecessary for me, at this point, to read again from my early cables and letters, in which I was emphasizing the importance of keeping the American forces together, to operate as a combined unit against the submarines, in the area of their greatest activity. I had also repeatedly pointed out to the department the fact that a general view of the whole situation was available only abroad, where, through personal conferences with the heads of the allied navies, all needs could be considered, and arrangements made for the most effective use of such reinforcements as the United States Navy could afford. I had thus from the first urged that all of our destroyers be concentrated in the most critical area of all, that south of Ireland, where shipping routes from overseas focused—these destroyers to be based on our own repair ships, stationed at an Irish port. Later on I repeatedly asked the department, in making assignment of any new ships, to consider the recommendations I was making. All the Allies were making numerous demands upon the Navy Department. I have already referred to the requests from the British, French, and Russian Governments, for certain specific assistance. Such requests were being made of me, as well as of the department.

It is true that the department assured me, on more than one occasion that, to quote from their message of June 24:

In making the local assignments abroad of forces the department requests, and will be guided by, your advice, which should be given after consultation with the various Admiralties concerned, as to the priority of requirements.

All of my recommendations, from the time of my first cable, had been in accordance with these fundamental instructions from the department.

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Let us see in what way the department was guided by my advice. I had repeatedly requested the immediate increase of our antisubmarine forces and the concentration of these forces in the critical area.

On June 29 I recommended the immediate sending of gunboats in addition to destroyers, tugs, and yachts.

I was not consulted by the department with regard to the number and character of the vessels sent to France in June, or later months, and, similarly, the first indication that I had that the department intended to send forces to Gibraltar was in a message of July 5, in which they said:

Department is strongly impressed with the necessity for adequate antisubmarine patrol in and off entrance to Gibraltar. Ten vessels are available to send across, if considered that they can be of value.

The point to be emphasized here is the fact that such a decision, as to disposition of forces in European waters, was made by the department without reference to their representative abroad, who was in a position to thoroughly underrun all individual allied requests for assistance, and determine priority in accordance with departmental instructions and the needs of the situation.

I replied to this, after consultation with the Admiralty, that the vessels of the gunboat class, named by the department, would be very useful for antisubmarine work at Gibraltar. I realized that this was a digression from the policy which I had been insisting upon from the start, of concentrating all reinforcements in the critical area. However, I felt that I could not possibly explain the necessities therefor any more fully or clearly, and it seemed now to me that I should grasp any opportunity of getting forces across the ocean. Their subsequent disposition could be determined later. It was quite true that forces were needed urgently in all areas. The lines of communications to the armies in the near and far East were being hard hit at this time by submarine operations in the Mediterranean. It was simply a case of accepting the best that could be obtained.

I was accordingly informed by the department on July 14, 1917, that 11 vessels, which had been named in previous messages, and included gunboats and light cruisers, had been directed to prepare for distant service under the command of Admiral Wilson, and would sail for Gibraltar at the earliest possible date.

An even more striking illustration of the manner in which the department failed to carry out its policy announced in its cable of June 24, which I have read you, is to be found in the case of the forces sent to the Azores.

The Germans had fitted out the big submarine *Deutschland* to assist in the submarine campaign, and this ship began her cruise in the summer of 1917 in the vicinity of the Azores.

It was obviously a diversion on the part of the Germans of a character already described. It was therefore no surprise to learn on July 5 that this submarine had actually bombarded a port in the Azores. This, of course, could have no effect upon the progress of the campaign other than a moral one. No damage which could be inflicted in the Azores could appreciably affect the issue. After a consultation with the Admiralty as to what action should be taken to meet such diversions it was decided, and I stated in a cable of July 13 to the Navy Department, that two submarines, with a decoy

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ship, might profitably be sent to the Azores for operations against these cruising submarines, as such craft had the best opportunity of successfully attacking this class of submarine.

I may say right here that the object of sending them there was to keep the Germans from using the inlets and bays of the islands as a resting base. It had been discovered earlier in the war that submarines sometimes would put in to uninhabited islands and anchor their boats and make certain repairs and rest their crews.

As a matter of fact, one of these submarines was torpedoed later in this same area by a British submarine. I heard nothing from the department as to this recommendation. The first information that I had that any forces were being sent to the Azores was received on July 19, when I learned through the Admiralty that four destroyers, with the *Panther*, had arrived in Bermuda en route, apparently, for Europe. I had received no information from the department, but by this time I had become thoroughly accustomed not to receive such information, and therefore assumed that these forces were probably bound for some station in Europe. Accordingly I cabled the department on July 21 and 22, again pointing out the necessity for destroyers in the critical area and asking that these coal-burning destroyers be sent, together with all other destroyers available. In my cable of July 21, for example, I said:

JULY 21, 1917.

Secnav, Operations, Washington.
No. 122.

Conference with Admiralty to-day results in recommendation that destroyers from Manila base on Gibraltar while situation remains as at present. Also that *Panther* and those sent to Azores base on French coast, probably Brest, because of open harbors at Azores and superior facilities Brest, and less steaming necessary for escort duty, and particularly for effect on French. *Panther* also urgently needed for yacht squadron. 16621.

SIMS.

I may say that the destroyers mentioned there as going from Manila to the Mediterranean were too small and had too little radius of action to act as escort destroyers for the North, off the coast of Ireland and France. They were only 420 tons instead of 1,000 tons.

On July 27 I received a message from Ponta del Gada, Azores, in an undecipherable code, and on cabling for a repetition, or explanation, received the following message:

AUGUST 1, 1917.

Origin: Ponta Delgada, Azores.
Admiral SIMS, *London*.

Replying to your cable 18027. We have reported to you the arrival of the U. S. S. *Smith*, and the U. S. S. *Lamson*, 08026 Ponta Delgada Azores,, in accordance with the department's orders, and have registered a cable address, Senafloat, Ponta Delgada, Azores. There has been no information with regard to German submarine operations since July 22. Have cruised around all the islands, return Ponta Delgada. Thanks. 06031. 12031.

There is no signature to that. I do not know what "Thanks" means.

From this message it appeared that it was clearly the department's intention that these vessels should remain at the Azores, and operate under my orders, as the vessels had reported to me in accordance with the department's orders. I had still heard nothing whatsoever from

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the department. Accordingly, on August 2, I sent to the Secretary of the Navy the following message:

Cablegram sent August 2.
To: Secretary of the Navy, Washington.

108. *Smith* and *Lamson* have reported to me their arrival Azores. They find no information there regarding submarines since July 22, and have cruised around all islands and returned to Ponta Delgada, where they are now apparently awaiting orders. Request authority to order this division and *Panther* to join destroyer forces temporarily, until they can be instructed in methods and means of communication now in force. Will probably then wish to base them on Brest, particularly to assist in escort of troop ships.

SIMS.

To this message I received only a brief statement that the department, for special reasons, desired these forces to continue to operate in the Azores. But they did not state their request.

Nothing was stated with regard to their orders, nor was it clear in my own mind as to whether they were actually under my orders. I received nothing further from the department concerning these forces. On the 18th of August, I learned, again through the admiralty, that eight United States destroyers had arrived at Bermuda, and the *North Carolina* and three further destroyers at St. Johns, the admiralty being under the impression that they were all bound for the war zone, as in the case of the four which had proceeded to the Azores. As the situation was becoming increasingly confused, I sent the following message:

Cablegram sent August 18, 1917.
To: Opnav, Washington.
Simsadus 295.

Request information as to final destination of United States forces recently arrived at Bermuda and St. Johns, and orders under which force based on Azores is operating. Two allied countries have forces operating in same area, and this information is required in order to coordinate their activities. 18218.

SIMS.

I might say right there that the reason was, seriously, this. I have previously explained how dangerous it is for submarines of different allies to be operating in the same neighborhood. As the allied forces had submarines operating in the vicinity of the Azores it was necessary that I should see them every day so that I could coordinate what they were doing and keep my forces under command so as to keep them from bombarding the other fellow's, because they might come in contact if they were not under my orders.

This is perhaps a detail, but it is nevertheless a very significant one, as illustrating the extent to which, in so far as our own Navy Department at least was concerned, we had at that time anything approaching to what might be called "unity of command." The department replied as follows on August 23:

From: Chief of Naval Operations.
For: Admiral Sims, London.
Received: August 24, 1917.

Opnav 221. 18218. Destroyers recently arrived at Bermuda Islands will return this coast. Yachts sailing from St. Johns, Newfoundland, are attached to patrol force duty coast of France, under Capt. Fletcher, United States Navy. The Azores Islands force is at present operating under orders to patrol in vicinity of these islands 12023.

ADMIRAL BENSON.

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That means, return back to America.

It is to be noted that this message did not state that the Azores force was operating under my command, nor did it give any indication with regard to plans concerning their future employment. I might add that if I had been content not to go beyond the strict letter of my instructions from the department, but only, as it has been stated in the press, to mind my own local business, and these forces in the Azores had followed the same principle, they would have been left in the air, trying to get detailed instructions from day to day from Washington. In passing, it should be noted that these forces experienced great difficulty at the Azores, because no arrangements or preparations had been made for their coming. They found themselves in difficulty with the Portuguese officials, who, apparently, were as much surprised by their arrival as I had been. It was with great difficulty that they could purchase stores.

This following little item here I will ask the press not to mention. It is a matter which I should prefer should not be given publicity on account of its international aspect, but the fact remains that the Portuguese officials actually viewed the presence of these ships with suspicion, through the failure to prepare the way for their coming, and it is a long and rather unfortunate, as well as in some aspects ridiculous, story, as to the local experiences which resulted from this situation. There is no need, however, to bring out such sidelights on the war in this inquiry.

In my letter report to the department of August 20, I summed up the case as follows:

AUGUST 20, 1917.

It is important that I should be kept generally informed of orders under which independent forces in the Atlantic are operating, for example: I am not aware to date of the orders under which the destroyers at the Azores are operating. A number of messages have been received from that force which were unsigned and which have been reported to the department.

Both the French Ministry of Marine and the British Admiralty have inquired as to the number of destroyers at the Azores, how long they intended to remain in that vicinity, and as to the nature of their operations. A British submarine and decoy ship have been sent to operate from the Azores during the last week, and Portuguese forces are also there. It is manifestly important that allied operations should be coordinated.

Information concerning enemy activity in all areas in the eastern portion of the Atlantic, as fast as it becomes available in France or England, should be utilized to the best advantage of the forces concerned. This information will, of course, be transmitted to the Azores forces as fast as it becomes available, but it can be handled much more intelligently if full information is available as to the orders under which the forces involved are operating.

I have learned from the British Admiralty that eight United States destroyers, apparently from the Pacific Fleet, have arrived at Bermuda, and that the *North Carolina* and three destroyers have arrived at St. Johns. The British Admiralty is daily informed through the consular service, and other channels, of the movements of war vessels, and it has, at times, proved embarrassing to me to receive information of our own vessels' movements from the Admiralty.

In the meantime Admiral Mayo had arrived in London. The question of the disposition of these forces at the Azores was taken up by him, and on August 29 he sent the following message to the Navy Department:

AUGUST 29, 1917.

To: Opnav, Washington.

396. After discussion with Admiral Jellicoe, Admiral Beatty, and Vice Admiral Sims, recommend send one division submarines operate against enemy submarines vicinity Azores, with monitor tender, base Fayal, where monitors' guns furnish local base defense. Tender should be prepared lay net in Horta Harbor entrance from

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breakwater end. Following 20-fathom curve towards signal station, submarines and tender should be attached to naval forces in European waters.

After arrival submarines, Azores destroyer division one proceed operate from base Brest, stopping Queenstown en route for instruction. *Panther* also proceed base Brest, where can assist in yacht upkeep, provided another destroyer tender available for upkeep destroyers home waters 15429.

MAYO.

In reply, the department cabled Admiral Mayo, on September 1, in their 298, that his recommendation would be carried into effect. It is rather significant to note that, here again, the recommendation referred to was the same one that I had made in July—that is, that submarines should be sent to the Azores to operate against the enemy submarines, and that our destroyers should be brought immediately to the critical area. This message of the department to Admiral Mayo was confirmed in two dispatches sent to me four days later, on September 5:

SEPTEMBER 5, 1917.

Opnav 328. In about two weeks, and upon arrival of *Truxton* and *Wheeling* at Azores Islands, *Panther* and division one destroyer force will be directed to proceed European waters to be disposed of as per cable 396 from Admiral Mayo. 16000.

BENSON.

From: Chief Naval Operations.
To: Commander naval forces European waters.
Cablegram received September 5, 1917.

Opnav 340. Our 328 by 2d of October Azores Islands force should consist of one division of submarines, U. S. S. *Tonopah*, yacht *Atlantic*, U. S. S. *Whipple*, and U. S. S. *Truxton*. Radius of action will extend to Canary Islands. All forces will be under your general instructions, but we do not wish U. S. S. *Whipple*, U. S. S. *Truxton*, or *Atlantic* moved from this general area.

Issue instructions in keeping with above and you 396, so that U. S. S. *Panther* and division our destroyer force may sail shortly after arrival of U. S. S. *Whipple* and *Truxton*. 10006.

ADMIRAL BENSON.

It is to be noted in these messages that in the first message the department indicated its intention of sending two more older destroyers to replace those at the Azores, and that in the second message, announcing the addition of a division of submarines, it was specifically stated that, while these forces were under my general directions, the ships should not be moved from this area. The whole situation with regard to these forces and their command was still so unsatisfactory that, on November 5, in my letter report, I again reverted to the matter in the paragraph which I will quote you:

Letter 7305 November 5, 1917. Azores forces:

The force at present at the Azores consists of the U. S. S. *Wheeling*, *Truxton*, *Whipple*, and four submarines of the K class. These forces are apparently under the immediate command of Commander H. W. Osterhaus, United States Navy, commanding officer of the *Wheeling*, in his capacity of senior naval officer present.

I should consider it desirable, however, to bring to the attention of the department the somewhat unsatisfactory situation from the military point of view that exists with respect to this force.

On August 29, Admiral Mayo cabled to the department concerning the Azores force (cable No. 396), stating in part as follows:

"Submarine and tender should be attached to naval forces in European waters."

The department, on the 31st of August (cable No. 298), stated:

"The disposition recommended in your cable No. 396 approved."

It was understood by both Admiral Mayo and myself that the department intended to place the Azores force under my command.

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On September 6 the department (cable No. 340) stated the proposed composition of the Azores forces, and stated:

"All forces will be under your general instructions, but do not wish U. S. S. *Whipple*, *Truxton*, or *Atlantic* moved from this general area."

On October 22 the department sent cable No. 799 to me, and to the *Wheeling* for the commander of the submarine force, giving certain information regarding conditions at the Azores, and stating as follows:

"Force now there will be based at Ponta Delgada and operated along such lines as you may deem best. Senior naval officer present there will be informed of any future additions to submarine force in case any are contemplated."

As this message left me in great doubt as to the exact desires of the department regarding the Azores command, I sent the following cable on October 23:

"No. 1035. Part of message relative to operations not clear. I assume all forces, including submarines, will be under my orders; that Capt. Robison will remain as senior officer, Azores, and operate all forces under my direction, subject to department's wishes."

To which the department replied as follows:

"Opnav. 340. Capt. Samuel S. Robison has planned for operation of his force in Azores. Senior submarine commander will naturally keep you informed, and will be guided by your instructions. Azores force is within limit of your command, and all forces there will be under your general directions. Very probably, in the near future, a group of destroyers assigned to troop convoy work may be based on the Azores. You will be informed of any intended additions to Azores force as soon as additions are made. It is not the intention to keep Capt. Robison permanently at Azores, but later on an officer of suitable rank will be ordered, probably a rear admiral, as base commander. You will be informed of the detail when it is made."

It appears, from careful consideration of the foregoing correspondence, that the Azores force is within the limits of my command; that it is under my general direction; that the senior submarine commander will keep me informed regarding the plans which have apparently been made by Capt. S. S. Robison; that he will be guided by my directions, and that an officer of suitable rank, probably a rear admiral, will eventually be sent to Ponta Delgada as base commander.

I wish to represent to the department that the situation thus created is not a satisfactory one from the military point of view, and that it should be corrected by placing the Azores force under my orders without reservation or restriction. The department must, of course, presume that I will not hamper the senior submarine officer by such detailed orders as would check his initiative and reduce his area of discretion below what it should be.

I recognize, of course, that this is rather tedious work, but as it illustrates one of the most complete examples that I have ever known of trying to run even intimate details of a campaign from a distance of several thousand miles, it is necessary to go into it to prove the points made in my letter.

In later letters and dispatches I again emphasized the embarrassment and difficulty which had arisen as a result of sending this force to the Azores without having arranged ahead of time for their repair and supply facilities without having undertaking the necessary diplomatic steps to insure cooperation on the part of the Portuguese authorities. Thus in my letters of September 7, 1917, November 15, 1917, and February 11, 1918. I will read short extracts from those letters. [Reading:]

6. AZORES DETACHMENT.

Letter 495, September 7, 1917:

The commander of the Azores detachment has reported to me a number of petty difficulties which have arisen with the Portuguese authorities, for example, that export taxes for supplies purchased by our forces and harbor dues are charged each time a destroyer gets under way for patrol duty. I have taken up this matter with the embassy in London, and requested that the embassy in Lisbon be asked to take such steps as may be possible to remove these minor difficulties which, incidentally, are discriminations, as they are not applied to British naval forces operating in the vicinity of the Azores.

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7. FORCES BASED ON AZORES.

Letter 2629, November 15, 1917:

Copy of a report dated October 10, submitted by the senior officer at the Azores, direct to the department, has been received.

It is considered very necessary that the negotiations with the Portuguese Government should be prosecuted with a view to improving the cooperation between our forces and the local Portuguese authorities. It is noted, in the report from the Azores, that Portuguese authorities do not cooperate freely with our forces; and, in fact, withhold military information from them. Further, that great difficulty is experienced in arranging for stowage on shore for necessary supplies and an entirely unnecessary amount of red tape is involved in handling and actually obtaining the supplies for use. It is noted that before gasoline could be landed the local authorities considered it necessary to communicate with Lisbon. These are intolerable conditions. The question of military control should be definitely cleared up. It is also noted that our senior officer at the Azores has been informed by the local authorities that the Portuguese themselves are planning to protect the harbor with nets.

8. AZORES.

Letter 8749, February 11, 1918:

Referring to the inclosed report, from Commander Osterhaus, on the fortifications at Ponta Delgada, the question arose recently in one of the daily conferences of the admiralty staff, as to the extent to which the United States would contribute to the defenses which are obviously inefficient.

The force commander has been informed by the department of the dispatch of two 7-inch guns and a company of marines to Ponta Delgada, but was not advised as to the arrangements that had been made with the Portuguese Government regarding the manning of these guns. A cable inquiry addressed to Rear Admiral Dunn brought the reply that one gun was being mounted near the radio station, and one at Ponta Delgada, that the work was being pushed as rapidly as possible, and that the Portuguese had insisted on manning the guns. This, Admiral Dunn stated, had been promised them when they had been sufficiently instructed and had become proficient.

It is very earnestly recommended that our Government come to an understanding with the Portuguese Government, if it is at all possible to do so, by which the manning of these guns shall be entirely in our own hands.

I think this case well illustrates the manner in which the department acted upon various information, received by it in Washington, independently of my recommendations, and how my recommendations were put into effect only after they had been later reiterated by Admiral Mayo. It demonstrated how effective the German propaganda was, that the bombardment of an outlying port in the Azores could induce the department to divert forces of exactly the character which the Germans desired and intended by such a diversion. I remember following the German press at a later period, when Monrovia in Liberia was similarly bombarded, the general theme being to demonstrate how Germany was actually controlling the sea with her submarines, pointing out that they were proceeding where they pleased, bombarding ports, and that the Allies were powerless to prevent them.

To take an extreme case, for the sake of illustration, if every time the enemy detached a single submarine and sent it off into some remote locality to shoot up an undefended beach, we made a redisposition of our forces, or detached a comparatively large force to proceed there in reply thereto, the submarine campaign would have been still more threatening.

I am citing these cases merely to show the repeated violation of fundamental principles of warfare; for one of the most universally accepted principles of strategy is involved, namely, that of concentration. Many other cases could be brought in to show that.

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although the department agreed in theory to the policy which I had recommended, especially that of the concentration of forces, I continued to receive, well into 1918, many similar proposals for the diversion of our forces, to meet sporadic submarine activities, aimed at this very end, that is, to force us away from the principle of concentration. This was the point referred to in No. 5, of my summary of conclusions, in the letter which has led to this investigation.

To take one more instance of this attitude on the part of the department: On the 13th of February, 1918, I received from the department a dispatch (their No. 2977) calling my attention to the fact that the German submarines had recently been active in the vicinity of the Canary Islands, and suggesting that we send forces to that area to establish a patrol of the waters about these islands. I discussed this matter with the representatives of the Allies, in accordance with my instructions, and on the 15th of February sent the following message to the Navy Department:

VERY SECRET.

4016. Your 2977. By agreement with French Ministry, when our forces were sent to the Azores, we were to avoid waters south of 30° and east of 20°, since the French had forces in the Canary Islands. British submarines have recently been dispatched to the vicinity of the Canaries, in consequence of enemy activities.

As I previously explained, it is extremely dangerous to put submarines of different nationalities in the same area without their previously having orders. [Continuing reading:]

I do not consider that, with the limited number of units at my disposal, any effective patrol of the Canaries and vicinity can be established, and that to establish an ineffective patrol is merely a waste of effort. Furthermore, if forces are drawn from Azores to patrol Canaries region, the enemy would doubtless transfer his activities back to the Azores. I therefore recommend no change from present disposition of forces, on account of enemy activities in vicinity of Canaries.

SIMS.

In a letter to Admiral Benson, on February 18, I wrote:

FEBRUARY 18, 1918.

TO BENSON:

Referring to your cablegram, concerning the advisability of sending the Azores force down to the Canaries, to suppress the activity of the cruiser submarines in that neighborhood, the whole subject was discussed at length at the usual morning council at the Admiralty, and we all came to the unanimous conclusion which was embodied in my reply.

As will be seen from this cable, not only was such a dispersion of forces on our part inadvisable, from a military point of view, but it was unnecessary, because Allied forces, already operating in that vicinity, from bases previously established, were ample to meet the situation; that is, to deny these islands to enemy submarines as havens for resting their crews, making minor repairs and so forth. In spite of this recommendation, I find that six weeks later the department was again suggesting the establishment of bases, and the sending of forces, this time not to the Canary Islands, but to Madeira and to the Cape Verdes, still further afield. Their message was as follows:

Cablegram received April 2, 1918.
Origin, Washington, Ser. No. 4487.
Simsadus.

4487. Presence of hostile cruiser submarines around Canary Islands and Cape Verde, operating as indicated in the estimate by your planning section, coupled with recent

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requests to run sailing vessels to African coast, through the zone for lumber, leads the department to look with favor upon the establishment minor bases of our own, at Madeira islands and Cape Verde. As bases from which a few of our submarines might operate, assisted by heavily armed cruising craft of the P or Q type, these islands seem to present possibilities. Matter has been taken up with Portuguese authorities, through our State Department, but has not progressed to a decision. What is opinion of Admiralty as regards feasibility of such a scheme, and, if considered feasible, what pressure can Admiralty bring to bear to further it, provided United States agrees to furnish operating craft, and to make scheme merely an extension of present Azores Islands operations. 22001/4487.

BENSON.

(At this point, at 12 o'clock M., the subcommittee adjourned until Monday, Mar. 15, 1920, at 10 o'clock a. m.)

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NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

MONDAY, MARCH 15, 1920.

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON NAVAL AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 o'clock a. m., in room 235, Senate Office Building, Senator Frederick Hale presiding.

Present: Senators Hale (chairman) and Trammell.

STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL WILLIAM S. SIMS—Resumed.

Admiral SIMS. When the hearing ended Saturday I was discussing the attitude of the Navy Department in sending reinforcements to such places as the Azores and Madeira, the Cape Verde Islands, and such places in the Pacific, and there is a little more I have to say on that same subject.

The department was so insistent upon instituting operations in these areas that I further took up the question with the Allies and, in order to try to meet the department's wishes, I sent a further message on April 7, reporting that I was considering the plan outlined by the department, and on April 10 I sent the following message, giving the conclusions reached:

VERY SECRET.

6314. Your 4487. My 6151. Madeira appears to offer no facilities as a base for submarines. In the Cape Verde Islands harbors are poor, but probably Porto Grande would be best place. It is not regarded as feasible to base submarines in a locality where there is no secure harbor, as is the case at Madeira and Cape Verde Islands. It is suggested that department consider basing submarines at Dakar, where excellent base facilities belonging to French already exist. I am not convinced that submarines based at any one of the three places mentioned would be better employed than on the home coast, where defensive operations may be required against cruising submarines. 6314.

SIMS.

It will be noted that I again expressed my doubt of the advisability of any such use of our submarines, stating that they would be of more use to meet the submarine raids on the American coast, which at this time it was considered would not be long delayed.

I might also add that I always encountered a tendency on the part of the Allies to avoid disagreements with our Navy Department. It was natural that they should show a desire to acquiesce in departmental suggestions as far as possible, or at least not to be found at all times in opposition to them.

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To show that I had tried to state fully the situation in this outlying area, I will quote the following from a letter of December 19, 1917:

10. SITUATION AZORES.

The situation at the Azores remains unchanged. One large enemy submarine is operating in the general vicinity, and another is probably at sea en route. These submarines are believed to be the *U-152* and *U-157*.

The large areas involved, and the large cruising radius of these submarines, will always render any patrol system entirely out of the question.

The danger in these waters is so slight, compared to that in the vicinity of the British and French coasts, that it is urgently recommended that the force at the Azores be kept at a minimum, unless very marked changes in the enemy submarine campaign occur. It is considered that the Azores forces can not be expected to do more than deny these islands as an enemy base, and to hold themselves in a constant state of readiness to proceed on independent operations whenever a submarine is known to be within close enough proximity.

It is desired to point out that the Azores can never be considered as an efficient base for antisubmarine craft without a dry dock.

Destroyers are constantly laid up, owing to bent propellers, and if we attempt to base destroyers at the Azores, the necessity would constantly arise of sending vessels to Gibraltar or Queenstown for docking.

If the department intends to prepare the Azores as a possible future base, immediately steps should be taken to provide a floating dry dock. So long as shipping is kept away from the Azores, it is most unlikely that submarines will appear in that area.

As a matter of fact, the department's action, in allowing antisubmarine craft to be wasted, for the periods above mentioned, in such areas as the Azores, is susceptible of being converted into terms of actual unnecessary loss of life and wealth.

While some of the incidents narrated occurred considerably more than six months after our entry into the war most of them occurred during the first six months—the period to which my letter of January 7, 1920, principally related.

On October 2, 1917, I received the following cablegram from the Chief of Naval Operations:

SIMSADUS:

571. You are authorized to redistribute the naval forces under your command to meet such changes as may arise in European waters. Every redistribution of your command shall be made with a view not only to meeting the military situation but also with a view to foster feelings of harmony among the Allies concerned. Evidence of dissatisfaction on the part of one or more of the Allies with a proposed redistribution shall operate to prevent such redistribution until you have adjusted the matter to the satisfaction of all concerned. In case not yielding to adjustment submit plan your views and the views of the Allies concerned to department and defer action. No redistribution of forces shall be directed against the forces of any other power than Germany. 19001.

That last proviso was on account of our not being at war with Turkey.

Of course, we all know that history is full to overflowing of explanations of failures in military operations, owing to exactly identical cases to those I have described, namely, violations of such fundamental principles as decentralization of command, which affords commanders in the field the wildest possible area of discretion, and above all the fundamental principle of concentration. As for the question of unity of command, I will leave that to the committee's own conclusions. The facts speak for themselves. I would merely add one point, and that is that it is quite possible to point out in extenuation or explanation of our own departmental errors, similar instances in the case of the Allied Governments.

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The reply to this is that allied operations are not here under discussion. It was my aim throughout the war to insure not only that we should profit from allied successes and experience, but what was equally important that we should profit from their errors. It was a game of learning how not to do it as well as how to do it. As I pointed out, in dealing with the question of cooperation with the Allies with regard to aviation, in a message which I sent to the department on the 21st of April, 1917:

I have had thorough consultation with aircraft commission.
They are willing and anxious to give us anything and help development in any way. Their experience in design and construction, as well as operation, has been bitter and gained by blood and tears. We should profit by their mistakes and not repeat them.

Questions of national defense are so well understood and their vital nature so fully appreciated abroad that a premium is placed upon free and open criticism, which can be found not only in the public prints but heard on the floor of their congresses day after day. For every instance which I could cite, or which could be brought up with the object of justifying our own errors, I could turn to the foreign press and find dozens of similar cases. I doubt if to-day foreign navy departments have escaped free and open criticism on a single phase or possible error of the war. As witness, for example, the discussions of the Battle of Jutland, in which the British Admiralty, as well as the commander in chief, have been subjected to a degree of violent criticism and condemnation which would startle this committee.

IMPRACTICABLE PLANS OF THE DEPARTMENT BASED ON INCOMPLETE INFORMATION.

If I may refer back again to the summary of conclusions in my letter of January 7, 1920, I would again invite attention to my point 8, in which I said:

The Navy Department made and acted upon decisions concerning operations that were being conducted 3,000 miles away, when the conditions were such that full information could not have been in its possession, thus violating an essential precept of warfare that sound decisions necessarily depend upon complete information.

One of the most striking illustrations of this point, and a case in which the action of the department might have had the most disastrous effect, occurred in the case of the first convoy of troops sent to Europe in June, 1917. Since the early part of May, 1917, I had been receiving unofficial information, in personal letters from officers in the Navy Department, from armed guard officers, from Army officers, and from allied officers, to the effect that a convoy of American troops was almost immediately to be sent to Europe. I of course expected that the department would give me full and complete information concerning any plans for troop convoy, and would, in preparing the plans for the transport of these troops, utilize all of the available war experience in the transport of troops overseas which the Allies had acquired after nearly three years of such operations; but no request from the department for information as to allied methods, and no request for recommendations as to how the convoy could best be protected in the war zone, reached me until plans had been definitely completed in Washington for the sailing of the convoy.

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As an illustration of how completely I was in the dark as to the probable movement of these troops and the method to be used in handling them, I may say that I received information from both British and French naval authorities concerning the convoy before I was officially informed of it by the department. Furthermore, the tentative regulations providing for all the details of the handling of troop convoys, including their protection in the war zone, which were agreed upon by the War and Navy Departments on the 26th of May, 1917, signed by Gen. Bliss and Admiral Benson and approved by Secretaries Baker and Daniels, and further approved by the President on May 27, 1917, were not known to me, nor did I receive a copy from the department until the 30th of October, 1917; that is, five months later. I submit a set of these regulations for the record, but consider it unnecessary to quote them here.

(The regulations submitted by Admiral Sims are here printed in the record, as follows:)

[Received by Admiral Sims, Oct. 30, 1917.]

TENTATIVE REGULATIONS FOR THE TRANSPORTATION OF TROOPS TO EUROPE.

1. The following rules supersede for the time being all previous regulations for the government of the naval convoy of military expeditions to Europe.

2. All matters relating to the purchase, charter, fitting out, equipping, and maintenance of transports, engaging their officers and crews, and providing rules for their government and their interior disciplinary administration shall be controlled by the Army, except that all regulations concerning the security and defense of the vessel and the safety of all persons on board, both at sea and in port, shall be prescribed by the Navy.

3. All matters relating to the loading of troops, animals, or stores upon transports and the quota of cargo to be assigned to each such vessel shall be under the charge of the Army.

4. When an overseas expedition requiring naval convoy has been decided upon, a naval officer of suitable rank shall be appointed as convoy commander. He shall be furnished full information concerning the strength of the expedition and its proposed objective. The Army authorities shall afford him adequate facilities for inspecting the transports as they assemble for the purpose of ascertaining whether they are properly armed and equipped for defense, fitted with ground tackle, boats, life rafts, life preservers, lines, and all equipment necessary for the proper management and control while in transit or while disembarking men and animals, under the conditions which will be probably met. The convoy commander shall call the attention of the Army commander to defects or deficiencies with respect to such matters, and the Army commander shall use every effort to remedy such defects or deficiencies in accordance with the judgment of the naval convoy commander. The naval convoy commander shall render all possible assistance with the resources at his disposal. In the event that it be found impracticable to remedy the defects or to suppy the deficiencies, which, in the opinion of the naval convoy commander will, if allowed to continue, threaten the safety of the convoy or jeopardize the safety of the expedition, the matter shall be reported immediately to their respective departments by the Army commander and the Navy convoy cammander.

5. The naval escort for each group of transports shall consist of not less than one cruiser throughout the entire voyage. The escort shall be augmented in special areas so that the naval force available shall render the maximum protection to the convoy throughout the voyage.

6. Each transport shall be armed by the Navy with the minimum of four guns, of not less than 3-inch caliber, and shall be equipped with an efficient fire control and lookout system, including suitable glasses for lookouts.

7. An officer not below the rank of lieutenant commander in the Navy, and two other experienced officers together with a suitable number of quartermaster and signalmen, radio operators, and a full gun's crew for each gun, shall be detailed to each transport by the Navy Department. The means for making flag, semaphore, and wig-wag signals by day and by night shall be provided by the Navy Department.

8. (*a*) The order as to destination of the convoy and time of sailing shall be issued by the naval convoy commander after the Army commanding officer, under authority of the War Department, has stated that he is ready to sail. The orders of the naval

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convoy commander shall be immediately communicated to the Army commanding officer. Should circumstances arise after sailing, which render a change in plan or destination necessary or desirable, which change is not practicable to refer to higher authority, the naval convoy commander shall, after consultation with the Army commander, decide as to such change.

(*b*) The naval convoy commander shall have control of all movements of the convoy and shall prescribe all orders of sailing and formation. He shall make provision for emergencies, such as an attack by an enemy, or a dispersion of the convoy by weather or other circumstances.

(*c*) The naval convoy commander shall assure himself that his subordinates, placed on the transports and supply vessels, are familiar with dispositions and plans.

(*d*) Should the transports be separated from the convoying vessels by accident or design, the senior naval officer present and on duty shall take charge of the convoy and control its movements in accordance with the plans of the convoy commander.

9. (*a*) The senior naval officer attached to the transport shall at all times, both in port and at sea, have complete command of the transport in all matters relating to speed, course, maneuvering, anchorage, and the defense of the vessel. He shall act in accordance with the instructions issued to him by the naval commander (convoy). He may call upon the commanding officer of troops for officers and men for any duty connected with the security and defense of the vessel or her personnel. The commanding officer of troops will detail officers and men in the numbers requested, and officers and men so detailed shall perform the duties for which their services are requested, under the direction of the senior naval officer on board.

(*b*) All signaling and all radio shall be under the complete control of the senior naval officer on board.

(*c*) The senior naval officer on board shall be responsible for the exercise of the passengers and crew of the transport at fire quarters and abandon ship.

(*d*) The master and officers of the vessel shall perform their navigation duties affecting her speed and movement, under the direction of her senior naval officer on board, and should there be any opposition to or interference with his authority in any way, he may call upon the commanding officer of troops on board, who shall then take such steps with the forces under his command, as may be necessary to enforce the authority of the naval officer attached to the vessel.

10. The authority of the senior naval officer on board shall be limited to those matters above enumerated.

11. The time and place of landing shall be determined by the naval commander, after consultation with the Army commanding officer. The order of landing shall be determined by the Army commanding officer, after consultation with the naval convoy commander. After the order of landing has been known to him, the naval convoy commander shall control the disembarkation of men and material.

12. It is deemed desirable that the Army commanding officer if convenient, shall be embarked in the flag ship of the naval convoy commander. If not convenient, the Army commanding officer's transport shall be near the flag ship of the naval convoy commander, in order that communication between them may be readily had at any time, and in this case the senior naval officer assigned to transports should be embarked in the same transport as the Army commanding officer.

W. S. BENSON,
Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Chief of Naval Operations.

TASKER H. BLISS,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Acting Chief of Staff.

Approved May 26, 1917.

JOSEPHUS DANIELS.
BAKER.

Approved May 27, 1917.

WOODROW WILSON.

On June 6, 1917, the first information that I received from the department with regard to these first troop convoys, was contained in the following message, sent but three days before they were scheduled to sail:

[Very confidential.]

Received: June 6, 1917.
From: Secretary of the Navy, Washington.

A convoy of American troops to France will sail about the 9th of this month. It is now contemplated to despatch four convoys, in groups of three or four transports,

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under separate escort. The first three groups have troops, and sail at about six hours interval. The first groups are of faster speed. The fourth group, bearing animals, will sail last, and may be delayed. All of the groups sail for a meeting place at sea, location of which you will be informed of later. The meeting place will be reached, by the first group, about one week after sailing. The third and fourth groups in about nine days. I will advise you later of the dates and hour of sailing, and of arrival at the meeting place.

I hereby instruct you to furnish escorts, to consist of one division of destroyers for each convoy group, from the point of meeting to the port of debarkation. When this escort duty is finished those detailed to this service will be returned to their present service. Rear Admiral Gleaves will accompany the first group, in *Seattle*, and will have command of all operations of convoy.

DANIELS, *Secretary of Navy.*

It would be impossible to find a more striking example of the department's insistence upon making decisions based upon incomplete information than is provided by this message. The whole scheme of troop convoy outlined in this message showed a complete ignorance and disregard of convoy methods and of war experience in the submarine danger zone. The action of the department in giving me definite and detailed orders from Washington as to how the convoy should be handled in the danger zone and as to what escort each group should have exhibits a disregard of the fundamental military principle of command which requires that subordinate commanders shall be allowed to exercise their initiative in their own fields in carrying out the mission assigned to them. The department not only assigned me a mission, but, as will be noted in this case, practically dictated the orders which I should issue to the vessels under my command. This I pointed out to the department in my cable of June 8, 1917, in reply to the message I have just read you. This message was as follows:

[Cable Dispatch.]

Sent: June 8, 1917.
To: Secretary of the Navy (Operations).
Through: State Department.

11. Escort and convoy duty within danger zones is performed in accordance with experience, and each case is dependent upon disposition of allied forces at time and latest information concerning enemy activities. Generally speaking, duty is carried out in relays, ships escorting only in their assigned areas and passing on the convoy to ships of next area on the route of the convoy. As our destroyers generally operate farthest to westward, we participate in majority of escort duty. In view of above, suggest that in future the number and nationality of ships to be detailed for escort duty be not specifically ordered by the department, but be determined here, dependent upon the disposition of allied forces and circumstances at the time of arrival at appointed rendezvous. Such a course will not only facilitate convoy duty, but also other military operations of submarine campaign.

SIMS.

The department, in reply to my dispatch which I have just read you, cabled me as follows, on June 10, 1917:

Received: June 10, 1917.
To: Alusna, London.

Department considers it essential, on account of the present sensitive public opinion, that the escort orders for the first convoy, already issued, be executed by our own destroyers. The soundness of your recommendations are recognized by the department. For subsequent convoys, not more than three transports in one group with escort of not less than one cruiser and three destroyers per group is the present policy of the department. Please write giving outline plan for handling the Euproean end of the escort duty for further convoys and mention the numbers and types of vessels likely to be assigned to escort each group of transports throughout each section of the danger zone. 21009.

DANIELS, *Secretary of Navy.*

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It is to be noted in this message that the department, although recognizing the soundness of my recommendations, still persists in the first plan outlined in its previous cable. I was now asked for the first time to write the department outlining a plan for handling the European end of the escort duty for further convoys. That is, my recommendations were sought with regard to this very essential and important duty as commander of our forces abroad only a week before the sailing of the first convoy. On June 12, 1917, I replied to the message of the department with the following:

[Cable dispatch.]

Sent: June 12, 1917.
To: Secretary of the Navy.

21. 21009. Letter follows next mail. Necessary for safety that, for future troop convoys, rendezvous and routes be designated and controlled from here based upon latest information enemy activity. Initial orders, on sailing, should be subject to change by radio, after sailing. Troop ships should zigzag together, two to four point changes, irregularly. Destroyers should zigzag independently, avoiding regularity of position in reference to convoy. In accordance with British experience, when escorting cruiser enters dangerous submarine zone, she is of practically no protection to convoy, and virtually becomes one of convoy. It is necessary in danger zone that radio be not used, except for most important messages. Evidence indicates that radio direction finders have been able to locate large forces if radio work of distinctive nature. While in zone, experience indicates that convoy commander should leave maximum initiative and freedom of movement to senior destroyer commander, in view of his recent experience, and later knowledge of methods. Enemy submarines do not have beam tubes. Line "column" (this word should probably have been "division") recommended, with force concentrated as much as consistent with zigzagging, this to reduce visibility of the force and facilitate offensive operations of destroyers. It is now practice here to furnish escort of one destroyer for single troop transport, three for two transports, four for three or four transports, and one destroyer per transport when number is greater than four.

SIMS.

On the following day, June 13, 1917, I sent to the department the letter referred to in the cable, outlining for the department the war experience in troop transports, and making definite recommendations as to how American troops should be transported and protected in the war zone. It will, I think, be unnecessary to read you this letter. I have a copy of it before me, which with your permission I will insert in the record, to show that the department, in this case as in every other instance in which it called upon me for recommendations, was provided with all the information available; and the recommendations, which were drawn up only after a conference with the heads of the allied navies.

The letter referred to is as follows:

[Letter No. 1.]

OFFICE VICE ADMIRAL, COMMANDING,
UNITED STATES DESTROYER FORCES,
EUROPEAN WATERS,
London, June 13, 1917.

From: Vice Admiral Wm. S. Sims.
To: The Secretary of the Navy (Operations).
Subject: Convoy operations in submarine danger zone.
Reference: Department's cable 21009.

1. With reference to the department's cablegram 21009, concerning methods of protection future convoys of troops or supplies for our Army and Navy forces while in submarine danger zone.

2. The governing considerations in the question of escorting through the submarine zone are:

(1) Latest information concerning enemy activity.

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(2) The question of not entirely abandoning our own offensive campaign in favor of escorting duty, and

(3) The question of the number of craft available for such duty and their disposition.

If, for example, enemy activity is concentrated to the westward of Ireland and convoys are coming in well to the southward of this area, it manifestly is important to concentrate our offensive campaign in the area in which the enemy can be most effectively attacked.

In deciding as to the number of types of ships to be diverted from offensive operations preference is always given, of course, to convoys carrying troops. Convoys carrying material, whether it be munitions, animals or food supplies are escorted whenever necessary; but such escorting duty is not allowed materially to interfere with the offensive campaign in operation at the time in question.

3. In those areas which are constantly being covered by destroyers or other antisubmarine craft, such as sloops (specially built antisubmarine vessels, about 1,200 tons), the attempt is made to avoid taking such vessels out of their designated patrol squares. The vessel, or vessels, which first picks up a valuable cargo escort it through her square, notifying the patrol vessel on the next square, inshore, and turning over to her as soon as the meeting of the ships is effected. If by reason of thick weather, etc., contact is not made, the convoying vessel continues on the next square.

4. The routes which will be followed by our troops and supply ships bound for France are, generally speaking, outside of the main areas of submarine activity, and hence outside of the areas continuously patrolled by destroyers and other antisubmarine craft, except for a short distance off the west coast of France.

5. For the purpose of handling such convoys, and also the merchant shipping convoys which are now in operation from Hampton Roads to the Mediterranean, the Admiralty have established, for convenience to their own administration, a comparatively large number of rendezvous well out at sea, and encircling the British Isles and west coast of France. Also a comparatively large number of locations on the Irish, English, and French coasts have been given designating figures or symbols. It will therefore be the practice each time that one of their convoy sails from a foreign port, to designate a rendezvous which they are to pass through, and a point on the coast which they should steer for after passing through the rendezvous.

This requires a notification well in advance giving as closely as possible the time that convoys will pass through the rendezvous points designated. Escorting destroyers will then be able to intercept the convoys at some point on the route between the rendezvous and the point designated on the coast, the position of interception depending primarily upon enemy activities at the time. It manifestly must also be possible to communicate in cipher with convoys at sea and divert them from one rendezvous to another, if occasion demands.

The above-mentioned lettering and numbering of rendezvous and points on the coast are, as stated, primarily for convenience of reference in administration in the Admiralty itself.

The significance of such symbols if circulated even to our own allied officers abroad must necessarily be limited to the maximum extent in order to preclude any possibility of the enemy becoming aware of them.

6. If the greatest possible degree of safety for convoys is to be insured, it is entirely necessary that their movements should be under control of one source, and therefore as all enemy activity is concentrated on this side of the Atlantic, and his main effort must necessarily remain in its present zone, it follows that selection of rendezvous routes and other directions in regard to movements of convoys should be controlled and directed from this side, that is, in the Admiralty itself. It is for this reason that the Admiralty has requested, and I strongly recommend, the immediate detail of a competent and tactful officer whose duties in the Admiralty under my general direction will be confined to those above indicated.

7. The following procedure in regard to convoys is therefore recommended:

(1) Early advance information regarding prospective sailing of convoys and their character.

(2) Immediate information as soon as definite hours of sailing can be foreseen.

As soon as this information is received, and after consultation with the Admiralty, a rendezvous and route to be included in sailing orders will be selected and given. Definite information should then be given when convoys sail, as to its prospective speed and time of passing through rendezvous designated.

8. It is urgently requested that only British Admiralty codes be used for such communications, addressed to the Admiralty, the first word of the message being "Sims."

9. Under no circumstances, if convoys are divided into groups, should these groups use the same rendezvous and the same routes after reaching the danger zone, as in such a case if the enemy should become aware of their movements he would be able to concentrate for successive attacks.

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10. Ships of convoy should zigzag together from two to four points irregularly. Organized irregularity is one of the principal requirements in opposing submarine attack.

11. Escorting destroyers should be allowed the maximum independence of movement and the exercise of initiative. They should not be held to strict formations in reference to bearings and distances from the convoy. This procedure is necessary in order that full advantage may be taken of their experience in operating against submarines and their later information in regard to enemy methods, which are continually changing.

12. It is mandatory that the wireless shall be used as little as possible. In fact, it would be better not to use it at all, except for important directions which may have to be sent from shore as to changes of routes. Evidence indicates that the enemy has been successful in the use of radio direction finders, particularly in locating large forces of radio work of an unusual or distinctive character.

13. It is apparent that once a convoy enters the danger zone an escorting cruiser is of little or no protection against submarines, and virtually becomes one of the convoy itself, also requiring protection.

14. Up to April 1 there is no evidence to indicate that any German submarine carried beam tubes, and this is one of the principal reasons why they have never attempted attacking a formation from ahead—that is, approaching from ahead and firing as they pass through the formation. With bow tubes they would be forced to use the helm before reaching the formation, with considerable danger to themselves, which they seldom, if ever, incur. Hence the principal arc for destroyer protection is on the bows and wings of formations.

15. The two principal requirements of formations of a considerable number of ships for defensive purposes against submarines are:

(1) Minimum depth of formation—that is, minimum length of formation in the direction of course. This in order to reduce the arcs on the bows and beams, which must be protected by destroyers.

(2) The second consideration is to concentrate the formation as much as possible—that is, it is also necessary to reduce the dimension of the formation at right angles to the course.

This not only reduces the range of visibility of the force, but it also restricts the advantageous positions of attack which the submarine desires to attain.

It is for the above reasons that line of divisions formation is generally adopted, with the distance between columns as small as consistent with zigzagging evolutions.

W. S. SIMS.

In further cable, sent on June 14, 1917, I again called the attention of the department to the embarrassment caused by the plan, which they had ordered carried out, for the handling of this first convoy. The pertinent paragraphs of this message are the following.

You will see, before I get through, that it was one of the most dangerous operations we had to conduct during the war, and God was good to us that we did not lose any of those ships. [Reading:]

June 14, 1917:

There are not now sufficient vessels available for escort duty to insure safety of all vital supplies and also prospective movements of our troops and their supplies. As our troops and their supplies will approach European coast outside of zones used by shipping and shipping convoys, it is mandatory that information be given immediately as to the probable numbers and times of sailing of all Army shipping in next three months, as on this depends the program of merchant ship convoys, which must be arranged some time ahead. The approach of our first Army convoys will seriously embarrass the shipping situation, as it will require all destroyers based on Queenstown, thus necessitating entire suspension of patrol and escort duty in that area. I can not lay too much stress upon the urgent necessity of increasing the destroyer and other patrol forces here with utmost dispatch. * * * Urgently request answer in next 24 hours, if possible, as to prospective movements of all Army shipping in next two or three months. This information is of vital importance. Also request information as to probable additions to antisubmarine forces these waters. The Admiralty informs me that present prospect is that if oil supplies are protected food supplies can not be. I again urgently recommend that all destroyers that can be brought to the coast of Ireland be sent at once.

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The same information was also conveyed to the department in my letters of June 15 and 20, which I have read in another connection, and which it is hardly necessary to repeat here.

I wish here to make one point perfectly clear, as it will be referred to later. There is no question, in these messages, nor was there any question at the time, as to whether troops should be given first call on protection, should get the very best protection that was available. They always did throughout the war; and it may be interesting to the committee to know that throughout the war American troops received more protection than the Allies were able to give their troops on the high seas. The point I was trying to make clear was that it was absolutely necessary that, in moving our troops, we bear in mind, at all times, the great importance of the saving of shipping, upon which the operations of these troops depended after they got abroad. I have fully covered this question of available tonnage in previous testimony. To save time, I will state an extreme case, merely for the purpose of illustrating the point at issue. If we had gone ahead and moved troops abroad as fast as ships could be found to carry them, and had done this with no regard to merchant shipping, we might easily have found ourselves in the position of having a large army marooned abroad, but helpless through lack of supplies: or, on the other hand, as I hope I have clearly shown, we might easily have lost the war, in the meantime, on the score alone of the loss of our available allied merchant tonnage, in spite of the number of troops in the field. Another point, which should probably be stated at this time is that, contrary to impressions which have been given in the press, there was never any issue between me and the department as to the fact that the primary mission of American naval forces was the protection of the necessary army, and Army supply movements.

Such a statement goes without question. It is very easy to confuse the issue in a case like this, in discussing it a long time after it happened; to disregard the time element and to confuse dates by merely omitting reference to them. The heavy movement of troops, in fact, what is now justly regarded as one of the wonders of the war, namely, the remarkable transport of American troops overseas, did not occur in the period we are here discussing. On the contrary, it was nearly a year later, as will be seen by reference to the Government statistics. The curve of the movement of troops was very low during these early months and did not commence to rise until about April, 1918.

On June 17, 1917, I received a detailed message announcing the sailing from New York on June 15 of three troop convoys, and giving me detailed instructions as to their movements on the high seas I will include this message in the record, but will not read it on account of its technical nature.

(The message referred to is here printed as follows:)

Received: June 17, 1917.
To: Vice Admiral Sims.
No. 20.

The convoys are arranged in groups.

Three groups sailed June 15 from New York.

Group one will arrive at 6 a. m., June 23, at first rendezvous, latitude 48–55, longitude 24.20.

Group 2 will arrive at 4 p. m., June 23, at first rendezvous, latitude 48–10, longitude. 25.

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Group 3 will arrive at 6 a. m., June 25, at first rendezvous, latitude 46–46, longitude 23.65.

The French Admiralty will designate second rendevous and forward same to escorts viz United States destroyers sent by you to first rendezvous.

Group escort flagships:

Group 1, U. S. S. *Seattle*.

Group 2. U. S. S. *Birmingham*.

Group 3. U. S. S. *Charleston*.

The sailing date for group 4 will be communicated later.

This information must be sent most confidentially and immediately to naval attaché, Paris.

Acknowledge receipt of this message for Vice Admiral Sims. 12016.

DANIELS, *Secretary Navy*.

It informed me that two convoys would pass designated rendezvous on the 23d of June and the third convoy on the 25th. It further stated that the French Admiralty would designate the second rendezvous, and would forward the same to the convoys, via the destroyers, which I was to send to meet the convoys at the first rendezvous. It would be hard to imagine an arrangement more calculated to create confusion, or to disseminate more widely information as to the movements of these convoys, thereby exposing them to unnecessary dangers. It meant that information concerning their movements had been cabled to me in London, in a code which I had repeatedly told the department was unsafe; and, furthermore, that the same information had been cabled to Paris, apparently passing through numerous hands in Washington; and that it was left to Paris to select the second rendezvous, communicate it to me in London, thence to be passed along to Queenstown, and given to the destroyers, and carried by them to sea, for further transmission to the convoys. I will not tire the committee with a lengthy description of how impossible this plan was.

Suffice it to say that the safety of the convoys, once they got into the war area, was dependent upon the latest information of the enemy movements. At the time in question, I was in Queenstown, in temporary command of the British station at that point. I leave you to imagine my difficulties in trying to coordinate the plans for these first convoys, by messages over the cables to Paris, London, and Washington. It was difficult to know just who was in charge, and who was responsible. It was very easy to have a misunderstanding. I was unaware at the time how many forces the French could send, or had promised to send, to sea to meet these first convoys; and, further, I did not know what information the French had concerning the composition, speed, times of sailing, and number of destroyers to be supplied by me or from home waters. I was unaware of the forces which were to be sent from home with these convoys. I could, of course, have merely sat tight, carried out only the specific task assigned to me; that is, of sending the destroyers which had been prescribed. But I think it will be recognized that nothing could excuse me from doing everything in my power to straighten out the tangle in which the movement of these convoys was involved.

I realized that there was no time to be lost. In fact, before I could get word to the department, the convoys had actually sailed and were on the high seas. There was the possibility, in fact the probability, that the destroyers would not be able to find the convoys, or would be unable to reach the first rendezvous by the time the convoys got there. This would leave the convoys in a quandary on the high seas as to where to go next.

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I therefore drove through a brief message as follows:

JUNE 18, 1917.

To: Secretary of the Navy.

Number 20 acknowledged. Please direct convoys to proceed from first rendezvous on course east, in absence of other instructions and until escort joins. They should use 600 meter wave length, and will receive instructions concerning rendezvous, or enemy, from Queenstown via Valencia, call sign G C K, or via our destroyers. Use Sigcode Cypher.

SIMS.

The reason for directing them to proceed due east from the first rendezvous was simply to avoid their arriving there without instructions as to where to go, and in order to make sure of the destroyers finding them. Their subsequent movements, after the destroyers had joined, I hoped to be able to straighten out before that time arrived.

I should also state, at this point, that war experience clearly proved that it was impossible for forces, destroyers or otherwise, to meet on the high seas at specific points. The explanation of this is a long story. It is involved in the inevitable inaccuracies of high seas navigation, particularly of the types of ships we were using, inevitable delays, due to casualties to machinery and weather conditions, which were always involved, etc.

On June 19, right in the midst of the trying hours we were going through, I received the announcement of the sailing of the fourth group in the following message:

Received: June 19, 1917.
To: Alusna.
For: Vice Admiral Sims. No. 21.

Convoy group No. 4, U. S. S. *Hancock* flagship, sailed June 17. Will arrive at rendezvous, with United States destroyers, latitude 47–40 north, longitude 23 west, at 6 a. m. June 28. Communicate this in most confidential manner to naval attaché, Paris. 14018.

DANIELS.

The last sentence of this message was confusing, because I was left in doubt as to whether the French were depending solely upon me for their information or were getting independent information from the department. I was further confused as to whether the department expected me to provide the destroyer escort for this last group or whether such escort was in the accompanying convoy. Previous messages had directed me to furnish escort. I therefore immediately cabled asking for this information.

In the meantime this convoy group was at sea, and it was nearly halfway across the Atlantic before I received from the department information as to whether or not I should furnish destroyer escort for it. On June 22, 1917, I received the following message from the department:

June 22.
To: Alusna.
From: Secretary of Navy.
For: Vice Admiral Sims 28.

Your 120. You are to supply destroyer escort for Army convoy groups 1, 2, 3, and 4. Please inform the naval attaché at Paris 19021.

No point would be served in going further with the detailed messages which were exchanged between London, Paris, Queenstown, and Brest concerning the movements of these convoys but, if they

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were read it would be an impressive demonstration of how confusing the situation really was.

As quoted in my official letter of July 6:

* * * I would cite an incident illustrating the great danger of attempting to communicate with more than one headquarters. Although every measure had been taken for the escorting and safe passage of convoy group No. 1 to the submarine zone, and all necessary orders had been issued, with the full cognizance of the French and British Admiralties, a dispatch in the French, Russian, English war merchant code was intercepted between the *Seattle* and Brest. Not only was this dispatch sent in a code which was considered very unreliable, but it was either coded very poorly or garbled in transmission, and for these reasons, and the nature of the dispatch itself, further radio communication was undoubtedly necessary. The dispatch asked where French men-of-war would join the first group. This was entirely unnecsessary, as all arrangements that could be made concerning the question had been made in advance. Even in case the French torpedo boats failed to join before the group reached the coast, it was very inadvisable to attempt to communicate with the French Admiralty, particularly with an unsafe code. The convoy group was under wscort of six destroyers, which is more than is usually assigned troop convoys of such size.

On June 29, 1917, I received the following report from St. Nazaire, of the arrival of this first convoy group, and of a supposed attack upon it:

JUNE 29, 1917.

Group 1, Expeditionary Force * * * arrived on June 26, at midnight at St. Nazaire. Group 1 was met and escorted by United States destroyers and two small French war vessels. U. S. S. *Corsair* is with group 2. * * * Group 1 was attacked by a submarine at 10.30 p. m. on June 22, 85 miles from the first rendezvous and opened fire. Two torpedoes passed close to *Havannah*, two passed close to *DeKalb*, one across her bow and one under her stern as she turned away, one torpedo crossed the *Seattle* bows. There were no hits.

SAYLES.

(NOTE.—The foregoing is a paragraph of a quotation signed "Gleaves.")

On July 4, 1917, I received the following message from the Secretary:

Received: July 4, 1917.
To: Alusna, London.
This cable for Vice Admiral Sims.

The Navy Department wishes to express its satisfaction at the very effective way in which the escort of convoyed ships has been accomplished. Josephus Daniels. No. 20003.

DANIELS.

I wish to make it perfectly clear that I make no criticism whatever of the commander of the troop convoys. Such confusion and difficulties as arose were due to the orders and plans given to him by the Navy Department.

It might be interesting at this time to quote from an illuminating confidential intelligence report submitted by the naval attaché in Paris covering this period.

These are extracts from the report of the naval attaché in Paris.

To show how closely guarded military secrets were kept in the United States, I have only to state that the first knowledge I received that the first convoy had actually sailed, was in the course of a social conversation with a woman. Col., then Capt. B——, Gen.——'s personal and confidential aid, was present. As soon as we could draw aside to talk together, I never will forget the words he first said. The expression was a classic. Undoubtledly, the women's husband's business friends in New York had cabled him the news in some sort of a business code. I never pursued the subject further. But if one realizes that, at that time, the security in France against enemy agents was in the hands of M. Malvy, minister of the interior, since tried and banished for criminal neglect of duty, and that the then head of the secret police, and the chief assistant to the prefect of police, are both now serving jail sen-

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tences for intercourse with the enemy, the necessity for more than ever guarding such a secret will be apparent. Due primarily to inexperience, and secondly, to the fact that three different general staffs were attempting to fix a rendezvous, a few days before the first convoy was due, there was still considerable confusion, in the French Ministry of Marine, as to just what was to happen, and where it was to happen, when our ships approach the coast.

The admiral in command of the troop convoy, had been told in Washington that he would be met by French destroyers, etc., and, as a matter of fact, they didn't exist. Like a great many other matters, it seemed impossible to make the Navy Department in Washington believe to what desperate straits the French naval forces had been reduced. They had only five destroyers on the west coast, and on the night of May 21, 1917, I had personally seen four of them put out of action, for weeks or months to come, in a destroyer fight off Dunkirk.

Now that it is all over, and we have won, and so many big historical events have happened since ; we are prone to forget the importance and what was at stake on a successful outcome of this expedition. If even one transport had been sunk, it might have resulted in disaster to the Allied cause.

It is not yet understood generally what Admiral Gleaves and his officers accomplished; it will be years before what it meant phsycologically to the allied cause will be fully appreciated.

To return to the general question of the unsound military nature of the plans for these first convoys, and to the danger and confusion which resulted, I exchanged numerous messages with the department in the next few days—that is, the first part of July, attempting to point out to them the principal errors which had been committed, with a view to preventing them in the future.

In referring to this subject, on July 7, 1917, in my letter report I said:

I feel reasonably certain that, if information reached the enemy as to the movements of the troop convoys, which it appears to have done, it was due to the method of communication in what is undoubtedly a wholly unreliable code. There is ample evidence here to support reports which I have made, to the effect that all codes of invairable character are dangerous, and that any code can not be considered safe unless it is frequently changed. It is for the above reasons that I have so urgently recommended the exclusive use of British Admiralty codes until such times as other secret codes based on war experience are available.

I mentioned the other day that in using those codes we had our own keys, which we changed frequently, so that they could not be read.

In other latter reports to the department, I pointed out how the inclination to trust their information and judgment alone had been the cause of very grave danger to our forces. As a matter of fact, it was only a matter of luck that we did not lose a number of vessels, not only from the troop convoys, but also from the various groups of destroyers which had arrived in May. In the case of the destroyers, they were saved only by the thoroughness of the precautions taken by the commander in chief at Queenstown to meet them. It was hard to believe otherwise than that the enemy knew all about the movements of these forces, from the day cables began to be sent about them.

In fact, the announcement of the sailing of the first destroyers was published in the Berlin papers four days before they arrived in Queenstown. The suspicion that the Germans were aware of our troops movements was therefore strengthened. As will be noted, I had recommended to the department, beginning early in May, 1917, that important and highly secret information should not be trusted to our own Navy codes, as I considered them unsafe. I had pointed out that the British codes had been tested and proved safe by war experience and were constantly being changed to prevent the enemy

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from deciphering them. I had, therefore, implored the department in June not to send any messages concerning this troop convoy in any other than the British Admiralty's war codes, and yet all the messages I received still continued to be sent in the Navy secret code, and other codes which we had been using in peace times for years.

I am not going into the technicality of this business of codes. When I refer to changing the code, that refers to changing the cipher. As long as the ciphers are in keys which are changed, you can give the enemy the code book, and it does not do any harm, provided you change them frequently enough.

It was a revelation to me, and something quite outside of my previous experience, to see the extent to which the allies were breaking enemy secret codes. The problems of codes and their fallibility, if it could be fully stated, would make a story in itself and would furnish very interesting material for the committee, as well as the general public. It is sufficient to say that one of the many measures which enabled the Allies to have such complete information at all times of enemy submarine movement was their ability to break the codes and decipher the messages exchanged between submarines at sea and between them and their base.

I was too busy in those days to go into this question thoroughly; in fact, it was unnecessary; it was sufficient to me to know the above facts. There was nothing to do but to assume that the enemy was equally clever in breaking our codes. As a matter of fact, I later found that the enemy was not so clever, and that, fortunately for us, they apparently were not aware of the extent to which the Allies were able to break their codes. It seems that they did not change their codes nearly so often as the Allies did. They were, of course, using war codes while, on the other hand, our Navy Department was using codes which had been in use in times of peace for years past.

To sum up, I think I can safely say, therefore, that if the Germans had seriously desired to attack this first convoy, the action taken by the Navy Department and the method which it covered, provided the Germans with opportunity to obtain information as to the composition and route of the convoy. As I pointed out to the department in official and personal correspondence, the fact that the convoy arrived safely was due in a measure to good luck.

The fact that the department itself realized the impracticability and impossibility of carrying out further transport movements along the same lines that had governed the first groups is best shown by the fact that even before the convoy sailed the department had requested me to make recommendations as to how troop convoys should be handled in the future. I have already read the answer which I sent at that time. After the receipt of my reports concerning the confusion which attended the arrival of the first groups, the department again asked for recommendations in the following message:

Received July 9, 1917.

209. Following from Navy Department for Admiral Sims:

Future cross-water operations concerning save transportation of our troops to France is one of the most important operations of future. For this purpose every guarantee has been given to War Department that every effort will be made by the Navy Department to safeguard lives of the soldiers in crossing. From the interned German ships, 14 of the fastest, largest, and best will be commissioned, under complete naval control, and used to take over the troops. It is of the utmost importance these ships should receive greatest protection on the passage in, and owing to the valuable nature of

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ships and difficulty of obtaining others in their place if lost, it is desirable to guard them on passage in Atlantic. Will you therefore submit an outline of what you consider the best method of carrying out such operations after you have consulted various authorities, especially the French? About 4,000 troops will be dispatched in each ship. Do you think that they should sail in company or singly?

I would not have believed it possible that that question could be asked at that stage of the game, how we should put the convoy in, and when we had put it in. [Continuing reading:]

During the voyage in, what protection can they expect from our destroyers and what from the French? Also, on the voyage out, what protection can and will be (given) by French, or do you contemplate providing that from our forces? In addition to sending you all the information in advance possible, should we request from you a rendezvous for each ship, or group of ships, leaving here and a course in from there, or will you in advance set out a course, both of which will be understood to hold good until you change the same? Should the Army supply ships, large number of which will be of moderate speeds, sail together in groups, or singly, so that greatest security may be given them in that part of voyage when it is the most essential? Even if these points have been discussed by you, it is desirable to have them clearly indicated, so that greatest efficiency and cooperation may be obtained from our combined efforts.

I do not think it would be possible for me to convey to you the discouragement of receiving at that date, after the miles of cables and letters I had sent in, there on the 9th of July exhibiting the crassest ignorance of the elements of the whole problem.

In view of the extensive communications which I had sent to the department concerning these convoys previous to this dispatch, I think it requires no explanation on my part to convince the committee of my feelings upon receiving such a message as this. Here was question after question asking about handling convoys which I had explained over and over again.

Some days before I had sent, by an armed guard officer, the full information which they requested. I therefore replied to the department as follows:

Sent: July 11, 1917.
To: Secretary of the Navy.

No. 95. Replying to your dispatch concerning troop convoys. I fully appreciate the importance of matters set forth therein. It is considered of vital importance to reduce cable communication on this subject to minimum. A comprehensive letter was forwarded via Lieut. Herbster on *St. Louis*, and another will be sent by next steamer.

SIMS.

As the plans contained in this letter were approved, and as they were adopted by the department in their entirety, without comment, and continued thereafter to govern the movements of our troop transport operations throughout the rest of the war, I would like to make a few brief comments before proceeding further. This secret report of July 6, 1917, is perhaps too technical to read to the committee. It is, however, a very important document and will be included in the record.

Those letters are long and very technical, and I think it would do no good at all to read them to you, but they should be submitted to the record so that they can be examined.

(The documents referred to are here printed in the record, as follows:)

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[Letter No. 17.]

OFFICE VICE ADMIRAL COMMANDING
UNITED STATES DESTROYER FORCES, EUROPEAN WATERS,
London, July 6, 1917.

From: Vice Admiral William S. Sims.
To: Secretary of the Navy (Operations).
Subject: Procedure concerning protection of Army convoys in trans-Atlantic passage.

1. As it is apparent that the responsibility for the safe passage of troop convoys through the submarine area should be placed upon the commander of the escorting forces in that area, who has latest information as to enemy movements, I herewith submit my recommendations as to the procedure which I consider necessary for safety of future troop convoys.

2. These recommendations are based upon actual experience with the four convoy groups which have already made passage and after a thorough consideration of all British Admiralty war experience in connection with such convoys.

3. The greatest danger in connection with troop convoys lies in the possibility of interception by enemy of cable and wireless communications in connection therewith.

The below recommended procedure is therefore based primarily on this consideration—that is, insurance against any information reaching the enemy as to routes followed and prospective movements of convoys in time to be of any use to him.

I can not too strongly urge against all wireless communication between ships of convoy or between convoy and the shore except in cases of extreme necessity.

I must also lay great stress on the necessity of my having definite information as to the time when escorting forces will be necessary.

The destroyers available for escort duty, as has been reported to the department, are also absolutely essential to the safety of vital merchant convoys. And in addition they must be prepared at all times to take advantage of any opportunity for effective offensive operations against the enemy.

It is therefore absolutely necessary that I be enabled to plan in advance and to coordinate all work of the destroyers in the submarine zone.

4. The following specific procedure, stated in the order of its occurrence, is therefore recommended:

First. Notify me in British Admiralty codes as far in advance as possible of (*a*) probable date of sailing of convoy group, (*b*) the number of ships, and (*c*) anticipated average sea speed.

This communication should contain no information as to routes to be followed or rendezvous to be made.

Second. Issue sailing orders to the convoy group in the manner prescribed below, and concerning which the greatest possible secrecy should be maintained, not even allowing the essential parts of the orders to be known generally to officers or clerical staff of the department, or, in fact, by the convoy group commander himself until after he has sailed.

Select a meridian which will be known hereafter as the standard meridian. I recommend the thirtieth, and will assume in the absence of contrary instructions that the department hereafter in referring to standard meridian will refer to the thirtieth.

Select in the Navy Department a latitude in which the convoy group in question should cross the standard meridian. In cabling this latitude add 3° to it for purposes of deception. In absence of contrary instructions, I will understand that a constant figure of 3° will always be added to the actual latitude in which the convoy will cross the standard meridian.

Also decide upon a definite time at which the convoy group in question should cross the standard meridian in the latitude selected.

In selecting this time due leeway should be allowed for heavy weather and other casualties which may reduce the convoy below its anticipated sea speed. For example, if the convoy should encounter good weather and find itself in advance of scheduled time, it should deliberately slow down sufficiently to insure its passage through the point selected at the time previously arranged. This affords us on this side definite information as to where the convoy will be at a certain specified time, and this without the necessity of any further communication with the force itself from either side. Such increase in the time required to make the passage as results from this procedure is of no consequence in comparison to insuring the safety of the convoy.

After the convoy is joined by the escorting destroyers it will, of course, proceed at maximum speed.

Third. On the days of departure of the convoy group cable me in British Admiralty code a message such as follows:

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"Convoy group No. 1 latitude 49 N. 10 a. m., August 21."

I will understand this message to mean that convoy group No. 1 (as previously reported) sailed on the date of this dispatch, and that it will cross the standard meridian (the thirtieth) in latitude 46 (49 minus 3) at 10 a. m., July 21.

On this information I will be enabled to prepare in adequate time definite sailing orders for the escorting destroyers and issue the necessary instructions to insure their readiness for the duty in question.

In the case here used for illustration I would understand that the convoy group passing through latitude 46 N., longitude 30 W., on August 21, would proceed on a course at its average sea speed direct for its destination.

The escorting destroyers will receive orders to intercept the convoy group on this line, and well to the westward of the dangerous submarine zone. And they will also have orders as to any necessary diversion from the direct route on the way to their destination. They will also be kept informed of the latest news at all times direct from Queenstown as to enemy movements.

Fourth. The destroyers, after joining with the convoy group, will inform me in a special secret code of the approximate time and latitude in which they will cross a certain meridian—usually the tenth.

This information will reach me through Queenstown station, and will enable me to notify the French ministry of marine in order that any necessary mine sweeping may be done, and that French torpedo boats may be on hand off the port to give any necessary instructions as to the method of approaching the port.

5. To sum up, two dispatches only would be sent to me from the department. I would send nothing in return except acknowledgments.

The first of the two dispatches should be sent as far in advance of sailing as it is possible to anticipate approximately the time. This dispatch is particularly important, because if I should find that the prospective arrival in the submarine zone of troop convoy should coincide with the arrival of a merchant convoy it might be necessary to request a delay of one or the other.

The second dispatch, which states only latitude, date, and time of crossing the standard meridian, gives no information of essential value to the enemy, because the standard meridian is not mentioned in any dispatch

6. I would strongly recommend that no other cable or wireless communications be sent except in case of extreme necessity; and further that the convoy itself be directed to carefully avoid wireless communication except such as may be necessary at very low power for communication with destroyers when they reach a relatively close position.

7. The convoy commander should be directed to accept the advice of the senior destroyer commander as to courses and speed and formation after escorting destroyers have joined. They will have the latest information as regards enemy movements, and it will also be possible, if necessity arises, to communicate with them from their headquarters at Queenstown, where the latest developments are always known.

8. I would strongly recommend that no communication be made with the French shore. It is very unwise, as long as sufficient escorting destroyers are sent from Queenstown, for French men-of-war to attempt to meet and escort our convoys in, except when they arrive near their destination, to give them information about channels, etc. Such a course necessitates radio communication in a code which is now well known to be compromised. There is also great danger of misunderstanding on account of differences of language.

I have thanked the French ministry of marine for the courtesy extended and protection afforded by the French vessels which were sent to meet our first four troop convoys. They were sent primarily as a courtesy in view of the historical significance of the occasion. I am in constant touch with the French ministry of marine and there will be no misunderstandings. I think it very undesirable to send communications concerning the movements of the convoys to the French ministry of marine as well as to me. I will keep them fully informed to such extent as may be necessary in arranging for arrival of the convoys.

9. One of the first essentials in the movements of shipping in the war zone is that it should never stop or even slow down, but should proceed to destination at maximum speed, regardless of circumstances. If, for example, in heavy weather, the escorting destroyers should not be able to join, the convoy should disperse and proceed independently at maximum speed, and zigzagging. This is the practice of the British service. There is little danger of submarine attack in such heavy weather.

Likewise, in case of fog or other unusual conditions, if the convoy should become separated, it is much the wiser course for each ship to proceed independently rather than to attempt to reassemble by changing course, slowing down, and sending numerous wireless communications.

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10. All internally codes and merchant codes are unreliable. There is good reason to believe that they are in the hands of the enemy. It is therefore entirely essential to safety that radio communications, when necessary, be confined to the latest United States or British naval codes with ciphers. Our destroyers are equipped at all times with such codes. Any necessary communications while en route which can not be foreseen should be made preferably by destroyers, which have the code, to "Vice Admiral, Queenstown," who will take the necessary steps and keep me fully informed in case of my absence from Queenstown.

11. Briefly stated, when the convoys have reached the submarine zone they should act under the guidance of the escorting destroyers, subject to orders of the commander in chief at Queenstown (the command under which they are operating at all times). I am kept fully informed at all times as to all duty being performed by our destroyers there. and accept full responsibility for all orders which emanate from Queenstown to or via our destroyers. They are thoroughly familiar with the policies and methods of communication in use in Queenstown area, and it is highly desirable that they should continue under the same policies and methods as those with which they are constantly working in the war zone.

12. I would cite an incident illustrating the great danger of attempting to communicate to more than one headquarters. Although every measure had been taken for the escorting and safe passage of convoy group No. 1 through the submarine zone, and all necessary orders had been issued wth the full cognizance of French and British admiralties, a dispatch in the "French, Russian, English" code was intercepted between the *Seattle* and Brest.

Not only was this dispatch sent in a code which is considered very unreliable, but it was also either coded very poorly or garbled in transmission, and for this reasons, and also the nature of the dispatch itself, further radio communication was undoubtedly necessary. The dispatch asked where French men of war would join the first group. This was entirely unnecessary, as all arrangements that could be made concerning the question had been made in advance. Even in case the French torpedo boat failed to join before the group reached the coast, it was very inadvisable to attempt to communicate with the French Admiralty, particularly with an unsafe code. The convoy group was under escort of six destroyers, which is more than is usually assigned to troops convoys of such a size.

13. I trust that the Department will see fit to adopt the recommendations contained in this letter, which will involve placing full responsibility on me for handling the convoys while in dangerous waters. I am convinced that the principal danger to be considered is preventing the enemy from intercepting cable dispatches as to the movements of convoys on the high seas. Hence the necessity for a minimum amount of communication and the undesirability of selecting a series of rendezvous and having to constantly refer to them in dispatdhes between the department and myself and between me and France and between the various stations involved in England.

It will be observed that the method suggested is "iron clad" in this respect, namely, that even if all the messages indicated were intercepted and translated by the enemy there is no information in them which would enable them to intercept a convoy on any parts of its route, since the standard meridian is not mentioned and three is added to the latitude.

It is true that the method involves the inconvenience of having the convoy reach the standard meridian at a prescribed time; but we can always be sure that it will not cross this line ahead of time, and if it is somewhat late this means only that the destroyers will have to wait for it. But even this inconvenience can be avoided, except in very exceptional circumstances, by allowing a sufficient margin between the maximum sea speed and that necessary to reach the standard meridian at the prescribed time.

As has previously been reported, a convoy of eight transports with an escort of eight destroyers is safer than two convoys of four transports, each escorted by four destroyers. See my letter of June 13, 1917.

Convoys should not follow each other at intervals of less than one week, because if a number arrive in quick succession they will require the absence of a great many destroyers from their patrol area at the same time.

As the escorting cruiser affords no protection again t the attack of submarines, she should return to the United States as soon as the destroyers join the convoy, provided she has radius enough to do so. In the case of British convoys, the cruiser leaves the convoy as soon as the destroyers join it, and proceeds to port (for coal, etc.) at full speed.

The British consider it essential that the convoy commander should always be on one of the escorted vessels (transport or merchant vessel). This because both the cruiser and the convoy should be free at all times to maneuver separately, the former to maneuver for attack and chase of a raider and the latter to maneuver to avoid the enemy.

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In accordance with the plans proposed therein, all that part of our expeditionary Army overseas, which was transported on American ships, was safely carried eastward through the war zone, without any loss whatever from any enemy action.

It is, of course, true that we had some losses of troops carried in allied transports, which were handled in accordance with this plan, but, in justice to the Allies, it should be pointed out that these transports landed in British ports, and were therefore necessarily carried through the same areas as the majority of merchant shipping. It was in this area, as I have repeatedly pointed out, in which the enemy very wisely, and of necessity, concentrated his principal submarine efforts.

In view of certain slurring remarks made before this committee, in its previous inquiry, concerning the officers of my staff, I wish to emphasize the importance of these plans, and also the tremendous strain under which they labored, assisted by but one regular aide at this time, in preparing them, not to mention all of the other demands made upon us.

I wish clearly to establish the fact that the responsibility, throughout the war, for the safety of our troops in the war zone, rested primarily upon me. If there is any question as to this, the various documents which I am submitting should clear it up. One thing is certain, and that is that there can be no question as to whose head would have come off if the plans had not worked out satisfactorily, or even if our troopships had not been joined at the proper times by their destroyer escorts in the war zone. I would like to quote two paragraphs only from this letter of July 6, 1917, which embodied the plans in question:

As it is apparent that the responsibility for the safe passage of troop convoys through the submarine area should be placed upon the commander of escorting forces in that area, who has the latest information as to enemy movements, I herewith submit my recommendations as to the procedure which I consider necessary for the safety of future troop convoys. These recommendations are based upon actual experience with the four convoy groups which have already made passage, and after a thorough consideration of all British Admiralty war experience in connection with such convoys.

* * * I trust that the department will see fit to adopt the recommendations contained in this letter, which will involve placing full responsibility on me for handling all convoys while in dangerous waters.

Upon the receipt of this letter in the department in Washington I received the following message:

[Cablegram received July 22, 1917.]

Origin: Washington.
To: Admiral Sims. Secret 56.

Your letter No. 17. Rules for convoy therein accepted and will govern.

The subject of the assistance which was afforded me during this period will be taken up later; but the committee can perhaps realize the task which confronted me at this time, in handling all the other subjects which you have heard about in previous testimony, and at the same time digging out and digesting previous allied experience with troop convoys, in order to prepare this plan. From this experience, upon which we based the plan, we found out just as much about how not to do it as about how to do it. We went over the detailed history of convoy after convoy, and studied all the difficulties which arose, both before the convoy sailed and while it was on

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the high seas. Throughout the war the routes followed by all troop convoys, and, in fact, also by all United States Government vessels, naval or merchant, were furnished from my headquarters in London, where also all detailed plans were prepared and issued to insure the destroyers meeting up with the convoys on the high seas to escort them through the dangerous areas.

In dealing with the establishment of the convoy system I referred to the adoption, at the end of July and in August, 1917, by the department, of the recommendations which I made at this time for the handling of Army and Navy supply ships. It will, therefore, be unnecessary for me to read again my cables of July 12, 14, 28, 31, and August 4, 1917, which I have already either read, or referred to, in my discussion of the convoy system, and in all of which I urged that all shipping should be coordinated in such a way that ample protection could be given, not only to troops but to Army and Navy supply ships, and to mercantile shipping as well. The department agreed to this policy, and it was followed throughout the war, with the result that we were able, from London, to assign routes to all convoys and to provide the necessary escort for the danger zone. The proof of the effectiveness of the plans recommended is to be found in the success which attended the convoy system thus established, and by which our troops and Army supplies were transported with comparative immunity from submarine attack.

In spite of all these communications and the department's acceptance thereof, it developed that our troubles in handling troops were not yet over. It was about this time, that is, during July, as nearly as I can remember, that the authorities at home started in the practice of sending troops overseas in allied passenger liners and other ships. In many cases the allies were not consulted at all, and apparently all that was done was to go to the office of the shipping lines and buy passenger space, filling it up with troops. I distinctly remember the embarrassment which was caused to the allies by suddenly discovering, after the ships were on the high seas, that they were in fact troop ships. I remember that the question arose as to what constituted a troop ship and what did not. As repeatedly stated before, we were woefully short of escorting and protecting craft.

Something had to suffer. It was a heartrending task to try to decide where we were justified in drawing the line. Various schemes were drawn up in the attempt to divide shipping according to its importance to the outcome of the war. In all such classifications, troops, of course, always came first, and then followed such designations as "specially valuable," "valuable," and so forth. It was even necessary to leave passenger vessels with wholly inadequate or, in some cases, no escort at all. And then the question would arise as to whether such a liner was a troop ship, whether she had only 10 soldiers aboard or 50.

Further to complicate matters, the method of communication continued to be very badly confused. All experience during the war showed that no precaution could be too great to restrict the number of people who were entrusted with essential information upon which the safety of ships at sea might depend. I learned during these days that information concerning troop sailings continued to be rather widely dispersed among various allied officers.

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I did everything I could to get all communication concerning troop movements on the high seas narrowed down to one line. For example, I sent the following cable on July 24:

To: Secnav.

One hundred and twenty-nine. In order to insure safety of troop convoys, I consider it essential that no cables concerning movements, times of arrival, etc., be sent by Army or others, but all information should be sent through Navy Department to me, and I will notify all concerned, including French ministry of marine. 18023.

SIMS.

It should not be forgotten, however, that the substance of this recommendation had been made many times before.

On July 25 the department cabled me that they had accepted this suggestion.

On July 28, 1917, I cabled the department again, concerning the many sources from which information concerning these sailings was reaching Europe. My cable was as follows:

JULY 28, 1917.

To. Secretary of Navy.

One hundred and forty-five. Information concerning proposed and actual movements of troops and troop supplies reaches France in various direct and indirect ways. For example, from War Department to its various representatives abroad and from French military and naval attachés, and from the various French missions in America. Information concerning troop movements has even been heard in social circles. The greatest danger of such information reaching the enemy lies in methods of communication and codes used, in multiplicity of official, or other communications exchanged. All experience of war, in handling valuable Government shipping, and all war secret service experience, points to necessity for restricting communications to a minimum, and reducing personnel who are to be trusted with vital information involved. I therefore submit that the most important measure that can be taken to insure maximum degree of safety for troop and troop supply shipping, and in fact to provide against disaster, is to require that all information concerning movements of such shipping, proposed or actual, should be transmitted safely through the Navy Department to me, holding me responsible for informing all parties concerned on this side, in sufficient time. French ministry marine and Gen. Pershing are in full accord with these recommendations. The French Government is taking steps to stop future communications by their representatives in America. But it is necessary to also take effective steps to insure that no information concerning the above is sent out of Washington, by officials of any government, or our own, except through Navy Department, which alone can be responsible for safety at sea.

SIMS.

This message was accompanied by another message of the same date, sent by Gen. Lassiter, the War Department's representative in Great Britain, to the War Department, indorsing my recommendations, and urging that all such information should be sent only through me. This message I will not read, but will merely submit for the record:

The message referred to is as follows:

[Cablegram sent July 28, 1917.]

To: Secretary of the Navy.
Serial No. 155.
No. 155.
For: War Department.

"With regard to the movement of United States troops to France via England, it is necessary to know two weeks before the arrival of the troops in England—

"First. The exact composition of the party, i. e., the number of officers, enlisted men, nurses, civilians.

"Second. The amount and character of baggage with party.

"Third. The purpose for which the party is coming, i. e., to serve with the American, British, or French forces.

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"The foregoing information should be furnished with regard to all parties coming, no matter how large or how small their size. Thus, if staff officers are coming on a certain ship, information to that effect should be given. Moreover, if any parties of a quasi military nature, such as Red Cross or other organizations having a distinctive uniform, are sent over, notification should be given. On receipt of this information in London through Admiral Sims it will be transmitted at once to the war office and to Gen. Pershing's headquarters in France. Lassiter."

SIMS.

In another message, of July 28, 1917 (my No. 150), I again called the attention of the department to the importance of keeping secret everything in my letter No. 17, concerning the plans for handling our troops on the high seas. This message was as follows:

JULY 28, 1917.

To: Secnav, Washington.

No. 150. Reference your 56, and my letter regarding troop convoys. Please note my urgent recommendations that procedure contained in my letter be restricted only to Government troops and troop-supply ships bound for France, and not individual commercial ships carrying small units and bound for England or other countries. Such latter vessels should be routed by British shipping officers, the same as for all British vessels proceeding independently. The system I recommended should not be communicated to shipping officers at various ports, but should be confined solely to one or two officers in department. A message was received by Admiralty concerning *Philadelphia*, which apparently referred to system recommended for troop convoys, and which was therefore not understood. If cables are to be exchanged with any source but me concerning the system, its primary object of secrecy will be destroyed.

SIMS.

I received the following reply from the department:

Origin via Simsadus, London.

Your 150. Your letter No. 17, regarding troop convoys, known only to two officers. The instructions contained therein have been used only for convoys bound for France, and will be used only as you request in your 150. Commercial ships bound for England are not routed this way. We have not misunderstood your wishes in this matter. We have no knowledge of the Admiralty message about naval vessel *Philadelphia*, and since the receipt of code O we are communicating directly with you. 18001.

BENSON.

On August 2, 1917, I was informed by the department that arrangements had been made for handling all communications with regard to the movement of troops and Army supplies in the manner that I had recommended, and later on I received a copy of a memorandum which was sent by the Chief of Staff at this time to The Adjutant General to put these recommendations into effect. It would not contribute anything of interest to read this memorandum, and I will therefore merely ask that it be inserted in the record.

(The memorandum submitted is here printed, as follows:)

47. As a result of the recommendations of Admiral Sims the War and Navy Departments agreed that all information concerning movements of troops should be sent only via the force commander in London. The following memorandum covering this point was signed by the Chief of Staff of the Army on August 2:

AUGUST 2, 1917.

[Confidential.]

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ADJUTANT GENERAL.

The instructions heretofore given under which the military attachés in Washington of certain allied Governments have been furnished with advance information of sailings of individuals and organizations for service abroad are revoked. The instructions under which The Adjutant General of the Army has been sending notice of sailings of cargo vessels and of Army personnel to Gen. Pershing are hereby revoked. Information of such sailings, actual or prospective, will be sent to The Adjutant General hereafter by confidential messenger from the ports of embarkation. When received, they will be furnished by confidential messenger—a commissioned officer

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of The Adjutant General's Office—to an authorized officer of the Bureau of Operations of the Navy. It is then the exclusive business of the Navy to convey the information to the senior naval commander abroad, who is charged with the further duty of informing Gen. Pershing and our attaché in London of such sailings.

The chief of the embarkation service will govern the communications of his office with the Navy by the same rule of confidential messenger service. The effect of these rulings is to prohibit all bureaus and agencies of the War Department sending information relative to the sailing of our personnel or our cargo ships for Europe and to confine the transmission of such information to one channel only, namely, the Navy. This prohibition extends to the giving out of such information to anyone in this country which either in the course of duty or by accident may come to the knowledge of any officer.

TASKER H. BLISS,
Major General, Acting Chief of Staff.

On August 10, 1917, I received a message from the department announcing that the methods I had proposed in my letter No. 31 had been accepted and would begin with group 7. This letter was merely a further elucidation and confirmation of the original important letter proposing the plans for handling our troops at sea.

The department's message was as follows:

SIMSADUS, *London:*

Opnav, 124. Reply your letter 31. Troop convoy system satisfactory. Begins with group 7. Acknowledge. 2009.

ADMIRAL BENSON.

All the recommendations that I had made in regard to restricting communications to one channel, had been fully discussed at Paris, during the naval conference there at the end of July, 1917, and the recommendations were made only after a full discussion with Gen. Pershing, and with the chief of staff of the French Navy. They agreed with me absolutely, and the British authorities were also in complete accord.

Gen. Pershing assured me that he would cable the War Department that all communications concerning troop movements should pass only through the Navy, and the French and British chiefs of staff also assured me that they would instruct their officials in America to discontinue sending any information about troop movements. I might add that one cause of great concern about this matter of communications was the fact that I was horrified to find during my visit to Paris, that information about these convoys coming over was known in official and social circles, even before Gen. Pershing knew about it himself. It appears that the various allied naval attachés and missions in America had been picking up all kinds of information, here and there, telegraphing it to their Governments. The same thing had been true of the War Department. After my recommendations were put into effect, the leakage of information ceased, and it became possible to handle the great volume of Army shipping with comparative secrecy.

While discussing this question of the protection of American troops while they were being transported across the eastern Atlantic, it should perhaps be emphasized again that I fully realized that the full responsibility for their safety rested upon me, and upon me alone. I realized, too, from the first, that this, of course, was the primary mission which the American naval forces in Europe had to fulfill. However, during the period in which our troops were crossing in very limited numbers, and especially in the first months of the war, when practically no troops were being sent over, I regarded it as

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imperative that our antisubmarine craft should be used to the maximum advantage in defeating the campaign of the submarine against merchant shipping, and thereby saving the tonnage so vitally needed by the allied cause as a whole as well as for the support of our Army. I remember Gen. Pershing telling me at this time, that is, at the end of July, 1917, that an army of a million men on the western front would require 50,000 tons of freight a day. In other words, this would require a total of five 10,000-ton cargo ships arriving each day, or 150 every month. It would have required a total of nearly 5,000,000 tons of shipping to have kept this army constantly supplied with all necessary equipment, food, munitions, artillery, etc.; and it was very clear from the first, as I have already pointed out, that unless shipping could be saved at this time, it would probably be impossible for America ever to support an army in France. I was, therefore, completely in accord with the Secretary of the Navy in his attitude set forth in the following cablegram, which I received on July 28, 1917:

JULY 28, 1917.

Origin: Josephus Daniels.

Vice Admiral SIMS, *London*.

Opnav 35. The paramount duty of the destroyers in European waters is principally the proper protection of transports with American troops. Be certain to detail an adequate convoy of destroyers, and in making the detail bear always in mind that everything is secondary to having a sufficient number to insure protection to American troops. 11027.

JOSEPHUS DANIELS,
Secretary of the Navy.

I realized that, in order properly to protect American troops abroad, it would be necessary to protect and to save enough of the Allied shipping to keep this army in France. The Navy Department must also have realized this but did not appear to give it due weight.

Volumes would be required for all the messages that were sent back and forth, between my headquarters and the Navy Department, concerning the whole question of the transport of troops abroad, but it would not be particularly profitable to go any further into the matter. I think that enough evidence has been introduced to show that the department, in attempting to direct the whole voyage of the first troop convoy from America, committed a very dangerous fundamental military error, as they could not possibly possess the information in Washington upon which the orders for the protection of this convoy in the war zone should be based. I have also shown that the department themselves recognized this error, by calling upon me for recommendations, based upon an examination of the war experience of the Allies; that when these recommendations were submitted to the department, they were adopted, and subsequently governed the whole of our Atlantic transport of troops and supplies; that the responsibility for the safety of these troops and supplies devolved upon me, in so far as their passage through the war zone was concerned; that their routing was done from my headquarters; and that their escorts were arranged by the forces under my command. The best proof of the effectiveness of this protection is the fact that no troop transport bound for France with American troops was ever sunk by a German submarine.

As an illustration of how close and cordial were the relations between my staff and that of Gen. Pershing, and of how completely

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we were in agreement, it may be interesting to refer to a cable which I sent Gen. Pershing on January 4, 1918, in reply to a request from him with regard to the routing and handling of army transports. My message of January 4, 1918, was as follows:

[Cablegram sent Jan. 4, 1918.]

To: Gen. Pershing.
Urgent. For Gen. Pershing.

All the forces under my command are disposed with the primary purpose of assisting in the safe and prompt dispatch of troops and supplies to France, and safe convoy out of France.

Regardless of original destinations, I shall at any time, at your request, divert cargo vessels, fuel ships, animal transports, or mechanical transports, to any port you desire. This diversion can be made at your convenience, at any time while the vessels are en route, or after arrival on this side. Our plans provide for diverting vessels from one port to another, at any time, to facilitate your operations.

You will appreciate that, with troop transports, the utmost safety must be assured, combined with secrecy of movements. There are many considerations that can not be placed before you in a cable. For this reason I directed Commander Kurtz, on January 2, to proceed from London to your Paris headquarters, to present certain considerations. If the result of this conference was unsatisfactory, I request you will do me the honor of sending an officer to London to present your further wishes in this matter.

I fully appreciate the urgency of the situation, my dear General, and will leave nothing undone to assist your operations in every way. 12004.

SIMS.

It will be noted that there never was any question about my recognition that the primary mission of the forces under my command was the protection of American troops and supplies.

It would be possible to take up many other subjects and show how, in other cases, the department similarly insisted upon acting from Washington, upon the incomplete information which they had available there, and how thereby mistakes were made, and impracticable plans proposed. I have already shown you how, in the case of convoys, for example, because of a wrong estimate of the situation, the department delayed putting into effect the convoy system, and strove, as an alternative measure, to carry through schemes, such as the arming of merchantmen, which were of value, certainly, but of minor importance, or such as the establishment of a completely new system of handling merchant shipping, which because of the critical situation, was thoroughly impracticable.

I wish now to discuss only three or four other similar cases, such, for example, as the plan which the department insisted upon for meeting a possible raid against convoys, by enemy battle cruisers in the Atlantic, and, finally, the plans proposed by the department with the object of finding a royal road to victory, by blockading the German ports, or similar measures.

The question of a possible use by the Germans of raiders to attack convoys, and perhaps even of the employment of battle cruisers for this purpose, had, of course, been under consideration by the naval staffs of the Allies, prctically from the time at which the use of the convoy system was begun. It had been fully recognized, of course, that a heavily armed, fast ship could probably destroy a whole convoy with extreme ease, if such a raider ever got loose in the Atlantic on the convoy routes. I pointed this out repeatedly to the department in the summer of 1917, as, for example, in my official letter-report No. 864, of September 15, 1917. At that time I pointed out that it was important to have plans prepared, and kept constantly up to date, at all times, in the event of such raider activity. I stated

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that it would, of course, be possible to abandon the convoy system entirely and revert to a plan of dispersed shipping, but that this course did not seem a sound one, and that greater protection could always be afforded by keeping the shipping in convoys, and by providing these convoys with escorts of sufficient gunpower to overcome any raider. I insert an extract from this letter in the record. It is as follows:

[Letter 864.]

SEPTEMBER 15, 1917.

One possible enemy move would be to use the relatively smaller number of long-distance submarines as scouts, relatively close to the American shores for the sole purpose of locating and tracking convoys passing the information along to raiders or other submarines held in reserve nearer to the European coast.

It would seem important to have plans prepared and kept constantly up to date at all times with a view, if the necessity should arise of initiating an extensive scouting campaign or else of actually individual escort of troop and other important convoys.

It is, of course, possible at any time if a serious menace should be encountered from raiders, to entirely abandon the convoy system and revert to a plan of dispersed shipping. It is strongly believed, however, that such a course would not be a sound one, and that greater protection will always be afforded by holding the shipping in convoys escorted by cruisers of sufficient power.

Any individual convoy could, if the occasion demanded, be dispersed at any time. It is understood that all ships of convoys are given orders as to routes to follow in case of forced dispersal.

A reversion to a system of independent sailing such as existed before the convoy system was put in operation would again return us to a situation in which the available number of antisubmarine craft operating as patrol craft would be wholly inadequate. Escort of individual vessels would be entirely out of the question.

I understand that negotiations are now under way with the Japanese Government with a view to basing their battle cruisers and perhaps some of their light cruisers on a British port as a measure of preparedness against high-sea raiding during the coming winter.

In my letter report of October 23, 1917, I referred again to the question of possible activity of enemy raiders, again emphasizing that the subject was one which required the most thorough and complete estimate of the situation, which could not be made with the staff I had at that time. As I will point out in a moment, I had still been unable to obtain from the department a sufficient staff to permit a continuous study of the war situation, and the formulation of plans, such as would be required to meet such a situation as this presented by the possibility of the operations of enemy raiders against convoys. In this letter of October 23, I discussed the cruises of the previous raiders which had escaped, and the possibility of a repetition of such operations, pointing out again that the only apparent effective solution was the assignment to each convoy of a force superior to that which could be expected of the raiders.

I insert in the record an extract from this letter. [Reading:]

[Letter Oct. 23, 1917.]

14. The situation concerning enemy raiders, particularly during the coming winter months, is one fraught with grave possibilities. The subject is one which requires a most thorough and complete estimate of the situation, which can not be done with available staff here. Some of the general considerations involved in this subject may be stated as follows:

(*a*) The disposition of British and allied fleets to prevent escape of raiders.

(*b*) The neutrality of Norway. The question of whether raiders have used, and will in future use, the neutral waters of Norway for escape.

(*c*) The extension of the convoy system and provision for escorting all convoys with vessel of sufficient power to withstand the attack of raiders carrying at least 6-inch guns.

(*d*) The placing of shipping in remote areas such as the Indian Ocean, South Atlantic and Pacific in convoys, whether escorted or not, in order that they may be easily

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diverted the moment any news of a raider is obtained. As long as shipping is not in convoy, it is a most difficult, if not impossible, problem to attempt to divert it or control its routing, particularly shipping which is under way on the sea.

(*e*) The broad question of whether the enemy may consider it as warranted to jeopardise the chances of success in possible future fleet actions in favor of risking his entire light cruiser force, and possible battle cruisers, in addition to converted merchant raiders, in serious attempts at high-sea raiding.

Action against enemy raiders is to be considered from two points of view: first, operations to intercept them before they reach the open sea; second, arrangements to protect shipping if the first can not be made effective.

As long as Norway remains neutral, we must certainly expect that her neutral waters will be utilized by raiders, particularly on the long dark nights of winter, and if this is permitted it is practically impossible in view of the large sea areas to the northward, even around the north of Iceland, to prevent the escape of raiders.

In addition to the recent very successful attack by the new very fast enemy light cruisers on a Norwegian convoy in the North Sea (as reported by cable) we have examples of what a few raiders even of the converted merchant type, may accomplish. Evidence indicates that the *Mowe* probably left Germany during the first half of November, 1916, and, after sinking 112,000 tons of British shipping alone, containing many valuable cargoes, she succeeded in returning to Germany in safety.

The *Wold* apparently left Germany during the first half of March, 1817, with a cargo of mines with which she succeeded in accounting for at least 90,000 tons of British shipping alone in the Indian and Pacific Oceans.

The danger from mines in the track of shipping well outside of what might be called the war areas, is illustrated by the sinking of the *Cumberland* off the coast of Australia in over 75 fathoms of water. Also the sinking of two large ships in the vicinity of the Cape of Good Hope over six months after the first merchant ship had struck a mine in the same vicinity.

As no evidence of the *Wolf* has been obtained since about the 1st of March, she has either returned to a home port or come to grief elsewhere.

The *Seeadler* left Gemany in the middle of December, 1916, and accounted for at least 10,000 tons of shipping in the South Atlantic before she was finally run ashore on one of the South Sea Islands within the last few months.

The tonnage figures mentioned for the above vessels are minimum figures which are definitely known concerning British vessels. In addition, the ships in question undoubtedly accounted for considerable allied and neutral tonnage, and there are also other ships still long overdue which may have been sunk.

The fact that the amount of tonnage sunk by enemy submarines has not increased in spite of an increase in the number of submarines operating, and the fact of America coming into the war with the effort that she is putting forward in the way of shipping alone to ultimately defeat the submarine campaign, would seem to be in itself a sufficient reason to expect very determined efforts by the enemy to add to the work of submarines the efforts of high-sea raiders.

From the general survey of the situation it is considered very impracticable that the escape of raiders during winter months can be prevented. During these months there is over 20 hours of darkness in northern waters which would be used for escape.

The only apparent effective solution would seem to be the consignment with each convoy of a force superior to that which may be expected on raiders.

I was so seriously impressed with this possibility that, even with the insufficient staff that I had, I made a special study of this situation, in 1917, and submitted on November 2, 1917, a letter with regard to the protection of troop convoys, in which I specifically discussed the possibility of enemy raiders operating against them. This letter is too long to read, but as it covers the whole situation, it will perhaps be interesting to insert it in the record:

TROOP TRANSPORT SPECIAL LETTERS.

NOVEMBER 3, 1917.

From: Force commander.
To: Secretary of the Navy (Operations).
Subject: Protection for troop convoys.

1. The three things that endanger our troops transports are:
(*a*) Submarines and mines encountered in the zone.
(*b*) Raiders on the high seas.
(*c*) Large submarines operating outside the zone.

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2. Of these dangers there can be no question that the maximum danger is occasioned by (*a*). With the approaching winter nights I think the next greatest danger to which they will be exposed is (*b*), particularly if ships are sent without ocean cruiser escort. There will always be zone danger from (*c*).

3. We are thoroughly familiar with the danger from submarines and mines in the zone, and know what steps to take to protect our transports, although it must always be understood that, regardless of the protection given, a chance shot from a submarine (a Browning shot from a long distance) may sink a vessel, a drifting mine torn up by the winter gales may sink a transport, or mines not encountered by the sweepers may damage or sink one of our ships.

4. So far as raiders are concerned, a battle cruiser on the high seas would easily overpower our areared cruisers, and again our protection is only partial.

5. There remains to be discussed the new problem of large submarines operating outside the usual area of the ordinary submarine. Thus far there has been one (or possibly two or three) of these vessels operating outside the regular submarine area. In every case the operations of this vessel or vessels have been to the southward of the seas, and at the present moment one is operating along the West African coast.

6. Nearly all the sinkings occasioned by these submarines have been by gunfire. A large submarine is unwieldy and difficult to maneuver under water, and never will be as efficient for torpedo work as the smaller type. Like other vessels of small freeboard, they must confine their operations to areas where good weather prevails. It is not, of course, impossible for a submarine of large type to cross the North Atlantic or a operate in that area; but considering the approaching winter gales, the whole proprocedure is most unlikely. There is always the question of strain on personnel and damages to the submarines that are to remain at sea for several weeks. I consider it highly improbable that the efforts of these submarines will be confined to areas where good weather prevails.

7. During this winter they could operate in such areas as the islands off Africa, off Gibraltar, and so forth. I consider, therefore, that there is little chance of encountering large submarines in the North Atlantic during the winter, but that there is more liklihood of encountering raiders.

8. Modern German light cruisers making upward of 20 knots, and a 17-knot ship like the *America*, or even the 24-knot *Kaiser Wilhelm*, would fall an easy prey to a 30-knot light cruiser. It is for this reason that I do not recommend routing our large transports independently. It is true that the *Olympic* was routed independently for some time, but that was during a period when only small, slow raiders were sent out by the enemy. Since the convoy system has been established, resulting in a partial defeat of the submarines, it is not at all unlikely that the enemy may meet this situation by dispatching a greater number of raiders of greater speed and power. This is a matter that has always to be considered.

9. As is well known, it will be difficult, if not impossible, for our destroyers to stand the North Atlantic weather during the winter. There is no doubt that the destroyers can weather gales, but they can make little progress into them. Furthermore these gales may do considerable damage to the vessels and result in laying them up. I consider it will be difficult to carry out a plan of giving to our transports destroyer escort across the North Atlantic during the winter. In fact, there may be times when out troops can not be met by destroyers, on this side, and may have to travel a considerable part of the distance through the zone with destroyer escort. The British have had this experience several times in handling troop transports. Within the last week two mercantile convoys were broken up by storms to the westward of Ireland. One of the convoys contained one of our troop ships, the *Pawnonia*, and this vessel had to travel for some time in the zone without escort, as it was too rough for the destroyers to get to the rendezvous. These are risks that may be expected.

10. I do not see the desirability of routing our transports to the southward in order to permit destroyers to cross with them. Bad weather will be encountered to the southward, and if an area is selected where good weather prevails, this is precisely where the cruiser submarine would most likely be found. I should recommend that this idea be abandoned.

11. If it is decided to provide one or two destroyers to escort our convoys all the way across, it would seem logical to base a force on the Azores. However, destroyers based on the Azores will need many repairs beyond the capacity of a repair ship or the resources of the Azores. I am afraid the scheme is hardly practicable during winter weather.

12. My recommendations are these:

(*a*) That a limited number of destroyers be retained in the United States for escorting our troops off shore, so as to protect them against any large submarine that may be operating off the port of embarkation.

(*b*) That the routes of our convoys be varied so as to deny the enemy information of any one line of approach.

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(c) That an ocean escort be provided sufficient to withstand any raider that escaped to sea. This will mean a dreadnaught in the event that we get information of the escape of enemy battle cruisers or else sailings will have to be temporarily suspended.

(d) That all escorting vessels should have guns superior to 6-inch.

(e) That all convoys be routed through the North Atlantic, as before.

(f) That any destroyers be released that can be spared for operations on this side, so that greater protection can be given in the area where the danger is greatest.

13. It is unfortunate that at the very time that our larger transports come into operation the number of men that Field Marshal Haig wishes to send on leave is greatly increased. We have, as the department knows, a limit now of 600 arrivals a day in England, or 5,000 a week. If we can provide from the United States some fast shallow-draft transports of 18 knots or upward for cross-channel service, we can assist materially to relieve the congestion.

14. The British war office are striving to comply with Sir Douglas Haig's wishes and to increase the number of men on leave. If the leave requirements are fully met, it will mean that practically none of our troops can be handled into England unless we can provide some fast steamers for cross-channel service. I consider this matter a very urgent one. An inquiry has already been sent by cable indicating the types of ships needed. I think perhaps both the *Harvard* and the *Yale* could be used and perhaps some others of a similar type could be found.

15. Aside from the question of handling our large transports, there are a number of British liners crossing that can be utilized for carrying our troops. This is a great saving in tonnage to us and a great convenience to land troops in England, for the French ports are very poorly developed, and all the assistance we got from the English ports is helpful. I have repeatedly pointed out, however, the desirability of sending no freight via England, only troops and kit; but despite my recommendations the freight still rolls in, embarrassing the situation more than ever. I had hoped to arrange for our first lot of large transports to come direct to England; but I find that in addition to troops and kit these vessels contain some 4,000 tons of freight for France. The department will understand that this additional amount of work thrown on the cross-channel service is most serious and can not be handled at present. As a result, these vessels could not be received in England. As a compromise I have suggested to the department the desirability of lending these ships with freight for England, the freight carried to be determined by Mr. Guthrie, the allied shipping representative in America. It is possible that wheat or some nonexplosive freight could be carried in these large ships and these vessels routed direct to Liverpool; but this is contingent upon our help in furnishing steamers for cross-channel service.

16. I consider Liverpool the safest port of entry in the submarine area. For the present, however, I think we shall have to send our large ships to Brest roads and then, when they are unloaded, escort them into England to be coaled.

17. I have previously reported against using the *Vaterland* for the present until we have a little more experience in handling the other large transports. The *Vaterland* is of course a much longer target, and injury to her would be a serious affair. I am assuming too that all of the troops that we have to transport for the next few months can be accommodated in other transports, assisted by British liners. Whenever the situation becomes pressing I presume we shall have to use the *Vaterland* and take the additional risk.

18. British destroyers would escort all our troops sent in British liners. Queenstown destroyers (our own) escort all our troops in regular convoys and also escort to France all supply ships in convoys sailing from Hampton Roads or Sydney. British destroyers escort to a position near Brest all our store ships in New York convoys.

19. Forces based on Brest escort into France to storeships in New York convoys that are carried by British destroyers to a rendezvous near Brest. The Brest forces also distribute our storeships to their destination along the French coast, and escort out of French convoys of empty vessels. It will be noted that the great bulk of our work is done by our Queenstown destroyers, and that the forces based on Brest do principally coasting work, and for escorting out our empty vessels.

20. At the present time, as we have things organized, we can handle one troop convoy every eight days. If six or eight vessels are sent in a convoy averaging 15,000 troops per convoy, this would mean approximately 60,000 troops a month direct to France with the addition of some 15,000 or 20,000 troops a month through England in British liners under the present arrangement.

21. To bring the troops in at a faster rate will require more destroyers on this side, and any considerable increase in storeships will also require more destroyers.

22. With reference to the use of submarine versus submarines, this matter has been given more attention since the establishment of convoys. Formerly the system in use was patrol surface craft of sea routes. With this system it was rather difficult to work submarines except in limited areas. Now that a large part of the patrols have been

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withdrawn in order to provide escort for convoys, there is considerable area open for the employment of submarines versus submarines. I believe the system will never be very effective so long as the attacking submarine must rely on torpedoes, owing to the difficulty of maneuvering into position to attack the enemy submarine. But a type of submarine which is now being built in England, of which Lieut. Pierce has the sketch drawings, provides for the use of guns against enemy submarines. I am hopeful that this method of attacking enemy submarines will give much better results. There is no doubt that the presence in waters of our submarines makes the problem much more difficult for the enemy, and already a number of German submarines have been sunk by British submarines. The presence of our submarines in the Azores will have the effect, I think, of keeping enemy submarines away from that immediate area.

POSSIBLE BATTLE CRUISER RAIDS.

If there is any further doubt in any one's mind as to the extreme danger of imposing war plans from a distance of 3,000 miles, the narration of the case that I am now going to take up should clear it away. It should make clear that, in so far as a statement recently made before this committee by the Secretary of the Navy carried the implications that my position abroad was a purely local one, and that general plans and policies were not any of my business, the statement was inaccurate.

Apart from the case now to be considered, I am sure the committee must have been impressed with the extent to which the execution of departmental plans were required of me, whether I originated them or not. As a matter of fact, as I have stated repeatedly in this testimony, my principal mission throughout the war was in connec- with departmental plans and policies. As you have seen, I was constantly called upon for advice and directed specifically to take up and discuss with allied leaders this and that question of plans and policies.

In the spring of 1918, as the losses of merchant tonnage in the submarine campaign were falling off month by month and it had become apparent that the submarine campaign against shipping was being defeated, the allied naval staffs again became apprehensive that the Germans might, as a last venture, send out their battle cruisers as raiders in the hope of meeting and completely destroying some of our convoys, or of compelling the abandonment of the convoy system. I might say that it was a surprise to the Allies that the Germans had not done this long before, if only for the confusion it would have caused the Allies and the disturbance in the convoy arrangements that would inevitably have resulted.

The planning section of my staff in London, which had been established upon my recommendation and after approval given by Admiral Benson during his visit to London in November, 1917, had thoroughly examined the probable conditions of such a raid and had, in conjunction with the plans division of the British Admiralty, drawn up a plan to meet it. A copy of this plan was forwarded to the department on June 20, 1918.

On July 2, 1918, I received the following dispatch from the department:

SIMSADUS.

Simben 3. Your 307. As last hope. German battle cruisers may be sent out to completely destroy one of our large troop convoys. We depend upon you to gain and give information on this point, and Grand Fleet to take necessary action until United States could act. 11001. Simben 3.

BENSON.

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I would like to explain right here—I think I have not made the explanation before—that any message that is marked "Simben" was sent with an agreement which I understood to be that the message would be delivered directly to Admiral Benson and nobody else; and any messages coming to me on the other side that were addressed to "Simben," that meant that they had been sent by Admiral Benson and not necessarily anybody else.

I would like to add in further explanation about "Simben" messages that they were sent in a separate code. There was only one officer in the Navy Department who had that code and could translate it, and there was only one officer in my quarters who could similarly translate messages coming the other way. That was to secure extra secrecy to the important messages sent in that way.

The CHAIRMAN. Was that code changed from time to time?

Admiral SIMS. Yes; that code was changed from time to time, but only those two people knew it.

To this dispatch I replied as follows on July 2:

Simben 11. Referring to your Simben 3. All possible measures will be taken to gain information of prospective and actual movements of enemy vessels. Grand Fleet and other British vessels and United States vessels in these waters will be prepared to act within the limits of their capabilities. Notwithstanding all that may be done, it is impossible to guarantee that enemy battle cruisers will not gain the high seas, and it is therefore apparent that battle ship escorts for convoys constitute their only real safeguard. Attention invited to planning section memorandum No. 26, forwarded with letter No. 21969, June 20, 17002.

SIMS.

By this time the department was evidently becoming alarmed, as is indicated by the following message received about a month later, namely, July 28:

Simben.
Simsadus.

No. 7. Department feels very apprehensive of at least one enemy battle cruiser getting out as forlorn hope and attacking United States naval vessel convoys. It is proposed to send three oil-burning dreadnaughts to Berehaven or Queenstown to be in a position to protect convoys, depending upon British to give us information immediately of the exit of cruisers from German waters. Comment and recommendations requested as to the better of the two places to send them and have adequate protection against submarines. What do you think of our mine force extending at once at least one line of mines all the way across to Norway? 24027, No. 7.

BENSON.

I replied immediately by stating that Berehaven seemed the better base for the dreadnaughts which the department proposed to send.

Replying to this on July 30 the department outlined a new and complete plan of their own for the protection of shipping against battle-cruiser raid. I insert the dispatch in full, but as it is long and technical I will not read it, but will refer to and explain certain of the defects of the plans proposed. The dispatch is as follows:

[Highly secret.]

Simsadus.

Simben 8. Reference planning section memorandum 26, battle-cruiser raids. The department is of opinion that raid by a battle cruiser against the supply lines to European ports, particularly against troop convoys, is a possibility, and that even if the chance is remote it should be guarded against. The department further notes that the decision arrived at as modified, by the action actually contemplated by the Admiralty, while safeguarding ships leaving port after notice of the escape of an enemy battle cruiser has been promulgated, is in the nature of a negative decision and affords only partial relief to ships then in transit between United States and European ports. The department further proposes the following definite plan for consideration and

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action. General plan to be applicable to United States troop convoys, cargo convoys to French bay ports, and convoys carrying United States troops, other convoys to utilize plan if considered advisable by Admiralty. Plan drawn on line of battle cruiser escaping by way of North Sea around north end Scotland, though with slight modification it is applicable also to enemy battle cruiser escaping from Black Sea. Definite information of escape of enemy should be given to all forces before enemy has crossed Scotland to Iceland lines or has gotten clear of Aegean Sea. Plan applicable to both eastbound and westbound ships. Specific details: The Navy Department has asked the State Department to request of Japan that she detail a battle cruiser to * * * with the Atlantic Fleet at Hampton Roads. The North Atlantic to be divided into three areas: First, west Atlantic, longitude 45° west to United States coast; mid-Atlantic, longitude 20° west to longitude 45° west; east Atlantic, longitude 20° west to east Atlantic destination. The United States to station Division 6, consisting of U. S. S. *Utah*, U. S. S. *Nevada*, U. S. S. *Oklahoma* at Queenstown or Brest, preferably the former port or vicinity, to act as raider guard against battle cruisers in the mid-Atlantic and east section. To hold the Fifth Division, consisting of U. S. S. *Arizona*, U. S. S. *Mississippi*, U. S. S. *New Mexico*, U. S. S. *Pennsylvania*, to cover the west Atlantic section or to proceed where necessary. To use the Japanese battle cruisers, if they are detailed to work with our forces, for the purpose of direct pursuit. Eastbound convoys: All convoys between longitude 45° and United States return to nearest United States or Canadian port, there to await adequate escort. Furnish two old battleships as escorts for each convoy carrying troops.

If practicable, extend the same escort to cargo convoys, and where this is not practicable use two armored cruisers for escort to cargo convoys, all convoys east of meridian longitude 20° proceed to destination at top speed, convoys between longitude 45° west and longitude 50° west diverting immediately to Azores Islands and make for an anchorage or less under Island San Miguel; convoys between longitude 30° and longitude 20° diverting to San Miguel or proceed to destination or nearest port as circumstances demand, depending upon estimated position of enemy cruisers relative to position and speed of convoys. Westbound shipping: Ships between longitude 15° west and European ports return to port to await adequate escort or divert to San Miguel, Azores Islands, depending upon submarine situation; ships between longitude 15° west and longitude 45° west divert to Azores Islands or to nearest United States or Canadian port, depending upon their proximity to those points. Ships westerly of longitude 45° west route to destination or to nearest port. Utilize U. S. S. *Delaware* and U. S. S. *North Dakota* with Division 3, Division 4, Division 5 battleship force to escort troop convoys; utilize cruiser force to escort cargo convoys; hold Battleship Division 8 with one destroyer division instantly ready to proceed; dispatch Division 6 with two destroyer divisions in European waters to proceed at top speed to Azores Islands, San Miguel. Use Japanese battle cruisers as pursuit division if they are detailed to cooperate with United States forces and if such plan is agreeable to them. Above plan to become effective immediately upon agreement and to be put into operation upon receipt of broadcast radio and cable stating that enemy battle cruiser had escaped from North Sea. The department to maintain adequate supply of coal and oil in European waters and Azores Islands to meet the logistic needs of Battleship Division 6. This above plan is suggested as a possible counter to any enemy battle cruiser or small force of enemy ships escaping from North Sea and attempting to raid our lanes of communication before internment in some neutral port or escape to other seas.

Modification suggested for raiding force escaping from Adriatic Sea or Dardanelles ships east or west bound between meridian longitude 20° and longitude 45° and north of latitude 45° proceed to destination or the nearest port at top speed. 10030.

BENSON.

Briefly stated, the department's plan provided that one division of battleships was to be stationed at Queenstown, to cover the eastern area of the Atlantic. Another division was to be held at home waters to cover the western Atlantic. A division of Japanese battle cruisers was to be requested to base on a United States port, and conduct direct search operations. Upon the warning being given, eastbound convoys in certain general sea areas, were to return to the nearest United States or Canadian port. All convoys in the eastern part of the Atlantic were to proceed to destination; while convoys in mid-Atlantic were to be diverted immediately to the Azores. For westbound shipping about the same procedure, re-

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versed, was to apply. After the battle cruiser was out, in fact, after the trouble was on, another division of battleships was to be detailed to escort any troop convoys which were then to move. The plan was to become effective only after receipt of information that the battle cruiser had, in fact, escaped from the North Sea.

The plan was impracticable for numerous reasons, and it was eventually abandoned with the full concurrence of the Navy Department and before any necessity for its application arose; for it was substituted a plan substantially the same as that previously recommended by the planning section.

I will explain briefly some of the undesirable features of the department's plan:

(*a*) Most serious of all, it was not a joint plan—that is, it provided for American troops and shipping only—a small portion of the whole—and could not be made applicable to all allied shipping. One can imagine the confusion in the Atlantic of attempting to handle allied convoys and shipping with conflicting wireless instructions by other than a joint plan.

(*b*) It upset the whole delicate allied machinery for providing destroyer escort through the submarine zone. That is, in attempting to guard against an enemy battle-cruiser raid it subjected shipping to added and unnecessary risk of destruction by submarines. It was quite impossible for the department to know of the extensive and delicately adjusted system in London for providing protection against submarines for all allied shipping. The system was constantly changing as new forces or additional convoys were added.

(*c*) It was based on an erroneous premise, namely, that we could be sure of counting on advance knowledge of the escape of a battle cruiser. I had repeatedly reported that the Allies could not guarantee any such information. While we could and did track the progress of submarines quite accurately, a battle cruiser at high speed could make its escape from the North Sea in one night, taking advantage of fog or heavy weather, with small chance of being detected.

(*d*) If a false alarm of the escape of a raider were given, and such a case actually occurred after the latter plan had been adopted, the system of controlling shipping would be so deranged that it could not be put back into normal operation for some time. Consequently there would be increased opportunities for submarines to attack unescorted convoys and shipping as well as unnecessary delay to shipping.

I would like to invite attention at that point to one of the gravest dangers that can be inflicted upon the people who are doing the fighting, by the people at headquarters; that is, that they at headquarters should, in the pride of intellect, draw up a plan to be executed by the people at the front, and thereby incur the danger of drawing up that plan on a false premise. That was done twice during the war. In one case it is my conviction that it cost us at least half a million tons of shipping. It was the premise which enabled them to draw up the perfectly erroneous estimate of the situation that one of the best things to do was to depend upon arming merchant shipping; and it was that which caused the delay of the convoy system for approximately three months. The false premise in this case—and it was exceedingly dangerous—was that we would be sure to be

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able to tell them when the battle cruiser went out of the North Sea. As a matter of fact, we never were sure, the premise was wholly false. Consequently, the estimate of the situation was wholly false; and consequently the department's plan was wholly impracticable. If that lesson can come out of all this trouble and expense we have gone through, it will be something that will be of value to the United States Navy and this Government in the future.

I replied to the department's dispatch as follows:

Date: August 3, 1918.
To: Opnav.

[Simben.]

Urgent. Simben 21. Your Simben 8. I believe it extremely dangerous to base a plan on assumption that information of enemy's escape will be obtained, otherwise than through news of attack. There is certainly a small chance that this information will be available, and, in long nights of winter, chances will be very much against this early information. I believe safety requires plan should be based on assumption that one or more battle cruisers will be at large in Atlantic, with ample fuel supply, and in a position to attack convoys, before we have any knowledge of their existence from home ports. Only possible protection against this danger is battleship escort of convoys, inaugurated before the danger arises. This would subject the battleships to a relatively small risk of being torpedoed, as compared with the great risk of one or more convoys of many thousand troops being destroyed before measures could be taken to protect them. I have consistently advocated this plan, and am convinced that no other can offer the same certainty of protection to troop and other convoys. The following comments are submitted on the department's plan, as set forth in its cablegram:

Assembly of large number of merchant ships at Azores dangerous, because of possible submarine attack, and extraordinary marine risks due to assembly so many vessels. Think general principle of action should be to keep all convoys moving toward destination. To turn back shipping, or to deflect it toward other than terminal ports, would make antisubmarine escort impossible in many cases, and would introduce refueling difficulties that would tie up many vessels until fuel could be sent to them.

Battleships based on Irish port, as proposed, would be available to escort to safe positions such troop convoys as might be in danger area when alarm was given, and this is deemed a safer plan than to have such convoys proceed to destination unescorted, or to have them proceed to Azores. If department should decide to adhere to its plan of having battleships go to the Azores to furnish escort to shipping assembled there, it is suggested that the Tagus River would be a better base than an Irish port, being 300 miles nearer the Azores.

When department has decided on general principle of plan, I will take up whole question with British Admiralty. Final plan must be a joint plan, taking cognizance of all allied shipping. 22005.

SIMS.

I might say there, in explanation of the sending of a vast number of ships to the Azores, and the plan of sending a dozen destroyers out there to protect them, if there had been ten or one hundred times the number of destroyers sent to protect them, everybody on the other side that had anything to do with this war against submarines would have known that no possible number of destroyers will ever protect a vessel that is standing still, at anchor.

The case of the British vessel *Justicia* illustrated that perfectly. was torpedoed and not sunk, and they had 5 tugs and 17 destroyers She was bound out of the channel from the North Sea when she and all the vessels in the neighborhood circling around her, and they were dropping depth charges, and so forth, and yet they could not prevent her from being torpedoed, because she was not moving more than a mile or a mile and a half an hour.

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The department, however, replied with a long message, insisting upon their original plan. I insert the message in full, but will not read it:

Origin: Opnav, Washington. Ser. No. Simben 11.
Date: August 7, 1918.

[Highly secret.]

Simsadus.

Simben 11. Your 21. Our 8. The details of the plan drawn by the department were laid down to accord in general with the decision of your planning section as revised by the Admiralty planning department. As to your first point, viz, that safety requires plan should be based on assumption that one or more battle cruisers will be at large in Atlantic with ample fuel supply and in position to attack convoy before we have any knowledge of their exit from home port, this statement seems to be in contradiction to statement in F. D. O. 80, paragraph 5, and opposed to the actual information which you have from time to time furnished us. It is, however, so important a point that a direct statement should be had from (?) the Admiralty as to their ability to provide the necessary information. You will notice in our plan that it is department's intention to furnish old battleship escort to number of two for such important convoy when necessity arises, but there have been many reasons why we did not wish to do this in advance of the necessity, one being that we did not desire to give advance information to the enemy, as to one of the most important elements of the plan, and thus give him the opportunity to plan an answer. In this matter also you should get a direct statement from the Admiralty, as to the advisability of our using our predreadnaughts for escort and when the operations in their opinion should go into effect. With regard to the rest of our plan and your comment on same: Even when battleship escort is provided this in itself on account of its fixed character is still only a partial answer and can be countered by the enemy by an increase in power of his raiding force. It therefore becomes necessary to provide for further contingencies, and this the plan submitted attempts to do.

It differs only from the decision of your planning section in introducing the scheme of premeditated diversion. In general on account of the few dreadnaughts available, their slower speed than that of battle cruisers, the number of convoys to be protected, and the great area over which (?) these convoys operated, it seemed first necessary to divert according to a plan which might at same time get our dreadnaughts in touch with battle cruisers and afford greatest protection with minimum number of convoy ships. Second, nothing in the above prevents department from immediately proceeding on the plan of evasion by warnings either before or after the premeditated plan is operative; and, lastly, as a final resort, it is always in the province of the escort commander to scatter his convoy. Therefore the department still adheres to its predetermined plan, introducing the element of evasion by warnings; and, lastly, proposes that the movement to scatter be left in escort commander's hands, as last resort. The department prefers to base division 6 many points of view. U. S. S. *Oklahoma* and U. S. S. *Nevada* will sail in a few days. The plan above outlined will apply to our troop convoys to France and to the direct cargo convoys to French bay ports. It is desired that this plan be taken up immediately with Admiralty to get their concurrence as to HJ and HC convoys carrying our troops, or for such modification of the plan as they suggest. 18006. Simben 11.

BENSON.

N. B.—The words evidently omitted in coding, as blank spaces indicate.

The gist of the reply was that it was apparently hard for them to believe the specific statement that the Allies could not guarantee getting advance information of the escape of a raider from the North Sea. That, to us, was one of the most astonishing things done during the war, the conclusions drawn in that way. Frequently I have encountered civilians who would say to me, "It does not seem to me that you would have much trouble in blocking up that North Sea." I would say, "How wide do you suppose it is up there?" They would make a guess, anywhere from 15 to 50 miles. Their mental picture of the thing was a little map in the geography that they studied in school, and when you told them that it was 240 miles across and 900 feet deep, then they began to think about it.

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In their messages they asked me to confirm the statement about the Allies getting advance information of the escape of the raider from the North Sea.

They also stated that there were many reasons why they did not wish actually to put battleships with convoys, in advance of the necesssity, one being that they did not desire to give advance information to the enemy as to one of the most important elements in the plan. They opposed the recommendations to but the battleships with the convoys, saying that this would be put a partial answer, and would be countered by the simple expedient of increasing the power of his raiding force. It may be well to state that the main thing we were providing against was the escape of a single raider, which would be very difficult to run down. If the enemy were foolish enough to send out a heavy battle cruiser force, it would play directly into our hands, as it would at once warrant a corresponding heavy detachment from the British Grand Fleet, to say nothing of our own fleet. The case was complicated, because the number of United States convoys involved were very small indeed, compared to the number of allied convoys.

It was really astounding to me that the department would consider diverting a large number of ships to the Azores, where there was no inclosed anchorage; they would practically have to anchor in the open sea—not to mention the complications which would be introduced by the necessity of sending many other ships to supply them with fuel and provisions before they could continue their voyage, and of providing destroyer escorts from the Azores, through the submarine danger zone to destinations.

It was difficult enough to send destroyers out from the coast of Ireland or England, 200, 300, or 400 miles. to meet convoys and bring them back again. To send destroyers from Queenstown all the way to the Azores required refueling there before they could proceed, required nearly double the number of destroyers before they could do it, etc.

My attitude in the matter was summed up in a personal letter of August 10, 1918, to Admiral Benson, of which I will read you the pertinent paragraphs:

AUGUST 10, 1918.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL: I have just received your second cable about the measures proposed in case the German battle cruisers come out. I will take this up at once with the Admiralty, and will of course telegraph the answers to the questions you ask.

It seem to me that there is only one vital decision to make in solving this problem, and that is as to whether or not it should be based upon the assumption we will get warning of the battle cruiser coming out, or as to whether we will not get warning. In the latter case our first intimation will be an attack on the convoys.

An examination of the planning section's estimate, to which you refer, will show that it is really based upon the assumption that we would probably not get the information. At all events, it seems to me that any problem of this kind, should, in the interests of safety be based upon the worst that the enemy can do.

I have never thought it very probable that the German battle cruisers would come out to attack convoys, because I do not think it would pay them, as I have always understood that, whether they win or lose, they would want to be in possession of their fleet in as great a force as possible when they come to the peace negotiations.

I may say right there that all through Admiral Von Tirpitz's book he expatiates upon that scheme, that the prime minister at that time

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insisted upon having the fleet preserved, while he wanted to use it. [Continuing reading:]

This statement about preserving the fleet until the end of the war was made within two weeks after the war was declared, in 1914. It may not have been authoritative, but it was made by the officials of the German Embassy, who were at Newport at the time, and was promptly reported in Newport by one of the retainers.

As to whether we would be likely to get warning of the exit of a battle cruiser, I have often talked over this with the officials of the Admiralty, and it was discussed recently at one of the morning conferences. It was agreed then that the probability is that a battle cruiser could get out without being detected; also that if she was detected she would not continue on the way out, though we would not be sure of this, and of course the proposed plan would have to be carried out.

Considering the distance across the North Sea, the position of the Grand Fleet on the western shores of the North Sea, the proportion of bad weather and fog, and the limitations as to the use of oil, it does not seem to me at all likely that the attempted exit of a battle cruiser would be discovered. It therefore seems to me that it would be only ordinary prudence to base any plan for the protection of our troop convoys upon the assumption that we will not know of the exit of the cruiser until an attack has been made.

Some of the people in the Admiralty have expressed the opinion that a battle cruiser coming out for this purpose could not remain out long and would almost surely be detected upon attempting to return. have always dissented from this opinion, and in our last discussion of the subject it was apparent that the Admiralty officials now think it more than likely that the battle cruisers would not go out without having a certain amount of coal in vessels that had been dispatched for that purpose.

It has always seemed to me that by the expenditure of a sufficient amount of money coal could be cleared from almost any country for perfectly innocent ports, and arrangements made to divert the cargo and anchor it in many places where it could be used and where there would be very small chance of its detection. I should expect a battle cruiser, once out, to have facilities for recoaling at least for a considerable time. This would, of course, be a serious matter—so serious that it would seem that the plan would be based upon this assumption.

Of course, if a battle cruiser did go out and we had no warning of her, the chances of her finding a convoy out in the Atlantic would be small. It is assumed that she would not search for a convoy close to the European coast, where convoys converge toward their ports. This would be too dangerous a proceeding, as she could hardly cruise in these waters without being detected, and in that case she would be in great danger of being run down by British battle cruisers, particularly if one or more destroyers got contact with her and kept contact.

It is therefore assumed that she would take to mid-Atlantic or appear off our coast, where there are no battle cruisers. The chance of encountering a convoy in mid-Atlantic would, of course, be small. If we knew she had just left the North Sea we could take measures to protect the convoys, but if we did not get this warning we would probably lose some one or more convoys before the necessary measures could be taken.

It is for this reason that I have always advocated our battleships being used for the ocean escorts of our troop convoys. While I have never been particularly apprehensive as to the battle cruisers coming out, I was always apprehensive that a raider might come out carrying one or more guns heavier than those of our cruiser escorts.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Sims, I have certain matters that I must attend to before the Senate meets, and the committee will therefore have to adjourn now until to-morrow morning.

Admiral SIMS. Yes, sir.

(Thereupon the subcommittee adjourned until to-morrow, Tuesday, March 16, 1920, at 10 o'clock a. m.)

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NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

TUESDAY, MARCH 16, 1920.

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON NAVAL AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 o'clock a. m., in room 235, Senate Office Building, Senator Frederick Hale presiding.

Present: Senators Hale (chairman) and Trammell.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. Admiral Sims, will you proceed?

TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL WILLIAM S. SIMS—Resumed.

Admiral SIMS. I was explaining yesterday that I had always advocated our battleships being used for ocean escort of our troop convoys. While I had never been particularly apprehensive as to the battle cruisers coming out, I was always apprehensive that a raider might come out carrying one or more guns heavier than those of our cruiser escorts.

On August 17, 1918, I sent the following dispatch to the department:

[Simben.]

Simben 28. Your Simben 13. Matter was referred officially to Admiralty August 8. No written reply yet received, but from discussion with Admiralty staff I can say that they do not believe that their information service is such as to make the probability great of securing information of the exit of an enemy raider from the North Sea. Similarly, I can say that the Admiralty opinion is that battleship escort should be provided for convoys whenever there is thought to be possibility of the escape of a raider, and that the provision of such escort should not be deferred until the raider is known to be out.

SIMS.

But the department continued to insist upon the plan which they had previously suggested.

The first intimation of the probability of a German battle cruiser raid was manifest at the end of August, 1918, when information was received simultaneously from a variety of sources that two heavily armored cruisers might soon attempt to enter the Atlantic to attack American troop convoys. In the face of this we had no plan, although plans had been urged since September, 1917. The department's action to meet this situation was to adopt my repeated recommendations and assign battleship escort to convoys, together with certain parts of their own plan concerning convoy routes. They deferred putting their own complete plan into operation until more definite information was available.

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This is indicated by their message to me of 31 of August, as follows:

[Highly Secret.]

824. Plan outlined our Simben 8 and 11 for protection against battle cruiser raids, and instructions one of Commander Force European waters, will become effective upon receipt of this cable so far as plan for diversion of routes is concerned. Beginning with September 9, battleship escort will be given to the HX, HC and United States troop convoys, in order of importance named. Until system of battleship escort is thoroughly in hand, it is probably that some convoys will sail without additional battleship escort. You will be informed when this happens. To put the entire plan into active operation if it is so desired, when information is gained of the escape of a raider, the following radio or cable will be sent by Sims and by Opnav, "Battle cruiser raid plan operative." 14030. 724.

BENSON.

6.52 a. m., August 31, 1918.

The mixture of plans, the inevitable difficulties of coordination to be expected from the department policy of divided control and responsibility, was immediately apparent.

I have before me and insert in the record a long message from the department, of September 4, pointing out the confusion which had resulted.

The message referred to is as follows:

Origin: Opnav, Washington.
Ser. No. 857.
Date, September 4.
31 ADR.
Simsadus.

[Secret.]

857. Your 3959, 3947 and 3937. The disinclination of the admiralty to divert HX and HC convoys in accordance with our plan naturally weakens it. Since protection must be afforded HX and HC convoys as they carry our troops your plans to use division 6 for the protection of HX and HC convoys as indicated in 3947 approved but the United States troop convoys diverted to Azores Islands according to our plans must receive the protection of at least one of our dreadnaughts from division 6. Therefore until joint agreement is reached we will expect the United States troop convoys and the HB to be diverted and the HX and HC to proceed. If department finds according to this arrangement which scatters our force we will be unable to adequately protect all the troop convoys it may be necessary to urge upon the War Department the advisability of discontinuing sending troops in the HC convoy. As no joint agreement has been reached convoys at sea are not familiar with our plan and United States convoys must be given diverting instructions, but on receipt of this issue instructions to all transports.

United States men of war and escort ships in European waters make themselves familiar with necessary details. Also furnish all American merchant vessels with sealed order to be broken in case of receipt of operating signal as prescribed, whereby westbound ships may avail themselves of protection if desired. The operating signals will be sent in a United States code to American ships only. Beginning with September 9 it is department's plan to furnish predreadnought escort to the HK and HC convoys, whose captain will be familiar with our plan, but will not use it unless Admiralty so desires. Commander cruiser force will issue similar instructions to ships on this coast. Finally, this plan is only a temporary expedient and does not solve the problem of continued activity of an enemy battle cruiser in the North Atlantic. Escort by battleships will protect troop convoys against the ordinary raiders, but the cargo convoys will still be lightly protected. Our dreadnoughts are too slow for an efficient pursuit division, and no answer has been received from Japanese on our request that they send four battle cruisers to base with our fleet. Department desires to know what will be the Admiralty policy as to the use of their battle cruisers for pursuit in case of the escape of an enemy battle cruiser 18503. 857.

BENSON.

September 4, 1918, 12.06 p. m.

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It is an impressive example of the deplorable absence of unity of command on the seas, a measure which the Allies finally adopted on land, and which made victory possible. The message is too long to read. I note such statements as the following: "As no joint agreement has been reached, convoys at sea are not familiar with our plan"; "This plan is only a temporary expedient and does not solve the problem of continued activity of an enemy battle cruiser in the North Atlantic"; "No answer has been received from the Japanese"; "Department desires to know Admiralty policy as to use of their battle cruisers."

There is nothing to be gained by examining this situation in order to try to determine who was right or who was responsible for the confusion. The point is that it was wholly impossible even to attempt the preparation and execution of extensive and complicated Allied plans, with the plan makers, the members of the team, separated by over 3,000 miles of ocean, and the discussions carried out over a heavily overworked cable. It was attempting the impossible. Judging from all other experiences in the war, a few hours of joint personal discussion between the parties concerned would have resulted in complete agreement. But the issues at stake were so serious that something had to be done, no matter how impossible it seemed, to straighten out the tangle.

I therefore discussed the situation with the heads of the British Navy, and proposed that my staff get together with the British planning staff, and, regardless of difficulties, produce, in the shortest possible time, the simplest possible joint plan, which they believed would be acceptable to our department. (These planning sections had been collaborating since May.)

I have the plan before me and insert it in the record. It is as follows:

Date September 10, 1918.
To Opnav.

[Highly Secret.]

Your 857. Instructions to United States merchant vessels and to United States naval forces have been issued as directed. Admiralty propose to use their battle cruisers to bar the return of enemy raiders, and do not propose to use them for pursuit of raiders in the Atlantic.

I recommend the adoption of the following joint plan which has been prepared jointly by my staff and Admiralty Plans Division, and has the approval of the admiralty:

The following plan shall govern all vessels and convoys at sea after they have received warning of a raid.

PLAN.

1. Raider warning shall not be sent out without mutual consent of Navy Department and admiralty, unless evidence is conclusive that raider is out.
2. As a rule convoys and supporting forces will be handled by radio from the Navy Department or the admiralty.
3. The aim will be to continue all voyages and to provide all convoys that are in danger with battleship escort by sending battleships from Halifax and Berehaven to overtake or to meet convoys not already escorted by battleships; and by combining convoys of approximately equal speed.
4. Battleship escorts will leave eastbound convoys and join westbound convoys as indicated by the situation, getting all their fuel in American ports.
5. During a raid all operations west of longitude 40 shall be controlled by the Navy Department, in consultation with British C-in-C North Atlantic and West Indies, and all operations east of longitude 40 shall be controlled by the admiralty in consultation with the commander, United States naval forces, Europe, with complete interchange of information received and orders issued.

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6. The ordinary machinery for routing shall continue in operation except that orders to convoys and escorts at sea to avoid raiders shall be sent direct from the Navy Department and the admiralty to save time. Base commanders concerned shall be informed of orders issued.

7. Special rendezvous routes to be used in the case of a raid in the absence of radio instructions will be given each convoy unescorted by battleships before sailing, and battleships will be sent out from Berehaven to join the convoys.

8. Commanders of battleships at Halifax and at Berehaven, and all commodores of convoys and commanders of escorts, shall be given the routes of convoys sailed or about to sail, together with the latest information on the submarine and raider situation.

9. Destroyer escorts will accompany Berehaven battleships when practicable.

CONVOY INSTRUCTIONS.

1. Raider warnings and all subsequent communications will be made in convoy cipher. Reports of enemy position will be broadcasted by shore stations.

2. Convoys shall listen in for radio instructions, but in their absence on receipt of warning the following shall govern:

(*a*) Notwithstanding these general instructions, special vessels and convoys are given full discretion as to action taken to evade the enemy, when danger is imminent.

(*b*) When practicable convoys should seek to escape in the general direction of their destination.

(*c*) As a final resort convoy commanders when insufficiently protected may disperse t heir convoys.

(*d*) Maintain radio silence except that senior officers' ship shall:

(1) Report position and movement of raiding force if sighted.

(2) Relay to shore stations such reports if deemed necessary.

(3) Communicate rendezvous signals unless safety of convoy is thereby endangered.

EASTBOUND CONVOYS.

(*e*) Convoys escorted by battleships will continue their route.

(*f*) Convoys unescorted by battleships in the absence of radio instructions will get on rendezvous routes and follow them.

(*g*) Battleships will be dispatched from Berehaven to join convoys unescorted by battleships.

(*h*) Convoys for which no battleships escorts are available may be ordered by radio to join escorted convoys.

(*i*) A separate rendezvous route will be assigned for convoys bound to:

(1) French ports.

(2) English and St. Georges Channels.

(3) North Channel.

WESTBOUND CONVOYS.

(*j*) Convoys will, if practicable continue their voyage.

(*k*) Westbound battleships will give such protection as practicable.

SOUTHERN CONVOYS.

(*l*) Should proceed on their voyage unless ordered to port.

4523. SIMS.

This plan was simple, and, in substance, was identical with my previous recommendations.

Briefly stated it was, that the moment any possibility of a raid developed, the battleships at both ends of the line would put to sea and pick up and escort the nearest convoys believed to be in danger. That, as far as possible, and in order to make up for the lack of battleships, an attempt would be made to combine convoys. That the department would control all shipping in the western Atlantic, and the British Admiralty all in the eastern Atlantic, by direct radio communication with the convoys and battleships.

That the battleship escorts would not attempt the complete passage, but those in the eastern area, after reaching a central point, would pick up an eastbound convoy and return. It contained many other

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details as to methods of routing, control, and communication. Generally speaking, however, all convoys were to keep going. The scheme of diversion to Azores was abandoned.

The department finally recognized the impossibility of carrying out their own plan, for on September 21, 1918, I received a dispatch, informing me that they had accepted the plan that I had proposed, and which I have just explained. The dispatch was as follows:

[Secret.]

Origin: Opnav., Washington. Series No. 1869.
Date: September 21.
53 ADR.
Simsadus.

1860, 6974. 4523, 4885. Plan for meeting raider menace approved, and will be substituted in place of present plan. For the present, our division 8 with duty corresponding to division 6, will base at Hampton Roads, though later some ships of the division may base at Halifax. Issue necessary instructions to put this plan into effect, and furnish department with rendezvous route. Directions will be given to commander in chief, and commander cruiser force, to issue instructions from this end putting plan into effect immediately after. Though plan does not embrace westbound shipping proceeding independently, department infers that the provision of paragraph 3, first sentence, your cable 4523, will hold, and that, if necessary, westbound shipping will be guided by warning received, and by any subsequent instructions broadcasted, is this correct? 21020 1869.

BENSON.

N. B.—No record this office of 6974.

Fortunately, the enemy never attempted a battle cruiser raid. To any one at all familiar with the case, it is, to put it mildly, disquieting to contemplate the confusion of all Atlantic shipping, naval and merchant, stoop carriers and all, which would have resulted if a raid had occurred during those long-drawn-out negotiations between Washington and London, in an attempt to reach a simple decision as to joint action.

As far back as September, 1917, the danger had been pointed out and the necessity for plans stressed. Ten months later, although plans had been proposed, when the danger was thought to be really imminent, the department acknowledged that it had no approved plans. and said that it depended upon the European forces, and upon the British Grand Fleet, to stand off the danger until they had time to act. Even after the department had been aroused to the necessity for a joint plan, and had put forward one which was not really a joint plan and was wholly inpracticable, it took nearly two solid months to solve a problem which was easily susceptible of solution in a few hours of personal conference.

In May, 1918, the headquarters Planning Section had, in collaboration with the British, prepared a definite plan. This was submitted to the department in June. About September 1, a month after the department had submitted its impracticable plan (which was never adopted, and which was not agreed to by either the British or the American Planning Sections in London) it insisted on its plan and directed that it be put into effect, notwithstanding the fact that the majority of shipping involved was not United States shipping, and that other forces than our own were required to put the plan into execution.

If the enemy had only known. All he need have done during those two months was to make a series of bluffs, involving little risk to himself, and we would have done the rest. Shipping would have been paralyzed.

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In conclusion I wish to reiterate the salient point in this case I am presenting. It is not that Foreign Navy Departments had abler officers than ours, nor that the officers of my London staff were abler than their brother officers in Washington, but that our Navy Department violated sound military principles in attempting to run a joint campaign over a 3,000 mile cable. This, notwithstanding that the department had in London an organization established by the department for the express purpose of preparing joint plans and coordinating with the Allies, all of whom maintained similar organizations in London to facilitate unity of command.

I have necessarily condensed this case, as it would take days to cover all of the details connected with it.

I feel that I have presented enough to give a true picture to the committee, and thereby to establish in this case alone that portion of my letter under investigation.

DEPARTMENTAL PLANS.

Thus far in my testimony I have been considering only the recommendations made to the department, after consulting with the Allies, and the action, or lack of action, of the department upon those recommendations.

I now propose to take up for discussion certain plans proposed by the department at different stages of the war, to show how and why certain of these plans were impracticable of execution, and why I was compelled to recommend against their adoption.

In paragraph 69 of my letter of January 7, 1920, I stated as follows:

> 69. * * * The objection to radically new plans was that the situation was critical and their preparation would delay striking quickly with all available forces. This insistance assumed that the department, incompletely informed as it necessarily was, and without previous experience in the war, was more competent to decide upon practicable plans than their own representative in continuous conference with the leaders of the allied navies who had had nearly three years experience. * * *

The war, at the time of our entry into it, had been going on for nearly three years. The United States Navy had, during this time, few, if any, representatives abroad other than the regular naval attachés, whose facilities for collecting information are much restricted in war time. Consequently the Navy Department was not very much better informed than the general public of actual conditions in the belligerent countries, and had but little trustworthy information in such matters as submarine losses, shipping losses, anti-submarine measures that had been tried and found effective, or the reverse, or on the other matters concerning which complete knowledge was essential to the development of effective plans for combatting the submarine menace.

After my arrival in England, where I was given access to the facts, it was wholly impossible, with the meager staff at my disposal, to place the department at once in possession of all the information that I acquired or was in position to acquire.

I shall take up in succession each of the following plans proposed by the department:

1. A protected land through the danger zone.
2. Blocking German ports.
3. Mine barriers of net and mines of standard types.
4. Mine barrier of mines of new type.

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PLAN FOR PROTECTED LAND.

On July 7 I received the following message from the Navy Department:

Received: July 7, 1917.
To: Alusna, London.
From: Secretary of the Navy.
For: Vice Admiral Sims, U. S. S. *Melville*.

Is it not practicable to thoroughly patrol a single lane through the danger zone, by having sufficient number of antisubmarine vessels constantly passing back and forth, thus guarding a constant stream of vessels through the lane. 22006.

I think it is unnecessary to comment on this message, other than by reading the reply sent on July 11, which was as follows:

Sent: July 11, 1917.
To: Secretary of the Navy.
Through: Admiralty.

No. 93. Your dispatch 22006 concerning patrolling a single lane through danger zone received through *Melville* July 10. The plan has been fully considered in the past by the British Admiralty, but not adopted for primary reason that the number of patrol craft available have been, and will continue to be, inadequate. Another vital objection is that no matter how much or how often the lane can be shifted, its western end would always be clearly defined. Submarines have operated to a maximum distance from Ireland of 400 miles, and sinkings are frequent up to 200 miles. Even if the submarine did not attempt to attack through the patrol lines themselves, it could always attack to the westward, and the patrol line would afford excellent information as to the proper areas for attack. As experience shows that a vessel, even when zig-zagging and accompanied by a single zig-zagging destroyer close ahead, is not always immune to attack, it is apparent that, unless such a proposed patrol line was very dense, the submarine could undoubtedly attack successfully at any point along it. As more than one lane would have to be established, and as at least one-third of all patrol craft would always be resting, refueling or repairing, it seems manifest that the number of ships required for such a plan would never be available.

SIMS.

That is still another of the very numerous recommendations that were made by the Navy Department which exhibited a hardly understandable ignorance of the very elements of the submarine campaign.

BLOCKING GERMAN PORTS.

The success of German submarines in the early stages of the war, before our entry into it, and the apparent inefficacy of the measures adopted to combat them, led many of our naval officers to the opinion that the one measure that would prove really effective would be that of preventing their exit from home ports, either by blocking the ports or by mining them in.

No less a person than the President himself gave voice to this idea in his well-known statement that the best way to fight hornets was to destroy their nest, not to chase them individually after they had left their nest. The strategical idea involved was unquestionably sound; it was so unquestionably sound that it should have been patent to all that there must have been compelling reasons, tactical or otherwise, that had prevented its adoption by the Allies long before our entry into the war.

I found gradually in the early months of my mission abroad that the department was insistent upon development of some such solar plexus blow which would immediately defeat the submarine. Personal letters from officers in the department indicated clearly to me that, in their failure to realize the desperately critical nature of the

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situation, they were allowing themselves to be drawn into fascinating speculation, in the effort to devise some such new and radical offensive plan. In fact, this was clearly revealed to me, a few days after my arrival in London, when I received from the department the following dispatch, on the 17th of April:

Is it not practicable to blockade German coast efficiently and completely, thus making practically impossible the egress and ingress of submarines? The steps attempted or accomplished in this direction are to be reported at once. Yours of noon 14th April will be given earnest and immediate attention.

DANIELS,
Secretary of the Navy.

After consultation with the allied naval authorities, I replied to this cable in a dispatch of April 18, as follows:

To absolutely blockade the German and Belgian coast against the entrance and departure of submarines has been found quite unfeasible. Attempts have been made with all possible means to stop egress and to prevent nets and mines being dragged out. Many nets and mine fields have been, and continue to be, laid—destroyers, submarines, and other vessels have been used. Of course, for craft operating so near enemy bases, the danger is great and the result has been that several have been mined and torpedoed. Even to keep up an effective patrol against submarines and raiders between Norway and Scotland has been found quite unfeasible; far too many ships were attacked. On lines between Iceland and Scotland, and between Scotland and Greenland, ice floes as well as enemy craft must be guarded against on lines where patrol is now kept up. It is necessary to move these lines after each enemy contact, in order to maintain them and to prevent torpedoing, as there are no available ships to protect the cruisers from attack by submarines. The destroyer has shown itself to be to a great degree the most efficacious enemy of the submarines attacking commerce. All possible means are taken by the enemy to force their being assigned to other duty, even to sinking ships on hospital service. With the exception of the minimum number required by the Grand fleet, for carrying troops and their supplies, all destroyers are now so used. These vessels are being constructed as expeditiously as possible, but their number is quite insufficient to meet the existing submarine crisis, particularly as it affects merchantmen.

SIMS.

In my letter-report of April 19 I further discussed this problem, pointing out the impossibility of such operations as the one proposed by the department. The letter is as follows:

22. In the absence of adequate patrol craft, particularly destroyers, and until the enemy submarine morale is broken, there is but one sure method of meeting the submarine issue, upon which there is also complete unanimity—increased number of merchant bottoms, preferably small.

More ships! More ships! More ships! is heard on every hand.

23. It is also significant that, until very recently, the Admiralty have been unable to completely convince some members of the Cabinet that the submarine issue is the deciding factor in the war. The civilian mind, here as at home, is loath to believe in unseen dangers, particularly until the pinch is felt in real physical ways.

24. The prime minister only two days ago expressed to me the opinion that it ought to be possible to find physical means of absolutely sealing up all escape of submarines from their own ports. The fact that all such methods (nets, mines, obstructions, etc.) inherently involve the added necessity of continuous protection and maintenance by our own naval forces, is seldom understood and appreciated. I finally convinced the prime minister of the fallacy of such propositions by describing the situation into which we would be led, namely, that in order to maintain our obstructions we would have to match the forces the enemy brought against them, until finally the majority, if not all, of our forces would be forced into dangerous areas, where they would be subject to continual torpedo and other attack, in fact, in a position most favorable to the enemy.

25. Entirely outside of the fact that the enemy does, and always can, force exits, and thereby nullify the close blockade, the weather is a serious added difficulty. The heaviest anchors obtainable have been used for nets, mines, and obstructions, only to have the arduous work of weeks swept away in a few hours of heavy weather. Moorings will not hold. They chase through. In this respect we could be of great assistance, i. e. in supply of moorings and buoys.

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26. The channel is not now, and never has been, completely sealed against submarine egress, let alone the vaster areas of escape to the north. Submarines have gone under mine fields, and have succeeded in unknown ways in evading and cutting through nets and obstructions.

That this idea of a close blockade of German ports was not entirely given up by the department, is evidenced by the fact that when Admiral Mayo came to Europe in September, 1917, this whole question of a close blockade was taken up by him with the allied authorities, at the request of the Navy Department.

It may be interesting to review, for a moment, what happened at that time, to show how impossible such a scheme was, and to illustrate how difficult it was to convince the department why a scheme apparently so simple had not long since been carried into effect; and that there was some other reason besides its mere impracticability which had prevented the Allies from carrying out such an operation. As I will point out in a moment, I had received repeated inquiries from the department, between April and August, concerning plans for future operations, desiring to know whether or not, and if not why not, the Allies were considering any new offensive operations. I had replied to these at the time, pointing out that full plans for offensive operations had been outlined in my messages to the department. The military issue at the time depended upon putting down the submarine menace, and it was, therefore, a military necessity that all plans for immediate operations should have as their mission the defeat of the submarine campaign, and the recommendations which had been sent to the department since April, 1917, had been plans proposed to meet this end.

When Admiral Mayo arrived in London in August, 1917, it was arranged that, in the naval conferences to be held in September, the first subject for discussion should be, at the request of the Navy Department, the "question of offensive operations against enemy fleets or bases," second, "manner in which United States Navy can best operate with Allies for successful prosecution of war," fifth, "offensive measures against enemy submarines."

In the first days of this session, plans for such a close offensive against German bases in the Heligoland Bight were discussed. Admiral Mayo, in his report to the Navy Department, reported on these. After an examination of such operations, he was convinced that they would be impossible, without the sacrifice of a very large naval force; and in his letter to the Secretary of the Navy, on September 8, he said that the only scheme which might be practicable would involve the sinking of 40 old battleships and 43 old cruisers, to be contributed pro rata by the allied powers, as merchant ships could not be spared for the purpose. The primary object of this scheme was that proposed in the department's cable of April 17, which I have read, that is, to block submarines in by blocking up the German exits to the North Sea. The old battleships and cruisers referred to above would have been filled with cement, and sunk in the entrance to German ports, in the same way as was later done at Zeebrugge and Ostend.

When the full details of the discussions at this conference were presented to the Navy Department, the magnitude and impracticability of such a scheme of close blockade was at last recognized, and in a cable of October 21, 1917—that is, seven months after the department had proposed the scheme, they cabled:

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No. 775. Department considers close offensive involving sinking of older battleships and cruisers to block German channels impracticable.

I might add there that it was also the opinion of the conference that even if the channels should be successfully blocked, a channel could be dug around the blockading ships in a very short time.

Even in the case of similar operations, undertaken by the British against Ostend and Zeebrugge in the spring of 1918, it should be remembered that even the partial closing of these two ports, which was accomplished by that splendid naval feat, required intensive preparation which was going on for eight months before the operation was actually carried out. The gentlemen of the committee will, therefore, perhaps be able to imagine the length of time and the amount of material that would have been required to carry out a scheme such as that proposed by the department in April, 1917; but it is needless to discuss this further, for, as I have already read you, the department itself, after it had received Admiral Mayo's confirmation of my recommendations, announced that such a scheme was impracticable.

NET AND MINE BARRIERS.

The idea of blocking the German ports was only one phase of the idea which the department seems to have had in mind at this time, that is, in the early months of 1917, to do away with the submarine menace by some new and radical plan of offensive operations. Personal letters which I received from officers in the department at this time contained practically nothing else than long discussions of various projects which might be carried out to accomplish that end, all of these requiring a tremendous amount of material, and a length of time, which necessarily reduced them to subsidiary operations to be carried out when time and material might be available, if they were considered at all feasible, rather than as the main operation which the United States Navy should undertake.

Another proposal of this sort was made to me by the Navy Department on May 11, 1917. This was as follows:

[Cablegram.]

From: Secretary of the Navy.
To: Rear Admiral Sims.
Received May 11, 1917.

Much opinion here is in favor of concerted efforts by the Allies to establish a complete barrier across the North Sea, Norway, and Scotland, either direct, or via the Shetlands, to prevent the egress of German submarines. This plan would involve the use of various forms of mines, nets, patrols, and the release for this purpose of all ships upon American coast patrols, as well as many vessels of the Allies now employed elsewhere. The plan also involves regulations for the commerce of Holland and Scandinavian neutrals to pass barriers and defined control gates. It also includes closing Norway's territorial waters. The difficulty and size of the problem is recognized, but, if it is possible of accomplishment, the situation would warrant the effort. If this plan is not feasible, could not the same plan be carried out between Denmark and Norway, across the Skaggerack. Make full report.

One or two comments should be made before I read you my reply. It should be noted that the department specifically stated that this plan would involve the use of various forms of mines, nets, and patrols, and the diversion to this project of many vessels of the Allies now employed elsewhere. This feature at a time when, as I was informing the department several times weekly, the war might be lost in a few months, made the scheme quite impracticable, unless we could first

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be assured of such a diminishing of tonnage losses that the war could be carried on to a successful conclusion, and that the material required for any such plan could be transported overseas.

I replied to this with my dispatch of May 14, 1917, which was as follows:

[Cable dispatch.]

Sent: May 14, 1917.
To: Secretary of the Navy.

Replying department's cable of May 11, concerning net and other barrages for preventing egress of enemy submarines. The general situation is as follows, based upon full conference with British Admiralty. According to their experience, all barrages, whether of mines, or nets, or both, are not an absolute solution, for the following fundamental reason: Nets do not stop submarines. Mine barriers can not be wholly effective, unless they could be maintained by patrol at all points. Few of the 30,000 laid in Heligoland Bight can be watched, but, even if all could be patrolled, it would not be wholly effective, because the necessarily locally weak dispersed line of patrols can be broken by enemy concentrated attacks at any point, and as often as may be necessary, and mines dragged out, thus releasing submarines. A barrage that can be thus broken at will, by concentrated attack, is ineffective. This subject was fully explained in my letter of May 11, now on the way. For special purposes of embarrassing enemy movements, unprotected barrages of mines have always been, and now are extensively used in certain areas. Bitter and extensive experience has forced the abandonment of any serious attempt at blockading such passages as Scotland to Norway, Scotland to Shetlands, Skaggerack. The one place that serous attempt at mine barrage is still attempted is the Heligoland Bight. Over 30,000 mines are now planted there, and mine losses there are replaced as fast as possible, about 3,000 a a month.

This of course does not, and probably never can, be absolutely effective, for reasons above given. Enemy submarines can always find passages around, and through, principally close in shore, and through island passages and gaps dragged in mine fields. The larger the number of mines, however, the greater degree of embarrassment to enemy. Hence the more mines we can send the better, and there is no limit to number that would be useful. Mined area much too extensive for all to be patrolled, hence no definite knowledge of number of submarines destroyed or damaged by mines. Speaking generally, the primary immediate necessity in numbers of patrol craft, and, as previously reported, too much stress can not be laid upon the urgency of reinforcing the Allied antisubmarine forces to the extreme possible limit. Defensive measures on our own coast, or in any other locality, and in fact, all defensive considerations, should be subordinated to the offensive against the submarines where they are operating. Even if enemy submarines appear on our own coast, their operations can never be of major importance, owing to the manifest limitations of distance from their bases, and endurance of personnel. In fact if some of the submarine efforts could be diverted into other areas than the focus of all lines of communications, the critical nature of the present situation would undoubtedly be diminished. It is the firm conviction of all British officials concerned in this problem that the most effective opposition to submarine lies in numbers of antisubmarine craft strategically disposed, with the mission of dispersing the enemy submarine efforts from the critical areas and thereby forcing them to operate over such widely separated areas that their successes and our losses will be reduced below the critical point. Every effort is being made to increase the British patrols. The measures we take must be carried out with utmost dispatch in view of the critical degree of enemy submarine success and the general Allied military and political situation.

The element of time is all important. The need is for destroyers antisubmarine craft tugs and mine layers in the greatest possible numbers. The British Government and Admiralty deeply appreciate the evidence of America's desire to assist in putting down submarine menace.

SIMS.

It should be noted at this point that the scheme here proposed, although similar in character, and designed to be carried out in the same area, as the northern mine barrage which will be discussed later, was in no sense the same plan later carried into effect in laying that barrage. The thing which made possible the northern barrage was the use of a certain type of mine known as the antenna mine,

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because of its technical features which had not been invented at the time this dispatch was sent to the department.

For a month I had been cabling full details as to the situation, outlining the offensive plan against submarines, which involved the use of all available antisubmarine craft, and the adoption of the convoy system, in order to insure the protection of sufficient merchant tonnage to enable the war to be carried on. As I have already pointed out, I had received few replies to my recommendations from the department.

In my letter of May 11 to the department, dealing with this subject, I said:

15. Numerous propositions are made to the British Admiralty that have for their object the closing of the North Sea, or the German ports, against the ingress or egress of submarines. These are presented by all classes of people, including Members of Parliament.

They are, generally speaking, of two classes, namely, mines or nets, or both. I have gone over this whole matter with the first sea lord, and those members of the Admiralty board who are specially charged with the practical details of such matters.

16. As may well be imagined, this whole subject has been given the most earnest consideration, as it is of course realized that if submarines could be kept from coming out, the whole problem would at once be solved.

17. As a result of this consideration many schemes have been tried. The following is a brief summary of those tried and the difficulties encountered:

18. It has been found that no net will stop a submarine if it is securely anchored at each end. The submarines are fitted with net cutters on the bow and sides, housing periscopes, and strong steel guys from the bow to the tower.

19. But even those not so fitted can steam through a net, unless one end is held by a trawler, fitted with a winch for slacking off the anchor line.

20. Nets have been fitted with numerous small mines which will blow a hole through a submarine's side, but as soon as the nature and location of such nets were known, the submarine made a practice of approaching with the periscope out until the surface buoys were sighted, then rising to the surface, running over the buoys, and immediately diving again. An attempt is being made to so fit the buoys that contact with them will explode the mines immediately below.

21. There has been great difficulty in maintaining nets and mines in place. Gales frequently sweep out both, and the enemy mine sweepers are constantly at work destroying them.

22. In some places neither mines nor nets are effective on account of the strong tides. This is particularly the case between the Orkney and Shetland Islands.

23. Mines and nets are very extensively used in the attempt to prevent the ingress and egress of submarines from German ports, and to embarrass their movements, and also in attempting to prevent their passage through the Channel. I have been shown the working charts and have had the various efforts explained to me by Admiral Jellicoe.

24. Generally speaking, the area inclosed within a line running first north-northwest, then north, from Texal Island, thence in a curve to the eastward to a point north of Horn Reef, contains numerous lines and fields of mines. Within this area there are at least 30,000 mines, and additional ones are being laid at the rate of 3,000 a month. The field is now being extended to the westward and northward from Texal Island to Broken Bank. (See chart of the British Islands and North Sea.) Some submarines are known to have been destroyed in the Channel; but the difficulty of the problem will be recognized from the fact that the comparatively narrow Dover Strait is not now completely closed to the passage of submarines.

25. This latter illustrates the difficulty of closing such a wide gap as the northern entrance to the North Sea from Kinnard Head to Norway. On this line of about 230 miles there is 30 to over 100 fathoms of water. The number of patrol boats necessary to watch these nets would be very great.

26. As for protecting such a long line, or any line of considerable length, it is of course physically impossible to do so effectively, and this for the fundamental rason that the defense is stretched out in a long and locally weak line, while the enemy can concentrate an attack at any point of it, destroy the patrol vessel, and drag our some sections of the mines or net, thus permitting the passage of any number of submarines.

27. This can be done in as many places as desired and as often as may be necessary, whether the barrier is nets or mines, and it is because of this fundamental principle of a concentrated attack against a point of a necessarily dispersed force that no such

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barrier can ever be sufficiently effective to prevent the passage of all the submarines the enemy wishes to send out.

28. This is the gist of the whole matter, the physical impossibility of a dispersed force successfully resisting a locally concentrated attack.

(*a*) Enemy cruiser of considerable gun power can make a hole in any patrol of a barrier.

(*b*) The patrol vessels must retire before such a force, thus permitting a section of mines or nets to be dragged out and thus defeating the object of the barrier.

(*c*) It has, of course, been proposed to guard a barrier with heavy vessels. This is what Germany hopes Great Britain will do, thus exposing them to torpedo attack and permitting their policy of attrition to be carried out. The British vessels would also be exposed to similar attack, but the British can not successfully compete with Germany in torpedo warfare, particularly near the bases of the latter.

I can not too strongly emphasize the fact that during nearly three years of actual warfare this whole question has been the most serious subject of consideration by the British Admiralty, and that many schemes of the nature of those in question have been thoroughly discussed and those considered practicable—those which do not violate a fundamental principle—have been or are now being tried and extended; but the point is that no barrier can be completely effective, and, unfortunately, a barrier or system of barriers such as mines, etc., needs only to be slightly ineffective to permit continuous passage without much loss of submarines.

29. It is in view of the above and of the large amount of supporting evidence obtained that I have so urgently recommended that our primary military effort should be concentrated in getting the maximum number of antisubmarine craft of all descriptions into the enemy's main area of activity.

Nets, barriers, and similar methods can never be entirely effective but only palliative. The submarines must always be opposed in its field of action, and the most effective opposition discovered to date is numbers of antisubmarine craft.

The difficulty at present is the lack of such craft.

THE NORTHERN BARRAGE.

I have already pointed out, in the discussion of the plans for net and mine barriers, that the barrage proposed by the department in may, 1917, involved the use of various kinds of mines, nets, and patrols in quantities which rendered any such plan impracticable of execution. With the invention in the United States of a new type of mine, however, the project was put in an entirely new light and it merited further careful consideration. The Bureau of Ordnance of our Navy Department was quick to grasp the possibilities offered by the new mine and to outline a plan for its use.

From the time of my first arrival in Great Britain I had taken up the question of the improvement and development of our mines. In spite of all the other demands upon my time, the failure of the department to provide me a staff and the difficulties which I had in obtaining information myself, I yet considered this subject sufficiently important to make a special effort to keep the department informed of allied experience.

Thus, in a cable of April 16, I informed the department:

Sent: April 16, 1917.
To: Navintel. No.20017.

Admiralty reports Vickers Elia mine as originally designed very unsatisfactory, and that necessary service improvements, since war began, are essential to efficiency. Particular trouble with depth taking and pistol. Distance weight now not released until mine and anchor sink about 10 feet. New design pawl on mooring line reel,

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and elimination shearing pins and modification firing pin sleeve release. All are Admiralty improvements and war secrets. Am sending drawings next dispatch bag, and British expert mine officer, as soon as possible. Admiralty now building German mine similar Carbonnit, with changes (see Babcock intelligence reports, 1912 and 1913). Please send me latest torpedo war nose and anticircular run device, both drawing and sample. Advise sending McBride, also engineer and gunnery officer. All information now wide open.

SIMS.

I arranged as soon as possible with the Admiralty to have a mining expert sent to the department, with samples and designs of all British mines, and at the end of April such an expert was sent to the department, with plans and samples of all British improvements.

In my letter of April 27, I referred to certain of the British experiences during the war, with regard to the use of mines and reported that they were abandoning the type of mine that had been in use, in favor of one similar to the German type. In view of the fact that the British had found the type of mine, which they had been using previous to the war, sufficiently unsuitable for war purposes to induce them to change their own mining designs, it soon became apparent that our own existing types of mines, which were identical with the British mine were also antiquidated and unsuitable for the type of work required and would not be of any material assistance. This I pointed out to the department in a cable of May 31, 1917. [Reading:]

Sent: May 31, 1917.
To: Secretary of Navy, Operations.
Through: State Department.

With reference my previous dispatches concerning our supplying mines, the British Admiralty have concentrated on mine construction to such an extent that they now expect the output by August, will reach 10,000 a month. Their maximum facilities for laying mines are about 7,000 a month. From their previous experience with mines, similar to those which we now have on hand, they consider it unwise to attempt to utilize our present available supply. In view of above, and as our output of a different type of mine would not be available in sufficient time, they now consider we can more profitably concentrate on other work.

SIMS.

It is, of course, unnecessary to emphasize the fact that the mine that I was referring to here was our supply of prewar designs, which the war had shown to be ineffective and not the mine which we finally used and which at that time had not been perfected, or even, to my knowledge, invented.

On June 23, 1917, I received another cable from the department with regard to mines. This was as follows:

Received: June 23, 1917.
To: Alusna, London.
For: Vice Admiral Sims. No. 31.

The Bureau of Ordnance is now in a position to manufacture latest type of Admiralty mine, or a superior type, at the rate of 4,000 per week beginning 60 days from now. It is the opinion of the Admiralty that possible future improvements make it desirable that we construct a surplus supply, for possible use in European waters; if so, how many do they suggest we ought to manufacture? Would the Admiralty like to have us manufacture nets for use over there? If so, send details at once. Has a mine, not effective against surface craft, but effective against submarines ever been under consideration? Are there any plans of future contemplated operations that we could be supplied with. 16022.

DANIELS.

A point, which I should like to stress, is well illustrated by this message. I still had but one aide, and yet the department asked me to find out the Admiralty opinion as to possible use of various

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types of mines, how many they should supply, whether the department should manufacture nets, and, if so, I was to send all details. I was to find out all about mine developments among the Allies. It should be pointed out that at the time I received this message, I was at Queenstown, in command of the Irish station. Nobody on my staff was in London, with the exception of one man who had resigned from the Navy in 1914, and had been assisting me voluntarily without pay since April, 1917. During this same week I received requests from the department for recommendations as to the type of destroyers that should be built, as to the allied aircraft plans, and as to what the effort of the United States in naval aviation, and cooperation with the Allies, should be. It was therefore, quite impossible for me to reply immediately, as the number of hours in a day is fixed, and the physical endurance of men is limited, and of this I informed the department at the time.

On July 7 I replied with the following message:

Sent: July 7, 1917.
To: Secretary of the Navy.
Through: Admiralty, via naval attaché, Washington.

No. 84. Replying your No. 31, all assistance which Bureau of Ordnance can render in manufacture of efficient type of mines and depth charges will be invaluable. British output at present in excess of available ships to handle, but numbers ships being increased. Can we furnish mine layers as well as mines. Admiralty experience now indicates necessity for abandoning entirely the Elia lever type, in favor of the German horn type, with horns on bottom as well as top. Also necessity for increased buoyancy to oppose tieds. Latest type will have 500-pound buoyancy, and 1,300-pound anchors. For mining against submarines, they are now using fixed instead of automatic depth anchors, as one floating mine or mine near surface discloses an entire field. Many designs of mines effective against submarines, but ineffective against surface craft, have been considered, but no satisfactory type developed to date. Admiralty would appreciate information if such a mine has been developed. Drawings of latest British mine of horn type forwarded June 28. Nets, moorings, and wire gear generally are available, to the extent to which they can be used, and it is urgently necessary to reduce demands on shipping. Brazil is asking England for nets. Can we meet her demands. Delay in answering this cable due to impossibility of keeping up the work here with present staff.

In my letter of July 14 I plainly state my attitude with regard to the whole question of the use of mines. The following are extracts from this letter:

[Letter No. 29, July 14, 1917.]

7. *Mines.*—There seems to have been a misunderstanding, probably owing to the inadequacy of cable communication, concerning our cooperation as regards mines. The responsibility concerning such a misunderstanding, if it has occurred, should be mine, as it was probably due to lack of time on my part to follow all of the subjects which affect the cause and to clearly set them before the department.

There is, of course, an urgent need for mines and, as I originally stated in a cable, too many could hardly be available.

Up to the present, however, the British output of mines has been equal to or in excess of their facilities for laying them.

An attempt is now being made to impress certain auxiliary vessels into service for this duty.

Great difficulty has also been experienced, due to the stress of other important war requirements, to obtain a mine of satisfactory design to meet the unusual conditions which have developed.

Serious troubles developed from the beginning with the Vickers Elia type, and, as all British mine manufacturing facilities were equipped to build the Elia mine, it was very difficult to alter the design, as experience from time to time indicated to be necessary and to change the methods of manufacture which were thereby imposed.

8. It has now been decided to abandon this type of mine entirely in favor of a mine of the type used by the enemy, modified in accordance with British experience.

In fact, the drawings of this type of mine which are now in the department do not cover the latest developments, which have occurred since they were prepared.

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The mine question is a very serious one, and our cooperation can only be efficiently directed by having an expert representative of the Bureau of Ordnance here at all times.

9. At the present moment the enemy is making determined efforts to sweep numerous channels through the mine fields in Helgoland Bight. The extent of the mine fields renders offensive operations against the enemy mine sweepers very difficult, particularly as they are aided by Zeppelin scouts.

In addition, mining activities are going on in other areas, particularly the Belgian coast at the western end of the allied lines.

Recent evidence has indicated preparations on the part of the enemy to attempt a landing to the south of the allied lines, apparently with a view to outflanking, and as a result new mine fields are being laid by the British in that area.

Early in August, 1917, I received a number of letters from the Bureau of Ordnance referring to their plans for the production of mines and offering to provide the Admiralty with a supply of mines and depth charges.

In reply to these letters, I cabled on August 13, 1917, the following message:

To: Secretary of the Navy, Washington.

No. 246. Admiralty very appreciative of department's willingness to undertake suggested program for manufacture mines and depth charges, and much impressed with magnitude of program. At present no United States representative here familiar with bureau plans, and no British representative in Washington competent to represent Admiralty. Since program involves personnel and ships of both services, also in view Admiralty's extensive war experience in these lines, recommend at earliest date, before undertaking manufacture in quantity, bureau send competent representative here with Admiral Mayo temporarily, for conference. Should bring fullest data and samples if available.

In my letter report of the same date, August 13, 1917, I made clear the confusion which was existing with regard to the subject of mines, pointing out that this confusion and the misunderstanding which had arisen on both sides were undoubtedly due to the lack of that coordination of effort which I had been recommending for four months—since April—and again urging that representatives of the Bureau of Ordnance be sent to London. I had made this recommendation first on the 16th of April. I had repeated it continually throughout May, June, and July; and at this date was still without any technical assistants familiar with the plans of the Navy Department with regard to this very important question of mine development. My letter of August 13 was as follows:

It is considered very important that closer cooperation should be established between the Bureau of Ordnance and the Admiralty concerning the general subject of mines and depth charges, their design, manufacture, and supply.

It is apparent that considerable confusion has occurred to date on this subject, owing to the various means of communication which have been used and, primarily, with the difficulty of insuring clear understanding with long-distance communications by letter and cable. For example, it is found that communications have been exchanged via this office, via the naval attaché's office, London, and office of Naval Intelligence, and also by direct cablegrams between the Admiralty to their naval attaché in Washington. Owing to the stress of duties in all the above forces, considerable misunderstanding has evidently developed.

The Admiralty are very appreciative of the efforts being put forward by our Bureau of Ordnance in connection with the mines and depth charges and fully realize the great assistance which the Navy Department is in a position to render to the common cause in this direction. They have at no time wished to convey the idea that they were reluctant to accept assistance, or that they were not perfectly willing to accept new designs developed in the Bureau of Ordnance. Their experience in developing new designs and arranging and conducting manufacture rapidly under pressure of actual war conditions has been very disheartening, and they are therefore considerably concerned over the prospect of our introducing new designs with which the personnel here will not be wholly familiar.

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I might say in that connection that all the Allies discovered that not only mines, but a good deal more of their war material which had stood the ordinary tests in time of peace, failed to stand the tests in time of war. Mines that had been developed in time of peace and were tested by putting perhaps a couple of dozen on a ship, the people interested in the mines having seen that they were all in apple-pie order and having succeeded in laying those mines at proper depths, and when they began to lay them in numbers of 300 or 400 from one ship going at a certain speed and then made an examination of the field, they found that it was not effective. [Continuing reading:]

So many designs have been developed during the war which appeared entirely satisfactory in the drafting room, and even after service test, but which developed serious troubles and difficulties when the finished weapon was used afloat, that it is natural that every effort should be put forward now to adhere to any design which has proven itself satisfactory afloat, in order that manufacturing can be facilitated, the maximum efficiency of the personnel afloat obtained, and the success of future operations thereby better assured. Some of the various considerations which complicate the general mining problem are facilities of depots, provision and supply of spare parts, facilities and fittings of mine layers and mine transports, allocating the various types, keeping track of their issue and consumption, training of personnel, and many other questions. The Admiralty state that their representative should in no case be considered as a representative of the mining department of the Admiralty; his experience has been primarily connected with the Vickers Elia type of mines, which is now definitely abandoned. The Admiralty state that there is at present no one British officer in the United States sufficiently familiar with British designs and British experience to be in a position to properly represent the Admiralty.

The assistance of the Navy Department in this field is of such importance, and the subject is so complicated, that I strongly advise sending a thoroughly competent representative of the Bureau of Ordnance to London at the earliest possible moment for temporary duty, with the sole object of consulting with the Admiralty mine officials, obtaining general information of the mining situation, and then returning immediately to the bureau. Such a representative should bring with him all drawings and specifications, and if possible sample mechanism, and in case of new developments such sketches or other information as is available.

It is urgently requested that all information, including drawings or even sketches of bureau designs, be forwarded as fast as they are developed, in order that the war experience of the Admiralty may be placed at the bureau's disposal before manufacturing is undertaken to any considerable extent.

The first intimation that I had from the department of the discovery or invention of any new type of mine, such as would make possible extensive operations when material and tonnage became available, was in a message received from the department on the 18th of August, over three months after the department had proposed their first scheme for a barrier across the North Sea. The message was as follows:

[Cablegram, Aug. 18, 1917.]

From: Admiral Benson.
To: Admiral Sims.

Opnav 187. Bureau of Ordnance has developed mine which is hoped may have decisive influence upon operations against submarine. Utmost secrecy considered necessary. Request that officer representing Admiralty, clothed with power to decide, be sent here to inspect and thoroughly test mine. If found satisfactory arrange for cooperation in mine operation. 20017.

I immediately replied in my dispatch 187 of August 22, stating that the British were sending a special officer to inspect and test the new mine, and that if it was found "suitable for operations in contemplation further arrangements for cooperation would be made."

It was at this time—that is, just after the middle of August—that Admiral Mayo arrived in London. He brought with him a memo-

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randum from the Bureau of Ordnance with regard to the new mine and had been instructed by the department to discuss at the allied conference the possibility of offensive operations based upon the employment of this new mine.

In the agenda for the conference prepared by Admiral Jellico, item 2 was that of a mine or net barrage, either in German waters or further afield. In his report of the conference, addressed to the Secretary of the Navy on September 8, Admiral Mayo said regarding the discussion that took place:

The British Admiralty put forward as an alternative to a close offensive in German waters the suggestion that the activity of enemy submarines might be restricted by the laying of an effective mine field or mine net barrage. If such an operation were undertaken, it would appear that it would take the form of:

1. An efficient mine-field barrage, so as to completely shut in the North Sea, which was estimated to require about 100,000 mines, a number of which would not be available for some considerable time; or

2. A barrage of mine nets for the same purpose, which proposal was, in view of experience to date, deemed impracticable. The conference after discussion agreed that the distinct mine barrage could not well be undertaken until an adequate supply of mines of satisfactory type was assured and that until or unless such conditions ensue the improvements and extension of the present system of mine fields was desirable, and further, that a barrage of mine nets was impracticable.

This was Admiral Mayo's report.

The same information was cabled to the department by Admiral Mayo in cables of September 5 and September 6, 1917.

It is apparent from the results of this conference that once again the impracticability was clearly shown of any such scheme as that proposed by the department in its cable of May 11, which was based upon the assumption that a barrier of mine nets could be planted and maintained.

The description of the new mine brought over by Admiral Mayo gave an entirely new direction to the discussion, and before Admiral Mayo left he was provided with a plan drawn up in a conference of allied officers for a barrage of mines of this new type to be put across the North Sea.

On September 13 Admiral Mayo received a message from Admiral Benson emphasizing the great possibilities of the new mine, stating the British officers sent over to the United States to examine it had found it most satisfactory and urging that immediate action be taken. The result was a proposal by the Admiralty of a definite scheme for the northern mine barrage.

On October 21, after Admiral Mayo had returned to Washington and conferred with the department, the department cabled me in their No. 772 as follows:

Sixth. Contract has been let for 100,000 mines of American type. The United States has offered to commandeer for British Admiralty three vessels suitable for mine laying, and in addition can probably commandeer two or three more vessels suitable for mine laying, to be manned by United States for employment in cooperation with British mine-laying force, in joint plan which may be finally agreed upon.

Seventh. Question of proposed mine barrage, Scotland to Norway, as presented to Navy Department is not definitely concurred in, but careful consideration is being given to this particular subject with a view to arrive at definite conclusion in regard to employment of the mine barrage, which measure is considered in principle to promise good results.

That is to say, the mine barrage of the North Sea, the plan of which was drawn up by the British Admiralty and which had been proposed by the British Admiralty and which was taken home by

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Admiral Mayo, was held up for discussion to see whether the American Navy Department would agree to the laying of that barrage.

After a further consideration of the plans, the department decided to accept the Admiralty's proposal for a joint mine barrage in the North Sea, and in a cable of November 2, 1917, I was informed of the acceptance of the project by the department in the following cable:

Inform Admiralty that department concurs in project for mine barriers, Scotland to Norway, and has already taken steps to fit out eight mine planters, to sail February 1; also expediting completion 12 mine-sweeping tugs. Expect begin shipment of mines January 15. Will send officers to confer and arrange details within a few days.

By this time losses of merchant tonnage through submarine action had diminished to one-half the April, 1917, figure, and this, combined with the increasing number of antisubmarine craft, the rising curve of merchant tonnage production, and the extended employment of the convoy system, had made it apparent that the Allies would be able ultimately to defeat the submarine, and to carry on the war throughout 1918, provided no increase in tonnage losses was experienced.

This situation, and this situation alone, made it possible to divert a portion of our military and industrial efforts from those antisubmarine measures which were producing immediate results to others, such as the proposed mine barrage, from which it would take longer to realize benefit. Our primary mission continued of course to be the protection of troops and shipping in convoys; but any undertaking which we could carry out in addition, such as the northern mine barrage, gave promise of being of great value in helping to defeat the submarines, and in depressing the morale of submarine commanders.

As I have clearly pointed out, however, the plan of the mine barrage, as finally carried out, as a supplementary measure against submarines, was an entirely different matter from the plans proposed by the department in April and May, 1917. These implied a complete neglect of the time element, and a desire to undertake enormous projects which could not possibly have been carried out at the time, and in time to be of any avail against the submarine campaign, unless, in the meantime, the measures which had been recommended to the department, after full conference with the Allies, had been accepted and put into full effect. Considering the resources of the Allies at that time, this was a condition impossible to fulfill.

Here, again, is an illustration of the way in which, to quote from my letter of January 7, 1920, paragraph 78:

Instead of relying upon the judgment of those who had actual war experience in this peculiar warfare, the Navy Department, though lacking not only this experience, but also lacking adequate information concerning it, insisted upon a number of plans that could not be carried out.

I wish also to point out again that I am not asking this committee to believe that the plans of the department, cabled to me in April and May, 1917, were impracticable because I said so at the time, and say so now, but because the department definitely stated later, as I have read to you, that upon receiving fuller information, they regarded their plans as impracticable or impossible of execution; and during this time, before the department could be convinced that any such royal road to victory was impracticable, they were delaying action on recommendations made by their representative abroad,

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after full consultation with the Allies, and thereby postponing by just so much the ultimate victory of the Allies.

To indicate to you further how impossible it would have been to undertake any such scheme as the northern barrage until it could be certain that the submarine activity could be checked, and time could be given to the development of other schemes like the mine barrage, let me review for a moment what had to be accomplished in developing the new mine, and preparing for the laying of the barrage, before it could even begin to be effective. The following problems had to be solved before this barrage could be put in effect:

1. The successful testing of the new mine at sea in the depths of water in which it was to be placed.

2. The placing of the production on an adequate basis to insure having a hundred thousand mines in time.

3. The commandeering of vessels and refitting them as mine layers.

4. The determination of the feasibility of fitting elevators on layers to reduce the number required and thereby the amount of time necessary.

5. The determination of the durability of the antennae of the mine in rough sea.

6. The determination of how successfully the normal electrical firing device would operate under actual conditions in the North Sea.

7. The problem of quantity production of the mine existing because of the necessity for assembling parts manufactured in many factories throughout the country.

8. The commandeering of 24 mine cargo ships to carry mines across the Atlantic at a time when all shipping was badly needed.

9. The necessity of establishing bases in Scotland for assembling the mines and loading them into the mine layers.

That question of bases alone, I may say incidentally, was a very, very large one; a tremendous installation with—I have forgotten how many—probably 3,000 men in all.

10. The necessity of arranging for adequate screening and protecting forces from the grand fleet for laying operations.

11. The planning of means of preventing sweeping operations by the enemy in a barrier 230 miles in length.

12. The solving of the problem of how Norwegian territorial waters could be closed.

13. The difficulty of cooperating with the grand fleet and of securing the consent of the commander of the fleet to laying mine fields with an untried electrical device in areas through which and over which the grand fleet necessarily might operate.

I might say in that connection that the mine barrier of nearly 100,000 mines got to the east of the anchorage of the grand fleet, and with the experience of all the Allies that many thousands of mines came adrift and drifted in shore, Admiral Beatty asked me what assurance I could give him that if our mines did drift—and a very considerable number of them did, drift—that they would become inoperative as soon as they got adrift; and it was only after we were able to satisfy him that there were three, and perhaps four—I can not remember exactly—separate devices in each mine which operated to make it ineffective after it became adrift, that he was satisfied that that mine barrage ought to be laid.

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14. The problem of insuring the absolute secrecy upon which the success of the operation depended.

15. The problem of getting the adequate number of mines transported abroad, assembled, and laid, within a time which was practicable.

With the exception of the first, fifth, sixth, and fourteenth, all of these problems would have been presented in case a barrier of nets and ordinary horn mines had been undertaken, and such a barrier would have presented these further problems:

1. The production of about three times as many mines and with a corresponding increase in the times required for production and laying and in the tonnage required for their transportation.

The mine barrages as finally laid took about 100,000 mines. Without going into any details, I will say that was rendered possible by the antennæ and afloat projecting above the mine, which was so designed that contact with any part of the mine or float would set the mine off. This enabled a barrage to be established with about 100,000 mines. Before the invention of that antennæ type, it would have required about from three to four times as many mines; that is to say, from 300,000 to 400,000, to make a barrier extending down to 250 feet.

2. The establishment of a base on the coast of Norway as a haven for small patrol vessels or the employment on the patrol of large vessels able to remain at sea a long time and in all weathers.

It is apparent that, until solutions of all these problems had been assured, the barrage could not be definitely decided upon, and the actual laying of mines could not be begun until the problems had been actually solved.

As soon as the project was decided upon, its execution became one of the activities of the United States naval forces in European waters under my command. It therefore was incumbent upon me to assure myself that before giving my concurrence, not only that it was a practicable project but that it promised to be reasonably effective and could be executed without serious detriment to the efficiency of the other antisubmarine measures which were already being carried out.

The whole project was executed in a manner which reflects credit on all concerned in it; the bureaus of the Navy Department that produced the mines and mining material and that fitted out the mine-laying vessels—the most suitable and efficient employed by any of the allied navies—the officers who trained the personnel in mine laying and who controlled the actual operations; the officers who established and equipped the bases in Scotland; the officer who commanded the whole force engaged and was, in the first instance, responsible for the success of the whole operation; and the personnel, officers and men who worked out the project to a successful conclusion.

From the time at which the project was undertaken, it had my full support and approval as a subsidiary measure, designed to depress enemy morale, and to accomplish the destruction of a certain number of enemy submarines.

It would, perhaps, be unnecessary for me to make this statement but for the assertion which has been made and widely circulated that the Navy Department had proposed and had from the first favored

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this project and that I was about the only officer of the Navy who had ever opposed it.

That statement was made before a large assembly in New York, in a very responsible manner, before an audience which was composed largely of our friends, the Irish, and my name was cordially hissed. I have gone into this subject here at some length to show that the statement there made was wholly false.

It should be fully understood, as I will explain in detail in a moment, that I never opposed the Northern Mine Barrage, as a valuable supplementary antisubmarine measure, when once the material and tonnage were available to make such a barrage possible. There is a distinction with regard to the mine barrage which has been lost sight of. As an achievement it stands as one of the wonders of this war. No such project in naval warfare had ever before been carried out more successfully. It is entirely beyond my power to give adequate expression to the admiration which I have for the organization in the United States which produced the mines, mine layers, and mining material and sent them abroad, and for the brave and efficient officers and sailors who were instrumental in the laying of this barrage; but, as a matter of policy, there is a very great difference between a mine barrage carried out as a useful supplementary measure and the proposal to make such a barrage our principal activity, when, in view of the fact that a year's preparation was necessary before so gigantic a project could be carried into effect. The war would have been lost before we could have assembled the material for such a barrage or could have found the tonnage to carry this material to Europe.

As I have repeatedly pointed out, the time element is one of the deciding factors in warfare. At a time of great danger, such as existed in 1917, at the time of our entry into the war, any plan, however successful in its ultimate results might be, must be judged in the light of the situation existing at the time. It is not enough when a nation is at war to prepare magnificent schemes of operation to be effective at some future date. When the enemy was striking the Allies in 1917, and dealing blows that were rapidly cutting all lines of communication by destroying the tonnage upon which the allied cause depended, no plan which we could have adopted would have been of any use which did not provide the immediate necessary assistance to the Allies in meeting the immediate issue; that is, the submarine campaign as it was being waged in 1917.

This is a point so simple that it needs only to be stated for its truth to be clear. Numerous illustrations can be drawn from the history of warfare to show how disastrous have been the consequences of failing to enter immediately into a war and meet a situation created by the enemy's activities in the hope that later a royal road to victory could be found. The idea of making a grand stroke which would at one fell swoop reduce the enemy to confusion and force him to surrender, has been throughout history one of those fascinating and delusive fallacies which have cost many a defeat.

As I am about to begin a new subject, and I understand the chairman wanted to stop a little early to-day, I might stop here.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. The committee will stand adjourned until to-morrow morning.

(Thereupon, at 11.50 o'clock a. m., the subcommittee adjourned until to-morrow, Wednesday, March 17, 1920, at 10 o'clock a. m.)

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NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 17, 1920.

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NAVAL AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 o'clock a. m., in room 235, Senate Office Building, Senator Frederick Hale presiding.

Present: Senators Hale (chairman), Ball, and Pittman.

TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL WILLIAM S. SIMS—Resumed.

Admiral SIMS. Before proceeding with the testimony to-day, I should like to state that I have had printed each day the testimony I have given before this committee, and I have in addition to giving copies to the press, given copies of each day's hearing to all officers and others in the Navy Department who wished them, so that they would have a complete record of all the documentary evidence and comments, and would thus be able to bring out all the facts in the case.

I should also like to say that if any errors have been made in the copies of the letters and cablegrams that have been submitted, I should be very glad to have them corrected by a comparison with the official record. There may be some mistakes of a typographical nature.

I finished yesterday the consideration of the question of the North Sea barrage. In that statement I tried to make it entirely clear that I never had, at any time, opposed the barrage as now understood by this committee, and probably by the American people. It was only the impracticable barrage that was proposed in the first place.

DEPARTMENT'S REQUESTS FOR PLANS.

Throughout the months of June, July, and August, 1917, I continued to receive, from the department, cables in which they indicated their desire for some new and radical policy, thus showing that the department could not have realized, at the time, the dangerous character of the submarine warfare, and did not appreciate the extreme importance of the element of time.

Thus in a cable of June 23, 1917, with regard to the production of mines, the department cabled:

Are there any plans for future contemplated operations that we could be supplied with?

And this was on June 23, 1917. For over two months I had been urging upon the department the plans for future operations which

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had been agreed upon by the heads of the allied navies as those required to meet the situation. This I continued to point out in other cables sent to the department.

In another cable of July 5, 1917, which I have already quoted in connection with the disposition of forces, the department stated:

So far no information as to any definite plans for future operations of naval forces. In view of requests made, and our efforts to respond, must insist that any plans for operations under consideration be submitted for our study.

Similarly, in its cable of July 10, 1917, with regard to the policy of the Navy Department, it was stated:

The department can not too strongly insist that, in its opinion, the offensive must always be the dominant note in any general plans of strategy prepared, but as the primary rôle in all offensive preparations must perforce belong to the allied powers, the Navy Department announces as its policy that, in general, it is willing to accept any joint plan of action of the Allies deemed necessary to meet immediate needs. * * * The Navy Department announces as its general plan of action the following * * *. 3. Its willingness to discuss more fully plans for joint operations.

JOSEPHUS DANIELS.

It is apparent from these dispatches, first, that the Navy Department still believed that it was being kept in ignorance with regard to essential plans; second, that its estimate of the situation in the war zone was completely mistaken, as is clearly indicated by its refusal to recognize the plans for antisubmarine operations, and for the convoy system as plans of operation against the enemy; and, third, that it still had in mind the royal road to victory.

As I pointed out in paragraph 20 of my letter of January 7, 1920:

Judging from the actions that were finally taken, after extensive cabled and written communications, and consequent long delays, it is apparent that, if I could have appeared daily in Washington to explain fully my recommendations, and the discussions before the conferences upon which they were based, they would undoubtedly have been carried out from two to six months earlier.

In paragraphs 28, 29, and 30 of this letter, I referred to these requests of the department for information concerning future offensive operations, and pointed out:

In other words, while the department's first statement of policy was what I had recommended since the beginning, it, nevertheless, withheld putting it into effect, apparently because of the conviction that the Allies were not keeping it fully informed of their plans. The truth of the matter was that nothing was withheld, and that all policies and plans which were in writing, which were actually of an official nature, and which in any way affected United States naval cooperation, had been transmitted to the department as completely as long distance communication—coded messages—permitted.

The review that I have thus far made of the attempts of the department to propose plans, and make decisions in Washington, has been, I think, a sufficient one to show you that, in the cases I have mentioned, the department itself recognized in the end the impracticability of the plans they had themselves earlier proposed. As a corollary to this, in the case of all the essential recommendations made in consultation with the Allies, the best proof of their soundness is the fact that the department later admitted their soundness by adopting them and by carrying them out as the policy of the department throughout the rest of the war. Consequently, there can now be no fundamental disagreement between myself and the department as to the policy and plans which were finally followed.

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We are agreed that that policy was sound when it was adopted and put into effect. We are agreed also that the Navy in the war zone maintained its highest traditions, by the efficiency and devotion with which the personnel carried out their mission, and made the sea safe for our American troops and reasonably safe for all allied shipping, in spite of every effort of the German submarine.

But the point which I again stress, and can not stress too much, is that, for the first six months of the war, the department failed to realize, as it did later, the soundness of the recommendations which were being made in accordance with the department's instructions, and insisted upon proposing alternative schemes of its own, which the department itself, six months later, recognized were impracticable or unfeasible. This delay was tremendously costly, resulting in unnecessary loss of shipping and therefore the unnecessary prolongation of the war, with all its sacrifices.

INADEQUATE PERSONNEL FOR STAFF.

I come now to a question which I have touched on frequently in my testimony; that is, to the point No. 6, of paragraph 78, of my letter of January 7, 1920, in which I said:

> The department's representative with the allied admiralties was not supported during the most critical months of the war, either by the adequate personnel, or by the adequate forces, that could have been supplied.

In my letter, paragraphs 27, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 57, 58, I referred to the immense difficulty that I had in handling the tremendous amount of detailed work, and in discharging the very grave responsibilities which the department had intrusted to me, without giving me the assistance of an adequate staff of trained officers, who could have assisted me from the beginning to make my headquarters serve the department to the maximum extent, enabling it to maintain constant and intimate relations with the various branches of the allied admiralties, and with all the multifarious activities of the various branches of the allied admiralties, and with all the multifarious activities of the various allied fleets, throughout the areas in which they were engaged. In order to handle the situation, as I pointed out in paragraph 50 of my letter:

> I should have had a staff capable of:
> 1. Obtaining complete information of the various phases of the naval campaign, which had been in operation for over two years.
> 2. Keeping up to date with the developments which were rapidly changing almost from day to day.
> 3. Efficiently administering, supplying, and operating the entire force.
> 4. Coordinating our work with that of the Allies.

All the testimony that I have thus far offered will, doubtless, have served to convince you of the wide variety of subjects, and of the grave responsibility of the decisions, which the responsibilities of my position made necessary. It will only be necessary to review the letters and cables that I sent to the department on this subject, beginning in April, 1917, and continuing throughout the ensuing year, to show you what difficulties I had to meet, because of the lack of an adequate and properly equipped staff—a staff similar to that with which any business organization would have been provided.

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Before proceeding with the testimony to substantiate this part of my letter, I wish clearly to define, beyond possibility of misunderstanding, the sole point at issue. That point, simply stated, is this: That during the critical period of the war, the first half of the war, the department left its representative abroad with wholly inadequate assistance to carry out the mission which they had assigned to him. As I stated in my letter of January 7, the necessity for such assistance was finally recognized by the department, and in the latter months of the war I was provided with an adequate staff. I hope I have made this sufficiently clear, and that we will not be led away from that point, namely, that the period in question is the critical first half and not the last half of the war.

It should also be pointed out that one of the chief reasons for the assignment of an adequate number of officers for duty abroad was, not only to assist me in carrying out my duties, but also to assist the department by making it possible to supply full reports upon every aspect of the naval activity in the war zone. One of the great dangers in the military service is apt to be the instinct of overconservatism, which clings to old teachings and traditions, without realizing to the full the changes brought in the crucial test of actual warfare, especially when, as in our case, we had been mere spectators for three years without receiving any very full or complete accounts of the developments and war experience of the allied powers. The very fact that we did not realize how many things we had to learn was, from the first, one of the grave dangers in making decisions and drawing up plans in Washington, and it was for this reason that I insistently urged that the department should send over officers in whom it had confidence, representing each of the technical bureaus, whose only function should be to acquire from the various allied services every available kind of information which would be of help to our own department, or, to put the case quite simply, that we might profit by the success and mistakes of our allies.

From the first week of my arrival in England I realized the urgent necessity of this measure. The Admiralties of the allied Navy Departments from the time we declared war, offered us complete access to all information at their disposition and to all the experience they had acquired. It was, therefore, only a question of having a sufficient number of trained assistants to collect this information, to put it in proper form, and transmit it to Washington. It must be remembered that the responsibility for gathering this information rested mainly on me. I was aware of our own needs. Every man in the allied services was occupied with a real job. They had no time to worry about what we knew or didn't know. The naval attaché with his two assistants, one an officer of the Supply Corps, the other of the Medical Corps, had been fully occupied with the duties imposed upon them by prewar conditions, and although they rendered such assistance as they could, they were not placed under any orders until a later period. The task of getting the information we required was a very difficult and tedious one. It meant digging through records, and it meant following up sources of information, wherever they might lead, out into the fleet or elsewhere. From the present viewpoint it is almost impossible to conceive of the wall of secrecy that was necessarily maintained around allied war operations and the allied

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military services. I am sure every officer who had experience over there will agree, when he stops to look back, that our ignorance of the experiences of the war prior to our entry was indeed appalling.

Furthermore, in order properly to coordinate our own activities with those of the Allies, it was essential that we have available, in the war zone, a sufficient number of capable officers who understood the Allies, in order to profit by their experiences and to keep our own forces in the closest possible harmony with them. The importance of this is now generally recognized. We find, for example, in the report of the Secretary of the Navy of the year 1918:

The outstanding accomplishment of the Navy abroad in this war, outside of rigorous and valorous service in the danger zone, has been the character and degree of cooperation, and practical consolidation, for the time being, of our services with those services with which we have been associated. The Navy, beginning with the arrival of the first ship abroad, has stood out for unity of command, even this in some instances involving sacrificing temporarily something of our identity as an independent service. It is believed to be a safe statement that the degree of accomplishment of our service in this respect is without precedent in allied warfare.

This quotation establishes the thorough and complete approval of that accomplishment by the Navy Department. It remains to be shown, therefore, the attitude taken by the department in 1917, in the critical months of the war, when I was requesting the assistance necessary to make possible this accomplishment, and when I was pleading with all the insistence at my command, that the department take some action.

To run through briefly, a few of the outstanding facts regarding the assistance given me by the Navy Department in this period. As I have stated, I went abroad with one aid. When I arrived in London I found in the naval attaché's office one line officer, the naval attaché, one officer of the Supply Corps, and one officer of the Medical Corps. These officers had been for some time in London, and each of them was already fully occupied before I arrived with a variety of tasks which precluded their giving me any great degree of assistance. They did everything in their power to assist me, as far as permitted by the paramount demands of their regular duties. In a very few days I found myself literally overwhelmed with the task that faced me, with every department of the British Admiralty and likewise the French Ministry of Marine, thrown open to us, and with insistent requests from many sections of the Navy Department at home for technical information of many descriptions. It was physically impossible for me and my one aid merely to collect the information requested, to say nothing of maintaining constant touch with the heads of the allied admiralties, and later directing the operations of our own forces in Europe, looking out for their supplies, etc. To complicate matters still further, all communications had to be converted into intricate codes, which was a tremendous task in itself, and involved hours of purely routine labor on the part of my aid, assisted by the small staff of the naval attaché; and this purely mechanical detail was added to the task of collecting, digesting, and collating the information to be sent to the Navy Department. It was for this reason that, in cabling the department on April 16, a week after my arrival, I said:

Advise sending McBride, also engineer and gunnery officer. All information now wide open.

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Again, in my letter of April 27, in referring to this same recommendation, I wrote the department as follows:

APRIL 27, 1917.

All essential information has been covered by cable dispatch. Up to the present my time has been too fully occupied in ascertaining and confirming information concerning the military situation to give much attention to questions of material.

I strongly recommend that expert representatives of the Bureau of Construction and Repair, Ordnance and Steam Engineering, be sent here as early as possible, as all channels of information are now open. Such representatives should be of as high rank as practicable.

On April 29 I received from the department the announcement of my appointment to command the destroyers then on their way to Europe.

On April 30 I therefore sent the following cable:

Sent: April 30, 1917.

I acknowledge receipt of orders to command destroyer forces in these waters. As consultations with Admiralty will frequently be required, it is essential that I have experienced representative at base of our forces at all times. Therefore I request immediate detail of staff as follows: Pratt, chief of staff, and Taylor, Evans, or Daniels, or Coffey as aid; and Tobey. It is essential that Tobey be assigned in addition to his present duties. Sims.

PAGE.

It will be noted that I pointed out the need for a staff, requested specifically the appointment of Capt. Pratt to be my chief of staff, and asked for one aid out of three officers whom I named. I had every reason to believe that Capt. Pratt was available and would be assigned. I was under the impression that he was on duty as a student at the Army War College in Washington. I believe it was some time after this that he was assigned to duty in Operations, and it was considerably later that he was assigned as assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations, on the death of Capt. Chase. Not receiving any answer, about eight days later I cabled and asked information concerning the assignment of Capt. Pratt and an additional aid, stating that their services were urgently required.

Lieut. Commander J. P. Daniels was ordered on April 30, 1917, to proceed to Europe and report to me. He arrived Queenstown May 17, 1917, and was assigned to Queenstown base in connection with destroyers.

On May 11, in another cable to the department, I said:

Capt. Pratt's services urgently needed, specially owing to his previous service with me and his experience and knowledge of destroyer operations.

SIMS.

Similar requests for the services of Capt. Pratt were cabled to the Navy Department on May 21 and May 23.

On May 25 I received the following message from the department:

Capt. W. V. Pratt is not available for duty as chief of staff.

DANIELS,
Secretary of the Navy.

When I received this message of May 25, stating that Capt. Pratt was not available, but with no information as to what his duties were, or as to any other officers that might be available for this duty, I felt again the necessity of pointing out to the department the situation which led me to specifically request Capt. Pratt. This was in my cable of May 27, which I will read you. This was sent evidently from Queenstown. [Reading:]

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Sent: May 27, 1917.
To: Secretary of the Navy.
Through: State Department.

Begins: Returning London to-morrow for conference with Chief of Staff, French Navy. It is of particular importance that Capt. Pratt be sent at earliest moment as chief of staff. Situation is of such nature that success of operations and spirit of cooperation (coordination) might be endangered by an officer of wrong temperament and methods. From extended experience with Capt. Pratt, I know him to be peculiarly well adapted to requirements of this situation. In view of fact that strain of this position is not light, and responsibility is heavy, I request that selection of staff be based upon my estimate of my peculiar relations with officials of allied naval forces.

SIMS.

I received no answer to this cable, and throughout the remainder of the month of June I continued to be without any information as to whether or not assistance was to be sent me, or as to whether I was to have a chief of staff or not.

In the meantime I had endeavored to secure the services of a number of officers who had come to Europe on armed guard or other duty. Thus, for example, the steamship *New York* had been mined on entering Liverpool, on my arrival at that port. It became necessary, therefore, for her to remain some time at Liverpool for repairs. At the same time I learned that the *Minnesota* was tied up in London and would not sail for some time. At my request, the naval attaché, therefore, cabled the department, requesting that the armed guard officers of these steamers be assigned to temporary duty to help out in London. The department approved this on April 28.

The approval of the department that these officers should remain and assist me meant only while their vessels were held for repairs in England.

When in May, however, I requested their services for duty in Europe, the department disapproved by recommendation. Thus, on May 9, in a dispatch, I stated that there were petty officers on each of these vessels competent to command the armed guard, and requested that the officers be assigned to duty with the destroyer force.

Again, on May 14, I cabled as follows:

Sent: May 14, 1917.
To: Secretary of the Navy.
Through: State Department.

Request information concerning my request to retain Lieuts. Emmet and Van de Ver, whose services are urgently needed. Former's engineering knowledge proving of great assistance, and latter's knowledge of French renders him of great value. Both officers report having excellent petty officers capable of taking charge of their armed guards. Request immediate reply on Emmet, as *Minnesota* sails in few days.

SIMS.

At about this time the armed guard officer of the *Philadelphia* arrived at London, and I learned from him that the department desired a great volume of information along many different lines. I referred to this in my cable of May 16, in which I said:

Sent: May 16, 1917.
To: Secretary of the Navy.
Through: State Department.

I am informed by officers arriving on armed liners that department desires a great deal of information concerning military and material information. Urgently request that cable be used freely in acquainting me with information desired, and also in informing me of situation at home as affects forces and duties of cooperation here. Request that as many former destroyer officers, particularly those who served under my command, and are now on duty elsewhere, be sent over, either on vessels coming, or as stand-by reliefs for ships now here. Information urgently requested as to my

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requests to retain Lieuts. Emmet and Van de Ver. Former sails in three days. Lieut. King on *Philadelphia*, who speaks French and Italian fluently, will also be of great service as liaison officer in coordinating work here and on the Continent. He sails in three days. Services of such officers will greatly facilitate duty here and aid in obtaining all information desired. It is of vital importance that all possible information should be obtained and transmitted rapidly, in order to prepare our forces for any future emergency. Services of Capt. Pratt as chief of staff are urgently needed.

SIMS.

The cable stating that Capt. Pratt was not available was not received until nine days after that dispatch was sent. I would like to invite attention here to that particular cable I have just read of the necessity of being able to send in all possible information about all possible details concerning the operations abroad.

In repeated cables I have assured the department that I have sent them all essential military information. That only covered the broad outlines of the situation. I wanted to be able to send them in information on all the specialties on the other side, so that they would be as well informed as possible of the conditions under which the submarine campaign was being carried out. I could not do it. It was physically impossible to do it with only two or three assistants. The consequence was, as you have seen by the testimony I have been giving for the last half dozen days, that time and time again the department in its cables exhibited an astonishing ignorance of the very elements of the submarine campaign, and I wanted to avoid that thing in the early months of the war, so that that thing would not happen. But I did not succeed because they did not give me the necessary personnel.

No reply was received for over two weeks. Lieut. Emmet, the armed guard officer of the *Minnesota*, was obliged to leave London when his ship sailed on May 16.

In a cable of May 31, I again referred to these armed guard officers, and requested authority to retain them for duty under my command.

When the *New York* was finally about ready to sail on her return trip, on June 12, I cabled again to the department, with regard to my request for the services of the armed guard officer, but was informed by a dispatch of June 14 that the return of this officer to the United States was desired.

In the meantime I continued to have only the services of one aide, together with that of an American in London who had resigned from the naval service in 1914, but who volunteered for duty with me, and was given a provisional appointment as lieutenant, by authority of the Secretary of the Navy, on April 16.

On May 21, I pointed out to the department that the staff that I had was entirely inadequate to make possible the handling of Navy codes. I therefore, said:

In order that our staff officers here be available for important military duties, it is urgently requested, as recommended in my previous dispatches, that the State Department's codes and staffs be utilized for all communications, except those of a special secret nature.

On May 15 I learned that Commander Morton, who had been in command of the *Scorpion*, our station ship at Constantinople, had succeeded in reaching Paris. As I had no information concerning the sending of officers from America, and as at this time the department had informed me of its intention to establish bases on the French coast, I cabled on May 15, requesting that Morton be assigned to duty in France, in accordance with his own request.

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On May 18, I received a message from the Secretary of the Navy, ordering him to return home on the first available steamer.

On May 25, I cabled to the Secretary, pointing out that an urgent conference made it necessary to hold Morton for a few days, and requested that the department's orders be reconsidered.

On May 26, the Secretary of the Navy replied that Morton could remain for a few days, but should then carry out his previous instructions.

On May 31, after a conference with the French chief of staff, I felt it so important that we have officers speaking French, and familiar with European conditions, for this duty, that I cabled to the department, requesting the reconsideration of Morton's orders, and stated:

His language and experience urgently needed. Speaks French fluently and is unusually well equipped to assume command of one of the prospective French bases.

I realized that as Capt. Morton had but recently escaped from Turkey, the department, undoubtedly, was anxious to have his reports, and, therefore, stated in the cable that Morton was prepared to submit at once all of the information which he had acquired in Turkey.

The only reply that I received was a statement that Commander Morton should carry out his original orders.

Up to June 5, about two months after my arrival, the only additions to my staff made by the department were Lieut. Commander Daniels whose services were needed at Queenstown, and Surg. Pleadwell, assistant to the naval attaché, concerning whom the naval attaché received the following dispatch on May 26:

Please direct Surg. Pleadwell, United States Navy, to report to Vice Admiral Sims, United States Navy, for additional duty as medical aide.

DANIELS,
Secretary of the Navy.

On May 30, after conference with the French chief of naval staff, I cabled that the French chief of naval staff had expressed the wish that:

A representative of the Navy Department, not below the rank of captain, be assigned to the French Navy Department. Although I am in touch with the French department, through their naval representative here, and also by telephone and telegraph, and can always reach Paris in a short time, it is considered that the request should be granted, as it will ensure closer daily cooperation and coordination. It is also considered that active officers, preferably with knowledge of French, should be assigned to our prospective bases in France.

On May 31, having heard unofficially that it was intended to order home Tobey, the officer of the Supply Corps on duty as assistant naval attaché, both the naval attaché and myself cabled the department, pointing out that his—

Services are urgently needed, both in an advisory capacity, as well as for his wide acquaintance in official circles, and familiarity with the situation and methods pursued in the British service.

It will be remembered that I had requested on April 30 that Tobey be assigned additional duty as aide to me. Up to this time, a month later, I had received no reply from the department concerning this.

On reviewing the situation with regard to personnel at the end of May, on returning from Queenstown, and especially after my conference with the French naval staff, and learning of the plans which

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the department had for the establishment of bases and the sending of forces to France, I felt that the situation could not continue longer as it was, and I therefore sent the following message, attempting to point out to the Navy Department that the responsibilities which devolved upon me, and the necessity of getting for the department the benefit of allied war experience, made necessary the sending immediately of sufficient experienced representatives. My dispatch was as follows:

To: Secretary of Navy, Operations.
Through: State Department.
Sent: May 31.

In the belief that the future security of the United States, or at least the accomplishment of our purpose in entering this war, will in a considerable degree be dependent upon the efficiency of the organization on this side, both afloat and ashore, it becomes my duty to specify the requirements, based on the situation here, which are necessary to the discharge of my full responsibility. Distance and methods of communication render it impracticable to convey to the department fully the peculiar character of the various situations that arise and the developments thereof. Decisions which I have to make may be of such far-reaching effect that my duty impels me to appeal for the assistance and facilities which I believe the situation demands. It is therefore urgently requested that the department approve a greatly enlarged organization, with a view to insuring that the department, fleet and the forces here are able to cooperate with the Allies to the maximum extent, and that they may fully profit in the future, as well as the present, by all available war experience ashore, afloat, material and otherwise. The importance can not be overestimated of having expert and experienced representatives, of all branches of our shore and sea forces, constantly in touch with the allied forces ashore and afloat, who are engaged in actual conflict. These representatives should be in the grand fleet, in the submarines, the patrol, and other services, gaining all possible experience and keeping in touch with the progress of all war activities. Experienced technical officers should be in London, to keep in touch with all departments of the Admiralty. The Admiralty have already suggested the advisability of our having a representative in the secret-service department, but no officers are available. It is necessary that I have an adviser concerning supply and accounting questions which have already arisen with the Admiralty. The supply officer of the *Melville* (which was at Queenstown) is already overburdened with local work concerning the destroyers, and can not keep in touch with the necessary work in London.

The requirements of the situation set forth above had led to request detention here of Morton, Van de Veer, Emmet, Tobey, and authority to enroll any one qualified for Naval Reserve Force. The organization requires greatly increased clerical staff; funds and authority to authorize expenditures under war conditions, as free as possible from detailed accounting as pursued in peace time. In view of the uncertain possibilities of this position the department's early action is earnestly requested.

SIMS.

That was May 31, about 2 months after we had entered the war.

In another message of June 1 I referred also to the desirability of cooperating with the allied secret service, and urged that an officer be sent from the United States to coordinate our secret-service work with that of the British.

In my letter to the department of June 1, 1917, I again emphasized the points which I have read you in my cable of May 31.

The cable of May 31 seems to have been sufficiently urgent in its tone to call forth a response, for on June 5 I received the following dispatch:

Received: June 5, 1917.
This cablegram is for Sims.

Quote reply to your cable of June 1. Department will afford you every facility which material and personnel conditions Navy permit. Technical officers from material bureaus have been ordered or will be order(ed). You are authorized to detain Tobey. *Dixie* coming with full complement of officers. Department disapproves of

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(all) commissioning of personal (personnel). You have authority to employ necessary clerical assistance. Arrangement has been made to keep United States Navy force(s) supplied with fuel, provision(s) and spart parts existed repair. Authorize such expenditure as (may) be necessary to maintain your forces in efficient condition and for any purpose connected therewith. No. 23004.

DANIELS,
Secretary of the Navy.

NOTE.—This is the literal translation of the word as verified by repetition.

It will be noted that in this reply, the first information which I had received concerning personnel, it was stated that the department would afford me every facility which the personnel conditions of the Navy permitted, and that technical officers from material bureaus had been or would be ordered. Up to this time I had received no information, however, concerning these officers, and what is more important, the officers themselves had not yet put in an appearance, except in one case, that of Lieut. G. L. Schuyler, who had been ordered abroad by the Navy Department for the purpose of inspecting certain ordnance equipment being purchased from British firms not in London. He had reported in London to the naval attaché on May 26, but had no orders to report to me as aid, and his time was fully occupied by the duties which the department had assigned him, at least during the first months.

On June 8 in a letter to the department I again pointed out the necessity for coordinating our service with that of the Allies through the sending to Europe of an adequate number of experienced officers. My letter was as follows:

JUNE 8, 1917.

It is assumed that the primary purpose of the United States naval organization here in London is to serve as the coordinating link, on this side, between the department and the British and French admiralties, or, in other words, between the United States and allied naval services in prosecution of the war. It is therefore a duty to keep the department informed of any difficulties which may be encountered and the best means of correcting them as seen from the viewpoint here.

The paramount difficulties so far involved have been due to the lack of an adequate experienced staff, as fully set forth in previous dispatches.

It is also essential to the efficiency of the organization that the department's policy, plans, and intentions should be known in a general way at all times. It is for this reason that I have previously requested a weekly information dispatch for the sole purpose of information as to matters of policy and prospective plans, in order that the activities of this organization may be thoroughly coordinated with those of the department, and, what is more important, that our service may be at all times prepared for any developments or emergencies, and that its activities may be directed to an end of the maximum service to the allied cause.

On June 10, I received a cable from the Secretary of the Navy, announcing that I was to inform Paymaster Tobey that he was to report for additional duty as aid to my staff.

I might say here in passing that in spite of all the recommendations which I had made, I had up to July 7, three months after my arrival in England, received only three additions to my staff. One of these officers had necessarily been detailed to duty at Queenstown; the other two were assistants to the naval attaché, ordered to additional duty with me. In the meantime, after the convoy system was put into effect and our troops began to move on the high seas, and my responsibilities were thereby greatly increased, almost daily it became necessary that I should have a competent officer for the

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exclusive handling of these convoys. I therefore sent to the department on June 11 the following message:

Sent: June 11, 1917.
To: Secretary of the Navy.
Through: State Department.

18. Admiralty has requested, and I recommend, that a United States naval officer be assigned to me for exclusive duty in admiralty in connection with convoys and selection of rendezvous and similar important duties concerning movements our Government ships as affected by submarine campaign. Officer should be commander, as head of that admiralty department is a captain. Very important to be carefully selected with view of insuring desirable cooperation and relations. With increase of our military and naval forces in European waters, and their attending shipping for maintenance, the question of a convoy and routes will become increasingly intricate and important.

SIMS.

This recommendation I repeated in my letter of June 20 and in dispatches of July 1, July 3, July 5, July 9, and July 14, without ever receiving an answer, and, therefore, finally I was compelled to order the commander of one of the Queenstown destroyers to duty in London, in order to take charge of this important work, upon which the lives of our troops, as well as losses of valuable cargoes, was dependent.

I only wish that I were capable of describing the conditions existing in my office at this time. We were established in two small rooms in the Embassy, which had been kindly given us by the Ambassador, only at the expense of additional crowding of Embassy officials. Dispatches were pouring in on us every day. This is the period when we got a business man, a former American naval officer, to come in and help us, and also got the assistance of some stenographers from American business firms in London.

Incidentally, that business man paid the salaries of these stenographers for some time.

I will not even attempt to describe this remarkable situation, further than to say that the reason I became so insistent, was that we had reached the limit of the physical endurance of the personnel available.

There were simply not enough minutes in the day to accomplish the work that had to be accomplished—and with such important questions as troops moving on the high seas, dependent upon us for direction and control, it was quite within the range of possibility that a mistake might be made which would have resulted in disaster.

I fully explained the situation to the department, in repeated letters of about this time, as, for example, in my letter of June 20, to the department. [Reading:]

18. I wish again to urge the necessity for greatly increasing the staff under my command. It is wholly impossible for me to keep myself fully acquainted with the situation without an increased staff. The lack for an experienced Chief of Staff, with whom I am thoroughly acquainted, suited to the peculiar existent conditions, has been a great embarrasment. The need for at least one experienced representative, in the Operations Department of the Admiralty, has been pressing, and becomes more important daily. The time and attention of all officers of the Admiralty are fully taken up with pressing daily war duties. They can not keep me fully informed of the problems which may affect me, both owing to the lack of time and also to lack of knowledge of what I need; my information is therefore, chiefly confined to very important questions which require my action, and to that which I deliberately seek.

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Again I want to point attention to the last sentence of that message, that I was only able to send in information which was confined to very important questions which required my action. I could not possibly send in the information which the department should have had to make it thoroughly acquainted with conditions of the antisubmarine warfare, and the result of that thing was, as you have seen by my previous testimony, a most amazing ignorance of the department, up to the latter period of the war, as to what the whole business was about.

As I have already stated, I received no answers to any of my dispatches regarding personal sent at this time until the 7th of July.

In the meantime I had cabled again to the department on July 1 as follows:

Sent: July 1, 1917.
To: Secretary of the Navy.
Through: Admiralty.

No. 66. I again urgently request the services of Capt. Pratt, and a commander, for duty in Admiralty, in connection with convoys. If Capt. Pratt could come at once, with department point of view, his estimate of situation would undoubtedly be of incalculable value, and remove any misunderstanding of the situation which may now exist.

SIMS.

When I received a cable stating that Capt. Pratt was not available, I did not know then what his duty was. I assumed that he was on duty, as I had known him to be, in the Army War College.

On July 3 I cabled to the Navy Department as follows:

Sent: July 3, 1917.
To: Secretary Navy.

No. 72. Again urgently recommend that a carefully selected commander be sent immediately, for duty under me in British Admiralty in connection with convoys. The Admiralty particularly desires this. If Capt. Pratt can not be sent as chief of staff, is Capt. Twining available?

Having learned, on July 3, of the death of Capt. Chase in Washington, and consequently, of the necessity for retaining Capt. Pratt in the Office of Naval Operations, I cabled again on July 4, as follows:

Sent: July 4, 1917.
To: Secretary of the Navy. (Operations.)
Through: State Department.

No. 75. Request services of Capt. Twining as chief of staff; also request services of Commander Cone for duty on my staff, or under my command.

SIMS.

And on July 5:

Sent: July 5, 1917.
To: Secretary of the Navy, Washington.
Through: State Department (enclair).

No. 78. It is physically impossible to insure efficiency my duty, and safeguard department's and country's interests, without immediate increase of staff. My responsibilities demand immediate dispatch, by first steamer sailing, of chief of staff and minimum of two additional assistants, with war college experience. Request Capt. Twining, Commander McNamee, and Lieut. Coffey.

SIMS.

In answer to this series of messages I received, on July 7, the following dispatch from the department:

Appointment of Capt. Twining as your chief of staff has been ordered.

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And on the following day I received another message from the department confirming this and stating that a lieutenant commander had also been ordered for duty as aide.

The personnel situation which I had to face, at that time, was summed up in my letter of July 7, 1917, of which the pertinent paragraphs were as follows:

It is impossible this week to submit a full report of operations of our forces, and all other developments of interest and value to the department.

This is on account of the unusual strain which has been placed upon the organization here, and the total inadequacy of the staff available to handle it.

It has now become physically impossible to carry on the work with the personnel available. With all British officials individually engaged in the actual conduct of the war, it is wholly impossible for them to furnish me or my staff voluntarily with all the information which I should have, and it is necessarily incumbent upon me to join into British official activities and ascertain the majority of the information which the department needs by actual contact and observation. Such a course is manifestly entirely dependent upon the size of my staff and the demands made upon the time of myself and my staff.

As previously reported by letter and cable dispatch, the very minimum assistance which is necessary is a chief of staff an dthree subordinate aids experienced in staff work.

As reported by dispatch, it is physically impossible for the organization under my command to accomplish the mission for which it is assigned without an immediate increase of personnel.

In interviews with officers recently arrived from the department they indicate the possibility of a more or less fundamental misunderstanding between the department and myself. The misunderstanding is probably due to various causes, principal among which are—

(*a*) Difference of point of view, each more or less unknown to the other.

(*b*) Lack of full information on my part of the difficulties under which the department is working.

(*c*) The inadequacy of both written and cable communication; that is, the impossibility of fully explaining the phases of the situation or circumstances reported and the danger of misinterpretation of statements actually made.

I will, therefore, urgently recommend that from time to time an officer be selected from the department who is thoroughly in touch with the department's point of view and policies and sent on temporary duty to confer with me with a view of returning immediately to the department.

REQUEST FOR LIAISON OFFICERS.

As I have already pointed out, I had been also repeatedly informing the department of the necessity for capable officers for duty in Europe of a liaison character, in order that the war experiences of the Allies might be made available for the department. I have already referred to my cables in April and May on this subject. On May 16 I sent a letter to the Navy Department on this subject, pointing out how essential it was that competent American officers should be sent for duty in Europe with the various allied naval forces, in order that the department might be kept constantly informed of war experience and new developments. I had received no reply from the department or any indication that they had received or considered my recommendations up to this time—that is, three months after my arrival in London. In the meantime I learned that the various armed guard officers, arriving in English ports on passenger liners, had orders to proceed directly to London, on arriving in English ports, to obtain information for the department on special subjects. Thus, for example, on May 15, 1917, a lieutenant arrived in London and informed me that he had verbal orders form the Chief of Naval Operations "to get information as to the antisubmarine operations of

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the allied forces; to ascertain if it would be practicable in any way to blockade the German submarines in the North Sea, and, in addition, to obtain any points which might be of value in connection with new submarine construction of the United States."

I should like to comment on that in this way: The Navy Department sends a rear admiral abroad, who is there with certain assistants. He has been there three months. He has been in almost daily communication with the heads of the allied navies. He bears a tremendous responsibility of the safety of all those forces and the safety of our troops. He is devoting all his energies to it. Still, the Department gives an order to a young, comparatively inexperienced lieutenent to run down from the port of arrival in Great Britian to London, pick up what information he can, and go back and give it to the Navy Department, with the avowed object of basing the action of the Navy Department on the result. If anything could possibly be more dangerous in warfare than that, I do not know what it is.

Thus, instead of depending upon the London headquarters to obtain this information, which could easily have been done, if I had had adequate assistance, because of the close relations which existed with the heads and various officials of the allied navies, the department apparently expected to obtain this information by having an armed guard officer spend a week in London during the time before his ship started on its return voyage to the United States. I have a letter addressed to me by this lieutenant, covering the subject which he talked about at the Admiralty, and the information which he obtained. It is too long to read here, but it would be interesting to include in the record as showing the variety of subjects on which he obtained information for the department, and in pointing out the way in which, by this method, the department was necessarily duplicating the work by sending a number of different officers, at different times, to the Admiralty to ask, from the same sections, approximately the same information. This happened so often in the early months of 1917 that at the beginning of August I received from the Admiralty a polite request asking whether it would not be possible to have all requests for information come through one channel, as the Admiralty had found that a number of officers had at different times asked for exactly the same information.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you placing this letter from the lieutenent in the record?

Admiral SIMS. Yes; I will do so.

Senator BALL. It should be placed in the record, I think.

Admiral SIMS. Yes; it is in the record, but it is too long and too technical to read to the committee, I think. It is there.

(The letter referred to is as follows:)

AMERICAN EMBASSY,
London, May 16, 1917.

From: Lieutenant R. C. Grady, United States Navy.
To: Rear Admiral Wm. S. Sims, United States Navy.
Subject: Report to Chief of Operations.

1. Upon my return to the Navy Department, Washington, I will make a report in substance as follows:

2. The trip over was uneventful except for the casualties to the *Conyngham's* circulator and the *Wainwright's* condensor. The casualty to the condenser of the *Wainwright* points to the military necessity of having two condensers.

3. In the vicinity of Queenstown and Fasnet there is an area of submarine activity which it is very important to patrol to safeguard shipping. There will be included in

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the report of the Queenstown area many minor bits of information, chiefly interesting rather than instructive in character.

4. Before going to the Admiralty, I submitted an outline of my mission in London, a copy of which I will give to the Chief of Operations. This letter was presented to Admiral Jellicoe and sent by him to the division of antisubmarine affairs.

5. At the Admiralty in London an officer—Lieut. Commander Hichens—was assigned to introduce me to various officers who could give me information needed. Mr. Hichens also gave me information of a general character. I talked to Rear Admiral Alexander L. Duff, head of the division which deals with antisubmarine measures, with Admiral Edward S. Fritzherbert, Director of Torpedoes and Mining, and with Capt. Spear, head of the Mine Division.

6. Some of the details of the nets I made notes on but as I learned later that the details and drawings of all nets and mines were to be furnished or else had already been furnished to the Navy Department, I kept no further notes. I also got information as to the probable routes the submarines take in leaving their bases at Zeebrugge, Emden, and Wilhelmshaven through and around the area mined by the British.

7. The British have in general found it impracticable to maintain an adequate patrol in the North Sea which would seriously interfere with the passage of submarines through the North Sea on account of the number of ships needed. Two net barriers or barrages which were established in the vicinity of Dover to prevent submarines from passing through were finally partially carried away by the tide and sea and though parts of them are still in place no one doubts that some of the submarines pass over to Ireland by this channel.

8. Most of the German submarines and particularly the large ones after clearing the mine field off the German coast head directly for Fair Island between the Orkneys and the Shetland Islands and do not hesitate to pass through to the Atlantic. The British have found it wholly impracticable to net this passage. The submarines usually made a landfall at St. Kilda west of the Hebrides and thence down to the vicinity of Fastnet and the Scillys. They are usually out 20 days, eight of which are required for the passage to and fro. Submarines usually spend two-fifths of their time away from their base. As the Admiralty believe that the Germans have 150 submarines there are 60 submarines always out. The Germans are turning out about two submarines a week.

9. In connection with a scheme for effectively closing the North Sea by using mines and nets in conjunction with the patrols, the officers of the Admiralty consider it to be impracticable. The same thing was suggested several times by their own officers but after consideration was disapproved. The objections are given as the lack of necessary patrols, impossibility to maintain nets, impracticability to mine in water over 50 fathoms with anchored mines, and the undesirability of floating mines on account of possible danger to their fleet.

10. Patrols have been withdrawn from the North Sea except near the coast and near the channel. At present the general line of defense is the mined area in Heligoland Bight and the patrol of the areas of submarine operations.

11. The strategy regarding the Grand Fleet is still adhered to, with the view of its meeting the German High Sea Fleet in the near future.

12. The patrols are no doubt as efficient as their numbers make it possible for them to be but on account of the need of certain flotillas being kept ready with the fleet. the patrol is reduced so much in its effectiveness

13. The Admiralty are somewhat reorganized and will no doubt result in improvements, as the heads are relieved of much routine and details.

14. I will state as my opinion that the present lines of effort are defective to some extent.

15. At present the policy of maintaining the fleet is of prime importance and overcoming the submarine menace is of secondary importance. This is wrong because it will be the submarine that will (if anything does) bring about the defeat of the Allies, and not the German High Seas Fleet. As to secure control of the surface it is necessary to operate against the enemy on the surface, so to secure the control of the subsurface it will be necessary to operate against the enemy in subsurface areas. Surface craft could carry out submarine operations by dropping mines and depth charges if they could see the submarine. Not being able to see the submarine the only other way to gain control of the subsurface is to scatter mines everywhere in it so that a submarine can not operate in it. This, of course, can not be done over the entire ocean, but the North Sea presents an area which it is possible to control. Actual attempts to gain control there may prove it to be impossible, but it should at least be attempted. This will require the extensive use of mines and may interfere with the Grand Fleet, but even so, the movements of the Grand Fleet should be subordinated to the antisubmarine measure to whatever extent necessary.

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16. If present patrols are just maintaining their own, and the German submarine force is to be almost doubled, in a year it will be necessary to double the patrol force.

17. I will also say as my own opinion that every possible chart that can be of service to the Allies in their antisubmarine campaign be immediately sent over. This for two reasons. The first is that there should be no chance for a complaint that the campaign was lost because the United States did not give adequate help in time; the second, that the submarine must be kept from getting stronger until more extensive mining operations can be carried out. It will also recommend that the manufacture of mines on a grand scale be relentlessly pursued in case of any failure of the patrols.

In addition to the armed guard officer of whom I have just spoken, there were many others who came to London with similar instructions from the Navy Department. I would like to include in the record at this point a letter addressed by one of these armed guard officers, to the Chief of Naval Operations, after his arrival in Washington. It is interesting as pointing out the realization which he, like every other officer who came to London, obtained of the problems we were facing once he was able actually to see them for himself and to visualize the situation. In his letter he emphasized the importance of having additional officers abroad to collect information for the department, and to assist in the administration of our forces overseas, and in the coordination of our work with the Allies.

I will submit that letter also for the record, as it is long and technical. The letter is as follows:

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C., June 19, 1917.

From: Lieut. R. M. Emmet, United States Navy.
To: Chief of Naval Operations.
Subject: Additional personnel and forces in Europe; liaison officers and other matters.
Reference: Letter Vice Admiral Sims re information service, dated from London May 14, 1917, and his dispatches re additional personnel from time to time.

I. Additional personnel and forces in European waters.

(*a*) From observation abroad and discussion with officers of British Navy, I am convinced in a short time department will have to face problem of finding additional officers and enlisted ratings for our forces operating in Europe.

II. Liaison officers.

(*a*) Liaison officers are a development of this war. They were inaugurated by the French and subsequently adopted by British. They are used in both army and navy. They are considered indispensable.

III. Admiral Sims's staff.

(*a*) When I left London the demands on Admiral Sims's time, brain, and energy were enormous. They were increasing by leaps and bounds. There was ample work for almost any number of efficient officers of an active turn of mind, had they been there.

(*b*) It seems to me that both the importance of his mission and the widely scattered character of his command, together with the relatively weighty part it plays in the conduct of the war demand that the admiral receive the most efficient assistance possible.

IV. Explanation of purpose of this letter.

(*a*) Fundamentally I desire to bring to the attention of Operations my conviction of the paramount importance of I, II, and III above.

(*b*) While abroad I became thoroughly imbued with the fact that this war is being surely decided in the waters washing the coasts of Great Britain and France; to a lesser extent the Mediterranean, and nowhere else.

(*c*) From a week's contact with the Navy Department I am fully alive to the demands there are for trained officers.

(*d*) In spite of that, I am convinced that nothing should interfere with maintaining our forces in European waters at the maximum pitch of efficiency.

(*e*) It is possible in great measure to consolidate the functions set forth in I, II, III in the same body of officers, which under the circumstances seems desirable.

V. Discussing I, additional personnel and forces, European waters.

(*a*) I know Admiral Sims, after consultation with far more authoritative sources of information than those open to me, became keenly alive to the necessity of reserve personnel for the destroyer force.

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(*b*) His dispatches indicate it.

(*c*) I have heard him say time and again that we would find 50 per cent necessary.

(*d*) The irreducible minimum be considered to be one-fifth, which on a basis of 30 boats would mean 6 captains and a proportionate number of junior officers and enlisted ratings.

(*e*) My personal conviction is that in the case of officers certainly, the department will find it must provide nearer one-half than one-fifth.

(*f*) The service is trying. It is work and no play, with a constant tension thrown in.

(*g*) I am sure it is not the admiralty's intention to retain all our forces indefinitely on their present service. It is drudgery. Undoubtedly, as time goes on, some of our destroyers will be transferred to east coast immediately facing enemy. Casualties are bound to occur.

(*h*) Casualties are bound to occur on present stations. There the danger of death and wounds is not so imminent, but we will surely encounter cases where officers must be given a rest.

(*i*) If reliefs are available, a few weeks' or months' change of duty may restore a valuable man to his full efficiency, and in the interim he may perform work of value as a liaison officer or on admiral staff, temporarily in London.

(*j*) If reliefs are not available the loss of efficiency of the force may prove cumulative due to increased strain on officers remaining.

(*k*) There is also the danger that men will be overworked to the extent that their services may be lost to the country for long periods of time, for the rest of the war, or forever.

(*l*) The British have met this time and again. The whole policy of the Admiralty is to make life aboard seagoing ships as livable as possible, even to the extent of sacrificing in some degree military efficiency.

(*m*) We were warned again and again it did not pay to strip ships to the bone, as they did to their cost at beginning of war.

(*n*) I feel absolutely confident that unless this problem is met squarely now it will be very much more embarrassing in the future.

VI. Discussing liaison officer.

(*a*) A number of officers have been sent abroad representing the various bureaus. They will undoubtedly render valuable service.

(*b*) I think arrangements ought to be made to have part of them return home from time to time and make their report personally. I believe if this was done the value of the information supplied department would be many times increased.

(*c*) Business by cable has its drawbacks. I have heard Admiral Sims say in discussing submarine situation, that Admiral Jellicoe had told him that we could not furnish too many mines; that a million was not too many.

(*d*) I have been informed since my return from abroad that the British did not want any mines from us. They must need them, and there must be a misunderstanding at long range.

(*e*) Officers in reserve for our destroyers can gain invaluable experience with the British forces actually facing the enemy. They can be changed from time to time so that the whole force will be leavened with everything our Allies have learned in three years of war.

(*f*) Officers temporarily incapacitated can render valuable service in London, and as opportunity offers, can be sent home to bring the actual seat of operations to the high command here in a way that can never be accomplished by correspondence by cable or by letter.

(*g*) I desire to invite attention to Admiral Sims's letter of May 14, 1917, re "Establishment information and liaison service." The subject of liaison officers is therein discussed at length.

VII. Interchange of information with our allies.

(*a*) Admiral Sims was informed by the Board of Admiralty that they had given orders to all departments of Admiralty that there was nothing confidential as between the two services; that they were willing and anxious to supply us with any and all information on any subject we might desire.

(*b*) I know I reflect Admiral Sims when I recommend that a similar policy of complete frankness be given serious consideration by us.

* * * * * * *

VIII. Need for destroyers.

(*a*) The Admiralty consider at the present time a destroyer to be literally worth her weight in gold.

(*b*) Too many can't be built.

(*c*) In my association with the Office of the Engineer in Chief in the Admiralty, and with various engineering firms, I became keenly alive to the difficulties of obtaining suitable gearing for turbines of our new 35-knot destroyers.

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(*d*) Even if the gears be cut abroad there is always danger of loss in transit to this country.

(*e*) The need for destroyers is paramount.

(*f*) The British state if they had been able to force Germany's course of unrestricted submarine warfare, they would have now 200 more than at present.

(*g*) They feel confident that with 200 more they could surely control the submarines below the critical point—that is, prevent them sinking more merchant tonnage than the Allies can build. They admit to lack of vision.

(*h*) Our 742-ton destroyers are splendid ships.

(*i*) We know all about them.

(*j*) Every shipyard in the country is supplied with plans and patterns.

(*k*) It would be easy in view of our past experience to turn out quickly many 33-knot boats modeled on the *Jouett* and *Beale*, which were unqualified successes.

(*l*) A boat like the *Beale*, with 4-inch guns instead of 3-inch, and, if you like, three triple instead of three twin torpedo tubes would give a good account of herself against any destroyers in the world.

(*m*) For purposes of antisubmarine warfare she would be fully as efficient as the 1,000-ton boats.

(*n*) Most important of all, such boats can be turned out quickly.

IV. In conclusion, I felt impelled to submit this letter, as I felt in my seven weeks in England I had had an exceptional opportunity to observe conditions affecting the successful conduct of the war on the sea.

R. R. EMMET.

My great difficulty was in getting the department itself to realize this situation, and it was many months before I received any indication that they had come to this realization.

On July 9, for example, I sent the following dispatch:

[Cable dispatch.]

Sent: July 9, 1917.
To: Secretary of Navy.
Through: State Department (on clair).
Urgent: Please give priority.

87. In order to keep the department informed of the information which it requires, and which is essential to efficiency of our cooperation in this war, I must have men of special experience, training, and ability. With my knowledge of situation here, I urge immediate detail of at least three of following, in addition to chief of staff: Cone, Knox, Sterling, McNamee, Cotten, King, Pye, Coffey. Chief of staff must be free for independent and continuous estimate of situation. In addition, I must have competent commander, constantly on duty in admiralty in connection with convoy system and daily movements and operations of our forces, and at least two additional aids in my office. More are required. Replies to department's cables are now being greatly delayed, and other important military matters being postponed, owing to physical impossibility to keep up with current work. It therefore is my duty to urge that other interests be subordinated to the demands of the organization here, upon which efficient United States naval cooperation must necessarily primarily depend. I submit that safety of our ships, as well as efficiency of their operations, is dependent upon availability here of adequate staff.

SIMS.

SAFETY OF TROOP CONVOYS ENDANGERED BY INADEQUATE STAFF.

In further dispatches of July 14, 17, and 23, I again pointed out that the safety of all troop convoys was endangered by my lack of assistance: that the necessary and rapidly increasing work in connection with our cooperation with the allies, with the operations of our own forces, and of the obtaining of information for the department was practically overwhelming myself, my aid, and such members of the naval attaché's office as were able to devote time to assist me. Consequently, when the department cabled me an announcement of their policy on July 10, I replied in a long letter, fully setting forth my estimate of the requirements of my position and of the means

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which seemed necessary to carry out this policy of the department, so far as operations in European waters were concerned. It would be interesting to read the paragraphs of this letter, dealing with these subjects. It will be noted that I fully stated to the department the necessity of having all plans for operations and the direction of actual military operations handled in the war zone, at a place where all information was available, and where cooperation and coordination with the allied military effort could be accomplished through personal conferences. I recommended this to avoid the inevitable misunderstandings, due to correspondence between men whose minds are running in different channels. My letter was as follows. I apologize for the length of this thing, but I think it is necessary to read it. [Reading:]

Letter No. 27, July 16, 1917:

14. The department's policy refers to willingness to extend hearty cooperation to the allies and to discuss plans for joint operations, and also to its readiness to consider any plans which may be submitted by the joint allied admiralties.

15. I submit that it is impossible to carry out this cooperation, to discuss plans with the various admiralties, except in one way, and that is to establish what might be termed an advance headquarters in the war area, composed of department's representatives, upon whose recommendations the department can depend.

I refer to exactly the same procedure as is now carried out in the Army; that is, the general headquarters in the field being the advance headquarters of the War Department at home, and the advance headquarters must of necessity be left a certain area of discretion and freedom of action as concerns the details of the measures necessitated by the military situations as they arise.

16. The time element is one of the most vital of all elements which can enter into military warfare, and hence delays in communications by written reports, together with the necessity for secrecy, render it very difficult to discuss plans at long range. The enemy secret service has proved itself to be of extraordinary efficiency.

Moreover, I believe it to be very unsafe to depend upon discussion of military plans by cable, as well as by letter. The necessary inadequacy of written or cable communications needs no discussion. The opportunities for misunderstandings are great. It is difficult to be sure that one has expressed clearly one's meaning in writing, and hence phrases in a letter are very liable to misinterpretation. They can not explain themselves.

17. One of the greatest military difficulties of this war, and perhaps of all Allied wars, has been the difficulty of coordination and cooperation in military effort. I am aware of a great mass of information in this connection which it is practically impossible to impart except by personal discussion.

It is unquestionable that efficiency would be greatly improved if any one of the Allies—Italy, France, England, or the United States—were selected to direct all operations, the others merely keeping the one selected fully informed of their resources available, and submitting to complete control and direction in regard to the utilization of these resources.

18. If the above considerations are granted, it then becomes necessary to decide as to the best location in which to establish such advanced headquarters, or what might be called an advance branch war council at the front; that is, an advanced branch upon whose advice and decisions the War Council itself largely depends.

I fully realize the pressure, and the influences, which must have been brought to bear upon the department from all of the Allies, and from various, and perhaps conflicting, sources.

I also realize that my position here in England renders me open to suspicion that I may be unduly influenced by the British viewpoint of the war. It should not be necessary to state, however, that I have done everything within my ability to maintain a broad viewpoint, with the above-stated mission constantly in mind.

19. From the naval point of view, it would seem evident that London is the best and most central location in the war area for what I have termed above the advance branch of our Naval War Council.

The British Navy, on account of its size alone, is bearing the brunt of the naval war, and hence all naval information concerning the war reaches and centers in London.

It will be quite possible for all of our advanced headquarters' staff, or parts or divisions thereof, to visit Paris and other allied admiralties at any time.

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I wish to make it quite clear that, up to date, it has been wholly impossible for me with one military aid, to perform all of the functions of such an advanced branch of the department.

As stated in my dispatches, it has been evident for some time that I have been approaching a state in which it would be physically impossible to handle the work without an increase of staff.

The present state of affairs is such that it is quite within the range of possibility for serious errors to occur, which may involve disaster to our ships, due to the physical impossibility of handling the administrative and other work with the thoroughness which is essential to safety.

20. I consider that a very minimum staff which would be required is approximately as follows. More officers could be well employed with resulting increase of efficiency.

(1) One chief of staff, who should be free to carry on a continuous estimate of the situation, based upon all necessary information. He would be given the freedom of the operations department of the British and French admiralties.

(2) An officer, preferably of the rank of commander, for duties in connection with shipping and convoy, to handle all the numerous communications in relation to the movements of American shipping, particularly military shipping, and also other shipping carrying American troops.

(3) An officer, at least a lieutenant commander, for duties in connection with anti-submarine division operations in order to insure perfect cooperation in that field of work between our service and other allied services.

(4) An officer, of all around ability and discretion, for duties in connection with general military intelligence. He should be in constant touch with the secret service departments of the admiralties, in order to insure that all military intelligence which in any way affects the Navy Department or our forces is properly and promptly acted upon.

(5) At least two lieutenants, or lieutenant commanders of the line, in my own office, in connection with general administrative questions, in addition to the one now available. The necessity for these additional officers is imperative.

(6) One communication officer to take general charge of codes and communications, both with the department at home, the allied admiralties, and with the various bases of our forces in the war area (at present Queenstown, Brest, Bordeaux, St. Nazaire, London, and Paris).

(7) A paymaster, to have complete charge of all financial matters connected with our naval organization abroad. This officer should be in addition to Paymaster Tobey, who is performing necessary and invaluable service on my staff in connection with all logistical questions.

I very well remember the preparation of that dispatch, and the question arising as to whether we should state what we ought to have, or something near what we thought we ought to get. Anyone who knows anything about military procedure knows that what I asked for there is not what I should have had; but as this was then the 16th of July, and we had not been able to get anything to speak of up to that time, I saw the utter impossibility of success in demanding the kind of an organization that I should have, and that I eventually did have.

Not until some of the authorities in Washington visited the other side, after the sixth or seventh month of the war, and saw the situation did they realize the facts, and begin to give us the staff which was adequate.

In other official letter-reports, written about the same time; that is, on July 14 and July 18, I again pointed out that it had become impossible for the staff then available to keep up with the necessarily increasing work. In letters of July 18 I said:

For this reason, replies to department's cables and adequate reports of operations have been delayed. Although I have only asked for five additional staff officers, there is, nevertheless, ample work for many more, and it would be in the interests of the efficiency both of the department and our forces, if the staff were too large rather than too small.

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At the end of July I also pointed out, in cables to the department, how essential it was, in order to insure quickness and certainty in our communications, that I should be sent capable officers, familiar with cable communications, with code work, and with radio.

On July 23 I received a message from the department, finally announcing the sailing of Capt. Twining as my chief of staff, with two lieutenant commanders as aides, and also two lieutenants, for communication and radio duty, for which I had specifically requested assistance.

In my letter No. 52, of July 30, I made the following comments with regard to the action of the department:

In closing, I wish again to call attention to the necessity for an adequate naval staff abroad. I have received the department's notification of certain young officers who are being sent, apparently for staff duty. I have tried to make it clear that the department's interests can not be efficiently served without an adequate staff of experienced men of adequate training.

The young officers who are being sent will, of course, be of assistance in handling routine administrative matters, but the urgent need is for men of much more experience, who will be capable of collecting all information which is available, concerning the general situation, and from it preparing estimates of the situation concerning broad questions of policy, and plans of operations upon which the United States naval efforts may be safely based.

I fully realize the demands being made on the naval personnel at home, but as the naval staff organization abroad is the one coordinating link between the current allied war situation abroad, and the department, I submit that its demands should take precedence over a large majority of other demands, made for training and other purposes at home. I feel and have tried to explain in my previous dispatches and letters, that if I could have here a council of perhaps four officers of experience of the type of Capts. Pratt, Schofield, or Commanders Knox, Stirling, Cotton, I could be assured of accomplishing the mission which I am sure the department expects of me.

TECHNICAL OFFICERS NEEDED ON STAFF.

While I was assured by the department, four months after my own arrival, that five officers would arrive for staff duty, I had yet received no reply to my repeated requests for the sending of technical officers, to report to the different bureaus in the department, and to obtain for them the technical information and data available in the allied navy departments, which it was essential the Navy Department should have for carrying out its own plans for the preparation of our American naval forces for war.

It will be remembered that in April I had requested that Naval Constructor McBride be sent abroad for such duty. He arrived four months later, in August, and was the first of such technical officers to be sent in accordance with my recommendations.

On August 9 I wrote the following to the department concerning his services:

Naval Constructor McBridge has reported for duty. He will be of great service not only in obtaining general information of value to the department and the fleet, but also for staff duty concerning his bureau in connection with the forces here. He will generally keep in touch with any unusual or extended repairs under the Bureau of Construction and Repair, advising me where my action is necessary, and generally acting as a representative of his bureau.

In a cable of August 13 I pointed out how confused the mine and depth-charge situation was, because there was no American officer in London familiar with the Navy Department's plans and policies, and no British officer in Washington at that time fully acquainted with all the British experience and developments; but no such offi-

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cer was sent by the department. Fortunately I was able to avail myself in this connection of the services of Lieut. Commander Schuyler, who had been sent abroad by the Bureau of Ordnance to inspect shells being purchased by the bureau in Great Britain.

In my letter-report of September 7 I again pointed out the necessity for officers for this liaison duty. I will read one paragraph of this letter:

5. Liaison officers: I would again renew my recommendations that carefully selected liaison officers be detailed for duty with the various units of the allied forces.

It would be extremely useful to me as well as to the department, for example, if a competent officer of general ability were assigned permanently to the main allied fleets and also to detached forces which are not operating in direct conjunction with United States forces—for example, the Harwich light cruiser and submarine force and the British submarine force in the North Sea. I consider that the assignment of an officer to the French, Italian, and British main fleets would be productive of a great deal of useful information to our service, as well as regards questions of policies which arise in the department.

Up to the end of October, 1917, the only officers that I had received from the department for staff duty were the three previously mentioned, the five sent in July, to whom I have referred, and Naval Constructor McBridge, who arrived in August. I had been obliged to detach a number of officers from vessels operating in Europe in order to handle the constantly increasing burden of staff work. It probably would not have been possible to accomplish the work at all previous to this time if I had not been authorized (as I shall point out in a moment) by the Bureau of Navigation to enroll in London nine young Americans, many of whom had been Rhodes scholars or in the service of Mr. Hoover in the Belgian Relief Commission, who had volunteered their assistance and in some cases had been working for me voluntarily and without pay as civilians for a month or more before authorization was received from the Bureau of Navigation to enroll them as naval reserve officers. All of our communications with the department and with the forces, including the coding and decoding of such dispatches, were handled by six of these young men, and my staff was thus relieved of mechanical routine work and permitted to perform other duties of a more strictly military character. Two of these young reserve officers similarly took over the routine of the office administration, secretarial work, etc., and thus further relieved the regular officers of routine duties.

In a letter of August 23 to the department I pointed out the situation which existed and the necessity of increasing the number of trained assistants.

It may be pointed out that on October 1, 1917, there were in European waters 73 naval vessels and 15 shore stations, comprising 652 officers and 9,500 men, and yet to administer these forces, to control operations, and at the same time to keep in constant touch with the allied admiralties, and to acquire information for the department about all allied war experience, I had available in London only six regular offices, sent abroad by the department for staff duty, and two officers whom I had ordered up from the forces afloat. In addition there were four officers in the naval attaché's office who were assigned additional duty on my staff. You may be able to under-

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stand more completely this need for assistance if I read some extracts from my letter of October 23, 1917. [Reading:]

OCTOBER 23, 1917.

From: Force commander.
To: Secretary of the Navy (Operations).
Subject: Need for an increased staff for the force commander.

1. As the war progresses and the activities of our own forces, increased by the addition of new units to the forces operating in European waters, and as new activities are added, as, for example, the matter of aviation of French and English stations, the purely administrative work at the headquarters of these forces has increased, is now increasing, and may be expected to increase.

2. In addition to the administrative work, which must be disposed of from day to day, if the forces are to be kept in continuous and efficient operation, there is most urgent need for planning and deliberative work, if the operation of our forces are to be intelligently conducted, in full and efficient cooperation with those of the Allied powers.

3. It is plain that the two classes of work can not be performed by one and the same staff of officers, but should be entrusted to two separate staffs, one of which should be purely a deliberative and planning staff and the other purely an administrative staff.

4. I now have, aside from the naval attaché, 12 officers who are either actually attached to my staff in London or are assistants to the naval attaché and doing staff duty in connection with the administration of our naval forces in Europe. The inclosed office memorandum shows the distribution of duties among these officers. One of these officers, Lieut. Gillmore, is a reserve officer (formerly in the Navy), and there are, in addition to the 12, a number of recently enrolled reserve officers who are performing the routine office duties indicated in the memorandum.

5. All of these officers are working to the utmost limit in keeping the administrative work up to date, and the number is still insufficient for present needs, and will be still more inadequate as the activities increase.

6. The immediate needs for increase are as follows:

(*a*) An officer to relieve the chief of staff of the major portion of his administrative work and leave him free to fulfill his more important function of military adviser and chief of the planning staff.

(*b*) An officer to take charge of all aviation matters that must be handled in this office, and act as the liaison officer between myself and the British Admiralty in these matters.

(*c*) An additional assistant to the intelligence officer. A vast amount of military information comes into the office, and much more could be secured, if my staff were large enough to permit of its being properly examined and digested.

(*d*) An officer to whom all personnel matters may be entrusted. Lieut. Commander Ancrum has until the present time handled these matters, but owing to the absolute necessity of furnishing an assistant to Commander Long (who was in charge of the convoys) he has been detailed for that duty, and personnel matters turned over to Lieut. Gillmore, who owing to having been out of the service for some years is somewhat out of touch with service matters, and in any case, should be in a position to devote his whole time to his secretatial duties which are not light.

7. For the planning staff, I believe that it will be necessary that not less than five officers be made available in addition to the chief of staff, who should be the head of this organization. Such a staff could, and would, work in close cooperation with a recently established planning staff of the British Admiralty. By this means close cooperation between the two services could be secured, and facilities furnished for impressing our views on the British Admiralty to a much greater extent than has been possible in the past.

10. I trust that the department will share my views as to the necessity and urgency for increasing my staff in the manner, to the extent, and for the reasons, set forth above, and I request that the necessary additional officers be ordered to this duty as soon as practicable, since every day's delay increases the burden thrown upon me and my existing staff, and makes more urgent the necessity for additional officers.

WM. S. SIMS.

P. S.—With reference to paragraph 7, I wish to make it quite clear that the whole object in establishing a planning staff is to insure that I may be in a position to give the best and most thoroughly considered advice to the department as to proposed operations of our naval forces abroad.

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It should be especially noted, that, in making requests for officers now, as in previous letters and cables, I distinctly specified that, while I often mentioned officers by name, these names were given to indicate the type of officers required, more than to indicate that that officer alone would be suitable. In many letters requesting personnel, I had specifically pointed out that, with the exception of Capt. Pratt, whom I had especially desired because of our previous relations and our mutual understanding, the officers I had named were only intended to indicate the type of officer. It is, of course, true that I would have preferred the officers that I named, but there were many other officers in the service of similar qualities who would have been equally suitable for the work.

Of course, this lack of staff seriously embarrassed me and rendered my work less effective than it would otherwise have been, as I wrote the Secretary of the Navy, in a personal letter of July 31, 1917, in which I said:

LONDON, *July 31, 1917.*

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: You may be sure that I have been doing my best to carry out the department's wishes in the performance of this rather delicate and difficult duty. I have not been able to do so to anything like my own satisfaction and, I fear, that of the department. This has been due to the physical impossibility of doing all that should be done, due to the fact that I have with me only one aid in my office and one aid at the flotilla base. I hope the department will see its way clear to give me a staff of really efficient officers of such size as to enable me to send in all of the important information which became available immediately upon the outbreak of war.

Very sincerely, yours,

WM. S. SIMS.

The Hon. JOSEPHUS DANIELS,
Secretary of the Navy,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

Again, in my official letter report to the department, of November 15, I informed the department of the continued necessity for additional assistance. [Reading:]

Letter 2629, November 15, 1917:

8. *Increased staff.*—The necessity for an increased staff grows daily. As previously reported, practically the entire time of the present staff is now taken up with administrative work which can not be avoided and for which the staff is inadequate. It is realized that the department depends to a considerable extent upon this organization to furnish it with complete information of the progress of the war upon which its plans must be largely based.

The British Admiralty has been severely criticized for not having an efficient policy, and particularly for not having plans projected sufficiently into the future to forestall enemy plans. Without going into the merits of these criticisms at all, and viewing the problems from our point of view alone, the question is a serious one as to the best means of insuring our efficient participation in combined naval plans for the future. In view of the vital element of time, and the impossibility of efficiently formulating combined plans at long range, the most efficient course for us is believed to be the assignment of a force of capable officers to actually participate with the Admiralty in the preparation of all plans.

The decision on our part in regard to all plans must of necessity remain in the Navy Department, where the ultimate responsibility rests and where all information bearing upon our participation is available.

The point that it is desired to stress, however, is that, with the present staff here, it is entirely impossible to keep the department informed fully of the progress of the war, and particularly to assist it in the formulation of plans for the future.

In a personal letter to Admiral Benson, of October 9, 1917, I had pointed out much the same condition. [Reading:]

You will note from the reports to be made by Admiral Mayo, the amount of information his large staff was able to dig out in a comparatively short space of time. That

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sort of work can be accomplished only by men who can devote their exclusive attention each to one specialty.

It was with the object of being able to do this that I was so insistent in requesting more assistance when I first came over here. I am glad to say that the officers and men who have been sent over eased up things very considerably, but I think you should know that conditions in this respect can not be satisfactory to the degree indicated above unless I have a sufficient personnel to be able to keep some of the officers continually at work in departments of the Admiralty. It is only by this daily contact and association that we can keep thoroughly in touch with what is going on. The people of the Admiralty are working to the limit, and we can not expect them to think of and supply us with the things which would be desirable for us.

As an example of what I mean, I may say that I had hoped that when Twining and the others arrived here they would be able to spend at least a considerable amount of their time working with the people in the Admiralty. It was my intention, and theirs, that they should do so, but unfortunately the amount of work to be done is continually increasing and has increased to such an extent that this has proved impossible.

You will realize, I am sure, that I am speaking in this respect only of a certain type of officer. The officer who is the ordinary run of the mine could not be advantageously employed in this manner. It is as specialized and as important a kind of work as that which is being done by your able assistants. The type of man to which I refer are as follows: Stirling, McNamee, Yarnell, Knox, Coffey, Cotton, etc. We should have five such officers if we are to carry on this work efficiently and keep you properly informed.

ARRIVAL OF ADMIRAL BENSON IN EUROPE.

When Admiral Benson finally arrived in England, in the middle of November, 1917, it took him only a few days to convince himself of the necessity of establishing a real advanced headquarters of the Navy Department abroad, with an adequate staff to make possible full cooperation with the Admiralty, to prepare plans for future operations, and adequately to cooperate with the Allies in coordinating all activities. I had been recommending such action for five months, and specifically in my letters of May 16, July 16, and October 23, had pointed out the necessity for the establishment of such an advanced headquarters abroad. Similar recommendation had been contained in many of the cables, as you may remember, which I have read you in the last few minutes.

Then on November 17, 1917, the department sent the following dispatch to Admiral Benson, then in London:

Simsadus.

1160. For Benson. After thinking carefully subject feel that it would be to advantage if we have a permanent War Staff in England, as a part of the plans department of the Admiralty. If this meets your approval, additional officers will be sent to augment those already in England who are fitted for this work. 19016.

BENSON.

As I have before explained "Benson" was a cable signature showing that the message emanated from the office of Naval Operations, so there will be no confusion when you see a message sent from Washington and signed "Admiral Benson," although Admiral Benson is on the other side.

Admiral Benson replied as follows on the following day:

[Very secret.]

1530. Your 1160. Subject has been under discussion with Admiralty several days before receipt your message. Definite plans submitted to Admiralty. Am waiting decision. (Signed) Benson. 15118.

SIMS.

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On November 19 he sent a further cable, outlining fully his recommendations to carry out this plan. His cable was as follows:

[Very secret.]

To: Opnav, Washington.
1550. For Secretary of the Navy.

I have gone over the situation fully with British Admiralty, and outlined what I believe to be best plans for future Naval Operations, but am convinced that British are not prepared now to offer definite plans of their own for our consideration. From my observations, and after careful consideration, I believe that such plans, satisfactory to both countries, can not be developed until we virtually establish the strictly planning section for joint operations here, in order that the personnel thereof may be in position to obtain latest British and other Allied information, and to urge, as joint plan, such plans as our estimate and policies may indicate. This action appears to be all the more necessary, considering the fact that any offensive operation which we may undertake, must be in conjunction with British forces, and must be from bases established or occupied within British territorial waters.

The officers detailed for this duty should come here fully imbued with our national and naval policies and ideas. Then, with the intimate knowledge they can obtain here, from data available, actual disposition of allies forces, reasons therefor, they will be in a position to urge upon British any plan that promiess satisfactory results.

In order to initiate this policy, I recommend that Capt. Schofield and Commander Know be ordered to report to Vice Admiral Sims and Admiral Jellicoe, first sea lord, for this duty; a third officer to be selected after my return.

This matter is an urgent one, and action should be taken at once.

Capt. Pratt cable me his recommendations for officers to fill vacancies created thereby in department.

Acknowledge. 19319. (Signed) Benson.

SIMS.

The department replied immediately, on November 21, with the following dispatch:

[Very secret.]

Sims due.

1230. For Benson. Your 1550 acknowledged: reply thereto. Schofield and Knox will be ordered.

BENSON.

Thus, a recommendation which I had been making for six months was not carried into effect until Admiral Benson, during his short stay in London, convinced himself it was justified, and recommended to the Secretary the establishment of such a planning section for my staff in London.

It is hardly necessary to repeat that this is merely another instance of the attitude of the department during all of those first critical moments of the war. My recommendation for months were allowed to go unheeded. The efficiency of our cooperation with the Allies was seriously impeded during this period by the failure to act on the recommendations made by their representative abroad, who, in accordance with departmental instructions, was fully cooperating with the allied admiralties, and made these recommendations only after full consultation with them.

The soundness of the policy was again demonstrated by the fact that the department adopted it, and throughout the remainder of the war continued to recognize, though sometimes grudgingly, the necessity for what had been continually recommended and which should have been obvious from the very first.

During the six months following Admiral Benson's visit I continued to be without an adequate number of assistants. This I

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pointed out in my letter-report of the 19th of December, 1917, in which I said:

[Letter 4844, December 19, 1917.]

STAFF REQUIREMENTS.

The staff work required on shore, both in London and Paris, and at our bases, is steadily increasing. In spite of the additional officers who have recently been ordered to this staff, the necessity for further increases is rapidly developing. This is in accordance with experience of allied Governments and armies. It has been particularly impressive to learn of the requirements of staff work in allied admiralties and in the field. It is, of course, manifest that all operations afloat or in the field are dependent for their efficiency upon planning and administrative staff work. This is work which can not be dispensed with, and must be provided for even at the cost of active combatant personnel.

The planning staff which will be created here on the arrival of Commanders Schofield and Knox will soon be in need of assistance which can not be supplied with the present available officers.

Similarly, in my letter of December 31, 1917, I said:

The demands upon the staff organization ashore upon which the efficiency of our operations afloat are entirely dependent have grown steadily from the beginning, and are still growing. In addition to the direction of the activities of the forces afloat, and the administration work which is unavoidably involved, it is a tremendous task to attempt to keep fully informed of all developments and condition in the allied campaign which may affect our plans.

This same report was made to the department in many later letters, as, for example, in my letter of January 8, 1918, No. 6044, paragraph 10.

In my letter of March 23, 1918, No. 1223, I said:

The peculiar requirements of all staff duty performed abroad, in cooperation with allied services, makes the duty of a nature for which there was no peace training. It has been necessary to depart from all precedents, and to be governed by the greatest care in establishing and maintaining efficient relations between the services. It is for the above reasons that the force commander has so many times in the past, in asking for officers for staff duty, laid stress upon particular types and personal characteristics, and upon the necessity of permanence of assignment.

VALUE OF PERSONAL TOUCH.

I had from the first been impressed with the importance of coordinating the work abroad with the work of the Navy Department. Many misunderstandings inevitably arose as a result of the lack of personal touch, on both sides of the ocean. I was very glad in 1917 to have Admiral Mayo and Admiral Benson come abroad, in order that they could see the situation for themselves, and be in a position on their return to inform the department of some of the problems to be faced in Europe. In repeated letters to the department, personal letters as well as official letters, I had emphasized the importance of having officers frequently exchange between Washington and Europe, in order that the Navy Department and the headquarters of the forces abroad could be brought into more intimate contact with each other, and thus obviate many of the difficulties which arose from inevitable misunderstandings.

These difficulties were increased by the tendency of the department to demand, and require, full and complete explanations of every request made to them, and of every detail of the operations of our forces before they would approve such requests or sanction such operations. I could mention many illustrations of the depart-

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ment's demands in this respect. Thus, for example, I have already pointed out that in a case of recommendations for an increase in the forces abroad, for the adoption of the convoy system, for the sending of a division of battleships to the grand fleet, for the sending of tugs and submarines as reenforcements, the department failed to act for many months, chiefly because they apparently did not consider that they had full information in Washington, although, as I pointed out repeatedly, such full information could not be communicated under the conditions existing because of the necessity of secrecy, because of my lack of assistants to forward the information desired, and because of the necessary delays and misunderstanding attendant upon cable and letter communications.

A few cases will show the department's attitude. On May 18 I received a cable from the department in which it was stated:

> It is essential that the department be promptly and fully informed of all operations of our vessels acting with the allied naval forces.

In reply I assured them I had outlined the general operations of our own forces, had pointed out difficulties of communications, and had stated that the department would be informed of all important developments or prospective changes in general plans.

In a cable of July 5 the department stated:

> In view of requests made and our efforts to respond, must insist that any plans for operations under consideration be submitted for our study.

In a cable of June 24, replying to various dispatches and letters which I had sent, the department again insisted that while it was willing to cooperate in any way, it would only consider "the question of supplying additional naval forces * * * whenever the advisability of so doing is justified."

The department seemed disinclined to take any action or indorse any recommendations, unless the fullest and most complete explanation could be made, and this was extremely difficult, if indeed not quite impossible. I was at that time working nearly alone, and lack of time and the difficulties of communication made such full explanations quite impossible. In many cases it took weeks to explain to the department something which could have been dealt with in 10 minutes, if I could have gone to the Navy Department and discussed the matter personally. As I have already pointed out, in dealing with the plans for protection of shipping against a battle cruiser raid, it took nearly two months to obtain an agreement upon a plan for meeting these raids.

This could probably have been settled in a few hours of conference. I was in complete accord and in constant consultation with the allied admiralties. No recommendation was made to the Navy Department by me until it had been fully discussed and agreed upon with them. I might say that in those first few months it was infinitely easier for the commander of the American forces in European waters to cooperate with the allied naval forces, in spite of all the differences and difficulties which inevitably exist between allies than it was to obtain action from his own naval department.

In its cable of July 10, 1917, announcing its general policy the department again, while announcing its willingness to cooperate fully with the Allies, yet insisted upon decisions being made by the Navy Department and insisted that the emergency warranting any

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action should be fully explained to the department. As I have already pointed out, and as the department later came to recognize, it was possible to cooperate with the Allies only by giving the commander abroad and the department's representative in council with the Allies authority to discuss matters with them and to act as the representative of the Navy Department and in that capacity to make decisions as to actual operations required by sound military policy.

Thus on October 13 I reported to the department that a special squadron of yachts had been organized on the French coast. On October 16 the department cabled:

Inform department reason for and mission of special squadron under Commander Freemen.

I replied in my cable of October 17:

[Cablegram sent Oct. 17, 1917.]

To: Opnav, Washington.
Via: N. C. B. 18bR.
Copies to: C. on S., J. V. B., B. A. L.

923. Opnav 594. Special division under Commander Freemen will consist of *Aphrodite*, *Corsair*, *Alcedo*, *Wakiva*, *Noma*, and *Kanawha* and will be used primarily for escort of convoys. Other yachts not suitable for this duty. Reassignment of yachts to divisions in accordance with speed, radius, and so forth will be submitted to department for approval at an early date. 62017.

SIMS.

That is exactly parallel to what would have been the case if the Secretary of War had telegraphed to Gen. Pershing and asked him to report immediately why he had moved a brigade over a couple of miles to the right.

Again in December, 1917, after the arrival of our battleships with the Grand Fleet, it was recommended, after a conference between Admiral Rodman and the commander in chief of the Grand Fleet, that a fifth American battleship be sent abroad in order that, when one of the ships was under repair or docking, there would be a full division of four ships ready to put to sea at any moment. This was essential, as the Grand Fleet was under four hours' notice at all times, and it was imperative that the fighting effectiveness of its squadrons should be at all times unimpaired.

The department, not understanding in detail the reasons for this request, cabled as follows on January 5:

[Very secret.]

Simsadus.

If the reason for asking for the U. S. S. *Texas* to be assigned to group 9 is as stated to make a division of five ships, this reason the department does not consider a valid one, as it breaks up and is counter to our battleship organization. If, however, a real need exists for one more battleship, provision can be made to send one, though the department would prefer to send a division if the supply question will admit, rather than break its organization. 19005.

BENSON.

That is putting a paper organization against the necessities of war. I replied in my cable of January 8, which is as follows:

[Very secret.]

2781. Your 2010. My 2286 did not state reason for asking for *Texas* was to make a division of five ships, but stated that in order to insure four ships continuously in battle line a fifth ship was necessary. A real need does exist for one more battleship and this should be the *Texas* in order that there may always be one ship and usually two with 14-inch guns at our end of the battle line. Need for another division of battleships not sufficient at present to justify additional strain on supply lines.

SIMS.

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I might explain there that our division was employed on one of the wings of the Grand Fleet, with a corresponding division of British ships on the other end, and it was very desirable to have the 14-inch guns there.

On January 11 the department cabled me that the U. S. S. *Texas* had been assigned to this duty and would sail immediately.

Another case illustrating the same hesitancy of the department to act on recommendations, until the whole matter was explained in detail, is illustrated by the plans proposed for establishing a docking schedule for our battleships in European waters. In a letter of August 13, 1918, I had made full recommendations as to how our ships abroad could be sent home and docked in rotation provided one additional battleship could be supplied by the department.

I might state there that the difficulty on the other side was in finding docking facilities for our vessels in addition to those of the Grand Fleet, and also the desirability of giving our people from time to time a run home. It was a frequent apprehension that the long period of service in the Grand Fleet might eventually get on the men's nerves, and to a certain extent affect the morale; that was the opinion throughout the war in the British Navy; and everybody was delighted to find that that opinion was not a sound one. But it was reasonable to suppose that men who stayed on board ship for four solid years without ever being allowed to leave for more than four hours at a time, and during that period having twice to go to a certain place and see whether a telephone message had not called them back, would be liable to be affected. It would be liable to get on the nerves of any man.

I cabled the department on September 6, 1918, asking early action. On the following day the department replied that an additional battleship was not available, but that the plan was approved, if it could be carried out without this additional battleship. It was, however, quite impracticable to carry out the plan unless the additional battleship could be supplied, as Admiral Rodman informed me in his cable of September 9, when he said:

My proposed plan can not be carried out with only five ships, as it would not be possible in this case to send home one battleship for docking, out of the five available, and still maintain in fighting condition the division of four ships with the Grand Fleet.

The matter was explained as fully as possible to the department by letter and by cable. Then, on October 3, 1918, the department suggested a new plan of its own. This plan involved a rotation of battleships between divisions 6 and 9, which were in European waters (Division 6, comprising two oil-burning and one coal-burning dreadnaughts, had then recently arrived at Berehaven for duty in connection with the battle cruiser raid plan) and divisions 7 and 8, which were in the United States. Due to various difficulties, however, in getting a complete arrangement by cable, with the Admiralty on one side and the Navy Department on the other, no definite arrangements had yet been made at the time of the armistice, four months after the plan had first been proposed by the department.

I will insert in the record without reading some of the cables and letters bearing on this subject to show the difficulties attaching to an apparently simple matter.

There are a great many similar cases that could be cited.

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[Cablegram sent Sept. 6, 1918.]

To: Opnav, Washington.

4232. My indorsement 29216, August 13. Early action by cable is requested in order that docking schedule on this side may be arranged. 4232.

SIMS.

[Confidential.]

SEPTEMBER 7.

Simsadus.

1082. Reference letter, Division 9, file 7, of July 27, 1918. Your first indorsement 29216 of October 23. Procedure approved provided it can be carried out with five ships now available. U. S. S. *Delaware* not available. 12106. 1082.

BENSON.

SEPTEMBER 7, 1918.

Simsadus.

666. My file 7, Sept. 1. Docking arrangements with British authorities make it necessary to get an immediate reply to my letter file 7 of July 27, 1918. 17006. 666.

FIBATUS.

[Confidential.]

SEPTEMBER 7, 1918.

To: Fibatus, Admiralty, London.

939. Your 666. Cable just received from department approves procedure recommended in your letter of July 27, provided it can be carried out with five ships now in the division. Department states *Delware* not available. In this case it seems to me impracticable to carry out the scheme. Request your opinion. 239. 024008.

SIMS

[Secret.]

SEPTEMBER 9, 1918.

Simsadus.

676. Your 939. My proposed plan can not be carried out with only five ships. I have arranged with commander in chief to adhere to original plan and dock all ships on this side. 17109. 676.

FIBATUS.

OCTOBER 3.

Simsadus.

2489. In order to carry out the desires of commander Division 9 as approved by you of sending one ship of that division home at regular intervals for overhauling and at same time keeping up the strength of Division 9 and Division 6 to this present quota, department suggests following plan for consideration: At stated intervals replace one of the ships of Division 9 in rotation by one of the ships of Division 6, upon reporting of ship from Division 6 to commander Division 9 detach one ship of Division 9 to sail for home. One dreadnaught of battleship force 2 will sail to replace ship in Division 6. 1102. 2489.

BENSON.

[Secret.]

OCTOBER 15, 1918.

From: Force commander.
To: Secretary of the Admiralty.
Subject: United States battleships in European waters.

1. In order to provide so far as possible for making repairs in the United States to United States battleships detailed for service in European waters and for the further purpose of affording to officers and men opportunities for leave at home, the Navy Department has proposed the following plan for rotation of vessels composing battleship Division 9 (sixth battle squadron, Grand Fleet) and battleship Division 6 now stationed at Berehaven, Ireland, as a raider guard.

2. It is proposed that on a given date one ship of Division 6 sail for the north to join Division 9 and upon her reporting one of the ships of Division 9 shall sail for the United States.

On the date upon which the vessel sails from Division 9 for the United States, an additional battleship shall sail from the United States to join Division 6.

The department has not stated how frequently such a change would be made, but it is probable that allowing 10 days for the voyage each way across the Atlantic one month overhaul period, and 10 days for contingencies, the cycle would be two months.

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3. This plan has been pronounced satisfactory by the commanders of both battleship divisions concerned and the commander battleship Division 9 has stated that the commander in chief, Grand Fleet, is in accord with the policy involved. The admiralty's views in the premises are requested.

4. The principal particulars of the vessels involved are as follows:

Name.	Fuel.	Battery.
Now with Division 9:		
Texas	Coal	10 14-inch.
New York	do	Do.
Wyoming	do	12 12-inch.
Florida	do	10 12-inch.
Arkansas	do	12 12-inch.
Now with Division 6:		
Utah	do	10 12-inch.
Nevada	Oil	10 14-inch.
Oklahoma	do	Do.
In United States:		
North Dakota	Coal	10 12-inch.
Delaware	do	Do.
Arizona	Oil	12 14-inch.
Mississippi	do	Do.
New Mexico	do	Do.
Pennsylvania	do	Do.

5. If the Admiralty sees no objection to the proposal in principal, the details can doubtless be arranged. It seems important that so long as a raider guard is maintained at Berehaven there should be at least two oil-burning vessels there, in order to facilitate refueling should the vessels return from a trip and be obliged to proceed immediately to sea on another trip.

6. It would also be the endeavor always to replace a 14-inch gun ship in the Grand Fleet by a 14-inch gun ship, so as not to reduce the battery strength of the United States division.

7. As docking arrangements have already been made for the vessels with the Grand Fleet covering a period from October 21 to January 31, these arrangements would have to be altered in case the policy herein set forth is inaugurated, but this can doubtless be arranged without serious dislocation of plans for British vessels.

WM. S. SIMS.

[Secret.]

OCTOBER 27, 1918.

Simandus.

3923. From Opnav. For Admiral Benson. Recommend battleship assignment to divisions be changed as follows:

November 15: U. S. S. *Arizona*, 8 to 6.
December 1: U. S. S. *Nevada*, 6 to 9.
December 10: U. S. S. *Wyoming*, 9 to 7, and U. S. S. *North Dakota*, 7 to 6.
March 1: U. S. S. *Oklahoma*, 6 to 9.
March 10: U. S. S. *Florida*, 9 to 8, and U. S. S. *Mississippi*, 8 to 6.
June 1: U. S. S. *Utah*, 6 to 9.
June 10: U. S. S. *Texas*, 9 to 8, and U. S. S. *New Mexico*, 8 to 6.
September 1: U. S. S. *North Dakota*, 6 to 9.
September 10: U. S. S. *Arkansas*, 9 to 7, and U. S. S. *Idaho*, 7 to 6.

Foregoing changes will greatly benefit personnel and return to home ports vessels that require overhauling. 13126. 3923.

BENSON.

OCTOBER 27, 1918.

AMNAVPAR, *Paris:*

For Admiral Benson. With reference to Opnav. 3923 retransmitted to you from Washington. The proposal made some time ago by the department for rotation of ships between battleship Division 6 and 9 is now under consideration by Admiralty and commander in chief, Grand Fleet, as to its effect upon Grand Fleet and as to whether oil burning or coal burning ships should be used in Division 9. Recommend final decision on this matter be deferred until Admiralty's ideas have been made known, which should be soon.

SIMS.

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The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Sims, it is almost 12 o'clock, and if that is a good place for you to stop, I think we had better suspend here.

Admiral SIMS. Very well.

Senator PITTMAN. Mr. Chairman, for the record, just before we adjourn: I have been necessarily absent from two or three hearings of this committee, and so that it may not appear that there was any discourtesy to the chairman, or neglect of my duty on this committee, I want to state that I have been attending hearings of the Foreign Relations Committee in a matter which was of considerable importance, and in view of the fact that we had agreed that the direct testimony here should be put in first without any interruptions, and it appearing that the direct testimony of Admiral Sims was all prepared in advance, I felt that I could be spared better from the subcommittee here than I could from the Foreign Relations Committee, at that time. I think that the various matters we have had under consideration in the Foreign Relations Committee are now terminated, and if that is so, I expect to be in more active attendance at these hearings. I have been reading these hearings at night, and while I would have liked to have had an advance copy of this, because I could possibly have gone ahead faster, there are a great many questions that have suggested themselves to me which undoubtedly Admiral Sims can clear my mind on, and I assume that it will take to-morrow to complete the Admiral's testimony, at least.

Admiral SIMS. There will be only 10 or 15 pages more to-morrow, and I can finish them in about an hour or an hour and a quarter, or something like that.

Senator PITTMAN. I would like to ask, then, that when the direct testimony is through to-morrow, we adjourn until the next day, by reason of the probability that to-day and to-morrow the most important phases of this treaty matter will be disposed of.

The CHAIRMAN. That is, after the hearing to-morrow it is suggested that we adjourn until Friday?

Senator PITTMAN. Yes.

Admiral SIMS. That is only giving up half an hour, then?

Senator PITTMAN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will adjourn now until to-morrow morning.

(Thereupon, at 11.50 o'clock a. m., the subcommittee adjourned until to-morrow, Thursday, March 18, 1920, at 10 o'clock a. m.)

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NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

THURSDAY, MARCH 18, 1920.

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON NAVAL AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 o'clock a. m., in room 235, Senate Office Building, Senator Frederick Hale presiding.

Present: Senators Hale (chairman), Ball, and Trammell.

TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL WILLIAM S. SIMS—Resumed.

Admiral SIMS. When I concluded my testimony yesterday we were considering the subject of the negotiations that were being carried on between the Navy Department and the Admiralty and the headquarters abroad, with reference to the rotation of battleships, so that our ships could come home for docking and recreation. Continuing from thereon, I have cited these cases at this time in order to show the delay and confusion caused by the department's failure to send me adequate assistance, and to maintain a sound military policy with regard to the command and administration of the overseas forces.

Of course, when the officers were sent over for a planning section, many of the early difficulties disappeared. This planning section proved to be of great value to the allied cause. The allied naval council was formally organized in December, 1917, and held its first meeting in January, 1918. I was detailed by the department by cable as the American representative in this council, and in the great and increasing volume of work which arose in connection with the consideration of many plans for fuller cooperation between the Allies, and for carrying out new operations, the services of this planning section were of the utmost importance.

In pointing out to the department how easily operation could be coordinated by the use of such a staff, in a letter of January 21, 1918, to the department I said:

> As a result of the activities of the planning section, all questions concerning the northern barrage which required prompt settlement have been taken up for discussion and, with one or two exceptions, have been settled. * * * In my dealings with the Admiralty in this matter of the northern barrage, I found that Admiral Wemyss is very desirous of having his subordinates handle all matters of details, bringing to him only completed solution of all problems presented, rather than to depend upon him for a solution. I believe that the entrance of our planning section into the Admiralty will have a good effect in this respect.

Among other things this planning section drew up a study of the fundamental naval problems of the war, which was transmitted to the allied naval council. As I stated in my letter of February 22 to the department, No. 9489, "this was one of the first problems

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I requested the planning section to take up after it was organized, as I am of the opinion that at no time in the past has sufficient thought been given by the several admiralties to the general naval situation and to the relations that must exist between the maritime and land strategy of the war."

In a letter of August 15, 1917, I discussed the services rendered by this planning section in the following paragraph:

AUGUST 16, 1918.

The planning section which was formed in December, 1917, has been of the utmost service to the force commander through its studies of important political, strategic, and tactical questions, upon which it has submitted memoranda of great value, not only as meeting existing situations but as forming matter of permanent value in connection with future operations.

Many of the suggestions and recommendations made by the planning section have been adopted, and much of the material prepared by it has been promulgated to the forces in Europe for their information and guidance.

The influence of the planning section upon the British Admiralty has been noticeable as affecting the methods of work of the plans division of the Admiralty and affecting the opinions of the Admiralty naval staff. Planning section memoranda No. 40, which contained some recommendations capable of being construed as critical of Admiralty methods and performances, was given by me unofficially to one of the members of the naval staff, who I felt sure would take it as it was meant, that is, as a study of the situation from the German point of view and in no sense a criticism of the Admiralty. Not only was this paper highly thought of by the officer in question, but it has been most favorably commented upon by the first sea lord, who has directed that a copy be sent to the commander in chief, grand fleet.

This is a good example of how constructive criticism should be received.

Great as has been the benefit to the force commander of the work of the planning section, I am disposed to believe that its chief value has been in its tendency to establish mutual understanding as to methods of thought on military questions as between ourselves and the admiralty.

The number of problems that were studied, and the solutions which were proposed, undoubtedly had a profound effect upon the general agreements and coordination of activities between the various allies. It should be borne in mind, however, that this planning section did not begin its work until the first week in January, 1918, nine months after we entered the war, although I had recommended such action in May, 1917, eight months previously. Consequently, effective as was its work after it was established, much valuable time was lost in those early critical months, because there was not available in London such a group of our experienced and highly efficient officers, familiar with the major lessons of naval warfare, to assist in planning our activities and coordinating them fully with those of the various allies.

DEPARTMENT REFUSED TO PERMIT ENROLLMENT OF AMERICANS IN NAVAL RESERVE.

In my letter of January 7, 1920, which is the basis of the testimony that I am presenting, I also pointed out in paragraphs 70, 71, 72, and 73, that during the first year of the war the department refused to permit me to enroll in the Naval Reserve capable Americans who had special knowledge and who offered their services; that the department refused to trust to my discretion any promotion of these officers, thereby doing a serious injustice to the men themselves, by failing to recognize really distinguished service; and also occasioning me great embarrassment.

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These officers perform important services, and were frequently of an age and experience much greater than their rank indicated, and were dealing with allied officers of much higher rank. Practically from the time of my arrival abroad, I recommended to the department that I be authorized to enroll in the Naval Reserve for work in my command suitable Americans who were at the time abroad. Many of these Americans, because of years of residence in Europe, and familiarty with European customs and languages and personalities, were in a position to render the greatest service to our naval forces in Europe, especially in positions on shore, which required no technical knowledge of naval duties but required exactly those qualifications which these men possessed preeminently, and which it would be extremely difficult to find among the naval reserve officers being enrolled in the United States.

In April, Lieut. Gillmore, an ex-naval officer of wide European experience in dealing with European admiralties in connection with naval appliances, voluntered his services, and on April 14 the Secretary of the Navy authorized his provisional appointment as a lieutenant in the naval reserve. Lieut. Gillmore provided me personally with office force, and equipment, including typewriter and paper and pencils, and himself paid the salaries of the stenographers during those early critical days of my activities, as the authority for such expenditure had not been granted by the Navy Department. Lieut. Gillmore was the only reserve officer whom the Navy Department authorized me to enroll during the first year of thr war.

On May 7, 1917, the naval attaché requested authority to enroll another American to handle the confidential work in his office.

On May 9, I cabled requesting "general authority to enroll simir lar qualified candidates for naval reserve force as may be useful fo- my command, notifying department in each case."

On May 18, the naval attaché received a cable stating:

Received May 18. Naval attaché.

It is the opinon of the Navy Department and particularly that of the chief of Naval Operations that the services of patriotic Americans abroad can be used to the best advantage by employing them, and it is considered that employing them is preferable to giving them commissions in the Naval Service.

NAVINTEL.

On May 14, in a cable to the department I requested information concerning the department's action on "my request for authority to enroll qualified candidates in the naval reserve. The services of these officers are urgently needed both for staff work here and in France and as relief for officers afloat."

On May 19 the Secretary of the Navy informed me:

The department does not authorize enrollment in the naval reserve at present.

And again in a cable received June 5, the Sercretary stated:

The department disapproves of all enrollment of commissioned personnel. You have authority to employ necessary clerical assistance.

As, however, these assistants were, by the nature of the situation, intended to handle most secret communications and matters, which, by Navy regulations, can not pass out of the hands of commissioned officers, it was practically essential, if my work was to continue, without great embarrassment, that reserve officers should be enrolled to handle this class of work.

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The idea of having enrolled officers is that as soon as a man is enrolled in the Navy he comes under naval regulations, and is subject to disciplinary measures, can be court-martialed for offenses, and is therefore under more efficient control and distinct authority.

In July and August, as the work rapidly increased, a number of young Americans volunteered their services and came in to help me. Five of them took up work immediately, handling codes and doing the necessary communication work. Another was practically put in charge of the secretarial work.

In a cable of August 12, 1917, I referred to this fact and requested authority to enroll six men in the naval reserve, stating:

> Unless this is done, the services of most of these men will be lost to me, as they naturally do not wish to go through the war as civilian appointees, and need not do so, as one or two of them already have opportunities for obtaining commissions in American Army in Europe.

Two days later I received a dispatch in reply stating:

> Necessary steps have been taken. Armed guard officer will inform you upon arrival.

There was no other information but that "necessary steps have been taken. Armed guard officer will inform you upon arrival."

At the time this cryptic message was not understood, but when the armed guard officer arrived 10 days later it was found that he had brought with him the necessary forms for the enrollment of 12 reserve officers and the necessary authority from the Bureau of Navigation. Immediately upon receiving this authority eight men were enrolled in the naval reserve in London, and later one additional man was enrolled in London and three in Paris, all being employed on work in the Paris or London headquarters, and thereby making it unnecessary to employ regular line officers so badly needed for other duties. Repeatedly throughout the following year I requested authority to enroll further officers in the reserve as the requirements grew, but received no such authority until March, 1918, and then only for five officers.

PROMOTION OF OFFICERS.

Similarly with regard to the promotion of these reserve officers, no regular method of promoting officers in the naval reserve forces on duty in European waters was established until late in the war. In the meantime many of these officers, especially those naval coast defense in class 4, for whom no promotion could be made except by special recommendations, were rendering most valuable service in positions normally held by officers of higher rank. For many of them I considered it in the interests of the services that their work should be recognized and rewarded and that they be promoted not only for the sake of the morale of the service, but also as an actual help to me, because of the greater facility it would give them in their relations with Allied officers of higher rank with whom they were dealing. The situation was especially aggravated among the reserve personnel on duty abroad as they began to discover that many men with whom they had served in the United States and who had remained on duty in the United States in more or less routine posts were being regularly promoted, sometimes one grade, sometimes two, while for the arduous and important service in the war zone practi-

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cally no promotions at all were being made at this period among reserve officers. For example, many aviation officers who rendered the most distinguished service in actual flying were recommended by me for promotion and these recommendations disapproved, although other men, who had remained at home, were promoted by the department, and finally when they came to Europe a few months later were superior in rank to the pilots who had had many months' experience and who had rendered most distinguished service in the war zone. This I pointed out in a letter of April 28, 1918, but no action was taken.

On August 29, 1918, I sent the following cable, concerning the matter, to Admiral Benson, but the action I recommended was not taken:

[Dispatch to be sent. Simben.]

Date: August 29, 1918.
To: Opnav, Washington.
Prepared by A-1.

Simben 33. Our letter A-1, 15766 of April 21, 1918, recommended Ensigns J. R. MacNamara and P. F. Ives, Reserve Force, for promotion to rank of lieutenant (junior grade), in recognition conspicuous service rendered. Ensign MacNamara was officially credited with having seriously damaged enemy submarine on March 21, and Ensign Ives with having made a successful attack against enemy submarine, but his bombs failed to explode due to no fault of his own. On June 8 our cable No. 9234 again recommended these two ensigns for promotion together with 16 other deserving cases. Of the 18 officers recommended the only one promoted was Lieut. (junior grade) C. F. Fuller, Reserve Force, attached to my headquarters to the exclusion of those officers recommended for gallant conduct in war zone.

Our cable No. 3741 of August 29 again recommended Ensign J. J. Schieffelen, Reserve Force, for promotion to lieutenant (junior grade) in recognition of his having seriously damage enemy submarine off east coast of England August 9.

In order to maintain esprit de corps and high standard of efficiency of U. S. Naval Forces, Foreign Service, urgently request that my recommendations for promotion due to gallant conduct in the face of the enemy be accorded prompt recognition. The arrival of officers holding the rank of lieutenant (junior grade), from the United States, senior to those ensigns mentioned above, can not fail to cause a spirit of dissatisfaction and discontent which will ultimately break down the excellent esprit de corps now existing. This is particularly true in the case of Ensigns Ives and MacNamara, who were recommended for promotion in recognition of their conduct in the face of the enemy over four months ago. 033730.

SIMS.

In a personal letter of August 30, 1918, to the Secretary of the Navy, I had pointed out to him also what injustices were being done by the failure to promote those brave and efficient officers in the reserve flying corps in the following letters. [Reading:]

Admiral Sims's personal file.

AUGUST 30, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I should like to invite your personal attention to a matter which, in my opinion, very intimately concerns the efficiency of one of the branches of the forces over here, namely, the Naval Aviation Service. The young men of this service are performing their duties in a manner of which the Navy Department should be very proud. They are risking their lives every time they make a flight. They are losing their lives at the rate of about one per day. They have received very high commendation from the Allies with whom they are serving.

In some respects they are the Allies' hope of the future in this service, as they come to their duties with the fresh enthusiasm of a country that has not been at war for a number of weary years as these people over here have been. It seems to me that when they perform conspicuous acts of gallantry they should be promptly rewarded by the Navy Department. Some such reward is necessary to keep up the admirable spirit they have at present. I am afraid that the treatment they are now receiving

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can not but affect their morale. For the most part, they are carrying out their duties from isolated stations, and something is necessary to keep up their enthusiasm.

It is for this reason that I have recently recommended by cable certain officers of the rank of ensign for promotion to the grade of junior lieutenant.

I understand that it is a regulation or a policy of the department that all promotions shall be made only upon the recommendation of a certain board in Washington. I may be misinformed upon this subject, but the point I wish to make is this, that in order that these rewards should have the effect that I believe to be necessary, I think that upon the recommendations made from this side that these young men should be promoted without the slightest delay.

It would not be unprecedented at all, to entrust me with this power of promotion in the case of young men who perform these gallant actions. It certainly would not be unprecedented to trust my judgment in this matter and to immediately promote these officers upon my telegraphic recommendation. It seems to me that, in the interests of getting along with the war, an exception might be made in the case of the commander of the forces over on this side.

I beg you to believe that I do not make this recommendation with any other object than to increase the efficiency of our naval aviation forces.

I like to believe that you would have sufficient confidence in my judgment and integrity to be sure that a privilege of this kind would not be abused.

In my cable of August 29, 1918, I recommended Ensigns MacNamara and Ives of the reserve force for promotion to junior lieutenant, in recognition of the conspicuous service they have rendered. Both of these officers were officially credited with having seriously damaged an enemy submarine. Subsequently I again recommended these officers for promotion together with a number of other deserving cases. Of all of those recommended only one promoted to lieutenant (junior grade), namely, Ensign Fuller of the reserve force, who is attached to my headquarters. I also recommended Ensign Schieffelen for promotion in recognition of having seriously damaged a submarine off the east coast of England.

It is more particularly to be regretted that these officers are not promoted because of the fact that officers are arriving on this side holding the rank of lieutenant, and this of course can not fail to cause a great spirit of dissatisfaction and discontent and thus can not fail to lower the enthusiasm and the morale of these splendid young men who are doing such excellent war service.

Similarly, with regard to reserve officers who were doing important work in London and Paris, I repeatedly recommended their promotion. In the case of a number of officers in London headquarters, I recommended promotions on March 31 on their fitness reports. I cabled on July 15, requesting to know what action had been taken. Again, on July 17. I received no reply from the department until August, when I received letters of July 22 and August 2, which I will read. [Reading:]

N-32-R/CS. 871-172.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
BUREAU OF NAVIGATION,
Washington, D. C., July 22, 1918.

To: Force commander, United States naval forces operating in European waters.
Subject: Promotion of officers recommended in reference (*a*).
Reference: (*a*) Cablegram to Bureau of Navigation No. 9622. (*b*) Cablegram to Bureau of Navigation No. 1335.

1. Receipt of the cablegram, references (*a*) and (*b*) recommending certain officers for promotion is acknowledged. The board for the assignment of higher provision rank to officers in the United States Naval Reserve Force has not had an opportunity to act on these recommendations.

2. The importance of assigning higher rank to office, deserving promotion is fully realized by the bureau, but owing to the immense amount of extra work in the bureau incidental to the war which has had to be accomplished by an untrained force, it is impossible to act upon such recommendations with the dispatch that is desirable.

3. As it is inevitable under present conditions that considerable time must elapse between the receipt of these recommendations and the day they can be acted upon, it is suggested that in the future such recommendations be made through the regular mail channels. It is also desirable that a separate letter be submitted on each officer

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recommended for promotion. If separate letters are submitted the individual cases can then be acted upon without loss of time and with much more convenience to the bureau.

L. C. PALMER,
Rear Admiral, United States Navy;
Chief of Bureau.

In reply refer to No. 13J. N-10-ED-P. 31-9-1.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
BUREAU OF NAVIGATION,
Washington, D. C., August 2, 1918.

To: Force commander, commanding United States naval forces, operating in European waters.
Subject: Promotion of officers, reserve force, class 4.

1. Promotion of officers in classes 1 and 2 of the Naval Reserve Force is provided for automatically by assigning to such officers running mates of the Regular Navy. It is the bureau's desire to have as many officers of class 4 qualify for duties in class 2 as is possible and to transfer such officers to that class, whereupon they will be assigned running mates and attain their promotion automatically.

2. The bureau will allow certain promotion of class 4 officers, subject to the following restrictions: Ensigns who have attained the age of 24 years, performing shore duty only may be promoted to the rank of lieutenant (j. g.) after 12 months active duty as commissioned officers. Ensigns doing duty afloat should be required to qualify for duties in class 2 and be transferred to that class. The length of service required for such transfer will depend only upon the officer's ability to attain the qualification, but not sooner than three months' duty afloat. No promotions will be made above the rank of lieutenant (j. g.) until officers have qualified for duties afloat and been transferred to class 2.

3. The bureau reserves to itself the right to promote or not to promote in any individual case, depending upon the ability of the officer concerned, dependent upon his record.

L. C. PALMER,
Rear Admiral United States Navy,
Chief of Bureau.

I finally was informed by the department that before any promotions could be made complete fitness reports must be submitted, and that in any case the bureau would have to be furnished evidence of faithful service and of qualifications for promotion before such promotion could be made. It was not until after the armistice that I received authority to make the promotions which I had been recommending in many cases for nearly a year, and then only a certain number of those I recommended were authorized.

Early in September, 1918, an officer who had recently been on duty in the Bureau of Navigation was available for temporary duty at the London headquarters. This officer had been ordered to Europe for duty in the forces, but with instructions to make a study of the personnel situation in the forces and to submit a report thereon to the Bureau of Navigation before reporting to me for such duty as I might assign. In the course of his studies he visited all of the stations occupied by us in the British Isles and many of those in France, and thus acquired a very intimate knowledge of the situation and of the conditions under which the forces were operating.

After he had completed his study and submitted his report, I directed him to make a particular study of the subject of reserve officers, and prepare for me, for submittal to the department, a letter on "Policies with regard to promotion of United States Naval Reserve Force officer personnel serving in the war zone." His report was submitted under date of September 11, 1918, and he handed it to me with the remark that before beginning his work, he had been of the opinion that promotions should not be made by me, but should

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be made in accordance with the policy set forth in the Bureau of Navigation's letter of August 2, 1918, which I have just read and in which the bureau stated that it reserved to itself "The right to promote or not to promote in any individual case, dependent upon the ability of the officer concerned, dependent upon his record," but that in the course of his investigations he had entirely changed his mind and was convinced that it was essential that the power to promote should be placed in my hands, and that he had therefore been able to prepare a letter recommending that policy.

This incident illustrates perfectly the fact that, generally speaking, sounder decisions can be reached by those living in the atmosphere of the war zone than those who are far removed therefrom. In other words, it is safest to entrust to the commander in the field all possible discretion and all powers which can legally be so entrusted, and to repose trust in him rather than to attempt to control his actions from a headquarters far removed from the scene of his activities.

This letter is entirely too long to read, but I will insert it in full in the record and will merely state, for the present information of the committee, that it recognized fully the difficulties with which the Bureau of Navigation and the Navy Department had been confronted in administering the Naval Reserve Force, and expressed concurrence in nearly all of the rules and policies laid down by the Bureau of Navigation, governing the appointment and promotion of officers in the reserve force, pointing out, however, how in some particulars these rules and policies operated to the disadvantage of officers serving abroad as compared with those serving at home. The letter includes certain specific recommendations regarding the placing in the hands of the commander of the European forces the appointment, promotion, and demotion of reserves officers, the policies of the bureau being strictly followed. The letter referred to is as follows:

SEPTEMBER 11, 1918.

From: Force commander.
To: Secretary of the Navy (Bureau of Navigation).
Subject: Policies with regard to the promotion of U. S. N. R. F. officer-personnel serving in the war zone.

1. A careful study and analysis of all the letters, instructions, circulars, and orders issued since the inception of the Naval Reserve Force, with particular regard to the appointment, classification, precedence, and promotion of officers, has been made by the force commander. It is noted that the bureau has repeatedly invited comment and recommendations; this letter contains certain comment, conclusions, and recommendations based on giving due regard in every case to the following considerations:

(*a*) A vigorous prosecution of the war.
(*b*) Fairness and justice to the personnel.
(*c*) The present necessary policies with regard to naval personnel as a whole.
(*d*) The naval personnel situation after the war.

2. The force commander has been greatly impressed by the magnitude of the bureau's task, the farsightedness that is in evidence throughout the policies, the painstaking efforts to achieve fairness to all, and the consistent effort to build up a reserve force with seagoing qualifications. The bureau's very obvious objectives are thoroughly appreciated.

3. While the force commander is concerned first of all with the vigorous prosecution of the war by the forces under his command, he desires to emphasize the fact that so far as the recommendations contained in this letter are concerned, he has given careful thought in such case to the possibility that the policy which, at the moment, may best serve military ends, may be detrimental to best serving them later on. The future as well as the present is, therefore, carefully taken into account. The bureau's viewpoint as well as the European forces' viewpoint is considered. The bureau's relation to influence and authority entirely beyond its control is considered.

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4. Such parts of the act of 29th August, 1916, as established the reserve forces were couched in extremely general terms, so that all provisions admitted of great flexibility and latitude in the instructions for the administration and organization of the force. The general order promulgating the establishment of the reserve force virtually gave a free hand to the Bureau of Navigation in all matters. The organization, in order that it might fit the practical requirements and the needs of the service, has undergone an extensive evolution, so that the various classes in effect to-day are not those in effect immediately after the passage of the act which created the reserve force. It has been necessary to carry out a continuous reconstruction of policies. The policies of January, 1917, were widely different from the policies of January, 1918. This has been necessary because the bureau has had to meet changing conditions. The reserve force had to be organized quickly, for the personnel was needed. The bureau decentralized its authority, and naturally turned to the naval districts. The districts produced the personnel and gave it initial training; the bureau gave certain personnel more training; the forces afloat gave, and are giving, further practical training; and the redistribution of the trained personnel is taking place continuously according to the needs for their services. The success has been great, and has been due to the splendid cooperation between the Bureau of Navigation and the forces on shore and afloat.

5. It has been necessary to change the policies to meet the changing conditions; the conditions as they pertain to the naval districts and to vessels in home waters are not the same as those pertaining to the forces operating against the enemy. The bureau has taken the second named conditions into consideration, but it is the opinion of the force commander that some variation from the general policy is necessary to fit the conditions at the front. Decentralization has extended, generally speaking, only to the naval districts, and to the supervisors representing the bureau. Meanwhile, the forces in Europe have increased to a point where both in officers and men they number more than the personnel of the entire Navy immediately prior to the war.

6. There are now attached to the forces operating in European waters approximately 3,700 officers and 55,000 men. These figures include none of the trans-Atlantic transports, but include only the personnel under the commander of the United States naval forces operating in European waters. Six months hence, the personnel will very probably have increased 50 per cent. Of the total number of officers, approximately 1,800 are U. S. N. R. F. The remaining 1,900 are regulars and temporary officers.

7. The act of July 1, 1918, absorbed the National Naval Volunteers into the newly legalized class 2, and fixed precedence, stating however, "That during the present emergency the date of precedence of all officers of the Naval Reserve Force shall be as prescribed by the Secretary of the Navy." This authority may, of course, be delegated by him to others and rigid rules are not mandatory. The bill further specifies how promotions of reserve officers shall be effected; the force commander has received an advance copy of the bureau's memorandum of July 22, 1918 drawn up pursuant to this act

8. The memorandum mentioned in the preceding paragraph, and such parts of the previous instructions, etc., as are still in effect are assumed to include all the policie now in operation pertaining to Naval Reserve officer-personnel.

9. The comments which follow will relate to the various classes of reserve officer personnel, and to reserve officers-personnel in general.

10. *Class 1 officers.*—The rules and policies regarding the precedence and promotion of officers of this class are considered to fit the conditions in the forces in Europe excellently.

11. *Class 2 officers.*—The rules and policies regarding the precedence and promotion of such officers of this class as were National Naval Volunteers are considered to fit the conditions in the forces of Europe excellently.

12. As regards officers in class 4 for 1, who, it is stated, will be transferred to class 2, the rules state: "Will have the precedence from the date of their designation as class 4 for 1"; and, as regarding all class 2 officers—"at the time an officer (line or staff) is appointed in, given a provisional rank in, or transferred to class 2, his running mate in the Navy will be the officer who is at the bottom of that rank and grade, and promotion will follow as outlined under (1) (*d*)."

These two rules are apparently at variance. There will be numerous cases in which officers whose dates of designation as class 4 for 1, and of transfer to class 2 will be separated by considerable periods of time.

In other words, all administrative delay will operate against the officer, and therefore the farther away from the adminsitrative center the officer is, the lower down the list will his ultimate running mate be found. The officer in Chesapeake Bay will have considerable advantage over the officer in the North Sea. Furthermore, any class

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4 for-general-service officer who has been doing duty on shore in the war zone will receive no credit for this service when finally designated as class 4 for 1, and transferred to class 2, as the precedence and promotion rules do not take into account any of this class 4 for general-service employment. This will be decidedly discouraging to a number of officers who have been performing excellent service in various parts of this station, frequently in hazardous billets. It is considered that some differentiation should be made between the employment on shore of class 4 for-general-service officers in the United States, and those on shore duty with the fighting forces. The conditions are entirely different, and the duties differ widely. It is not maintained that their service is more arduous or more important, but it is more trying in every way, and they feel that it is more intimately connected with fighting the enemy.

13. *Class 3 officers.*—The rules and policies regarding the promotion of officers of this class are considered to fit the conditions in the forces in Europe excellently.

14. *Class 4 officers.*—The rules and policies for precedence of class 4 officers are considered entirely satisfactory. There is no necessity for their having military authority outside of their own special assignment to duty, and the rules state they shall have none. Attention has been invited in paragraph 11 to the fact that the rules for precedence and promotion for class 2 officers who have been transferred from class 4 for 1 are apparently at variance, and to the fact that no account is taken of the service performed by the class 4 for 1 officer during the time that he was a straight class 4 officer. The class 4 officer takes precedence from the date of nis provisional assignment or rank.

Let it be assumed that an ensign, class 4 (general service) was given his provisional rank May 1, 1917. (There are many ensigns on this station who were appointed at approximately that time. His date of precedence is then May 1, 1917. On September 1, 1918, it has been found possible to release him from duty at Dunkirk, and send him to sea for training to qualify for class 4 for 1. He immediately ranks below all ensigns in the Navy and all ensigns of class 1 and class 2. His precedence drops lower and lower during his period of training, so far as it concerns officers of the other three classes just mentioned. By January 1, 1919, it is decided to recommend that he be designated as class 4 for 1. The recommendation is forwarded to the bureau, and, while he is awaiting action on this recommendation, his precedence continues to fall lower. After two months, he receives notice that he has been designated as class 4 for 1 and his transfer to class 2 follows. He now takes precedence from the date of his transfer to class 2. Thus after nearly two years' service in Europe he finds himself below all ensigns of the Navy and all class 1 and class 2 officers. His original date of precedence has fallen two years, because he has not had the good fortune to have been at home where he could be trained and made an ensign (T), or to have been sent afloat for training. His duty on shore in Europe has been necessary to the carrying on of active operations, and the force commander could not release him without loss to the effectiveness of the prosecution of the war. The two years this ensign did duty before at last finding himself at the foot of the class 2 list of ensigns, and junior to all ensigns in the Navy have given him no official recognition whatsoever; the only advantages are those of having added to his experience by doing work in a field of naval activity that was, unfortunately for him, not at sea.

15. Not let it be assumed that an effort was made to promote this ensign, while he was still ashore, and serving as a class 4 for-general-service ensign. For a long time the only rules that applied to such a case are those found on page 12 (4) (*a*) of the Regulations Governing the Organization and Administration of the Naval Reserve Force, 1917 (issued in May, 1918). Prior to receipt of these regulations there were numerous circulars, etc. bearing on the subject. It should be noted that in none of these instructions has mention ever been made of the numerous bases in Europe from which forces operate against the enemy. Naturally enough, the bureau's principal thought was of the naval districts and other shore establishments which were and are the sources of supply of new personnel to meet the ever-increasing demands for officers. To date not a single letter from the bureau pertaining to policies regarding officers of the United States Navy Reserve Forces has mentioned personnel doing duty at the numerous active basis on the front line. What then is the policy applying to the class 4 officer in Europe? In the absence of any mention of this particular personnel, it may be assumed that the rules relating to class 4 officers in naval districts should apply, but no notice to that effect has ever been given. The conditions in a naval district and those in a base in Europe, from which operations are conducted against the enemy, are by no means analogous. All forces are told to make their recommendations in the fitness reports on the officers whom it is proposed to recommend. Some of the class 4 officers were promoted, but the greater number recommended were not. The officers recommended expected to hear the results of their recommendations for promotion. Only those who were promoted, after considerable delay, received any notice

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whatsoever. The force commander resorted to the use of the cable, and was requested to take up the matter of recommending officers for promotion, by letter only, and has lately been informed that individual letters in each case are desired.

16. The force commander does not desire that the preceding paragraph be considered in any way as an adverse criticism of the bureau. He feels that the bureau has done the very best that could have been done under all the circumstances, but the condition of affairs has not been conducive to the betterment of the morale of the class 4 officers in Europe, as may well be imagined.

17. At about the same time the pamphlet of Regulations was received, the bureau's memorandum of May 25, 1918, was received. The latter qualifies the former extensively, and new policies are announced in it.

18. The memorandum of May 25, 1918, makes no mention of class 4 serving in Europe, and, as in the case of all previous announcements, is based absolutely on the naval district plan. Attention is invited to paragraph 5, which reads:

"Having in view the general policy outlined above, recommendations and suggestions regarding this complement are, however, requested, in order that any future change may be made uniformly in all districts."

If it is to be assumed that class 4 officers in Europe are to be promoted as such according to the naval district plan (and the force commander has never been so informed) how will complements be established in Europe? The bureau's policy, and rightfully, is based on mobilization organization. The bases in Europe are changing and there will be no United States naval bases and stations in Europe after the close of the war. If it is intended that the stations and bases in Europe be assigned class 4 complements, when will it be done, and how will it be done? If it is not intended to do this, what then is the existing policy with regard to class 4 officers in Europe?

19. If the bureau intends that class 4 officers in Europe be promoted to fill vacancies in complement, it will find such a plan to be absolutely impracticable. Shore complements in Europe can never be definitely and permanently established any more than can a complement for a line of trenches or an ammunition depot behind the lines. The base or station that is necessary and important to-day, may be unnecessary and unimportant next week, etc. The force commander alone will be able to estimate the necessary base and station complements essential from day to day to carry on the operations that are in hand. In May, 1917, the naval forces in Europe consisted of a few hundred officers and men, to-day there are 3,700 officers and 55,000 men.

20. It is, therefore, concluded that there is no policy in effect that is applicable to the promotion as such of class 4 officers in Europe, other than the bureau alone will decide which class 4 officers recommended for promotion shall be promoted, and which shall not.

21. *Class 5 officers.*—The bureau's pamphlet states (see p. 12, (5) (*a*)):

"The number of officers allowed in each rank in class 5 shall be established by the Bureau of Navigation, and higher ranks may be given to fill these vacancies as outlined in (4) (*a*)."

22. The bureau's memorandum of May 25, 1918, states that, "as there is no Naval Flying Corps at present, a class 5 reservist can not be assigned a running mate in this corps. During the present war, aviation duties will be performed almost entirely by reservists of class 5 and a complement in the various grades has been established. This complement will be modified from time to time," etc. The bureau's memorandum of July 22, 1918, as far as it pertains to class 5 officers, is precisely the same as the memorandum of May 25, 1918. It is safe to assure, then, that the actual effect upon the policies relative to this class of officers by the act of July 1, 1918, consists only in extending the provisions of promotion by selection to officers of and above the rank of lieutenant commander, as these provisions apply to the whole reserve force.

23. There have been class 5 officers in Europe since May, 1917. The number is now 751. In the early part of 1919, the number will be about 2,000, provided the casualties do not become greater than has been anticipated. Up to the present time, no announcement as to the quotas in the various grades to make up the class 5 complement has now been received. Neither has any information been received as to the basis upon which the complement will be established. A policy has been announced, but the terms upon which it is to be operated in order to be in effect, as a policy, have not been made known. Therefore, so far as the force commander and the class 5 officers in Europe are aware, there is not yet any policy in operation, other than that the bureau alone will decide which class 5 officers recommended for promotion shall be promoted, and which shall not. To date, the class 5 officers in Europe represent the largest proportion of any class of reserves who are actually fighting the enemy. Furthermore, the casualties, in battle, sustained by this class of officers are greater than the combined casualties of the Navy and all other classes of reserve officers.

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The casualties will become greater and greater as the northern bombing group gets into full fighting strength, and as the seaplane stations get into full operation. The average operating life of an officer pilot in Europe is three months.

24. Had the gallant work of the class 5 officers, who (unfortunately for purposes of publicity) have been compelled to fly foreign-made planes, received the wide notice that it deserves, it is felt that the subject of their promotion would naturally have received proportionately more prompt and serious consideration.

25. Page 12 (3) of the bureau's pamphlet states: "Officers in class 3 may be promoted in accordance with the position they held on a merchant ship or naval auxiliary (table Art. 207)." This excellent rule, by which promotion is governed by the position which the officer holds in the organization of which he is a part, should be applied as far as possible to class 5 officers—personnel in Europe, but applied within reason, of course. A ship requires an organization. The bureau would never assign a captain with the rank of ensign, and nine other ensigns, as the officer complement of a 10,000-ton transport. Yet there are fighting organizations of class 5 personnel in Europe of which the head and all his officers are ensigns. These numerous anomalies in the naval flying forces in Europe are not conducive to high morale, good organization, discipline or fighting efficiency. The splendid work of class 5 officers has been due to their universally high intelligence, keenness, interest in their work, and their courage. Meanwhile, on account of their relatively low rank, the naval service, of which they are a part, is subjected continuously to embarrassment and humiliation. There are many ensigns who have been fighting the enemy in positions that are filled by captains and majors in the various allied air forces in conjunction with whom they are fighting. Flying organizations—both tactical and administrative—are instituted in precisely the same manner as are military fighting organizations. The platoon, the company, and the battalion each has its counterpart in the flying services. A thoroughly established order of things exists in all the allied flying forces. They promote their officers precisely as the bureau promotes the class 3 officers "in accordance with the position they hold." They no more consider assigning a sublieutenant to a major's billet in the flying service than do they consider assigning a sublieutenant to command a battalion of infantry.

It would not be the part of wisdom to jump ensigns into the grades of lieutenant commander, even though they satisfactorily fill a fighting position which should entitle them to this rank. However, any system of promotion for class 5 officers in Europe that is not established along the same general lines as the class 3 system will be unsatisfactory and unsound. The bureau will apply the present excellent rule 3 to the 20,000 class 3 officers; it must provide in meeting the gigantic personnel demand involved in the Navy's operation of the various transports now building projected. A similar system should be applied, and immediately, to the promotion of class 3 officers in Europe.

26. From the present methods of promotion as applied to class 5 officers in Europe there have resulted many unreasonable and unfortunate situations. First of all, there has been invariably long delay in receiving the bureau's action on the recommendations. Some of the officers were, in the meanwhile killed, interned or captured. Among a number (18) of officers recommended in the past were Ensigns Ives and McNamara, both of whom had received letters of recommendation from the Secretary of the Navy for gallantry in action with the enemy. Up to September 3 but one of the 18 officers had received the promotion recommended. Unfortunately, this one officer was stationed at the Naval Headquarters, London. While it is a mere coincidence that this particular officer received his promotion, it is but natural that many class 5 officers ascribe his good fortune to the fact that he was on duty at headquarters. On September 4, following receipt of the force commander's dispatch on the subject, Ensigns Ives and McNamara and one other officer were promoted by the bureau's cable. The remaining 14 officers are as yet unpromoted. The promotion of Lieut. Fallon, during his presence in the United States, naturally created false impressions among a number of class 5 officers. Lieut. Fallon was recommended following distinguished conduct in action, for promotion to lieutenant (junior grade). He not only received his promotion to which recommended, but an additional promotion while in the United States. Meanwhile, his former fellow officers at the same station in England, who have been fighting the enemy during Lieut. Fallon's absence, have remained ensigns.

27. The beneficial and stimulating effect of the prompt recognition of meritorious or gallant conduct is lost if the promotion proposed as the recognition of demonstrated ability, courage, and fitness for higher rank, is delayed.

28. Numerous awkward situations have arisen due to the fact that newly arrived class 5 officers, with the rank of lieutenant (junior grade) must necessarily be sent out as second pilots with ensigns who have been in active service in Europe for some time.

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29. *Reserve officers in general.*—The reserve officers in Europe have done little complaining; this is a very gratifying fact when it is considered that they are new to the naval service and are unaccustomed to the naval way of taking summary action on requests and recommendations. They have had much to discourage them, yet their morale has been high. It is the opinion of the force commander that it is incumbent on all concerned to give careful thought to the manner of dealing with reserve officers. They have not had the benefits of four years at the Naval Academy, and rightfully expect more of a human touch in informing them of what can be done for them and what can not. The force commander realizes the many difficulties in the bureau's way in its earnest endeavor to do the square thing by the reserve officers, and to secure their loyalty to the naval service. A great number of them are prominent and influential citizens, and it is encumbent upon all to insure a solid service loyalty on the part of these reserve officers. One of the best ways to accomplish this is to make them feel that their personal welfare is being intimately and carefully looked out for. The reservists in Europe have not the inspiriting example of patient, careful, and intimate administration of their personal affairs by the regular establishment that the regular establishment desires that they should have.

30. One of the most disheartening conditions, to the minds of the reserve officers, is the necessarily long delay involved in taking action on recommendations for their promotion. The many instructions regarding their appointment, classification, and promotion have, as may well be imagined, been most mystifying to the majority of the reservists. The numerous instructions have been necessary in order that the policies may fit the ever-changing conditions. As a result instructions are always forthcoming, the policy is never up to the minute, and by the time many instructions are received they are out of date, not applicable, or further instructions are announced as being in process of preparation to complete indefinite features, or to qualify other features of the current instructions. It takes approximately six weeks to two months to send a letter from most parts of this station to the department and receive a reply thereto.

31. The forces in Europe are on the front. Conditions on the front change rapidly. The personnel policies must meet the conditions and must meet them promptly. There is only one way that the details of policy can meet conditions on the front promptly, and that is by making the details of policy on the front, and carrying them out on the front. Policies based on the conditions of three months ago will not do for the conditions of the moment. Operation policies on the front must be up to the minute; so must the details of personnel policies. The Army has found it absolutely imperative to promote and demote where the fighting is going on, and the authority for this has been given. The Bureau of Navigation is just as desirous that the methods employed in carrying out the details pertaining to the promotion of reserve officers in Europe be improved as is the force commander. The following is an extract from the bureau letter of July 22, 1918:

"The importance of assigning higher rank to officers deserving promotion is fully realized by the bureau, but owing to the immense amount of extra work in the bureau incidental to the war which has had to be accomplished by an untrained force, it is impossible to act upon such recommendations with the dispatch that is desirable. As it is inevitable under present conditions that considerable time must elapse between the receipt of these recommendations and the day they can be acted upon, it is suggested that in future such recommendations be made through the regular mail channels."

32. It is considered important to mention that while it is undoubtedly not feasible to conduct examinations for confirmation during the continuance of the war, it is unfortunate that the confirmation of a number of class 1 officers was not deferred until the termination of the war, in order that the other classes of reserves might feel that all are being treated alike. It is not fair to the other classes of reserves to assume that all that they desire is the two months' retainer pay that goes with confirmation, for they have proven their unselfishness in too many ways to warrant that assumption. However, while this condition can not be altered now, it is important to note that it is a condition with which all reservists are familiar and one that inevitably appears to them as an example of discrimination although it is well known that discrimination was never intended. This is mentioned in order that the necessity for improving such conditions as do permit of improvement may be emphasized.

33. *Recommendations.*—After giving the entire subject mature consideration, and after giving due regard to the relations of the personnel situation to (*a*), (*b*), (*c*), and (*d*), as indicated in paragraph 1 of this letter, the following policies with regard to United States Naval Reserve Force officer-personnel in Europe are strongly recommended; and, furthermore, it is urged that they be put into effect at the earliest possible date:

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(*a*) Upon receipt of the new Bureau of Navigation's circular with regard to appointment of reserve officers, appointment authority will be established in Europe, and appointments consummated in Europe, the instructions contained in the circular being followed exactly.

(*b*) Designation of reserve officers, as of class 4 for 1, and class 4 for 3 (as necessary from time to time) will be made in Europe, following the policies established by the Bureau of Navigation.

(*c*) The transfer of officers from class 4 to class 3, and from class 4 for 1 to class 2, and from class 3 to class 2 (as necessary from time to time) will be effected in Europe, following the policies established by the Bureau of Navigation.

(*d*) Appointment, promotion, and demotion of class 3 officers will be done in Europe, following the policies established by the Bureau of Navigation.

(*e*) Promotion and demotion of class 4 officers will be done in Europe, following the policies and the spirit of the Bureau of Navigation's instructions.

(*f*) The promotion and demotion of class 1 officers and of such class 2 officers as were formerly National Naval Volunteers will be done only by the Bureau of Navigation.

(*g*) The promotion and demotion of class 2 officers, except those who were transferred to this class from National Naval Volunteer status, will be done in Europe, following the policies established by the Bureau of Navigation.

(*h*) The promotion and demotion of class 5 officers will be done in Europe, following the spirit of the general policies with regard to reserve personnel, and upon a complement basis, the complements to be established in Europe and varied from time to time as necessary, to meet the operating policies of the fighting forces.

(*i*) The promotion authority established in Europe will not extend beyond the grade or rank of lieutenant commander, and promotion will always be made one grade or rank at a time. In the staff corps, in which a grade may include more than one rank, promotion will be made so that one rank only will be the amount of the advancement at any one time.

(*j*) Promotion will follow only in the cases in which all qualifications will have been unquestionably established, and the promotion authority in Europe will be used conservatively.

(*k*) Every effort will be made in Europe gradually to replace class 4 officers not serving afloat, by class 2 officers, and to send the class 4 officers—thus released—to sea for training and ultimate transfer when qualified, to class 2.

(*l*) The administration of all personnel affairs of class 3 officers will be carried out in Europe.

(*m*) The Bureau of Navigation will be promptly notified of the appointment, promotion, demotion, and transfers between classes, of all officers.

(NOTE.—The foregoing policiesr elate only to United States Naval Reserve Force personnel under the command of the commander, United States naval forces, Europe.)

34. There are no legal obstacles whatsoever in the way of the accomplishment of the foregoing proposed policies.

35. *Administrative machinery necessary to carrying out proposed policies.*—To carry out the foregoing proposed policies, the following would be necessary:

(*a*) Establish an appointment division in the personnel section of the United States naval headquarters in Europe.

The head of this division should be a lieutenant commander of either the Regular Navy or Naval Reserve, class 1. He should have had some legal experience, should be broad-minded, and should be tactful and patient in dealing with reserve officers. He should be satisfactory to the Bureau of Navigation.

NOTE.—The force commander nominates Lieut. Donald Craig, U. S. N. R. F. (class 1) for this duty. This officer is about to be advanced to the provisional grade of lieutenant commander.

(*b*) The head of the appointment division should have enrollment and recruiting authority, and should have authority to sign appointments, promotions, etc., for the Bureau of Navigation over the phrase "By direction." The same applies to one or more assistants in the division.

(*c*) He should keep in close touch with the Bureau of Navigation (for the force commander), and should also keep in continuous touch with all conditions on this station.

(*d*) All appointments, changes in classes, designations, etc., should be on forms identical with those used in the bureau.

(*e*) It is suggested that the bureau send an officer who has had experience in its reserve division (officers) for temporary duty at naval headquarters to assist in getting the appointment section in smooth running order.

(*f*) The bureau should be furnished a copy of every appointment, oath, and acceptance, designation, etc., accomplished by the office here, to insure that its records are complete.

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(*g*) Assign to the staff of the flag officer commanding base 29 (Cardiff, Wales) an officer whose duty shall be the supervision of the personnel of the class 3 reserve on duty in European waters, his position and duties being analogous to those of a supervisor of naval auxiliary reserve.

(*h*) The force commander will establish a personnel board at his headquarters, and no promotions will be made except on the recommendation of this board, approved by the force commander. The officers on the board (with the exception of the head of the appointment division) will be of the Regular Navy.

(*i*) In the event of the bureau's approval of the policies and practice proposed in this letter no new policies will be initiated and put into effect without the bureau's advice and approval in each case.

35. The bureau's telegraphic approval of the policies proposed is requested in order that the force commander may proceed to carry out this plan at the earliest possible moment.

WM. S. SIMS.

I would like to say in connection with that subject that there was nothing at all personal in my request to be allowed either to enroll a certain number of reserve officers over there or to be allowed to promote within certain limitations.

In order to carry on business with an admiralty abroad and with a great number of business firms that we had to do business with, it was necessary to have men who knew the ropes, who were accustomed to that sort of thing, and the men referred to in my dispatches were American business men who had been doing business on the other side for years, who had personal associations with the people we wanted to get in contact with, and who could have been of the greatest possible use to us; say men of 40 or 45 years of age; men getting salaries from $10,000 to $20,000 and $25,000 a year, who were perfectly willing to come into the office and give us the benefit of their experience and advice, and to work for us. The Navy Department refused to allow these men to be enrolled, saying that we ought to employ them in a civil capacity. Well, a red-blooded American does not take to that sort of thing, and he simply promptly goes over to the American Army and gets enrolled there. He wants to wear the uniform and wants to it for his future, etc. That was all refused.

Now, as to the promotion of young reserves that we had over there, who were doing more fighting than any other of the American forces on the other side—naval forces—those were the aviation fellows; living in an outlying station, 20 miles from the nearest village, risking their lives every day, having a loss on the average of 1 to 1½ men a day. Those men were doing splendid stunts reported to us by the British, with whom they were associated. All I wanted was authority to make that man immediately a lieutenant. But it could not be done. That is an authority that is very commonly given to a commander in the field. It is called promotion on the field of battle. Not only was I refused permission to do it, but the people in Washington who had not been to the front at all, had not risked their lives or lost a man, were promoted and came out there with superior rank to these people that I wanted to promote.

Then another reason why I wanted to employ those very experienced Americans in London in the naval service was to get them into uniform, because that gives them a pass to all the activities of the Government, the admiralty, etc., that you could not expect to get for a man in civilian clothes.

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TOTAL PERSONNEL IN EUROPE.

Before concluding these remarks on the question of the personnel provided me by the department for the administration of our forces and for the representation of our Navy Department with the Allies, I should like to invite your attention a moment to the actual number of officers that were on duty at different periods throughout the war, at the naval headquarters in Europe and in the European forces, and also to the amount of work that had to be accomplished. I have before me a table, which I will include in the record, which shows the approximate number of officers and men on duty in European waters at different periods during the war, together with a statement of the number of vessels and shore stations which were under my command in European waters at these periods.

Table I shows the number of personnel at naval headquarters on the first of each month during 1917 and at the beginning of each quarter during 1918. This table will show that, while late in the war the staff available became sufficient for handling the problems we had to face, the number was pitifully insufficient during the most critical period in the first half of the war, when it was vitally necessary that our preparations should be pushed with the utmost celerity, and that we should coordinate at once our activities with those of the Allies. This table will also show the long delays in making the weight of the United States Navy felt in the war because of the department's inaction in those early months so far as cooperating with the Allies was concerned.

Several tables produced by Admiral Sims are here printed as follows:

Officer personnel on duty at United States Naval Headquarters, London, England, Apr. 1, 1917–Nov. 11, 1918.

	Duty on staff.				Communication office and administration.				Total officers.	Enlisted men.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)		
1917.										
Apr. 1			[1] 3						3	
May 1	1		[2] 5	1					7	
June 1	1		[3] 4	1					6	
July 1	1		[4] 3	1					5	
Aug. 1	1		[5] 5	1					7	
Sept. 1	5		6	4				5	20	12
Oct. 1	6		6	4	1	1		5	23	18
Nov. 1	6	1	7	4	1	2		4	25	26
1918.										
Jan. 1			25			15			40	51
Apr. 1			40			27			67	72
July 1			47			34			81	160
Oct. 1			[6] 81			53			134	280
Nov. 1			93			58			151	320

[1] Office of naval attaché: 1 line officer; 1 pay officer; 1 medical officer.
[2] 2 armed guard officers on brief temporary duty.
[3] 1 armed guard officer on temporary duty.
[4] 1 armed guard officer on temporary duty.
[5] Naval attaché's office increased by 1 naval constructor, and 1 officer on special ordnance inspection duty.
[6] Increase due chiefly to transfer of aviation headquarters from Paris.

NOTE.—Following is explanation of meaning of figures in above columns: (1) Regular officers sent from United States by department for this duty; (2) reserve officers sent from United States by department for this duty; (3) regular officers ordered by Admiral Sims to this duty; (4) reserve officers enrolled in London or ordered by Admiral Sims from other forces for this duty.

Data not available for year 1918, but a small percentage of increases were ordered for specific staff duty.

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TOTAL UNITED STATES NAVAL VESSELS IN EUROPE.

Table II shows month by month for 1917 the number of vessels that were available in European waters and the same information quarter by quarter for 1918. This table shows that our effective weight was not really thrown into the war so far as the Navy was concerned until well along in 1918. As I have already pointed out it was primarily either the department's failure to have our forces prepared when war began or the lack of whole-hearted cooperation with the Allies during the six or eight months of the war to which this delay must be attributed.

Arrival of forces in European waters.

Dates.	Totals.	Destroyers.	Tenders.	Yachts.	Tugs.	Gunboats.	Cruisers.	Coast Guard cutters.	Submarines.	Submarine chasers.	Battleships.	Mine layers.	Mine sweep.	Cargo miscellaneous.
1917.														
April	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
May 1	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
June 1	19	18	1	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
July 1	30	28	2	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Aug. 1	47	37	2	8	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Sept. 1	36	39	3	8	.....	4	1	1	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Oct. 1	73	41	3	17	.....	6	2	4	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Nov. 1	97	46	3	17	.....	7	2	6	5	.....	.....	.....	9	.....
Dec. 1	100	45	4	19	.....	7	2	6	5	.....	.....	.....	8	4
1918.														
Jan. 1	110	47	4	23	.....	7	2	6	5	.....	4	.....	9	4
Apr. 1	145	58	6	28	4	7	2	6	12	.....	5	1	9	7
Oct. 1	300	68	11	28	11	5	3	6	11	42	5	10	11	15
Nov. 11	375	74	12	27	15	5	3	5	10	102	8	10	11	24
July 1	220	62	9	28	11	7	3	5	10	120	8	10	13	73

UNITED STATES NAVAL PERSONNEL IN EUROPE.

Table III indicates the number of officers on my staff, the number of ships and shore stations under my command, and the total number of naval personnel abroad at the beginning of each quarter of 1917 and 1918.

Number at headquarters compared with total number.

Date.	Officers at headquarters.			Number of ships and stations.			Total of naval officers.			Total enlisted personnel.		Total personnel.	
	Officers on staff.	Communication officers.	In office of attaché.	Ships.	Shore stations.	Total.	Headquarters.	Forces.	Total.	Headquarters.	Forces.	Headquarters.	Forces.
1917.													
Apr. 1	.....	.....	3	.....	1	1	3	.....	3	.....	.....	3	3
July 1	2	.....	4	30	3	33	6	214	220	.....	1,840	6	2,054
Oct. 1	16	7	4	73	15	88	24	629	653	18	9,544	42	10,173
1918.													
Jan. 1	25	15	.....	106	32	138	40	1,482	1,522	51	22,724	91	24,206
Apr. 1	40	27	.....	135	48	183	67	2,072	2,139	72	31,080	139	33,152
July 1	47	34	.....	199	70	269	81	3,135	3,216	160	47,685	241	50,820
Oct. 1	81	53	.....	300	90	390	134	4,469	4,603	280	66,242	414	70,711
Nov. 11	93	68	.....	375	100	475	161	[1] 5,000	5,161	320	[1] 75,000	481	[1] 80,000

[1] Estimate.

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VOLUME OF CORRESPONDENCE CARRIED ON BY UNITED STATES NAVAL HEADQUARTERS IN EUROPE.

The rapid increase in the number of forces and in the amount of administrative work thereby involved can well be imagined, and I would submit for the record at this point a series of tables showing the growth in the volume of correspondence and cables handled daily and monthly during 1917 and 1918. It will be noted from this table that during the month of July, 1918, a total of 353 letters and 268 cables were sent and received from my headquarters. These numbers increased greatly in the succeeding months, and by the time of the armistice we were handling daily over a thousand individual pieces of correspondence. Thus in the month of September, 1918, alone, 11,500 cables passed through my headquarters. Nearly 8,000 letters were received and 7,000 letters sent, making over 30,000 communications that were handled during this one month.

GROWTH OF ADMINISTRATIVE WORK AT NAVAL HEADQUARTERS.

The following tables have been prepared in ordered to show the rate of growth of the number of correspondence and dispatches passing through Admiral Sims's headquarters.

The number of papers handled monthly has grown from an average of 700 per month in the second quarter of 1917 to an average of nearly 15,000 per month in the second quarter of 1918.

In July, 1917, an average of 22 letters and 24 dispatches were received or sent daily. Three months later these averages had grown to 60 in the case of letters and 65 in the case of dispatches, making a total of 125 papers handled daily. In January the daily business had grown to 151 letters and 131 cables, or a total of 283; in April the numbers were 224 letters and 203 cables handled daily, and in July 353 letters and 268 cables daily.

The accompanying graphs will illustrate the rate of growth by months and quarters. In the first nine months that Admiral Sims worked in Europe a total of 25,160 papers passed through the files. In July, 1918, alone 19,275 papers were received or sent, while there was on August 1 a total of approximately 125,000 papers in the files.

MEMORANDUM ON THE WORK OF THE FILES.

The following statistical data has been prepared to illustrate the work done by the central registry.

The first table shows the number of letters and cables handled by Vice Admiral Sims and his staff, month by month, from April, 1917.

The second table shows the average number of papers handled per day during each month.

The third table gives data concerning the methods used in filing papers.

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Number of papers handled monthly, 1917.

Month.	Letters.			Dispatches.			Total.
	In,	Out.	Total.	In.	Out.	Total.	
April (20 days)	110	80	190	70	80	150	340
May	190	160	350	190	220	410	760
June	250	230	480	260	310	570	1,050
July	360	510	1,090	480	580	1,060	1,430
August	580	510	1,090	480	580	1,060	2,150
September	730	640	1,370	620	720	1,340	2,710
October	920	960	1,880	900	1,130	2,030	3,910
November	1,350	1,360	2,710	1,230	1,560	2,790	5,500
December	1,925	2,075	4,000	1,490	1,820	3,310	7,310
Total	6,415	6,335	12,750	5,580	6,430	12,290	25,060

Number of papers handled monthly, 1918.

Month.	Letters.			Dispatches.			Total.
	In.	Out.	Total.	In.	Out.	Total.	
January	2,330	2,370	4,700	1,860	2,210	4,070	8,770
February	2,550	2,250	4,800	2,010	2,420	4,430	9,230
March	2,745	3,020	5,765	3,354	3,766	7,120	12,885
April	3,572	3,150	6,722	2,840	3,252	6,092	12,814
May	3,528	3,381	6,909	3,150	3,363	6,513	13,422
June	4,437	4,275	8,712	3,958	4,664	8,622	17,334
July	5,863	5,097	10,960	3,867	4,447	8,314	19,274
Total	25,025	23,543	48,568	21,039	24,122	45,161	93,729

Number of papers handled quarterly.

	Letters.			Dispatches.			Total.
	In.	Out.	Total.	In.	Out.	Total.	
1917.							
April–June	550	470	1,020	520	610	1,130	2,150
July–September	1,670	1,470	3,140	1,440	1,710	3,150	6,290
October–December	4,195	4,395	8,590	3,620	4,510	8,130	16,720
1917	6,415	6,335	12,750	5,580	6,830	12,410	25,160
1918.							
January–March	7,625	7,640	15,265	7,224	8,396	15,620	30,885
April–June	11,537	10,806	22,343	9,948	11,279	21,227	43,570
July	5,863	5,097	10,960	3,867	4,447	8,314	19,274

Average daily number of papers handled, 1917.

Month.	Letters.			Dispatches.			Total.
	In.	Out.	Total.	In.	Out.	Total.	
April	5.5	4.0	9.5	3.5	4.0	7.5	17.0
May	6.1	5.1	11.2	6.1	7.1	13.2	24.2
June	8.3	7.7	16.0	8.7	10.3	19.0	35.0
July	11.6	10.4	22.0	11.0	13.3	24.3	47.3
August	18.7	16.5	35.2	15.5	18.7	33.2	69.4
September	24.3	21.3	45.6	20.6	24.0	44.6	90.2
October	29.7	31.0	60.7	29.0	36.5	65.5	126.2
November	45.0	45.3	90.3	41.0	52.0	93.0	183.3
December	62.0	67.0	129.0	48.0	58.7	106.7	235.7
Total	211.2	208.3	419.5	183.4	224.6	408.0	828.3

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Average daily number of papers handled, 1918.

Month.	Letters.			Dispatches.			Total.
	In.	Out.	Total.	In.	Out.	Total.	
January	75.2	76.4	151.6	60.0	71.4	131.4	283.0
February	91.0	80.0	171.0	71.7	86.3	158.0	329.0
March	88.5	97.4	185.0	108.6	121.4	229.6	415.6
April	119.0	105.0	224.0	94.6	108.4	203.0	427.0
May	113.8	109.0	222.8	101.6	108.4	210.0	432.8
June	147.9	142.5	290.4	131.9	155.4	287.4	577.8
July	189.1	164.4	353.5	124.7	143.0	268.2	625.0

Total number separate pieces of correspondence in files, 1917.

Mar. 1	43,060
Number of main groups of subjects	27
Subsubjects groups	164
Number of folders or subjects	1,400
Average number of papers to folder	31
Secret file:	
Number of folders	250
Number of papers	5,000

Comprising correspondence and dispatches relating to: Ship movements, convoy operations, codes and call signs, northern mine barrage; question of policy, aviation program, fuel oil situation, interallied naval council, enemy intelligence, etc.

Total number of separate pieces of correspondence in files, 1918.

August 1	118,889
Number of main groups of subjects	26
Submarine subjects groups	174
Number of folders or subjects	2,006
Average number of papers to folders	59
Secret files:	
Number of folders	407
Number of papers	12,484

Comprising correspondence and dispatches relating to: Ship movements, convoy operations, codes and call signs, northern mine barrage; questions of policy, aviation program, fuel oil situation, interallied naval council, enemy intelligence, etc.

ORGANIZATION OF EUROPEAN COMMAND.

As a further indication of the magnitude of the task imposed upon these headquarters in Europe, I will present for the record a chart showing the organization of the forces in European waters. Some idea of the complexity and wide variety of questions involved in the command of these forces can be gathered merely by a glance at this chart.

ORGANIZATION OF UNITED STATES NAVAL HEADQUARTERS IN EUROPE.

For the information of the committee, I will also present for the record at this point a copy of a memorandum which was drawn up in August, 1918, for the information of the Committee on Naval Affairs of the House of Representatives then making an inspection tour abroad, which explains the function of each section of the naval headquarters and covers the general operations of the forces under my command at that time

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(The memorandum referred to is as follows:)

A BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVAL ACTIVITIES IN EUROPEAN WATERS, WITH OUTLINE OF THE ORGANIZATION OF ADMIRAL SIMS' HEADQUARTERS.

[Prepared by Intelligence Section of Admiral Sims' staff, August 3, 1918. Prepared for Naval Committee of Congress on tour of inspection abroad.]

GENERAL ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES NAVAL FORCES IN EUROPEAN WATERS.

Since the predominant naval effort in this war is British, due to the size and range of activities of the British Navy, and since the British Navy is controlled from the Admiralty in London, Admiral Sims selected London as the location of his headquarters for the purpose of directing the participation of the United States Navy in the naval campaign in European waters.

Since France is an invaded country, it is but natural that the predominant national interest of France is centered in its armies; as a result the French Navy has undoubtedly suffered, and has not been able to expand to any considerable degree during the war.

The naval attachés of Paris and Rome are the medium of communication between Admiral Sims and the ministries of marine in France and Italy, and they keep him in constant touch with the naval situation in these countries. The Admiral makes frequent trips to Paris and an occasional trip to Rome. Our naval attachés in Holland and Scandinavian countries keep Admiral Sims constantly in touch with all information they obtain.

There is direct telephonic communication between the British and French Admiralties, and in addition, the French Admiralty keeps an Admiral with a staff on duty in London, who cooperates with our staff.

The organization of the British Admiralty includes a highly efficient intelligence division, through which all important naval information is made available to Admiral Sims in all times. It is therefore unnecessary for Admiral Sims' organization to include a large staff for collecting information; it must and does include a small intelligence section for collating, digesting, and disseminating information.

It was at first proposed to establish Admiral Sims's headquarters in the British Admiralty, but on account of the congested condition of the Admiralty offices it was finally decided to establish the United States naval headquarters near the embassy.

Admiral Sims attends the daily conferences of the naval staff at the Admiralty, and in addition each officer of the Admiral's staff keeps in close touch with the corresponding division of the Admiralty.

In order to facilitate communications between the Admiralty and the United States naval headquarters and to establish a liaison service a British naval officer assigned to Admiral Sims's staff has an office at the Admiralty and a desk at Admiral Sims's headquarters; any division of the Admiralty desiring any information from or consultation with individual members of Admiral Sims's staff are enabled to do this through this officer. Similarly, officers of Admiral Sims's staff are enabled to quickly obtain information from the Admiralty.

Special telephone and telegraph wires have been installed between the Admiralty and the United States naval headquarters.

The Allied Naval Council, consisting of the representatives of France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan and the United States, meets frequently in London or Paris to discuss important questions concerning the naval campaign and particularly the disposition of forces.

The natural inclination of a naval service, which is a team by itself, is, of course, to operate together as a team. Admiral Sims believed from the beginning, however, that the only effective way to throw the weight of the United States Navy into the war without delay was to use its available units to strengthen the weak spots in the other navies, and thus effect a more vigorous conduct of the war already so thoroughly under way in all areas.

There would have been much wasted effort and time if any attempt had been made to take over any particular area and operate it entirely with United States Naval Forces. Hence, as the various naval forces have been rendered available by the Navy Department, the question of the best location for them has been discussed with the representatives of the other navies, and the disposition has been the result of common agreement.

Admiral Sims' headquarters may be considered the advanced headquarters of the Navy Department in the field. The Department deals only with Admiral Sims' headquarters, and Admiral Sims in turn directs and coordinates the work of all of the various groups under his general command.

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All groups, wherever located, report regularly to Admiral Sims concerning their activities and operations, their condition as regards material, and supplies, their needs, and their plans, together with recommendations or suggestions for changes in plans or policies. Admiral Sims in turn keeps the Department informed by general reports of the activities of all the forces under his command. Daily matters of importance or of current interest are handled by telegraph or cable.

UNITED STATES NAVAL HEADQUARTERS—EUROPE.

In order to carry out the organization and meet the demands outlined above, Admiral Sims' headquarters is divided into various sections. The following is a list of these sections with very brief outlines of their functions.

1. *Chief of Staff.*—The Chief of Staff handles only important questions concerning plans and policies and disposition of forces, and renders decisions on questions affecting the various sections of the Staff.

2. *Planning Section.*—The Planning Section is composed of three Captains and a Lieutenant Colonel of the Marines, all of War College training, who have no administrative duties. It is their mission to keep themselves informed of the general situation, to carry on a constant study thereof, and to prepare and submit studies or plans covering proposed future operations or changes in present operations and methods, whenever in their opinion these are advisable.

Whenever new problems are encountered, the Planning Section is asked to make a comprehensive study of them before decisions are taken.

The Planning Section works in close cooperation with the corresponding Planning Section of the Operations Division of the British Admiralty.

In addition to making studies of problems and preparing plans for future operations, the Planning Section also fulfills the function of a critic of the organization and methods in effect in the forces.

3. *Operations Section.*—The Operations Section handles the convoying of all United States Navy and United States Army shipping, keeps track of the location of all United States Naval and merchant ships and, in close cooperation with the Admiralty, acts upon all cablegrams dealing with the routing of convoys and the assignment of escorts. The Operations Section prepares all orders to forces which affect their employment.

The Operations Section also has charge of the antisubmarine work and the operations of submarine chasers.

4. *Material Section.*—The Material Section keeps itself informed of the requirements of all forces as regards supplies of all description, including money, fuel oil, coal, food and clothing, and repair materials.

It also supervises all financial dealings with foreign Governments in connection with expenditures for the Navy. Arrangements have been made with the allied Governments by which our ships can put in to any of their naval bases and obtain urgent supplies just as if they belonged to the Navy of the country. Commanding officers of such vessels sign the necessary receipts covering the supplies they receive and these finally reach the Admiralty of the Ministry of Marine, as the case may be, and are referred to United States Naval Headquarters for auditing and reimbursement.

5. *Repair Section.*—The Repair Section keeps in touch with the needs of all forces in the matter of overhauling and repair, arranges with the different allied services for repair and docking facilities and keeps the department informed in regard to the material which must be provided from the United States.

6. *Ordnance Section.*—The Ordnance Section keeps in close touch with the requirements of all forces as regards guns, ammunition, depth charges, and ordnance equipment of all kinds. It also follows closely mining operations and cooperates with the Admiralty and with the Mine Force in carrying them out.

7. *Medical Section.*—The Medical Section has general supervision over all naval hospitals, keeps informed of the location of all sick and injured, and of their disposition and arranges to have them cared for in allied hospitals wherever they can not be treated in our own naval hospitals. There are at present three naval hospitals in commission in Europe; one at Strathpeffer, Scotland, one at Queenstown, Ireland, and one at Brest, France. In these, and in certain Red Cross hospitals devoted entirely to naval use, there are more than 3,000 beds.

8. *Aviation Section.*—Before the Naval Aviation Service could begin operations, it was necessary to establish aviation stations, to equip them, provide planes, and train the personnel. This work was placed under the direction of Capt. H. I. Cone. Capt. Cone established headquarters at Paris and the aviation section of Admiral Sims's staff has had as its chief function the work of assisting Capt. Cone in every possible way, and particularly by establishing the closest cooperation with the British Air Service.

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As fast as the stations that are being built and equipped are ready for operation they are placed under the commanders in the different areas, who direct their operations just as if they were surface naval craft. There are at present 27 United States naval air stations in England, Ireland, France, and Italy, with a total personnel of 300 pilots, and 11,000 machinists and other assistants.

9. *Intelligence Section.*—Since the time of all officers of the various sections of the staff is completely taken up by their immediate duties and the current business, it is necessary to have a section for the single purpose of obtaining and and furnishing information which may affect the work of the various sections. For example, the Intelligence Section follows the movement of all enemy submarines, studies their method of operation, and keeps the Operations Section informed of the latest information available in order that convoys may be safely routed and handled. The different sections of the staff call upon the Intelligence Section to collect and prepare information on a great variety of subjects.

Examples of the questions received are as follows:

(*a*) What has been the percentage of sinkings by submarines in the various areas for the past two months?

(*b*) What is the proportion of shipping passing into the English Channel to that passing into Gibralter?

(*c*) What information is there available as to engagements of United States naval vessels with enemy submarines and the results of these actions?

The Intelligence Section is constantly engaged in making summaries of information and compiling statistical and other data in convenient form for the information of the other sections of the staff.

The Intelligence Section also transmits all important information received and the results of its own investigations to the department, to Army Headquarters, and to the operating forces. It works in close cooperation with the Intelligence Division of the admiralty, and one officer, who is especially detailed, spends a great part of his time in the Admiralty Intelligence Division. In this way it is possible to obtain for the department all information available concerning enemy submarines and the submarine campaign, methods of attack and operations of the enemy, and information as to their future plans, which is obtained by the admiralty from prisoners or through their own intelligence service.

10. *Disbursing Section.*—The Disbursing Section has general supervision over all financial disbursements for personnel, and those required for the administration of the United States Naval Headquarters.

11. *Communication Section.*—The Communication Section arranges all lines of radio, cable, and telegraph communication between the forces operating under Admiral Sims and with the Navy Department. The cable and telegraph office established at Admiral Sims' headquarters is operated by United States naval personnel. There are direct wires to the cable and telegraph lines of communication throughout Europe. All dispatches to and from the Navy Department and the forces in European waters pass through this office. During the month of June the average traffic in received and sent messages was 13,500 five-letter code groups each 24 hours.

Practically all naval dispatches are handled in Navy codes and ciphers.

The Communication Section also works in close cooperation with the Signal Division of the admiralty, supervises the use of codes, ciphers, and radio communications of the forces under Admiral Sims, and looks after the distribution of codes and ciphers to these forces. Trans-Atlantic radio stations in France and the United States are being used for certain classes of dispatches, and a system is being perfected for the use of trans-Atlantic radio in case of the breakdown or cutting of the trans-Atlantic cables. A trans-Atlantic radio receiving station is installed at headquarters, which receives messages from the United States, France, Germany, and Italy.

The head of this section is a member of the Inter-Allied Signal Conference and of the Inter-Allied Radio Commission, which meet quarterly for the purpose of administering the communications of all the allied forces.

The Communication Section is also in close touch with the admiralty and Royal Air Force Radio Material Divisions and supervises all radio material for naval vessels and shore stations under Admiral Sims. Radio telephones and United States naval aircraft. Radio repair bases are being established at convenient shipping points throughout Europe.

12. *Personnel and Secretarial Section.*—The Personnel Section, under the direction of the flag secretary, keeps a record of the location of all officers and men in Europe, issues all necessary orders, and provides transportation for all officers and men.

There are at present 47,000 enlisted men and 3,542 officers of the Navy serving in European waters (including naval aviation personnel). There are now over 250 vessels, including 77 submarine chasers, under Admiral Sims' command. Twenty-five other chasers and numerous other vessels are designated or en route.

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This section also administers the handling of all correspondence and supervises the mail service for the forces in European waters. A complete card index of all men serving in European waters is maintained, and many thousands of personal letters are forwarded each week to the proper addresses. This section also provides and supervises the clerical staff at headquarters, and administers the headquarters' buildings.

13. *Administrative section.*—All correspondence and telegraphic communications pass through one office, whose function is the coordination of the work of the various sections. This office, directed by the Assistant Chief of Staff, is thus enabled to make sure that the members of the staff do not work at cross purposes. If letters or telegrams originating in one section affect other sections, they are referred to them before being sent out.

UNITED STATES NAVAL FORCES IN EUROPEAN WATERS.

United States naval forces operating in European waters may be briefly grouped as follows:

(*a*) The force based on Queenstown handles certain merchant convoys coming to France and to the United Kingdom and also fast British liners carrying United States troops. This force is composed of 24 destroyers, 2 tenders, and 3 tugs. Two additional destroyers of this force are temporarily assigned to duty at Plymouth with the submarine chasers, and one is in the United States for the renewal of her boilers.

(*b*) The force based on the French coast escorts troop ships into the French ports and out to sea, assists the French in escorting coastal convoys up and down the French coast and across the channel to England, and aids the French in keeping the channels clear of mines. This force consists of 33 destroyers, 16 yachts, 9 mine sweepers, 5 tugs, 4 repair ships, 1 barrack ship, 2 barges, and 1 tug which is temporarily assigned to duty in the Azores.

(*c*) The force based on Gibraltar works with the British in escorting allied trade in and out of the Mediterranean. This force consists of 2 scout cruisers, 5 destroyers, 6 Coast Guard cutters, 5 gunboats, and 10 yachts. In addition 1 destroyer and 1 gunboat of this force are now in the United States for a general overhaul.

(*d*) At Plymouth, England, there are 41 submarine chasers with 2 destroyers and 1 tender. These are engaged in hunting submarines in the entrance to the English channel. There is also 1 submarine from Berehaven at Plymouth on temporary duty.

(*e*) At Berehaven are six submarines with a submarine tender engaged in hunting enemy submarines off the entrance to the Irish Sea and the English Channel.

(*f*) At Corfu are 36 submarine chasers with a tender, which are engaged in hunting submarines in the Adriatic Sea.

(*g*) With the Grand Fleet are five battleships operating as a battle squadron of the fleet.

(*h*) The mine force, based on Inverness and Invergordon, is working with the British in the laying of mines in the North Sea. This force is composed of 10 mine planters, 1 repair ship, and 2 tugs.

(*i*) The force based on the Azores is engaged in patrolling in the vicinity of the Azores to keep the route clear in order that our submarine chasers and other craft can safely use the port for coaling and obtaining supplies while en route ro Europe. This force is composed of four submarines, one gunboat, one monitor, two yachts, and a marine detachment on shore. There is also one tug from the Brest force on temporary duty at the Azores.

(*j*) There is a fleet of merchant ships engaged in carrying coal for the United States Army from England to France, which are under Admiral Sims's general control; 73 such ships have been commissioned or orders have been given for their commissioning.

(*k*) There are at Southampton four cross-channel transports engaged in carrying troops across the channel. These are commissioned ships under Admiral Sims's command.

(*l*) At Murmansk, Russia, there is one cruiser cooperating with the allied forces in Russia.

(*m*) At Genoa there are two tugs, which have been placed at the disposition of the Italian Government.

(*n*) At Liverpool there are two tankers.

While the United States Navy is doing its bit and doing it well, a sense of proportion must not be lost. Our effort is small compared with that of our Allies.

In this connection the following approximate percentages are of interest as giving a comparison between the naval effort of the allied powers. The percentage of the various types of vessels engaged in the antisubmarine campaign in British waters and eastern Atlantic is about as follows:

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	Great Britain.	France.	United States.
	Per cent.	*Per cent.*	*Per cent.*
Destroyers	80	6	14
Submarines	78	17	5
Miscellaneous patrol craft	86	11	3

The following percentages give a similar comparison of the naval situation in the Mediterranean:

	Great Britain.	France.	Italy.	Japan.	United States.
	Per cent.	*Per cent.*	*Per cent.*	*Per cent.*	*Per cent.*
Destroyers	27	38	26	7	2
Submarines	13	37	50	.....	.....
Miscellaneous patrol craft	22	66	4	.....	8

In the Grand Fleet Great Britain has about 91 per cent of the major fighting forces and the United States 9 per cent.

Of the total number of all patrol craft operating against enemy submarines in British and eastern Atlantic waters, the American patrol forces constitute less than 5 per cent of the total number. In the Mediterranean the United States supplies 5 per cent of the patrol forces.

As a comparison between the naval aviation effort of Great Britain and the United States the following data is of interest:

Great Britain had about four and one-half times as large a naval aviation personnel as the United States, and about three times as many naval aviation stations. Great Britain has approximately fourteen times as many seaplanes as the United States, and those British machines patrol eight times as many miles during the week as the American machines.

On August 1, 1918, it has been estimated that the British Navy has on active service in European waters approximately over three times as many officers and over four times the enlisted personnel of the American forces operating in European waters. This estimate must be assumed as low because it does not include the hundreds of officers and thousands of men the British have in their so-called auxiliary patrol service.

MEMORANDUM ON ATLANTIC CONVOY SYSTEM (AS REQUESTED BY THE HOUSE NAVAL COMMITTEE).

A further significant illustration of the relative parts being played by the United States Navy and the allied navies is given by a study of the Atlantic convoy system and by the protection and escorting of American troop convoys to Europe.

Taking into consideration the whole Atlantic convoy system, that is, all shipping in the Atlantic, whether French, Italian, American, British, or neutral shipping in allied interest; also United States troop transports and troop convoys bound for the Mediterranean, the shipping is protected by the naval vessels of the Allies in the following proportions:

Great Britain provides destroyers for 70 per cent of all convoys.

United States provides destroyers for 27 per cent of all convoys.

France provides destroyers for 3 per cent of all convoys.

All convoys at sea in the Atlantic are protected by cruisers so as to guard against attack by enemy raiders. The cruisers necessary for protecting the allied shipping in the Atlantic in this way are provided as follows:

	Per cent.
Great Britain	61
United States	35
France	4

Great Britain has organized and arranged and provides the signal codes and instructions for the entire convoy system; also commodores and signal men for the great majority of all convoys.

The convoy system usually carries the shipping as far as the European coast, where it is generally diverted on a coastal route as to its destination. This necessitates a

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great amount of coastal escorting. Great Britain provides coastal escorts for the Irish Sea, English Channel, and North Sea, and, in general, throughout all coastal waters of the United Kingdom.

Great Britain also provides destroyers for all Allied shipping across the North Sea; escorts for practically all shipping across the English Channel between England and France, and also keeps all channels in British waters clear of mines.

There is very little coastal escort required on the French Channel coast as all shipping follows the English coast. On the French Atlantic coast, the United States furnished three-eighths of the coastal escort and France furnishes the remaining five-eighths. The United States also furnishes about one-third of the mine-sweeping forces on the French Atlantic coast.

British destroyers are now rendering the following protection to United States shipping:

United States troops.—(*a*) British destroyers escort 52 per cent of the United States troops that come into England. (*b*) British destroyers escort all of our troops that cross the English Channel going to France. (*c*) British destroyers escort all United States troop ships bound up or down the English Channel.

Army store ships.—(*a*) British destroyers bring into the English Channel about half of the store ships that carry supplies for the United States Army. (*b*) British destroyers escort into Scottish ports all United States mine carriers bringing mines for the North Sea barrage.

United States merchant shipping.—(*a*) British destroyers provide the coastal escort for United States ships along the south and east coast of England. (*b*) All United States trade with Scandinavia is escorted by British destroyers. (*c*) All United States trade with Holland is escorted by British destroyers. (*d*) All United States ships bound out of the English Channel from either French or British ports are escorted to the westward by British destroyers.

(Intelligence Section, United States Naval Headquarters, London, August 3, 1918.)

NAVY'S SPLENDID ACHIEVEMENTS IN THE WAR WERE IN SPITE OF DELAYS, INACTION, AND VIOLATION OF MILITARY PRINCIPLES BY THE HIGH COMMAND IN FIRST MONTHS OF WAR.

The statistical tables and the memorandums which I have just referred to will give a sufficiently comprehensive idea of the growth and importance to the Navy Department of their advance headquarters in Europe after they had once adopted the policy which they announced in July, 1917, of cooperating wholeheartedly with the Allies. Of course, when once the available naval forces for operations afloat and a sufficient number of capable officers to administer these forces, to control their operations and to coordinate our activities with those of the Allies were available, there could be no longer any question of the effectiveness of our help. The Allies themselves have repeatedly assured us of the vital services rendered by our Navy to the allied cause, and we of the Navy can take pride in the record that was achieved. Great as this record was I think I have said enough to convince you that it would have been infinitely more effective if the policies ultimately adopted by the Navy, and which can be found set forth in the Secretary of the Navy's Annual Report of 1918 had been put into effect from the moment when we entered the war instead of after dangerous delay of many months.

Furthermore, it seems to me that these achievements of the Navy should gain greater importance in the public mind when it is realized as has not been generally realized, outside of the service, that they were accomplished not because of an equal amount of efficiency in the higher command which directed them, but rather in spite of long delays, inaction, and violations of fundamental military principles committed by the high command in the first months of the war. In other words, the personnel of our Navy afloat, in accomplishing

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the mission assigned them had to struggle with the enemy and also endure the handicap of an uncertain policy and of misdirection such as I have repeatedly pointed out in the cases which I have reviewed before this committee.

Let me state in connection with this and other tables that I submitted that they are compiled from the records that we have available. It is barely possible that you might find that instead of six ships arriving at a certain time, there might have been seven or might have been five. There may very probably be inaccuracies of that kind, but the tables are presented as an illustration of the general flow of the forces to the other side, and the inaccuracies would not interfere in the slightest with the impressions that they would convey.

COMMANDER NAVAL FORCES IN EUROPE NOT ALLOWED TO SELECT PRINCIPAL SUBORDINATES.

In paragraphs 74 and 75 of the letter which I addressed to the Navy Department on January 7, 1920, I called attention to the violation by the department of a fundamental principle of military command. In No. 7 of my summary of conclusions, I stated:

> The department's commander in the critical area of hostilities was never allowed to select his principal subordinates and was not even consulted as to their assignment. A fundamental principle of the art of command is here involved.

I think I may say that without exception the commanders of the subordinate units operating in European waters under my command were selected by the department without previous reference to me and without observing this principle of the art of command. Practically from the time of the sending of the first forces abroad, I endeavored to convince the department of the necessity of securing the closest coordination and harmony in our forces abroad by the selection of commanders subordinate to me who would be in sympathy with my policies and that I should be at least consulted before their selection. I am, of course, unaware as to the policy which governed the department in making these selections; but in practically every case the first intimation that I had of an officer being assigned to a subordinate command was the information that he had sailed to take up this command. Thus, the first official information which I received concerning the officer to command on the French coast was a dispatch I received from the department on July 5, stating that this officer would arrive on the coast of France on July 5. Similarly, with the commander of the first force sent by the department to Gibraltar, the first intimation I had of the selection of this commander was in the middle of July, two weeks after the department had informed me of their intention to send vessels to Gibraltar.

I repeatedly requested officers for definite subordinate commands in Europe, based on my knowledge of the requirements, of the position, only to have these recommendations disapproved by the department. It will hardly be necessary to go into details in this regard to substantiate this point, because it is a principle so elementary that it only needs to be stated to be proved, and if I were to enter into a discussion of this particular point it would inevitably

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involve the discussion of personalities, which I consider as quite apart from the purposes of this investigation. I have at no time during this investigation made any reflections upon any naval officer in our service, and I have no intention to do so. It would serve no useful purpose and would not contribute to the good of the Navy, which is the one interest which actuates me.

In a personal letter addressed to Admiral Benson on July 28, I fully stated the reasons which had led me to request that I be permitted to nominate for subordinate commands officers who were completely in sympathy with me and in whose ability and loyalty I could have complete confidence. The paragraphs of this letter of interest are as follows:

(12) In case it should be your intention to send additional flag officers for the above-suggested places, or for others, I hope that you will give me a chance to select the officers or at least to exercise choice within such limits as you may think it necessary to prescribe.

You know, of course, to what an extent personality counts for efficiency under the circumstances which now exist over here, and how highly important it is that we should have officers on duty in European waters in positions of responsibility who are not only willing to cooperate with our Allies here whole-heartedly and loyally but who have the necessary tact and personality to render this cooperation successful.

Perhaps it is equally important that the officers indicated should be in sympathy with me and my methods. You know the difficulty that has arisen through lack of sympathy of this kind. I feel that this particular point should be given very serious consideration, because not to do so might add very considerably to the strain which I necessarily have to bear.

In a cable sent on August 9 to Admiral Benson I nominated an officer for the command of the base at Cardiff, stating in full my reasons for making the request, but this officer was not chosen.

In later cables of the same month I made other suggestions as to appointments abroad, with similar lack of result.

On September 30, in cabling to Admiral Benson, I therefore said:

Simben 37. Referring to my letters explaining the regrettable difficulties and resulting inefficiency caused by the assignment of officers to vitally important positions who have in the past been opposed to me in official matters and who are not in sympathy with my methods, I respectfully request that if none of the officers mentioned in my cable number Simben 27 are available the department cable me the names of those who are available, so that I may recommend the officer who in my judgment is best qualified to successfully cooperate with me and the French and British admiralties in carrying out the increasingly complicated convoy system upon which depends the safe arrival of our troops and their supplies, and to enable me efficiently to discharge my responsibility to the department.

SIMS.

CONCLUDING STATEMENT.

I have now concluded my introduction of testimony and documentary evidence in substantiation of the statements made in my letter to the Navy Department, of January 7, 1920, regarding the military errors committed by the Navy Department in the initiation and conduct of the war. The official documentary evidence incorporated in the hearings establishes the following facts:

1. That, in spite of the fact that war had been going on for nearly three years, and our entry into it had been imminent at least from February 2, 1917, the vessels of the Navy were not ready for war service when the United States entered.

2. That the first few months after America entered the war were extremely critical ones for the whole allied cause, due to the success of enemy submarines.

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3. That this critical situation was made clear to the Navy Department a few days after America entered the war, and repeatedly thereafter by cables and letters, and supported by independent advices to the Government from the American ambassador in London and by Mr. Hoover in person.

4. That the Navy Department supplied me with no plans or policy covering our participation in the war for three months after our entry therein.

5. That, having information as to the critical situation of the Allies, the Navy Department did not promptly assist them, and thereby prolonged the war by delaying the sending of antisubmarine vessels, none reaching Europe for nearly a month after war was declared, and three months elapsing before 30 vessels arrived.

6. That the Navy Department failed to appreciate the military value of time.

7. That the Navy Department violated fundamental military principles in attempting to formulate war plans of operation without having sufficient knowledge of the whole situation.

8. That the department's representative with the allied admiralties was not supported, during the most critical months of the war, either by the adequate personnel or by the adequate forces that could have been supplied.

9. That the Navy Department violated fundamental military principles in dispersing forces away from the critical area in order to meet diversions of the enemy.

10. That the Navy Department, in the first months of the war, attempted the direction of details although 3,000 miles distant from the scene of active operations, where the situation was changing from day to day.

11. That the Navy Department, in not clearly defining the responsibility and delegating authority to its representative in Europe failed to follow sound principles, common alike to the business and military professions.

12. That the Navy Department, by controlling the operations and movements of certain forces within the war area, violated the fundamental military principle of unity of command.

13. That the Navy Department failed to keep its representative abroad completely informed as to its plans affecting dispatch and disposition of forces in the war zone, and frequently reached decisions in such matters through information gained from sources other than its representative in the war zone.

In no part of my testimony have I charged the responsibility for any of the failures enumerated against any person, but I have tried to make it clear that the responsibility for these failures rests, in my opinion, upon the Navy Department as an organization rather than upon any individual. If any individual was responsible, wholly or in part, for the failures I have pointed out, the fact would necessarily have to be developed by persons who were in a position to know the inner workings of the department during the period in question.

My official knowledge extends only to the doors of the department and not beyond them. The fact that numerous letters and cable dispatches which I have submitted in evidence bear the signature of this or that person, is not to be taken as an indication that I believe

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the signer personally responsible for the action indicated. They merely indicate that the letter or dispatch was official and written with the authority of the Navy Department as an organization.

To point out violations of well known and generally accepted principles of warfare such as have been shown by my testimony is in itself to suggest the remedy which is obviously to avoid such violations in the future. It not having been shown up to this stage of the investigation whether these violations of principle were due to faulty organization of the Navy Department or to faults of personnel I am not, at present, able to submit well-founded recommendations looking to the adoption of measures to insure us against similar violations in the future.

My testimony has been devoted almost entirely to pointing out defects in the administration of the Navy in the first few months of the war. This does not mean that I have been insensible to the splendid work done by the Navy at large or by the bureaus and other offices of the Navy Department. I have, at different times, in letters to the chiefs of the bureaus of the Navy Department, and to other officials, including the Chief of Naval Operations, expressed my personal satisfaction at the splendid way in which many of my requests had been met, particularly during the latter part of the war.

Taking the service as a whole, I have the most profound admiration for the manner in which the officers and men of the regular Navy, Naval Militia, and Reserve Force carried on their duties in this war, and have expressed this admiration in a series of articles now being published. Not only from the war zone, where events were constantly before me, but from home and remote areas, reports reached me which showed, beyond any doubt, what a magnificent body of officers and men we had in the Navy. You may be sure, gentlemen, that the Navy, if loyally and properly supported and directed, may be counted upon to maintain the finest traditions of the service.

It is a source of the greatest pleasure to testify to the pride and gratitude I feel for the manner in which the Naval Militia and the Reserves—in many instances at great personal sacrifices—came to the aid and support of the regular Navy. Without their invaluable help much of the work done by the Navy in this war could not have been undertaken. It would require volumes to tell of the hundreds of ways in which their splendid services made success possible. The outstanding feature of their service was the cheerful and loyal support which they gave to the regular Navy at all times and under all conditions. I can not commend too highly their services to the nation.

It is furthermore a great pleasure and satisfaction to me to be able to testify to the magnificent way in which the many enterprises were undertaken and pushed to a successful completion by the united efforts of bureaus of the Navy Department, and the naval personnel engaged in the operations. I can not pretend to enumerate completely the operations of this nature which contributed to the winning of the war. I may mention, as typical examples, the northern barrage, the railway batteries, the transport of troops, and the training of officers and men in the ships of the Atlantic Fleet that remained in home waters.

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It is, of course, to be expected in connection with an investigation of this sort, particularly of a war which was won by great sacrifices and gallant, patriotic services of the entire Nation, that the first thought which occurs to mind is that hindsight is better than foresight, and that it is always easy, in the light of hindsight, to point out our errors committed in any undertaking. I submit, however, that, as the issue here under investigation is one vitally affecting our future national safety, we should not let such thoughts carry us away and blind us to dangers which the lessons of the past have clearly indicated. Hindsight must not be blindsight.

I wish also to repeat and to emphasize at this time that no claim is made that my recommendations or advice should have been accepted because they were mine, but they should have been heeded and acted upon because of my position in continuous consultation with the heads of the allied navies. There should be no question as to whether I merited the confidence of my superiors. If I did not, then an additional violation of a fundamental military and business principle was committed in leaving me at my post. I should have been removed as soon as there was the slightest loss of confidence in me.

If I have shown that there was a lack of conviction or clear understanding on the part of the Navy Department as to where its efforts should be directed; if I have shown that the Navy was hampered by a lack of preparedness, by lack of essential plans, and by being held back in the beginning; if I have demonstrated that victory was won not because of these errors but in spite of them, and that such errors were only nullified by a combination of circumstances which we would be foolhardy indeed to count upon in the future—then I will feel that I have been fully justified in submitting my letter of January 7, 1920.

That finishes my statement, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. As Senator Pittman has asked that the cross-examination be put over until to-morrow, we will now stand adjourned until to-morrow morning.

(Thereupon, at 11 o'clock a. m., the subcommittee adjourned until to-morrow, Friday, March 19, 1920, at 10 o'clock a. m.)

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NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

MONDAY, MARCH 22, 1920.

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON NAVAL AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 o'clock a. m., in room 235, Senate Office building, Senator Frederick Hale presiding.

Present, Senators Hale (chairman), Ball, Keyes, Pittman, and Trammell.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. Senator McCormick has been obliged to retire from the subcommittee, and Senator Page has appointed Senator Keyes in his stead.

TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL WILLIAM S. SIMS—Resumed.

The CHAIRMAN. At the meeting on March 9 it was decided that each witness be permitted to finish his direct testimony before any cross-examination takes places, or anything in the nature of cross-examination, and that thereafter any member of the committee be permitted to cross-examine, and that his cross-examination be finished before being interrupted by any other member of the committee, so as to have an orderly process of examination. We shall accordingly follow that procedure unless it is found by the committee that it does not work satisfactorily.

Admiral Sims, in your letter to the Secretary of the Navy of January 7 you stated:

> No formal instructions or statement of the Navy Department plans or policy were received at that time, though I received the following explicit admonition: "Don't let the British pull the wool over your eyes. It is none of our business pulling their chestnuts out of the fire. We would as soon fight the British as the Germans."

The committee would like to know, Admiral Sims, who made that statement to you, who were present at the time, and what were the circumstances under which it was given,

Admiral SIMS. If the committee will permit, before answering that question, I should like to make a short correction in the statement I made at the last hearing. My attention has been invited to a misinterpretation of my statement in the hearings, that the routes followed by all United States convoys through the war zone were furnished by my headquarters in London. I intended to convey the fact that it was the European organization which did this routing rather than the Navy Department itself. While the general plans of this routing were of necessity formulated in London, in harmony with the whole allied convoy system, a great amount of detailed routing was necessarily done, and very successfully done, by Admiral

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Wilson, in command of all naval forces on the French coast, also by Admiral Niblack at Gibralter, Admiral Dunn at the Azores, and other commanders.

This has been corrected in the hearings.

In reference to the question that you have asked me, you have noticed that in all of my testimony I have avoided any personal references, and that I have not attempted in any case to fix any personal responsibility. I have tried to make it clear that my criticisms referred to the organization known as the Navy Department and not to any individual; that my criticisms stopped at the doors of the department. I am not informed as to what took place, completely, in the department during the war, and if the committee wants to know that, it must be brought out by others.

I think that in answering the question I had better relate the circumstances under which it was given to me. I was telegraphed to at Newport to come to Washington. Everything was very secret. Secrecy is one of the things that Government departments love. I was told not even to come to the Navy Department, but to telephone to the department, as I remember to the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, for instructions, probably to arrange an interview. I tried to do so and could get no reply at all from the department, so I went there and reported to the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, who was then Rear Admiral, now, Captain, L. C. Palmer. He told me that I was to be sent abroad to confer with the allied admiralties. He said that I was to go secretly, under an assumed name, and not even to take uniforms with me.

I was then taken in, or rather sent in, to see the Secretary of the Navy, as nobody went in with me and nobody was present at the interview. The interview was very brief. In substance the Secretary said that I was being sent abroad to confer with the admiralties on the other side, and to use the cable freely in advising them as to how best they could cooperate with the allied navies, in case we were unfortunately drawn into war. He also told me that the reason I was being sent over was because of a request from the then ambassador in London, Dr. Page; that an officer of high rank should be there, as officers of the rank of rear admiral were representing other countries I believe the Navy Department had taken the initiative in suggesting that an officer be sent over to confer with the other admiralties.

He gave me a copy of the telegram from Ambassador Page. I can submit a copy of that if it is required. We have it.

In his testimony on the awards, the Secretary of the Navy stated that he had reminded me of the indiscretion that I committed in 1910 in the speech at the Guildhall. The Secretary's recollection on that point is thoroughly mistaken. No reference whatever was made to the Guildhall speech by anybody in the Navy Department on this occasion.

When I came out from the Secretary's room, or just before I went in—I can not remember now which—in somebody else's office, I think it was the office of the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, and while my recollection is not clear on that, I think he was present, at all events he told me that he was present; and it was there that the admonition in question was given to me by a certain official of the Navy Department. As I said before, I wanted to avoid all personalities,

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and I should much prefer now to relate the incident and explain why I put it in my letter, without referring to the name of the individual.

The CHAIRMAN. I think the name of the individual should be brought out, Admiral Sims, and the committee would like to have you give it.

Admiral SIMS. The person who gave me the admonition was Admiral Benson, the Chief of Naval Operations. I had no interview with him. I received no instructions from him. The remark was preceded by nothing and was followed by nothing. It was told to me in all seriousness, and with bitterness, and I turned around and left the office immediately.

The CHAIRMAN. Was anyone present in the room when he told it to you?

Admiral SIMS. That is where my recollection of that particular incident is not clear, but Admiral Palmer has told me that he was in the room at the time, and that he remembers a remark of that character being made, although he is not able to recall exactly what it was.

The CHAIRMAN. There was no one else present excepting Admiral Palmer?

Admiral SIMS. As far as I can recollect; that was, as I remember now, pretty late in the afternoon of the day that I arrived in Washington.

The next day I had to go to the Navy Department to get papers, etc., before leaving, and I met Admiral Benson again, not in his own office or in that office, and there, in the presence of a number of officers, whether within their hearing or whether they heard or not I do not know, he repeated to me exactly the same remark, preceded by nothing and followed by nothing.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not remember who the other officers were?

Admiral SIMS. I do not know who they were, but I could probably find out. About six months later in my office in Paris he made a similar statement; at least, to the effect that I was not to allow the British to pull the wool over my eyes or to pull their chestnuts out of the fire, or something to that effect. I will admit that I had completely forgotten the incident. It was recalled to my mind by a member of my staff who was present, and who heard it. I think that the reason that I did not remember that distinctly was because I regarded this as a personal idiosyncrasy of the admiral. I had known the general opinion that he was intensely anti-British, but it did not affect me particularly.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it should be made perfectly clear that Admiral Benson in his second statement did not state to you that we would as soon fight the British as the Germans.

Admiral SIMS. Not at all; no.

The CHAIRMAN. To be fair to Admiral Benson, that ought to be made very clear.

Admiral SIMS. I want to make that very clear. He did not, of course, say that. I have regarded this always as simply a personal prejudice, you may say, on the part of Admiral Benson.

I would also like to say that I have always had the best possible relations with Admiral Benson. I regard him as an upstanding and honest man who has exceedingly strong convictions, and who is very

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firm in adherence to these convictions. I believe everything he has done during the war has been done conscientiously, and to get along with the war. I believe that it is due to Admiral Benson alone that I was given the opportunity to serve in this war as the commander of the forces abroad. In fact, he told me that his insistence upon my being put in command of those forces abroad had brought upon him the enmity of pretty much all the senior officers of the Navy, that being due to the fact that when I was appointed I was the last name on the list of rear admirals in the Naval Register at that time. I state this in order to make it clear that there is nothing whatever personal about this.

Now, my reason for putting it in the letter may not be so clear to a civilian as it is to a military man, but the spiritual foundation of every war is the will to victory, and if any man, no matter how honest, has an invincible prejudice against the people that we are fighting alongside of, it is very probable that it has an unconscious influence upon him; and that is the reason that in submitting this letter for the consideration of the Navy Department, I put that in there, as one of the most important things in the letter, that if ever we go into a war again we want to make sure that the spiritual foundation of our organization, the will to victory, is sound.

Now, I would like to touch on one other thing.

Senator PITTMAN. Is this in answer to the chairman's question?

Admiral SIMS. In answer to the chairman's question; closely related.

Senator PITTMAN. I think that I am at liberty to guard against any more letters coming in.

Admiral SIMS. Any more letters?

Senator PITTMAN. I think that I am at liberty now, in view of prior experience, to guard against any extraneous matter coming into the record.

Admiral SIMS. This is not extraneous. It relates to the same subject, and it is this, that in his testimony before this committee on the awards, Secretary Daniels, in reference to me and in reference to this particular incident, said, "as a naval officer, he had no business to think who was the enemy." That, to me, is a perfectly astounding statement. I received no instructions; I received no expression of policy. Manifestly, no plan can be based upon anything except the knowledge of who your enemy is going to be; and I had every possible business to think who my enemy was. That is all I have to say on that particular subject.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Sims, you are still under direct examination. Have you any further matters that you wish to bring out?

Admiral SIMS. No; I think not.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any questions to ask of Admiral Sims, Senator Ball?

Senator BALL. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you, Senator Keyes?

Senator KEYES. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any questions to ask Admiral Sims, Senator Pittman?

Senator PITTMAN. Yes. Admiral Sims, this statement that you attribute to Secretary Daniels, that it was not your business to

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consider against whom you were going to war, or words to that effect, that was made in his testimony here, was it not?

Admiral SIMS. Yes, sir.

Senator PITTMAN. That was not given you as a part of your instructions when you went to Europe?

Admiral SIMS. No, sir; it was not.

Senator PITTMAN. You state that Admiral Benson told you that it was upon his insistence that you were sent over on this mission at the time you were sent?

Admiral SIMS. I am not quite sure whether it was on his initiative that I was sent over, but I wanted to convey the impression that it was on his insistence that I remained over there as the officer in command of the forces. I was sent there first as a liaison officer, and it was subsoquently to that—we can give you the date if you want it—that I was put in command of the forces that were going over there.

Senator PITTMAN. You have stated that Admiral Benson is antagonistic to the British; that he is prejudiced, you might say, against the British. I do not remember your exact language, but it was to that effect. You do not think that Admiral Benson desired to retain you over there, thinking that you held the same sentiments, do you?

Admiral SIMS. Yes; I do, sir.

Senator PITTMAN. That he thought you were antagonistic to the British?

Admiral SIMS. No, sir; he did not think I was antagonistic to the but he thought that I was pro-British.

Senator PITTMAN. Yes.

Admiral SIMS. But he had reasons for retaining me over there in spite of that.

Senator PITTMAN. Then, as a matter of fact, if that be true, and Admiral Benson desired you to go over there, he wanted some one to go over there who was pro-British, and with whom the British would be confidential; is not that true?

Admiral SIMS. I do not know, I am sure. He wanted somebody over there that he thought could hold down the job. There were a good many reasons, as I see it, why I should have been sent over there as liaison officer, and why I should have been retained in command. Those reasons are as follows: That I knew a great many of the British officers, as I had gone over there from 1900 to 1907 or 1908, five or six times, in order to talk with the then leading officers of the British Navy about progress in gunnery, Admiral Scott, Admiral Jellicoe, who was then Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, Admiral Bacon, who was there, and Admiral Madden, and men of that stamp; so that I knew them all more or less intimately, had corresponded with them when neither of us knew much about shooting.

I had also been naval attache in Paris from about the beginning of 1897 until about 1900, or nearly four years. I know those people. I had gone over there in 1899 and spent a year in Paris for the object of acquiring a certain facility in handling the language.

For those reasons I was sent over there as a liaison officer, and for the same reasons, I assume, I was retained there in command, it being assumed, I suppose, that a man who had these relations and acquaintances with all these people, and who knew their methods and habits

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of thought and action, and who could speak both the French and the British languages with reasonable facility, was the logical man for the position, at least to begin with.

Senator PITTMAN. If Admiral Benson did not send you over there because he thought you would probably be treated with some confidence by the British admirals, but sent you over by reason of the facts that you have just stated, then Admiral Benson is a very broad-minded executive naval officer, is he not?

Admiral SIMS. I have always considered him a perfectly fair and square and honest man in all respects. I do not know just what "broad minded" means in this connection.

Senator PITTMAN. You would not consider that he was very narrow, or that he was controlled by his prejudice, if his motive in recommending you being retained over there is such as you have stated?

Admiral SIMS. I should.

Senator PITTMAN. You should what; think that he was prejudiced?

Admiral SIMS. I should think that a man who was intensely anti-French and anti-British would insensibly be controlled, as any other men is, by those sentiments, to a certain extent.

Senator PITTMAN. That was not my question. I stated that if he were moved by the considerations that you have suggested, that is your supposed eminent fitness for that position, at the same time being bitterly prejudiced against the British and believing that you were a pro-Britisher, and in spite of all that he was moved by the motives that you urge, then he is a man that is peculiarly above prejudice in determining what is in the interest of the Navy.

Admiral SIMS. I should not say so at all. I should say that he was a perfectly fair and square and high-minded gentlemen to have acted as he did; but. all the same, that he would in all probability be insensibly influenced by his anti-British feeling.

Senator PITTMAN. When you were sent over there we were not at war?

Admiral SIMS. We were not at war, but I was sent over there because we were going into the war immediately.

Senator PITTMAN. We were going in immediately?

Admiral SIMS. Yes.

Senator PITTMAN. Do you not know that that was a matter that could solely be determined by Congress?

Admiral SIMS. Yes, I know that.

Senator PITTMAN. And, you knew that we were going into the war immediately?

Admiral SIMS. Yes, I knew it perfectly well.

Senator PITTMAN. Of course no one else knew it. That preknowledge of yours is remarkable.

Now let us go a little further into the letter. At the time that Admiral Benson is alleged to have repeated the warning to you not to let the British pull the wool over your eyes, he did not make the additional assertion in regard to that we had just as leave go to war with one country as another?

Admiral SIMS. You mean six months later?

Senator PITTMAN. Yes.

Admiral SIMS. No, sir.

Senator PITTMAN. Because at that time we were at war with Germany.

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ADMIRAL SIMS. At that time we were at war.

Senator PITTMAN. I do not remember exactly what your testimony was when you first came in. I will probably pick that up later, on this hearing. But there was some excuse given by you why this letter of January 7 was injected into the middle of our proceedings. But there have been several publications attempting to explain why that letter was made public at that time—your letter of the 7th of January. I have had occasion to read them. Before reading one of these articles I want to call your attention to the fact that in the hearing you warned the committee that if they would read the World's Work that was coming out, they would get some facts with regard to various matters you were dealing with.

Admiral SIMS. No, that is not what I said. I said that if they would read the articles that I was writing in the World's Work they would get some facts. I do not know what else appeared in the World's Work.

Senator PITTMAN. Yes, You have been publishing a number of articles in the World's Work?

Admiral SIMS. Yes.

Senator PITTMAN. Who are the editors of that magazine?

Admiral SIMS. Doubleday, Page & Co.

Senator PITTMAN. Those are the proprietors of the publishing company, but who are the writers, generally, in the magazine?

Admiral SIMS. I do not know any of them at all, except perhaps Arthur Page himself, and Burton J. Hendrick. Those are the only two I know.

Senator PITTMAN. Have you ever discussed with Burton J. Hendrick your articles?

Admiral SIMS. Yes.

Senator Pittman. That you are writing?

Admiral SIMS. I am writing them in collaboration with him.

Senator PITTMAN. You are writing them in collaboration with him?

Admiral SIMS. Yes, I am writing them in that way so that people can understand them; so that they will not be too technical.

Senator PITTMAN. He has written some articles over his own signature in the World's Work, describing what you did over there; your connection with the war.

Admiral SIMS. Yes.

Senator PITTMAN. He is very well acquainted with your views on this subject?

Admiral SIMS. No; he is very well acquainted with the operations of the forces on the other side. We have talked over those matters, necessarily.

Senator PITTMAN. He is very well acquainted with your views, is he not?

Admiral SIMS. No, sir; I do not think so.

Senator PITTMAN. Then he guesses them very accurately. Now, in the World's Work for March, in an article on page 425, under the heading, "Admiral Sims and Mr. Daniels," we find the following [reading]:

The paper which Admiral Sims prepared was an official document. It was the carefully reasoned work of himself and his staff; it was written in official form and in official language; and was addressed to Admiral Sim's official superior, the Secretary

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of the Navy. Had the admiral sent his report to the public press or to any one except the one person entitled to receive it—the Secretary of the Navy—he would have committed a serious breach of discipline. Had he even made public the fact that such a paper existed he would have likewise been guilty of an impropriety. But the man who took the reporters into his confidence, and is thus responsible for all the publicity which has followed, was Secretary Daniels himself. The day the report was received he informed the press that Admiral Sims had sent him a letter which was "critical" of the Navy Department in the World War.

Naturally public curiosity was vastly piqued. A few days afterward Admiral Sims appeared before the Naval Committee of the United States Senate. This committee formally demanded that the admiral produce a copy of this letter. The Congress of the United States is a governmental body superior to Secretary Daniels himself and the Naval Committee of the Senate has the right to demand all available information on the conduct of the Navy Department. Neither could Admiral Sims have declined to furnish the report demanded. To have done so would not only have made him subject to contempt proceedings, but would have placed him in the unenviable position of insulting and defying the legislative powers of the nation. The letter, therefore, went upon the records and thus became public property. If there is anything in the nature of a "scandal"—

The word "scandal" is in quotation marks—

or a "controversy"—

And the word "controversy" is in quotation marks—

or a "washing of dirty linen in public"—

And those words, "washing of dirty linen in public," are in quotation marks—

Secretary Daniels is solely responsible; for, had he not made his public announcement that the report existed, the Senate committee would not have demanded its presentation.

Do you agree with that statement?

Admiral SIMS. I do not agree with the statement, I do not want to agree with it one way or another; but I want to say this: I did not know anything about that until I saw it in the World's Work. I did not know that it was projected, or anything about it at all, and I do not think there is anything in there that has not been published in other reviews and in newspapers, and so forth. In fact, the information there is simply a compilation of what was practically public property. I had nothing whatever to do with it, at all, in any way.

Senator PITTMAN. Where do you suppose he got that expression, a "washing of dirty linen in public"?

Admiral SIMS. Out of the press. I have seen it a number of times.

Senator PITTMAN. Did you ever testify to that on the stand?

Admiral SIMS. Testify to what?

Senator PITTMAN. Use that expression in your testimony?

Admiral SIMS. I may have. I can not remember now.

Senator PITTMAN. I will tell you later.

Admiral SIMS. But I have seen it in the press hundreds and hundreds of times. In fact, there is a cartoon to that effect.

Senator PITTMAN. That was an expression used here by yourself, Admiral.

Admiral SIMS. Yes; but if it was used by the people in the press, it can have no significance so far as I am concerned.

Senator PITTMAN. Yes. Let us go on a little further. This article there says that this letter was not shown to anyone else until it was presented to this committee—shown by you. Is that a fact?

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Admiral SIMS. No.

Senator PITTMAN. To whom did you show this letter?

Admiral SIMS. I showed it to perhaps half a dozen of my people who used to be on my staff on the other side.

Senator PITTMAN. I would like to know who they are.

Admiral SIMS. We can give you the names of those. Capt. Cone, Capt. Pringle, Capt. Knox, and Commander Babcock, and Capt. Chandler, and Lieut. Kittredge.

Lieut. KITTREDGE. No.

Admiral SIMS. You never saw it?

Lieut. KITTREDGE. No.

Admiral SIMS. They were Capt. Cone, Capt. Pringle, Capt. Knox, Commander Babcock, Capt. Chandler, and my aid, Lieut. Commander Edwards. There is only one other person I showed that letter to, and that was Mr. Davison, in New York. What are his initials?

Commander BABCOCK. H. P. Davison.

Admiral SIMS. H. P. Davison. I was a guest in his house on going to New York to attend a dinner given to Mrs. Whitelaw Reid, and I showed him a copy of that letter on that occasion. To the best of my knowledge, nobody else saw a copy of that letter at all. I did not even put it in my own files, but I kept a file copy myself, and I kept it in my pocket. I did not put it on my own files in Newport.

Senator PITTMAN. And yet you have testified that this letter was written as an official document solely for the Secretary of the Navy, as a naval officer; is not that true?

Admiral SIMS. Yes, sir.

Senator PITTMAN. Do you consider that it was proper, before sending this letter, to have submitted it to a civilian in New York City?

Admiral SIMS. No, I do not think it. That was an indiscretion upon my part. I should not have done so.

Senator PITTMAN. That is the only indiscretion that you have committed?

Admiral SIMS. So far as I know.

Senator PITTMAN. You stated in your testimony, presumably because the department had published its existence, of a general nature.

Admiral SIMS. That is what I thought at the time, but I was mistaken.

Senator PITTMAN. Did that letter contain everything that is now in it, at the time that you showed it to Mr. Davison?

Admiral SIMS. Did it contain everything that is now in it?

Senator PITTMAN. Yes.

Admiral SIMS. Yes; the identical letter.

Senator PITTMAN. The identical letter?

Admiral SIMS. It was not changed in any respect; no.

Senator PITTMAN. Upon what date did you show that to Mr. Davison?

Admiral SIMS. I can find the date by looking back and seeing what time that dinner took place in New York; but along about the middle of January it was.

Senator PITTMAN. About the middle of January?

Admiral SIMS. I should think so; about there.

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Senator PITTMAN. It was prior to the time you mailed it to the Secretary, was it?

Admiral SIMS. Prior to the time?

Senator PITTMAN. Yes.

Admiral SIMS. After the time.

Senator PITTMAN. After the time?

Admiral SIMS. After the time.

Senator PITTMAN. That you mailed it to the Secretary?

Admiral SIMS. I must have mailed it immediately after its own date, probably the 8th or 9th, or something like that.

Senator PITTMAN. At a dinner at Mr. Davison's house?

Admiral SIMS. No; in his private study. I was a guest at his house, and spent the night there.

Senator PITTMAN. Who else was there?

Admiral SIMS. There was another man in the house and his family, and his son, and so forth; but I can not remember anybody else, and it was only shown to him.

Senator PITTMAN. You can fix that date, can you?

Admiral SIMS. I can fix the date, easily.

Senator PITTMAN. Will you fix the date before you leave here?

Admiral SIMS. I will try to. I can find out about it. I may have to write to Newport and get the correspondence; but it was about the middle of January.

Senator PITTMAN. About the middle of January?

Admiral SIMS. My aid thinks it was the 14th, but I can not be sure. It is easily fixed because of the date of that dinner, you see.

Senator PITTMAN. On the 14th of January an article appeared in the Washington Post under the signature, or the name, rather, of Mr. Albert W. Fox, entitled "Sims attacks Daniels's policies. Army medal inquiry by the House. Admiral again writes frank criticism to the Secretary. Sees Navy's morale hurt. Fearless exposé of what he believes blunders and mistakes. Expected to bare conditions":

Secretary Daniels has received another letter from Admiral William S. Sims, which will prove of great interest to the service and the country if the Secretary does not succeed in suppressing it. It is a frank and fearless exposé of the hopeless story of maladministration, mistakes, and blunders into which the American Navy has fallen as a result of Mr. Daniels's policies, and it tells the Secretary things that became evident to the admiral during the war, and are even more evident now.

It is, in effect, an attempt by the officer who was commander in chief of the American naval forces in European waters during the war and is perhaps foremost among ranking officers in the service to rescue the morale of the United States Navy from the Daniels policy by appealing directly to the men responsible for it all.

Admiral Sims is now president of the Naval War College at Newport, R. I., and the letter was sent to Mr. Daniels from there.

* * * * * * *

If this officer, who is generally regarded here and abroad as one of the most competent naval authorities in the world, finds it necessary to expose Mr. Daniels's management of naval affairs and frankly and fearlessly undertakes the task it is not probable that senators will show lack of interest.

Every one admits that there is something vitally important to the Nation involved in naval efficiency or inefficiency and the big, broad question at issue is how Mr. Daniels's policies are affecting the service.

That is on the 14th day of January. I will ask you if you saw any publication in regard to that testimony of yours prior to that time.

Admiral SIMS. I do not understand your question.

Senator PITTMAN. I ask you if you saw any publication intimating that there was such a letter as that, prior to the morning of the 14th day of January?

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Admiral SIMS. Prior to that time?

Senator PITTMAN. Yes.

Admiral SIMS. Not that I recollect. I understand there was a squib in the papers; but I only found it out before I came down here to this investigation.

Senator PITTMAN. I would be very glad if you would have some of your convolutions hunted up in regard to this matter.

Admiral SIMS. In regard to what?

Senator PITTMAN. In regard to this matter. This is the first mention we have heard of this—have been able to find.

Admiral SIMS. Probably that is the first. I think that is the first.

Senator PITTMAN. I would be very glad to have you pursue it in any manner you can.

Admiral SIMS. I did not follow that carefully.

Senator PITTMAN. Because it would indicate great carelessness on our part.

The Post of January 15 has something else about this; not by Mr. Fox, however.

It is headed "Daniels mum on Sims. Stopped reading letter just when it became 'critical.' "

Then the article goes on:

Secretary Daniels admitted yesterday that he had received a "critical" or "controversial" letter from Admiral Sims, but said he had not yet read all of it. He stopped reading it just as it was becoming critical, he explained, and therefore could not comment on the charges against his management of naval affairs made by the admiral.

Then there is something else down here in the same article:

NEW POINTS MAY BE DEVELOPED.

Besides getting Admiral Sims's views on the actions of Secretary Daniels in the matter of naval awards, which the admiral has described as bringing condemnation and ridicule upon Mr. Daniels and the service and lowering the morale to the last degree, it may be that the committee will develop points having an important bearing on the present condition of confusion and chaos in the Navy.

It seems that some one was wise at that time.

Now, then, here is an article from the New York World under date of January 15, 1920, sent from Washington. The heading reads:

Sims writes long letter to Daniels criticizing Navy. Communication discusses "Lessons of the war." Secretary has no comment.

Then the article says:

Admiral Sims has been called to appear before the subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs Friday in connection with the committee's investigation of the award of decorations to officers and men of the Navy.

MAY CRITICIZE MISTAKES.

There are intimations that Admiral Sims on that occasion may discuss the Navy in general, the mistakes made during the war, causes for the present low state of morale, etc.

Secretary Daniels indicated to-day that he may have nothing to say regarding Admiral Sim's communication until after the admiral has had an opportunity to lay his views before the committee, should he desire to do so.

Asked whether the letter is "critical" of his policies and management of the Navy, Mr. Daniels said that the portions he had read were rather critical.

"If he (Admiral Sims) has given it out as being critical, I suppose the letter is critical," said Mr. Daniels.

* * * * * * *

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Those portions of the letter which Mr. Daniels has read contain no mention of the award of decorations which Admiral Sims criticized severely in a letter made public by Mr. Daniels some time ago.

There is a similar statement in the New York Times.

So that the first intimation made public was in the article of Mr. Fox in the Washington Post on the morning of January 14.

Admiral SIMS. Are you asking a question?

Senator PITTMAN. No; I am just stating a fact first, and then I wish to comment on it.

Admiral SIMS. Yes, sir.

Senator PITTMAN. The article purports to know the general tenor of that letter. It suggests that that may be made public unless Secretary Daniels suppresses it.

These other articles written by Washington newspaper men indicate that the Secretary was suppressing, and would not even discuss it. So much for the inference in this article, and also your testimony, that the Secretary was responsible for you placing that letter before the public through the medium of this committee.

Now, as to the inference that you were forced to produce this letter by the committee——

Admiral SIMS. Yes; will you allow me to make some comment upon what you have just been reading? You did not ask me any question about it.

Senator PITTMAN. No; because I want to connect it up with the hearings, and then let you answer it all at the same time, if you will.

Admiral SIMS. Oh, that is all right.

Senator PITTMAN. It will be better, and it will be more intelligible.

Admiral SIMS. That is all right, sir.

Senator PITTMAN. Now, then, as to the reflection upon the committee, that this committee here forced the letter out into public.

Admiral SIMS. Who made this reflection?

Senator PITTMAN. That reflection is carried in this article that I have read; and not only that, but I take it that it is carried in your testimony when you state here——

Admiral SIMS. I did not use any such expression as "forced." I said that it was asked for by the committee.

Senator PITTMAN. Yes. Well, if you do not want to use that word, that you were compelled to present it, I am perfectly willing, that you did not.

Admiral SIMS. Did I use it?

Senator PITTMAN. Well, were you compelled to present the letter by the committee?

Admiral SIMS. I was asked for it, and I presented it. I understand so.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pittman, in quoting Admiral Sims if you will stick to the record and quote him from the record and not from what you think he said, you will have less trouble.

Senator PITTMAN. The Admiral is here, and he is just as bright as the Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Nobody can remember what was said exactly. You have the record before you to quote from.

Senator PITTMAN. Possibly no one but the Admiral can.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not think we need any discussion ot the matter.

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Senator PITTMAN. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Nor will we have it.

Senator PITTMAN. No; I do not intend to stand for it. I am conducting this cross-examination.

The CHAIRMAN. And when it is not being properly conducted, I shall interfere, right along.

Senator PITTMAN. And I shall pay no attention to it.

The CHAIRMAN. We will not proceed.

Senator PITTMAN. I realized this morning that you were going to try to break up this cross-examination.

The CHAIRMAN. There is no attempt in any way to break up the cross-examination. Now, go on.

Admiral SIMS. May I say now, in reference to this, that I welcome this cross-examination, because if you continue it through my testimony, I believe it will be the means of bringing out possibly information that I did not bring out. Naturally, I want to bring out everything I can.

Senator PITTMAN. I will help you, Admiral.

Admiral SIMS. I am trying to help the department. I want it understood that as I made this statement from day to day, I passed it in to everybody on the other side, including the Secretary of the Navy. I want the whole thing to be brought out, and I am here to help you.

Senator PITTMAN. Now I want to know whether or not you were compelled to produce that letter by the committee.

Admiral SIMS. I understand that a request made by a committee of the Congress for testimony compels you to give it.

Senator PITTMAN. Admiral, if there were a matter within your knowledge, or any letter that you had written that you would consider that the publication of the same would be injurious to our vernment, would you publish that, simply upon the request of neone who did not know its contents, without suggesting that it tained matter that might be prejudicial to our government?

lmiral SIMS. Certainly not; I would submit it to the committee d closed doors. But when it is something that I know will be nely beneficial to the Government, I do not think that procedure is necessary at all.

Senator PITTMAN. I see. That answers my question exactly. You would have submitted it behind closed doors if you had not considered that it was very beneficial; and therefore you did not suggest to the committee that they consider it behind closed doors?

Admiral SIMS. I did not. It was not any of my business to.

Senator PITTMAN. You made no intimation to the committee that there was a statement in there that might be offensive to another Government?

Admiral SIMS. No.

Senator PITTMAN. Did any member of this committee know what was in that letter?

Admiral SIMS. Nobody except the people you have mentioned there, to the best of my recollection, knew anything about the letter at all.

Senator PITTMAN. Yes.

Admiral SIMS. Or, certainly, not what was in it.

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Senator PITTMAN. Yes. You had the letter in your pocket at the time, did you not?

Admiral SIMS. I had carried it in my pocket ever since the original was submitted. It never was out of my possession.

Senator PITTMAN. At the time this letter was presented, you were testifying in a proceeding dealing with naval awards, and the chairman stated to you this, and I call your particular attention to it so that you can determine whether he was referring to the letter in your pocket. I admit I did not know he was referring to the letter in your pocket. [Reading.]

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Sims, I think in connection with this matter if you have had any further correspondence with the Secretary of the Navy about the question of awards and their effect on the morale of the service, it would be well for you to give that correspondence to us at the present time.

Admiral SIMS. Will you read my reply?

Senator PITTMAN (reading).

Admiral SIMS. It does not bear particularly upon the question of the awards, but it does bear upon the question of the morale of the service.

The CHAIRMAN. Then I think it is decidedly germane to the issue.

Admiral SIMS. As I said before, the action of the Board in the awards is only the last straw in this whole business.

Senator PITTMAN. May I finish this line of examination with regard to this particular subject?

The CHAIRMAN. If the admiral has expressed himself in regard to this matter in any letter that will throw light upon the subject, we should have it.

That subject was the subject of naval awards. [Continuing reading.]

Senator MCCORMICK. My sentiment is that we should give the admiral an opportunity to furnish us these letters before we get too far away from the subject to which they refer.

Senator PITTMAN. It seems to me the admiral has had plenty of opportunity to put anything in this record he desired to insert. I am not making any objection to it, but I have started an inquiry right now with regard to the difference of opinion.

Then the chairman goes on again:

The CHAIRMAN. Now, Senator Pittman, with your permission we will go ahead with the question I put to the admiral, if the admiral cares to proceed.

That is the history of the way this matter became public. That is the history of the way the committee is alleged to have forced it from your possession.

One other question along this same line, and then I will let you answer it all, so as to connect it all up. Prior to January 6 you wrote a letter, and made it public, with regard to naval awards, did you not?

Admiral SIMS. No, sir.

Senator PITTMAN. You did write a letter with regard to criticising the naval awards?

Admiral SIMS. But I did not make it public.

Senator PITTMAN. What date did you write that letter?

Admiral SIMS. It was dated the 17th of December. The date is in the record. Have you a copy of the printed hearings on naval awards? You will find it in the record there.

Senator PITTMAN. I think that is near enough—the 17th of December?

Admiral SIMS. Yes.

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Senator PITTMAN. That was written from Newport?

Admiral SIMS. Yes.

Senator PITTMAN. Did you show that letter to anyone?

Admiral SIMS. Oh, yes; I consulted a good many people there about it, because it concerned those officers there so intimately, and I sent copies to a certain number of officers who were concerned, that is to say to officers that I had recommended for a certain decoration and who had only got another one. I wanted those officers to know what I had done about it.

Senator PITTMAN. You had that letter mimeographed?

Admiral SIMS. I had the letter mimeographed in order to send it to the officers concerned.

Senator PITTMAN. There were quite a number of the officers that you considered concerned, I suppose?

Admiral SIMS. I sent out, I suppose, a couple of dozen copies.

Senator PITTMAN. Then it found its way into the press?

Admiral SIMS. I do not know how it found its way into the press.

Senator PITTMAN. It is just as much a mystery as how Fox got his information.

Admiral SIMS. I know how Fox got his knowledge about it, but you have not asked me any questions about that.

Senator PITTMAN. I will ask you how Mr. Fox got the knowledge about the letter?

Admiral SIMS. I considered those letters you have read there from the press a very distinct tribute to the enterprise of the press in getting that information.

Senator PITTMAN. You said you knew who gave Mr. Fox the information.

Admiral SIMS. Do not be impatient, and I will tell you. I did not say I knew who gave Mr. Fox the information, but I said that I had been told that—I could tell you how Mr. Fox got the information; and I have been told—I have not seen him at all since I have been in Washington but I have been told that Mr. Fox got the information in the usual way from the Navy Department. Now, let me——

Senator PITTMAN. You have been told that?

Admiral SIMS. Yes; I have been told that.

Senator PITTMAN. I wish you would tell me who told you that.

Admiral SIMS. I could not tell you who told me, but some one came into the room where we had a number of people and said that was what Fox said, and you can easily ask Fox, if you want to.

Senator PITTMAN. I probably will.

Admiral SIMS. Let me tell you something. I went into the Navy Department on the 17th of January and I found copies of that letter you are talking about now, of January 7, in the Navy Department. It had been recopied, and it was there. You can not recopy a thing without somebody copying it. I know there were a number of copies gotten out and passed around the Navy Department. One minute; let me finish. I know that a letter that comes into the Navy Department is seen by a good many people before it is ever placed before the people who have to consider it. The ordinary procedure is for a letter to come to the file room, and there it is read by a clerk who makes on a yellow card a sufficient abstract so that you can recognize it—what is in it—and gives it a number, etc., and puts it in the proper basket, and it goes through. Anything that comes into the Navy

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Department is known to a number of people. If any one of those people wants to tell a newspaper man on the outside about it, he can do it. He ought not to, but it is very frequently done, and I understand that that is where this information came from—out of the Navy Department, where a great deal of other information of a similar character does come out.

Senator PITTMAN. Now, you say——

Admiral SIMS. But let me make this statement first.

Senator PITTMAN. Certainly; go right ahead.

Admiral SIMS. But nothing that I did, nothing that any of the officers in my entourage in Newport did, had anything to do in any possible way with the giving out of the fact that there was such a letter, let alone giving out the contents of the letter itself.

Now, the game was played perfectly fairly and squarely. I am no spring chicken in this business, and I am not putting my head into a noose unnecessarily. I saw that the letter was confidential, of course, and I took particular pains to see that it did not get out to any of our own people, and I even carried the only copy in my own pocket, so that I would be able to say that it was always there, and be sure that it was there; and I had it in my own pocket when I came down here.

Senator PITTMAN. When was it you say you were in the Navy Department and saw a copy of that letter?

Admiral SIMS. The same day I read it to you.

Senator PITTMAN. Before or afterwards?

Admiral SIMS. Directly afterwards.

Senator PITTMAN. Yes; I thought so.

Admiral SIMS. Directly after that.

Senator PITTMAN. Yes; directly after that?

Admiral SIMS. Yes; but it was only about two hours afterwards. The morning of Saturday that I read that letter here, the 17th of January, I received a telephone message while I was in the room here that the Assistant Secretary of the Navy wanted to see me that afternoon at half past 2, and I went down there, and I knew then, he told me, that the letter had been copied and circulated, and he showed me one on his desk.

Senator PITTMAN. Yes; he showed you one on his desk. To whom did you address that letter?

Admiral SIMS. To the Secretary of the Navy.

Senator PITTMAN. The Secretary of the Navy?

Admiral SIMS. That is, under the regulations, to address a letter to the Secretary of the Navy, and if it wants to go to a bureau, you put in parentheses "Bureau of Navigation," or "Bureau of Ordnance," or whatever bureau it may be.

Senator PITTMAN. And on the 14th Mr. Fox not only knows of the existence of a letter of that kind, but he has given a very accurate description of the general subject matter.

Admiral SIMS. I noticed that; yes. Now, you are trying to fix that on me, as to my giving it out. I tell you I had absolutely nothing to do with that.

Senator PITTMAN. I am not trying to fix it on you as to giving it out.

Admiral SIMS. What are you trying to do, then?

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Senator PITTMAN. No, no, no; far be it from me to try to fix anything on you.

Admiral SIMS. Well, cheer up; I am glad to know that. Go on.

Senator PITTMAN. But you, you see, got a little confused in your testimony when you testified so rashly here a while back with regard to the possession of this letter, and it now develops that you let Mr. Davison in New York, who was a civilian, read that letter before you put it in the record.

Admiral SIMS. Yes; that is right.

Senator PITTMAN. Before you made it public.

Admiral SIMS. No; I did not make it public. I showed it to Mr. Davison, that is all. He is an honorable man, and you can call him before this committee and he will tell you that he did nothing with it. That was an indiscretion. I have said so. You do not need to pound away on that. I acknowledge that thing.

Senator PITTMAN. I am very glad you acknowledge that. Now then, another thing; you were complaining that we are trying to pin something on you——

Admiral SIMS. Oh, I was not complaining at all.

Senator PITTMAN (continuing). You stated in your testimony presumably the letter was called out because the department had published the fact of its existence and its general nature. Now, as a matter of fact, is there any evidence here that the department had published its existence and its general nature?

Admiral SIMS. That is what I thought at the time; but I told you a little while ago that I was mistaken, and did not find that out until I came here and found those articles. I do not take the Washington Post, and I had never seen those articles you have read here, and I did not know about it; that is all. What I was referring to at the time was this, that I supposed that in the interview that takes place daily with the press and Mr. Daniels somebody on the press asked him about this. I have since been told, but I have not verified it, that the day before that thing there was a little squib in the newspapers saying that the letter had been received; but I did not know it when testifying. I did not know it until I came down here this time and somebody told me about it. [Reading:]

Presumably the letter was called for because the department had published the fact of its existence and general nature.

That is in my preliminary statement. There was a published interview in the paper with Secretary Daniels, in which they asked him about the letter, and he said, "Yes; there was a letter of a critical nature."

Senator PITTMAN. When was that?

Admiral SIMS. I do not remember when it was.

Senator PITTMAN. I have read when it was. It was subsequent to the Fox article.

Admiral SIMS. That is an attack on the Secretary of the Navy. I haven't got anything to do with that.

Senator PITTMAN. I say, the first notice of that was the Fox article. I presume that is connected with the leak, all right.

Admiral SIMS. That is something that concerns Mr. Fox and not me, because you said you were not trying to pin it on me and it does not concern me.

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Senator PITTMAN. It certainly, though, affects the Secretary of the Navy.

Admiral SIMS. Yes.

Senator PITTMAN. And by reason of the fact that you had publicly given the testimony you did here, which is a direct reflection that he gave publicity to it.

Admiral SIMS. Why should they not give publicity to it?

Senator PITTMAN. For the simple reason that it contained matters that were offensive to a Government which we were at peace, and on friendly terms; because it contained a communication that was a voluntary statement that was confided to a high admiral, in strict confidence.

Admiral SIMS. It was not in strict confidence.

Senator PITTMAN. In such confidence that it was not even transmitted in writing.

Admiral SIMS. It was not in confidence. It was before other officers.

Senator PITTMAN. Why Admiral, it was before the three men that have charge of matters of that kind.

Admiral SIMS. Excuse me, sir; it was in an office where there were a number of people. The second day it was stated to me——

Senator PITTMAN. The second day it was before naval officers?

Admiral SIMS. It was.

Senator PITTMAN. Before naval officers, who are supposed to respect the confidence that is reposed in them by superior officers, and who would hold sacred a secret of the navy that was essential to the protection of the Government.

Admiral SIMS. It was not told to me in that way, at all.

Senator PITTMAN. And you do not consider that the making public of such statements as that would be improper?

Admiral SIMS. For who to make it public?

Senator PITTMAN. Anyone.

Admiral SIMS. No; I do not.

Senator PITTMAN. You do not?

Admiral SIMS. No, I do not, where the interests of our service are at stake. We naval officers have made up our minds to one thing, and that is this, that we will never go into a war in that condition in which we went into this. Do not make any mistake about that?

Senator PITTMAN. That statement is all right, and I accept your statement also with regard to what you consider the duty of a high naval officer. That is all I have to ask you on that subject.

Admiral SIMS. Are you asking a question?

Senator PITTMAN. No, sir, I am through now on that. That is the end of that subject. There is another subject that I want to take up.

Now, Admiral, part of your criticism involved in this matter has been the lack of centralization of command in London.

Admiral SIMS. The lack of what, sir?

Senator PITTMAN. Of command.

Admiral SIMS. The lack of centralization, you said?

Senator PITTMAN. Yes, the lack of centralization of command in London. Is that not true?

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Admiral SIMS. No, I do not recall any such criticism. The command abroad was centralized in London perfectly, with the initiative to the subordinate commanders. I think we may misunderstand each other about the significance or drift of that question. Perhaps you will modify it a little.

Senator PITTMAN. Yes; I probably will. Now in letter No. 27, under date of July 16, 1917, from Vice Admiral Sims to the Secretary of the Navy, subject, concerning policy of United States naval cooperation in war and allied subjects, I read from paragraph 3:

3. The first course open to us which naturally occurs to mind is that we should look upon our service as part of the combined allied service, of which the British Grand Fleet is the main body and all other allied naval forces disposed throughout the world as necessary branches thereof.

On November 15, 1917, in a communication to the Secretary of the Navy by you, and called a general report, I read the following extracts from paragraph 11:

From the American point of view it appears necessary to accept as a fact that an increasing amount of American tonnage must be contributed to support the Allies entirely outside of the demands of our military and naval forces. If this is accepted, it appears that the extent of our military participation is only dependent upon the rate of American shipbuilding, and that our military participation must be viewed with great anxiety until the rate of production of new tonnage commences to exceed the losses. It has even been suggested that in view of the present situation a good proportion of our national army could perhaps be more efficiently utilized in prosecution of the war by actually utilizing it as labor in American shipyards.

I now read a communication from Admiral Sims to Admiral Bailey, under date London, January 24, 1918.

Admiral SIMS. To whom?

Senator PITTMAN. Admiral Sir Lewis Bailey, of the British Admiralty.

Admiral SIMS. Yes.

Senator PITTMAN. I may state that this letter comes from your historical section at London.

You will be interested to know that the question I mentioned to you about the best way to use the man power of America on the western front is now up for very serious consideration. It has evidently been presented on the other side with very great force, because the chief of our war staff, who has recently passed through London and who is a member of the Allied War Council, is of the opinion that we should utilize this man power in the way indicated in our discussion when I was at Queenstown. He believes that if we persist in the original scheme of organizing a large army based upon new ports, with adequate means of transportation, and so forth, that our army could not be made effective until 1919. The whole matter will come before the Allied War Council and be considered by the prime ministers of the countries most concerned and doubtless a decision will be forthcoming before long. I don't see how this decision can be anything much different from what we believe it should be.

In this connection, if the decision is made as indicated above, it will change to a certain extent the employment of our various groups of destroyers. According to the general, the scheme would be not to proceed with the development of the facilities in the ports on the west coast of France but to let them remain as they are and to use these ports for the supply of the troops already in there and for the supply of their reinforcements, and to divert the tonnage which is now carrying in all equipment and installation for handling a big army to the bringing of troops in to the western ports of the British Isles in order that they may be passed through the British camps to the western front.

If this is the decision, it will mean that there will be few army convoys going into the west coast of France, and consequently that these can be handled only by the destroyers now based on France with the possible addition of a certain number from Queenstown.

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On the other hand, there would be more troop convoys coming in either to the north or the south of Ireland, and provision would have to be made to escort these additional convoys. However, this is a bridge that does not need to be crossed until we get to it.

Admiral SIMS. That is a dandy letter, all right. I am proud of it.

Senator PITTMAN. Now, Admiral, I will ask you about this——

Admiral SIMS. I should like to explain that to you.

Senator PITTMAN. I will ask a few questions, and then you can explain all of it.

Admiral SIMS. Yes.

Senator PITTMAN. What was the question that you mentioned to him about the best way to utilize the man power of America on the western front?

Admiral SIMS. I was reporting to him what Gen. Bliss had told me, and what he told me he was going to put up to our Government when he went back, that until we could get a large number of troops in there and until we could put them through a long series of training so that they would be capable of taking over a whole section on the western front themselves, what would help to win the war the best at that time would be to do what the British were doing with their own raw troops that they were putting in there, and what Napoleon did with his troops throughout his whole career. That was, when he got a new contingent of raw recruits, instead of making an army out of them and putting them through from 6 to 8 or 10 months' drill to fit them to go into battle by themselves, he put them in small groups, in among the veterans on each side of them, so that they could be guided by the veterans among whom they were placed, which would fit them for fighting inside of two months; and I am very glad to say that the ideas of Gen. Bliss on the subject prevailed, and that the American army did do that exact thing at the time that he was talking about, and they put them on the western front in among the British, who spoke the same language, and they fought alongside the British, brigaded with them, as the expression is, a group of Americans with a group of British on each side, and so on, and they did most excellent service, and you probably remember that when they were put in under Gen. Haig to fight alongside of the Australians, when somebody asked the Australians how these raw American troops did, the reply was that they did first rate, but they were a little bit rough.

Now, that was what Gen. Bliss had recommended, and that is what I was talking about there, and that was a wise thing to do, as Gen. Bliss saw, and when he got back he proposed to our Government to that effect, and that is exactly what they did. Later, when they had so many troops in there that they constituted an army, after those fellows had gotten a good deal of experience, after those troops had fought under Gen. Haig, a certain number of them were withdrawn to form the nucleus of the army of the Argonne, and so forth. It all went forward as projected there.

Senator PITTMAN. So, on November 15 you were in favor of putting our soldiers to work in the navy yards as laborers, and on January 24 you were in favor of brigading our soldiers with other troops?

Admiral SIMS. At a certain time I was in favor of putting a certain number of them in the ship yards, in the same way as the British did, in order to get the tonnage. We all realized, and Gen. Pershing did,

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and whenever you are ready to hear about that I will tell you what he had to say on the subject, that the tonnage question was the very basis of the whole business, and if that was not solved the war could not possibley be won with the assistance of the American Army. Therefore it was necessary, not to take all the men who were enlisted for the Army and put them in the shipyards, but to take what were necessary in order to solve this tonnage situation. Great Britain proposed to do it and did do it. She withdrew men from her veteran army who were shipwrights and put them in her shipyards. That is all that was. It was simply to accentuate the fact that instead of putting into the Army men who were shipwrights, who understood how to build ships, it was so essential at that time that we have ships in order to get the Army over and to get the supplies over, that these men, instead of going into the Army, should have been employed in the shipyards. That is only ordinary American common sense.

Senator PITTMAN. Was Gen. Pershing, on January 24, favoring a separate American unit over there, or was he favoring your proposition of putting them under the British?

Admiral SIMS. I do not know.

Senator PITTMAN. You really do not know that?

Admiral SIMS. I do not know that. I do not know when he came out, but I know that he did come out and say, "I am willing to brigade my troops in any possible way." He said that at a certain date, but when he had the original idea I do not know.

Senator PITTMAN. When did you come out openly for a separate Amreican unit over there?

Admiral SIMS. I did not come out for it. It was none of my business and I did not come out for it, officially or in any other way. I naturally discussed it with Gen. Bloss when he came through there, and when I saw him on the Allied War Council at Paris, naturally those things were discussed with him, and he agreed that he would advise them when he went back, and he told me that when he came back to America he did so advise our Government at that time. It was not a question of brigading our troops with foreign troops at all times; it was only to get over an emergency. We would have to go into a great deal of testimony in order to establish all the facts in a case of that kind; but what I was advocating, or talking about in my letter to Admiral Bayly was what Gen. Bliss had told me was the decision of the Supreme War Council. That is to say, the Army people that discussed the whole matter thought that it was necessary at that time to put the troops in, and did put them in, and it succeeded admirably.

Senator PITTMAN. Now I read another paper from your historical section—

Admiral SIMS. Will you allow me to say also that in no case should it be considered that I, a naval officer, attending to my own business, was recommending anything at all. I wanted to know what they were going to do, because it might have a marked influence on how my forces should be handled. If they should decide, as they did later, to send a large body of troops through Great Britain, it would affect the disposition of my forces, in order that those things should be properly transacted. In the later period of the war, when the crisis came, it was found that this advice about sending them through Great Britain was exceedingly important, and when the

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rush came, after March 21, 1918, from that time on—I just make a rough guess that 50 per cent of the troops went into Great Britain and across the channel; so that all those things that I discussed with Gen. Bliss—not recommending them but trying to find out about them—were all done exactly as explained in that letter to Admiral Bayly; and we, as two sailormen, were discussing what would be the disposition of the forces that were escorting the troops, in case that did come off. I am pleased to death with that letter, and I am glad I wrote it.

Senator PITTMAN. Here is another statement, Admiral, sent over by your historical section in London at the same time with this letter, to the archives here:

There was a small dinner last night at which were present Balfour, Cecil, and Reading and the host, a very important person.

Admiral SIMS. Balfour, Cecil, Reading, and who else?

Senator PITTMAN. Balfour, Cecil, Reading, and the host, a very important person.

There was also present another man who holds somewhat radical views as to the most efficient way to employ America's man power on the western front, instead of organizing a separate Army with its own lines of communication and supply.

The gentlemen above mentioned were greatly interested in the expression of these views and highly approved of them and the discussion turned upon the means to be employed to realize them.

During the discussion the following facts were brought out:

First. This proposition was presented by the House mission upon its return home.

Admiral SIMS. Gen. Bliss was with the House mission.

Senator PITTMAN. (reading):

Second. The President asked Pershing for his views as to the advisability of the scheme, and, in case he did not approve of it, to state why he did not approve.

Third. Gen. Robertson went to France to discuss the matter with Pershing, and came back "much disappointed."

Manifestly, the pressure in favor of the scheme is increasing. It is becoming apparent that the bulk of the tonnage assigned to transport the Army is being used to bring over the material to create the facilities for handling and supplying a projected army so large that it can probably never be landed in France—at least not in time to get into the game.

It is believed that the pressure is now, or soon will be, such as to endanger the positions of those who continue to oppose the scheme.

It is, of course, desirable to increase this pressure as soon and as much as possible.

The reasons in favor of the scheme are so plain and simple as to be readily understood by the man on the street.

The reasons opposed to it are purely sentimental—national and state pride, and ambition for personal distinction. There is no sound military reason against it.

Therefore, it is of the first importance that this matter be clearly explained to the man on the street.

It is up to you and the men of your cloth.

Admiral SIMS. What is the date of that?

Senator PITTMAN. January 14, 1918.

Admiral SIMS. From whom?

Senator PITTMAN. It says, "Admiral Sims's personal file."

Admiral SIMS. Who wrote it?

Senator PITTMAN. I am asking you who wrote it.

Admiral SIMS. I am asking you who wrote it.

Senator PITTMAN. I have not the slightest idea. It is in your personal files.

Admiral SIMS. Then I have not anything to say about it. It may be a paper in my personal files, but if you want to question me about a paper that you read to me you must tell me who wrote it.

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Senator PITTMAN. It came with the Bayly letter, which is dated January 24, 10 days after this memorandum.

Admiral SIMS. I can not comment on it. Is it a letter?

Senator PITTMAN. The Bayly letter is a letter. This is dated January 14, 1918, and is marked "Admiral Sims's personal files. Memorandum."

Admiral SIMS. There were 50,000 papers in among those things, and if you will not tell me what it is about I can not comment on it.

Senator PITTMAN. If you do not know what your historical section had——

Admiral SIMS. Of course I do not know. They sent over to me and told me to send over all the stuff we got there, and it is up to them to sort them. I do not know what this is. That is not my files. That is the Navy Department historical files.

Senator PITTMAN. Very well. I call your attention to the fact, however, Admiral——

Admiral SIMS. Evidently it is somebody writing to me his opinion.

Senator PITTMAN. No; Admiral——

Admiral SIMS. It is not mine, evidently.

Senator PITTMAN. It seems to be so in accord with your letter to Admiral Bayly——

Admiral SIMS. Oh; most people were in accord with me. That is the reason I got along so well. I did not write that, and I do not know who did.

Senator PITTMAN. I enjoy affording you amusement. I am going to afford you some more amusement now. This letter of Bayly's——

Admiral SIMS. Let me state that——.

Senator PITTMAN. Just a minute. I am asking you a question.

Admiral SIMS. I only want to say that the probability is that that was a memorandum sent me for my information by Dr. Page, the ambassador, himself.

Senator PITTMAN. By Dr. Page?

Admiral SIMS. By Dr. Page, the American ambassador.

Senator PITTMAN. Did you discuss these matters with Dr. Page very frequently?

Admiral SIMS. No; I saw him very rarely about those things. I only went to see him when I wanted help from him.

Senator PITTMAN. Do you mean to say Dr. Page would send you a memorandum of this kind in the nature of propaganda?

Admiral SIMS. Not in the nature of propaganda, but for my information.

Senator PITTMAN. Admiral, it is evident that this is intended as British propaganda to be used against the effort of Gen. Pershing to establish a separate army.

Admiral SIMS. Gen. Pershing at that time, or a little while after, announced himself in favor of brigading those troops in England, until the army was fixed up, and they did exactly what is recommended there.

Senator PITTMAN. You say on January 14——

Admiral SIMS. No; I do not say on January 14, and I did not say that. I said before I did not know what date it was, but I do know that when the crisis came he came out in the most splendid way and said, "I am willing to brigade my troops in any way that will help along the allied cause."

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Senator PITTMAN. This memorandum says, "The reasons opposed to it are purely sentimental—national and State pride, and ambition for personal distinction. There is no sound military reason against it." This is a propaganda against the establishing of a separate American unit. Whether it was written by you——

Admiral SIMS. It was not written by me.

Senator PITTMAN. Or by Dr. Page to you, do you think Ambassador Page would engage in such propaganda?

Admiral SIMS. I absolutely object to calling that propaganda. It is perfectly good, sound military sense that at the crisis those things should be put in there. Of course, you had to put them in against personal ambition and all that sort of thing. It is exactly what was eventually done. It was a perfectly sound military reason, and it was what Gen. Bliss recommended, and it is what Gen. Pershing eventually did when the crisis came. That is not propaganda. That is ordinary, plain, common military sense, that is all.

Senator PITTMAN. I am glad you view it in that light, because it will connect up your actions later on very admirably.

Admiral SIMS. I can tell you one thing. I do not know who wrote that paper, do not know anything about it at all, so what is the use of my trying to discuss a paper I do not know anything about?

Senator PITTMAN. I am very pleased to know that you approve of it.

Admiral SIMS. I did not say that I approved of it at all.

Senator PITTMAN. It is practically your point of view.

Admiral SIMS. Then I absolutely deny that I approved of it. I have not anything to say about that paper at all, except that it predicts exactly what took place. It is not up to me as a sailorman to approve of military procedure at all. All the expressions of opinion I made on the subject were repetitions of what had been said by Gen. Bliss, who was a soldier, and who had just come from consultation with Gen. Pershing and Foch, and so-and-so in the Supreme War Council, and I simply discussed this thing with Admiral Bayly and Admiral Jellicoe, and so forth, to see what our disposition would be. That simply predicted what would have to take place in order to win the war, and it did take place, so what is the use fooling about it?

Senator PITTMAN. I am very glad to know you approve of this propaganda.

Admiral SIMS. You can keep on saying I approve of it, and you can keep on calling it propaganda, but that does not make it so.

Senator PITTMAN. I simply accept your first testimony instead of your last, just as I have done several times.

Admiral SIMS. Oh, well——

Senator PITTMAN. Now, I want to insert in the record here without reading again—and my purpose in inserting it is this——

Admiral SIMS. Before you leave that subject, Senator, I note that in reading from the letter of November 15 you quoted a paragraph in which it is said, "If this is accepted, it appears that the extent of our military participation is wholly dependent on the rate of American shipbuilding, etc." I simply refer to that to identify the paragraph. That is taken out of the letter after the following paragraph:

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Although it is difficult to obtain accurate figures of current production of new tonnage of both the United States and England, it appears in round numbers that the October losses are at a rate not far from double the rate of production. This means that if the present rate of loss continues the curve of available tonnage is on the down slope at a dangerous angle, and the present estimate for future production of new tonnage in England indicates that, on the most optimistic basis, a rate of 250,000 tons per month will not be reached in less than a year and only then provided the United States can assist by supplying a portion of the necessary steel, particularly plates. This indicates that until the United States production of new tonnage can be brought to the rate of 300,000 to 400,000 tons a month the existing tonnage will continue to decrease.

Now, this tonnage situation was the gist of the whole thing. As I have explained in my testimony, the hope of victory on the part of the enemy was that he could cut the lines of communication. The business of the allied navies was to prevent that and to preserve the lines of communication, and Gen. Pershing understood that thing perfectly. I would like to read this extract from Gen. Pershing's report to show how solicitous he was in that matter. [Reading:]

MILITARY SITUATION, 1915 (P. 7).

Although the British Fleet has established its superiority on the sea, yet the German submarine blockade had developed into a serious menace to allied shipping.

MILITARY SITUATION, SPRING OF 1917.

In the five months ending June 30 German submarines had accomplished the destruction of more than three and a quarter million tons of allied shipping. * * * Her battle lines were held on foreign soil and she had withstood every allied attack since the Marne. * * * It can not be said that the German hopes of final victory were extravagant, either as viewed at that time or as viewed in the light of history. Financial problems of the Allies were difficult, supplies were becoming exhausted, and their armies had suffered tremendous losses. Discouragement existed not only among the civil populations but throughout the armies as well. * * * Such was the allied morale that, although their superiority on the western front during the last half of 1916 and during 1917 amounted to 20 per cent, only local attacks could be undertaken and their effect proved wholly insufficient against the German defense. Allied resources in man power at home were low and there was little prospect of materially increasing their armed strength, even in the face of the probability of having the whole military strength of the Central Powers against them in the spring of 1918.

8. Such was the state of affairs that existed when we entered the war. While our action gave the Allies much encouragement, yet this was temporary, and a review of the conditions made it apparent that America must make a supreme material effort as soon as possible. After duly considering the tonnage possibilities, I cabled the following to Washington on July 6, 1917:

"Plans should contemplate sending over at least 1,000,000 men by next May."

TONNAGE REQUIRED FOR UNITED STATES ARMY (P. 10).

The complexity of trench life had enormously increased the tonnage of supplies required by troops. Not only was it a question of providing food but enormous quantities of munitions and material were needed.

For all practical purposes the American Expeditionary Forces were based on the American Continent, three thousand miles of ocean to cross, with the growing submarine menace confronting us, the quantity of ship tonnage that would be available then unknown, and a line of communications by land 400 miles long from French ports to our probable front presented difficulties that seemed almost insurmountable as compared with those of the Allies.

* * * Our available tonnage was inadequate to meet all initial demandc, so that priority of material for combat and instruction, as well as for supplies that could not be purchased in Europe, must be established by those whose perspective included all the services and who were familiar with general plans. (P. 12.)

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MILITARY SITUATION IN 1917.

At first the Allies could hardly hope for a large American Army. Marshall Joffre during his visit to America had made special request that a combat division be sent at once to Europe as visual evidence of our purpose to participate actively in the war. * * * (P. 18, Pershing's report.)

The arrival of the First Division and the parade of certain of its elements in Paris on July 4 caused great enthusiasm and for the time being French morale was stimulated. Still allied apprehension was deep-seated and material assistance was imperative. The following extract is quoted from the cabled summary of an allied conference held on July 26 with the French and Italian commanders in chief and the British and French chiefs of staff.

That is referred to in my testimony at a conference that I attended.

General conclusions reached were necessity for adoption of purely defensive attitude on all secondary fronts and withdrawing surplus troops for duty on western front. By thus strengthening western front believed Allies could hold until American forces arrive in numbers sufficient to gain ascendancy.

The conference urged the immediate study of the tonnage situation with a view to accelerating the arrival of American troops. With the approach of winter depression among the Allies over the Russian collapse and the Italian crisis was intensified by the conviction that the Germans would undertake a decisive offensive in the spring. * * * In view of this, it was represented to the War Department in December as of the utmost importance that the allied preparations be expedited.

On December 31, 1917, there were 176,665 American troops in France and but one division had appeared at the front.

That is, at the end of December, 1917, but one division had ap peared at the front. [Continuing reading:]

Disappointment at the delay of the American effort soon began to develop. French and British authorities suggested the more rapid entry of our troops into line * * *.

That was the reason that they did put them into the line later. [Continuing reading:]

EXPEDITING SHIPMENT OF TROOPS (p. 23).

The War Department planned as early as July, 1917, to send to France by July 15, 1918, 21 divisions of the then strength of 20,000 men each, together with auxiliary and replacement troops and those needed for the line of communications, amounting to over 200,000, making a total of some 650,000. * * * While these numbers fell short of my recommendation of July 6, 1917, which contemplated at least 1,000,000 men by May, 1918, it should be borne in mind that the main factor in the problem was the amount of shipping to become available for military purposes, in which must be included tonnage required to supply the Allies with steel, coal, and food.

On December 2, 1917, an estimate of the situation was cabled to the War Department with the following recommendation—

That is, the following recommendation from Gen. Pershing.

In view of these conditions it is of the utmost importance that we move swiftly. The minimum number of troops we should plan to have in France by the end of June is four Army corps of 24 divisions in addition to troops for service of the rear—Gens. Robertson, Foch, and Bliss agree with me that this is the minimum which should be aimed at. This figure is given as the lowest we should think of and is placed no higher because the limit of available transportation would not seem to warrant it.

4. A study of transportation facilities shows sufficient American tonnage to bring over this number of troops, but to do so there must be a reduction in the tonnage allotted to other than Army needs. It is estimated that the shipping needed will have to be rapidly increased up to 2,000,000 tons by May in addition to the amount already allotted. The use of shipping for commercial purposes must be curtailed as much as possible. The Allies are very weak and we must come to their relief this

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year, 1918. The year after may be too late. It is very doubtful if they can hold on until 1919, unless we give them a lot of support this year. It is therefore strongly recommended that a complete readjustment of transportation be made and that the needs of the War Department as set forth above be regarded as immediate.

And again, on December 20, 1917:

It is now the middle of December, and the First Corps is still incomplete by over two entire divisions and many corps troops. It cannot be too emphatically declared that we should be prepared to take the field with at least four corps by June 30 (1918). In view of past performances with tonnage heretofore available such a project is impossible of fulfillment, but only by most strenuous attempts to attain such a result will we be in a position to take a proper part in operations in 1918. In view of the fact that as the number of our troops here increases a correspondingly greater amount of tonnage must be provided for their supply, and also in view of the slow rate of shipment with the tonnage now available, it is of the most urgent importance that more tonnage should be obtained at once, as already recommended in my cables and by Gen. Bliss.

TONNAGE REQUIREMENTS OF ARMY (P. 67, PERSHING'S REPORT).

Following a study of tonnage requirements, an officer was sent to Washington in December, 1917, with a general statement of the shipping situation in France, as understood by the allied maritime transport council. In March, 1918, tonnage requirements for transport and maintenance of 900,000 men in France by June 30 were adopted as a basis upon which to calculate supply requisitions and the allocation of tonnage.

In April, the allied maritime transport council showed that requirements for 1918 greatly exceeded the available tonnage. Further revisions of the schedule were required by the Abbeville agreement in May, under which American Infantry and machine gunners were to be transported in British shipping, and by the Versailles agreement in June.

In July a serious crisis developed as the allotment for August made the American Expeditionary Forces by the shipping control committee was only 575,000 dead weight tons, afterwards increased to 700,000 tons, whereas 803,000 tons (not including animals) were actually needed. It was strongly urged by me that more shipping be diverted from trades and that a larger percentage of new shipping be placed in transport service.

I have read that in there to show that Gen. Pershing was, of course, thoroughly conversant with the very serious situation as regards tonnage and with the very serious situation as regards the western front and the necessity of giving the Allies early support.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pittman, will you have some further questions to ask Admiral Sims?

Senator PITTMAN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. The hour of 12 has arrived. Will you have questions, Senator Trammell?

Senator TRAMMELL. Yes; later on.

The CHAIRMAN. We will adjourn at this point, then, until to-morrow morning.

(Thereupon, at 12 o'clock m, the subcommittee adjourned until to-morrow, Tuesday, Mar. 23, 1920, at 10 o'clock a. m.)

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NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

TUESDAY, MARCH 23, 1920.

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON NAVAL AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 o'clock a. m., in Room 235, Senate Office Building, Senator Frederick Hale presiding.

Present: Senators Hale (chairman), Keyes, Pittman, and Trammell.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. Senator Pittman, you had some further questions, I believe.

TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL WILLIAM S. SIMS—Resumed.

Senator PITTMAN. I have here what purports to be a letter addressed by you, Admiral, to Senator Carter Glass, under date of February 15, 1920. [Reading:]

MY DEAR SENATOR GLASS Referring to the testimony given by Representative Byrnes and yourself before the subcommittee of the Senate investigating awards, I inclose you herewith a copy of the letter I have just written to Senator Hale, with a copy of a letter to Mr. Martin Egan, concerning my alleged criticisms of the Army, and also copies of certain letters from Gen. Pershing showing my cooperation with the Army and my relations with the Army and with the general.

These will, I believe, show you how very unlikely it is that I could have held any such opinions concerning the general's handling of the Army as was indicated by the testimony above mentioned.

Very sincerely, yours.,

WM. S. SIMS,
Rear Admiral, United States Navy

Senator CARTER GLASS,
Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.

Admiral SIMS. Will you read the inclosures?

Senator PITTMAN. I have not the inclosures. You placed them in the record of the hearing, did you not?

Admiral SIMS. I would like to have them read.

Senator PITTMAN. I would like to read them myself.

Admiral SIMS. They are in the hearing, there.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you want to have them read or just have them placed in the hearing?

Admiral SIMS. I think they ought to be read in connection with this.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Senator PITTMAN. I have them, I believe. They are found at page 636 of the hearings of the subcommittee on Naval Affairs, United

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States Senate, second session, on Senate resolution 285, and they are as follows [Reading]:

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE,
Newport, R. I., February 14, 1920.

MY DEAR SENATOR HALE: When I appeared before your committee on awards on February 10, when an effort was made to convey the impression that my relations with the Army were strained, and that I was criticising the actions of the Army, I told you that my recollection was that I could produce evidence to show how very cordial the relations in question were.

I find that on November 6, 1918, I wrote a letter to Mr. Martin Egan, who was then in Paris, in which I referred to a story I had heard to the effect that I was not in complete sympathy with Gen. Pershing. I inclose you herewith a copy of this letter.

Subsequently, Mr. George Bar Baker, who is mentioned as Commander Baker in the first paragraph of the above letter, communicated to me the following extract from a letter he had received from Martin Egan:

"I never did believe the several reports from the Admiral, brought over the channel by a lot of busybodies, and neither did the general. But it was fine to have his assurances, and when I talked to the general he said he never did believe any of the tales, and that he knew all the time that the admiral was playing the game loyally with every American effort in Europe. We have the satisfaction of clearing up the matter anyhow."

As further showing the cordial relations which have always existed between Gen. Pershing and myself, and all of his forces, I inclose copies of letters received from him dated April 1, 1919, April 21, 1919, and May 4, 1919. These letters will show that nothing could possibly have been more cordial than were our personal relations and cooperation throughout the war.

Very sincerely, yours,

WILLIAM S. SIMS.

Senator FREDERICK HALE,
Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.

AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES,
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF,
France, April 1, 1919.

Personal.
Admiral WILLIAM S. SIMS,
United States Navy, 30 Grosvenor Gardens, London, S. W.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL: I received with a mixture of pleasure and regret your letter of March 21—pleasure at the kind words and cordial sentiments that you expressed, and regret that you were leaving England before I had an opportunity of seeing you and thanking you in person for the consistent and cordial cooperation that you have from the beginning given to the American Expeditionary Forces. That there had been such good cooperation and such lack of friction between the land and the sea forces is, I am well aware, due in the largest measure to your helpful attitude and big way of looking at things.

With heartiest congratulations for the splendid services that you have rendered to the Government during this war, and with kindest personal wishes for your health and continued success, I remain,

Sincerely, yours,

JOHN J. PERSHING.

AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES,
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF,
France, April 21, 1919.

Personal.
Admiral WILLIAM S. SIMS,
Care Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL SIMS: I have just received a printed copy of the proceedings at the luncheon tendered you by the American Luncheon Club on the occasion of your leaving London. I have read your remarks with a great deal of interest, and especially appreciate the very generous and kind things you said of the American Expeditionary Forces and of me personally.

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I wish to take the opportunity of again expressing to you my personal appreciation, which I know voices the feelings of the whole American Expeditionary Forces, of the backing and cordial cooperation of the American naval forces under your command throughout the war. We realize fully that, had it not been for the Navy, who kept watch and guard night and day over our transport fleet, the American effort in France could never have been successful. Had it not been for you but few troops would have been landed, and those few could not have been supplied. The Navy's assistance was whole-hearted and arduous, and was always given in a most generous spirit of cooperation.

With best personal wishes for your continued good health and success, I am,

Very sincerely, yours,

JOHN J. PERSHING.

AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES,
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF,
France, May 4, 1919.

Personal.

Admiral WILLIAM S. SIMS,
Care Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL: I have just received a clipping from the New York Times quoting your speech on the Victory loan, in which you spoke very effectively and positively, and said some things with reference to me and the job that I had.

My dear Sims, I can not tell you just how much what you say touches me, coming as it does on top of two years of most loyal cooperation and support. I have often tried to express myself about what you did, but feel that I have never conveyed my real appreciation. Now, your speech arouses in me such a flood of sentiment that I must again leave you to divine what I feel.

Trusting that you are enjoying a long-earned rest after your more than two years of arduous service, believe me,

Yours, devotedly,

JOHN J. PERSHING.

UNITED STATES NAVAL FORCES OPERATING IN EUROPEAN WATERS,
U. S. S. "MELVILLE," FLAGSHIP,
London, S. W. 1, November 6, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. EGAN: I have just had a chat with Commander Baker, and to my great surprise he tells me that you are under the impression that I am not in complete sympathy with Gen. Pershing. How such a rumor could possibly have arisen is more than I can imagine.

If you could glance over the personal correspondence that I have had with the general, and the official letters I have had concerning the Navy's relations with the Army, I am sure your mind would be completely disabused of any such idea.

In my letters I have repeatedly stated to the general that my understanding of the Navy's position is that it is nothing to the world but the line of communications behind the Army. I believe I have explained that there is really no naval war going on; that the submarines are not fighting our military vessels, but are attacking the supply transport of munitions and food. In other words, that the German Navy is really making war against the armies of the Allies, and that our business as naval men is to do our best to insure this line of supply.

Not only have I been in complete sympathy with Gen. Pershing but I have been lost in admiration over the way in which the biggest military stunt in all history has been handled. If I have not actually said it to the general, I have repeatedly said to others that I have little conception as to how such a problem could be handled without getting things tangled up; that the stunt the Navy has to perform is, in comparison, simplicity itself; and I have always expressed my sincere sympathy with the difficulties the Army has to encounter.

Of course, you know, as well as I do, that a war can not be conducted by a number of allies without there being a certain amount of criticism in each country of all the other allies. We have, of course, not escaped such criticism. You will hear at times in general society, both in London and in Paris, expressions of regret that things are not going as well as could be expected with the American Army, or the British Army, or the Italian Army, as the case may be. Unfortunately, when such opinions are occasionally refused, some people will try to bolster up their case by quoting the supposed remarks of people who are more or less in the public eye. It is possible that I may have been quoted in this way, but I can assure you that it is wholly unjustifiable.

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Of course, I do not know what rumors and gossip you may have heard, but I should consider it a favor if you would write to me very frankly as one American to another and tell me what you know, so as to give me an opportunity to state my case.

Very sincerely, yours,

WILLIAM S. SIMS.

M. EGAN, Esq., *Paris.*

Those were the letters, I assume, Admiral, that were inclosed with your letter to Senator Glass under date of February 15, which I have just read.

Admiral SIMS. Inclosed to Senator Hale. I sent copies to Senator Glass.

Senator PITTMAN. Yes.

Admiral SIMS. I received a reply from Senator Carter Glass, in which he does not agree with the sentiments that I expressed.

Senator PITTMAN. This is the letter of Senator Carter Glass in reply to your letter in which you inclosed copies of the letters I have just read. [Reading:]

FEBRUARY 17, 1920.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL SIMS: I have yours of February 15, inclosing your letter of February 14 to Senator Hale with certain letters attached, written by you on November 6, 1918, to Mr. Martin Egan, at Paris, and written to you at London on April 1 and 21, and at Washington on May 4, by Gen. Pershing. I note your suggestion that these letters should convince me of the unlikelihood of your having "held such opinions concerning Gen. Pershing's handling of the army" as was indicated by my testimony before the subcommittee of the Senate Naval Affairs Committee on February 10.

I disagree no less with your method of stating the case than with your deductions. In the first place, I gave no testimony touching your "opinions concerning Gen. Pershing's handling of the army." Inspection of the record will clearly disclose to you that I testified as a matter of fact and not as to any opinion of Gen. Pershing held or expressed by you. Pointedly, I testified that, on October 30, 1918, in your apartment at the Hotel Crillon, in Paris, in response to my statement that Gen. Pershing ten days theretofore, had signified his opposition to an armistice with Germany, you explicitly said to Congressmen Whaley and Byrnes and me that we were obliged to grant an armistice because the communications of supply of the American army had broken down. Of that fact I have no more doubt than that I am writing to you at this moment, nor has either of my former colleagues any doubt of it. I might have added that, with a gesture, you precluded further talk on the subject by saying: "Oh, well, it will all come out in due course."

The fact that nearly seven months later you and Gen. Pershing exchanged cordial personal letters can not alter the circumstances nor in any way affect my distince recollection of it. The further fact, as disclosed by your letter of November 6, 1918, that a week after our audience with you in Paris, and after your return to London, you found it necessary to write Mr. Egan to set him straight concerning your attitudt toward Gen. Pershing and the American army, so far from altering my retrospect, singularly accentuates the likelihood that, prior to the discovery of your mistake, you had said to other persons substantially what you said to Congressmen Byrnes and Whaley and me on October 30, 1918, and which caused my two colleagues to travel 150 miles to Tours in an open automobile, in desperately chilly weather, for purposes of verification.

But, these things aside, I must decline to concede that anything could be adduced that would create one particle of doubt in my mind as to the absolute accuracy of my statement to the subcommittee of the Senate Naval Affairs Committee as to what you said in Paris to my colleagues and me.

In this connection I shall take leave here to say something which I could not have said on the 10th instant without appearing to break in rudely on your testimony before the committee. In this testimony you were at pains to include me in the suggestion that, if we believed you had made at Paris the statement ascribed to you and subsequently had found out that it was not true, we had neglected our duty in not "putting up a howl" to get you dismissed from the Navy. As it seems to me, in your eagerness to make this superficial point, you failed utterly to realize the nature of the only presumption upon which it rationally could be based. In short, to sustain this contention, you must assume that I was wrong in my inference that your statement to me at the Crillon in Paris was the recital, in good faith, of something which

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you had been told as a fact and which you had repeated to my colleagues and me, believing in its truth. Apparently you think I should have regarded your statement, when it was ascertained to be untrue, as a malignant invention of your own, uttered by you with deliberate intent to defame the American Army: and your grievance against me is that, without troubling to consider how you came by the misinformation and without for an instant attributing to you an evil motive, I regarded your character as a man and your honorable record as a naval officer a sufficient defense against the suspicion of a mean action. I distinctly testified, not once but twice, that I had not gotten the impression from our conversation that you intended to be critical of the American Army or in any way to disparage its officers; but from your testimony I conclude that you resent this equable state of mind on my part, since you insist that I should have regarded you as a slanderer and "put up a howl" for your dismissal. I am puzzled to divine how you may derive any satisfaction from such an attitude.

Sincerely, yours, CARTER GLASS.

Rear Admiral WILLIAM S. SIMS,
Naval War College, Newport, R. I.

On the 9th day of November, 1919, Admiral, you wrote a letter to Admiral Lewis Bayly, of the British Royal Navy. This was two days before the armistice. I quote from that letter. [Reading:]

It has been the opinion that it would be impossible to force the enemy back through the Argonne Forest, not only on account of the great difficulty of the terrain but also because the troops operating in this area could be supplied only over one main-line road. It was hardly thought possible that this road could carry supplies sufficient for the number of troops necessary. There is no doubt that the military opinion was sound, assuming that the attacking forces were not willing to make greater sacrifices than troops are usually called upon to bear. That these sacrifices were necessary is but too apparent. Of course, I do not know much about details at present, but enough to know that they were very severe. It turned out, as was to be expected, that the road was not sufficient to supply all the needs of the troops. Horses had to be slaughtered to supply the troops, notwithstanding the scarcity of horses at this time. However, there is nothing succeeds like success, and the cutting of the important railway lines has been accomplished.

That is all that I have on this line on this topic, Mr. Chairman.

Senator TRAMMELL. Admiral, just what time in 1917 was it that you went to Europe under orders of the Navy Department?

Admiral SIMS. As I remember it, I left on the 31st of March, 1917.

Senator TRAMMELL. The conversation that took place between you and Admiral Benson, then, when he warned you against Great Britain, was prior to that date?

Admiral SIMS. Just a few days before.

Senator TRAMMELL. Just a few days before?

Admiral SIMS. Just a few days before.

Senatore TRAMMELL. In other words, it was before the declaration of war.

Admiral SIMS. Yes, before the declaration of war, which was April 6.

Senator TRAMMELL. And after the declaration of war I believe you stated that he did not state to you that he would as soon fight Great Britain as to fight Germany?

Admiral SIMS. No, on the occasion of his visit to England in October, or something like that, all he said on that occasion was to express the opinion that I should not let the British pull the wool over my eyes, or an expression similar to that. In my testimony yesterday what I intended to convey was that it was the expression that he made use of on that occasion that I did not remember. I saw in one of the papers this morning the statement that I had said I did not remember any of those expressions having been used until somebody

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reminded me of it. Of course I remembered the one that was told me in Washington. I probably never will live long enough to forget it. It was graven on my memory, I can assure you; but I did not remember what he had said to me in London until my attention was called to it by one of my staff who was present and heard it. That is what I meant yesterday. Of course he did not say then that he would as soon fight Great Britain as Germany.

Senator TRAMMELL. I just want to get those dates fixed.

Admiral SIMS. Yes.

Senator TRAMMELL. That is, I wanted to get those dates into the record. I do not think they were put in the record yesterday. Now, in your direct testimony you made this statement on the question of the losses of tonnage and so on:

It can thus be said that the failure of the Navy Department to enter the war immediately and whole-heartedly cost the allied cause as a whole two and one-half million tons of shipping sunk unnecessarily. While this is, of course, an estimate only, it is based upon actual results obtained when our help became effective, and there is no reason to doubt that it is a conservative estimate.

Here is a drawing that was transmitted with this letter of transmittal to the Navy Department from your headquarters.

Admiral SIMS. Shall I read this letter?

Senator TRAMMELL. No, you need not read it. I just exhibit the letter to you for the purpose of identification of the drawing here.

Admiral SIMS. Yes.

Senator TRAMMELL. That drawing or schedule purports to be information as to the amount of available tonnage to the Allies, and also the amount of submarines available to the Germans, as I understand the letter of transmittal and the explanatory notes. That shows the tonnage available to the Allies to June 1 or June 30, I am not sure which, 1918.

Admiral SIMS. Now perhaps it will clear up that situation—and I am just as anxious to clear it up as you are—if I may give you now the data on which the statement in my direct testimony was based. I made out a full statement of it, but decided not to include it, on account of the number of pages and that sort of thing, and I summarized it in the statement that is there. The difference is that one includes American tonnage and the other does not.

Senator TRAMMELL. This one here does not include American tonnage?

Admiral SIMS. Yes, this one does include American tonnage.

Senator TRAMMELL. This includes American tonnage?

Admiral SIMS. Yes.

Senator TRAMMELL. Does this chart show that there was more or less tonnage available during the spring of 1918 than during the spring and summer of 1917? Does it show more or less?

Admiral SIMS. Less. It shows less. It is coming downhill. Generally speaking, without looking up the actual details, the tonnage successively decreased with great rapidity in the spring of 1917, with less rapidity in the summer, and with still less rapidity in the fall, and it was only much later that the two curves crossed each other. We kept that in my headquarters, a chart going, which showed the decrease in losses and the increase in building, and we worked out a curve to show when they crossed. You can see by glancing at the curve there where they cross. It was for that reason that when we

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saw these two curves approaching, we could make an estimate perhaps two or three months ahead as to when they would cross, and I remember stating, I think it was to a party of American correspondents in London who came over there officially, that we estimated that the two curves would cross each other in a certain month, I can not remember whether it was June or July or something else, in 1918. I remember that attracted a great deal of attention in the press, as to when they would cross, and the crossing was about that time.

That crossing meant that the building on both sides, in America and in Europe, was a little bit greater than the losses by submarines at that time, and from that time on we were on the increase in tonnage. But it was well along in 1918, about the middle of March, 1918, when the building of merchant ships in America and in England combined crossed the curve and became a little greater than the sinkings at that time. The curve of the sinkings was going down and the curve of the building of ships was going up, so from that time on we knew, and the Germans knew that they could not succeed with their submarine campaign. But the great period of danger was in the late summer and fall of 1917. As Mr. Hoover testified, that danger was excessive in April, May, June, and the summer of 1917, and continued to be very grave until the winter of 1917-18. That is generally the situation of the tonnage.

Senator TRAMMELL. According to the chart that was transmitted to the Navy Department from your headquarters there was more tonnage available in 1917 than there was available up to June, 1918, was there not?

Admiral SIMS. Yes, there was more tonnage available in 1917 than there was in 1918, because it was successively decreased during that period. That was what was the matter with the whole business. It was decreasing so rapidly, and that decrease had to be stopped, or they could not have won the war.

Senator TRAMMELL. In the spring of 1918, with less tonnage than was available in 1917, was not the movement of American troops over very largely increased?

Admiral SIMS. The movement of American troops was not largely increased until the crisis came in March; March 21 the great drive on the western front. Immediately after that the big movement came. Up to that time, in the first year of the war, we had from 250,000 to 300,000 troops taken over. The average per month was about 25,000. From that time on they saw the necessity of getting the troops over, and they were enabled then to withdraw from a great many steamer lines shipping which they would not have dared to withdraw if it had not been that our own shipping and the allied shipping was on the increase and was greater than the destruction. That is the point Mr. Hoover brought out also, and it is a very important point. If we could have seen ahead a year, and could have been sure that we were going to arrive at a position where the increase in the building of tonnage surpassed the destruction, we could have taken the action in 1917 which we did take in March or April, 1918, and succeeding months, but which we would not have dared to take and which it would not have been prudent to take in 1917. I do not know whether that is very clear or not.

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Senator TRAMMELL. I think I understand your point, Admiral. Of course, if we could have seen that we were going to have an increased supply of ships and a decrease of the submarine menace, we might have carried more troops in 1917.

Admiral SIMS. We would have dared to do it, but we did not dare to do it until we were sure of that.

Senator TRAMMELL. Really, that is just about what I thought. If that is true, was not that one of the elements that caused the delay in the progress that was made in the war, instead of it being all dependent upon the question of the Navy not entering the war whole-heartedly as you charge?

Admiral SIMS. The tonnage situation, of course, is what influenced it, but the trouble is that by our tardiness in entering the war we lost two and one-half million tons of shipping which we should not have lost. If we had butted in with all of our force in the very beginning, instead of coming in whole-heartedly after six months or a year, we would have saved that tonnage and that situation would not have arisen. I do not know whether you know it or not, but up to the first year of the war we did not have much more than 100 ships of all classes on the other side, and there was not a single ship that was not available or could have been available to be over there in the first 15 days of the war. Now, there is the whole point of all of my statement and all of my criticism. I have not got anything to say about anything else particularly, except that the Navy Department and the Government did not go into the war after they had declared it.

Now, I made a little statement at the end of this long statement, about the shipping, which I did not include in the other, and I think probably the best way to clear that up, with your permission, is to read that statement. I think it will clear it. This is a review of the merchant ship tonnage situation. I did not include it in the other statement on account of its length. I warn you that this is a little tedious and had figures in it and will require close attention.

A few facts and figures about the merchant tonnage situation, in 1917, may help to an understanding of why the losses in the submarine campaign were so dangerous.

In August, 1914, the total tonnage of the world was, approximately, 45,000,000 gross tons; of this about 5,000,000 tons was interned in the ports of the Central Powers, leaving about 40,000,000 tons, as Mr. Hoover stated before the committee. This 40,000,000 tons, however, included large numbers of ships used by the neutrals, Japan and the United States, for their own purposes. The best available figures of the allied shipping authorities show that in August, 1914, 31,500,000 tons of shipping was all that was available for the allied powers. This does not include the American shipping, which was comparatively small.

The total imports of Europe (other than Russia and the Central Powers) were about 170,000,000 tons annually. It required the employment of about 25,000,000 tons of merchant shipping to transport these imports overseas to their European destination.

In the first 28 months of the war, or to January 1, 1917, the total net loss of this tonnage amounted to 400,000 tons. The allies still had, therefore, 31,000,000 at their disposition, American seagoing tonnage of 2,500,000 not being included.

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About 8,500,000 tons of this shipping was being used by the allies for exclusively military or naval purposes, other than trans-Atlantic transport of munitions and supplies. Another million tons wa almost constantly under repair. The net amount available for imports of food, munitions, raw materials, etc., was, therefore, only 21,500,000 gross tons. War restrictions had reduced imports enough so that this quantity was sufficient, and a margin of safety was in existence as large as that at the outbreak of war. This fact was known in shipping circles, and was constantly emphasized by the allied governments to discount, in the minds of their people, the losses suffered through the submarine campaign.

The situation changed sharply for the worse, however, with the beginning of 1917. In the first quarter the net losses rose to 1,300,000 tons. In the month of April alone the net loss mounted to 800,000 tons, or twice as much as in the whole period of the war, up to January 1, 1917. In four months the margin between the amount of tonnage available and the absolute minimum required had been cut in half, and had sunk from about 6,000,000 tons to about 3,500,000 tons, allowance being made for the increased amount under repairs, as a result of damage received in unsuccessful attacks by submarines.

With a rate of loss amounting to about 800,000 tons net per month, or nearly 10,000,000 tons per year, this margin would have been completely wiped out within five months, or by October 1, 1917. Imports to Europe had already been reduced to 100,000,000 tons annually, or a reduction of 40 per cent. That is by the decrease of consumption, luxuries, and that sort of thing. They could hardly be reduced much further without starving the armies or the civil populations of the allied countries. By starving the neutrals and requisitioning their shipping, enough tonnage might have been obtained to keep things going until the end of the year. It is, however, practically a certainty that, if the rate of losses experienced in April had been continued, the Allies would have been compelled to sue for peace by the end of 1917. They would have lost the war. Any help the United States might have been ready to render later would have been absolutely unavailing.

Fortunately, the adoption of the convoy system, and also of the antisubmarine measures recommended to the department from April, 1917, on, resulted in a reduction of the losses to half the April rate for the last half of 1917, and to one-third the April, 1917, rate for the ten months of 1918.

Even so, the losses still were very heavy, and caused great privation to the allied countries. It has not been sufficiently realized what herioc efforts were made in order to overcome the shipping shortage. Imports of the allied countries were cut in half, and the populations put on comparatively meager rations.

This measure alone would have failed to meet the issue. The imports required would still have been greater than the tonnage available permitted, if this tonnage had been kept on its normal routes. Through the war efforts of America, however, the United States became almost the sole supply source of the Allies. Shipping was diverted from the longer South American, Pacific, and Oriental trade routes, and concentrated on the trans-Atlantic route. The additional number of trips each ship could make per year was thus

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just so much tonnage added to the allied mercantile shipping resources. Mr. Hoover's appeal to the American people to save food for the Allies was promptly responded to, and America was able to provide enough food to meet the Allies' needs, and the longer shipping hauls were thus eliminated.

Australian wheat, South American wheat, and so forth, banked up three and four million tons. It takes shipping a very long time to bring it. The food could be supplied from America by the shorter haul.

Despite all these efforts, the crisis was very grave in the early months of 1918. Hence the importance of the time element which was so repeatedly insisted upon to the Navy Department. The average monthly losses for the six months of the unrestricted submarine warfare, before American naval aid became effective (February to July, inclusive), were 640,000 tons per month. The average losses for the first six months of partial American intervention and of the use of convoys (August 1, 1917–February 1, 1918), were 390,000 tons per month. The average losses for the remaining period of the war, when American help was really effective (February 1, 1918–November 11, 1918), were 250,000 tons per month.

It is therefore possible to estimate what American help would have accomplished had it been rendered promptly instead of being delayed for some months. There is the point of all the criticism I have made—practically the basis of it. If the process of our getting into the fight, once we were at war, had been accelerated, as could have been done, by sending over immediately, in April, 1917, all available antisubmarine craft, and by accelerating and adopting the convoy system, there is no reason to doubt that, during May, June, and July, the losses would probably have averaged 250,000 tons per month less than they did, that is, the difference between the averages for the first two periods just referred to. For the six months following the losses would probably have been 140,000 tons per month less than they actually were. For the remaining nine months of the war losses would probably have been reduced another 100,000 tons per month. While this is only an estimate, it is based on actual results obtained when our help became effective. The delay of the Navy Department in getting into the war in the critical zone, backing up the Allies whole-heartedly, and accelerating the production of antisubmarine craft, probably resulted in the unnecessary loss to the allied cause, as a whole, of 2,500,000 tons of merchant shipping. The loss of this shipping in 1917 and the early months of 1918 delayed proportionately the transport of the American army to France. If a million additional tons of shipping had been available at the end of 1917, the rate of transport of American troops and supplies could have been doubled; the Allies could have been in a position to counter attack three months earlier, and the war might well have been ended by the time when, as a matter of fact, the allied success only began, i. e., in July, 1918. If this had been possible, four months of bloody fighting would have been avoided and probably half a million lives saved, to say nothing of some billions of dollars.

The shipping shortage was therefore acute from the middle of 1917 on to the time of the armistice. All plans for American assistance to the Allies was conditioned upon and limited by the tonnage consideration, as Mr. Hoover has testified. From the standpoint of the

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Allies, there was a choice between receiving supplies to maintain their own armies, or American troops, which would require more supplies, for the importation of which tonnage was not available. As a result of this situation, America was not pressed to send troops, badly as they were needed, but the Allies decided to keep their own armies supplied with the available tonnage. Only the German offensive of 1918 forced the Allies to appeal for American reinforcements on a big scale. In order to transport these to Europe the British had to abandon practically the whole of their shipping routes except that with America, and to turn over practically the whole of their liner tonnage for the transport of American troops. New pressure was brought to bear on the neutrals, and they were practically forced to turn over to the Allies an additional half million tons of shipping. Only then was the transport and supply of the American army in 1918 made possible.

In view of these facts, it is not a difficult matter to estimate with accuracy the loss suffered by the allied cause as a whole, by the failure of the Navy Department to cooperate whole-heartedly, and to send to the war zone all available antisubmarine craft in the first months of the war. As has been already noted, there were three stages to the unrestricted submarine campaign, distinguished by the measure of American cooperation.

The first was the period, February, 1917, to August 1, 1917, when American aid was ineffective, and when the bulk of the shipping was not convoyed. Losses were on the average 640,000 tons per month.

The second was the phase of moderate assistance from America, and a partial employment of the convoy system, the period from August 1, 1917 to February 1, 1918. Losses were 390,000 tons per month on the average.

The third period was from February 1, 1918, to the armistice, with losses averaging 250,000 tons per month; this was the period when full cooperation was given by America, and when full use was made of the convoy system.

If the process of our getting into the fight, once we had gone to war had been accelerated, as it could have been by the immediate sending to Europe of all available antisubmarine craft, and by the immediate adoption of the convoy system, as was urged upon the department, the first period referred to above would have been ended in April. Losses during May, June, and July would have been those of the second period, or 250,000 tons a month less than was actually lost. Similarly, the second period would probably have ended by August 1, and losses for the next six months would have averaged 140,000 tons a month less than the actual figures. The submarine campaign would have been so far defeated by February 1, 1918, that the losses during the remaining period of the war would probably have been reduced by another 100,000 from those actually suffered. It can thus be said that the failure of the Navy Department to enter the war immediately and whole-heartedly cost the allied cause as a whole 2,500,000 tons of shipping, sunk unnecessarily. While this is, of course, only an estimate, it is based on actual experience, and on what actually happened in the various phases of American naval cooperation in the war.

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The result of the loss of this shipping can also be translated into a prolongation of the war, and an unnecessary sacrifice of blood and treasure in accomplishing the victory.

If, in the fall of 1917, the Allies had had at their disposition the additional million tons of shipping, which, as has been pointed out above, was unnecessarily lost to the allied cause, by the delay on the part of the Navy Department in getting into the war, and in adopting the convoy system, it would have been possible to double or triple the number of American troops that were being sent abroad before April, 1918, without affecting the transport to the Allies of essential military supplies or foodstuffs. America could have had a million men in France by March 1, 1918, instead of 250,000.

The earlier defeat of the submarine campaign would have reacted on the morale of the German army and the German population in 1917, as it actually did in 1918.

Now, there is the point I would like to make with all possible emphasis. If we could have put a million men in France in 1917, as we actually did in 1918, we would have broken down the morale of the German population and the German army that much sooner. All the information that we have at the present time shows us that their army went to pieces because of the decrease of its morale and because of the decrease of the morale of the population behind it.

The German high command would have been forced into its desperate military venture earlier than was actually the case, or would have been forced to endure, in the early spring, the victorious assault of the Allies. In either case, the presence of a million Americans on March 1, 1918, and of another million within the three months following, would have forced the victory by July, if one may judge by what actually happened when this American force did become available. We know what did happen.

The unnecessary loss of shipping can therefore be stated as having caused a prolongation of the war a minimum of about four months, and thereby was responsible for the unnecessary killing of a half million men, and of the expenditure of many billions of dollars.

Now I would like to put that in the form of a perfectly simple illustration which can be understood by anybody. It all hinges upon this question, Was our naval effort in the war effective? We all know that it was. Those who oppose this argument have got to assume that it was not. If it was effective, it must have shortened the war. It therefore follows that if there was delay in making it effective, this delay prolonged the war. If three engines will put out a fire in a certain time, four engines will put it out in less time. If there is delay in sending the fourth engine, there will be a corresponding loss. I have shown by the official records that there was delay; delay in preparing for war, even after February 2, 1917, and delay in sending forces and personnel after we declared war. Therefore those responsible for this delay are responsible for the appalling sacrifices of life and treasure that resulted. That, I think, makes the situation entirely clear.

Senator TRAMMELL. According to a chart that you introduced in evidence here, if I understand it correctly, about the 1st of July, 1917, there was a very rapid decline in the submarine menace, beginning from the 1st of July. This is a chart that you introduced in testimony.

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Admiral SIMS. Yes.

Senator TRAMMELL. What do you attribute that very rapid decrease in the accomplishments of the submarine to, beginning with the 1st of July, 1917?

Admiral SIMS. It was largely due to the introduction of the convoy system. By that time a good proportion of the American shipping was in convoys; and it was due also to the augmentation of other means of defense. They were using then the depth charge to a much greater extent than they had before. They were also using other means; mines, etc.

On the 11th of September I wrote a letter to the Navy Department of which I will quote a paragraph here. [Reading:]

With reference to the antisubmarine campaign, generally speaking, the losses since April have not increased but, on the contrary, appear to be on the decrease. This, coupled with the fact that the number of submarines operating has, if anything, increased, is difficult to explain. There is considerable difference of opinion as to the causes for the above. The most reasonable opinion as to decrease in submarine losses and upon which there is the greatest degree of unanimity is as follows:

(*a*) The gradual extension of the convoys system together with increased experience of both the merchant shipping and escorting craft.

(*b*) Increase of antisubmarine craft and constant increase of experience thereof, coupled with the more extensive use of the depth charge.

(*c*) Effect on enemy submarine morale from the above, and particularly, from the more extensive use of depth charges. It is wholly impossible to estimate the number of actual submarine losses caused by depth charges, but the fact that depth charges are used liberally whenever a submarine is encountered, unquestionably has a marked effect upon morale.

(*d*) Difficulty the enemy must be experiencing in maintaining an adequate supply or efficient torpedoes.

Senator TRAMMELL. Was our navy rendering any effective assistance beginning with the 1st of July, 1917, when there seemed to have been a turn in the tide of submarine destruction?

Admiral SIMS. We may say that if we had sent over only one destroyer it would have been rendering effective assistance in proportion to the number of destroyers employed as a whole by the Allies. On July 1, 1917, we had 20 destroyers and 2 tenders actually engaged on the front. They were extermely useful, as useful as 22 other vessels of like character of the Allies. Our destroyers did as good service as anybody else's. They helped out. The convoy system, putting it in operation, was the turning point of the whole business. I do not know that it would be well to go into any discussing of that thing now, because it is rather a technical question. When you come to consider the fact that in the situation which confronted us in 1917 and 1918, the whole of the war hinges upon the preservation of sufficient tonnage to carry on the war, or rather to bring the war to a termination as soon as possible, there is a time before which it would not have been advantageous to put in operation a convoy system. Without going into any explanation of that, I can just give you an idea of what I mean. Many men who were interested in very large shipping companies, having perhaps 150 or 200 ships, were opposed to the introduction of the convoy system, and it was for this reason. One of those men said to me: "I find out by experience that one of my ships can make about 12 or 13 voyages, on an average, without getting torpedoed. If I put him into convoy, where he has to wait for convoys to be formed and where he has to conform to the speed of the slowest

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ship, I can get only, say, 8 round turns instead of 12 or 13, in the same time. Freight rates are so high that I can afford to lose my ship after 12 or 13 trips, rather than to cut down the number of trips by that much."

Applying the same principle to all the tonnage of the Allies, it follows that if you want to bring a war to a successful conclusion you can do the same thing with your tonnage; that is to say, use it to bring supplies in the fastest possible time, if you think it safe to do so. There comes a period, however, when it is no longer safe to do so; and the adoption of the convoy system was the turning point of the whole thing, as has been fully explained in my testimony and in the articles that I have written.

Senator TRAMMELL. When did our associates in the war adopt the convoy system?

Admiral SIMS. They adopted the convoy system on the 21st of May. They carried out experiments during the early part of May.

I recommended the convoy system about the 1st of May, 1917. It was then in discussion and had been for a long time. They carried out an experimental convoy which, if my recollection serves me right, arrived in Great Britain about the 20th of May, and I think that the 21st of May I reported to the Navy Department that it had been adopted in principle and would be put in operation as soon as possible.

Senator TRAMMELL. These losses, then, which occurred from the submarine during April and probably part of May, if they had not put it into full operation, if they are to be charged to anybody, might be charged to our associates probably more than to America, could they not, if there was a mistake and there was a neglect in adopting the system?

Admiral SIMS. It depends on when the convoy system ought to have been put in operation. That is something on which I would not care to express an opinion. When the whole thing came up over there it was a question of animated discussion among the allied navies as to when the convoy system should be put in operation. There were those who were in favor of it and those who were not. As I have already explained, one of the principal opponents to the thing were the merchant shippers themselves and the merchant shipping companies; but it was finally decided that they should put it in operation early in May, and they had an experimental convoy that came up from Gibraltar, and on the 21st of May, as I remember—no; the 31st of May. Here is a cable that I sent to the Navy Department on the 31st of May. [Reading:]

With reference my two previous dispatches concerning convoy system of handling merchant shipping, Scandinavian and North Sea convoys in force now over a month have proved very successful. First ocean convoy from Gibraltar arrived safely on May 20. Second ocean convoy from Hampton Roads of 12 merchant ships escorted by British cruiser sailed May 24. They will be met outside and escorted through submarine danger zone. The department's cooperation with the plan set forth in my dispatch of May 1 is urgently recommended. Early reply important in order that Admiralty plans may be governed accordingly.

So that on the 1st of May I recommended that the Navy Department cooperate with the Allies on a convoy system, but I was wholly unable to get them to do so, and I was constantly urging them for some months before they would come into the convoy system. That was due to a false estimate which they made which was based upon

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a false premise, that concerned the Army, the merchant ships, and efficiency of ships, etc. I can explain that further if it is necessary.

Senator TRAMMELL. Now, it is apparent that our associates in the war delayed putting the convoy system into effect. Might we not charge that had they put the convoy system into effect six months sooner, the war would have been ended six months sooner?

Admiral SIMS. You can perfectly well do that, provided that they had the material to do it. But all the testimony I have given shows, and supported by the testimony of the British Admiralty, Admiral Jellicoe in particular, in the communications on this subject, that they did not have the ships that were necessary to do it. They were progressively increasing their submarine craft, they were building sloops. Their destroyer program provided for six to eight destroyers a month, and as they got enough destroyers to do so, they put the convoy system into operation. They could not put it into operation completely without the destroyers of America. They asked us for 14 cruisers for escort. America did not accord them those cruisers until after a long delay, and it then finally gave them. Up to that time their cruisers had been used on what is called the ten s e (?), up to Iceland and off the ice banks, to head off the raiders that had been coming out, the *Moewe* and vessels of that type. They had to withdraw those and put them on convoy.

Senator TRAMMELL. When they first adopted the convoy system were they still maintaining a great many ships on those long trade routes, or was that convoy system adopted after they had diverted their shipping to the Canadian and American coast more, so as to get a shorter haul?

Admiral SIMS. I do not quite understand the first part of your question.

Senator TRAMMELL. When they first adopted the convoy system were they still sending ships to Australia, and having ships go on routes that required weeks for a voyage, instead of sending them across for cargoes where they could get them quicker, as they could from America and Canada?

Admiral SIMS. You would have to go into the history of the shipping to see just when that was done. I would not be sure about that. But there is one point you have not mentioned, and which bears on this question particularly. You must remember that the unresricted submarine campaign only began in February. If you will read Grand Admiral von Tirpitz's book, which for anyone interested in naval affairs is one of the most interesting publications I have ever read, you will find in there that the submarine campaign before February was a restricted one, and he constantly inveighed against the restrictions. They were not allowed to attack certain ships, and the submarine commanders constantly reported that that restricted them, particularly, because they could not always be sure whether a ship was a merchant or passenger ship, and they did not dare fire for fear of losing their commission, and all that sort of thing. The whole thing changed when the Germans determined that they must put in an unrestricted campaign; that is, any ship at all big enough to waste a torpedo on, they would fire at it. That brought about a new situation entirely. That new situation began from that point; because, as I have pointed out, up to the time of the introduction of the unrestricted submarine campaign the total losses of the Allies on the

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whole were only 400,000 tons, or half as much as they lost in April, 1917. So that what we are talking about is the force subsequent, you see, to February, 1917.

Senator TRAMMELL. If anybody is to be blamed for the loss in April, 1917, it is not the United States, is it?

Admiral SIMS. How is that?

Senator TRAMMELL. If anyone is to be blamed for the loss in April, 1917, which was the high water mark in losses, the United States is not to be blamed for that, is it?

Admiral SIMS. The United States is not to be blamed for that, no; but the United States is to be blamed for the losses in the latter part of the month of April, and for the losses in the month of May, in proportion to the assistance they could have given.

Now, as to whether the convoy system was put in operation as soon as it ought to have been or not, that, I say, is a matter of professional opinion. You will find that thing explained in the United States Service Institute by an officer there, who discusses this whole question. It is a question of naval controversy there at that time as to whether it ought to have been put in earlier, as to the errors made by the Allies in reference to the convoys, if they were errors, and in reference to the conduct of the war in general—heavens knows, there are plenty of them, as you will find out by reading the criticisms since in books published. The severity of the criticisms there makes the criticisms that I have made here look like 30 cents. Of course they made mistakes all during the war. It was a new proposition. Nobody had any experience of this kind of warfare at all, and nobody could be savage enough in his disposition to know what the Germans would do, and therefore to prepare for it; so that I would advise you to be a little bit gentle in criticisms of the naval officers in general, because they were not prepared for this war, because we are a more or less civilized people, and we could not possibly have imagined that the Germans would do what they did do. If we could have imagined it we would have prepared for it and built destroyers galore, if we could have persuaded Congress to give us the money.

Senator TRAMMELL. I am not criticising, Admiral, at all, myself. I realize that hindsight is always a good deal better than foresight, and that is so even more than in matters of everyday affairs, in which I know it is true that hindsight is better than foresight, so that I do not criticise. I said "if anybody was to be blamed."

Admiral SIMS. Now, as to whether the Allies were to be blamed for it is not quite the question. We went over there and had the benefit, as fast as we could acquire the information, of knowing what errors or alleged errors they had made, and with that information, which the Allies did not have when they started the war, we should not have made the same errors that they did; but unfortunately we did. If Great Britain was tardy in going into the submarine campaign—and it makes no difference to our case whether she was or not—we were doubly to blame, if we believe that for being tardy ourselves and holding back for some months. That is the point about the whole business, and I tried to make the whole thing clear.

Senator TRAMMELL. The point I have in my mind is to fix the responsibility for this loss of 500,000 lives and the loss of 2,500,000 tons of shipping unnecessarily, and also the expenditure of $15,000,000,000 unnecessarily. I want to find out if the blame for all of that

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is to be placed upon the United States, or probably some of these other people were at least to a minor degree responsible for it, if that is true.

Admiral SIMS. They may have been responsible for certain errors, but the point about it is this——

Senator TRAMMELL. I want to find out what the facts are, and I want to find out whether the United States has been guilty of practically homicide in 500,000 cases and the waste of this great treasure, and so on, or if the other nations should stand under that indictment; whether they are partially responsible for it.

Admiral SIMS. Let me point out this fact. Anybody who takes the ground that the delay of the United States in going into the war was not responsible for certain losses must assume that the naval intervention of the United States was not effective. And I do not assume that. I assume that the United States intervention was effective, and fully effective in proportion to the number of the forces we sent over. In order to make good the argument that our tardiness in going in did not result in loss of life and property, you must necessarily assume that the United States naval intervention was not effective. Now, I assume that it was effective, and that it did help decrease these losses, and that it thereby lessened the duration of the war. If it was not effective, or if there was delay in going in, it must have proglonged the war. Now, I take the attitude that the United States intervention was effective, and I think you must be forced to take the attitude that the United States intervention was not effective, and therefore it did not make any difference whether we got into operation or not.

Senator TRAMMELL. I did not say so.

Admiral SIMS. No, but I think that conclusion is forced.

Senator TRAMMELL. I did not take your position, at all. I do take the position, though, that if your statement is correct that the lives of 500,000 people were lost unnecessarily and all these other losses occurred, the United States has not got that indictment hanging over her head and that the facts do not sustain it.

Admiral SIMS. I believe that the facts do sustain it.

Senator TRAMMELL. You might as well say that the other people because they did not do this, that and the other 6 or 12 months previous—some stunt by which they might have won the war—have got to have that charged up to them.

Admiral SIMS. Every one of them has got to have something charged up to them; but that does not alter the fact that we have this charged up to us. If our intervention in the war did decrease the length of the war, and if it was useful it did decrease the length of the war and if it was not useful it did not, now I claim that it was exceedingly effective, and in order to sustain your argument you have got to take the position that it was not effective.

Senator TRAMMELL. No, I claim that it was effective. I see by your own chart that beginning in July the submarine campaign was very much diminished in its effectiveness, and the line began to go down a very little.

Admiral SIMS. It did drop, and if we had put in that same effort at the beginning it would have begun to go down that much sooner.

Senator TRAMMELL. Oh, yes; if we had declared war a year before we did, of course the war would have been over that much sooner.

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Admiral SIMS. Not a year before.

Senator TRAMMELL. Or six months. That involves the policy of the country going into the war.

Admiral SIMS. The country had already gone into the war on the 6th of April. If those vessels had sailed that night, and there is no God's reason why they should not have been ready to sail, and gotten into the thing by the end of April, the decrease in the losses you speak of in July would have begun then, and we would have saved 2,500,000 and we would have been able to put an army into France by May 1, 1918, of a million men.

Senator TRAMMELL. Admiral, if our associates had put into operation the convoy system sooner, would it not have had the same effect?

Admiral SIMS. Yes; but we were the ones that delayed the convoy system. You see, we delayed it because we did not adopt it when we started in May, and it takes a long time to get ready and to put it into operation, and we waited and waited and waited, after we had recommended it; we waited seven weeks, and my recommendation to send over 14 cruisers was not put into operation, and in the meantime they kept these vessels over on this side, at a distance of 3,000 miles from where the fighting was taking place. That is where the point comes in. That is what my criticism is about; and we are responsible for those heavy losses of life and property, and we cannot get away from it.

Senator TRAMMELL. What was the percentage of destroyers that we provided?

Admiral SIMS. For the convoy?

Senator TRAMMELL. What was the percentage of our assistance in the way of protecting the situation?

Admiral SIMS. It was very great. I will give you the figures, in a minute. There were, on the other side, a good many destroyers, but many of them were held with the Grand Fleet. They had to be in Harwich; they had to be held for a fight in case the German fleet should come out, and they were in various other necessary places. The existence of the German fleet and the possibility of its coming compelled them to keep those destroyers in those places. They were obliged to keep with them 100 destroyers to take place in a battle if the German fleet came out. They could not use them for this work.

We escorted 62 per cent, or about 1,250,000 troops of the United States expeditionary forces to Europe, without loss from enemy action. The United States destroyers escorted 27 per cent of all United States, allied, and neutral shipping carrying cargoes to England and France and Italy, during the period from April 6, 1917, to November 9, 1918, or during the duration of the war. The reason that we had such a small proportion of destroyers to the whole is because we never had more than about 70, and the Allies had about 500. The reason we were able to do so much in proportion was because so many of these allied destroyers had to be used elsewhere. As I said before, 100 of those destroyers had to be in the Grand Fleet to protect the fleet. They were down particularly in Harwich, and on the Scandinavian coast, and so forth; so that on our advices from the other side we concentrated our destroyers as far west as possible so that they would be handy to their own bases. We put them at

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Queenstown first, because the facilities for repairs and refuelling with oil were better there. Brest was better strategically, and as fast as we could increase the storage facilities there for oil we took them there, until finally we had 28,000 tons of oil there, and we sent them there and our destroyers were almost exclusively used for that purpose. We did not get many submarines, because our business was not to hunt submarines but to protect the convoys and troops. If we could only have begun that thing in April, and we could have begun it if we had had our hand on our number and prepared those destroyers. Why, even after war was declared they had to go into the navy yards and stay there for days and days to get painted and fixed and scraped up. That is the point about the whole business—the delay in getting into the war in those first few months.

I think there may be some little confusion on account of what I used to say sometimes to the newspaper men who came over to the other side, that I was exceedingly embarrassed over there with some of the headlines. One can afford to be patient to a certain extent with headlines in his own country, because if a man is publishing a paper and wants to sell it, he has got to tell about his own people; but it was carried to such an extent that when these things were repeated on the other side it placed me in an embarrassing position, because, of course, the French, Italians, and others are very sensitive, and they knew that I knew all about it, and they knew that I knew that they knew, and so forth; and the consequence is that in order to implore these newspaper men to let up on the thing and state the actual facts in the case, I showed them that at a certain period, for instance at the end of the war, we had about 120 craft of all kinds there, and the Allies had about 5,000. I told them so; 4,000, 3,000; any old thing, we had only 2 or 3 per cent, and we never got over 5 or 6 per cent. But that does not alter the fact of our having been able to release from the west coast of France allied destroyers to go on their own coast, and convoying troops and convoying 27 per cent of all the allied and neatral shipping that came in there in convoys, we were able to do a very great service; and my whole contention is that we ought to have begun to do that thing in April, and we did not begin to do it whole-heartedly for six or seven or eight months, and the official records show it, by their own telegrams and my telegrams. There is no getting away from it.

Senator TRAMMELL. I suppose that when you speak about the newspaper reports, and so on, you probably make some reference—that is, you have in mind—your statement on page 61 of the hearings on naval awards, that at one time you told a contingent of reporters that the American force constituted only 3 per cent of the entire submarine forces of the Allies, and our maximum force around the British Isles was what you call a "small number." You say it runs about 5, 6, or 7 per cent.

Admiral SIMS. Well, I stated, the effective force. Of course, if you counted all the subchasers, which we used because we had them—they were one of the mistakes of the war—but at the end of the war, counting all the subchasers and supply ships and everything we had over there, there were about 370, to compare with three or four or five thousand vessels of the Allies, as you please.

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Senator TRAMMELL. Did you state in a speech in London on October 10, 1918, as follows:

Another idea was sometimes in the American mind, that the American Navy had been doing the bulk of the business over here—at least a half. That was not correct. There were about 5,000 antisubmarine craft operating day and night, and the American craft numbered 160, or 3 per cent. The figures were about the same in the Mediterranean. Again, Americans seemed to regard it as a miracle of their Navy that they had got a million and a half troops here in a few months and had protected them on the way. "We didn't do that," said Admiral Sims. "Great Britain did. She brought over two-thirds of them and escorted one-half. We escort only one-third of the merchant vessels that come here."

Do you remember that?

Admiral SIMS. Yes. All those statements are substantially correct, if you take the effective craft. I eliminated from that the little subchasers that were sent there, and all sorts of small craft, and ships like that, in ports, and so forth. That was the effective forces. I gave a memorandum to the House Committee, rather a brief summary of the United States naval forces in European waters, outlining the organization at headquarters. They were asking me questions about it, and I thought it was best to get up the whole business. I have got it all down here, and you can include that in this hearing if you want to. In this connection, the following approximate percentages are of interest as giving a comparison between the naval forces of the Allied Powers.

Those were the figures, and the statement that I made in London was approximately like that, eliminating all the small craft. To give you an example of what I objected to, somebody sent me a clipping consisting of a whole page from a Boston paper, and the impression conveyed was, without an actual statement there, that we were pretty nearly doing the whole business. There was a photograph taken of the destroyer flotilla when the governors of a number of states came out there, some time before the war. We had 20 or 25 destroyers there. The artist very carefully, on the end of this photograph, jotted them down clean over the horizon. There must have been hundreds of them. This was supposed to be an actual picture of the destroyers operating in European waters. Of course they had my picture up in the corner, and all that sort of thing and all the rest of it. Those things were damaging and that was the reason I made those speeches.

The point about it is this, that after these headlines had been going on for a good while, the plain, ordinary, every day facts in the case were distasteful to a good many people, including some naval officers. They would rather have let the impression remain as it was in the headlines; but it was not possible for me and my people on the other side to get along with the war in harmony with the Allies without stating the facts. It was a situation I was confronted with that had to be attended to, that was all.

Senator TRAMMELL. Do you recall the date of the draft?

Admiral SIMS. The date of the draft?

Senator TRAMMELL. The first draft.

Admiral SIMS. I do not recall the date of it, but I recall the sensation it made on the other side. It changed the whole attitude towards us on the other side. It gave them over there their first realization, I believe, of what they had to expect from us. I think the opinion was almost universal among those peoples over there

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that we were a heteregeneous mass and mixture of populations, over here, and that there was hardly any occasion could arise that would bring our people together even in spirit, and I think that was the surprise of their lives, when those ten million men registered, on the first day when we passed the conscription act. I do not remember the date. It was pretty early in the war.

Senator TRAMMELL. I think the conscription act was passed some some time in May, 1917.

Admiral SIMS. It was pretty early.

Senator TRAMMELL. Do you know whether or not the soldiers had been trained and were ready for being transported at earlier dates than they were actually transported?

Admiral SIMS. I do not know very much about that.

Senator TRAMMELL. I mean, any great number of them?

Admiral SIMS. I do not know anything about the actual figures of the thing, but I do know this, that one of the most energetic and interesting statements that I ever heard was made to our representatives by Gen. Foch who was then the chief of staff of the French Army, and the burden of the whole thing was "Send over troops! Send over troops! Send over troops! Send us the men in France. Do not wait for them to be trained; get them here. Here is the place they can be trained, where we can teach them what we have learned." I do not know how many troops we had to send, and I do not know what the period of the training was, but I do know that the insistence of the people on the other side was to get the troops over and to train them there where they could learn this new kind of warfare.

Senator TRAMMELL. You are telling us the policy of the people on the other side. I think that our people on this side felt that our men ought not to be sent over there untrained, but that they ought to have some training at home. Of course this is a matter of policy, and I agree with the American policy, instead of the policy that they wanted us to adopt.

Admiral SIMS. I have not anything to do with that, except to tell you what the Allies wanted. It does not seem to me that it has much to do with it.

Senator TRAMMELL. I think it has a good deal to do with it, because you have charged that if we had had a million soldiers there by the first of March, 1918, instead of 300,000 only, it would have made all the difference. Now I would like to know the facts, as to whether or not we had trained and training, ready to get into the fighting, a million soldiers on the first of March, 1918?

Admiral SIMS. That is a year after we entered the war.

Senator TRAMMELL. We had to take our boys and train them from the ground up.

Admiral SIMS. That is a year after we had entered the war.

Senator TRAMMELL. A great many of them had never done a day's hard work in their lives. They were not even seasoned physically. That was March.

Admiral SIMS. About a year after we had entered the war.

Senator TRAMMELL. About a year; but it was not a year after we had passed the conscription act. It was not a year after we had made the first draft; and of course, on this side we had to construct camps and everything from the ground up, absolutely. We could

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not assemble our boys as they did, because we had no camps constructed, nor any place to put them. In the first place, we could have started our training a month or two sooner had we had the cantonments and the munitions and equipments and everything else. Now, the question with me is whether we were recreant in our duty in not having more men over there on the first of March, 1918, in not having 1,000,000 men there instead of 300,000 men. I think that is the important question in the controversy.

Admiral SIMS. Can we afford to take the position that in a year's time, if the tonnage had been available, plenty of it, we could not have recruited and hardened and partially trained 1,000,000 men, in view of the fact that all over Europe recruits were taken out of the dry goods stores, out of the mines, out of all sorts of places, and put in the actual fighting line inside of two or three months, and did effective work? They had to do it. The last draft that came out of Great Britain was 400,000 men. Those were recruits; I used to know some of them; they were raw men. They were put through a period of intensive training and put right on the front.

Senator TRAMMELL. They might have done that in the extremity of the case; but they did not do it in the early part of the war. I have frequently talked with a colonel of the British Army who happened to be stopping at the same hotel here, and in the early stages of the war, as far as the time concerning which you are expressing your opinion, so far as he was concerned he told me he thought our men ought to have 12 months' training; that it was almost suicidal to take men and put them right into the lines in four or five months after they had assembled in camps, men who never had seen a machine gun before or a rifle or a gun before.

Admiral SIMS. Here is what Gen. Pershing said:

> Recommendations were cabled to Washington emphasizing the importance of target practice and musketry training, and recommending that instruction in open warfare be made the mission of troops in the United States, while the training in trench warfare so far as necessary be conducted in France.

Of course, Senator Trammell, you are asking nothing but an ordinary, everyday sailor about the Army. If you would get some of these Army people up here they could tell you about that more accurately than I could.

Senator TRAMMELL. I just wanted to know whether you had taken that into consideration in your accusation against the Navy Department.

Admiral SIMS. Thoroughly so.

Senator TRAMMELL. It seems to me, in view of the fact that the Army had to be transported, and that the men who went to the front and went into the trenches and did the fighting and had something to do with the victory, the question is as to our ability to have gotten them to the front even if we had had the ships had something to do with it.

Admiral SIMS. I think it would be best to ask the Army people, who have had the experience over there, what they think about it. Of course, I did not make these accusations without having a considerable knowledge of the matter by talking with Army officers, etc., and it is my opinion that those troops should have been sent over and gotten to business as soon as possible. The effect on the morale of the Germans would have been immense. I think if no

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American troops had fired a shot at all, but 2,000,000 of them had landed in France, or 1,000,000 at an earlier period, the effect on the soldiers of the German armies, as described to us in various ways, was very marked, because they had been publishing all the time, "They will never be able to get their troops over. We will destroy them with the submarine." The clamor became so insistent that Admiral von Cappelle, who was then at the head of the German Navy, after von Tirpitz was put out, made an explanation as to why it was he could not stop those troops. It is a technical explanation, about the danger of attacking, and how he would have to abandon the process of sinking merchant ships if he had gone out into the alleys through which transport troops were coming, etc.

In Gen. Pershing's report [reading]:

On December 2, 1917, an estimate of the situation was cabled to the War Department, with the following recommendation:

"Paragraph 3. In view of these conditions, it is of the utmost importance to the allied cause that we move swiftly. The minimum number of troops we should plan to have in France by the end of June is four Army corps of 24 divisions in addition to troops for service of the rear. Have impressed the present urgency upon Gen. Bliss and other American members of the conference. Gens. Robertson, Foch, and Bliss agree with me that this is the minimum that should be aimed at. This figure is given as the lowest we should think of and is placed no higher because the limit of available transportation would not seem to warrant it."

Senator TRAMMELL. By that time do you know about what number of troops we had there?

Admiral SIMS. December, 1917? Yes; we did not have, up to March——

Senator TRAMMELL. I mean at the time he estimated we should have a certain number.

Admiral SIMS. Yes, sir; it is given in this report. Even up to the beginning of the great drive we only had 300,000 troops altogether in France, up to March, 1918; and the big transport of troops began in April, 1918, at the rate of 300,000 a month after that. Just how many there were here in December, 1917, I do not know. There were probably about the same number, 250,000 to 300,000 only.

Senator TRAMMELL. He said he would like to have a certain number by June, was it not, 1918?

Admiral SIMS. Planning to have in France by the end of June?

Senator TRAMMELL. The end of June?

Admiral SIMS. His language is:

The minimum number of troops we should plan to have in France by the end of June is four Army corps of 24 divisions in addition to troops for service of the rear.

Senator TRAMMELL. Did we not have approximately that many there at that time?

Admiral SIMS. We had 250,000 to 300,000.

Senator TRAMMELL. No, I am talking about the last of June, 1918. Did we not have approximately the troops that he had requested?

Admiral SIMS. June? We have the figures here. This was December 2, 1917. There were 176,665 American troops in France, and but one division had appeared at the front. I think I read that to you yesterday. That is December 31, 1917. This is from the report of Gen. Pershing. Here is a little extract from Gen. Pershing's report. He says on page 8 of his report [reading]:

After duly considering the tonnage possibilities I cabled the following to Washington on July 6, 1917:

"Plans should contemplate sending over at least 1,000,000 men by next May."

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I had forgotten where I got that statement. That was sent on July 6, 1917, or only a few months after we entered the war. He telegraphs that the plans should contemplate sending over at least 1,000,000 men by next May, which would be May, 1918.

Senator PITTMAN. What was that second report he made that you read from, Admiral? At a later date he said that he wanted them there by the last of June, did he not?

Admiral SIMS. Here is an extract from a cable of Gen. Pershing to the War Department on December 20, 1917 [reading]:

The actual facts are that shipments are not even keeping up to that schedule. It is now the middle of December and the First Corps is still incomplete by over two entire divisions and many corps troops. It can not be too emphatically declared that we should be prepared to take the field with at least four corps by June 30. In view of past performances with tonnage heretofore available such a project is impossible of fulfillment, but only by most strenuous attempts to attain such a result will we be in a position to take a proper part in operations in 1918. In view of fact that as the number of our troops here increases a correspondingly greater amount of tonnage must be provided for their supply, and also in view of the slow rate of shipment with tonnage now available, it is of the most urgent importance that more tonnage should be obtained at once as already recommended in my cables and by Gen. Bliss.

That simply accentuates the point I have been endeavoring to make, that if we had gone into the war promptly with all our anti-submarine forces we would have had that tonnage to carry those troops over which Gen. Pershing says we did not have at that time, because if, after the intervention of our forces, the successive decreases of tonnage were as shown, in the first place 640,000 tons, in the next period 390,000 tons and in the next period 250,000 tons, it is as plain as a pikestaff that if we had begun that intervention four months earlier, we would have in those four months saved two and a half million tons of shipping which we saved in the subsequent four months, or after the first four months, and therefore Gen. Pershing would have had the shipping and he would have had the troops over there as he wanted to have them.

Senator PITTMAN. Admiral, if I understand you, the loss of life was caused by the failure of the arrival of our troops on the front, to terminate the war; that is what I understood.

Admiral SIMS. Would you mind repeating the first part of that question?

Senator PITTMAN. I understand your reasons for believing that the war was continued for four months longer, with the consequent loss of life, was due to the failure of a sufficient number of our troops to arrive on the western front.

Admiral SIMS. That is one of the elements; yes. When our troops did arrive on the west front, it had a very marked effect, particularly upon the morale of the German Army and the German population, who had been told all the time that they could not get there, and that the submarine campaign would turn us down, etc., and so on. The discouragement was intense, as we found out from prisoners, and so on. That is one of the elements of the thing.

Senator PITTMAN. Of course 300,000 men might have affected the morale of the British Army or the French Army; but the thing I am getting at is the excuse you give for the loss of life. It was the lack of man power on the west front, was it not?

Admiral SIMS. Partially.

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Senator PITTMAN. Partially. Well, I can not comprehend yet how we could have won this war without man power on the west front.

Admiral SIMS. I think you were not in the room here when I went over the tonnage situation with Senator Trammell. I think you had left, then. I would like to invite your attention to this little summary.

Senator PITTMAN. I do not care anything about the tonnage. The sole question I have in my mind is this; This war was on the west front. Of course I realize there were a great many questions involved in the winning of that war; but as a matter of fact it was the soldiers driving through that finally won out in this war. The getting of the soldiers there was essential, also. But the question is, Were the soldiers prevented from getting on the west front by reason of the Navy?

Admiral SIMS. No.

Senator PITTMAN. By reason of our Navy?

Admiral SIMS. By reason of the lack of merchant tonnage; by reason of the loss of merchant tonnage of two and a half million tons on account of our four or five months' delay in getting effectively into the war.

Senator PITTMAN. Do you know how many men were obtained in the first draft drawing in August?

Admiral SIMS. I do not, but I know that Gen. Pershing wanted over a million men there on May 1, and could not get them.

Senator PITTMAN. Do you know when the next drawing took place and how many men there were?

Admiral SIMS. No, sir.

Senator PITTMAN. Or the next?

Admiral SIMS. No, sir.

Senator PITTMAN. Do you know why they did not draw them all out?

Admiral SIMS. No, sir.

Senator PITTMAN. Do you know that soldiers were held here on this side because they could not get transportation?

Admiral SIMS. Yes, I do.

Senator PITTMAN. You do know that?

Admiral SIMS. Yes; so I understand.

Senator PITTMAN. You understand it? From what report do you obtain that?

Admiral SIMS. I know this, that when the crisis came and there was consternation over the drive on the western front, the tonnage that was then in operation and available to bring the people over, it was not there, and they had to divert tonnage, in their extremity, from all parts of the world in order to get over 300,000 troops a month.

Senator PITTMAN. If, as a matter of fact, the soldiers found transportation whenever they were in preparation, according to the American ideas, in order to go abroad, then your whole charge that the Navy is responsible for the loss of 500,000 lives has no foundation; is not that true?

Admiral SIMS. Will you repeat that again? If what?

Senator PITTMAN. If, as a matter of fact, the Navy was prepared and did transport, or rather saw to the transportation of, troops when they were ready, then your whole foundation falls, no matter how small the transportation was?

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Admiral SIMS. If that is true, then Gen. Pershing was entirely wrong about the whole business. I am only judging by what he wanted.

Senator PITTMAN. That is the sole answer? That decides the question, does it not?

Admiral SIMS. No; not at all, because they insisted on the other side and advised on the other side, with all their experience of the trench warfare, that you send the troops right over, and Gen. Foch said he pounded his fist on the table and said, "Marche, marche! Send the men over here."

Senator PITTMAN. I am not talking about what Gen. Foch said, or what Admiral Bayly said or any other foreigner. This country had established a policy of training. I ask you if, when the men were ready according to the decision of the American Army staff, to go abroad, the transportation was not ready for them as they were ready?

Admiral SIMS. If it was not ready for them?

Senator PITTMAN. Yes.

Admiral SIMS. What is the question?

Senator PITTMAN. It is a very simple question.

Admiral SIMS. I know, but——

Senator PITTMAN. As these American soldiers were ready, in accordance with the decision of the American Army officers and the Army staff, if transportation was not then ready for them, as they were ready?

Admiral SIMS. If it was ready for them?

Senator PITTMAN. Yes.

Admiral SIMS. But it was not, though.

Senator PITTMAN. Where is your evidence of that?

Admiral SIMS. Because they had to bring in transportation from all over the world to bring them there in time.

Senator PITTMAN. But they got there?

Admiral SIMS. They got there; but, great scott, if they had got there a year before, we would not have lost all those people.

Senator PITTMAN. Yes, I understand; but do you not know——

Admiral SIMS. You do not need to point your finger at me. It does not do the least bit of good.

Senator PITTMAN. I will use my own judgment about that. You are not now on the bridge of a ship.

Admiral SIMS. I would like to ask, as a special favor, that you do not adopt those methods of the police court lawyer here.

Senator PITTMAN. It is the only method, apparently, that brings you down to the proper courtesy due to the United States Senate.

Admiral SIMS. I do not think it is a good thing, do you, for you to point your finger at me? I do not think it is a good thing, really, now.

Senator PITTMAN. If it makes the Admiral uneasy——

Admiral SIMS. It does not make me uneasy.

Senator PITTMAN. But answer my question, now, Admiral.

Admiral SIMS. Certainly; I will be glad to.

Senator PITTMAN. If you please. The troops were being prepared much more rapidly in April, 1918, than they were in the fall of 1917; is not that true?

Admiral SIMS. I do not know, at all.

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Senator PITTMAN. You do not know?

Admiral SIMS. I do not know whether they were prepared more rapidly in 1917 than in 1918.

Senator PITTMAN. Is it not natural that the rate of preparation of the soldiers in 1918 was far more rapid, with the greater facilities that they had in 1918, than in 1917?

Admiral SIMS. Oh, you have turned it around, now. I understand what you mean. I think you inadvertently said 1917 when you should have said 1918.

Senator PITTMAN. You said you did not know. I ask you again.

Admiral SIMS. The facilities in 1918 would necessarily have been better than those in 1917.

Senator PITTMAN. They were, undoubtedly?

Admiral SIMS. Yes.

Senator PITTMAN. They were turning out more prepared soldiers then than they were in 1917?

Admiral SIMS. I suppose so. I do not know.

Senator PITTMAN. You would assume so? It was natural?

Admiral SIMS. You can assume it. I do not know anything about it.

Senator PITTMAN. If you do not know anything about it, I think it is a very serious charge to make against the Navy of the United States that it is responsible for the loss of 500,000 men, when you know nothing about the facts that is most material, and that is whether the soldiers were as prepared to go in 1917 as they were in 1918.

Admiral SIMS. Prepared to go?

Senator PITTMAN. Yes.

Admiral SIMS. They were there. They were enlisted and they were in uniform and soldiers; and soldiers were sent over that had only been in uniform, when the crisis came, less than 10 days; and they could have been sent over in the early part of the war the same way, but they were not because they did not have the tonnage to do it with.

Senator PITTMAN. Have you any evidence at all or any reports of any statements that soldiers were prepared by the Army and asking for transportation anywhere along in September, October, or November, 1917, and that they did not find transportation for them?

Admiral SIMS. September, October, and November?

Senator PITTMAN. 1917.

Admiral SIMS. I have not any official documents here to that effect; no.

Senator PITTMAN. You have not?

Admiral SIMS. No. We were transporting about 25,000 men a month; and in the official records it shows that they were telling us that they had 16 vessels that were available for that, only. This is from Gen. Pershing's report. [Reading:]

> The lack of ocean tonnage to carry construction material and animals at the beginning was serious. Although an increasing amount of shipping became available as the war progressed, at no time was there sufficient for our requirements. The tonnage from the States reached about seven and one-half million tons to December 31, 1918, which was a little less than one-half of the total amount obtained.

That would seem to answer the question, that there was not enough shipping.

Senator PITTMAN. Oh, there was not enough shipping.

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Admiral SIMS. To transport the troops.

Senator PITTMAN. We all know that there was not enough shipping to give the Allies and their populations all the men and materials they wanted to have.

Admiral SIMS. This does not say "the Allies" at all. It says reading]:

The lack of ocean tonnage to carry construction material and animals at the beginning was serious.

That is, American construction material to build up the ports of France and American animals. [Continuing reading:]

Although an increasing amount of shipping became available as the war progressed, at no time was there sufficient for our requirements.

That answers your question, absolutely. "There was at no time sufficient for our requirements." We lost two and a half million tons of shipping, and we did not have sufficient shipping to carry our troops over.

Senator PITTMAN. There no doubt never was sufficient for our requirements, as Mr. Hoover has testified, and everyone knows; but they did get enough food there to live on; and we come back to the question whether or not the soldiers of this country were transported or could not get transportation?

Admiral SIMS. According to Gen. Pershing they wanted a million soldiers there by a certain date and could not get them because he did not have enough shipping.

Senator PITTMAN. When did we first draw soldiers? Was it not in August, 1917?

Admiral SIMS. When did we first do what?

Senator PITTMAN. Have our draft of soldiers?

Admiral SIMS. I am not sure about that.

Senator PITTMAN. I think it was in August, 1917. I think so. Just how long did it take them to assemble? I just want to draw your attention to the fact that we did not have any army in 1917 to transport.

Admiral SIMS. Then Gen. Pershing must have been mistaken in supposing that they did have an army and that they did not have enough shipping to transport them. Now, you can not get away from that thing. Gen. Pershing said that he wanted troops sent over, so that they must have been here; but he says they did not have enough transportation to carry them.

Senator PITTMAN. How much of an army did we have when the war began?

Admiral SIMS. We did not have more than 25,000 or 30,000 effective troops.

Senator PITTMAN. It did not take very much tonnage to transport them. Now, the draft occurred in August. Under the policy established by our Army, which I assume the Navy has nothing to do with, those men required an intensive training there.

Admiral SIMS. Gen. Pershing said that they were ready to go over and he did not have the ships to bring them.

Senator PITTMAN. The fact remains, Admiral, that you have charged that the Navy is responsible for the loss of 500,000 men by reason of the failure to get our troops to the west front.

Admiral SIMS. I believe so.

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Senator PITTMAN. You can not substantiate that statement, sir, unless you can prove that the Army was relying upon them for the transportation to transport them, and they could not do it.

Admiral SIMS. There you are. Gen. Pershing said that he wanted a certain number of men by a certain time, and they could not get the shipping to transport it, and if you want any more evidence——

Senator PITTMAN. You not only have not given that evidence, but, in fact, you could not, and those facts will be demonstrated here absolutely when the time comes—that there is no foundation for that assertion.

Admiral SIMS. Then you must refute Gen. Pershing's own report to the President.

Senator PITTMAN. No; we do not have to.

Admiral SIMS. Yes; you do, because he said that he wanted the troops and did not have the transportation to get them there.

Senator PITTMAN. Oh, no.

Admiral SIMS. Well, yes; now, really.

Senator PITTMAN. You have read what is there.

Admiral SIMS. Here is another quotation. Here is "Organization Projects." [Reading:]

9. A general organization project, covering as far as possible the personnel of all combat, staff, and administrative units, was forwarded to Washington on July 11. This was prepared by the operations section of my staff and adopted in joint conference with the War Department Committee then in France. It embodied my conclusions on the military organization and effort required of America after a careful study of French and British experience. In forwarding this project I stated:

"It is evident that a force of about 1,000,000 is the smallest unit which in modern war will be a complete, well-balanced, and independent fighting organization. However, it must be equally clear that the adoption of this size force as a basis of study should not be construed as representing the maximum force which should be sent to or which will be needed in France. It is taken as the force which may be expected to reach France in time for an offensive in 1918 and as a unit and basis of organization. Plans for the future should be based, especially in reference to the manufacture of artillery, aviation, and other material, on three times this force, i. e., at least 3,000,000 men."

And the fact remains that according to Gen. Pershing he wanted the troops over there and could not get them because there was not sufficient tonnage; and there was not sufficient tonnage because two and a half million tons were clearly lost by the delay of the American Navy in going into the war.

Senator PITTMAN. According to his report he wanted 1,000,000 men there for the campaign, 1,000,000 American soldiers for the campaign of 1918. He got the 1,000,000 soldiers there in the first week of July, 1918. They participated in the fights, in the campaign of 1918, and participated in the victory. I was in hopes that you had made a study of the military situation over here, as you apparently had in France.

Admiral SIMS. I thought that I could rely upon the accuracy of the report made by Gen. Pershing to the President.

Senator PITTMAN. You have not discussed this matter with Gen. Pershing at all, have you?

Admiral SIMS. What?

Senator PITTMAN. You have not discussed this matter with Gen. Pershing, have you?

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Admiral SIMS. I have not seen him at all since we were in France.

Senator PITTMAN. No. But you must realize, Admiral, the conditions that existed here at the beginning of the war; although you left before it commenced, as has been stated by Senator Trammell. As you said, we practically had no army in the beginning of the war. I do not think that is the Navy's fault. We had no facilities for training at the beginning of the war. I do not think that is the Navy's fault. The policy decided by the War Department in our country was to train our soldiers on this side. I do not think that is the Navy's fault. And, as a matter of fact, until the beginning of 1918 it must be evident to you that we had very few soldiers to send anywhere; and then they commenced to come on all at once; and when they came on all at once, the combined navies of the world and the ships of the world got the food there to France, they got the amount of troops to France that Pershing said he would need, and won the war in 1918. I do not think there is any blame attached to the Army; I do not think there is any blame attached to the Navy; and I think that you ought to take back the assertion that the Navy is guilty of the murder of 500,000 people, until you produce some evidence stronger than you have produced.

Admiral SIMS. It seems to me that the evidence that I have produced shows very clearly that the Navy is responsible for the loss of those men and those billions of treasure. As I said to Senator Trammell, it all depends upon whether you assume that the intervention of the Navy was effective, or whether it was not. If it was effective, it decreased the length of the war, and if it delayed in making it effective, it prolonged the war. When the Navy intervened and the convoy system was put in operation, there was a decrease in loss of shipping. It began in a certain period.

If it had begun earlier, we would have saved just so much shipping; and if we had had that shipping we could have sent troops faster to France, and we would have done it, there is no doubt about it at all, because Gen. Bliss in his first visit over there and on coming back again said they had to get a million men over there as soon as possible, and they did not have the transportation to do it at that time.

Senator PITTMAN. Well, it was effective; and you do not have to take the position that it was either effective or not effective, at all. It was not effective as it would have been if Congress had appropriated money for more ships years before; but it was sufficiently effective to get over to France every soldier that we had trained to go to France.

Admiral SIMS. Congress did not appropriate as much money as the Navy would have liked to prepare for war, but that is not the point, at all. We are not criticizing Congress for that, at all. It is the fact that the antisubmarine forces we had were on this side, 3,000 miles from where the fighting was going on, and that they were not sent over, actually. We declared war on the 6th of April, and there was not a single force on the other side until the 4th of May. What do you know about that for preparation for war. And I can give you the dates that they arrived—another bunch of ships—and I can show you that after two months there were only 30 destroyers there. I can show you that at the end of a whole year there were approximately 120 vessels of all classes, including supply ships. Not

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one of those ships was built since the war. There was no reason why they could not have been all sent over immediately upon the declaration of war, and if they had been there, we would have put the submarine campaign out of operation, and decreased the losses. I do not know why they did not send them over there. The good Lord only knows why they did not send them over there, but they did not send them, at all.

Senator PITTMAN. There were only two things they sent over there, men and provisions for the war.

Admiral SIMS. Yes.

Senator PITTMAN. All they wanted over there first was man power, man power, just as you have stated. They had everything else but man power. We got every soldier to France for the campaign of 1918——

Admiral SIMS. That the tonnage would carry.

Senator PITTMAN (continuing). That was ready for it; and that is incontrovertible by the evidence.

Admiral SIMS. The German offensive began on the 21st of March. At that time the great American Nation had 300,000 men only in France, and they had to call in the shipping from all over the world, which they were enabled to do at that time because the curves had crossed. But for that fact they would not have been able to do it; it would have been too dangerous to do it, because you would have starved the allied armies. At the end of March, within a year, we had 300,000 men in France.

Senator PITTMAN. Yes; and in August we did not have any in the United States.

Admiral SIMS. What is that?

Senator PITTMAN. In August we had none in the United States. In September we had none in the United States. In October we had none in the United States. We had recruits that were being trained.

Admiral SIMS. They had men in the Army. They must have had.

Senator PITTMAN. We had no camps for them.

Admiral SIMS. If you had had ships, they would have put them on the ships and taken them over, like every other country that send their troops.

Senator PITTMAN. But that is not involving the Navy Department. The War Department decided they would not send them until they were trained.

Admiral SIMS. Was that the reason, because they were not trained troops, that the Navy Department held their antisubmarine forces on this side where the fighting was not going on?

Senator PITTMAN. That is another side-step of yours, Admiral.

Admiral SIMS. Not at all. I asked if that was a part of that plan, that they did not send the antisubmarine forces over there.

Senator PITTMAN. You have been trying to get away from the facts all the time, and because you do not know the facts you have made a false assertion without any knowledge of the facts.

Admiral SIMS. Not without knowledge of the facts. I have based it on the report of Gen. Pershing to the President.

Senator PITTMAN. But you do not know anything about the facts on this side of the war, and it will be demonstrated before you get through with it. But you have assumed that we had a million soldiers there.

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Admiral SIMS. Not at all. I never said so.

Senator PITTMAN. You read it, shipment, by the time that we were there——

Admiral SIMS. Will you fix that thing now? I did not say they were there, on the other side. I said they wanted the men shipped over there as soon as possible.

Senator PITTMAN. Well, your complaint is against the War Department and not the Navy.

Admiral SIMS. Not against the War Department.

Senator PITTMAN. For not shipping a lot of green men over there to be slaughtered.

Admiral SIMS. Like everybody else did. You know as well as I do, Senator Pittman, that we put the greenest possible men onto the western front. They put men there who had not been in uniform more than two or three or four months. We had to do it. But we would not have done it, in the first place, if we had had the transports; but we did not have the transports and could not get them there, with any endeavor. We had 16 transports only taking them there; straining every nerve to get them across.

Senator PITTMAN. As a matter of fact, on November 2, 1917, did you not report to the Secretary of the Navy as follows?

Admiral SIMS. What is that, please?

Senator PITTMAN. This report of yours on November 2, 1917, I am asking you about. [Reading:]

16. I consider Liverpool the safest port of entry in the submarine area. For the present, however, I think we shall have to send our large ships to Brest Roads and then, when they are unloaded, escort them to England to be coaled.

17. I have previously reported against using the *Vaterland* for the present until we have a little more experience in handling the other large transports. The *Vaterland* is, of course, a much longer target, and injury to her would be a serious affair. I am assuming too that all of the troops that we have to transport for the next few months can be accommodated in other transports, assisted by British liners. Whenever the situation becomes pressing I presume we shall have to use the *Vaterland* and take the additional risk.

Admiral SIMS. The nautical questions involved in that are that the *Vaterland* had no wharf to go alongside of in Brest, and she could not be coaled in Brest, because we would have to transport coal to Brest, and then she would have to go into Southampton, and through the submarine area.

Senator PITTMAN. The matter that attracted my attention was this [reading]:

I am assuming that all the troops we have to transport in the next few months can be shipped in other transports, assisted by British liners. Whenever the situation becomes pressing, I assume we shall have to use the *Vaterland*, and take the additional risk.

So that it was not pressing on November 2?

Admiral SIMS. According to Gen. Pershing it was very pressing, and he had not the transports to get them over.

Senator PITTMAN. Then you gave a wrong report to the Secretary of the Navy?

Admiral SIMS. It is quite possible, through ignorance of the military situation, that I might. But we can not get away from Gen. Pershing's report, really.

Senator PITTMAN. But that was your duty over there, to find out the facts.

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Admiral SIMS. Not at all.

Senator PITTMAN. You did not have anything to do with the transportation of troops?

Admiral SIMS. Of troops?

Senator PITTMAN. Yes.

Admiral SIMS. Nothing at all, except to escort them in.

Senator PITTMAN. Then you do not know anything about the transportation of troops?

Admiral SIMS. Yes, I do, because I have read Gen. Pershing's report.

Senator PITTMAN. Have you had any conversation with any of your other officers who had anything to do with the transportation of troops?

Admiral SIMS. Yes, I have seen lots of them.

Senator PITTMAN. Have you based it on anything they said to you?

Admiral SIMS. Based what?

Senator PITTMAN. Your statement about this?

Admiral SIMS. No; I based it on Gen. Pershing's report.

Senator PITTMAN. What is the date of that report?

Admiral SIMS. September, 1919.

Senator PITTMAN. Was that the first time you knew there was pressure for the transportation of troops?

Admiral SIMS. That there was pressure?

Senator PITTMAN. Yes.

Admiral SIMS. Oh, no; I had known it in a general way; but I had not known it officially.

Senator PITTMAN. You did not know it on November 2, 1919?

Admiral SIMS. I did not know it as well as I did later. That was pretty early in the game, you know.

Senator PITTMAN. That was the time you are complaining that you have been transporting troops very little.

Admiral SIMS. Yes; but the fact whether I knew or not has not anything to do with the case, as compared with Gen. Pershing's report.

Senator PITTMAN. You are relying upon that report fory our charge against the Navy?

Admiral SIMS. For the official part of the information. Surely, I thought that was pretty good evidence.

Senator PITTMAN. It bears on the construction you put on it, as to what it means.

But, nevertheless, you come back to the very same proposition that you have nothing excepting such conclusions as you can draw from that report of Gen. Pershing, to sustain your charges that our soldiers did not get to the front by reason of the failure of the Navy?

Admiral SIMS. That is your statement, but that is not mine. I read a statement here of the tonnage situation, and showed very clearly, I thought, just what the tonnage was. That was my idea of the thing. I think that the evidence I produced there from the shipping figures, etc., amply substantiates that fact, that the delay in getting into the war cost us those lives and those billions of dollars.

Senator PITTMAN. Do you not think, as a matter of fact, Admiral, that the shortage of tonnage that you have referred to resulted in a

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shortage of foodstuff, as testified to by Mr. Hoover, and that they sacrificed foodstuffs; but they did not sacrifice the transportation of troops?

Admiral SIMS. They had to do both. It was very, very dangerous, I think. When Mr. Hoover told me that the actual food supply in England, what he called here in his testimony—I have forgotten the technical term of it, but it means the supply in stores, not counting the ones in the retail stores, was only three weeks, that was very serious. Now, if the transportation of troops continues under those circumstances, without the possibility of supplying them after they got them there, there is where the danger of the thing comes in, as Gen. Pershing points out in his report. I will admit it was a matter of astonishment to me that they would want 50,000 tons of freight landed in the ports of France per week. If you put a million men in there, you have to give them that. They cut down on the food supply in those countries, I think, as far as they dared. When you get down below a certain point, you know what happens, as you see from the conditions in Germany. They reduced those supplies down considerably below that danger point. They reduced the supply of bread considerably, and cut out that of sugar almost entirely, and reduced all supplies all along the line, as far as they dared. The food-supply situation was extremely dangerous, and there was great anxiety, as Mr. Hoover has testified.

Senator PITTMAN. Mr. Chairman, in order to make the testimony complete in regard to the line I was taking this morning, I would like to have the testimony of Mr. Byrnes and Senator Glass and of Admiral Sims also in connection therewith, included in this record at this point this morning, where we leave off. I refer to the testimony of Admiral Sims in connection with that of those two witnesses only with regard to the one subject, and that is those letters.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. It is so ordered.

(The testimony is as follows:)

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES F. BYRNES, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA.

Senator PITTMAN. Mr. Byrnes, you are a Representative, are you not?

Representative BYRNES. I am.

Senator PITTMAN. How long have you occupied that office?

Representative BYRNES. Since the Sixty-second Congress; nine years, now.

Senator PITTMAN. A statement made by you on the floor of the House of Representatives recently was introduced in evidence a few days ago by the Secretary of the Navy, when testifying before this committee. That statement has been contradicted to a certain extent, as the evidence will disclose, by Admiral Sims in his testimony this morning. The portion of the speech that I refer to is as follows [reading]:

"In October, 1918, with two of my collegues, Representative Glass, of Virginia, and Representative Whaley, of South Carolina, I went to France, and among other other places visited Tours, the headquarters of the Services of Supply of our Army, and was thrilled with pride at the marvels worked by this branch of the service. On October 30, with my colleagues, I saw Admiral Sims, who was then in Paris. I shall never forget that interview. The armistice had been requested by the enemy. Sims told us of the magnificent progress made by the British on the English front, and as we listened he proceeded to tell us that the armistice would have to be granted, because Pershing had been unable to break through the German lines, owing to the absolute breakdown of transportation behind the American lines. With pathos in his voice he told us how unfortunate it was that this breakdown occurred at so critical a moment. In amazement we listened, and in the monologue he delivered he proceeded to tell us that while Americans believed their Navy was working wonders, that as a matter of fact we had but 3 per cent of the antisubmarine craft in English

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waters; that Great Britain had brought over two-thirds of our troops and had escorted one-half of them. I left him not only depressed at the failure of the American Army, but humiliated at the small part played by the American Navy. Believing that this disaster to the American Army, which, according to Sims, made necessary our granting the armistice, asked by the enemy, was destined to be a national scandal, Mr. Whaley and I determined to again visit the headquarters of the Services of Supply in order to ascertain the details of this disaster. Because of Sims's statement we traveled 150 miles or more to Tours. When we informed the commanding officer and the Chief of Staff of our desire to secure information with reference to this matter they were amazed. They advised us that it was the first time they had heard of it. They showed us records where Gen. Pershing, after the St. Mihiel drive, had thanked the Services of Supply for its wonderful service, and again, just a few days prior to our visit, had written congratulating the Services of Supply upon its continued success in supplying our forces in the field. Wishing to avoid friction between our officers, we refrained from disclosing the source of our information.

"When told that our statement must be mere gossip in Paris, we advised the commanding officer that our information came from an officer of high rank in the service of our Government, and in response to that statement an officer present said: 'That is nothing but British propaganda, and the only American officer who could have told you gentlemen this story is Admiral W. S. Sims.'

"While in London, in visiting the naval headquarters to secure information as to the departure of ships, we again met Admiral Sims. He courteously invited us to his office, and evidently forgetting that he had delivered his lecture to us in Paris, he again proceeded to impress upon us the small part our Navy played in the war, reciting the figures stated above, and which I have proved to be false. Not satisfied with telling us how small a part we played upon the sea in time of war, he proceeded to tell us that in time of peace we should seek to play no part at all. He expressed the hope that we would not be led astray by the agitation for a merchant marine. He declared that England, because of her geographical location, must necessarily control the seas, and that we could rely upon her at all times providing a merchant marine to transport our goods to foreign markets. When I took issue with him, he stated that even if we entertained the view that it would be desirable for the United States to possess a merchant marine, that it was impossible because we could not compete with Great Britain; that it would be necessary to pay subsidies, for which our people would never stand; and that it was the part of wisdom for us to develop the great West and leave the sea to Great Britain. With that Government, he said, we would never have any trouble, and Great Britain could be depended upon at all times to care for our business upon the seas."

Was that a part of a speech delivered by you, Mr. Byrnes, in the House of Representatives?

Representative BYRNES. It is.

Senator PITTMAN. On what date, do you remember now?

Representative BYRNES. January 27.

Senator PITTMAN. This morning when Admiral Sims was testifying with regard to that portion of your speech which was introduced in evidence and which I have just read, he testified as follows [reading]:

"Now, I should like to make a statement in reference to what Mr. Daniels had to say about the remarks of Representative Byrnes in the House. I am sorry to say that Representative Byrnes got his statement very badly twisted. As I read it in the press, he said that I told him that Gen. Pershing's army practically went to pieces behind the Argonne front, and that as a result of that is was necessary to ask for an armistice, or to accept the armistice.

"It is quite true that I told this to Representative Byrnes, and I warned him to be careful that he would hear it everywhere, and that he must not believe it or repeat it.

"I not only told it to him, but I told it to every Congressman or Representative who came through London at that time and whom I saw. I told it to all of the prominent Americans that I could get in contact with. Of course, you know that in a war there is always jealously not only between armies of different nationalities, but between the branches of your own Army, and these stories if they are not checked: For example, I was told by an American correspondent whose name is probably known to you all, who was an officer during the war—he was a liaison officer with some of the British troops with whom our troops were serving. He spread his hand out and he said: 'These are all American Army corps. If you walked up into this Army corps at headquarters and talk to them they will curse out the American Army corps on each side of them and say that in the last offensive they were not properly supported. Now, when you come to an American Army corps with a British or French corps on the other side, the same criticisms are made.'

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"It was that I was trying to get these Americans to understand, and I did not fail to make that statement to all the prominent Americans who came through. Mr. Byrnes is mistaken in supposing that I was the authority for this. I was simply telling him what was going about, so that when he went down onto the Continent and got into contact with all classes of people in Paris, he was not to believe any such yarns."

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pittman, would it not be well to read all of the testimony in regard to this matter, of this morning?

Mr. BYRNES. I wish you would.

Senator PITTMAN. It probably would be. Continuing where I left off with the testimony of Admiral Sims [reading]:

"I remember hearing an officer in our service, who was a bit of a wag, say to one of the younger officers, when they were discussing a matter of this kind: 'If you ever get surprised at sea in a fog, or anything, sing out "Hard aport," and they will not take your ship away from you; but if you do nothing they will.'

"The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Mayo also said—perhaps I should correct what I said about his statement before. He said that he understood that that was the policy.

"Admiral SIMS. Yes, sir.

"The CHAIRMAN. He did not say authoritatively that it was the policy.

"He also stated—I will look up his testimony so as to quote it exactly.

"Senator PITTMAN. While you are looking that up, may I ask a question?

"The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

"Senator PITTMAN. Admiral, I do not presume you had the record before you in regard to the charges made by Congressman Byrnes?

"Admiral SIMS. I only had what was in the paper, Senator.

"Senator PITTMAN. I think you are entitled to have the exact language of it. His language was taken from a written speech made on the floor of the Congress. The excerpt from it, which was placed in the record, is as follows.

Then the part of your speech which I have just read to you was read aloud. I then continued with my question to Admiral Sims as follows [reading]:

"I think that is the end of the quotation from Mr. Byrnes. Now, having that statement correctly before you and not having to depend upon a newspaper account of it, I will ask you if that statement is true?

"Admiral SIMS. It is not, and I can not understand how any such idea could have gotten into his head, because I never entertained those views. I was very much exercised about this rumor that was going about, about the operations behind the Argonne front. It came to me in a number of ways, through Paris, and so forth, and, as I said before, I took advantage of having this information that came to me that way, because I had many sources of information, to explain to these people. Now, my opinion of the Army, I think, is perfectly well known. You can ask Gen. Pershing what it is. But those criticisms are always there; and the only explanation I can make of it is that these gentlemen in their trip through Europe, and with all the people they had talked to, and so forth and so on, with all this, you can call it propaganda if you want to, but I do not think it was that; I think it was just natural jealousy that arises between armies; they got the thing mixed up, that is all. I have never held any such opinions at all.

"As to the merchant marine, it is a surprise to me that anybody should tell me that I have expressed any opinions about it, because I never had any. I may have said, of course, that there may be some difficulty or competition, as everybody knows there may be; but as to whether Great Britain, on account of 'her geographical position'—a remark which, to my mind, does not mean anything at all—should have all the shipping of the world, and we should depend upon it, I can not imagine how any such idea should have arisen at all.

"As for the relative amount of the work that our Navy did on the other side, one of the things I tried to get into the minds of the people that came over there, one batch after another of newspaper people, etc., and also Congressmen that came through, was to get some just idea in the minds of the American people as to what our Navy had done over there. Now, anybody who has had the curiosity to read the articles that I have written since last September will see that I have done the best I could with my limited literary ability to express my very high appreciation of the magnificent work that was done by our Navy on the other side. It is not depreciating the work of our Navy to make the simple statement that we had about 3 per cent of the Navy antisubmarine forces. I do not remember the figures, now, but it was something like 175 vessels at that time that we were using in antisubmarine work, not counting the small fry, and that the other people, including all the Allies, had about 5,000. Surely it is not depreciating the magnificent work that I have described in these articles, of our forces, to state that they were not as big as the other fellows. It is an absolute fact, that is all; and the contrary in the headlines of our papers, that

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we did the whole business, was hurting us on the other side, and was making difficult our relations with the Allies; and that is what I sought to correct. In two or three speeches at luncheons, etc., where these American correspondents were entertained, I said, 'Give the American people the truth of this matter so that you will not keep on embarrassing us on this side by saying things which of course we know to be not true, the Allies know to be not true, and which the Allies know that we know are not true. It makes it difficult for us; that is all.'

"As for the British bringing over two-thirds of the troops, I said that they brought over during the rush after the first year of the war, beginning in April, 1918, about two-thirds of the troops. It is about that; 59 or 60 per cent, or something of that kind. That is also true. That certainly does not depreciate the magnificent effort that we made to bring over the rest of the troops.

"Senator PITTMAN. That portion of Mr. Byrnes's statement, then, is not incorrect?

"Admiral SIMS. That portion is not incorrect. That is not incorrect.

"Senator PITTMAN. The first portion here where he says, 'Sims told us of the magnificent progress made by the British on the English front,' I take it is correct. 'And as we listened he proceeded to tell us that the armistice would have to be granted because Pershing had been unable to break through the German lines owing to the absolute breakdown of transportation behind the American lines.'

"Admiral SIMS. That is exactly what I told him, yes, and warned him not to believe it. That is what I did tell him. And it was, of course, absurd. I warned him not to believe it.

"Senator PITTMAN. You warned him that it was not true and not to believe it?

"Admiral SIMS. I am perfectly positive that I warned him that it was not true. That was my whole object in telling him.

"Senator PITTMAN. Did you notice anything else in the rest of Mr. Byrnes's statement that would indicate that he could have so understood you?

"Admiral SIMS. The only thing I can think of is that he had talked to a great many people, in my headquarters, and a good many people in Paris, naval officers and Army officers, etc., and he has got the thing mixed up; that is all,

"I can not conceive anything else, because I never had any such idea at all, and was distressed that this rumor came about. It seemed to indicate that it was set on foot by these jealousies, after the war was over. Then was when they broke out. That is to say, when the enemy asked for an armistice, there was a flood of these criticisms, and I explained to those who went through there, and told them to be careful not to believe it. I will look up my correspondence with Gen. Persning, which was rather considerable, and see whether I have not written to him on that subject.

"The CHAIRMAN. If you have any letters bearing on it, I suggest that you give them to the committee, and we will put them in the record.

"Admiral SIMS. I will look and see. The relations between Gen. Pershing and myself were as cordial as you could possibly imagine them to be between two men. We stopped barely short of exchanging photographs and that sort of thing.

"Senator PITTMAN. You remember the visit of Mr. Byrnes, do you?

"Admiral SIMS. No; I do not at all.

"Senator PITTMAN. I am surprised at that. I thought you stated a while ago that you told Mr. Byrnes what he said you told him, but in addition to that you told him not to believe it. Now, as I understand, you do not remember the visit of Mr. Byrnes?

"Admiral SIMS. I can not identify Mr. Byrnes and those other two, because every little while would come a number of Congressmen or newspaper representatives, etc. I do not believe I would recognize Mr. Byrnes if I saw him again.

"Senator PITTMAN. Do you remember meeting Mr. Carter Glass over there, who was Secretary of the Treasury?

"Admiral SIMS. I did remember it after I got back here and saw him.

"Senator PITTMAN. You remember meeting him?

"Admiral SIMS. Faintly; yes; when he came through there. When I came back I was associated with him on a trip out in the West, and I remembered it then. I might remember Mr. Byrnes if I saw him now, but I do not remember the occasion of his visit any more than I do the occasion of a dozen similar other visits.

"Senator PITTMAN. Then you do not remember what conversation you had with Mr. Byrnes, Mr. Glass, and Mr. Whaley?

"Admiral SIMS. Not particularly; no; but I do know I told everybody I could get my hands on, warned them not to believe these things, and I could not have said the other thing, because I never had any such idea in my life; that the armistice had to be had because they failed there.

"Senator PITTMAN. You know Mr. Carter Glass very well, do you not?

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"Admiral SIMS. I know him from having met him on this tour for the Liberty loan, that is all. I never saw him before unless I saw him when he came through there.

"Senator PITTMAN. And you feel that you might meet these gentlemen in Paris and then have a subsequent conversation with them again in London later on and not remember it?

"Admiral SIMS. No; it was not in Paris. I never was in Paris but once after that, and I did not meet any of them there. I went there once, in October and November, 1918.

"Senator PITTMAN. He states that he met you in October in Paris.

"Admiral SIMS. I was there just once, just before the armistice.

"Senator PITTMAN. Then they state that they called on you again just before their departure from England.

"Admiral SIMS. Yes.

"Senator PITTMAN. And again discussed this same matter?

"Admiral SIMS. Yes. There were a great many hundred people came through the office on similar missions. The way we came in contact with them was because in a sense my headquarters took charge of all the distinguished Americans who came through. That is to say, we were notified that they were coming, and an officer went aboard the steamer when they arrived and told them that all they had to do was to do as they were told, and that they would be perfectly well taken care of; that their reservations were made on the trains, and reservations were made in the hotels, and that an officer would meet them at the station, and they would be furnished with automobiles, and so forth. Naturally all these men came through the headquarters, and I saw them usually coming, and usually if they went back that way, because we facilitated their travel. If they said they wanted to go to Paris, all they had to do was to tell us about it, when they wanted to go, and everything would be taken care of for them, and they had nothing to do but go.

"Senator PITTMAN. Now, I understand from you that if you did have these conversations which Mr. Byrnes has recited you did not criticize the service that was supposed to supply Pershing's forces?

"Admiral SIMS. By no means. I told them what the criticisms were. I wish it would be proper for me to tell you the ways in which that information would come to me, but it would not just now. I was immensely impressed by the way in which the information came to me, and of its danger, and that is the reason I told these people to look out for it; that this was what was being said.

"The CHAIRMAN. Did you ever talk over with Gen. Pershing the general question of cautioning Americans who came over to the front about not making too much boastful talk about what America was doing?

"Admiral SIMS. No; I never saw Gen. Pershing much over there. I never was at the front at all, because I forbade all my officers to go to the front. I saw him when he came through there the first time. I saw him once when he came up to London for a conference. I saw him once or twice down in Paris, but I never was at the front and I never had any extended conversation with him, although we had considerable correspondence about various affairs.

"Senator PITTMAN. As I understand it, then, if Congressman Byrnes and Congressman Whaley and Mr. Carter Glass got this impression from you, or rather if they have this impression in their minds, you can only account for it by the fact that they must have gotten it mixed up with the impression they got from somebody else?

"Admiral SIMS. I do not know how they account for it, but I never held those opinions at all. I never held the absurd opinion that the armistice had to be accepted because of the condition on the western front. I never thought that for a minute."

Mr. Byrnes, in the light of the statement made by Admiral Sims, which I have just read, do you still contend that your statement made in your speech, which has just been read to you, is correct?

Representative BYRNES. I regret that Mr. Glass and Mr. Whaley and myself did not make more of an impression upon the admiral when we called upon him, that he could not remember us; though he did say, as I remember, at first, that he remembered very distinctly warning us to not repeat what he told us. But my recollection is very clear upon it. The admiral made a more lasting impression upon me, and I am satisfied also upon my two colleagues. I can recall with distinctness that we called upon him at his hotel between 9 and 10 in the morning, and while my recollection would not be clear upon this, I am almost certain it was as the result of a telephone message received by Mr. Glass from him. At any rate, we did call. I remember distinctly meeting a very prominent Frenchman, who at one time served in Washington, as we ascended the stairs to his room.

Admiral Sims very courteously asked us to his apartment, and there made to Mr. Glass, to Mr. Whaley, and to me the statement which I made in my speech, and

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which you have read and put into this record. That he told us, as he now says that he thinks he did, that this was propaganda, and that "I want you to contradict it wherever you hear it" might be possible if it was only one man who received such an impression as we did from his statement, but when three men hear a statement and leave the room with the feeling of depression and of humiliation that we did, it is——

Senator POINDEXTER. Mr. Chairman, just a second.

Representative BYRNES. Yes.

Senator POINDEXTER. I understood that these gentelmen were called here as witnesses.

Representative BYRNES. Yes.

Senator POINDEXTER. To testify to what occurred.

Representative BYRNES. Yes.

Senator POINDEXTER. Mr. Byrnes is now making an argument as to the matter.

Senator PITTMAN. Of course, if we are going to insist upon those technicalities, Mr. Chairman——

The CHAIRMAN. I think Mr. Byrnes would better testify as to his own impressions.

Representative BYRNES. Mr. Chairman, as a lawyer, I submit that I can testify as to the reasons why I am emphatic in my recollection.

Senator PITTMAN. That is it.

Representative BYRNES. And only for that reason do I make that statement. I submit to you as an attorney that when we——

Senator TRAMMELL. I submit that this morning Admiral Sims, in giving his reasons as to why he did not say that, went into a rather argumentative statement. He said that he did not say it because he did not entertain such views as that, and that he did not think that way. Now, I am sure that the witness at present is just explaining why he could not have gotten the other impression of the remarks of Admiral Sims.

Representative BYRNES. And I will promise the chairman and my friend, Senator Poindexter, that I am not going any further.

The CHAIRMAN. We want the facts.

Senator POINDEXTER. The only reason I object is because it opens up a whole range of facts.

Representative BYRNES. I will promise the Senator that I am not going to speak at length.

Senator POINDEXTER. Yes.

Representative BYRNES. I state that the reason that I am emphatic as to my recollection is that when we left the hotel and the three of us were going back to our own hotel, we immediately discussed the grave consequences of the situation that we felt would arise as the result of the information given to us by Admiral Sims, and with great inconvenience to ourselves we then determined to visit the headquarters of the S. O. S. in order to ascertain from Gen. Harbord and Gen. Hagood the details of this disaster to the American Army.

Mr. Glass had an engagement which precluded his accompanying us, but he agreed that we should go. We were satisfied by reason of the statement made by Admiral Sims that this matter would become known in America in a short time and become a national scandal, and in order that we might know the facts, we decided within 5 minutes or 10 minutes after leaving his apartment that we would go to Tours, and the next day we did go.

I will qualify that statement to this extent, that whether it was the next day or the second day succeeding, I am in doubt; but certainly my recollection is that it was the very next day. Mr. Whaley and myself drove 150 miles to Tours; we visited Gen. Harbord and Gen. Hagood, and we then told those gentlemen what Admiral Sims had told us in Paris.

The admiral says, according to his recollection now, as I understand it, that he was advising us of this in London so that if we went to the Continent we would not be misled. Well, the statement he made to us was not in London. It was in Paris, at the Hotel Crillon, October 31, 1918; and immediately after that we went to Tours, and we did not come back from London to go there. And, as the admiral forgets the date, I emphasize the fact that it was that date.

Now, my reason for that date, if I had any doubt about my recollection, my reason for being in Paris, would be that when we went to Tours we learned from Gen. Harbord and Gen. Hagood that the statements made by Admiral Sims were not true. It was all the more impressed upon our minds, and Gen. Harbord and Gen. Hagood produced letters from Gen. Pershing congratulating them upon the service rendered, after the St. Mihiel drive, a few days later, just preceding our visit there, and another letter from Gen. Pershing again thanking the S. O. S. for their splendid service.

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I can well remember that we did not return until about 11.30 in the evening, and our colleague, Mr. Glass, was so interested in awaiting our report, that he was up, near midnight, waiting to learn the facts about this terrible disaster about which we had been informed, and we told him then the story.

Unfortunately, I had not a diary. I did not know that I was going to be asked to come before this committee until an hour or so ago. I looked for a very incomplete diary—I never kept one in my life before, and only kept this in order to supplement the diary that my friend, Mr. Glass, was keeping on the trip. I found, however, this diary [indicating], which is very incomplete and which has not any record of the conversation we had with Admiral Sims. It starts only with the memoranda I have of our trip to the S. O. S. I was so impressed with the achievement of the S. O. S. that I wrote down my impressions of that trip, and I find in my shorthand notes the very statement that was made to us by Gen. Harbord and Gen. Hagood and exactly what I had put in my speech, which is now in the record, and the date, because this was the first time that we went down to Tours. I can add nothing else to my emphatic statement that my visit to Tours was not for the purpose of ascertaining the truth about a propaganda of which we had been warned in London or any other place.

Senator PITTMAN. And the statement of Admiral Sims to the effect that he warned you that such a thing was not true and not to be believed, is not correct?

Representative BYRNES. Absolutely not correct. The fact is I was amazed to think the admiral would say that. I thought of several things he might have said about it, but I did not think he would say that. And I might say, if emphasis be necessary as to the statement as to the merchant marine, that that conversation as stated in my speech was not in Paris but was in London, where the admiral very courteously invited us into his office when we met him at the naval headquarters, and in the course of the conversation he made to me the exact statement that I have made in this speech. I took issue with him because I have very strong views upon that question. I did not go into very great detail, but I remember distinctly telling him in that conversation that while in years past the argument in favor of the merchant marine had come from the manufacturers of this country, that by reason of this war there had been a change of mind on the part of the farmers of this country; that the farmers of the South found in 1914 that they could not ship their cotton to Europe because of the uncertain movement of ships, and that the wheat grower in the West found out that subsidies were necessary to establish a merchant marine; and that to-day the farmer was an enthusiastic advocate because he had learned the value and the necessity of ships. I remember distinctly of going into an argument on the question. I was interested in it and have no doubt about it. And if he does not recollect seeing us at all, and I do recollect seeing him and what he said, my recollection is more apt to be correct.

With reference to the statement the admiral made I again wish to challenge it when he says the Navy did not transport but a certain per cent of our troops. I submit that the statements made in my speech come from the official records of the department, and I submit that the statement about the 3 per cent that the admiral again makes is not correct according to the published report, Bulletin No. 5, from Admiral Sims's headquarters, which the committee can obtain, in which bulletin he distinctly gives the figures as to the escort and the number of troops transported. This bulletin will cause Americans to be more proud of the achievements of their Navy than the statements contained in the record there. I refer to the statement in the London Times History of the War, volume 20, page 42, which is substantially the statement which the admiral made to Mr. Glass, Mr. Whaley and myself in Paris, and when again in London as to what our Navy had done. This is the Times History of the World War. It says [reading]:

"While speaking in London on October 11, 1918, Admiral Sims said: 'An idea was sometimes in American minds that the American Navy had been doing the bulk of the business over here; at least a half. That is not correct. There were about 5,000 antisubmarine craft operating day and night, and the American craft numbered 160, or 3 per cent.'"

According to the figures of the Navy Department, that is not correct. The figures according to the Navy Department on that date—he was speaking on October 11, 1918—show that there were 323 United States naval vessels in European waters. On November 11 there were 373 United States naval vessels in European waters, including 70 destroyers, 5 gunboats, 5 Coast Guard cutters, 127 marine chasers, 27 Army yachts, 12 submarines, 13 mine sweepers, and 10 mine planters, making in all 262 vessels engaged in operation against the submarines, instead of 160.

Those were the discrepancies of statement to which I referred and which I took not from any information of mine but from Admiral Sims's statement.

If the committee has any further questions to ask me, I shall be glad to answer.

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The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Byrnes, after you had this interview there with Admiral Sims, and after you went to Tours, when you found that the admiral was making such statements, what did you do?

Representative BYRNES. What did I do?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Did you make any report to the Navy Department or to the Government in any way?

Representative BYRNES. Well, I did not to the Navy Department. Of course, when we returned, though, I was so amazed at it that I did make a report.

The CHAIRMAN. To whom did you make a report?

Representative BYRNES. I made a report to the President of the United States, in the course of a conversation with the President. Because of the impression made upon me by Admiral Sims, I believed it my duty to advise the President, and did advise the President, of the substance of my conversations with Admiral Sims, as I have advised the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. How did you advise the President? By a written report?

Representative BYRNES. No; I stated that in the course of the conversation with the President I told him about it.

The CHAIRMAN. When was that?

Representative BYRNES. I can not give you the date, but I can tell you when it was. It was the Saturday afternoon before Congress met in the fall of 1918. The Congress meets on the first Monday in December, so it was the Saturday night previous. I returned on Thanksgiving Day, that was Thursday, or the day before Thanksgiving. Then a week after my return and prior to the President's departure to Europe I informed him of it.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you talk with the Secretary of the Navy about it?

Representative BYRNES. No, sir; I did not. The only other person I mentioned it to was Mr. Tumulty. I met Mr. Tumulty at the White House while waiting to see the President. I remember telling him, and I remember very distinctly that Mr. Tumulty said, "Why do you not tell Daniels about it, if you feel that it is so important?" And I told him I did not want to, that hostilities were over. But I knew that the President was going abroad and I believed that the President should know it because the President would have to have naval advisors, and I believed that if Admiral Sims advised him as he had advised us, he would be so incorrectly advised that in fairness to him he ought to know what had been said to us, and then he could determine for himself how reliable would be the information he received from Admiral Sims.

The CHAIRMAN. Then, afterwards, when Secretary Daniels recommended Admiral Sims to the position of admiral of the Navy, the President was fairly cognizant of these events that you spoke of, and the attitude of Admiral Sims during the war, and yet did not interfere in any way.

Representative BYRNES. You are asking me to make an argument but you objected to my making an argument in the beginning——

The CHAIRMAN. And then I allowed you to go on.

Representative BYRNES. If you are asking me about the President, I know nothing about the President's views on this subject, why he didn't. I am not authorized to speak for him. I know of no reason why he should have recommended Admiral Sims. I have no doubt that if you ask him, he would advise you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Byrnes, what was this trip that you made abroad? Was it an official trip?

Representative BYRNES. It was not.

The CHAIRMAN. You three Congressmen—Senator Glass was a Congressman at that time, I believe.

Representative BYRNES. He was.

The CHAIRMAN. You made this trip on your own initiative?

Representative BYRNES. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And went to the front, and went around over the war zone in Europe?

Representative BYRNES. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Not officially in any way?

Representative BYRNES. Not officially, except as a Congressman to secure information about conditions abroad, but not by direction of the House of Representatives.

The CHAIRMAN. But not by direction of the House of Representatives?

Representative BYRNES. I say not by direction of the House of Representatives or by any committee.

The CHAIRMAN. You had nothing to do with the Naval Affairs Committee that went over?

Representative BYRNES. No. I am a member of the Appropriations Committee, not the Naval Committee. Mr. Glass, Mr. Whaley, and myself went not on trans-

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ports but on the French line at our own expense, and on our own initiative, not in any official capacity.

Senator POINDEXTER. Did you make any protest in the House of Representatives to the Naval Affairs Committee against the conferring of the rank of admiral on Admiral Sims, Mr. Byrnes?

Representative BYRNES. No. I am very glad to answer the question of the Senator. When that bill came up in the House I was sick, absent from the city, and therefore did not vote upon the question at all. In fact, I did not know that it was to be presented, and did not see it for several days afterwards.

Senator POINDEXTER. You did not know that it was pending in the House at the time the vote was taken on it?

Representative BYRNES. No; not until two or three days afterwards, I happened to see it in the newspaper.

Senator POINDEXTER. Do you recall when the armistice was agreed to, what date?

Representative BYRNES. November 11.

Senator POINDEXTER. I understand that your conversation with Admiral Sims was October 31?

Representative BYRNES. Yes; October 31.

Senator POINDEXTER. You say in that conversation he was explaining why it was necessary to agree to an armistice?

Representative BYRNES. Yes; he said that.

Senator POINDEXTER. The armistice was agreed to, or at least the terms were signed on the 11th of November?

Representative BYRNES. Yes.

Senator POINDEXTER. Some time after your conversation?

Representative BYRNES. Yes, sir; 11 days. At the time we saw Admiral Sims in Paris, Jellicoe and others from England were at our hotel, and a representative of the Italian Government had come, Col. House had arrived on this date—that is how I remember the date—too from this country, and they were there for the purpose of preparing the terms of the armistice. According to the most general information in Paris, they were meeting for that purpose at that time on October 31. That is what we learned from them.

Senator POINDEXTER. That is all.

Senator TRAMMELL. Do you know, Mr. Byrnes, whether Congressman Whaley is coming this afternoon?

Representative BYRNES. May I say that Mr. Whaley advised me that he has been sick in bed for three weeks and came out yesterday for the first time, and he telephoned me before I left the house and said that he would be unable to be here, but that he was writing a letter which he asked me to present to the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. I hope you will read the letter.

Representative BYRNES (reading):

"FEBRUARY 10, 1920.

"Hon. FREDERICK HALE,
"*Chairman Subcommittee on Naval Affairs,*
"*United States Senate.*

"MY DEAR SENATOR: I am informed that your committee at its hearing this morning decided to have Senator Glass and Representatives Byrnes and myself to attend a hearing this afternoon to make statements as to the conversation we had with Admiral Sims in Paris and London in October and November, 1918.

"I have been confined to my room for almost three weeks with influenza and my physician advises me that it would be dangerous for me to comply with the request of the committee and attend this hearing. It is my hope that within a few days I will have sufficiently recovered to enable me to appear before the subcommittee, and I shall then not only be willing but shall greatly desire the opportunity to appear. If the committee, however, desires to close this part of its hearing at this time and determines not to await my presence, I ask that there be inserted in the record this letter containing my recollection of the conversations above referred to.

"My recollection is very clear about them. In October, either the 30th or the 31st, 1918, Mr. Glass, Mr. Byrnes, and I called upon Admiral Sims at the Hotel Crillon, in Paris, in response to an invitation extended to us over the telephone by him. During our conversation with the admiral the question came up about the making of an armistice. He was asked why it was necessary and his reply was that the American transportation had broken down; that ammunition and supplies could not be gotten up to Gen. Pershing; and that the Americans could not advance any farther.

"This astounded us all, as we had been down to Tours some weeks before and had been informed by Gen. Harbord and Gen. Hagood, his chief of staff, of the splendid work of the S. O. S. There was no intimation by Admiral Sims that this was propa-

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ganda by anybody, but was a direct, concise statement of fact by the admiral and was made to us for the purpose of giving us the inside information as to why the armistice was being made.

"After we left the admiral at the hotel we were so disturbed at his statement and so worried because of the fact we felt the American Army was being unloaded on, Mr. Byrnes and myself decided to make another trip to Tours. Mr. Glass could not go with us because he had an engagement the following day, but urged us to go and carefully look into the matter, as all three of us felt it was one which would come up later on and be a source of a great deal of political discussion, national and international.

"During the afternoon Mr. Byrnes and myself got in communication with the Intelligence Bureau of the American Army, in Paris, and endeavored to make arrangements to go to Tours the next day. About 6.30 in the afternoon we received a telephone message stating that arrangements had been made whereby Mr. Byrnes and myself could be sent down in an open machine. We left the following day for Tours and arrived there about 2 o'clock, and we spent that afternoon and evening and part of the following day with Gen. Harbord and his staff, and informed them of this statement of Admiral Sims. The general advised us it was absolutely untrue, and showed us communications from Gen. Pershing containing the highest praise for the work of the S. O. S. Gen. Harbord told me, with some heat, this was nothing but British propaganda, and that there was but one man in Paris yelling for an armistice. Our investigation at Tours satisfied us that the staetment made by Admiral Sims to us was absolutely untrue.

"While in London we visited Admiral Sims again at his office in the American Admiralty Building. During this interview he made the statement that America should not go into the merchant marine business and should get rid of its merchant ships and allow England to control the merchant marine. I did not take part in this conversation to any extent except to listen with astonishment to his statements. Mr. Byrnes, however, did ask him many questions on this line and my recollection is clear that he was very emphatic in his opinion that America should not go into the merchant marine business on any large scale.

"I am told that Admiral Sims has made the statement when he told us about the breakdown of our line of communication back of the American Army, that, at the same time he advised us this was propaganda that was being circulated and he wanted to warn us it was incorrect. I desire emphatically to say that this is absolutely untrue. Had Admiral Sims told us any such story it would never have been misunderstood by all three of us, nor would we have, at great inconvenience, traveled 150 miles in order to ascertain the details of this alleged disaster. Had Admiral Sims told us it was propaganda we would never have reported it to Col. Harbord and Gen. Hagood, and I am absolutely clear in my memory of the conversation with Admiral Sims that it was a direct statement and charge against the American Army and his explanation now of the matter is simply an afterthought in order to avoid his statement which reflected disastrously on the American Army in France.

"I have stated my recollection of the matter succinctly and shortly, but I would like to again express to you my desire to appear before the subcommittee so that any member may have the opportunity of cross-examining me.

"Sincerely, yours,

"RICHARD S. WHALEY."

NOTE.—When the bill making Admiral Sims and Benson permanent admirals in the Navy was voted upon in the House of Representatives, Representative Whaley is reported as having voted in favor of the bill.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Glass, will you proceed?

STATEMENT OF HON. CARTER GLASS, MEMBER OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE.

Senator TRAMMEL. Senator Glass, you heard the statement read that was made by Admiral Sims this morning, in regard to the question of the visit made by yourself, Congressman Byrnes, and Congressman Whaley, and you observed that statements that were made that if he had told you anyting in regard to this report that he had done it in the nature of a warning, and that he had advised you that it was not true. Will you just tell us your recollection of that, Senator?

Senator GLASS. I want to say in the first place, Mr. Chairman, that I am neither a willing nor a cheerful witness. It is rather distasteful to me to be drawn into a controversy of this sort, because I entertain a very warm affection for my former colleague, Mr. Byrnes, and I have entertained a great admiration for Admiral Sims, and as much attachment for him as one might form for a man whom he has encountered in pleasant work.

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It is quite obvious to me that Admiral Sims has somewhat confounded some conversation held by him with some persons in London with his conversation held with Representatives Byrnes, and Whaley and me in Paris. As I find from my diary, on Monday, the 28th of October, Capt. Jackson, United States naval attaché in Paris, arranged for me to see Admiral Sims at the Hotel Crillon, and on October 30 we did see Admiral Sims.

Senator POINDEXTER. What date?

Senator GLASS. October 30. The notation here is "Admiral Sims at Hotel Crillon," so I take it that was the date upon which we saw him.

I had a letter of——

Senator POINDEXTER. Let me ask you there—not to interrupt you—you heard Mr. Byrnes's statement that it was the 31st?

Senator GLASS. Yes. I am giving my statement now, not Mr. Byrnes's.

Senator POINDEXTER. Mr. Byrnes is evidently mistaken about it.

Senator GLASS. Either Mr. Byrnes is or I am. [Laughter.]

Senator POINDEXTER. Which do you think it is? Do you think it is you or Mr. Byrnes that is mistaken? I am trying to get information. It could not have been both dates. You see, one or the other is mistaken.

Senator GLASS. It could have been both dates, because we might have seen him two times.

Representative BYRNES. If you will pardon me, I think in justice to me the Senator will remember that I have stated that I fixed the date by this diary, which showed that we were at Tours on the 1st, and that it was my recollection that it was the day previous. It might have been the day before that.

Senator GLASS. Certainly that is not material.

Representative BYRNES. I fixed it only by the date we went to Tours. I have a memorandum here from which I concluded that it was next day.

Senator POINDEXTER. I think you did say that.

Senator GLASS. I think it is totally immaterial whether it was the 30th or 31st.

Senator POINDEXTER. It is material or immaterial as showing the liability of a man to forget things.

Senator GLASS. Yes; anybody on earth is liable fo forget things, particularly as to whether a thing happened on the 30th of the month or the 31st of the month a year ago.

Senator POINDEXTER. I think that is true, and I just call attention to it to emphasize it.

Senator GLASS. At all events, Mr. Chairman, we did go to the Hotel Crillon, in Paris, and I sent up to the apartment of Admiral Sims a very cordial letter of introduction from the Secretary of the Navy, and Admiral Sims promptly came down into the lobby of the hotel and sought me out. I presented to him my two colleagues, and he invited us up to his apartment.

My recollection of the incident is a little different from that of my former colleague, Mr. Byrnes. As I recall, what Admiral Sims said was prompted or provoked by a statement that I made to him that we had been at general headquarrers a few days theretofore, at Chaumont, and had gotten the distinct impression that Gen. Pershing was opposed to an armistice, whereupon Admiral Sims responded, as I recollect, that we were obliged to grant the armistice because of the breakdown of the communications of supply. I was not impressed with the idea that Admiral Sims was in a critical state of mind but was simply stating his view of the situation. I can not say that I got the impression that he was undertaking to discredit the Army, but was merely stating what he supposed to be a fact.

I am quite clear that Admiral Sims did not say to us that he did not believe the statement, and that he did not caution us not to believe the statement, because that was the first intimation that any of us had received on the subject, and it came literally as an unqualified statement. It is incredible—and this may be argumentative and improper—it is incredible that two sane men—and all Congressmen are not sane—should have put themselves to the great inconvenience and indeed physical distress, in the state of the weather over there, to have gotten into an automobile and to have traveled, as Mr. Byrnes says, 150 miles, from Paris to Tours, to undertake to verify or disprove a statement, when they had been in advance told that the statement was not true and not to believe it. As a matter of fact, Mr. Byrnes and Mr. Whaley did, according to my diary, on October 31, go from Paris to Tours. My notation here is, "Thursday, October 31. Whaley and Byrnes went to Tours to see S. O. S." I did not go; and Byrnes will pardon the frank statement that I did not go because I wanted to get rid of him and Whaley the next day. I wanted one day in Paris to myself. [Laughter.] I wanted to see things that they did not want to see, and I saw them in their absence. I find that they were perfectly harmless things, though.

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I went to see Lord Derby, the British ambassador, and I went to the Church of Notre Dame, and I observe here that I "prayed in Notre Dame." At all events they did go. I, in a spirit of levity, teased them about having their South Carolina general, Hagood, involved in that sort of trouble. I had no Virginia general there to look after and I did not go—another reason.

At all events, they were rather indignant over the statement made by Admiral Sims. I was not especially indignant. I was a little regretful at the statement that there had been a breakdown of communications of supply, and that because of that we must grant an armistice.

I am not clear in my recollection that it was at that interview and in that conversation that Admiral Sims spoke of the merchant marine, and spoke specifically and in detail of the work, in contrast, done by the British and American naval forces. It may have been there, also; but undoubtedly, in London, Admiral Sims did make statements to us substantively as Mr. Byrnes has said, though I did not enter into the conversation to any great extent, except I recall, in response to the suggestion of Admiral Sims that we would never have a merchant marine because of the policy of subsidy necessarily involved, having answered that I thought the American people, subsidy or no subsidy, would decline ever to be caught in the humiliating situation at which we found ourselves at the beginning of this war.

While I have no sort of doubt in my mind that Admiral Sims made substantially these statements, I can not say that they made exactly the same impression on me that they made upon my colleagues. I had been, myself, regarded as decidedly proally and even, before the war began, by some of my friends had been regarded as decidedly pro-British. I recall very distinctly laughing at my colleagues and telling them that Admiral Sims beat me at it, all to pieces. And I did feel some sense of humiliation that apparently our Navy had not done a great deal.

There is not a particle of doubt in mind, however, that these statements were made by Admiral Sims, because—not "because." There is no doubt.

But then I called on perhaps two of the most prominent statesmen of Great Britain while in London with letters of introduction, and it happened that both of these gentlemen in a more or less mysterious way referred to this breakdown of the American communications of supply, and I remarked to my two colleagues that there must be some truth in what Admiral Sims had told us in Paris, because these two prominent British statesmen, in converstation with me, had mentioned the same incident. And later on in the month, when we went to the British front, Maj. Norie, of the British service, at the chateau at which we were stopping, made reference to the same thing. And again I twitted my South Carolina colleagues with the fact that their South Carolina general had broken down and that there must be some truth in what Admiral Sims had told us in Paris.

The CHAIRMAN. When was this, Senator? Was it before the armistice?

Senator GLASS. Oh, yes; this was all before the armistice.

I am not surprised that Admiral Sims has no recollection of receiving Whaley and Byrnes and me. He was a great man over there, and we were ordinary American Congressmen, a great many of whom went over and went to headquarters.

I am neither surprised nor indignant at his failure to remember me. I remember him very cordially, because he gave us the rare opportunity of visiting the Grand Fleet, and we were on board a British battleship when the wireless news came of Germany's capitulation, and there by the courtesy of Admiral Sims. I believe that I have, as briefly and as succinctly as I can do, stated my recollection of the matter.

Senator POINDEXTER. Did you make any entry in your diary of the principal conversation with Admiral Sims that you have referred to, on the 30th of October?

Senator GLASS. No; I did not; nor have I repeated the conversation since I have been back over here.

Senator POINDEXTER. I am referring to what you testified to here just now.

Senator GLASS. Well, I did not testify that I made any notation of my conversation.

Senator POINDEXTER. But you testified to a conversation.

Senator GLASS. I did; yes.

Senator POINDEXTER. And you made no note of that in your diary?

Senator GLASS. I said I had not.

Senator POINDEXTER. When were these conversations you had with the two principal statesmen of Great Britain?

Senator GLASS. Why, immediately before or immediately after the armistice. I think it was immediately before the armistice; sometime between the 4th and the 11th of November.

Senator POINDEXTER. Of course, then, that was after Mr. Byrnes and Mr. Whaley had visited Tours and returned and made their report to you?

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Senator GLASS. Oh, yes. They made no report to me, however. They merely stated conversationally that Gens. Harbord and Hagood explicitly denied that there had been any breakdown of the communications of supply, and had exhibited to them—and indeed they had obtained copies of—recent orders from Gen. Pershing highly commending the efficiency of their sources of supply.

Senator POINDEXTER. Do you remember what they said to you when you twitted them with the fact that it must be true, in view of what these British officers said?

Senator GLASS. Well, I would not like to repeat here in this presence what they said.

Senator POINDEXTER. It is quite interesting to know the substance of it, and you could leave out any offensive part of it and tell what they said.

Senator GLASS. All of it was offensive.

Senator POINDEXTER. I guess that is all.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all.

Senator TRAMMELL. I do not know of any further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Senator PITTMAN. Mr. Chairman, I was not present when Congressman Whaley's letter was read. Does he ask to be heard before the committee?

The CHAIRMAN. He says that he will be very glad to appear, unless we want to close the hearings immediately.

Representative BYRNES. Mr. Whaley says that he is not only willing but most anxious to have an opportunity to come before the committee. His doctor advised him that it would be very unsafe for him to come down town here to-day. He has been sick for three weeks.

Senator TRAMMELL. I think we have covered the principal points involved.

Representative BYRNES. He said that he desired to appear before the committee if they wanted to cross-examine him in reference to it.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Representative BYRNES. He hopes to be out in two or three days.

Senator TRAMMELL. So that, unless the committee decides later to call him, I see no necessity of it.

The CHAIRMAN. That is correct. Admiral Sims, have you anything further to say to the committee?

Senator TRAMMELL. I just want to ask one question.

The report of Gen. Pershing which you read from there, Admiral, does it state that the soldiers were ready and available or not?

Admiral SIMS. I do not think that it says that the soldiers are available; but when he asks to have them sent over by a certain time, of course he would not have asked unless they had been available. They would have been available or that would have been foolish. He must have known the situation thoroughly.

Senator TRAMMELL. I do not think that would have been foolish. I think he knew they were preparing our soldiers, and he was giving them in advance the number they would need by a certain time; and of course it may be, making that request that a certain number be furnished by that time, the War Department would go ahead and try to get that number ready for him.

Admiral SIMS. I think it is altogether probable that the rapidity of the training of the troops was governed by what they knew as to the limitations of the transports to carry them across. I would assume that as being entirely reasonable.

Senator TRAMMELL. As far as you knew, the soldiers were transported and available at the time that he requested them to have a certain quota requested in that communication?

Admiral SIMS. He made a request for a certain number of troops, and he said he made it that size because he knew that they could not get them over. Here is what he says (reading):

Understood here that a shipping program based on tonnage in sight prepared in War College Division in September contemplated that entire first corps with its corps troops and some 32,000 auxiliaries were to have been shipped by end of November, and that an additional program for December, January, and February contemplates

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that the shipment of the second corps with its corps troops and other auxiliaries should be practically completed by the end of February. Should such a program be carried out as per schedule and should shipments continue at corresponding rate, it would not succeed in placing even three complete corps, with proper proportion of Army troops and auxiliaries, in France by the end of May.

The beginning of that dispatch, which is dated December 20, 1917, says: "Understood here that a shipping program based on tonnage in sight prepared in War College Division," etc.

In other words, they were shipping troops over there conditioned upon the known condition of tonnage, and probably their training was the same way.

Senator TRAMMELL. It remains as a matter of fact that they did transport them, and, according to the report of the Secretary, got approximately 1,000,000 men there by the 30th of June, 1918?

Admiral SIMS. I will give you the figures there, in a minute. They got over there about 880,000 troops by the end of June; that is with the service of supply and auxiliaries, etc., as mentioned in his telegram.

Senator TRAMMELL. By the end of June?

Admiral SIMS. By the end of June. That is the arrival in the ports. These are the Navy's figures of the total at the time they arrived in the ports. They reported back to us. Here is a memorandum submitted to me by the officer who handled convoys, and who was informed directly through his office of the amount of troops that arrived on each transport, etc. [Reading:]

UNITED STATES NAVAL FORCES,
OPERATING IN EUROPEAN WATERS,
U. S. S. "MELVILLE" FLAGSHIP,
July 12, 1918.

Ref. 01.
Memorandum for the Admiral.

At the end of June there had arrived in Europe 878,878 troops. These have been carried as follows:

American ships	463,625
British ships or ships controlled by British	408,657
French line ships carrying a few troops as passengers	4,943
Italian line	1,653
Total	878,878

British moved less than 50 per cent total to date.

During April, 1918, the British began to reorganize their shipping, placing combined troop and cargo vessels on the run between United States and England. The first large convoy arrived in England on May 7. During May an additional 11½-knot troop convoy was started and the first convoy arrived on May 24. The process of reorganization is still going on. During the months of May and June 55 per cent of the troops brought to Europe were in British ships or in ships under British control. During June the percentage of troops in British was about 57 per cent.

The United States is also increasing its fleet of transports by adding Dutch ships and American ships; also a contract has been made with the French to use a number of French transports to carry troops direct to Europe. Thus far French ships have contributed practically nothing to troop transport.

The records for July thus far would indicate that July will be the biggest month to date, and there will be upwards of 250,000 troops carried during this month. It looks as if British ships would carry about 55 per cent of the total for the month of July.

That is just a periodical report that was sent in by the man handling the troop transports. He got all the figures as they came through.

Senator PITTMAN. When was the great troop shipment from the United States?

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Admiral SIMS. It began after the drive in March. It began in April. Just running down through the figures, without taking all the details of the entries, I find: January, 40,000; February, 27,000; March, 72,000; April, 104,000. Now we begin to get the large numbers. May, 233,000; June, 230,000: July, 318,000; August, 258,000; September, 311,000; October, 202,000; November, 97,000. So that it began with May—say, the 1st of May or the latter part of April. In April there were 104,000 and in May 233,000. So that it began the latter part of April. The drive began on the 21st of March, as I remember it.

Senator TRAMMELL. Was there more allied shipping in May, 1918, than there was in October, 1917?

Admiral SIMS. Was there more allied shipping when?

Senator PITTMAN. In April, 1918?

Admiral SIMS. Than there was in November, 1917?

Senator PITTMAN. In November, 1917?

Admiral SIMS. No; it was still going down. No, it did not begin to increase. the shipping, up until what was the month?

Senator PITTMAN. And yet in April, when you had less allied tonnage——

Admiral SIMS. What month?

Senator PITTMAN. April, 1918, when you had less allied tonnage than in November, 1917——

Admiral SIMS. Yes.

Senator PITTMAN. You transported 247,000 troops?

Admiral SIMS. Yes.

Senator PITTMAN. Two hundred and forty-seven thousand seven hundred and fourteen troops?

Admiral SIMS. Yes.

Senator PITTMAN. While in November, 1917, you transported 23,722 only.

Admiral SIMS. Yes.

Senator PITTMAN. In other words, when you had less allied tonnage, there were transported over ten times as many troops, in that month?

Admiral SIMS. Yes. I think you were out of the room when I explained why they were able to do that. I think you had left, and Senator Trammell was talking to me about it. The reason we were able to do that was this: When we were in this point of the curve—and this is very important—where these things were diverging from each other, the future looked very black, as Mr. Hoover explained. We did not see how we could escape defeat. When we put the convoy system into operation the losses of shipping began to go down, and building of shipping began to go up. Just as soon as we got up about here and here [indicating on chart], knowing that we were approaching the point where they would cross, we knew then that the submarine campaign could not win for Germany, and then we were able to bring in ships from the outside that were en route, that we would not have dared to bring in before. That is the point I want to make very clear. As long as these lines were diverging from each other, and the loss of shipping was very much greater than the building, we did not dare haul those ships in from all over the world, and concentrate the shipping all in one line. When it began to come down this way [indicating on chart], we knew

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that in a measurable time these two lines would cross each other, and buildings would be superior to losses; but until we could see these lines converging—and we kept this curve for that purpose; and I predicted that they would cross there, and I predicted within a week or something like that of the exact time—we did not dare bring in those ships. This was all done in sight of the members of the allied council. They said where they were going to get this tonnage for us; and it was not that they had less tonnage to use for the troops, but it was that they could use tonnage that they did not dare use before.

Senator PITTMAN. I am not interested in the reason. I just say that it is a fact that it was within your power that with the tonnage you had you did transport 247,000 tons in April, 1918, when you only transported 23,000 with a greater tonnage in November, 1917.

Admiral SIMS. Certainly it was within our power, but it was not within the limits of ordinary, mere common sense to have done it before we saw these curves converging.

Senator PITTMAN. I am saying it was possible.

Admiral SIMS. The possibility has not anything to do with it at all. It was made as a combined military decision of all the military men over there in the supreme war council, with all the naval men and the shipping men with the fate of the country in their hands, and therefore it was not possible to do it at all as long as human beings remained the same as they are.

Senator PITTMAN. In other words, there were British ships on some other long runs that could have been used?

Admiral SIMS. No; the ships were British, French, Italian, Portuguese, and all sorts of ships. They were bringing supplies along the coast of South America into the United States; many of those supplies absolutely essential, many of them articles that the war could not go on without. But as soon as we saw that we had the submarine campaign a failure, then we could bring those ships in. You could not say that it was possible before. Of course, it is possible to do any fool thing in the world, but no reasonable man sitting around a council table could have done it before that.

Senator PITTMAN. No; but if there had been a million troops in the United States in 1917, which there were not, and their immediate presence in France was essential to win the war, they would have been gotten there?

Admiral SIMS. They could not have been gotten there at that time until we saw our way clear, because there would have been no way to keep them there. We would have had an Army there all dressed up and no place to go. We did not dare to put too many troops there.

Senator PITTMAN. I see. Then Gen. Pershing was not in such a hurry to get them there after all?

Admiral SIMS. According to what he says, he was.

Senator PITTMAN. But you say that you would have had them there all dressed up and no place to go.

Admiral SIMS. The thing has to be carefully worked out as to what you are going to do. You have got to have the tonnage. Our embarrassment was due to the fact that there were 2,500,000 tons lost clearly by our not going into the war in the beginning. Now, the effect of that thing is a matter of military opinion, and there is

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no doubt in the world that about 2,500,000 tons were lost unnecessarily to the allied cause by our not going into the war until later.

Senator PITTMAN. You mean not declaring war sooner?

Admiral SIMS. No; I mean not putting forth our early effort, as we could have done in April, 1918, and resisting the convoy system. That is what hurt us, not sending the antisubmarine forces over to the other side, which would help convoy, because we convoyed 40 ships with only five or six destroyers. That was a scandal. And our ships were bumming up and down our coast here, and they would not send them over. They would not give them cruisers to transport them across the ocean, to protect them against raiders. That is the whole business about it.

Senator PITTMAN. That is a technical matter?

Admiral SIMS. No, it is not a technical matter. It is just plain, common, ordinary common sense. There was a war going on over there, and they did not send the ships over. It was months before any of them got there.

Senator PITTMAN. Undoubtedly there will be some other admiral come on here and explain every policy here, and I imagine they have got some common sense.

Admiral SIMS. They are going to be up against it.

Senator PITTMAN. All the admirals in the Navy will be up against it.

Admiral SIMS. They surely will if they undertake to explain how they could fight the war on this side. What we are trying to do, Senator Pittman—and you are a good American and you must be with us in this—is this: God help us if this had been a real war. As far as the Navy was concerned, if we had declared war against a single power that was ready on the drop of the hat with a navy, where would we have been? None of our ships, to speak of, were ready. There was no plan made as to what we were going to do with the submarine campaign; and officers of the Navy are horrified over that as soon as they find it out; and we do not want that to happen any more, and that is the reason we are bringing this thing out, to have it discussed.

Senator PITTMAN. The question of having an efficient fleet is a matter, of course, that appeals to every naval officer, and I think it appeals to every member of the Naval Committee.

Admiral SIMS. Yes; it is the first line of defense.

Senator PITTMAN. And it has, for a long time; but there are many in Congress to whom it does not appeal very strongly. There never is an appropriation bill prepared by the department and presented but what it is cut all to pieces. When the three-year naval program came up, the House cut it all to pieces, and the Senate Naval Affairs Committee doubled it and extended the life of it. But that is a matter of policy, of course, that is established by representatives of the various sections of the country.

Admiral SIMS. Yes; I understand that.

Senator PITTMAN. You can not build ships or repair ships nor get personnel for ships without money. That policy we are not going into.

Admiral SIMS. No. What I am speaking about is that they did not use the ships they had.

Senator PITTMAN. Yes; and I am confining my objection to your line of testimony on that. The only thing I am questioning you in

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regard to is what I consider hasty statements on your part with regard to the responsibility of the Navy; and I have not any doubt that you consider that the plans adopted by the board here with regard to the protection of this coast were absurd, and yet some of those are very able officers, who felt that the first consideration of the Navy was the protection of the ports of the United States.

Admiral SIMS. You can not protect the ports when they are not attacked.

Senator PITTMAN. Yes; I understand that; but they thought they might have been attacked.

Admiral SIMS. Very well; but I told them, and it turned out to be absolutely true. I said "There will never be a submarine leave the other side without my telling you her name and number and when she leaves, and what she is going to do. Listen to this: A submarine that came over here from the other side to attack our ships would have no base here. He has got to come over at a speed of 4 or 5 knots an hour, and it takes him nearly a month; and our submarines, as I said, could be sent back at double the speed, because they come right back and go into port and refuel; and the destroyers could be sent back. If you can imagine the situation, with a war going on 3,000 miles away, and they holding back the forces here for fear some of these fellows will slip through and come over here and attack the coast. If they had attacked the coast in any force at all they must have lost the war. It is like this: There are the ports of the submarines, separated from us by 3,000 miles. Everything that leaves out of those ports and comes across the ocean has got to go back in that hole there. What is the sense in coming way over here looking for them, when they are bound to come right back there to go back in their hole. Everything rendered it certain that the war would be lost to the Germans if they sent their submarines over here.

Moreover, they could not have sent them without my knowing it and telling them over here. I told them every time a submarine left when she left and where she would go and where she would lay her mines, and I told them all about it every time. If they were not disposed that that information was all right, for the Lord's sake, why did they not send somebody else over there that they would believe about it?

Senator PITTMAN. I do not know whether you are right or wrong about it, as a naval officer.

Admiral SIMS. I do. I know.

Senator PITTMAN. I know you are indiscreet about some statements you have made, that you have had to take back, so far, during the hearings here.

Admiral SIMS. Yes. Let me tell you one thing. I would like to make quite clear that in all the propositions that were made on the other side for the putting down of the submarine campaign, all of those things without exception, the ones that are worth talking about, were resisted by the Navy Department during a period of three or four months, and were then finally accepted and adopted. Therefore they must have been right in the opinion of the Navy Department. Every device that was put up by the Navy Department on this side, of any particular importance, was rejected by the Naval Council on the other side as not being practicable, and was finally, after a correspondence of two or three months, acknowledged by the

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Navy Department here as not being practicable. That is what we are complaining about; the violation of every principle of warfare, that you send a man where the fighting is going on to carry on the fighting, and then try to tell him, from a distance of 3,000 miles, every little thing that he is to do. We can not afford to put up with that sort of thing another time.

Senator PITTMAN. I know one thing, if they had asked your advice and taken it, you would have escaped one unfortunate thing, and that is this hearing.

Admiral SIMS. Let me interrupt, right there, please. It was not a question of my advice in the case. You can go through my testimony, and you can find repeated expressions about "my advice," but it was not my advice. It was the advice of the ablest men in the allied navies, sitting around in a council chamber, men who had had three years of experience in this war, and the whole thing thrashed out with the army people on the other side; and those decisions were sent over here. That is what is called, popularly, my advice. Every one of those decisions was reached after a long discussion of those able men, and was based on the discussion there. You could send to any part of the admiralty in Paris, or wherever it was, and get all the information on anything and lay it on the table and we would sit there for a week, if necessary, and discuss these things, and we would determine on the policy and then I would send it to Washington, and what happened? Nothing doing. They would not even discuss it; and then after two or three months of correspondence, finally they would say "The scheme of the allied council"—not my scheme—"is approved, and we will adopt it."

Senator PITTMAN. Did they ever follow your advice in regard to catching submarines with fish nets?

Admiral SIMS. With fish nets?

Senator PITTMAN. No; with nets?

Admiral SIMS. I do not understand.

Senator PITTMAN. Did they follow your advice about seining these submarines out of the ocean?

Admiral SIMS. They tried every possible scheme. They tried floating nets with glass balls on the top, not to catch the submarine but in order to trace him. During the years we were out of the war certain information drifted over here in various ways. I was asked frequently by church societies and such organizations to tell them what I knew about the submarine campaign. We did not know much about what they were doing on the other side then, although some of the attachés who were over on the other side, and that were serving in Washington, had been on the other side, and they told us what they knew about it, and it was full of misinformation; and in the lectures delivered then there were a good many things told, given to us as actual information, which were not true, or that had been tried and were not successful. Among those were the trailing nets, as they called them. They would suspect the presence of a submarine and they would put out a drift net with glass balls on top, and the idea is that the submarine comes along and puts his nose into the net and he can not get clear of it, and he is dragging along these glass balls on the top, and it shows you where he is. I never recommended anything after I got over on the other side that

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was not as the result of full conferences, naturally, with those leaders of the allied navies.

Senator PITTMAN. I do not believe that I have time to finish now, although I have not much more.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that we had better adjourn now. It is 1 o'clock.

(Thereupon, at 1 o'clock p. m., the subcommittee took a recess until 2.30 o'clock p. m.)

AFTERNOON SESSION.

The subcommittee reconvened at 2.30 o'clock p. m., Senator Frederick Hale (chairman) presiding.

TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL WILLIAM S. SIMS—Resumed.

Senator PITTMAN. We will just turn to another question and go on with the matter that I had in mind. The *Vaterland*, with regard to which you wrote on November 2, 1919, was afterwards known as the *Leviathan*?

Admiral SIMS. The *Leviathan*.

Senator PITTMAN. Did you not, Admiral, on the 24th of October, 1917, state as follows:

Consensus of opinion is against using the ship *Leviathan* as a transport. Her length makes her better target than smaller vessels.

And then on October 28, 1917, you reported:

Reasons against using United States ship *Leviathan* already have been submitted.

Do you know when the *Leviathan* was put in service as a transport with troops?

Admiral SIMS. I could not tell you about that; but I can tell you why they recommended that she should not be used, and that was on account of the lack of facilities in places to get her coal. As I remember the figures now, she requred about 8,000 tons of coal. She was built as a passenger steamer and required a great deal of coal; and all that coal was not in France. It had to be taken there.

Senator PITTMAN. The *Leviathan* did carry over 100,000 American troops across to France, did she not?

Admiral SIMS. Yes; when we got the facilities for her, and when we had put down five different big anchors in the harbor so that she could be held there, then she was used as a transport. She was one of those ships that although her anchor was of the very largest size known, it would not hold her at all, even in a moderate breeze. When we got all those things cleared up we used her as a transport to bring troops over. The reason we put that down, not to use her as a transport was, first, bad holding ground; second, lack of port facilities; third, liability to much delay in disembarking and coaling, owing to her exposed position where she had to lie out, at Brest. We had not the necessary lighters and steam lighters, etc. When all those difficulties were overcome, as I say, she was used with great success as a transport.

Senator PITTMAN. You know that in December they began to use her as a transport?

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Admiral SIMS. I would have to look up the records. I do not know.

Senator PITTMAN. Here is a letter of February 9, 1918, which reads as follows:

I have just had a conference with the Admiralty and the Ministry of Shipping regarding the use of the *Leviathan*, *Olympic*, *Aquitania* and *Mauretania* as troop transports. The following points were discussed.

USE OF LARGE SHIPS.

There was complete accord in the opinion that the use of these ships for carrying troops introduces a considerable element of danger, owing to the large targets that these vessels make. I pointed out, however, that this added danger would have to be accepted in order to carry out the programme of troop transport. The Admiralty officials wished to have it recorded that they considered the increase in danger of using these large vessels was marked, and that we might expect to lose one of these vessels at any time. All agreed, however, that the shipping situation demanded that these vessels be used for troop transports, assuming the necessity for early transfer of a large number of troops from America. Every effort will be made to give these vessels adequate protection.

SUITABLE PORTS FOR LARGE VESSELS.

A representative of the ministry of shipping desired that all of these vessels should use Brest, but it was pointed out that Brest has no facilities for handling these ships, and can not provide the necessary coal. The Admiralty officials were opposed to the use of Southampton on account of the added danger of submarines.

That is, having to go all through the channel.

In this I agree under present conditions. There remain only the ports of Liverpool and Glasgow. Of these Glasgow can not provide docks, and there is difficulty in providing water and coal. Liverpool is the only port that can be satisfactorily used, and even this port has many limitations. Already it is congested. During the past few weeks a greater number of submarines than usual have passed north about instead of through Dover Straits, and have entered the English Channel via the Irish Sea. This has greatly added to the dangers of the use of Liverpool; but at the same time the port is safer than that of Southampton under present conditions, and is the only port that can be used for these large vessels. In an emergency these vessels can be anchored in the Clyde below Glasgow; but troops would have to be transferred by tugs, and tugs would also have to remain in attendance in the event of the vessels dragging.

RÉSUMÉ.

I think it is clear to the department that there is some added risk in using these large vessels, and that there are many limitations to the employment of these vessels. We are restricted to use of British harbors, owing to the lack of suitable harbors in France and lack of coal in France. With the submarine situation as it is at present and as it has been for some time, we are practically restricted to the use of Liverpool, and the congestion and lack of facilities in this port for large vessels restricts us to having not more than two of these large vessels in port at the same time. Liverpool has but two berths that can accommodate these large ships under all conditions.

It will be necessary to arrange westward sailings in advance of the arrival of eastbound transports.

That was the difficulty. When those difficulties were removed, we used her with great facility.

Senator PITTMAN. What was the date of that?

Admiral SIMS. February 9, 1918.

Senator PITTMAN. And your first reported objection to it was in October?

Admiral SIMS. Sir?

Senator PITTMAN. Your first reported objection to the use of the *Leviathan* was in October, 1917?

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Admiral SIMS. October.

Senator PITTMAN. In which you said that the consensus of opinion was against using the United States ship *Leviathan* as a troop transport, because her length made her a better target than smaller vessels?

Admiral SIMS. Yes.

Senator PITTMAN. Now, Admiral, that is only a memorandum of various letters we have.

Talking about this submarine menace, and about your plan for breaking it up, how soon after the war began—I mean the European war——

Admiral SIMS. How soon after what?

Senator PITTMAN. How soon after Germany and Great Britain were involved in war, did they commence to use the submarine?

Admiral SIMS. Very soon after the war there was torpedoing of certain vessels. The whole of that situation is given in the best possible form, I should say, in Admiral von Tirpitz's book, where he took one attitude as to the use of the submarine, and the prime minister another attitude, and he explains in there the initiation of the submarine attacks, and the limitations, and their suspension, and so on, up to the final decision to start the unrestricted submarine campaign. I could not give you those dates now.

Senator PITTMAN. It commenced in 1914?

Admiral SIMS. Commencing in 1914.

Senator PITTMAN. They did commence, I say, in 1914?

Admiral SIMS. There were torpedoings in 1914.

Senator PITTMAN. Yes.

Admiral SIMS. Shortly after the war began.

Senator PITTMAN. As a naval officer, I suppose you were interested in the study of the problems created by those submarines in naval warfare?

Admiral SIMS. Certainly; yes.

Senator PITTMAN. And you were studying it from the time it commenced to the end of the war?

Admiral SIMS. In ignorance, at first; as to the conditions, the same as all naval officers were. That is a very singular thing. If you will look at that thing in Von Tirpitz's book, and in the articles that I have been recently publishing, you will see that the opinions of practically all the naval officers in the world as to what the submarine could do, and its limitations, were almost grotesquely in error. I wished in one of these articles to make the statement that none of us knew, in the beginning of the war, how much the submarine could do. I did not want to make that statement without backing it up with the necessary evidence, because there were a good many officers in all services who did not know what that evidence was, and in looking it up I found that the principal officers of the British service, dating back many years before the war, had expressed their opinion as to what they thought a submarine would be able to do, and I do not think that any of them, according to these statements, believed that a submarine could operate any considerable length of time away from its base, and consequently they believed that it could not go any considerable distance away from its base.

When the *Audacious* was torpedoed, you will find in the British published account, and also in Admiral von Tirpitz's book, that the

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British were so sure that that submarine which laid the mine which blew up the *Audacious* could not have been operating from Wilhelmshaven in the Heligoland Bight, but that it must have an outlying base some place; that they searched the west coast of Scotland minutely to see if they could find the base. The expressions of older naval officers before the war were to the effect that submarines would have to have parent ships with them; that the question of habitability alone would prevent them operating any length of time away from their base. So strong was that opinion in the German Navy itself that, although Admiral von Tirpitz, in his building program insisted upon submarines that were seagoing and not merely ones to operate around their own coast, so strong was that opinion that he had to have a very secret experiment carried out to demonstrate to his own people something of what a submarine could do; and according to his statement in his book he sent a number of submarines, I think there were 11 of them, to go 300 miles north in the North Sea and see how long they could remain; and they remained for 11 days, which was a very astonishing thing at that time, and demonstrated that they could do that.

With further improvements as to inhabitability, as you know now, they were able to operate much farther.

It is perfectly safe to say that it was a surprise to practically all naval officers in the world to find that submarines operated two and three hundred and 400 miles west of the west coast of Ireland and west of the west coast of France, and that they remained at sea usually anywhere from two to four weeks, depending upon what luck they had, the limitation being the ammunition that they carried, the ammunition being torpedoes.

Before the unrestricted campaign they used to sink ships by gunfire. They would pop up out of the water close by a ship and she would have to stop and surrender on pain of being torpedoed. They would send a boat to take off what they wanted from the ship, allow the crew to take to the boats, put an inexpensive bomb on board, blow a hole in her bottom, and watch her sink.

When the unrestricted campaign came on and when vessels were, generally speaking, armed, they had to attack without warning from under the water by torpedo, and when their torpedoes were exhausted they had to return. That, generally speaking, is the information they had about submarines at the beginning of the war.

Senator PITTMAN. You mean at the beginning of the German war?

Admiral SIMS. At the beginning of the German war.

Senator PITTMAN. Not our war with Germany?

Admiral SIMS. No, no. By the time of our war with Germany we knew better what they could do. But they did some things after we joined it, also.

Senator PITTMAN. How long was it before it was discovered that submarines were out in the Atlantic?

Admiral SIMS. It was very early in the war when the *Audacious* was torpedoed. They knew then, directly afterwards, that they were operating out there, because she laid a mine that the *Audacious* ran into.

Senator PITTMAN. Very soon after the beginning of the war?

Admiral SIMS. I do not remember just the date.

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Senator PITTMAN. Now, Admiral, you have criticized the fact that at the time we went into the war, in 1917, we were not sufficiently prepared to meet this submarine destruction. You had been studying the question as a very high expert, and on December 19——

Admiral SIMS. Studying the question with a very grave lack of information as to what the conditions were over there.

Senator PITTMAN. Yes.

Admiral SIMS. We did not send over officers to any great extent to get the information, and we did not know much about it.

Senator PITTMAN. The fact was that there were certain physical things that could be observed, that came to us, with regard to the torpedoing of vessels on the Atlantic, such as the *Audacious*.

Admiral SIMS. Yes.

Senator PITTMAN. On December 19, 1916, about four months before we entered the war—in fact, less—the Naval Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives was dealing with the question of preparing a Navy, I assume to be, when you gave this advice to the committee. I am reading from the hearings before the Committee on Naval Affairs of the House of Representatives on the estimates submitted by the Secretary of the Navy, 1917, at page 866. [Reading:]

Mr. KELLEY. With a reasonable number of submarines at the Canal an enemy fleet could not get very close, could it?

Capt. SIMS. I think I took that question up with the committee when I was here before.

That was in March, I think.

You must understand that a submarine cuts no ice at all as long as your enemy has control of the surface of the area in which he wishes to operate. A fleet has line after line of scouts out, and as soon as a submarine comes along she has to go to the bottom.

Mr. KELLEY. But where you have a comparatively narrow territory to guard, would not the situation be parallel to that along the German coast?

Capt. SIMS. As far as you can reach out with your guns at the Canal entrance, or as far on either side of the entrance as you are willing to build fortifications, you are safe from direct aggression by a foreign fleet, because a fleet can not stand the fire of guns firing from behind hills where they can not be reached by ship's guns; and they can not land within the area which you are disposed to protect by fortifications. But if you have not a fleet strong enough to keep them from coming over here at all they can land outside the area of your forts, and you are at their mercy. It is foolish to suppose that if your fleet is not strong enough to oppose the enemy's fleet and protect the canal that you can protect it by submarines.

Take, for example, the band of water across the English Channel, where hundreds of thousands of troops and hundreds of thousands of tons of supplies have been sent across to the Continent, and transports are going back and forth all the time and nothing happens. That is because that water is thoroughly patrolled.

I do not know whether you gentlemen know how dangerous a sufficient number of patrol vessels can make it for submarines. I have explained that to perhaps 15 or 20 civilian audiences who have wanted to know about the Navy. To give you an idea of what the thing means, let me say this: Suppose this table is the English Channel. The channel is divided into sectors, and each sector is in command of an officer, with a sort of central control for the whole business. They protect the channel against submarines. The channel is regularly patrolled, and that patrol is kept at work all the time. The chances for a submarine to get through that patrol are very small. Suppose, for instance, a submarine was sighted here [illustrating]. As soon as the patrolling vessel sees the submarine she has got to go down. The commander of the patrolling vessel immediately sends out a wireless saying the submarine was at such and such a point at such a time, say 6 o'clock in the morning. By 7 o'clock the submarine will be within that area [illustrating], and by 8 o'clock it will be within this area [illustrating].

The commander of the flotilla at this point [illustrating] will start out his flotilla from this point [illustrating], and deploy on a line from there to there [illustrating] by 8

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o'clock, and if the submarine is there it will be seen. At the same time aeroplanes go out, and they begin to look for the submarine, and look for traces of the disturbance on the surface of the water caused by that body going through underneath the surface, for although the submarine may be down 100 or 150 feet, there will be a disturbance on the surface. The waves are of a certain regularity on top, and that regularity will be disturbed by any vessel passing beneath the surface. As soon as the man in the aeroplane sees the disturbance on the surface he will notify the destroyers, and a destroyer lowers a net in front of the submarine.

This net is about 300 yards long and about 100 feet deep. It is made of wire rope, not much bigger around than a match, and the meshes are about 10 feet square, and when you bundle it up it makes a very small bundle, and you can put it in a small trough on the stern of a destroyer. The submarine comes along here [illustrating], and this net is put out, and it forms a barrier in front of the submarine. The submarine sticks its nose through one of these meshes in the net and is caught. The floats of the net remain on the surface, and the submarine can not get away from it. If she goes down to the bottom, the patrol boats know where she is, and then the commander of the submarine is ordered to say whether he will come up or not.

That is what makes it dangerous for the submarines to operate in the English Channel. If a fleet is coming along, it has a line of scouts out here [illustrating] and another line there [illustrating], advancing toward the canal, and any submarine that sees the line of scouts knows the fleet is behind, and if the submarine goes down the commander knows that by the time he gets to where the fleet is his ability to steam under the water will be about gone.

The submarine on the surface is like a powerful gasoline automobile; it can run as long as its fuel lasts, but can not use its oil engines when submerged. As soon as the boat goes below the surface it becomes an "electric runabout," being propelled by its electric motors, and when the batteries are exhausted he has to come to the surface or go to the bottom. After he gets to the surface he has to stay until he charges his batteries again. Submarines are no good at all in the face of an enemy who commands the surface of the water.

Mr. CALLAWAY. What have you to say about the action of the submarines when the British fleet was at the Dardanelles?

Capt. SIMS. They attempted it several times. The submarine which torpedoed the three British cruisers at the beginning of the war attempted to attack the British fleet, and so far as we know that is the only one who has ever gotten at the British fleet. When he went down he went under the screens and came up in the middle of the fleet and was promptly rammed and sunk.

Mr. CALLAWAY. At the Dardanelles they went in there and began to bombard everything.

Capt. SIMS. They sank vessels in there. The trouble about the whole business is that there are not enough boats in the world to patrol all the areas you want to control. The British Navy has probably about 200 destroyers with the fleet, and they have to stay there for fear the German fleet will come out.

Mr. CALLAWAY. There were quite a number of ships at the Dardanelles, and they had complete control of the surface of the water, and one submarine went in there and it sank two battleships, and at the time it sank the last one the statement was made that the smaller craft steaming to the aid of the sinking ship were so many that the smoke from the vessels almost obscured the sun, and they did not discover where the submarine came from.

Capt. SIMS. They did not understand at the beginning of the war how to meet the attack of the submarine. That would never happen now. As to how the submarines would be opposed, that is a question of nets. If this fellow goes down to the bottom instead of electing to run, and they wait for him in that area and do not find him they conclude he must be on the bottom.

Did the Navy Department follow your advice with regard to these nets?

Admiral SIMS. I never gave any advice.

Senator PITTMAN. I assumed that that was advice.

Admiral SIMS. Not at all, sir. That was simply repeating a lecture that I heard at the War College by an officer who had been over there during the greater part of the war. Just how much of it was true I do not know. I was informed since that they did in the early part of the war use nets with some success until the Germans got onto it and rigged their boats with appliances that would easily cut a net.

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Nets were used in the early part of the war with great success, but they soon found that with these net cutters they could stick through any net of any size unless the net would give, as they say, so that it would not bring it up with a halt. All sorts of methods were tried. Just whether those are descriptions of actual things that took place, I am sure I do not know. I listened to this lecture with considerable interest at the War College by a man who had been on the other side, telling what he knew at that time. Of course, a large part of that thing was in connection with what I told them about the Panama Canal, etc. That is entirely true. If you control the surface of the water and have a sufficient number of patrol craft, destroyers, you can go practically where you please in spite of any submarines, as you have seen done all during the war by the Grand Fleet.

The Grand Fleet is the perfect example of the convoy; that is to say, it is so adequately protected that they can go practically where they please with immunity from the submarine. You will find in Admiral Jellicoe's book that during the first, probably, two weeks of the war, while the Grand Fleet used an anchorage at Scapa Flow, which is up in the northern end of Scotland, in the islands, every time a submarine was reported outside in the neighborhood, the fleet always got underway and went out, proceded and surrounded by its screen as being the safest place it could be; because a fleet at anchor or immobile, or going slowly, is always in danger from submarines. Lying in port it is practically helpless unless the harbor entrances are blocked by nets and mines, which was not the case at that time.

Senator PITTMAN. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. I find that the draft law was passed on the 18th day of May, 1917, and registration took place on June 5, and the drawing took place on July 20, and the men reported on September 5. My recollection is that aside from the men who were drafted, there were a considerable number of volunteers in the war, somewhere around 750,000 I think, and these volunteers included the National Guard. Now, Admiral Sims, can you give me any idea how many of the troops there were serving under the colors on the 1st day of July, 1917?

Admiral SIMS. You mean in our own country or in France?

The CHAIRMAN. Can you tell us, altogether, at that time?

Admiral SIMS. Both in France and America?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral SIMS. I could not give you the figures on that, but it must have been a considerable number.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you give us the figures so that they can be inserted in the record?

Admiral SIMS. Yes; I can get those figures.

The CHAIRMAN. Of how many men there were serving under our colors, both in this country and abroad, on the first day of each month all during the war, up to the 1st day of January, 1918?

Admiral SIMS. I will get that thing to insert in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. How many men had we transported to Europe on the 1st day of January, 1918?

Admiral SIMS. On December 31, 1918, there were 176,665 American troops in France; and but one division had appeared on the front. That is from Gen. Pershing's report, page 18.

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The CHAIRMAN. Therefore, if we had volunteers to the number of 700,000 to 800,000, and there were only 176,000 in Europe, there were a large number of men before the draft took place, in this country?

Admiral SIMS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Who would have been available for service abroad?

Admiral SIMS. Yes, sir; there must have been. And, anyway, it seems to me that as we actually demonstrated, after the month of April, immediately after the month of April, 1918, that we could send over 300,000 a month and keep it up until there were certainly a million there, it makes it perfectly certain that in the six months preceding we could have done pretty much the same thing if we had had the tonnage; but we did not have the tonnage.

The CHAIRMAN. You have stated this morning, or Gen. Pershing's report as read by you has stated, that we ought to have had an army of 1,000,000 men in Europe by the 1st of May.

Admiral SIMS. The 1st of May, 1918.

The CHAIRMAN. And how many men were transported in May?

Admiral SIMS. Up to May?

The CHAIRMAN. No; in May; during May, 1918.

Admiral SIMS. It was a small number in May. No; in May it was about 233,000. I remember that now.

The CHAIRMAN. And in June, 1918, how many?

Admiral SIMS. I can not quite be sure; but I have the figures here. In April it was 104,000 and in May it was 233,000.

The CHAIRMAN. I want the figures substantially. You can give them afterwards.

Admiral SIMS. There were 233,000 transported in May, and then it began to go up more rapidly and in July there were 317,000.

The CHAIRMAN. And on the 1st day of July there were about a million men on the other side?

Admiral SIMS. Yes; in June there were 285,000.

The CHAIRMAN. The last of June?

Admiral SIMS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Therefore, subtracting the troops that went over in May and June, on the 1st day of May, when Gen. Pershing said we should have a million men there, there were very little over half a million men there; is that true?

Admiral SIMS. Something like 600,000, I should say. I have the figures here now. In April there went over 104,000; in May 233,000; in June 230,000; in July 317,000. Now, we can give you any figures that you would like to have.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you give those figures to the reporter? I have made the point that I had in mind.

Admiral SIMS. These figures show that in the first of May there were 420,000, and in reference to these figures, if you come to compare these with any others, remember this, that these are the figures of our own headquarters in London, representing the arrivals of troops in the port. The report I read to you a little while ago was made by the captain who had charge of the routing of all convoys, and when a convoy arrived with troopships, it was automatically reported to us how many ships we had and how many troops on board. We kept that before us. That did not represent troops at the front or anything except arrivals at the western ports of France, and some in English ports.

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In France on March 21 there were about 300,000, and on May 31 about 600,000, from Gen. Pershing's report.

The CHAIRMAN. You will get those figures and give them to us, inserting them into the record?

Admiral SIMS. Putting them in the record at this point?

(The figures above referred to are here included in the record:)

TABLE 2.—*Strength of the Army in the United States and in the Expeditionary Forces on the first of each month.*

[From Report of the Secretary of War for 1918.]

Date.	In United States and foreign possessions.	In the American Expeditionary Forces.	Total.
1917.			
April 1	190,000	.....	190,000
July 1	480,000	20,000	500,000
August 1	516,000	35,000	551,000
September 1	646,000	45,000	691,000
October 1	883,000	65,000	948,000
November 1	996,000	104,000	1,100,000
December 1	1,060,000	129,000	1,189,000
1918.			
January 1	1,149,000	176,000	1,325,000
February 1	1,257,000	225,000	1,482,000
March 1	1,386,000	253,000	1,639,000
April 1	1,476,000	320,000	1,796,000
May 1	1,529,000	424,000	1,953,000
June 1	1,390,000	722,000	2,112,000
July 1	1,384,000	996,000	2,380,000
August 1	1,365,000	1,293,000	2,658,000
September 1	1,425,000	1,576,000	3,001,000
October 1	1,599,000	1,834,000	3,433,000
November 1	1,672,000	1,993,000	3,665,000

TABLE 5.—*Men inducted into the Army under the selective-service law, by months.*

[From Report of the Secretary of War for 1918.]

	In United States.	In American Expeditionary Forces.	Total.
In Army Sept. 1, 1917	646,000	45,000	691,000

	Number of men inducted.
1917:	
September	296,678
October	163,644
November	35,721
December	20,320
1918:	
January	23,288
February	83,779
March	132,484
April	174,377
May	373,063
June	301,941
July	401,147
August	282,898
September	252,295
October	250,000
November	10,000
Total	2,801,635

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The CHAIRMAN. Yes. I want to ask you now a few questions about the convoy plan. The British put a convoy plan into execution on the 21st of May, 1918, did they not?

Admiral SIMS. The first convoy arrived in Great Britain on the 20th of May. They started to put it in about the 1st of May. They sent an officer down to Gibraltar to instruct them on each of the ships, and give them information, and it took some time to train the signalmen, and it took some time to get ready, and then they appointed a convoy commander; and the first convoy arrived in the channel on the 20th of May, and on the 31st of May I cabled the department that they had adopted the convoy in transport. In the first place, on May 1 I cabled to the Navy Department as follows:

British Admiralty has decided to give trial to the convoy scheme described in my last dispatch. Instead of present plan of naval forces operating independently against raiders, there will be a high sea convoy against raiders, such convoy to be established as quickly as possible on all main trade routes, and on approach to dangerous areas on this side will be met by destroyers and escorted into port. Hampton Roads and New York have been proposed as assembly ports for eastbound vessels on our coast and Gulf, with convoys sailing every fourth day. Plan decided on after long consideration by Admiralty and war council, and is considered absolutely necessary. It will strain British resources of personnel and ships to the limit and we must assist by taking one route, at least, if the plan is to be carried out. Admiralty desire to be informed whether we can provide escorts for convoys sailing from the rendezvous at New York. British estimate about 14 ships will be required for New York service, and larger numbers for other routes, including Mediterranean and South America. Escorts should have sustained sea speed of at least 12 knots and 6-inch guns. I very urgently recommend favorable action. Through British naval representative at Washington details of plan will be communicated from time to time as necessary.

SIMS.

That was May 1, 1917. On May 31 I cabled as follows:

With reference to my two previous dispatches concerning convoy system of handling merchant shipping. Scandinavian and North Sea convoys now in force over a month have proved very successful. First ocean convoy from Gibraltar arrived safely on May 20. Second ocean convoy from Hampton Roads of 12 merchant ships escorted by British cruiser sailed May 24. They will be met outside and escorted through submarine danger zone.

The CHAIRMAN. Was that the first American convoy?

Admiral SIMS. The first one from America.

The CHAIRMAN. That sailed on May 24?

Admiral SIMS. May 24. [Continuing reading:]

The department cooperation with the plan set forth in my dispatch of May 1 is urgently recommended. Early reply important in order that Admiralty plans may be governed accordingly.

SIMS.

The CHAIRMAN. And subsequent to that date the Navy Department sent all its merchant vessels over in convoys?

Admiral SIMS. They did not send them over in convoy, and did not get the thing in operation for some months after that.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the date of that?

Admiral SIMS. On July 5 was the first time that the Navy Department agreed to help out in the convoy, and they gave us 7 vessels on that occasion. They said they would provide 7 vessels instead of the 14.

The CHAIRMAN. Then on that date we had in all seven vessels that were aiding in convoy?

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Admiral SIMS. Seven that they offered, yes, in the cablegram of August 10, 1917. I will read as follows from the department to me on August 10, 1917. [Reading:]

The following is the situation in regard to American shipping. A few vessels route in the established convoys.

That is, a few of their vessels. [Continuing reading:]

More sail direct. Most ships confer with British shipping offices to get the latest information and routes. An effort is being made to induce American ships to take advantage of the protection offered by convoy. It is not possible to compel this except in Government orwned or chartered vessels until the Government takes over the control of all shipping. After studying your numerous cables on the subject, this office is of the opinion that what you want now is for it to furnish, after departure, names, dates of sailing, etc., of the following class of American ships only; those American cargo ships sailing direct and not taking advantage of convoy. In the case of all ships carrying troops, and all Army and Navy cargo supply ships, you wish the information forwarded you.

Will act along these lines unless you instruct otherwise. All other reports of sailings, except War Department reports through you, will cease.

ADMIRAL BENSON.

The convoy system was not in operation generally until certainly after that date.

The CHAIRMAN. At that time was the department doing everything it possibly could to aid the convoy plan?

Admiral SIMS. No, they were not, because they evidently did not take much stock in the convoy plan; and the reason of the thing was probably because of the false estimate of the situation that they made in reference to armed merchant ships. While I was at Queenstown—I have forgotten just the date now—I received a telegram from the Secretary of the Navy which I have mentioned in my direct testimony, which reads:

In regard to convoy, I consider that American vessels having armed guards are safer when sailing independently.

And not very long after that I received another cablegram from Admiral Benson—it was signed "Daniels," but, as I explained before, that means only the department in which it originates, which reads as follows:

The department is strongly of the opinion, based on recent experiences, that the question of supplying adequate guns and trained gun crews to merchant ships is one which can in no wise be treated as a minor issue. Coupled with a rigid system of inspection, this method is believed to constitute one of the most effective defensive submarine measures.

It announces, moreover, as its policy its willingness to cooperate in every way, and will consider the question of supplying additional naval forces of types other than antisubmarine craft, whenever the advisability of so doing is justified.

The department is also considering the outline of a scheme which it is hoped will allow of a greater degree of cooperation and ability to supply escort vessels through the danger zone, without interfering with the destroyers' other duties as much as does the present system of individual escort, and it will not displace the present method of handling merchant shipping from United States ports. Details when prevented (?) will be cabled.

DANIELS,
Secretary of the Navy.

Well, as I explained before, my discouragement on receiving those two telegrams was very great, and I replied to the department giving them actual evidence of the torpedoing within a period of five or six weeks off Queenstown of some thirty-odd vessels, none of which at all had seen the submarine or its periscope. Subsequently I received

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what we call in the Navy an estimate of the situation, which was drawn up in the Navy Department, and which was based upon this particular measure of the arming of merchant ships, and this estimate of the situation reasoned the whole business out very logically based upon this premise, that if you have armed guard crews on board the merchant vessels in charge of a competent officer, with a well-trained crew, that they will see the submarine in time to protect the ship against the attack by the torpedo. Well, the difficulty about the whole business was that the premise was entirely wrong, as was shown by the information I sent in from Queenstown, out of the experience of the war, of the number of military vessels bristling with guns, and the well-trained mystery ships with guns on board that were out searching for submarines having been torpedoed without warning. And in this estimate of the situation it inveighed against the stupidity of the allied navies in not being able to see this point, and thereby arming their vessels with competent crews and powerful navy guns. That I think must have been the reason why they resisted the convoy system.

But whether that was the reason or not, the convoy system was resisted until the date I stated, I think the 5th of July, when they offered us half the number of vessels that we wanted.

Now I do not want anybody to suppose that I ever expected the Navy Department to adopt any particular measure like that because I, Admiral Sims, said so: In all cases the recommendations that I sent in to the Navy Department were the recommendations that were based upon three years' experience of the war on the other side, daily conferences with the admiralties concerned, with the charts before us of the position of every submarine on the seas, what the movements of those submarines had been, projecting the probable change in tactics of the submarines, and so forth, and based on all that, these recommendations went over. They were not my recommendations. The were the recommendations of the Allied naval armies at the front, and the attitude of the Navy Department was that they were not willing to base their action upon these recommendations until we could explain the whole matter fully to them, and it was up to me to do that over a very heavily overworked cable and by correspondence, with the assistance of one aide, not to mention the fact that I was asked at the same time for information on all sorts of technical subjects, that 20 competent officers could not have supplied. I can give you my word, gentlemen, it was a hell on earth.

The CHAIRMAN. Then, Admiral, it was not until the 1st of September, or six months after we had entered the war, that we were cooperating with the British effectively in the convoy plan?

Admiral SIMS. About that date, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you recall when the convoy plan was first suggested and talked over by the English?

Admiral SIMS. When I arrived in London the whole business was boiling down there in the admiralty. The convoy section, or rather I may say the antisubmarine section, which was in charge of a vice-admiral, was the one that was particularly interested in it. It was up to them to devise means of protecting the shipping, and that office was divided against itself. There was a captain and a number of commanders in that office with all their staff, and the thing was being

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discussed then, and studies on the thing had been drawn up, and it had not at that time been decided.

Now here is an outline proposal for convoys by the Navy to ports to the north, including the St. Lawrence, and it is a very technical thing, and I do not think it is worth while to read it except to invite attention to the fact that the date is May 5. This was forwarded to Washington on May 4, from the Admiralty to our Navy Department, as a proposal for a convoy system. So they had all the information there in Washington as to what the proposal was.

The CHAIRMAN. What I want to know is whether the British Admiralty was considering the question of running convoys before we entered the war.

Admiral SIMS. Yes; they had been considering it for some time.

The CHAIRMAN. And one of the reasons that they could not do so was that the Navy could not take the destroyers and other ships necessary from the Grand Fleet?

Admiral SIMS. They did not have enough to put it into operation, and the great value of our coming into the war was that we supplied enough destroyers to initiate that thing, and they were supplying 5 or 6 new destroyers a month and it geadually built up from that. But they did not have the cruisers to furnish the ocean escort.

I want to call attention where they had to take the cruisers from. They had been trying to prevent the exit of the German raiders from the North Sea by having a line of patrol vessels extend up to Iceland, and they did head off some vessels and destroy some. The only way they could put the convoy system into operation naturally was to take the cruisers from this patrol system. If they did that, of course they would get no intimation of the raiders coming out. So they wanted to keep these cruisers there to keep back the raiders. They did not have enough cruisers to provide an escort of all the convoys. So that is the reason why they were depending on the United States to help them out and furnish the cruisers, which we ultimately did but only after long delay.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, if our Navy had been thoroughly prepared at the time that we entered into the war, and could have provided destroyers and cruisers for the use of the convoy system, is it probable that the British would have started the convoy system at once, if they had known that they could have availed themselves of these ships?

Admiral SIMS. That is their proposal as you see in the telegrams received near the 1st of May, and if we had been ready we could have supplied both the cruisers and the destroyers to put it in operation at once. I do not mean that you can put it in operation like that, because you have got to get information about the merchant steamers, and they have got to be sent to the rendezvous, and you gradually sort them out according to their speeds, and so forth, but getting the convoy system in complete operation would have taken place three or four months earlier if we had been ready with our cruisers and out antisubmarine forces to jump right into it.

The CHAIRMAN. And that in your opinion would have been one of the principal things that would have contributed toward ending the war?

Admiral SIMS. According to figures that I gave this morning, of the losses in the first, second, and third periods, we would have

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saved 2,500,000 tons of shipping if we had gone in to the thing immediately.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any comment to make on your letter of November 9 to Admiral Bayly which Senator Pittman read this morning? The letter was read, but no questions were asked.

Admiral SIMS. The only thing I have got to say about that is that it was simply stating to him what the conditions were on the western front. Recently there has been published a review of the whole of the western front at the time of the demand for the armistice, by one of the military critics on the other side, Gen. Maurice, who has been in this country lecturing, and he stated, in almost exactly the same words, what the condition was behind the British front and the French front in regard to the question of transports. I think that anyone who has not looked at a military chart behind an army on the western front and seen the network of big and small railroads and specially built automobile or motor roads can have very much conception of what it means to suddenly move an army forward after a retreating enemy even 10 or 15 miles, when that all has to be renewed. He makes a distinct statement that none of the armies on the western front could have kept their transports going after the advance of the armies farther than they did. It takes too much time to build up the roads. They have to depend on the motor roads. They can not follow up quickly enough on the other roads. That same condition obtains behind all armies. It obtains behind any army for months afterwards.

The CHAIRMAN. In the testimony yesterday an unsigned memorandum was submitted by Senator Pittman referring to the most efficient way to employ America's man power on the western front. Did you, in your capacity as commander of the naval forces on the other side, have anything to do with the question of brigading American troops?

Admiral SIMS. Nothing whatever, so far as concerned anything official. I, of course, discussed it with Gen. Bliss, and I discussed it with a number of other people.

I should like to say in this connection with reference to papers that have been used that are marked "from Admiral Sims's personal file." Of course, in the position that I occupied on the other side, there was a swarm of such arriving every day. Those letters were handled automatically. The only letters practically that I opened were those that were always recognized by my secretary as being in the handwriting of my wife. All other letters were opened, and naturally a good many of them under general orders. They were letters from all kinds of cranks, and all kinds of inventors. There were opinions and avice given to me by everybody from Spainards to Sinn Feiners. Those things were usually answered by some member of the staff, who would file the things in my personal files. The great bulk of those things I never saw at all. Now, when the Secretary of the Navy very late in the war, after giving up the idea of an established historical section in Washington to write up the history of this war, ordered me to establish one on the other side, I did so under the very able command of Capt. Knox, and I told Capt. Knox that he was at liberty not only to take out of the division files anything which he found had any bearing on the war, quite independent of his opinion as to whether it was correct or not, and that he could also go into my personal files and do the same thing, take out any-

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thing out of the personal files that he though might throw any light on the war.

There are a good many things in there that are exceedingly confidential, but they will be useful to a historian to show the atmosphere. There are letters there written to me by foreign officers of all the Allies in which they have expressed opinions which would be exceedingly embarrassing to those officers to have given out now, but the historian would like to see those things as giving the general atmosphere at the time. I only make this point to show that because a document came out of my personal files, it does not mean that I even saw the document.

The CHAIRMAN. Or that you indorsed it in any way?

Admiral SIMS. Or that I indorsed it in any way.

Senator PITTMAN. Now, Admiral, on January 14, 1918, we have this memorandum——

Admiral SIMS. Who is it from, sir?

Senator PITTMAN. I will read it so as to identify it to you, or a portion of it. I am referring to the one we are discussing.

Admiral SIMS. The memorandum that you were talking about?

Senator PITTMAN. The one that you have been talking about.

Admiral SIMS. Yes.

Senator PITTMAN (reading):

There was a small dinner last night at which were present Balfour, Cecil, and Reading, and the host, a very important person. There was also present another man who holds somewhat radical views as to the most efficient way to employ American man power on the western front, instead of organizing a separate army with its own lines of communication and supply.

The gentlemen above mentioned were greatly interested in the expression of these views and highly approved of them and the discussion turned upon the means to be employed to realize them.

I assume that that meant that Balfour and Cecil and Reading were highly pleased with the plan?

Admiral SIMS. They were more pleased that Gen. Pershing did that thing at a certain stage of the war.

Senator PITTMAN. But this plan of January 14 was not to have "a separate army with its own lines of communication and supply." That is what the memorandum says. Now, then, in the third paragraph of this memorandum it says. [Reading:]

Gen. Robertson went to France to discuss the matter with Pershing, and came back "much disappointed."

The memorandum evidently indicates that the writer of this memorandum considered that Pershing was very much opposed to this plan which appealed to Balfour and Cecil and Reading?

Admiral SIMS. That is the same plan he adopted, is it not?

Senator PITTMAN. That is not the plan that Pershing was for on January 14.

Now, on January 24, I find your letter following 10 days after this memorandum was dated, in which it is said. [Reading:]

You will be interested to know that the question I mentioned to you about the best way to utilize the man power of America on the western front is now up for very serious consideration.

On October 30, 1918, we have the testimony of Mr. Byrnes to a conversation that he had with you in Paris, which has already

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been put in this record, and came out in the medals-awards hearing. [Reading:]

I shall never forget that interview. The armistice had been requested by the enemy. Sims told us of the magnificient progress made by the British on the English front, and as we listened he proceeded to tell us that the armistice would have to be granted, because Pershing had been unable to break through the German lines, owing to the absolute breakdown of transportation behind the American lines.

That statement was substantiated not only by Senator Glass in his testimony at that time and by a letter from Mr. Whaley, but a letter from Senator Glass in reply to your letter which was introduced in evidence this morning reaffirms it, analyzes it, and adds to it.

Admiral SIMS. Yes.

Senator PITTMAN. Now, then, still later we have this excerpt from another letter that you wrote to Admiral Bayly, of the British Navy, on November 9, 1918, but two days before the armistice was signed. [Reading:]

It had been the opinion that it would be impossible to force the enemy back through the Argonne Forest, not only on account of the great difficulty of the terrain, but also because the troops operating in this area could be supplied only over one main line road. It was hardly thought possible that this road could carry supplies sufficient for the number of troops necessary. There is no doubt that the military opinion was sound, assuming that the attacking forces were not willing to make greater sacrifices than troops are usually called upon to bear. That these sacrifices were necessary is but too apparent. Of course I do not know much about details at present, but enough to know that they were very severe. It turned out as was to be expected.

I want particularly to call attention to this as in line with your thought on this subject, and my opinion is evidenced by everything I have read.

Admiral SIMS. I do not understand.

Senator PITTMAN. I am calling your attention to this particular language as influencing me to believe that you not only had the information on January 24, 1918, that there should not be a separate American Army, but that you had it on October 30, when you talked to Senator Glass, Congressman Byrnes, and Congressman Whaley, but you still had it at the time you wrote this letter two days before. I am calling your attention to this language. [Continuing reading:]

It turned out as was to be expected——

Admiral SIMS. Behind the armies.

Senator PITTMAN (continuing reading):

That the road was not sufficient——

Admiral SIMS. It was not 20 miles long.

Senator PITTMAN (continuing reading):

To supply all the needs of the troops.

Admiral SIMS. That is right.

Senator PITTMAN. You told Senator Glass and Mr. Whaley and Mr. Byrnes October 30, according to their testimony, that you stated that the armistice was necessary because there was an absolute breakdown of transportation behind Pershing's line.

Admiral SIMS. Yes.

Senator PITTMAN. Here it is reiterated again on November 9. [Continuing reading:]

Horses had to be slaughtered to supply the troops, notwithstanding the scarcity of horses at this time. However, there is nothing succeeds like success, and the cutting of the important railway line has been accomplished.

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Admiral SIMS. Everything that is stated in those letters I told Representatives Byrnes and Glass, and what they did not get and seize is what I have stated here, that I told a lot of other people about it, the same thing, that it was being said, and Glass said that he went to London and was told the same thing there. It was those things that were going around the armies that I was trying to counteract, and they did not seize that point.

As to making a statement that there was a single road there, that is true. There was a single road that they had to use, 20 miles long, and they had a lot of trouble with it. As Gen. Maurice said, they have the same trouble behind all armies. I never had any such idea, that the armistice had to be signed because we could not drive through. The armistice had to be signed because the French people made a protest against the cost of carrying that on after the enemy had asked for the armistice. The position that the Government of France was put in was this: The enemy asked for an armistice, and when you refuse it it means that you are willing to impose upon the army and the people an additional sacrifice. We naval men wanted the German fleet to be surrendered instead of interned. Gen. Foch—I was not present at that interview at all, but I was told that Gen. Foch had said—I might say that we were all called down to Paris. The naval men said what they thought should be the terms of the armistice, and the military men on their side said what they thought should be the terms of the armistice. We had no joint meeting. But I was informed that when we Navy men wanted to insist upon the surrender of the vessels instead of their being interned, Gen. Foch said:

Do you sailormen wish the French people to submit to the sacrifice of from 50,000 to 100,000 more casualties in order to change the word "interned" to "surrender"?

That is what I told many people at that time. We discussed it fully.

As to the first memorandum, I do not know anything about that at all. I do not know where it came from. It has been in my files, like a great many other things that I mentioned a little while ago. I was not present at any time at any dinner where those men were present, Balfour, Cecil, and Reading.

Senator PITTMAN. Now, I call your attention to the similarity of expression in your letter of January 24 to Admiral Bayly and the memorandum. The letters say [reading]:

The best way to utilize the man power of America is on the western front.

The memorandum says [reading]:

The most efficient way to employ America's man power is on the western front.

Admiral SIMS. I did not say that in the memorandum. I do not know anything about it. That is what everybody was talking about, the great subject of conversation between military and naval people. It was Gen. Bliss's idea, that he was going to make a recommendation. When I came to him I asked him if he had done so and he said he had. I understood what the brigading of our troops meant during a certain period of the war. I did not understand it to mean at all at any time a prohibition on the forming of a great American Army. The only point about it was this: If you are going to form an army that can take charge of a whole section of the line where it must be expected that the whole force of the German attack would

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fall, you must train them month after month behind the line until they understand it thoroughly. That makes delay. The only point at issue was whether or not it was not advisable to brigade them where they would have veterans on each side so that they would act more like veterans, and after they had got experience you could make their army out of them. That is what they did, and I believe that is one of the things that Gen. Pershing is proudest of, that when the crisis came he did brigade them, and they did splendid work, so fine that the Australians commended them very highly on the way they acted, but said that the Americans were a little bit rough.

Senator PITTMAN. In your letter of November 9 you state very emphatically [reading]:

> It has been the opinion that it would be impossible to force the enemy back through the Argonne Forest not only on account of the great difficulty of the terrain but also because the troops operating in this area could be supplied only over one main-line road.

Admiral SIMS. It was quite true that there was only one road. They had to use it. That is all.

There is no recommendation that I ever made on this question. I simply discussed it like any other intelligent man would. It was the question up before everybody, most interesting at that time to everybody, when the crisis was coming. I do not understand just what the idea is. Do you want to try to imply that I was recommending that there should be no American Army? Now, might I ask this question: Suppose it were true that I did recommend an American Army, what does it have to do with the convoy system in the handling of the Navy during the war?

Senator PITTMAN. I think you are entitled to an answer. I will try to answer it. Admiral, in the first place, there are evidences before this committee that you relied very greatly upon the British Admiralty for all of your opinions.

Admiral SIMS. There is no such evidence at all. It was the Allied Naval Council, consisting of the heads of all those navies. Now, how can you conceive an American officer of my experience, not to say record, either being so dumb intellectually or being so defective morally that he would recommend to his Government not what he believed but what the British Government wanted? For God's sake, how can you imagine an American doing that?

Senator PITTMAN. You have asked me a frank question.

Admiral SIMS. And I want an answer.

Senator PITTMAN. I am proceeding to answer. There is evidence here in your own letter that you favored the British policy or the French policy, certainly not the American policy, of sending raw troops over to the other country without training here. It is in your letter here that you recommend that some of these soldiers be put in the navy yards to work as laborers.

Admiral SIMS. Not that they should be worked as laborers, but that an experienced shipwright should not be taken out of the navy yard and put into a camp when we needed ships.

Senator PITTMAN. There is nothing said in your letter as to that.

Admiral SIMS. That is what it says, to take a man of that kind out of the Navy would be asininity, taking him out of the navy yard and making a soldier of him.

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Senator PITTMAN. There are letters here also which indicate to my mind—that is the reason I am going along with this examination—that you wanted the whole American Navy to be turned over to the British; that as far as the protection of the coast was concerned, or any American policy that they had, that you cared nothing for that. There are letters here indicating that your opinions were formulated with Admiral Bayly with regard to these matters.

Admiral SIMS. I was not with Admiral Bayly one one-hundredth of the time I was over there. I was in London.

Senator PITTMAN. Your letters were very confidential. There is evidence here also that in writing to Admiral Bayly you were opposed to the American plan, and were in favor of the British plan with regard to the disposition of our soldiers; that you were in January opposed to a separate army. There is evidence here that you discussed with Pershing a separate army on October 30. There is evidence that on November 9 you still thought——

Admiral SIMS. There is none of that there.

Senator PITTMAN (continuing). That Pershing had broken down and that you never expected him to get through.

Admiral SIMS. No.

Senator PITTMAN. That you expected he was broken down, by reason of one line of railroad and not sufficient communication.

Admiral SIMS. It was not a railroad at all; a road.

Senator PITTMAN. That communications with the rear were so incomplete that they had been compelled to slaughter horses for food.

Admiral SIMS. All the armies had to do the same thing. What Gen. Maurice said——

Senator PITTMAN. What I think about the proposition is, we are considering whether your advice on these matters was creditable.

Admiral SIMS. All right.

Senator PITTMAN. We are considering as to whether your advice was largely followed.

Admiral SIMS. That is the point.

Senator PITTMAN. And I think that this evidence is material, in that you were advising from the standpoint of foreign countries and not from the policy of your own country.

Admiral SIMS. I see. Well, Senator Pittman, that is the veriest possible kind of rot, for this reason, as pointed out explicitly all through my statement that this advice that was given to my Government was not only based upon all of the discussions that we had with the people over there, but that it was adopted by our own Government. If it were true that the advice I gave has proved to be wrong in the case of the convoy, and in the case of this, that, and the other, there would be something in what you say. But it proved to be right, and was adopted only after those long delays that cost us so much blood and treasure.

Senator PITTMAN. We had a separate army?

Admiral SIMS. You take them and you brigade your troops in there first. I did not recommend a separate army at all. That is all buncombe. It was simply discussions that were going on between two military men about the military questions of the day. There is nothing in there that I wanted to recommend. All I wanted was cooperation and coordination with the British Navy. That was the

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achievement of the Navy in the war. Here is what the Secretary of the Navy says about it. [Reading:]

Abroad, the Navy has given a demonstration that can only be characterized as wonderful, of its readiness to join with our associates in teamwork for the common end and the common good. * * * (In all areas and with all allied nations.) The United States Navy has cooperated without friction, looking always to the end to be attained, and has won the warmest encomiums and appreciation from our associates. * * *

Much of the above could not have been accomplished at all and none of it could have been accomplished so well, had not the American Navy, from top to bottom, fully appreciated the fact that in war teamwork is absolutely necessary and individual prejudices and ambitions, if they exist, must be sacrified and subordinated for a common end in a common cause.

We worked with those people in teamwork, with the French, Italian, and English officers, independent of nationality.

Senator PITTMAN. Separate entities can cooperate.

Admiral SIMS. They were separate entities, and they cooperated.

Senator PITTMAN. There is quite a difference between cooperating and being submerged.

Admiral SIMS. They were not submerged. They were separate entities, and they were based upon our own supply ships, and they were mobile forces. I have read telegrams to show that we could be moved from one place to another. We were hard up against it when we first went to Queenstown. The necessities were such that we had to cooperate. We did not have enough forces sent over to take over the Queenstown station. Our forces were relatively small, containing destroyers, supply ships, and some sloops. We had no mine sweepers operating there. All those things were necessary in order that those channels and ports be used. We did not have the material to take over the port of Queenstown and patrol the ports and escort in our troops. We worked together. If our destroyers were broken down, our sloops, and so forth, British ships would be supplied. It was necessary that that be done. It was teamwork. The same way pertained in the Mediterranean. The same way pertained in France, where our forces were greater than those of France. It is perfectly absurd to say that we subordinated ourselves to others.

Senator PITTMAN. No; we did not——

Admiral SIMS. Excuse me. There was never a time at all when all the American forces on the other side were not absolutely under the command of men of the Navy Department. They could all have been moved any place.

Now, you may say that we could have been made into a great American Army. It would have been wholly impossible to do it. You must remember that the British had an advantage with their fleet, which they had been years in forming, that we did not have. We had to go on their bases, and there was no place in Ireland where all our force could have been based, the 5 battleships, 140 sloops, etc. There was no possible place where those ships could have been put in a body and effectively used.

Senator PITTMAN. Now, you have read from the Secretary his suggestion as to cooperation. Permit me to read what you suggested to the Secretary of the Navy on July 16, 1917. [Reading:]

It is unquestionable that efficiency would be greatly improved if any one of the Allies—Italy, France, England, or the United States—were selected to direct all operations, the others merely keeping the one selected fully informed of their resources available, and submitting to complete control and direction in regard to the utilization of these resources.

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Admiral SIMS. Yes; that is not a recommendation. It is an illustration of what would be desirable if the Allies could do that, but they could not and would not. Nobody would dispute that statement, that if the Allies were so amiable with each other as to submit to control, it would be more efficient. Naturally, they were not willing to do that, and so we instituted—our Government did—the Allied Naval Council. And we got together and discussed the best thing to do with the forces available, which were inadequate. They were common sense men. We did not sit there drawing lots in the interest of any French or British or any American or Italian, sitting with that council and advocating that his forces should be subordinate to that of another nation, to the detriment of the common cause. That does not appeal to common sense. That is all I have to say about it.

Senator PITTMAN. Then another question. When you spoke of the available troops in this country by reason of the volunteer service, did you realize that troops are not available when war is declared; are not available by reason of the training not being sufficient?

Admiral SIMS. I did not know anything about that at all.

Senator PITTMAN. Do you know when the volunteer troops, those troops that volunteered, were drawn?

Admiral SIMS. I do not know those dates; no.

Senator TRAMMELL. I want to ask one or two more questions. In regard to the number of troops that were transported by May 1, was that, Mr. Chairman, what you were asking about?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator TRAMMELL. The chairman,, I believe, asked you to give the number of troops that were transported by May 1.

Admiral SIMS. I will get the figures.

Senator TRAMMELL. Well, while you are getting that information, I would like you also to get the information as to the number of troops that were transported by June 30, 1918.

Admiral SIMS. June 30?

The CHAIRMAN. I suggest that you get the figures down to July 1, 1918, giving the number transported every month.

Admiral SIMS. All right. The figures will be the arrivals in ports. That is all I have available.

Senator TRAMMELL. I believe it has been suggested here that Gen. Pershing first recommended a million troops by May, 1918, and pertinent to that subject I find this in Gen. Pershing's report. [Reading:]

The War Department planned as early as July, 1917, to send to France by June 15, 1918, 21 divisions of the then strength of 20,000 men each, together with auxiliary and replacement troops, and those needed for the line of communications, amounting to over 200,000, making a total of some 650,000 men.

Admiral SIMS. That is the extract I read this morning and also yesterday.

Senator TRAMMELL. Now, that seems to be the number that the War Department planned for in July, 1917, to be sent over by June 15, 1918. Gen. Pershing goes on to say. [Reading:]

While these numbers fell short of my recommendation of July 6, 1917, which contemplated at least 1,000,000 men by May, 1918, it should be borne in mind that the main factor in the problem was the amount of shipping to become available for military purposes, in which must be included tonnage required to supply the Allies with coal, steel, and food.

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Now, it seems from this report that Gen. Pershing, in July, 1917, first recommended 1,000,000 men by May, 1918, but we find nothing further in his report hereafter the department had decided on 650,000 men. So the department evidently at that time decided on 650,000 men to be there by the 15th of June.

Admiral SIMS. I understood that Gen. Pershing says 650,000 because there was not tonnage enough to carry any more.

Senator TRAMMELL. He first recommended in July, 1917, 1,000,000 by May, 1918, but after the department had revised his figures in July, 1917, there is nothing further contained in his report that I find here except Gen. Pershing's next recommendation on the 2d of December, 1917, and in that recommendation he recommended four army corps, of 20 divisions each, in addition to troops for service in the rear, to be sent over by the end of June. On December 2, 1917, he recommended that there be sent over by the end of June approximately 1,000,000. Then, later on I find on December 20 he practically repeats his recommendation that they should send over 1,000,000 by June 30, 1918. Now, of course, the figures are important to demonstrate not only the question of whether they sent over those that he first mentioned for May, but also as to whether or not they sent over the troops that he asked for by June 30, 1918. I do not believe you have that information, have you, Admiral?

Admiral SIMS. No; the information that I have is what I read out of Gen. Pershing's report, which were those two that you just read there, which I understood to mean that Gen. Pershing asked or agreed to 650,000 men because there was not tonnage enough to supply more and at the same time keep up the supplies to the other armies. That is what I understood that to mean.

Senator TRAMMELL. Admiral, I believe you stated that you did not know whether the soldiers were trained and were ready to be transported more rapidly than they were transported?

Admiral SIMS. I have no official documents here outside these reports of Gen. Pershing, but I think it is a very fair assumption that if you begin in April, 1918, and jump from 25,000 on an average a month to 300,000 because they brought tonnage in from all over the world to enable you to do it, that if the tonnage had been there they could have done it. The course of this map here [indicating] will show the movements of the troops, how it jumped.

Senator TRAMMELL. In that connection, in view of the fact that Gen. Pershing's report has been quoted from, I will read from an agreement that was entered into which was cabled June 5, 1918, an agreement which had been entered into by Foch, Milner, and Pershing, relative to the number of troops that should be sent over in June and July of that year and in regard to priorities for shipping. I find this clause in that agreement. [Reading:]

(*d*) We recognize that the combatant troops to be dispatched in July may have to include troops which have had insufficient training, but we consider the present emergency is such as to justify a temporary and exceptional departure by the United States from sound principles of training, especially as a similar course is being followed by France and Great Britain.

I just read that to show that it is indicative of the way they felt about it, for probably some of those troops to be shipped in July would not have sufficient training. For some reason, those commanders seemed to think that that was possible.

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Admiral SIMS. Of course it is not necessary to observe that of an army in the field—of the British Army I think there are about 1 out of 4 that is fighting at the front, and in the French Army 1 out of 2—I am not sure of those figures—but it is something of that kind, and the extreme value of untrained troops is that though untrained in warfare they can relieve perfectly trained men at the rear in a multitude of jobs that have to do with transportation and getting more bayonets at the front, when the great push came, they took Chinese or any men they could pick up to release men that could go forward on the line. If these three distinguished military men got together and pointed out the necessity of sound training of those troops, I guess they knew what they were talking about all right.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Sims, a few minutes ago you began a line of testimony which Senator Pittman attempted to bring out. In your letter of January 7 you criticized the Navy Department for lack of cooperation in carrying on the war. This is and will be of course the main purpose of this investigation. It is unavoidable that some side issues will come in during the course of the hearings. That will not deflect us, however, from our main purpose, which is to find out whether the charges made in your letter are or are not true.

Admiral SIMS. I would amend that to say the lack of prompt cooperation. Our Navy Department did cooperate with the Allies eventually. The great difficulty about the whole business is that they did not cooperate promptly. There were all the rest of those delays between recommendations made as the result of the cooperation of the Allied Naval Council and the acknowledgment of the soundness of that by the Navy and the putting of that into operation. That is the gist of the letter, and it would have been a very, very dangerous situation in case we had been up against a navy that was not interned or "contained," as they called it, so far as its battle fleet was concerned, and helpless to do anything against us in our own country except a submarine which had to come over with half the speed of ours.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all.

(Thereupon, at 4.10 p. m., the subcommittee adjourned until to-morrow, Wednesday, March 24, 1920, at 10 o'clock a. m.)

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NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 24, 1920.

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON NAVAL AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 o'clock a. m., in room 235, Senate Office Building, Senator Frederick Hale presiding.

Present, Senators Hale (chairman), Keyes, Pittman, and Trammell.

Senator PITTMAN. Mr. Chairman, before you proceed with another witness, I observe in this morning's press that there are copies of parts of a letter from Gen. Bliss, addressed to the Secretary of War, under date of March 23, 1920, denying certain statements made by Admiral Sims in his testimony upon yesterday, and there is a letter here of the Secretary of War transmitting the letter to the Secretary of the Navy. I have also a copy of a letter of the Secretary of the Navy to the chairman of this subcommittee, transmitting these. I ask consent that they be published in the hearing—the whole matter.

The CHAIRMAN. I received the letter from the Secretary of the Navy, and I replied to him this morning. I will read a copy of my reply. [Reading:]

Hon. JOSEPHUS DANIELS,
Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have your letter of March 23 inclosing copy of a letter from the Secretary of War with inclosed copy of a letter from Gen. Bliss to the Secretary of War and a copy of the original order under which Gen. Pershing proceeded to Europe. I note that you wish to have these letters and the accompanying order incorporated in the hearings of the subcommittee of the Committee on Naval Affairs. I think you will agree with me that in the course of the hearings it is entirely improper to insert papers in the record at the request of parties who are not before the subcommittee. You will be called before the subcommittee within a very short time and if you see fit to do so at that time you can of course present any testimony or papers to the subcommittee and they will then be made part of the record. I wish to call your attention to the fact that the papers submitted by you have nothing whatever to do with the very definite criticism of lack of preparedness and prompt support on the part of the Navy Department made by Admiral Sims in his letter of January 7, and that the subcommittee is limited in its investigation entirely to matters connected with this letter.

Very truly, yours,

FREDERICK HALE,
Chairman Subcommittee of Senate Committee on Naval Affairs.

Of course, Senator Pittman, if you as a member of the subcommittee wish to have these papers inserted in the record at the present time, they will be so inserted. If not, the Secretary can bring them up when he testifies before the committee.

Senator PITTMAN. I realize, of course, Mr. Chairman, that a letter has not the same force and effect as sworn testimony; but undoubtedly Gen. Bliss will be requested by some of the committee to testify here later, and as only portions of his letter were published in the press, I think it is only justice to Gen. Bliss that the whole matter should be published.

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The CHAIRMAN. I have no objection whatever.

Senator PITTMAN. I would just like to have it all put in the record at this time. I think it is only fair to Gen. Bliss.

The CHAIRMAN. I have no objection. It will be so ordered.

(The correspondence referred to is here printed in full in the record as follows:)

The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

WASHINGTON, *March 23, 1920.*

MY DEAR SENATOR: In the hearings before the subcommittee on Monday, March 22, Rear Admiral Sims, in his testimony, is quoted in the press (I have not the official report) as attributing to Gen. Bliss the recommendation of the policy advocated by Admiral Sims of brigading the American forces with units of the British armies. I am in receipt of a letter from the Secretary of War this afternoon inclosing a letter addressed to him by Gen. Bliss, saying that at no time did I make recommendation for the brigading of American forces with the British army, but the truth is exactly the reverse.

In his letter Secretary Baker includes also the original orders under which Gen. Pershing proceeded to Europe. Secretary Baker says this order was drawn up by Gen. Bliss and approved by him. He also calls attention to the fact that the policy laid down in the orders to Gen. Pershing "had the direct approval of the President."

I am sending you copies of these letters and accompanying orders that they may be incorporated in the hearings of the Subcommittee of the Committee on Naval Affairs.

Very truly, yours,

JOSEPHUS DANIELS.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, March 23, 1920.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: In to-day's edition of the Washington Post I noted a comment attributed to Admiral Sims with regard to the "brigading" of American forces with units of the British and French armies, in which certain views are attributed to Gen. Bliss. I beg leave to hand you herewith a full exposition of the attitude of Gen. Bliss on this subject, prepared by him for my information.

In addition to what Gen. Bliss says in his own letter, I have the honor to add that the original letter under which Gen. Pershing proceeded to Europe and assumed command of the American Expeditionary Forces was drawn by Gen. Bliss and submitted to me for approval. I attach a copy of that order and ask attention to paragraph 5 thereof, in which the policy of maintaining the separate and distinct identity of the forces of the United States was laid down. This policy, comprising as it did part of the original orders to Gen. Pershing, had the direct approval of the President and was never departed from by the War Department or by Gen. Pershing, except to the extent indicated in Gen. Bliss's letter, where, to meet a pressing emergency, a temporary association of lesser American units with British and French units was authorized.

I do not know whether this letter of mine, the orders to Gen. Pershing, and Gen. Bliss's letter can properly be tendered to the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs for admission to the record in the inquiry thay are now making, but if it can be done I would be glad to have the record thus made complete on this important subject.

Cordially, yours,

NEWTON D. BAKER.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF,
Washington, March 23, 1920.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: My attention has been called to a paragraph in to-day's edition of the Washington Post with reference to yesterday's hearing of Admiral Sims before a Senate committee. This paragraph is as follows:

"Senator Pittman then read from an unsigned document taken from Admiral Sims's files, urging that American troops passing through Great Britain be brigaded with the British forces. The Senator said this was British propaganda, 'to be used against Pershing's effort to establish a separate American Army.'

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"'It wasn't written by me,' said Admiral Sims, 'and I object to your calling it propaganda. It is pretty good military reasoning, and what Bliss recommended.'"

No dates are indicated and, therefore, I do not know to what period of the war the statement of Admiral Sims relates, but the following are the facts:

I have a carbon copy of every communication, of whatsoever kind, written by me to or for any person whatsoever, from the time of our entry into the war and on any subject relating to the war. Not only at no time did I make any recommendation for the brigading of American troops with the British Army but the truth is exactly the reverse. The only times that I ever came in contact with Admiral Sims in Europe were while I was with the American Mission (the so-called House Mission), in London between the 8th and 22d of November, 1917. During that entire time the idea of the brigading or amalgamation of American troops with foreign armies had not, so far as I know, entered into the head of anyone. As my report to you dated December 18, 1917, clearly shows, all British military and political men were urging the sending of complete American divisions for the purpose of having in Europe an American national army. I had carried to Europe the information that the United States hoped by about the 1st of June, 1918, to have in France 12 complete and equipped American divisions. In every interview that I had in London from November 8 to November 22, British military and political men urged that this effort must be doubled and that by the end of the spring of that year we should have in France not less than 24 divisions. In Paris, from November 23 to December 6, 1917, the same demand was made. And all of my work in London and Paris, while on the American mission, was directed to seeing how we could secure the equipment and the transportation for the larger American Army which the Allies were then demanding of us. In respect to the few American troops then beginning to arrive in England on commercial liners, the record shows that my only interest was in seeing how we could most quickly get them to Southampton and thence across the channel to France. The idea of "brigading" complete divisions with other groups is an absurdity. During the battle our divisions were at times used to meet an emergency in connection with either British or French divisions; but in the same way, French divisions were used with our troops. At no time during the American Mission's visit to Europe did I hear even the suggestion that our troops should be brigaded either in large or small bodies, with foreign troops.

Nor did I ever make such a suggestion, much less a recommendation.

The first suggestion as to the temporary use of any American troops with those of our Allies was made at the time when they apprehended the near approach of the German drive of March 21 and during the continuance of that drive. On January 29, 1918, the American commander in chief agreed with the British in a signed document that the latter should bring over six divisions in additional shipping which they would release from trade for that purpose, these divisions to be trained behind the British line, and to be taken over by the American Army when their training was completed. This was a distinct gain for the ultimate formation of an American Army, because we would never have obtained this additional shipping in any other way. During the session of the Supreme War Council from January 30 to February 2, 1918, Field Marshal Haig made the statement that he would not want to use British troops in battle which had not been trained nine months at home and five months in France prior to his making such use of them. He concluded by expressing the opinion that "he, consequently, did not consider the Allies could expect the American force, as a force, to be of effective support this year." He thought that the best use to make of them would be to put them "into quiet sections of the line."

Gen. Petain "agreed entirely with the conclusions arrived at by Sir Douglas Haig." He went further, however, and said that "in his opinion the entry of American troops by battalions or regiments into French or English divisions, not only for training, but also for fighting, was much the greatest assistance that the United States could give the Allies and would furnish a solution to the crisis with regard to effectives." He spoke of this as an "amalgamation with the British and French armies." But he then added that "the suggested amalgamation, of course, was only temporary. The American Army would get back its units afterwards and become fully autonomous."

During the discussion of this subject at this session of the Supreme War Council, I was asked for an answer to the question as to whether the United States Government would consent to this amalgamation (which can be nothing else than what Admiral Sims means by the word "brigading"). I then made a statement leading to the conclusion that "such a thing as permanent amalgamation of our units with British and French units would be intolerable to American sentiment." The presiding officer, Mr. Clemenceau, thereupon declared that "this point was settled," and nothing was thereafter heard on this subject.

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On March 27, 1918, in the very crisis of the battle which began on March 21, the military representatives recommended that in that crisis the American Government send to Europe American Infantry and machine-gun units; that the use, in principle, of those units with Allied troops be permitted; that no American troops then in Europe should be so used; and that the Infantry and machine-gun units referred to should be so used temporarily and only during the crisis and to be eventually returned to the American Army. Before acting on it I took this recommendation to you and Gen. Pershing at the latter's house at 73 Rue de Varonne, where you dictated to the President an approval of the recommendation, based upon "the present emergency," but making it perfectly clear that the training and use of these troops was to be in the discretion of the American commander in chief.

The joint note in which you took this action was not formally considered by the Supreme War Council until its fifth session at Abbeville May 1 and 2, 1918. At this session the American commander in chief was present. The object of this discussion was to learn to what extent the wishes of the Allies could be met without jeopardizing the timely formation of the American Army. After the discussion, the American commander in chief with Gen. Foch and Lord Milner withdrew in order to draw up the details of the proposition. These details were embodied in a resolution of the Supreme War Council of May 2, 1918, the first paragraph of which reads:

"It is the opinion of the Supreme War Council that in order to carry the war to a successful conclusion an American Army should be formed as early as possible under its own commander and under its own flag."

This was the last time that the question of the use of American troops was brought up.

To my knowledge, the question of the "brigading" or the "amalgamation" of American units in foreign armies was not brought up or suggested prior to the session of the Supreme War Council January 30 to February 2, 1918; it was then suggested only by Gen. Petain as a purely temporary measure. No attention was paid to it, even then, until Baron Sonnine, one of the Italian political representatives, insisted on an answer to his question as to whether the United States Government would permit this brigading or amalgamation. The answer having been made, the proposition was promptly vetoed. It was only during the crisis of the drive of March, 1918, and solely to meet that crisis, that the military representatives proposed to recognize in principle the possible temporary use of American Infantry and machine-gun units in the foreign armies. Before that crisis it was not dreamed of and with the speedy passing of that crisis it was not heard of again.

Sincerely, yours,

TASKER H. BLISS,

The Hon. NEWTON D. BAKER,
Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *Washington.*

From: The Secretary of War.
To: Maj. Gen. J. J. Pershing, United States Army.
Subject: Command, authority, and duties in Europe.

The President directs me to communicate to you the following:

1. The President designates you to command all the land forces of the United States operating in Continental Europe and in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, including any part of the Marine Corps which may be detached for service there with the Army. From your command are excepted the military attachés and others of the Army who may be on duty directly with our several embassies.

2. You will proceed with your staff to Europe. Upon arrival in Great Britain, France, or any other of the countries at war with the Imperial German Government, you will at once place yourself in communication with the American embassy and through its agency with the authorities of any country to which forces of the United States may be sent.

3. You are invested with the authority and duties devolved by the laws, regulations, orders, and customs of the United States upon the commander of any army in the field in time of war and with the authority and duties in like manner devolved upon department commanders in peace and war, including the special authorities and duties assigned to the commander of the Philippine Department so far as the same are applicable to the particular circumstances of your command.

4. You will establish, after consultation with the French War Office, all necessary bases, lines of communication, depots, etc., and make all the incidental arrangements essential to active participation at the front.

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5. In military operations against the Imperial German Government you are directed to cooperate with the forces of the other countries employed against that enemy; but in so doing the underlying idea must be kept in view that the forces of the United States are a separate and distinct component of the combined forces, the identity of which must be preserved. This fundamental rule is subject to such minor exceptions in particular circumstances as your judgment may approve. The decisions as to when your command, or any of its parts, is ready for action is confided to you, and you will exercise full discretion in determining the manner of cooperation. But, until the forces of the United States are in your judgment sufficiently strong to warrant operations as an independent command, it is understood that you will cooperate as a component of whatever army you may be assigned to by the French Government.

6. You will keep the department fully advised of all that concerns your command, and you will communicate your recommendations freely and directly to the department. And, in general, you are vested with all necessary authority to carry on the war vigorously in harmony with the spirit of these instructions and toward a victorious conclusion.

TESTIMONY OF CAPT. HARRIS LANING.

(The witness was sworn by the chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Capt. Laning, can you give the committee any information as to the steps that were taken by the Navy Department in preparing and conducting the naval activities during the late war, and if so will you please state what were your duties in the World War from 1914 up to the present time, showing your own experience and your opportunities for observation? Will you state the matter in your own way?

Capt. LANING. A few days after the announcement in the newspapers that a Senate committee had been appointed to investigate the conduct of the war by the Navy Department, rumors came to me that because of my services in the Navy Department during the war it was more than likely I would be called as a witness. It is anything but a pleasant duty to be a witness in an investigation of the department under which it is my pride and honor to serve, but when it seemed that I might be called before the committee I naturally made all the preparations I could to tell the facts as I know them. I made a careful review of my memory and studied the papers in my possession after which I prepared a statement of the facts. With the consent of the committee I will read that statement.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Capt. LANING. My sole object in presenting the facts as I will is to lay before the committee what I believe to have been serious faults in the administration of the Navy Department in connection with the war, in the hope that the faults being made known their recurrence can be prevented. I therefore request the committee to ever bear in mind that my statement is utterly devoid of personal feeling and that I make it only because it is my duty to do so.

From my knowledge of the Navy and from information gained through personal contact with the Navy Department, I am convinced that since the starting of the World War the department has not administered the Navy as it should have, and as a result the Navy was not properly ready for war when we entered the war, and the Navy did not carry on its part in the war in the early days as efficiently as it could and should have been carried on.

It has taken many things to bring about my convictions, among which I cite the following particulars:

First. That in the years immediately preceding our entry into the war the Navy Department did not take an attitude on legislation

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and policies that would enable the fleet to be made properly ready for war, and that the fleet was not properly ready when war was declared.

Second. That even when war was imminent, when it was apparent that war could not be avoided, the department even then did not do those things that ought to have been done to make the Navy ready to carry on the war in its full strength and along the right lines.

Third. That at about the time war was declared, although a carefully drawn up plan, outlining what direction the Navy's first efforts should take, was prepared by the office of the Chief of Naval Operations for the department's approval, the plan was not approved, and as a result at the very time a plan was most needed the Navy did not have any general plan that was based on the peculiar conditions imposed by an enemy whose naval effort was restricted almost entirely to the use of submarines.

Fourth. That not having a definite plan to work to, the various parts of the Navy Department could make no coordinated effort to carry on the war, but, on the contrary, each part was obliged to do what that part thought might be best, with the result that not only was the effectiveness of the naval effort greatly reduced in the early stages of the war, but also the cost of the war was probably considerably and unnecessarily added to.

Fifth. That during the war it was always difficult and frequently impossible to obtain the department's approval of essential plans and policies; that this made it necessary for subordinate officers to go far beyond their authority to get things done, and that as a result the difficulties of carrying on the war were increased while the effectiveness was decreased.

It is not possible for me to produce documentary evidence proving every detail of the above five particulars. In most cases where I can not produce documents I can give you the names of officers who can substantiate my statements and can refer you to Navy Department records and reports of congressional hearings where sufficient information can be obtained.

That you may understand my competency to report the facts that follow I will give you a history of the duty I have been performing since the beginning of the World War. At the time of the first declaration of war I was in command of the Reserve Destroyer Flotilla, Atlantic Fleet. On October 5, 1916, I was relieved from that duty and the following day reported for duty in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations and was assigned to duty under the Aide for Material, Capt. J. S. McKean, and became his senior assistant. I remained in that position from October 6, 1916, until July 16, 1917, when at the request of then Rear Admiral L. C. Palmer, Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, I was transferred to the Bureau of Navigation and placed in charge of the Officer Personnel Division, which position I held until September 21, 1918, when I was advanced to the position of Assistant Chief of Bureau of Navigation. I continued as Assistant Chief of Bureau until March 31, 1919, when I was detached and ordered to duty as Chief of Staff, Destroyer Squadrons, Atlantic Fleet, which is my present duty. Rear Admiral L. C. Palmer was detached from duty as Chief of Bureau of Navigation about November 1, 1918, and

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from that time until the first part of January, 1919, when Rear Admiral Blue became Chief of Bureau, I was the acting Chief of the Bureau of Navigation.

From the time I reported for duty in the Navy Department on October 6, 1916, until I left it on March 31, 1919, I was in very close personal association with the Secretary of the Navy and the other leading officials of the department. Not many days passed when I was not in personal conference with the Secretary on important subjects or placed before him matters and papers requiring his action or signature. I was an adviser on many matters in regard to material while I was in Operations and in regard to personnel while I was in Navigation. During the time I was acting Chief of Bureau I was the principal adviser to personnel matters. Officially I came to know the department and its ways very intimately, and from my close association with the Secretary and my intimate knowledge of departmental and naval affairs I feel I am more than usually competent to gauge the department and its methods. My statements are, therefore, not casually made, but are based on my personal knowledge both as to the officials and to the affairs.

Taking up now the first particular, I will show how the department, by its attitude in regard to certain legislation, made it impossible to have the Navy ready for war either in regard to personnel or material. I in no way intend to criticize the department's attitude on any building program for the Navy, for it has generally advocated considerable increases in our ships. Whether or not the numbers and types advocated were correct is a point on which opinions differ, but it has consistently advocated a large building program. The remarkable feature about the department's attitude was its apparent inability to realize the necessity for legislation that would provide adequate personnel to man the ships or that would provide for adequate money to keep the completed ships fully ready for war. You will notice in every report the Secretary of the Navy has made that he bases our Navy's strength on the total number of ships we have without taking into consideration their actual material condition for war or their being manned for war. It must be apparent to any one that a ship alone means nothing in readiness for war. To be of service a ship must be in a material condition to fight, and it must have a crew not only sufficient to fight it but trained to fight it.

If proof of the failure to realize the necessity for the legislation spoken of above must be had in black and white, the evidence can be gleaned from the recorded hearings before the Naval Committees and from the files of the General Board, Naval Operations, Bureau of Navigation, Construction and Repair, Steam Engineering, and Ordnance, and especially as to personnel from a letter written by Admiral Caperton, Commander in Chief, United States Atlantic Reserve Fleet, in January, 1914, and from the remarks made by Admiral Fletcher, Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet, in the "Report of battle practice, spring of 1915." Officers who can testify as to the lack of funds available for work on ships to put them in the best possible fighting trim during the years just before the war are the various officers who were in the material bureaus during that time.

Officers who were afloat at that time, if called upon, can testify to their inability to get alterations essential to fighting efficiency because of lack of funds. Those same officers can testify as to the

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personnel difficulties on even the best manned ships, and of the other ships that should have been manned and ready that were laid up immobile and therefore useless for war purposes for the want of officers and men. I personally know these things to be facts, and the department itself did not make sufficient effort to have them remedied and they were not remedied. On the contrary such glowing accounts of the Navy and its splendid condition and efficiency were given out by the department that few, if any, outside the Navy realized the true condition. The Secretary's reports, his hearings before Congress, and his statements to the press at that time were to the effect that the Navy was all right and entirely ready.

When the World War started in 1914, to most of the people in this country it seemed advisable that our Navy at least should be made as ready for war as it was possible to make it. We all hoped to keep out of the war, but many realized that a mere failure to be ready for war would not keep us out of it. Most of us realized that on the contrary a failure to be ready might tend to drag us in. In any event from August, 1914, until the spring of 1917 the press, the public, and Congress showed their willingness to have the Navy ready for war. With the plaudits of the country Congress authorized one of the greatest building programs ever known. It was generally understood in the Navy Department and throughout the service that all things necessary to make the Navy ready for war would be granted by Congress if the needs were made known. But even then the needs as to personnel, and personnel will ever be the life blood of the Navy, were not truly presented to Congress. When Congress was seen to be anxious to put the personnel on a sound footing that the ships might be manned for war, the service was astounded to learn that the department had recorded itself against any further increase of personnel, and this at a time when only about half our ships were manned with even peace complements. To prove this you have only to read over the congressional records of the hearings on personnel in the years just before the war.

The result of the failure to supply an adequate personnel for the Navy was fully stated by me to the House Naval Committee in my hearings before it on December 17 and 18, 1918, at which time I was acting chief of Bureau of Navigation. The statement will be found in House Document No. 11, pages 674–680, which statement I will insert in the record. In order to emphasize the personnel situation at the time war was declared and the first few months just after I will read one or two paragraphs from that statement:

At that time, on the west coast of the United States, of our armored cruisers I think all but two of them were manned with partial crews so small that the ships couldn't run. At League Island and other navy yards we had a number of battleships laid up in reserve because we did not have enough people to operate them. We had about 25 destroyers half manned and a number of other ships that ought to have been in operation all the time and weren't even partly manned because we didn't have the men and officers even to half man them. Those ships began to set up a cry for men and officers as soon as the war started, for the ships were needed and needed at once. It wasn't only there we had our trouble. We began to enlist men by the tens of thousands to man our unmanned and undermanned ships and these men had to be trained. Our regular training stations were filled with them and new training camps were set up in many places. Each one of these stations began to call for officers to train their recruits and there were no officers. We were in the predicament of not having personnel to man our ships and also of not having it to even train recruits to man them. A more difficult or serious situation at the beginning of a great war can hardly be imagined.

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Mr. OLIVER. When was that?

Capt. LANING. That was in 1917, at the beginning of the war, with Germany. Right here in Washington the Chief of Naval Operations needed officers in his office to handle the big operations of war, but they were not to be had. The Bureau of Ordnance was in the same fix. That bureau began to turn out guns and ammunition and needed somebody who knew about guns and ammunition to look after the production, but we didn't have the officers to send to them. Everywhere there was a cry for officers and men that we did not have. We did send green recruits to fill the places of the men we should have had ready and trained, but for officers we had none to send. That was the situation in July, 1917, about three months after the war started when I was called from the office of the Chief of Naval Operations and put in charge of the Officer Division of the Bureau of Navigation. We had 2,394 commissioned officers in the line of the Navy at that time and we actually needed right then and there between six and seven thousand line officers—officers trained in time of peace that they might be ready in time of war. Of all the vast Navy of the United States the only ships we had anywhere near ready were about half our battleships and destroyers, and even they were not up to battle strength in personnel, while the shore end, which is essential to the success of the sea end, seemingly had nothing at all.

The proposition that was put up to me at that time was to make 2,394 officers do the work that about 6,000 or 7,000 should have been ready to do. The enlisted men situation was somewhat better, for we could get the raw material, and though the men weren't trained we could absorb them in the ships and train them very much quicker than we could officers. The situation with regard to men was mighty bad, but the officer situation was desperate.

I want to say that Admiral Palmer and I put in some sleepless nights about that time.

The statement from House Document No. 11, above referred to, is here printed in full as follows:

Capt. LANING. Before we take up the details of our present and future needs I would like to make a statement to the committee as to the personnel situation both before and at the beginning of the war, and to tell you something of what we have done during the war which I don't think anyone knows except the Bureau of Navigation. I think the talk I will give you will make some points clear that would otherwise need clearing up later on.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you go ahead and we won't interrupt you. You can make your statement first and then we can take the other up in the analysis I have indicated.

Capt. LANING. I will do that. For the past 20 years we have been building up the Navy very rapidly. We have had several building programs. Right now we are engaged on the largest building program of any and there is some talk of this session undertaking an even larger building program. In all this increase of the Navy practically very little was done to increase the personnel to man those new ships that were turned out. There was some increase in personnel but it didn't compare with the increase of material, and the result has been that though each year we actually had in commission and in operation more ships than ever before, at the same time we had tied up at docks, unable to operate because of lack of personnel, more ships than ever before. The percentage of those that were not operating was constantly growing in proportion to those that were, and that was all due to the fact that we did not have the personnel to operate all the ships we built or needed to perform either the peace time work or the war work of the Navy.

I want to point out two or three instances of the effect on the Navy of that failure to provide personnel. Go back to 1914, just before the World War started, when we had trouble with Mexico. In a situation like the one we had in Mexico, we should have had our cruisers and gunboats down there to handle it. We didn't have sufficient of those in commission to handle the situation, and so we had to send the battleships and destroyers of the North Atlantic Fleet to do the work. They were taken off their legitimate work, the training and preparation for the kind of work they were built for, and sent down to do cruiser work in Mexican waters. They did the work all right, but at great cost to our training and readiness for a real naval war. We had ships of the right type to handle the task and ought to have had the men to man those ships so that they could have handled that situation without calling on our main fighting force; but for want of personnel those ships were not ready and could not be sent, and we had to send battleships and destroyers to do their work.

Right after that the war began. For lack of personnel we were still unable to operate much of anything except the battleships and destroyers. I remember in 1916 when I was in command of the reserve destroyer flotilla and the revolution in the

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Dominican Republic started. I had my little flotilla at Key West at that time and we were holding our target practice. I had only half crews, men and officers on those destroyers, and on the *Panther*, which was flagship. The Navy Department had to get somebody down there to handle that Dominican Republic situation. We came in from torpedo practice about noon one day and on the way in I received a radio asking if I could go down there with my little bunch of ships to meet that situation. I promptly telegraphed back that if we could forego gun practice, which we were to start in a few days, I could get away. At 4 o'clock that afternoon I received orders to go. We have eight destroyers. At 7 o'clock that night five of the oil-burning destroyers were on their way half manned with only 2 officers and about 45 men. The next morning I succeeded in getting off two more coal-burning destroyers. There were not enough men in the outfit for both the *Panther* and the other destroyer to go. Either the *Panther* could take the men and go and leave the *Preston* behind, or the *Preston* could go and leave the *Panther*. I telegraphed the department that I had enough men to send either the *Panther* or the *Preston*, but that as it was only one could go, and that before the other could go we had to have some engine-room force. The department sent word to put the men on the *Preston* and that men would be sent for the *Panther*. So I took men off the *Panther* and put them on the *Preston*, but before she could get away I got word for the *Panther* to go. I then took the men off the *Preston*, put them back on the *Panther*, and away she went. The *Preston* was several days getting the men she needed to enable her to move.

Well, we went down to the Dominican Republic and we did our part in that revolution. Those half-manned destroyers were running around that island night and day without sufficient officers or men to properly handle or take care of them, merely because the proper ships for that kind of work could not be supplied with crews, and were therefore laid up and unable to operate.

I stayed there about six weeks and came back, and just about four hours before I got into Key West I got a telegram to send three of those destroyers to Mexico for patrol work. They were still manned with only the 2 officers and 45 men to each destroyer, but they went and did the work.

I cite those instances to show you that even for minor naval operations that came to the Navy in times of peace we, with all of our vast expenditures for the Navy, could not send ships suitable to the task because we did not have men enough to man that class of ships. We not only did not have the cruisers and gunboats ready to meet emergencies like these, but also we didn't have enough to "show the flag" in other countries where there wasn't emergency.

As bad as was the situation for the ordinary naval operations we are called on to perform in time of peace, it was a good deal worse when we came to getting what we had ready for war. We only had about one-half of our battleships fully manned before the war. We had about 30 of our destroyers fully manned and about 25 with half crews. Those were about all the ships the Navy did have fully manned. We wanted to get our fleet ready for business when war came, and naturally we had to engage in maneuvers. In order to get sufficient ships for those maneuvers, we had to use all sorts of subterfuges. We would send a collier out and let her represent four battleships in a big war game, the battleships themselves being unmanned at a dock. That wasn't much of a way to train for war, but without men it was the best we could do. As far as being ready for war was concerned, the readiness and the fighting efficiency of those four battleships was truly represented by the collier, and that is a very good illustration of the Navy's readiness at that time. The Navy ought to be ready to fight with its full strength when war begins. It is the one arm of the service that can't wait. If we do not have our ships manned and ready to go out to fight, it will probably be too late to get them ready after war begins.

When the war actually started for us, the next year after 1916, when we went to San Domingo, we had manned every ship our scanty personnel would let us man, but even then only about half our ships were capable of operating. The North Atlantic Fleet was in Cuban waters. It had in it practically all of the ships that were manned and consisted almost entirely of battleships and destroyers, because we had no men with which to man our other ships, and even these ships were manned at that time with what we called peace complements, which is less than the war complement. We have since learned that a peace complement is something we shouldn't deal with, since it takes fewer men than are required to fight a ship in battle. You can't train a team properly unless you have all the members, and we were training the ships in our main fleet about like you would train a football team with eight men up to the day of the big game, and then on that day put 11 men in. Those ships were better off in men than in officers. The men had been increased a little more rapidly than officers, and when the war started those ships down in Cuban waters had approximately 27 officers and about 85 per cent of what we now know to be the

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war complement of a battleship. Those 27 officers should have been either 37 or 39 officers if the ships had been properly manned. The ships clamored for men and clamored for officers, and they wanted them right away and badly, and while we could and did furnish them green and untrained men to fill their vacancies, we could do nothing for the officers, which, of course, were not to be had so easily.

At that time, on the west coast of the United States, of our armored cruisers I think all but two of them were manned with partial crews so small that the ships couldn't run. At League Island and other navy yards we had a number of battleships laid up in reserve because we did not have enough people to operate them. We had about 25 destroyers half manned, and a number of other ships that ought to have been in operation all the time and weren't even partly manned because we didn't have the men and officers even to half man them. Those ships began to set up a cry for men and officers as soon as the war started, for the ships were needed and needed at once. It wasn't only there we had our trouble. We began to enlist men by the tens of thousands to man our unmanned and undermanned ships, and these men had to be trained. Our regular training stations were filled with them and new training camps were set up in many places. Each one of these stations began to call for officers to train their recruits, and there were no officers. We were in the predicament of not having personnel to man our ships, and also of not having it to even train recruits to man them. A more difficult or serious situation at the beginning of a great war can hardly be imagined.

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Everywhere there was a cry for officers and men that we did not have. We did send green recruits to fill the places of the men we should have had ready and trained, but officers we had none to send. That was the situation in July, 1917, about three months after the war started, when I was called from the office of the Chief of Naval Operations and put in charge of the Officer Division of the Bureau of Navigation. We had 2,394 commissioned officers in the line of the Navy at that time, and we actually needed right then and there between six and seven thousand line officers—officers trained in time of peace that they might be ready in time of war. Of all the vast Navy of the United States the only ships we had anywhere near ready were about half our battleships and destroyers, and even they were not up to battle strength in personnel, while the shore end, which is essential to the success of the sea end, seemingly had nothing at all.

The proposition that was put up to me at that time was to make 2,394 officers do the work that about 6,000 or 7,000 should have been ready to do. The enlisted men situation was somewhat better, for we could get the raw material; and though the men weren't trained, we could absorb them in the ships and train them very much quicker than we could officers. The situation with regard to men was mighty bad, but the officer situation was desperate.

I want to say that Admiral Palmer and I put in some sleepless nights about that time. We simply had to get officers and men, and we had to man our ships and carry on our shore work; and not only that, but on the day I went to the Bureau of Navigation the Office of Naval Operations called on us to man and put in operation in carrying troops abroad the 16 huge German ships that formed the nucleus of our transportation force. At the same time they were calling on us from the "other side" for ships to be used in driving down the submarines, and we were taking over yachts, trawlers, and other craft in large numbers, all of which had to be manned and sent over there as soon as possible.

The demand for trained combatant officers literally jumped up by the thousand, and I still had only the original 2,394 to meet the demand. I made an estimate of the situation and reached the decision that there were certain things that simply had to be done. All our destroyers were needed abroad to meet the desperate situation caused by the enemy submarines. Come what might, they had to go over, and we had to man them. The yachts had to get their crews so that they too could fight submarines, while only the transports could carry troops over. We had to man and operate those ships if we didn't do anything else, but also we had to get our submarines and battleships ready too.

Already the battleships had been robbed of their officers until they had only 21 line officers for work that required 37; yet we had to get those battelships in fighting trim. In my estimate of the situation I came to the conclusion that those battleships wouldn't be called on to fight for at least three months, for the British fleet had the Huns locked

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up, and even if they came out to fight we would still have three months to get ready in. I figured that each day that went by without the Germans coming out we had three months from that day before we would be called on to fight a general engagement, and therefore we had three months we could use to develop and train personnel.

Mr. OLIVER. What do you mean by that?

Capt. LANING. I figured if that if the German fleet came out on any date and by some chance whipped the British fleet—which however improbable it might be, we still had to consider as a possibility—it would be at least three months before they could repair themselves and be ready to tackle us. Of course, each day as it went by without their coming out left us still three months grace for preparation. We decided to take advantage of it.

We couldn't make those 2,394 officers go very far. I believed, however, that we had the finest officers in the world and that by using them as leaven in the dough of the splendid officer material that this country has, we could turn out a loaf that might meet our requirements. The idea was to spread the leaven of trained officers as much as possible, and, making with it the splendid material we had, bring the whole into a fairly satisfactory condition. If we did only what could be done with our few trained officers, our part in the war would be small, but if we could carry out our idea of using them as a leaven and were given the time, we could meet every demand made on us. Every young man who came to us and who seemed to have the qualifications of an officer was to be at once put in training for an officer, and as soon as he had had the rudiments of an officer's training we would send him to a battleship to be further trained and absorbed into her complement.

When we decided to take that step the battleships had already been cut down to 21 or 22 officers when they ought to have had 37 officers, and to place those green young men on them to fill the gaps was, to say the least, an experiment of dangerous character. We believed, however, that they could be trained quickly for the subordinate positions and later for higher positions and that by a process of younger officers understudying older officers and taking over the older officers' duties we could gradually get older officers released from various ships and made available for positions of greater importance on other ships we were taking on.

The plan was certainly radical, and in order to have success with it we had to get the hearty cooperation of every officer in the United States Navy. I went with this scheme to Admiral Palmer, and he said:

"It looks like the only chance we have to do our part in the war, so let us try it; but before we put it into effect we had better talk to the commander in chief and to the officers of the fleet to see if they think it can be done."

If the officers afloat felt that the proposition would not work, and if they would not go in heart and soul and carry it out, it would be impossible to put it through. So Admiral Palmer sent a telegram to the commander in chief and one to Admiral Gleaves, of the cruiser and transport force, telling them that on certain days I would be with them to confer on officer personnel, and on those days to assemble all the admirals, captains, and executive officers for the conference.

The fleet was at a base in Long Island Sound, and I arrived on the *Pennsylvania* the night before the conference. Admiral Mayo was abroad at that time and Admiral Coffman was in command. As soon as I arrived on the flagship I went to see Admiral Coffman. When I went in the cabin, Admiral Coffman, who is my very dear friend, said:

"Laning, I know what you are here for. You want to take more officers away from my ship, and I tell you now you can't do it. You have stripped us now until it is dangerous. If you take any more out you will ruin this fleet."

I replied:

"Admiral, I am sorry that we can't get any more officers from you, for to carry out the plans we must have them; but at least you will let me talk to you about it, won't you?"

He said, "Yes." And I talked to him that night until well after 11 o'clock. When I was leaving the cabin the admiral put his hand on my shoulder and said:

"It is the only way to do it, and I am going to back you up in it. There may be a good deal of opposition to it at the start, but it is the only thing to do."

The next morning I went in to the conference facing all those flag officers and captains, and just as Admiral Coffman did, they knew what I was there for. They knew I was going to suggest that they give us some of those 21 officers they had to do the work of 37; so when I began my talk I faced officers who I knew were naturally hostile to my plan. And well they might be, for I was calling on them to give up more and more of their already too few trained officers and the replacing of them with good material for officers, but material that was absolutely green and untrained. Admiral Coffman knew the situation and met it in a way in introducing me by saying that I

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had convinced him of the soundness of the plan, and that it simply had to go through. With the probability of a battle on sea, with the life of a nation at stake, it was rather hard to convince the captains of our dreadnaughts that in three months they must still be ready for battle, and during that time must train green officers (as well as their green men), and at the end give up 4 of their trained officers, reducing the number to 17 where 37 ought to be.

I am glad to say they saw the reasoning in our proposition, and when my talk was finished they to a man agreed that it was the only thing we could do that would enable the Navy to do its full part in the war. More than that, they all said that it not only could be done but that it would be done.

I went over to Admiral Gleaves's force and had a similar experience, and when I arrived back in the bureau I told Admiral Palmer that the fleet was with us and our plan could be carried out. We then issued our orders to the service, and from then until the end of the war the Navy trained officers and men while it did its work of the war. So well and so wonderfully did it work that a few outside of the service even dreamed of the desperate situation that we were in at the beginning of the war, but the fact remains that the Navy, as a whole was not ready to fight until many months after the war started. Had we met the German Navy this year we could have faced the result with confidence in the readiness and ability of our Navy, but we must not forget that it was this year before our personnel was ready. The next enemy may not be held in check as were the Germans, and we may be compelled to fight and at the very opening day of the war. We can not and must not again count on having an opportunity to get ready for war after war is declared and for that reason we must always hereafter be ready.

I consider the work of the 2,394 officers we had in the beginning of the war in providing, developing, and training our personnel as the Navy's greatest accomplishment in this war and we should take advantage of their magnificent work and keep the Navy ready. We have paid the price in effort and in treasure and we would be foolish now to waste what has been so dearly bought by allowing the Navy to go back to the condition it was in at the beginning of the war. It serves us nothing to pay billions for ships and then render them useless by not paying the millions it takes to man them. Ships alone can not make a navy or at least can not make a fighting navy. No matter how many ships we may have they count as nothing unless they can fight and to fight they must have personnel. In the last few months the Navy, for the first time in my knowledge, or in yours, has been ready to fight. Let us keep it ready by providing for the permanence of the personnel.

The legislation required to keep the Navy ready naturally divides itself into two parts: First, that necessary to retain what we now have while we are building up our permanent strength and enabling what we have to become a part of that permanent strength; and, second, the legislation necessary to establish a permanent strength. The bureau after long and careful thought has drawn up the legislation covering these two phases, and if the legislation is passed as recommended the United States will at last have a Navy adequate as to personnel and ready to fight with its full strength the moment war is declared. No part of the legislation recommended can be omitted without injury to the service, and I trust that the naval committee will see fit to recommend it as drawn up and that Congress will enact it into law. Economy, efficiency, and the national safety demand this legislation.

Capt. LANING. To further emphasize the situation in regard to the inadequacy of the personnel in the early stages of the war I refer you to a letter submitted to the Secretary of the Navy by the Bureau of Navigation about the end of October, 1918. The letter is dated October 26, 1918, and was prepared by the bureau in accordance with instructions from the Secretary to submit information for incorporation in his annual report made about the end of 1918. The letter begins as follows:

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
BUREAU OF NAVIGATION,
Washington, D. C., October 26, 1918.

To: Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: Information for incorporation in annual report.
Reference: (*a*) Secretary's memorandum of October 15, (*b*) Secretary's letter of October 24.

In accordance with your wishes expressed in the above reference the following information as to the work of the Bureau of Navigation is forwarded for incorporation in your annual report to the President.

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At the time the United States entered the war, the personnel of the Navy, while of a high standard, was entirely inadequate to meet the needs of war as it is waged to-day. Neither of enlisted men nor of officers were there enough to man the ships of the Navy that were then ready. It was possible to man and put in war operation those ships for which there were crews, but those ships were only a part of our available fighting force. The newer battleships and destroyers were manned and ready when war was declared, but the older ships, including battleships, armored cruisers, destroyers, etc., had only half crews and a few were not even in commission.

It was evident that if the Navy were to do its full share in the war broad plans for expanding the personnel would have to be adopted immediately. Fortunately for us the enemy was not at our doors. The allied fleet that for nearly three years held the enemy sea forces in check were still sufficient to hold them enough longer to get our personnel ready. In this we were very fortunate but we should not again let our Navy personnel be so reduced that we can not on the declaration of war put our full fighting forces into operation.

The plans adopted for rapidly building up our personnel have proved highly successful.

* * * * * * *

Capt. LANING. The letter then goes on to tell what we did in building up that personnel. Further confirmation of the condition as to personnel at that time can be obtained from Capt. L. C. Palmer, then Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, and Capt. L. M. Overstreet, who had charge of the enlisted personnel division. As for the material unreadiness of our ships with the fleet when war was declared, I refer you to a report submitted to the department at that time by Admiral Mayo, commander in chief. That report was made to the Navy Department and should now be on its files or can be obtained from Admiral Mayo's files. Based on the work that it was necessary to do on them at that time and taking into consideration our available repair facilities, it was found that it would take a period of over 100 days to get all battleships of even the active fleet materially ready for war.

I have in my possession the original estimate of the time for this work and later will refer to it and submit it in connection with another particular. Even though you may not care to delve into the department's records and congressional hearings to ascertain that the department did not make sufficient effort to have the Navy ready as to material and personnel, the evidence that the Navy was not ready in these respects, will be before you in Admiral Mayo's letter just referred to and in the statement from House Document No. 11.

Passing on to the second particular that even when war was imminent things that ought to have been done were not done, the following is submitted:

For many months prior to February 1, 1917, our representatives in Germany were reporting on the situation over there. They gave us fairly accurate information of Germany's submarine building program and of her intention to carry on unrestricted attacks on merchant shipping, whether neutral or not, as soon as their submarines were ready. These reports can be found on the files of the Office of Naval Intelligence. But in spite of them the department even then failed to take steps to get the fleet ready for war. As a matter of fact the dreadnoughts did not go to the yards for this work until summer—many weeks after the declaration of war. I wish to point out that had we sent the battleships to the yards in the winter 1916–17, and had concentrated on getting them ready

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for war so far as material is concerned, they would have been ready at least as to material when we declared war. As it was they were not ready at that time either as to material or as to personnel.

Taking up now, the third particular, on February 1, 1917, Germany announced her campaign of unrestricted submarine warfare. At that time the country practically gave up hope of averting war and certainly then, as never before, there was the necessity of at least preparing plans for a war against Germany. Certainly we should have laid some plans then, to enable us to act promptly and effectively if war should come. But although I was in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations and would have known of them, I did not hear of any such plans. So fearful of the result was I that on February 18, 1917, I prepared a memorandum on the subject. It reads as follows:

MEMORANDUM.

FEBRUARY 18, 1917.

I have been impressed recently with the really little progress we are making toward preparing ourselves for a war under the present situation. Our general plan of war is and has been based on meeting an enemy free to move in general as he pleases with all the various types that go to make up a strong offensive force. We have made little or no preparation for handling a situation like the present where the immediate menace is confined to submarine effort. The final menace, if the submarine effort is successful, will require every force we can raise to meet it and for that reason our first and immediate operations should be to destroy the immediate menace and thereby obliterate the ultimate menace.

From the material point of view there seems to be no general plan for handling the immediate menace. Without any other plan in mind than that developed to meet a situation in no way similar to the present situation, the Navy Department as a whole is proceeding with its task as if there was nothing new in the situation. While those steps must be taken to meet the ultimate menace, there is certainly no concerted action to meet the immediate menace. No one knows what particular task will fall to him to meet the present situation and therefore can not prepare himself for his task. In other words, not knowing what general plan must be followed in a situation like the present, practically the whole department is at a standstill in preparing for it.

I realize that an officially sanctioned plan can not be obtained at present, but is there any reason why a plan can not be made ready for submission and the different offices and bureaus made cognizant of it so that when it is called for the whole department will know just what the different tasks will be and will be prepared to carry them out? It looks to me like the present situation is going to call for a plan of action quite different from any we have been previously trained for or have prepared for. Some definite idea of the plan that much be put into effect to meet it is essential to every cooperating office if the offices are to be prepared to carry out their part. Its principles therefore should be known and the organization perfected to put it into effect with the least delay when it is adopted.

It is not a disloyal act to prepare a plan for use when needed. In fact, I can not but feel that it is our duty to prepare on and to indicate what it is to the cooperating officers that they may be prepared to expeditiously perform their tasks in it. There is now no direction of the present energy. Each part of the organization is directing its efforts only as that part estimates the situation for itself. Some may be headed right and some wrong, but all could be more or less right if a logical general plan were known and energies were directed to meet it.

The country believes we are at least ready to put a plan of some sort in operation, and I feel that we are not doing our duty if we fail to do so. We are not utilizing the days of grace now being given us, and they can be used to enormous advantage if we only know our possible individual tasks if war should come.

Aren't we failing in our duty if we don't do all we can to meet the emergency? The first step to meet is to have a plan and an organization ready to carry it out. Can't we have it?

This memorandum I handed to my immediate superior, who later returned it to me. It shows very clearly the situation in the department at that time.

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Some few days later, just after the naval appropriation bill of March 3, 1917, was passed, I took the matter up verbally with Admiral McKean, and the following morning, at a conference of all the officers in Operations held in Admiral Benson's office, Admiral McKean brought up the question of formulating a plan for conducting the then inevitable war with the particular view of determining how to best utilize, to meet the then existing conditions, the new resources in money placed at our disposal in the appropriation bill. Admiral Benson then and there told the officers to take the question up and submit plans for consideration. I at once began an estimate of the situation, and on March 13, 1917, submitted the estimate which embodied my idea of the plan we should follow in our first war efforts. It must be remembered that at that time we were in possession only of general information. We had no inside information of the true state of affairs or as to what the Allies would want when we joined them in the war, and for that reason our estimate and decisions at that time had to be restricted very largely to our case at home. Still it was essential that we at once take all the steps we could to prepare both for our own safety and for those things our information showed us we would certainly have to do. It was not known until some time later that the greatest of all our naval efforts would be in overcoming submarines in European waters and in the transportation of troops. I will insert in the record a copy of that estimate and plan.

The CHAIRMAN. Was that plan the plan of the Bureau of Operations that you referred to before in your statement?

Capt. LANING. No; that is leading up to that plan. You will see in a moment, after I have read a little farther.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Capt. LANING. The paper is a long one. It analyzes the war situation as it appeared three weeks before we declared war. It shows what we would have to do to combat the submarines and after summing up our forces suitable for that and other war purposes, divided up the money resources then available to create and prepare the additional forces the estimate showed to be necessary.

A study of the estimate should enable you to see how utterly unprepared we were at that time, in so far as material was concerned, for a war against submarines. It shows that with the exception of 52 destroyers, of which, I may add, only about 30 were manned for active service, the United States Navy had practically nothing with which to combat submarines.

The estimate of the situation is summarized at the end into a decision of 28 parts, each of which covered an action to be taken at once. I will insert the entire paper in the record, but will here read only the 28 parts of the decision:

DECISION.

1. Arm all merchant ships engaged in trade with the allies, cost to be charged to ordnance appropriations. Use guns of 5-inch or larger caliber, if available.

2. Encourage by subsidies and insurance as many additional ships as possible to enter into trade with the allies, arming all that do.

3. Encourage new construction of merchant shipping in all ways.

4. Enter into contracts for all 5 and 6 inch guns and ammunition for auxiliaries that ordnance appropriations permit.

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5. Rush to completion the 16 dirigibles now contracted for and enter into contracts for 64 more to be delivered as soon as possible.

6. Proceed with the erection of the air-patrol stations for the above dirigibles.

7. Set aside from the emergency fund $10,000,000 for dirigibles, stations, and other aviation purposes.

8. Start construction at once and rush to completion, or charter, 300 large size patrol vessels capable of keeping the sea. Those built should be not less than 110 feet long and should have a speed of not less than 24 knots.

9. Secure by purchase or charter all craft suitable for harbor and in-shore patrol.

10. Make $30,000,000 available at once for the above patrol vessels from the emergency fund.

11. Equip the above-named patrol vessels at once with suitable guns, to be paid for as far as possible from the ordnance appropriations.

12. Make available at once from the emergency fund $5,000,000 to be used by the Bureau of Ordnance to provide additional guns and ammunition for patrol vessels that can not be covered by their appropriations.

13. Provide 100 pairs of mine sweepers by commandeering, charter, or purchase of all available and suitable vessels. If 100 pair can not be obtained in this way construct the others.

14. Allot $10,000,000 from the emergency fund for obtaining sweepers.

15. Equip for sweeping and arm all mine sweepers from present ordnance appropriations.

16. Inform the Lighthouse Service that many largest size spar buoys will be needed for marking swept lanes of travel, and set aside $100,000 from the emergency fund to pay for buoys until Lighthouse Service has funds for the purpose.

17. Provide bases for surface patrols in protected and convenient harbors, setting aside $5,000,000 from the emergency fund for equipping them.

18. Bureau of Ordnance provide 10,000 anchored contact mines.

19. Bureau of Ordnance provide antisubmarine nets in large quantities both for harbor protection, protection of lanes of travel, and for use of patrol boats.

20. Allot $5,000,000 from emergency fund to Bureau of Ordnance for use in connection with their own funds for purchase of mines and nets.

21. Rush to completion the following craft under construction or authorized: First, the five battleships now nearest completion; second, all authorized destroyers; third, all authorized submarines.

22. Set aside $32,250,000 from the emergency fund for rushing the above construction.

23. Endeavor to rush other authorized ships to completion to the greatest possible extent within the limit of their appropriations.

24. Urge upon Congress as soon as it convenes to supply an additional emergency fund of $250,000,000 to complete authorized craft and to provide such other craft and material as may be needed not specially authorized.

25. Make immediate allotment of the remainder of the $6,000,000 appropriated last year to improve yard equipment to the east coast yards.

26. Call for bids on all authorized new construction at earliest possible time and thereby make the $12,000,000 appropriated for improving yards available and at once allot the money to the yards to equip them properly. It must be remembered that additional yard equipment is absolutely necessary.

27. Start the construction of the additional storehouses provided for in the new bill for New York and Puget Sound and allot $5,000,000 to provide for such additional storehouses and depots as may be necessary to handle the increased supplies and material.

28. As soon as Congress meets urge upon them the necessity of bringing our fleet up to the required standard to meet the ultimate menace which, in addition to all the material above provided for, requires the following: Five battleships (first line), 3 battle cruisers, 18 scouts, 26 destroyers, 19 coast submarines (800 tons), 17 fleet submarines, 16 mine sweepers (fleet), 7 mine layers (fleet), 20 fuel ships, 8 supply ships, 5 destroyers' tenders, 8 submarines' tenders.

The estimate above referred to is here printed in full, as follows:

NAVY DEPARTMENT.
Washington, March 13, 1917.

ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION.

Mission.—The naval appropriation bill having become a law and its funds made immediately available, to determine the best plan for utilizing those funds in the present situation.

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SUMMARY OF THE SITUATION.

About Feburary 1, Germany announced her intention of destroying all shipping without further warning in certain zones established by herself, around the coasts of the nations in Europe with which she is at war. The United States denying that Germany has a right to destroy any neutral ships without warning and without visit and search and safeguarding lives, at once broke off diplomatic relations with her. Since that time both enemy and neutral ships have been sunk in the barred zone by German submarines without warning, but as yet no United States ships have been so sunk. In order to protect American ships from these illegal attacks the President has ordered the arming of merchant ships and authorizes them to resist illegal attack.

At this time the condition is not one of war, but with German submarines carrying out the announced German policy and being resisted therein by our Government-armed ships, a state bordering on war exists and the situation is such that at any time we may be actually involved in war.

The situation has been gradually developing and in order that the Navy might be ready to meet war conditions, Congress has passed an enormous naval appropriation bill and has made its funds immediately available. If the Navy is to be ready for possible and probable war there is no time to lose in preparing for it. There can be no doubt that Congress and the entire Nation expect us to immediately use such of the appropriated funds as are necessary to prepare ourselves. To fail to use them now to the best advantage may bring terrible disaster to the Nation, but by using them, if war comes, we may bring it to a successful conclusion. But the great reason for using the funds at once and in the best manner is that we may keep from waging war on the vast scale of the war in Europe, even if we do not altogether avert it.

ENEMY FORCES.

Strength and disposition.—The possible enemy forces in the present situation are those of all the Central Allies. On both land and sea their forces are enormous, are magnificently trained and equipped, and are organized in a way beyoud the conception of the vast majority of our population. They wage war in the most scientific way and apparently let no opportunity of injuring their enemies escape. They are brave, resourceful, and ruthless.

Fortunately for us, the tremendous forces of the Germanic powers are not free to operate against us in their full strength. Their vast armies are generally on the defensive and are opposed by armies of greater numbers and as splendidly equipped. To maintain her armies Germany depends entirely on her internal resources, and in this lies her strength. To maintain their armies, the Allies seem obliged to call on the rest of the world, or at least to bring supplies across the sea, and in that lies their strength and their weakness—their strength because of the inexhaustibility and quantity of their supplies, but their weakness because of the danger to their lines of communication.

The huge naval forces of the Central Powers, as great as they are, do not control the sea. Their coast is blockaded, and except for submarines their fleets are contained. So blockaded, except for her power of self-sustenance, Germany would long ago have collapsed, but in spite of her enormous resources and her intelligent use of them she is facing serious shortages of food and possibility of other supplies essential to the conduct of the war.

If the present conditions can be continued, everything points to the Entente's final success, but there is some doubt that these conditions will continue. There is but little chance of victory for the German armies until the Entente's supply lines are broken, and it is at these, with the only weapons she has, that Germany is striking, and in so striking has denied our rights on the sea. It is yet too early to estimate the result of her blow, but it is to prevent the success of the blow that we must bend our efforts. Should we, with the Allies, fail in that effort, success may come to Germany, and should it, it may fall to us to have to meet Germany's full strength alone.

It follows, then, that we must prepare ourselves to render futile and destroy the immediate menace of the German submarine campaign, in order to destroy the ultimate menace of her full strength used against us, but at the same time we must prepare ourselves to meet the ultimate menace if it comes, for unless we are prepared to meet it the very life of our Nation is endangered.

Probable intentions.—The enemy intentions are fairly well understood. With his enormous submarine force he is endeavoring to break the lines of supply to the Entente forces. Should he succeed, he may gain a decision or at least get a draw, either of which would leave him with far greater strength than we have. His submarine pressure works against his enemies in the field and against noncombatants.

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If he cuts the lines of supply of those in the field, he may win a decision. If he cuts the lines of supply to noncombatants, their demands may force an indecisive peace. He operates with both ends in view. Even though he may not immediately succeed, he may so scare the civil population that their demands will force the Entente powers to sacrifice protection to their fleets to save their populace from starvation. In such case Germany might take advantage of the lack of protection to the Allied Fleet, weaken it by submarine attack, and possibly engage it successfully, thereby gaining to themselves the control of the sea and immediately threatening us, as well as the Allies' communications.

To carry out the above general plan, Germany is already operating her submarines in the "barred zones." That she will continue to operate them there can not be doubted, since it is in those zones that shipping converges, and it is there that submarines are nearest their base. But knowing also that those zones are best defended against submarines it is likely and probable that other much used lanes of travel will be attacked. Naturally, lacking bases, not a great many submarines can be used for distant work, and it would take many to stop shipping at the source. However, it is probable and possible for some to so operate, and it is natural that they should choose to attack in those lanes that are nearest and most frequented. Such lanes are those leading out of our own east coast ports, including the Panama Canal, and it is on these lanes that we must prepare for counter operations at once, even though we do not attempt offensive operations in conjunction with the Allies.

In every instance when a nation has entered this war against her, Germany has at once struck that nation a powerful blow. Such blows delivered as soon as war comes have the double effect of damaging and discouraging the new enemy and reducing his power and of encouraging Germany's own people. There is every reason to believe that should we be involved in the war Germany will make such an attempt at us. We may expect serious attacks from her immissaries within the limits of the country, but such attempts are not to be met by this department. Her one way to strike the Navy a hard blow and a serious one is to operate submarines against the fleet. Germany knows that we have practically no security force in our fleet and that a very small submarine force could possibly deliver a serious blow. We must guard against such a blow.

Germany's probable intentions in the immediate submarine menace have been fairly covered. The ultimate menace, should she get into a position to adopt it, involves the use of her full strength against us. It will probably take the form of an advance across the sea with a naval force to gain control, accompanied by an army to carry out a victorious campaign on land. The details of the methods she would follow are well known to us and will not be taken up here. That we must be ready to meet such a campaign is evident, and while preparing to meet and overcome the immediate menace we must not lose sight of the ultimate menace or fail to prepare for it. Success against the immediate menace may remove the ultimate menace, but to be sure of safety against both we must prepare for both.

OUR OWN FORCES.

Strength and disposition—As compared with the forces of our probable enemy our land forces are insignificent and in no way ready to defend the country. Even though immediate steps are taken to prepare land forces, they can hardly be ready to meet the ultimate menace within a year. Our sole reliance for many months to come must be in the Navy, and the Navy must at once prepare to meet both menaces confronting us.

Our total of naval forces may be grouped into three classes: (1) Ships completed that are now ready for service or that will be ready shortly; (2) ships now under construction or authorized; and (3) the funds made available in the recent appropriation bill for speeding up (2) and for providing material in addition to (1) and (2). It is to determine how to best utilize the third part of our force that this estimate is made, but in order to do that I must ascertain what is needed to meet the present situation, compare it with what is now ready, and then arrange my expenditures to make up the pressing deficiencies as far as possible. I must realize that an expenditure of these funds in any but the right direction, will materially reduce any power to meet the situation, so the greatest care must be exercised.

Not including the Asiatic force, my available fighting force now practically ready for service consists of 12 battleships, first line; 21 battleships, second line; 9 armoured cruisers; 4 cruisers, first class; 3 cruisers, second class; 12 cruisers, third class; 7 gunboats; 5 monitors; 52 destroyers; 11 coast destroyers; 3 mine layers; 4 mine sweepers (with fleet); 6 mine sweepers (coast); 36 aeroplanes; 28 submarines; 3 kite balloons.

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Under forces appropriated for but not ready we have: Now building—Nine battleships, first line; 1 scout; 27 destroyers; 58 submarines (coast); 3 submarines (800 tons); 3 submarines (fleet); 1 gunboat; 16 nonrigid dirigibles; 78 aeroplanes; 12 kite balloons; Authorized—Three battleships, first line; 5 battle cruisers; 5 scouts; 15 destroyers; 38 submarines (800 tons).

Under funds immediately available that may be used to complete authorized material or to provide material not specifically authorized we have the following:

For aviation	$5,133,000
Ordnance and ordnance stores	8,488,333
Batteries for merchant auxiliaries	4,731,174
Ammunition for merchant auxiliaries	7,731,941
Storehouses, New York and Puget Sound	1,000,000
Naval emergency fund	115,000,000
For equipping navy yards	12,000,000

COURSES OPEN TO US.

In order to ascertain what to do we must first compare the above-listed forces with what we actually need to meet both the immediate menace and the ultimate menace. Let us therefore study the methods of combating each menace and thereby determine our needs after which we will determine how to provide all of them, or not being able to provide for all to provide those things that will best enable us to meet both menaces and hold them in check until we can prepare additional forces.

The immediate menace is from submarines so our first step must be to render that menace futile and to destroy it. It will become futile if, in spite of it, we and the entente allies can maintain the allies' overwater lines of supply. If we destroy it our first mission is gained. How can we do those things?

Submarines have only three offensive weapons—guns, mines, and torpedoes. Of these the gun is naturally the favorite for use because by its successful use it does the most damage at the least cost. To use guns the submarine must operate on the surface, but so operating, owing to the very few guns they carry and the vulnerability of the ship, they are easily sunk by gun fire. A submarine can not operate on the surface against armed ships and hence properly arming ships requires that submarines attack while submerged and denies the use of their guns.

With their guns eliminated, submarines must depend on mines or torpedoes. Of mines they may carry both the floating and the anchored types. They are not well suited for using floating mines and at best such mines do not meet their requirements. Good lookouts usually enable a ship to avoid them. Anchored mines are more suitable but submarines can carry only a few of them and when laid they can be quickly destroyed by sweeping. They can not be used in over 50 fathoms of water, and as the quantity is limited they must be placed in the approaches to harbors. To eliminate the danger from mines requires that we must keep certain lanes for ingress to or egress from our harbors, free of mines. This requires sweeping, for which special types of boats especially fitted for their work, are required. Owing to the facility with which mines can be placed and the large areas along our coast that are suitable for mineing work, we will require a very large force of mine sweepers, but with such a force the dangers from anchored mines, placed by submarines, will be a minimum.

With guns and mines practically eliminated the only other weapon carried by submarines that we need fear is torpedoes. Torpedoes are powerful weapons, but they are expensive and submarines can carry very few of them. By arming merchantmen we force submarines to depend almost entirely on torpedoes for their offensive operations and to remain submerged while attacking. This alone greatly reduces the danger from submarines, for working submerged they can use only slow speeds, can not choose their positions, and have great difficulty in getting the course and speed of the target upon which knowledge accurate torpedo fire depends. But while arming merchant ships practically insures their safety from gunfire and coincidently renders torpedo fire less successful, these steps only tend to render submarine warfare futile. We must expect many casualties even after we arm merchant ships, and the only way to stop those casualties is to effect the destruction of the submarines. How can we effect their destruction?

To destroy submarines we must first locate them and then sink or capture them. A submarine's safety lies in her ability to completely hide beneath the surface of the water. Its greatest weakness lies in the fact that it can not remain submerged for any great length of time except while resting on the bottom in less than 30 fathoms of

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water. It follows then the best means of destroying submarines is to utilize the most suitable device for locating them and when they come to the surface to bring to bear on them sufficient gunfire to destroy them. The best position for seeing submarines is from aloft. We can locate them from surface craft, but eyes well above the sea not only cover larger areas of water but can see better. Aircraft are therefore a necessity Aeroplanes being heavier than air and entirely dependent on speed to remain up, are unsuited as air patrol for submarines. Lighter-than-air craft are especially suited for the work, being more habitable, better arranged for the work, able to cover as much water, having great speed, and being capable of moving slowly in any direction if desired. It follows that we should have small lighter-than-air craft for the purpose. The small rigid dirigible appears best suited for it.

To give us the gun power to sink submarines when located by the dirigibles we must have patrol boats suitably armed near at hand. To have them near at hand at all times means that they must be available in great numbers. Those that operate close in shore may be only large enough to carry the necessary size guns, but those that operate well out at sea must be large enough to withstand any and all weathers and be able to keep the sea. It would appear, then, that we must have many large patrols and many small patrol boats, but for outside work the minimum size would be the 110-foot boat.

In addition to destroying submarines by gunfire we may also destroy them by mines placed in areas they will infest. Nets to entangle submarines can also be used to great advantage, especially in shoal waters. They should be used to protect all harbors and, if available in sufficient quantities, to protect lanes of travel of shipping. Patrol boats should be fitted with entanglement nets.

It would appear, then, that the steps to meet the immediate menace are:

(1) To arm all merchantmen, but especially those carrying supplies to the entente powers.

(2) To increase the number of merchantmen carrying supplies to the Allies to insure that these supplies will be sufficient.

(3) To provide mine sweepers sufficient to sweep all lanes of travel from our harbor entrances to water of 50 fathoms depth.

(4) To provide sufficient buoys to mark the lanes of travel kept clear of mines.

(5) To provide sufficient rigid dirigibles to maintain a close air patrol over the established lanes of approach to our harbors and the waters adjacent thereto.

(6) To provide surface patrol vessels, large and small, the former to operate offshore to destroy submarines, the latter to patrol the lanes of travel for shipping and the harbors, both cooperating with the aerial scouts already mentioned to destroy submarines.

(7) To provide anchored mines in large numbers.

(8) To provide submarine nets to cover the outside entrances to all harbors and lanes of travel if practicable, and to equip patrol vessels.

What quantities of the above-described material do we need? At this time it is utterly impossible to tell the total amount we will require but it is far more than the money at our disposal will buy and more than our resources can produce in a short time. We should attempt to provide as much as possible of each kind at once, bearing in mind that no matter how much we get now it will be far short of what we must finally have if war comes.

In the present situation all armed merchant ships become auxiliaries and to equip them we can utilize what guns and ammunition we now have ready for arming auxiliaries. While we have not a great many guns for the purpose we can probably arm most of our shipping that now goes to Europe. But as more shipping enters for that service more guns and ammunition will be needed.

In arming ships we must bear in mind that they must have gun fire superior to that of the submarines. From this it follows that guns for merchantmen should be of equal or greater size than are carried by submarines and they must be so placed as to permit at least two to five in every arc. Depending on the way ships can mount guns they should have three or four guns of 5-inch calibre or larger. To provide these, contracts should be entered into for all the 5 and 6-inch guns and ammunition for them that can be purchased out of the appropriation "Batteries for merchant auxiliaries, $4,731,174," and "Ammunition for merchant auxiliaries, $7,731,460." Three-inch and 4-inch guns can be used to arm ships until larger guns are available, but all future guns for shipping should not be below 5 inches.

To provide more ships for carrying supplies to the Allies, the United States Government can not itself do much at once. If ships are to be provided by the Government they must come from other than the present naval appropriations. We can and should

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encourage private ships to enter the trade by offering insurance or subsidies, for it is of vital importance that the supplies to the Allies be maintained. On the success of maintaining them a favorable decision for the Allies rests and their success now means our own success at the least cost.

To provide mine sweepers will not be very difficult. There are already many small tugs and steam fishermen that can be quickly taken over by purchase or charter, and sweeping equipment is easily obtained. The number of sweepers so obtained will probably not be sufficient and we may have to construct many. We should provide for at least 100 pairs immediately, arming each with a small gun, preferably a 3-inch. The sweepers will have to be obtained out of the "emergency fund" and $10,000,000 should be set aside from that fund for the purpose. The battery, ammunition, and sweeping equipment of the sweepers will have to come from the ordnance appropriations "Ordnance and Ordnance Stores" and "Reserve Ordnance Supplies," etc.

In order that there may be proper buoying of swept lanes, an enormous number of buoys must be provided. These buoys should be provided by the Lighthouse Establishment and notice should be sent them immediately to provide those buoys. As the Lighthouse Establishment may not have funds at this time we could possibly contract for them and arrange for reimbursement later. To make sure that the buoys will be ready we should set aside $100,000 for them from the emergency fund. The Lighthouse Establishment should be informed of the lanes to be kept swept and should plan the buoyage system to mark them.

Our coast air patrol as now arranged for provides for 15 stations. It seems that 4 dirigibles would be the minimum for each station and that those stations near important ports where close patrol is necessary should have more. We have 16 dirigibles ordered and need 44 more to equip stations to the minimum, but if we get 80 all told that should be enough for a start. That means 64 more dirigibles than have been ordered, and these will cost about $50,000 apiece. They should at once be ordered from the appropriation "Aviation, $5,133,000." But in addition to providing dirigibles we must provide places for their stowage and operation. Of these we have none and they will cost much. We must allow $10,000,000 from our emergency fund for aviation purposes in addition to the "Aviation" appropriation.

Patrol vessels to be provided are of two classes—those for inshore work and those for offshore work. There are many small craft available for inshore work that can be purchased or chartered and perhaps not many small boats will have to be built. A very different situation holds for the larger patrols for offshore work. There are some fair-sized yachts immediately available by charter or purchase but in addition to which we require many more. We should allow for at least 300 offshore patrols at a cost of $100,000 each ($30,000,000). For patrols $30,000,000 of the emergency fund should be immediately utilized. The arming and equipping of these patrols will have to be paid for from the Ordnance appropriations or other bureau appropriations.

Bases will have to be provided for these patrols and funds must be found for them, since without bases they can not be maintained. Makeshifts can be provided if funds are available, and at least $5,000,000 will be required for that purpose.

Mines will have to be provided from the Ordnance appropriation and in large numbers. Ten thousand should be provided for at least. Submarine nets also come from the Ordnance appropriations and are needed in enormous quantities. The Ordnance appropriations are probably insufficient to provide for as many nets and mines as are needed at once, so we should allot $5,000,000 for those purposes from the emergency fund.

Up to this point we have discussed only those materials to meet the immediate menace. What we have found necessary to provide so far is material to meet that menace alone. But what should be done to meet the far more dangerous ultimate menace? To meet that requires that I must have a strong and well-balanced fleet. It is not sufficient to merely have the power to strike, for unless I have a security and information of force the enemy can attack my heavy ships at will, while I can not attack him because I can get no information of his whereabouts. A study of what will be required to meet the ultimate German menace shows what we should have. Without going into the reasons, the force we require is indicated in the second column of the table given below. In the third column I have listed what we now have; in the fourth column what must be provided to give us the needed strength; and in the fifth column what has been done toward providing the material column three indicates as necessary.

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Type.	Number required.	Now ready.	To be provided.	Steps taken to provide missing units.
Battleships, first line	27	12	15	9 building, 3 authorized, but not contracted for.
Battleships, second line	21	21	.....	Completed.
Battle cruisers	8	.....	8	5 authorized, but not contracted for.
Armored cruisers	9	9	.....	Completed.
Scouts	24	.....	24	1 contracted for; 5 authorized.
Destroyers	120	52	68	27 contracted for; 15 authorized.
Submarines, small	87	29	58	All under construction.
Submarines, coast	60	.....	60	3 contracted for; 38 authorized.
Submarines, fleet	20	.....	20	3 contracted for.
Mine sweepers	20	4	16	None.
Mine layers	10	3	7	Do.
Aeroplanes	114	36	78	All been ordered.
Fuel ships	40	20	20	4 building.
Supply ships	12	4	8	1 building.
Destroyer tenders	8	3	5	3 authorized.
Submarine tenders	12	2	10	2 authorized.

With the material previously mentioned as necessary to meet the immediate menace and the material listed in the second column above, we should be able to meet even the ultimate menace. We may not even with those forces be able to win a decision over Germany, but it is practically certain that she would not be able to decisively defeat us. It is, however, the minimum we should have to be even reasonably safe from defeat.

It is seen from the above table that we have much to do. It might appear at a first glance that we should at once prepare to meet the ultimate menace by completing all authorized ships and starting additional ships as necessary. Such would be the case if we had sufficient funds to do that after providing for the immediate menace. But we have not. After providing for the immediate menace as indicated above, we have less than $55,000,000 available in the emergency fund which is not even sufficient to rush to completion all authorized ships, much less to provide for additional destroyers and other small craft. To determine how best to handle our remaining funds we must analyze our building program.

Of the nine battleships authorized, the actual construction of only five has been started. Three of these are well along in completion and two are started. All five may be completed before the ultimate menace comes and we may act wisely in expediting them. It is not probable that the other three authorized can be made ready in time to meet that menace and therefore to use any of our emergency fund on them would be useless. They should be expedited to the fullest extent within their special appropriations and steps should be taken to provide money to allow the work to be rushed. Of the five that can be expedited, $1,000,000 each should cover the cost of expediting the three that are furthest advanced and $2,000,000 each for the other two.

The battle cruisers and scouts, excepting one scout, have not yet been contracted for. It is doubtful if any of them can be completed in time to meet the ultimate menace, so it is useless to spend our present small emergency fund on them. They should be expedited as much as possible under their present appropriations and other appropriations should be asked for to expedite these and to build the many others required.

Being without scouts we urgently need destroyers. We should get all we can at the earliest possible time, not only by rushing to completion all that have been provided for, but also by building as many more as we can put on the ways. We have 27 contracted for and 15 more authorized, and all these can be rushed to completion at an average cost of not over $200,000. We should allow money from the emergency fund for the purpose, but should ask for more money to provide additional destroyers and rush them to completion.

Perhaps our greatest immediate need for meeting the ultimate menace is to have many submarines. We can not win a decision with submarines, but it is probable that with sufficient of them we can keep the enemy from gaining one over us. A large submarine force will prevent an invasion for a while at least, and they should therefore get our very great attention now. We should rush to completion all that are now authorized and build as many others as the building capacity of the country permits; and Congress should be asked to provide them.

Of submarines we have 58 small size contracted for, and they can be rushed to completion at an average cost of not over $150,000. We have three 800-ton submarines contracted for and 38 authorized that can be rushed to completion at a cost of not over

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$250,000 each. We have three fleet submarines under construction that can be rushed to completion at a cost of not over $300.000 each. We should provide for rushing these from the emergency fund, but should at once ask for additional funds to provide more.

A summary of the rush work that should be undertaken on new construction and its cost is shown in the following table:

Ships on which work should be rushed.	Number.	Cost per ship to rush.	Total cost to rush.
Battleships, first line	3	$1,000,000	$3,000,000
Do	2	2,000,000	4,000,000
Destroyers	42	200,000	8,400,000
Submarines:			
Small	58	150,000	8,700,000
Coast	41	250,000	10,250,000
Fleet	3	300,000	900,000
To be allotted for speeding up construction			35,250,000

The remaining ships called for on our list to meet the ultimate menace should be rushed to completion also, but not at the expense of our emergency fund. Congress should be urged to provide for these.

No consideration has as yet been given the essential shore stations and bases for handling these large amounts of material required for either menace, yet in order to maintain the upkeep of that material and to supply it requires vast additions to our shore plants. Our facilities for handling our fleet upkeep work are constantly strained even in peace times. They simply can not handle a larger fleet under war-time conditions. Toward supplying the fleet we find the same inadequate preparation. Fortunately we have some appropriations that can be used to meet these emergencies outside of our emergency fund.

We have the remainder of the $6,000,000 made available in last year's appropriation for equipping yards for building ships, and $12,000,000 available from the new appropriation in the event the Secretary of the Navy is unable to secure from the private shipbuilders contracts for the expeditious construction of the ships heretofore authorized at a fair or reasonable price to enable him to equip the navy yards with suitable and necessary machinery, implements, building ways, and equipment for the construction of such of said vessels as may be assigned to navy yards for construction. It is practically certain that private shipbuilders will be unable to construct expeditiously at a reasonable price all the ships authorized, and therefore the total, $18,000,000, will be available for adding equipment to yards, which, while installed for building purposes, would be available and used also for upkeep purposes. The need of equipping yards is pressing and no time should be lost in making all the funds available and allotting them to yards for equipment, etc. These $18,000,000 available should be sufficient to cover the yards' needs for upkeep work and I need not consider utilizing any of the emergency fund for that purpose at this time.

Supplying the fleets in peace times has reached a high state of perfection, but the preparations are insufficient for an increased fleet, and especially so under war conditions. The bill contained two items of $500,000 each for storehouses at New York and Puget Sound, but while these will help they will not nearly meet the requirements. Central distributing depots will have to be provided, as well as smaller distributing stations. The stations may be of a temporary nature, but funds must be provided for them at once. We should set aside $5,000,000 from the emergency fund for that purpose.

It is also to be noted that the tremendous augmentation of naval craft necessary to meet the immediate and ultimate menace requires tremendous additions to our fuel depots. This is especially true of oil fuel, for while there will not be a very great increase in coal burning craft there will be enormous additions of oil burners. Even now our fuel oil storage is inadequate and not underground, as is necessary for its proper protection. As establishing fuel-oil stations requires special appropriations for the purchase of land, Congress should be asked to make special appropriations for the purpose. Estimates have been asked for storing 2,000,000 barrels of oil to meet the fleet requirements at a cost of $10,000,000 and that amount should be asked for, for the purpose.

A particular feature that must be borne in mind in this estimate is that the machinery and personnel of the department in Washington was designed largely on a peace basis. With the vast expenditures provided in the naval bill the activities

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in the departments are multiplied. Technical experts, draftsmen, material experts, clerks, and stenographers are absolutely necessary to all bureaus and offices to carry on the huge increase of work, yet the wording of the appropriation bill is such that no part of any sum appropriated in it can be used for any expense of the Navy Department at Washington, unless specific authority is given by law for such expenditures. This situation is so serious that unless steps are taken to provide the additional personnel necessary to handle work in the department the whole program may be seriously interfered with. Immediately upon the convening of Congress steps should be taken that will permit the employment of the essential personnel.

Up to this point we have covered to some extent the things we need immediately. We must realize that we have not made sufficient provision to fully meet either the immediate or the ultimate menace, but if we do all that has been laid out we will have gone far and in the right direction. We will at least have started some of the things urgently and immediately needed without which we are practically helpless. Before we get this material, Congress will again be in session and if more is needed, there is no doubt but that provision for it will be made. Having started the work, it will be easy to continue and tremendously increase it if necessary.

The total money that should be allotted now is about $10,000,000 less than what we have at our disposal. It is not safe to set it all aside at this time as there are surely other things that will be needed at once. If we find the $10,000,000 remaining will not be needed for other purposes, we can devote it to increasing our material along certain of the lines indicated above.

Therefore, in order to provide for the country's safety as seems to be the wish of the people, and to carry out the intent of Congress, we should at once allot money in accordance with the following decision and proceed to carry that decision out as rapidly as possible.

DECISION.

1. Arm all merchant ships engaged in trade with the Allies, cost to be charged to ordnance appropriations. Use guns of 5-inch or larger caliber if available.
2. Encourage by subsidies and insurance as many additional ships as possible to enter into trade with the Allies, arming all that do.
3. Encourage new construction or merchant shipping in all ways.
4. Enter into contracts for all 5 and 6-inch guns and ammunition for auxiliaries that ordnance appropriations permit.
5. Rush to completion the 16 dirigibles now contracted for, and enter into contracts for 64 more to be delivered as soon as possible.
6. Proceed with the erection of the air-patrol stations for the above dirigibles.
7. Set aside from the emergency fund $10,000,000 for dirigibles, stations, and other aviation purposes.
8. Start construction at once and rush to completion, or charter, 300 large-size patrol vessels capable of keeping the sea. Those built should be not less than 110 feet long, and should have a speed of not less than 24 knots.
9. Secure by purchase or charter all craft suitable for harbor and inshore patrol.
10. Make $30,000,000 available at once for the above patrol vessels from the emergency fund.
11. Equip the above-named patrol vessels at once with suitable guns to be paid for as far as possible from the Ordnance appropriations.
12. Make available at once from the emergency fund $5,000,000 to be used by the Bureau of Ordnance to provide additional guns and ammunition for patrol vessels that can not be covered by their appropriations.
13. Provide 100 pairs of mine sweepers by commandeering, charter, or purchase of all available and suitable vessels. If 100 pairs can not be obtained in this way, construct the others.
14. Allot $10,000,000 from the emergency fund for obtaining sweepers.
15. Equip for sweeping and arm all mine sweepers from present Ordnance appropriations.
16. Inform the Lighthouse Service that many largest size spar buoys will be needed for marking swept lanes of travel and set aside $100,000 from the emergency fund to pay for buoys until Lighthouse Service has funds for the purpose.
17. Provide bases for surface patrols in protected and convenient harbors, setting aside $5,000,000 from the emergency fund for equipping them.
18. Bureau of Ordnance provide 10,000 anchored contact mines.
19. Bureau of Ordnance provide antisubmarine nets in large quantities, both for harbor protection, protection of lanes of travel, and for use of patrol boats.
20. Allot $5,000,000 from emergency fund to Bureau of Ordnance for use in connection with their own funds for purchase of mines and nets.

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21. Rush to completion the following craft under construction or authorized: First, the five battleships now nearest completion; second, all authorized destroyers; third, all authorized submarines.

22. Set aside $35,250,000 from the emergency fund for rushing the above construction.

23. Endeavor to rush other authorized ships to completion to the greatest possible extent within the limit of their appropriations.

24. Urge upon Congress as soon as it convenes to supply an additional emergency fund of $250,000,000 to complete authorized craft and to provide such other craft and material as may be needed not specially authorized.

25. Make immediate allotment of the remainder of the $6,000,000 appropriated last year to improve yard equipment to the east coast yards.

26. Call for bids on all authorized new construction at earliest possible time, and thereby make the $12,000,000 appropriated for improving yards available, and at once allot the money to the yards to equip them properly. It must be remembered that additional yard equipment is absolutely necessary.

27. Start the construction of the additional storehouses provided for in the new bill for New York and Puget Sound and allot $5,000,000 to provide for such additional storehouses and depots as may be necessary to handle the increased supplies and material.

28. As soon as Congress meets urge upon them the necessity of bringing our fleet up to the required standard to meet the ultimate menace, which, in addition to all the material above provided for, requires the following: Five battleships (first line), 3 battle cruisers, 18 scouts, 26 destroyers, 19 coast submarines (800 tons), 17 fleet submarines, 16 mine sweepers (fleet), 7 mine layers (fleet), 20 fuel ships, 8 supply ships, 5 destroyer tenders, and 8 submarine tenders.

I have introduced this paper not only because it is an item of proof, but also and more particularly because it gives you some idea of how decisions are reached as to what to do in war and shows what we should have been doing weeks before we actually declared war. That Congress expected us to do those things was evidenced by the huge appropriation bill of March 3, 1917, that Congress had rushed through.

On or about March 14, 1917, that estimate and outline of plan was handed to Admiral Benson, who, after reading it, directed Capt. V. O. Chase, Capt. W. V. Pratt, and Capt. F. H. Schofield to examine it and draw up a more complete estimate and plan. I was never shown the results of their work, but was several times questioned by them as to certain features of my estimate, and Capt. Pratt told me that their decisions were practically the same that I had reached. Later I was told by Capt. Schofield that they had completed their estimate and plan and that it had received the approval of Admiral Benson, but that they had been unable to get departmental approval to go ahead with it.

Had the department approved that plan, or even authorized Admiral Benson to go ahead with the plan, which must have been presented about the time war was declared, the various parts of the Navy Department would have been informed as to what their missions were and could have proceeded to carry them out. Without such a plan no one knew what to do. The Bureau of Ordnance, not having any definite plan to provide guns and ammunition for, was forced to order them for all kinds of projects, whether or not such projects might be feasible in the war as it was necessary to wage it. The Bureau of Supplies and Accounts had no information on which to base their purchase of supplies and was forced to buy not what actually would be needed, but what they guessed they might possibly be called on for.

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The Bureau of Navigation had no idea of what they should do as to providing personnel. Every bureau and every office was in a similar predicament. Such a plan was equally necessary to those at sea, for without it instructions could not be given them as to how to best direct their efforts. All of these faults would have at once disappeared had there been an approved plan on which the whole Navy could be concentrated.

I do not mean to infer that the Navy Department had no general plans whatsoever for war. As in all navies we had a more or less well-prepared plan for the conduct of a war along the ordinary lines where all classes of ships are free to operate. What we did not have and what we needed at that time, was a plan for waging war against an enemy that used only submarines. That such plans were not prepared long before is not remarkable, for until the Germans used their submarines as they did, no one conceived of such a war. However, at the time we entered the war, submarine warfare was an established fact, and its methods were sufficiently well known for us to lay plans to combat it.

Success in war and economy in war both demand a general plan. It requires the coordinated effort of the entire service along correct and well-defined lines to win a war. When there is no plan, it is impossible for those who supply material to tell what to get. When there is no plan each bureau becomes fearful that it may not have everything that will be called for, and it provides material not only in excess of the needs, but material that may not be needed at all. In this way vast sums can be wasted.

Because of the failure to get authority to carry out the plan submitted, and because there was no general plan for providing material and ships to meet the conditions then existing, each office and bureau of the department was forced to guess at many of the things it ought to do, and then each, without reference to any other office, go to the Secretary and ask for allotments from the emergency funds with which to do these things.

The allotments were frequently made, and resulting contracts for material were entered into without the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts having sufficient cognizance to know how the emergency fund stood. I know that one day, a month or two after the armistice was signed, Admiral McGowan, Chief of the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, said to me:

> Do you remember the plan you tried to put through at the outbreak of the war that provided for handling the emergency fund, and which the Secretary wouldn't approve God, man, if he only had done it! The way things have gone, we find that after charging off everything we could to other appropriations, we have overexpended the emergency fund by about $165,000,000.

Later, by congressional action, money was transferred from other naval appropriations to cover the overexpenditures. I do not cite this to show that the money was wasted or lost, but merely to show that for the want of a definite plan for using funds that had been appropriated, it was not only impossible to provide exactly and only what was needed to carry on the war in the most efficient and economical manner, but also it was impossible to even tell how we stood on the money allowed us to carry it on.

Not having a definite general plan to work on, the operating part of the department was in quite as much of a quandary as the material

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part. Instead of concentrating on a broad and clearly defined plan, the Navy began the war with merely a series of efforts exerted in several directions, and only coordinated as each effort received consideration in the same office, that of the Chief of Naval Operations. You can imagine the difficulties Admiral Benson was in under the circumstances. You can realize how impossible it was for him to send to Admiral Sims the antisubmarine craft that were wanted so badly on the other side.

You can see why for a long time he was unable to tell Admiral Sims what forces were ultimately to be sent to the war zone to overcome the submarines. Instead of having his original plan approved that he might put the machinery of our great Navy to work to carry it out and insure a successful conclusion in the least possible time, he was compelled to himself sink into details and get approval of first one and then another part of his plans. I was and am still amazed that the Navy was able to accomplish the remarkable work it did, but it is certain that what it did accomplish could have been accomplished much more quickly and much more efficiently than it was accomplished if we could have had a plan from the very start—a plan that was based on conditions as they were. Furthermore, I believe that had the Navy worked on that original plan, frequently modified to meet the changing conditions and new information, as all war plans must always be modified, we could have accomplished all that we did and much more in a very much shorter time and with a very much less expenditure of money. The above are my reasons for believing the fourth particular.

It should be clearly emphasized that subordinate officers in the Navy Department ought not to be criticized for any action they took that may have led to large expenditures. In the absence of plans from higher authority to guide them, it was their duty to do everything they could that in their individual opinion would help to win the war. They would have failed in their duty to the country if they had not assumed the responsibility and taken action to carry out the plans they themselves thought necessary, because of the absence of a general departmental plan.

Under the guidance of the Chief of Naval Operations the Navy's efforts did ultimately follow a correct and sound general plan, but I don't believe the full plan was actually ever laid down on paper or that under the necessity of having to get approval by piecemeal a general plan could have been laid down. Operations did what it could to establish a definite general plan at the time war was declared, but did not have the authority to order such a plan carried out. As nearly as I can recall, it was about the 1st of July, 1917, before any well-defined antisubmarine plan was approved. About that time the Secretary did approve the suggestions submitted by the "Board on devices and plans connected with submarine warfare" and instructed the bureaus to take steps to carry them out. That, I believe, was the first really definite plan the bureaus were given, but it was not until then, about three months after the war started, that the bureaus had even as much of a war plan to work to as that.

Passing on now to the fifth particular, it would be impossible to explain the situation I have just described without touching on a matter that I speak of only with great reluctance and hesitation. I

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would not introduce it were it not essential to a clear understanding of the reasons why plans were not approved and why delays occurred in getting action on many important matters. But as the personal characteristics of executives often have profound effect on the organizations they direct, an understanding of those characteristics is essential to an understanding of the workings of that organization. In this case it was the personal characteristics of the Secretary of the Navy that often made it impossible to get approval of the really important policies. I found this myself, and many others found it. If more information is desired on this point I can give the names of such officers.

Whenever a plan or a policy was presented to the Secretary he almost invariably delayed action on it. The personal interest taken by him in all matters connected with the department absorbed so much of his time that he never had much left to give to us on the more important affairs. Therefore when we would present something important, even though it might be urgent, we could secure only a few minutes to discuss it. We would generally be directed to leave the paper with him for consideration. Now it is remarkable but true that papers left for "consideration" were for the most part not heard of again until the officer who presented the paper hunted it out. Frequently when it was followed up the paper could not be found. If it was found, there would usually be some reason for not approving it or of further delaying action. We always considered it much easier to get up a sound plan or policy than it was to get permission or authority to carry it out. It generally took longer to get approval, when we succeeded in getting it at all, than it did to formulate the plan or policy. This condition finally became so bad that officers used every means possible to put their plans and policies through without obtaining the required authority.

My own difficulties in this respect were probably greater than those of officers who had only to get approval of plans or policies, for not only did I have papers of that kind to present but also, being in charge of the officer personnel division, I had to prepare the vast number of orders to officers, commissions, etc., that the Secretary by law or by his orders had to sign. I mention this only to show you that my duties necessarily afforded me excellent opportunities of becoming familiar with the subject I am now discussing.

As you no doubt know, the Bureau of Navigation is responsible for the personnel of the Navy. The mission of the bureau is to obtain, train, and distribute personnel. Early in the war the bureau realized that it could rarely obtain approval of its plans for performing its mission in the war and from that time on the bureau was forced to assume much more authority in those matters than actually belonged to it. In spite of failure to get plans for obtaining men approved and even in spite of repeated orders not to take men into the reserves, Admiral Palmer directed that they be taken in and we took them in. Capt. Palmer himself can give you further information on this point. When it came to plans for training men, approval was equally hard to get. Capt. Palmer and Capt. E. L. Bennett can give you some interesting details of their difficulties in that line and of how frequently they went ahead and did things without having authority to do them. As for the distribution of personnel, the

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Secretary of course rarely knew about the distribution except in the case of officers. But in the case of officers I met a most remarkable attitude in regard to sending officers not attached to ships abroad for duty in the war area. I made it one of the rules of the office that when Admiral Sims asked for officers he was to get them but I always had lots of trouble getting such orders signed. As a matter of fact not once but several times during the war the Secretary told me, and told the chief of bureau, too, that he didn't want any more officers sent abroad. Of course they had to go and we sent them by the simple process of assuming an authority we did not have and issuing the orders and passports ourselves.

Having above given you an insight into the difficulties of the officers in the department, I will now present some documents. The first document is one prepared by me on April 12, 1917, in an effort made at the request of Admiral Earle, Chief of Bureau of Ordnance, that "Operations" do something to help him get approval of contracts for the reserve 14-inch shells for our dreadnaughts and for the torpedoes for our new destroyers. The document was prepared by me and handed to Admiral Benson by Capt. McKean with a view to having the paper presented to the Secretary by Admiral Benson. It reads as follows:

[Confidential memorandum for the Secretary of the Navy.]

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, April 12, 1917.

1. I have to invite your attention to conditions so alarming to the safety of the country that in my opinion immediate steps must be taken to avert them. These conditions are reported by the Bureau of Ordnance's quarterly report, "Preparedness for War." These serious conditions are summarized as follows:

(1) Shortage of shells, 14-inch caliber.

(2) Nonaward of contracts for 1,296 torpedoes required by the 1917 building program.

2. As the Navy stands to-day we have the full allowance of 14-inch shell on the battleships in commission having that caliber guns. These are the (1) *Arizona*, (2) *Nevada*, (3) *New York*, (4) *Oklahoma*, (5) *Pennsylvania*, and (6) *Texas*. Should these ships be called into battle and expend their ordinary supply of shells—which is only sufficient for a short battle—we have not on hand to-day sufficient reserve 14-inch shell to refill their magazines. The total reserve supply of 14-inch shells for refill is but 1,861, an average of less than 31 shells per gun. Furthermore, if this small reserve is used for refills there would be no shells at all available for the *Idaho*, *Mississippi*, and *New Mexico*, now well along to completion. I can not bring too strongly to your attention that without shells for the guns battleships and all they contain are worthless. They not only can not defend themselves but can not even fight to save the country. To be without sufficient shells for our largest and best battleships exposes not only the Navy but the whole country to disaster. I most earnestly urge that the Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance be given authority and orders to provide sufficient 14-inch shell at the earliest possible time to fill out the allowance for the ships built and building and to complete the reserve stocks essential for those ships.

3. While the situation as to 14-inch shell is dangerous, that with reference to torpedoes is none the less so. Our new submarines, Nos. 78 to 107, and destroyers, Nos. 75 to 94, are all being speeded to completion and will undoubtedly be required for service as soon as ready. Neither can be used unless they are equipped with the torpedoes they were built to use. Unless the contracts for their torpedoes are entered into at once the ships will be ready before their torpedoes are.

The price for the 1,296 torpedoes involved, which has been the cause of the delay in executing the contracts, has been adjusted and the contracts have been signed by the E. W. Bliss Co. The price having now been satisfactorily arranged, it only remains to sign these contracts to start the work. It is earnestly recommended that the contracts be signed at once and the Bureau of Ordnance directed to have the work pushed to completion.

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For some weeks before the declaration of war Admiral Earle had made every effort to get those contracts approved, but for some reason he had been unable to do so. You can imagine the situation in the Bureau of Ordnance to find itself unable to place contracts for shells that might be needed at any moment. With the Nation at war those shells for our dreadnaughts and the torpedoes for our new destroyers were essential, and Admiral Earle had been urging their purchase for weeks but without result. On or about April 28 the paper was handed back to me to find out from the Bureau of Ordnance if there was any change in the situation. I found the contract for torpedoes had been placed, but was informed that on that date the order for shells was still unplaced.

During the early stages of the war those of us working on problems concerning material saw that with skilled men leaving important war industries to enlist for the war we might become seriously handicapped in getting material for war purposes. At that time a number of firms wrote to the department begging us to take action that would prevent too great disruption of their plans through their men leaving them, especially at the solicitation of the Army which was seeking skilled mechanics and was making a great campaign for them without any consideration at that time as to whether or not the men were more valuable in the private plants that were supplying war material than in the Army.

One of the earliest to bring this matter to the attention of the department was the Tropenas Converter Co., who, I believe, supplied machines for making munitions. It can be seen that such companies produce one of the fundamental requisites for war and that if their plans failed to supply munitions or the machines needed to make munitions we could not get the munitions. Realizing the necessity of getting this important matter settled before any serious disruption took place, on May 10, 1917, I prepared a departmental letter to the War Department giving a plan for handling it, which letter I will place in the record.

The letter was not signed, nor was any action taken for some time on this important matter. The original of this letter, with a further memorandum by me, was filed in the Operations file under No. 4488–359–15 and can no doubt be found there. At the same time I prepared a reply to the Tropenas Converter Co., which I will also place in the record.

(The letters submitted by Capt. Laning are here printed in full in the record as follows:)

(Penciled note: Submitted on May 10, 1917, but not signed. Original is on file No. 4488–359–15, together with a further memorandum prepared by me explaining this.)

SIR: The attached papers are forwarded to the War Department for consideration, and their return is requested.

The Navy Department is receiving daily a number of letters from private firms engaged in the manufacture of munitions essential to this department and to the allied countries, complaining of the fact that through the enlistment of their employees the carrying out of their contracts and the manufacture of munitions is being seriously interfered with. I have no doubt but that the War Department is having the same experience.

It is felt in this department that the situation is serious, especially in view of the fact that munitions are at this time even of more vital importance than men. It is noted in the selective draft system for raising the additional Army increments that

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this feature will undoubtedly be covered, but in the forces that are recruited entirely from volunteers it will continue.

The forces relying on volunteer recruits are (1) the Navy, (2) the Marine Corps, (3) the Regular Army, and (4) the National Guard. Even when the selective draft measure is passed these four forces will continue their call for volunteers and the result will be to continue the present disastrous plan.

It is realized that to properly cover the situation and to permit every man to serve the country in the place he is best suited for will require an organization of the size and authority of an executive department which it will be difficult to provide, requires legislation, and which can not be put into effect in time to meet the immediate and pressing situation. I am of the opinion that the situation can be fairly well met by coordination by the War and Navy Departments along the lines suggested in the attached correspondence. By this plan all Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and National Guard recruiting officers will become cognizant of the names of firms in their vicinity engaged in making munitions for either department, and with that information will be able to advise applicants employed by those firms not to enlist but to remain at the work where they will be rendering the best service to the country. At the same time the plan provides for placarding the munition plants with authoritative information to the men employed therein that by remaining at their work they will serve the national interests.

While the plan outlined above will not insure the complete immunity of munition plants from loss by the volunteering of their essential employees, it is believed that it will so materially reduce it as to make the loss negligible. It is comparatively simple to put in operation and its effect will be of vital good to the Government.

Hoping the War Department will see its way clear to cooperate with the Navy Department in putting the plan into effect, I am,

Very sincerely, yours,

———— ————.

The SECRETARY OF WAR,
Washington, D. C.

[Inclosure.]

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, May 8.

DEAR SIR: Receipt is acknowledged of your letter of May 4, 1917, concerning the loss of services to your contracting plant, R. S. Newbold & Son Co., by their men enlisting in the services.

The Navy Department recognizes the difficulty of the situation and agrees that men at work supplying machines can render no better service than to remain at their work at this time. Having this view, the Navy Department is endeavoring to put into effect a plan to discourage such men from leaving that work to enlist, and when completed I have no doubt but that R. S. Newbold & Son Co. will be included in its provisions. In the meantime it is hoped that your losses through enlistments will in no way interfere with the output.

Sincerely, yours,

———— ————, *Secretary of the Navy.*

Mr. G. MUNTZ,
Vice President Tropenas Converter Co., Brooklyn, N. Y.

The CHAIRMAN. You prepared these letters for the Secretary to sign?

Capt. LANING. Yes, sir. These particular letters I am handing you now, the originals were approved by Admiral Benson, but they were not approved by the Secretary.

Later, on June 1, 1917, this same question of the loss of skilled men from munitions plants was still before us, at that time coming up in a different way in connection with the operation of the draft law, and when we again tried to get the matter before the War Department in a way that would at least cover individual plants we were still unable to get any action. I will insert the letter in the record.

(The letter submitted by Capt. Laning is here printed in full in the record, as follows:)

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NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington.

From: The Secretary of the Navy.
To: The Secretary of War.
Subject: John T. Lewis & Bros. Co. request advice on the subject of conscription of their employees.

In view of the importance to the Navy Department of the material referred to, the attached correspondence is forwarded to the War Department with the request that steps be taken to exempt men listed from conscription under the terms of the selective draft law.

JOSEPHUS DANIELS.

NOTE.—After signing the original the Secretary of the Navy scratched over the face of it with a pen.

Original contains penciled memo made by me at the time, as follows: "All this to be taken up after June 5."

HARRIS LANING.

Capt. LANING. Failure to get approval of these letters caused great delay in getting an agreement with the War Department in the very vital question of holding skilled men for the work in munition plants.

Those who were formulating the Navy's plans for the war found, in the earliest stages, that appropriations made for specific purposes did not give us our money resources in such a way as to enable us to use them to the best advantage in carrying on the war. War plans constantly change, and money to provide material to carry on war should not usually be appropriated for specific purposes. In order to avoid the previous errors and to enable us to go on with plans without any further delay after obtaining approval, on May 2, 1917, I prepared for departmental signature a letter which was approved by Admiral Benson and submitted for signature. This letter reads as follows:

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington.

MY DEAR MR. SPEAKER: I have to invite your attention to a serious oversight in that portion that refers to the Navy of House bill 3971, making appropriations to supply urgent deficiencies in the Naval and Military Establishments on account of war expenses.

From the bill as reported to the House there is absolutely no provision made for increasing the Navy as to destroyers, submarine chasers, patrol boats, mine sweepers, mine planters, and the many other additional small craft that will surely be required for offensive and defensive purposes in this war. I believe this to be a most dangerous oversight, since the Navy has already entered contracts for these craft up to the limit of the present appropriations, and the additional craft and other material required to carry on the war can not be obtained because no funds are available.

It is utterly impossible to forecast what direction additional construction or operations will take, nor the exact kind of material they will call for. It is certain, however, that when the time for action comes, this department must be able to act immediately and on a large scale I therefore recommend that Congress be requested to provide a special naval emergency fund of $250,000,000, to be known as naval emergency fund No. 2, and to be available for expenditure in the discretion of the President to meet all needs of the Navy not otherwise provided for.

Unless this provision is made in the very near future, it may not be possible for the Navy to undertake those operations that may be essential to success in the war.

Sincerely, yours,

———— ————, *Secretary of the Navy.*

The SPEAKER, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

The letter was not signed and was later returned to me for file. Had that letter been signed at that time it would probably have given us just what we needed in the way of money resources, and

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what would have enabled the Navy Department to go on with the development and carrying out of plans for which there was no money then available.

Of all the matters on which action was delayed there is probably none that gave the aid for material more worry or longer worry than that of getting the dreadnoughts materially ready to fight. Before and after February 1, 1917, and even after April 6, when war was declared, the material condition of all our ships, and particularly our heavy ships, was repeatedly discussed and authority asked to get them ready to fight. But the authority to get the heavy ships ready was long coming. About the time war was declared announcement was made to the public that the Navy was entirely ready, but as late as May 18, 1917, we were still urging that the battleships be sent to yards to have work done that was essential to their fighting efficiency. I will now read a memorandum which I prepared and which Capt. McKean signed and Admiral Benson about May 18, 1917.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, May 18, 1917.

Memorandum for Chief of Naval Operations.
Subject: Repairs to battleships, Divisions 5, 6, 7, and 8.

1. Attached hereto is correspondence on the subject of repairs to battleships of the divisions recently known as the active fleet, as follows:

(1) A letter from the commander in chief, setting forth in general terms the material condition of the ships referred to and pointing out the necessity of establishing a definite policy as to putting them in condition for any kind of service.

(2) Letters from each of the bureaus, Construction and Repair, Steam Engineering, and Ordnance, commenting on the above, indicating that the necessary work can be done, and each recommending that the essential work be done as soon as possible in order that the fleet may be ready for any service.

(3) Rough lists of the major items of repairs required on each ship.

2. It appears that the essential repairs to these battleships can be completed in approximately the following times:

Connecticut, 45 days; *South Carolina*, 20 days; *Michigan*, 15 days; *New York*, 35 days; *Texas*, 40 days; *Oklahoma*, at yard, June 9; *Delaware*, 20 days; *Florida*, 40 days; *Utah*, 50 days; *Arkansas*, 15 days (with turbines, 50 days); *Pennsylvania*, June 4 to June 30; *Wyoming*, 30 days; *Nevada*, 12 days; *Arizona*, new propellers, June 15, only few days; *North Dakota*, 35 days for fire control and over 4 months to install engines; ready January 1.

3. Based on recommendations of the Bureau of Construction and Repair, it is suggested that a schedule for repairing these ships be considered along the following lines:

Boston: Take *Utah* immediately, followed by *Delaware*, then *North Dakota* (total, 100 days).

New York: Take *Arkansas* and *New York*, immediately followed by *Texas*, then by *Wyoming*. *Arizona* to arrive middle of June for propellers (total, 105 days).

Philadelphia: Take *Connecticut*, *Michigan*, and *South Carolina* in order recommended by commander in chief (80 days).

Norfolk: Following *Oklahoma*, take *Pennsylvania* (already arranged for), then *Florida* (or *Florida* may be sent before *Pennsylvania* leaves if yard is ready); *Nevada* to go to yard when material is ready (total, 100 days).

4. By the above the fleet will be ready for anything about the middle of August.

MCKEAN.

With this memorandum and the papers referred to in it which were later sent to the files, where no doubt they can be found, Admiral Benson was finally able to get approval of a definite plan for the overhaul of the dreadnoughts. I do not know when the work on the ships actually started, but you can see for yourselves the length of time that was required to do the work of getting them ready when the work did start. Attached to the signed memorandum you will

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find another memorandum and detailed lists of the larger items of work required on each ship. These I will insert in the record. [Reading:]

MEMORANDUM.

Attached hereto are lists showing the major items of work each battleship now operating with fleet that was unfinished when the ships left the yard to go to the winter maneuvers. The lists do not include any additional repair work that may have become necessary by the arduous winter maneuvers.

The lists show that practically all battleships require work that is essential to their fighting efficiency. The important work is mostly in the nature of the uncompleted alterations in the fire-control systems necessitated by the 1915 fire control board and the turret board. These changes make for better gun fire in action and therefore should be made if a way can be found to make them.

In addition we must also weigh the fact that the ships with the fleet have been out of dock about five months and that in the course of a few months more they will require docking if they are to be ready to make their speeds in case of war.

In view of the above it would appear that we must give careful consideration to the condition of the fleet and weigh its probable employment. The time must come in a few months when each ship will require docking and some overhaul.

U. S. S. "CONNECTICUT."

	Time to complete (days).
Steam Engineering:	
1. Install Levekin asst. cylinders	64
2. Install distant control valves to after dynamo stops	25
3. Modify training gear of 8 and 12 inch turrets to enable quicker shift to be made from fast to slow rate of train (work started). No estimate.	
Ordnance:	
1. Train guns of all 12 and 8 inch turrets; adjust to proper convergence, check sights with guns cross-connected and singly	25
2. Overhaul cross connecting gear of 12 and 8 inch turrets and install indicators to determine when oil motors are in neutral position (work was partly completed but indicators were not installed)	10
3. Install larger oil expansion boxed for oil motors, all turret guns	15
4. Substitute geared train in place of chain drive in limit switch of 12-inch hoists	25
Construction and Repair:	
1. Calk and make tight steel deck under and around No. 12, 7-inch gun foundation	4
2. Straighten and refit gun port shutters	20
3. Install voice tubes from upper deck radio station to after bridge	8
4. Install permanent nonmagnetic torpedo defense fire-control station in place of present wooden one	20
5. Improve sound-proofing of arc radio station	5

"SOUTH CAROLINA."

Hull Division:	
1. Rolling and inclining experiments	15
2. Stiffen deck under blowers in both engine rooms	4
3. Install steel protectors for sea charts	25
4. Install wind shields and umbrella tops on torpedo defense stations in foremast	4
5 Repair bituminous composition in fire-room bilges	15
Machinery Division:	
1. Rebalance armatures with fans in place	10
2. Roll out bottom brasses, starboard engine, repair leaks in water jacket	20
3. Renew three fire room traps	10
4. Remove all boiler safety valves to yard testing plant and adjust; determine if any repairs needed, if so make them	30
5. Install auxiliary lighting system	30
6. Purchase and install hydraulic speed gear for boat crane	30
7. Install auxiliary lighting system	30

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"MICHIGAN."

	Time to complete (days).
Ordnance:	
1. Manufacture and install extension to 12-inch guns elevating control gear of each 12-inch gun (work started)	6
2. Change bag ejector at top of 12-inch auxiliary powder hoists so as to function without breaking powder bags	20
Steam Engineering:	
1. Overhaul counter-gear, etc. (work completed at yard, but not satisfactory)	14
Construction and Repair:	
1. Fit cast steel bolster outboard on each hawser pipe	5
2. Manufacture and install strong backs for shell bins	10
Steam Engineering (electrical):	
1. Necessary electrical work in connection with changes in voice tube systems, in accordance with 1915 board of fire control	3
2. Modify fire control salvo system, fire control board report (can be completed by ship's force).	
3. Install auxiliary lighting system	30
4. Mechanical distant control for search lights	12
5. Run feeder and connect up to panel for (1) 4,000 cubic foot blower	4
6. Install 1 1,000 foot ventilating blower	20
7. Remove and relocate rammer motor rheostats in Nos. 1, e, and 4 turrets	5
8. Number of small electrical items requiring from 2 to 10 days.	

"NEW YORK."

Construction and Repair:	
1. Calk leaky compartments (not double bottom)	15
2. Calk leaky seams and rivets in double bottoms	15
3. Renew two steel wire nets in mainmast	8
4. New sound proof radio booth	40
5. Weld steel plate protections around sea chests	16
6. Search light platforms	23
7. Rearrange present friction band steering gear, etc	25
Bureau of Ordnance:	
1. Ordnance work in connection with installation of two anti-aircraft guns	6
Steam Engineering (electrical):	
1. Provide and install director firing system complete	40
2. Provide and install ball bearings in all motors and remove, retap, and reinstall field coils	36
3. Provide and install return calls for fire-control voice tubes	15
4. Auxiliary lighting system, magazines, shell, and handling rooms	30
5. Turret salvo system alterations	30
6. Alterations in torpedo defense salvo signal system	15
7. Change fire-control telephone system to conform to plan for California class	30
8. Relocate searchlights	30
9. Fire-control telephones for antiaircraft guns	20
10. Rearrange radio room	10
11. Overhaul and modify battle radio system	15

"TEXAS."

Steam Engineering (electrical):	
1. Torpedo defense salvo signal system alterations. No estimate.	
2. Fire-control changes, turret and target bearing system	15
3. Fire-control changes, telephone system to conform to California class. No estimate.	
4. Relocate searchlights. No estimate.	
5. Provide and install return calls for certain fire-control voice tubes. No estimate.	
6. Auxiliary lighting in 14-inch magazine and shell rooms. No estimate.	
7. Provide and install wiring for plotting indicators in conning tower. No estimate.	
8. Provide and install fire-control telephone circuit, aircraft guns	20
Construction and Repair:	
1. Install stiffening in way of 22 VS WT door-operating gear brackets	9
2. Repair leaky seams, rivets, laps, etc., in double-bottom compartments	10
3. Renew gaskets on oval bunker doors	8

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Construction and Repair—Continued.	Time to complete (days).
4. Rearrange Admiral and Chief of Staff quarters	20
5. Alterations of ventilation and coaling pipes, raise sprinkling pipes to permit stowage of original number of powder tanks	28
6. Windshields around torpedo defense stations	45
7. Umbrellas over torpedo-defense stations	20
8. Rearrange searchlight platforms	38
9. Torpedo-defense platforms	24
10. Rearrange present system and install additional fire-control voice tubes	60
11. Rearrange friction band of rudder to clear armor	25
12. Voice tubes to antiaircraft guns	25
13. Alter bucklers, No. 1 turret	13
14. Provide and install an upper-deck radio house	10
Steam Engineering:	
3 small items the material for which is to be sent to ship, and ship to do work.	

"OKLAHOMA."

Ordnance:	
1. Install directorscope, Mark IV, in turret	15
2. Ordnance work in connection with installation of 2 antiaircraft guns	10
3. Remove and reinstall torpedo air compressor, accumulator, and pipes due to omission of after torpedo room	15
4. Install clutch and lever for shifting rammer motor, turrets 2 and 4	20
5. Drain cocks on bottom of 20 pneumatic cylinder shell hoists, all turrets	6
6. Increase inside diameter of nose caps in shell carriers of shell hoists in all turrets	12
7. Remove rivets securing guides in upper end of shell hoist tubes and replace with countersunk head bolts in turrets 1 and 4	6
8. Install grease cups in clutch between elevating motors and speed gear in turrets 1 and 4	6
9. Make and install safety catch on rammer control levers in turrets 1 and 4	15
10. Fit heavier brass trays (24) to cars of powder hoists in turrets 1 and 4	15
11. Make oil tight metal oil seal covers on rammer friction disks in turret 1	6
12. Strengthen bearings of shell rollers abaft upper hoists in turrets 1 and 4	12
13. Make and install heavier counter springs to shell trays in turrets 2 and 3	4
Steam Engineering (electrical):	
1. Install light on each 2-gun turret adjacent to each sight scale	10
2. Relocate fire-control action cut-out switches in plotting rooms	No estimate.
3. Switch for ammunition hoist motors and two 2-gun turrets	10
4. Install additional cease-firing gongs for 5-inch guns, and cease-firing contact makers in both torpedo defense stations	15
5. Restore switchboards, forced-draft blowers, to original position	15
6. Complete director-firing system	3
7. Install smoke-telegraph system	25
8. Ventilating sets for auxiliary lighting systems, magazines and handling rooms	20
9. Install wiring and switch panels for operating anchor windlass motor from either forward or after generators	45
10. Call bells for voice tube from shaft alley to engine room	20
11. Install distant mechanically controlled high-power search lights	10
12. Electrical work for fitting up auxiliary radio room	15
13. Ventilating sets auxiliary lighting batteries	20
14. Electrical work in connection with replacement of forced draft blowers	15
15. Ship's service telephones	25
16. Wiring for plotting indicators in conning towers	10
17. Provide and install switches for various lights	25
18. Auxiliary lighting system in magazines	25
19. Install more efficient torpedo defense salvo buzzer system	No est.
20. Repairs to commutator bars forced-draft blowers	20
21. Overhaul, repair, and install one 5-kilowatt transformer radio set	10
22. Repair one armature for forced draft	10
23. Rewind one radio rotary gap motor	5
24. Properly install high-low power device	10

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	Time to complete (days).
Steam Engineering:	
1. Install superheaters on 6 inboard boilers	100
2. Alter bottom blow overboard discharge piping in boilers as required in connection with the installation of 2-inch independent sea chests in each boiler compartment	10
3. Cross-connection pipe between the circulating pumps for distillers	15
4. Fit connections for and supply portable air gauges for furnaces and uptakes	20
5. Shields over oil return rings, outside of connecting rod forks for air engines.	15
6. Install system for cooling oil used for forcing lubrication of generators and generator turbines	15
7. Install exposed handwheels for operating gear for fuel oil cut-out valves	15
8. Steam hose and connections in each fire room	15
9. Install discharge line from dynamo condensor hotwell pumps to main feed tanks	20
10. Replace electrical forced draft blowers by Terry steam turbine blowers	30
11. Renew brick in boilers (3 unfinished)	14
12. Repair runner shaft and bearings main circulating pumps	15
Construction and Repair:	
There are 88 items on the Construction and Repair list requiring from 1 to 100 days. Largest item is structural changes following removal of after torpedo room	100

"DELAWARE."

Construction and Repair:	
1. Ash ejectors	30
2. Replace zinc protectors around sea chests with mild steel protectors	3
3. Install an approved design of gun spray operated from turret booth at each 12-inch gun	20
4. Renew top of fire control towers	20
Steam Engineering:	
1. Install motor type engine revolution telegraph. No estimate.	
2. Complete installation of heating and cooling coils in starboard and port forced lubrication oil tanks	8
3. Install 4 ash ejectors and 2 pumps in fire room	30
4. Complete auxiliary lighting system	9
5. Install 8 automatic contractor types controllers with master switches for controlling blowers in blower room	20
6. Modify solenoid operated antenna switch	7
7. Make changes to ship service telephones	28
Ordnance:	
1. Ordnance work in connection with manufacture and installation of power powder conveyance hoists	2

"FLORIDA."

Construction and Repair:	
1. Repair as necessary sections of sprinkling system and flushing fire main. No estimate.	
2. Overhaul and make water-tight all 5-inch gun port shutters	10
3. Examine and calk oil leaks in compartments C–3, C–4, etc	5
4. Renew asphalt formula where metal of hull is exposed in double bottoms, engine and fire room bilges	10
5. Overhaul steering transmission shafting and bearings	22
6. Overhaul coaling winch gear	25
7. Renew the inner and outer rings in fourth tier and the outer rings in fifth tier of mainmast	8
8. Remove wire nets in cage masts	17
9. Remove, repair, and replace 34 McCreery elbows	20
10. Repair by acetyline process outboard casting of ash ejector	6
11. Make changes in voice tubes	60
12. Wind shields and umbrella tops, torpedo defense stations, etc	45
13. Provide and install bulkheads fitted with water-tight door at frame 77, install shelving, etc	15
14. Replace zinc protectors around sea chests with mild steel protectors	4
15. Strengthen bulkheads in wake of main feed pumps	30
16. Install antiaircraft guns	30

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Construction and Repair—Continued.	Time to complete (days).
17. Sound-proof bulkhead for radio room	8
18. Bridge radio station	15
19. Inclosure for Kolster meter	10
20. Build and install house on upper deck for radio station	25
21. Install approved design of gun spray at each 12-inch gun	30
Steam Engineering (electrical):	
1. Change searchlights and control platforms to conform to 1915 fire-control board report	60
2. Install mechanical control of searchlights	40
3. Change fire-control telephone system to conform to 1915 fire-control board report	40
4. Make changes in torpedo defense and turret salvo systems to confrom to 1915 fire-control board report	30
5. Change voice tube system to conform to 1915 fire-control board report	60
6. Make changes to voice tube call system to conform to 1915 fire-control board report	25
7. Install director firing system complete	30
8. Install auxiliary lighting system to fire and engine rooms, central station, etc	20
9. Install auxiliary lighting system in 12-inch magazines, shell rooms, and handling rooms	20
10. Install directorscopes, Mark IV, in turrets 2 and 3	15
11. Install approved design of gun spray at each 12-inch gun	30
12. Install 20-kilowatt arc transmitter, etc	30
Steam Engineering:	
1. Renew pitted and defective tubes, both main condensers	30
2. Repair 2 fuel-oil heaters	6
3. Cross connect steam lines in dynamo room	25
4. Install deck operating gear to cut-out valves main steam line	35

"UTAH."

Steam Engineering:	
1. Re-babbit as necessary, bearings, line shaft and main	4
2. Re-wood stern tube and strut bearings as required	15
3. Cover bare spots engine room bilges	30
4. Examine and test compartment C–99 for leaks and repair	20
5. Overhaul and calibrate, Cory shaft and revolution indicator system	20
6. Repairs to starboard feed heater	20
7. Reblade first two expansion H. P. C. turbine	50
8. Overhaul turbine throttle and automatic stop valves	25
9. Lift all turbine casings and rotors	60
10. Renew bent and broken flame plates in all boilers, line up and secure all in place	50
11. Turn off nozzles of ship joints in M. H. P. throttle valves and shrink on Monel metal sleeves	12
12. Strengthen bulkhead back of main feed pumps	30
13. Install lubricating oil settling tanks	40
14. Install operating gear from deck to 6 out valves of main steam line in fire rooms	35
15. Cross connect steam lines in dynamo rooms	25
Construction and Repair:	
1. Relag piping	20
2. Rewind armature No. 1 deck winch	15
3. Rewind 4 field coils of 35 horse power deck winch motors	8
4. Make change in voice tubes, etc	52
5. Construct torpedo defense stations, search light platform, etc	45
6. Replace zinc protectors around sea chests with mild-steel protectors	5
7. Strengthen bulkheads in wake of main feed pumps	30
8. Install foundations, platforms, etc., for three antiaircraft guns	30
9. Install trunks for main, auxiliary, and vertical antennæ leads	15
10. Install approved design of gun spray for each 12-inch gun	30
11. Rearrange bulkheads in connection with rearrangement of arc radio station and installation of Kelster motor	20

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	Time to complete (days).
Ordnance:	
1. Overhaul cross-connecting gear, turret No. 5	15
2. Install springs and other parts to upper powder-hoist doors for each turret	8
3. Install modifications to periscope mounts in turret officer's booths (for each turret)	10
4. Install a device on shell hoists to prevent premature hoisting (for each hoist)	3
5. Install new clutches for elevating cross-connection gear of all turrets (for each)	5
6. Install directorscopes, Mark 4, in turrets (time per turret)	10
7. Install approved 12-inch gun spray (for each gun)	6
Steam Engineering (electrical):	
1. Submarine signal oscillator	26
2. Return calls from forward distributing room to both radio rooms	10
3. Install antennæ lead in 30-inch turrets, etc	30
4. Install gyro repeater compass in radio direction finder station	No estimate.
5. Overhaul and calibrate shaft revolution indicator system	25
6. Install auxiliary lighting system in 12-inch magazines, etc	20
7. Provide and install director firing system complete	20
8. Changes in voice tube call system	25
9. Changes in fire-control telephone system	40
10. Changes to torpedo defense and turret salvo system	30
11. Install auxiliary lighting system fire and engine rooms, etc	20
12. Provide and install turret auxiliary lighting system	30
13. Install mechanical control on 8 searchlights	40

"ARKANSAS."

Construction and Repair:	
1. Rearrange friction bands and tightening gear of rudder to clear armor	18
2. Pneumatic tube for delivery of radio messages	4
Steam Engineering (electrical): Auxiliary lighting systems in magazines, shell rooms, etc. (started)	10

NOTE.—No mention is made in report of turbine work required on *Arkansas*.

"PENNSYLVANIA."

Construction and Repair:	
1. Rearrange after torpedo room	90
2. Metal wind shield around torpedo-defense stations	45
3. Canopies over torpedo-defense stations	30
4. Provide and install stowage for antiaircraft ammunition	15
5. Install valves and protections on all pipes that pierce armored deck over steering-gear compartments	10
6. Stowage for 5-inch ammunition	10
7. Install 10-inch copper antenæ trunk	20
8. Ventilation for auxiliary lighting system, engine and fire rooms, etc	30
9. Stiffen near after keel knuckle	90
10. Install supports for tops 5-inch hoists	10
11. Strengthen decks under lower handling room	15
12. Change port bucklers No. 1 turret	20
13. Install voice tubes between turret chamber and upper powder handling room	No estimate.
14. Install voice tube from forward torpedo-defense station to barbette, etc	15
Steam Engineering (electrical):	
1. Install lighting system in magazines, etc	30
2. Provide and install smoke-indicator system	No estimate.
3. Shift electric leads to steering gear	40
4. Electric indicator system for steering telemotors	No estimate.
5. Auxiliary lighting circuits torpedo and steering engine room	No estimate.
6. Provide and install smoke indicator system	10
7. Install fire control circuits for antiaircraft guns	20
8. Complete installation of flagship battle radio	12
Steam engineering:	
1. Install separators in evaporator vapor lines, etc	25
2. Install distant control for steam stop valves fuel oil and booster pumps, fire room	No estimate.

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Steam Engineering—Continued.	Time to complete (days).
3. Make connection from reserve feed tank suction pipe to main air pump suction	No estimate.
4. There are other alterations not essential to war efficiency	No estimate.

"WYOMING."

Construction and repair:	
1. Install stowage arrangements for antiaircraft ammunition	30
2. Rearrange present and install additional fire control voice tubes	28
3. Install extension to flying bridge, etc	18
4. Install metal wind shield to flying bridge	20
5. Rearrange present friction hand and tightening gear to rudder to clear armor	25
6. Replace zinc protectors around sea valves	38
Steam engineering:	
1. Rewood main circulating pump shafts	15
2. Furnish material repair and realign baffles of boilers	18
3. Furnish material for removal of evaporator leads 3 and 4	9
Steam engineering (electrical):	
1. Reinsulate commutators of 2 forced draft blowers	15
2. Return call bells for voice tubes	6
3. Auxiliary lighting system in magazines and shell rooms	30
4. Engine revolution telegraph system	20
5. Install six new turret power panels in flame-proof boxes	35
6. Install circuits for directorscope in main top	15
7. F. C. telephone circuits for antiaircraft guns	4
8. Install five sets power elevating central for director firing sprocket chain	30

"NEVADA."

Construction and repair:	
1. Overhaul anchor windless machinery (may not be required)	30
2. Recalk deck and stop leaks in steel shell, all weather decks	25
3. Overhaul and repair all 5-inch gun port shutters	15
4. Repair leaks in deck around both windlass foundations	15
5. Make decks around No. 1 turret water-tight	15
6. Complete the temporary installation of turret training control gears	10
7. Complete alterations in connection with after torpedo room	30
8. Remove rudder brake-band bracket and install new brackets	35
9. Install stiffening near after-keel knuckle	10
10. Additional storage for 14-inch shells	20
11. Alterations in steering gear clutch to shift from steam to electric steering	15
12. Install metallic stiff dressing table in sick bay	10
13. Modify fore and aft bulkhead in shell-handling room in turrets 1 and 4	20
14. Convert air locks in fireroom rooms into sound-proof booths and fit voice tubes for communication	20
15. Complete installation of ventilation system for charging station	10
16. Modify turret training control shafting	10
17. Provide and install 7 stationary type foam fire extinguishers	35
18. Close up openings in bulkheads in machinery spaces below third deck	20
19. Construct and complete metal radio house on bridge	15
20. Install valves in all pipes piercing deck over steering house	40
21. Wind shields around torpedo defense station	30
22. Provide and install metal house on boat deck	60
23. Ventilation for auxiliary lighting system	15
24. Voice tubes from engine rooms to shaft alley	20
25. Rearrange present and install additional f. c. voice tubes	50
Steam engineering:	
1. Install blinker signal lights on main yardarms with controllers on bridge	15
2. Make and install struts in water drums of all boilers	30
3. Alter baffling of boilers	30
4. Install Bowser oil meter	20
5. Replace electrical forced draft blowers by Terry steam blowers	30
6. Install smoke telegraph system	25
7. Install directorscope mark four in turrets	15
8. Remove and reinstall torpedo air compressors, accumulators, and air pipes	15

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The second memorandum and the lists of work had been prepared by me some time before war was declared and were items essential to the fighting efficiency of the ships. It should be noted that the items were all known to be necessary at the very time the announcement was made that the Navy was ready, for they were only essential work that had been authorized and left unfinished when the ships left about January 1 to go to Cuba for winter maneuvers. I have no record of the additional repair work required on those ships as a result of their several months of operations in tropical waters.

There is perhaps no achievement of the Navy that has been as favorably commented on as its work in transporting troops across the ocean during the war. I will now point out how hard it was to get the Navy Department to take any action that would enable the Navy to get control of and operate the transports.

In connection with my duties in regard to Navy material, early in May, 1917, after carefully studying the situation, I prepared a memorandum on the subject of the Navy manning and handling the transports that would be utilized in carrying troops abroad. Unfortunately I did not save a copy of that memorandum. However, about May 24, 1917, no action having been taken on the matter and a letter having been received concerning the use of the *Vaterland* for transport duty, I took the occasion to prepare a department letter to the Secretary of the Treasury, who at that time had possession of the seized German ships, setting forth the necessity of having troop transports manned and operated by the Navy and requesting that 16 of the largest, fastest, and most suitable of the seized German ships be turned over to the Navy to be fitted out for that purpose. The letter followed closely the lines of the memorandum I had previously prepared. It reads as follows:

N. S. C. 65.
Mat-1-M. L. 5/25.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, May 25.

SIR: I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of May 22, forwarding a copy of the letter from the collector of customs of New York, in which he recommends that the *Vaterland*, not being suitable for a cargo ship and being especially suitable for a transport, should not be intrusted to a merchant crew but should be under the command of an officer of the department that would operate her in the transportation of troops.

I most heartily concur in the collector's view and recommend that not only the *Vaterland*, but also such other of the seized German ships that are required for use as troop transports, be turned over to the Navy Department to be prepared, fitted out, manned, and operated by the Navy in that service.

In this connection I invite your attention to the necessity of the Navy operating all vessels used in the transport of troops during war, and especially of those vessels operating in waters where the enemy may be encountered. Unless such ships are manned and operated by the Navy the chances of their loss will be tremendously increased, and since their destruction will cause enormous loss of life and may jeopardize the campaign, we must take every possible step beforehand to reduce the chance of such loss to a minimum.

The first consideration in the transporting of troops is their safety. It must be remembered that while on troop ships the troops can not fight. A torpedo or even one lucky shot from a gun may sink a transport with practically all its precious freight of munitions and lives. It follows, then, that every plan for transporting troops must contain every possible safety precaution. The mere presence of a naval convoy is not in itself sufficient protection and especially so against submarine attack. The ships carrying troops must maneuver and operate defensively under command of the convoy commander.

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It is evident that the haphazard gathering of ships to transport troops, with personnel untrained to maneuvers or even to communication with the leader of the force, is merely inviting colossal disaster. The country stands to lose all and gain nothing by such a method of handling troops. It may be justly likened to detailing an untrained industrial force to go into the fighting line on land. Such a plan would have no chance against a powerful and resourceful enemy. Even to a less extent would an industrial navy have any chance against the enemy's fighting navy, and to carry thousands of troops into the waters of the fighting front in industrial shipping, places them in the greatest possible danger.

While there are a multitude of details in connection with the transportation of troops, there are two points of vital importance to be considered in assigning transports. These are:

(1) The selection of vessels of suitable type, with sufficient capacity and speed.
(2) The personnel and operations of the vessels.

The selection of ships for transport service requires care. Ships suitable must have accommodations for a great number of men and cargo capacity for the equipment and supplies of the men carried. Speed enters into the selection for several reasons. First comes the question of safety, for the greater the speed the more immune is a ship from attack. Next comes the question of grouping the transports according to speed. If we mix ships of various speeds in one group of transports, the speed for all of the group at once becomes that of the slowest ship. If we put the *Vaterland*, with 24 knots' speed, in a group containing one ship of, say, 15 knots' speed, the *Vaterland* becomes for that trip a 15-knot ship and at once loses the value of her great speed. It follows, then, that in selecting and arranging ships for transport service, we must select ships of similar speeds for each group, and sufficient groups to carry out our task.

From a study of the possible requirements of our overseas operation it would seem that four groups of ships should be provided. If of sufficient speed, each group can make a round trip about once each month, and this would give us a constant and steady flow of troops and supplies to the front. After a careful study of the ships most suitable for the purpose the Navy Department is convinced that the best ships available are certain of the seized German ships. They were especially designed to carry troops and can be put in service in the shortest possible time. It is advisable to use them, since by so doing the regularly established shipping routes will be least interfered with. These ships are at once the best and most available for the purpose and of them those listed below will answer the immediate requirements. They are grouped as to speed and each group would form one unit of the transport service, probably as large a unit as could be safely convoyed with the submarine situation as it is. These groups are as follows, the estimated troop capacity being based on an allowance of 4 tons per man carried:

FIRST GROUP.

Ship.	Estimated troop capacity.	Speed.
		Knots.
Vaterland	10,000	24
Kronprinzessin Cecelie	3,000	23½
Kaiser Wilhelm II	3,000	23½
Uss Von Steuben	2,500	23

SECOND GROUP.

Ship.	Estimated troop capacity.	Speed.
		Knots.
George Washington	8,000	19
America	7,000	17½
Martha Washington	3,000	17

THIRD GROUP.

Hamburg	3,300	16
Grosser Kurfurst	4,000	15½
Konig Wilhelm II	3,000	15½
Princess Alice	3,300	15½
Princess Irene	3,300	15½

FOURTH GROUP.

Cincinnati	5,000	15
President Grant	6,000	14½
President Lincoln	6,000	14½
Frederick Der Grosse	3,300	14½

With a fleet of transports operating in groups as above we could handle about 70,000 men a month, with all their equipment except animals.

To handle these ships safely, they must have the personnel trained to operate in naval methods. This applies not only to the actual maneuvering of the ship but also to the specially trained men to man and operate the guns, the signalling outfit, and the radio outfit. Men untrained in naval methods can not operate any of these things, and yet on them depends the ships' safety.

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Also we must not overlook the fact that each of these ships must be specially equipped with naval outfits of signal books, radio, etc. These things can not be entrusted to any but naval men. They are most secret and to allow them to pass into other hands endangers not alone the ships of the expedition but the whole Navy that uses them.

Again we must bear in mind that these ships carrying the most precious and essential part of our war forces must be entirely manned by men tried and true. The methods of signing up crews for merchant shipping if used in obtaining crews for vessels in our transport service leaves an open way for enemy agents or sympathizers to work into the crews of those vessels and they can carry out any nefarious design they might wish. We must man transports from captain to coal-passer with the most dependable men available, so that there may be the minimum danger from enemy agents.

From the above it is evident that there can be no division of authority on the ships engaged in carrying troops. If the Navy is to be responsible for the safety of the convoy after sailing it can not permit any but its own representatives, trained to the requirements of the duty, to operate any part of it. Even then, only by close coordination between every unit of the expedition can success be expected and with the utmost coordination the duty is fraught with danger. We can not permit added dangers by putting any phase of the troop transporation in the hands of untrained and unorganized assistants, or in the hands of anyone of whose loyalty and fidelity there can be doubt.

I therefore strongly urge that this matter be given careful attention and that not only the *Vaterland* but all the other vessels listed above as necessary for transport duty and that are not now assigned the Navy, be assigned to the Navy at once in order that they may be properly fitted and equipped for the work and manned and put in service as troop transports at the earliest possible time. As not only the safety of the expedition but also the success of our whole campaign in the war depends on this matter, it should be decided on now and not wait for terrible disaster to show us the error of adopting any other plan.

Sincerely, yours,

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

The honorable the SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

Four days later I prepared a letter to the Secretary of War asking the War Department's assistance toward getting the troop-transport service turned over to the Navy and the service established on a sound basis. This letter, which was returned to me some days later from Admiral Benson's office unsigned and marked "hold," reads as follows:

In reply address the Secretary of the Navy and refer to Mrr. 1–5/29.

NAVY DEPARTMENT, *Washington.*

(Penciled note:) "Hold."

Capt. MCKEAN.

SIR: There is forwarded herewith a copy of a letter I am this day sending the Secretary of the Treasury, suggesting that certain seized German ships be turned over to the Navy to be fitted out, manned, and operated by the Navy as troop transports.

While the Navy Department does not desire to change the arrangements already made with the War Department concerning the immediate transportation of troops across the Atlantic, it feels that the ultimate problem is so essentially naval, that it would be derelict in its duty if it did not point out what it believes to be the most practicable and safe method of carrying out its part of the general mission.

The Navy is concerned in transportation of troops only from the time they go on board the troop ships until they leave the ships, but during that time it is entirely responsible for the expedition. The points of embarkation and debarkation mark the beginning and end of the Navy's responsibility, and in view of that responsibility it recommends a well-planned and carefully organized service.

The Navy Department is of the opinion that the transportation of troops should interfere as little as possible with shipping now engaged in transporting supplies across the Atlantic, and to that end proposes that certain seized German ships, especially designed for use as transports in war, be fitted up for the purpose. The ships can not be used immediately, but when repaired, equipped, and properly manned will be the best ships possible for the work. The ships named in the letter will give excellent service and will probably handle the transport question fully, enabling this country to deliver in the neighborhood of 70,000 troops per month on the western front.

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It is not proposed that all supplies for troops be sent on these transports, though they will, of course, carry all that their capacity permits. Munitions, animals, etc., will, as a general rule, be transported by merchant ships, while fresh trooops with their equipment will go forward on transports.

The reasons for the Navy handling this service are set forth in general terms in my letter to the Secretary of the Treasury, and in view of the necessity of at once establishing the service on the best possible basis I request that the War Department, if it concurs with the views set forth, assist in every possible way to establish the service as recommended at the earliest possible time.

Sincerely, yours,

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

The honorable the SECRETARY OF WAR.

As I said before, that letter was not signed and was returned to me marked "Hold."

Even as late as July 3, 1917, I was still hammering away the little I could to get the transports turned over to the Navy. This is evidenced by a memorandum submitted by me to the Chief of Naval Operations on July 3, 1917, and which I will place in the record:

N. S. O. 65. Mat-1-ML (7/3). "M."

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, July 3, 1917.

Memorandum.

Attached hereto is a copy of a letter addressed to the President by the chairman of the Shipping Board, in which it is requested that all seized ships not already turned over to the Navy be transferred to the Shipping Board.

It is noted from the letter that while the Shipping Board is apparently adverse to turning over to the Navy or Army any of the seized ships that are to be used as transports, they suggest that the President give the matter consideration and that a decision as to what branch of the Government shall operate troop ships should be reached only after the arguments of all concerned are heard.

It is further noted from the letter that the board states that there is abundant time to make this decision before the ships are ready to load. This statement would be true if a merchant ship were ready for use as a transport whenever she is ready to load, but such is not the case. A very considerable change must be made in merchant ships before they are suitable for transport use, and to delay making these changes will merely delay the readiness of the ships for the service. The decision should be made at the earliest possible time and the fitting-out work started.

From conversation with Shipping Board representatives it is understood that they agree that some of the German ships must be used as transports, but they are of the opinion that such ships should be officered, manned, and operated by the Shipping Board and taken by the Army on "time charter" whenever it becomes necessary to transport troops. They apparently fail to grasp the idea that if we are to transport a large number of troops to France it will require a special service of large fast ships, and that the ships engaged in that service will be worked to capacity and can not do any cargo carrying other than to bring such cargo from their ports of call in Europe as may be ready when the ship is about to return. Inasmuch as the transports can not engage in commercial work at all, it hardly seems proper that the board should insist that they be officered, manned, and operated by civilian complements.

To operate troop ships in the submarine danger zone with any but the best disciplined and most loyal crew available is merely inviting colossal disaster. The Shipping Board plans to officer and man its ships as all merchant ships are officered and manned. One has but to read the reports of the officers in charge of our armed guards to realize the absolute menace to any ship by employing that method, yet it is the Shipping Board's plan to apply it to ships carrying invaluable munitions and thousands of men on whom our success in war depends. Unless troop ships are manned and operated under trained and loyal men of the Navy the chances of their loss will be tremendously increased, and, since their destruction will cause enormous loss of life and may jeopardize the campaign, we must take every possible step beforehand to reduce the chance of such loss to a minimum.

The first consideration in the transporting of troops is their safety. It must be remembered that while on troop ships the troops can not fight. A torpedo or even one lucky shot from a gun may sink a transport with practically all its precious freight

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of munition and lives. It follows, then, that every plan for transporting troops must contain every possible safety precaution. The mere presence of a naval convoy is not in itself sufficient protection to troop ships, especially against submarine attack. When attacked, the ships carrying troops must maneuver and operate defensively under the command of the convoy commander. It is evident that the haphazard gathering of ships to transport troops with personnel untrained to maneuvers, or even to communication with the leader of the force, is merely inviting colossal disaster. The country stands to lose all and gain nothing by such a method of handling troops. It may be just likened to detailing an untrained industrial force to go into the fighting line on land. Such a plan would have no chance against a powerful and resourceful enemy. Even to a less extent would an industrial navy have any chance against the enemy's fighting navy, and to carry thousands of troops into the waters of the fighting front in industrial shipping places them in the greatest possible danger.

While there are a multitude of details in connection with the transportation of troops, there are two points of vital importance to be considered in assigning transports. These are:

(1) The selection of vessels of suitable type with sufficient capacity and speed.

(2) The personnel and operation of the vessels.

The selection of ships for transport service required care. Ships suitable must have accommodations for a great number of men and cargo capacity for the equipment and supplies of the men carried. Speed enters into the selection for several reasons. First comes the question of safety, for the greater the speed the more immune is a ship from submarine attack. Next comes the question of grouping the transports according to speed. If we mix ships of various speeds in one group of transport, the speed for all of the group at once becomes that of the slowest ship. If we put the *Vaterland*, with 24 knots speed, in a group containing one ship of, say, 15 knots speed, the *Vaterland* becomes for that trip a 15-knot ship and at once loses the value of her great speed. It follows, then, that in selecting and arranging ships for transport service we must select ships of similar speeds for each group and sufficient groups to carry out our task.

From a study of the possible requirements of our oversea operation it would seem that four groups of ships should be provided. If of sufficient speed, each group can make a round trip about once each month and this would give us a constant and steady flow of troops and supplies to the front. After a careful study of the ships most suitable for the purpose, the Chief of Operations is convinced that the best ships available are certain of the seized German ships. They were especially designed to carry troops and can be put in service in the shortest possible time. It is advisable to use them, since by so doing the regularly established shipping routes will be least interfered with. These ships are at once the best and most available for the purpose, and of them those listed below will answer the immediate requirements. They are grouped as to speed and each group would form one unit of the transport service, probably as large a unit as could be safely convoyed with the submarine situation as it is. These groups are as follows, the estimated troop capacity being based on an allowance of 4 tons per man carried:

Groups.	Estimated troop capacity.	Speed.	Groups.	Estimated troop capacity.	Speed.
First group:		*Knots.*	Third group—Continued.		*Knots.*
Vaterland	10,000	24	Konig Wilhelm II	3,000	15.5
Kronprinzessin Cecelie	3,000	23½	Prinzess Alice	3,300	15.5
Kaiser Wilhelm II	3,000	23½	Princess Irene	3,300	15.5
Second group:			Fourth group:		
George Washington	8,000	19	Cincinnati	5,000	15
America	7,000	17.5	President Grant	6,000	14.5
Third group:			President Lincoln	6,000	14.5
Hamburg	3,300	16	Frederick Der Grosse	3,300	14.5
Grosser Kurfurst	4,600	15.5	Barbarossa	3,000	14

With a fleet of transports operating in groups as above we could handle about 70,000 men a month, with all their equipment except animals.

To handle these ships safely, they must have a personnel trained to operate in naval methods. This applies not only to the actual maneuvering of the ship but also to the specially trained men to man and operate the guns, the signalling outfit and the radio outfit. Men untrained in naval methods can not operate any of these things and yet on them depends the ship's safety.

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Also we must not overlook the fact that each of these ships must be specially equipped with naval outfits of signal books, radio, etc. These things can not be intrusted to any but naval men. They are most secret and to allow them to pass into other hands endangers not alone the ships of the expedition but the whole Navy that uses them.

Again we must bear in mind that troop ships carrying the most precious and essential part of our war forces must be entirely manned by men tried and true. The methods of signing up crews for merchant shipping (which will be followed by ships operated by the Shipping Board) is used in obtaining crews for vessels in our transport service leaves an open way for enemy agents or sympathizers to work into the crews of these vessels and they can carry out any nefarious design they might wish. It is perfectly evident that we must man transports from captain to coal-passer with the most dependable men available, so that there may be the minimum danger from enemy agents. The most dependable men available and perhaps the only entirely dependable men we can get are those in the Navy.

If the Navy is to be responsible for the safety of the convoy after sailing it can not permit any but its own representatives, trained to the requirements of the duty, to operate any part of it. Even then, only by close coordination between every unit of the expedition can success be expected and with the utmost coordination the duty is fraught with danger. We can not permit added dangers by putting any phase of the troop transportation in the hands of untrained and unorganized assistants, or in the hands of anyone of whose loyalty and fidelity there can be any doubt.

This matter should be given careful attention and all the vessels listed above as necessary for transport duty, be assigned to the Navy at once in order that they may be properly fitted and equipped for the work and manned and put in service as troop transports at the earliest possible time. As not only the safety of the expeditions but also the success of our whole campaign in the war depends on this matter, the correct decision should be reached without waiting for terrible disaster to show us the error of adopting any other plan. The best service possible is none too good for taking our troops across the sea and that best service is the service of the Navy.

It is not contemplated to use these vessels as naval auxiliaries but only to take them under complete naval control during such time as they are employed in carrying troops for the Army. The Navy Department does not wish these ships to remain permanently in the Navy but to have them revert to the Shipping Board when the transportation of troops has been completed.

From the very start I felt that we would not get any departmental action on this very vital question as to who would man and operate the troop ships. During the month of May, 1917, in conversation with my brother-in-law, Col. John McAuley Palmer, United States Army, who was Gen. Pershing's Chief of Operations, this question came up and I explained the situation to him. As a result of this conversation, through the recommendation of Gen. Pershing and his staff, the War Department began to advocate the taking over and operation of the troop transport service by the Navy.

Under the circumstances it seems probable that had the Navy Department taken positive action when the matter was first brought up much time could have been saved and the Navy would have had those transports and would have been getting them ready fully one month before we finally did get them. It may be added that the transports first turned over about July 10, 1917, were with one exception the very ones suggested in the first memorandum.

Just as there was great delay in getting the transport service turned over to the Navy, so also there was great difficulty and delay in that other much talked of naval effort, viz: The destroyer program. The estimate drawn up at the beginning of the war called for many destroyers in addition to those provided for in the three-year building program. In the piece-meal method of developing a general plan an additional destroyer program was also called for. This was met in part by placing orders for destroyers to be paid for out of the first

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emergency fund, but the fund was too small to provide anything like the required number. It was to provide for just such situations as this that caused me, on May 2, 1917, to prepare for the Secretary's signature the letter I inserted above addressed to the Speaker of the House, asking for an additional emergency fund of $250,000,000, which letter, as you will recall, although approved by Admiral Benson, was not signed by the Secretary.

Evidently no action along the line of getting more money for destroyers and other small craft had been taken up with Congress prior to June 22, 1917, for on that date Capt. Schofield, then in "Operations" came to me and told me that in spite of all efforts it had been impossible to get the Secretary to take up the matter of getting appropriations for additional destroyers. He said it was imperative to get action on this matter which was vital, and that in order to force action it had been decided to each day submit a memorandum prepared by an officer giving that officer's argument as to the necessity of providing the additional destroyers. Capt. Schofield then gave me a copy of his memo. which was to be submitted the next day and asked me to prepare the memo. for the following day. These memos. read as follows:

[Capt. Schofield's memoranda.]

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, June 21, 1917.

Success in the present war means success in combating submarines. This fact is so patent to everyone that we have grown accustomed to the idea without being properly stimulated by it.

No war can be won on defensive measures. The offense is the only known way of imposing our will on the will of the enemy.

To date, the most effective offensive against submarines is the destroyer offensive. As the submarines extend the area of their operations seaward the "chaser" type becomes less and less effective and the demands made upon the destroyers increase.

The number of destroyers now is wholly inadequate. They are working under heavy strain. Their material will deteriorate. Units will be lost. These conditions, the present and foreseen demands have lead the General Board, all of the officers of operations, and Vice Admiral Sims, to urge that every possible effort be made now, with facilities already obligated to the Navy, to build the maximum number of destroyers in the shortest possible time.

The above recommendation contemplates laying aside for the present the laying down of additional battleships, battle cruisers, and concentrating on the building of destroyers.

The cooperation of shipbuilders and the authority of Congress are essential. Delay may be fatal.

The following day I submitted this memorandum:

JUNE 22, 1917.

The country relies on the Navy to save the submarine situation and will rightly hold the Navy Department responsible for any failure to do so. It is possible, at comparatively small expense, to save the situation, but failing to save it not only will we pay the penalty in life and treasure but we will actually jeopardize the national existence. It follows that this department must leave no stone unturned to fulfill its duty to the people and the country.

Up to the present time practically every measure we and our Allies have taken against the submarine warfare has been defensive. We are allowing our enemy to continually increase the number of his submarines and enlarge his area of operations. It takes but an instant's thought to show that this policy plays directly into the enemy's hands and that unless we can reverse the condition he must surely succeed while we and our Allies suffer defeat.

Our present defensive measures are perhaps the most extravagant and wasteful, as well as the most futile that can be devised. We are not using every effort to destroy the increasing number of wolves feeding on our flock, but rather are adding

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to our flock, at tremendous cost, that these wolves may feed the better. To continue this plan means more than military defeat—it means economic ruin for all the world except our enemies.

Because we have great wealth is no reason why we should allow it to be sunk in the sea, for, great as it is, it can not sustain the cost we are putting upon it. Congress and private enterprises, as well as our Allies, are spending billions for ships to feed these submarine wolves whereas a small part of those expenditures, if used to create offensive weapons, would destroy them. Shall we continue to spend billions and insure defeat or shall we spend millions wisely and insure success?

Two years' experience has developed but one type of vessel capable of coping with submarines and that is the destroyer type. It alone has the speed, offensive power, sea-keeping qualities, and other characteristics that the submarine can not overcome. Sufficient destroyers, suitably equipped, will drive the submarines down, and keep them down or destroy them. Should we not build every destroyer possible in the shortest time possible?

A thousand merchant ships built to be sunk will cost us life and untold treasure. A much less number if kept afloat will save the situation. It is the Navy's duty to keep them afloat and since to drive the submarines from the sea to keep the merchant ships afloat will cost infinitely less than to overfeed submarines on costly laden ships, shall the Navy fail in the hour of need by not providing the only known cure—destroyers?

HARRIS LANING.

These "memos" show how strongly we had to argue before we could get any action. I have no knowledge as to what other officers submitted "memos" nor how long after the "memo" method was started before action was finally taken. It is sufficient for me to show you what lengths we were put to to get action on vitally important matters and how such matters were delayed through the difficulties in getting action. That these difficulties made the Navy's task much harder is certain; what the resulting delays cost in lives and treasure no one can even guess.

That is all of my statement.

The CHAIRMAN. Capt. Laning, what was the feeling in the department after the German ambassador had been given his passports? Was there a general feeling that war was inevitable?

Capt. LANING. As I recollect it, he was given his passports about the 3d or 4th of February.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is correct.

Capt. LANING. The general feeling at that time among the officers was that war was inevitable; yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And the general feeling among the officers of the department was that preparations should be made at once?

Capt. LANING. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Preparations for war?

Capt. LANING. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you give me any information as to the complement of officers and crews on the various battleships and destroyers in February, 1917?

Capt. LANING. On the battleships at that time we had what was known as the peace complement. That was about 85 per cent of what we then considered to be the war complement. Later we found that what we considered to be the war complement was entirely inadequate to meet the demands of war as it is waged to-day. The introduction of submarines and certain other craft made it necessary to have a great many more men for lookouts, and the fire-control system required many additional men; so that at the time we went into the war we had not what was then thought to be the

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battle complement, but what we then called the peace complement, and what we then thought to be the battle complement was not what we now know to be the fighting complement of those larger ships.

Of the destroyers at that time I think the crews were 94 men each, but when they got over into the war zone they found that to combat submarines, particularly, the destroyers had to have something like 120 or 125 men.

Now, the figures I have given you, of course, were for the active fleet. Those were the ships that were actually operating. There were a number of ships that were not operating. A number of the large battleships were in reserve, and the armored cruisers were in reserve on the west coast. I think all but two were in reserve on the west coast. Of our destroyers we had approximately 30 manned with 94 men each and something like 25 that were manned with what we call reserve crews; that is, 50 per cent of their full complement.

The CHAIRMAN. Was any attempt made to bring them up to their full fighting complement?

Capt. LANING. No, sir; we did not have the men with whom to bring them up. The law at that time, I think, gave us about 67,000 men, and we were pretty well recruited up to that number, and at that time we had no way of increasing the number of men on the ships unless that law was changed.

The CHAIRMAN. Was any attempt made to enlist any more men?

Capt. LANING. Just at that time, Senator, I was dealing with matériel and operations, and I did not know much about the personnel situation, did not pay much attention to it from October, 1916, until July 16, 1917, when I went to the Bureau of Navigation, and I am not competent to give you all the figures for that period, or to tell you what they did as to personnel at that time. I know that when the war started we did not have enough men to man all our ships.

The CHAIRMAN. Was there any plan of any kind made by the department to increase the efficiency of the Navy as to preparedness between the 5th of February or the 3d of February, when the German ambassador was given his passports, and the time that war was declared?

Capt. LANING. Oh, undoubtedly there were a number of things done.

The CHAIRMAN. What were the general plans of the department?

Capt. LANING. There was not any big general plan that I ever heard of, but I am sure that each bureau went ahead and did a number of things that it could do to get ready, but I do not know what they were.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know whether the Secretary had any particular plan of his own?

Capt. LANING. No, I do not. I do not think he had.

The CHAIRMAN. And there was no general plan given out to the different departments?

Capt. LANING. Oh, no sir, there was no general plan. There may have been some individual plans carried out, but there was no general plan at all.

The CHAIRMAN. Was any attempt made to put in commission the battleships that were in reserve?

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Capt. LANING. As soon as they could get the men, of course, they tried to put them in commission; but that is a detail that did not come under my office at that time, Senator, and I am unable to answer.

The CHAIRMAN. Was any attempt made to get merchant vessels, that you know anything about?

Capt. LANING. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. For transporting either troops or supplies?

Capt. LANING. I heard of no attempt by the Navy to get any troop transports other than these that I have read to you. I initiated those myself. I do not know of any other efforts to get troop transports at that time. We did get some merchant ships for certain naval purposes at that time, but that was not until after war was declared, of course.

The CHAIRMAN. When were you transferred to the Bureau of Navigation?

Capt. LANING. July 16, 1917.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you state the condition of the ships of the Navy generally at that time as to matériel?

Capt. LANING. My recollection is that at that time we had started on the repairs to the large battleships. When I submitted that memorandum, about May 18, and took up the subject of repairs to battleships, a definite plan was established immediately after that, and that went on and was carried out during the summer of 1917.

As regards the destroyers, they were repaired as fast as they came North, and as soon as they were repaired a great many of them were sent to Europe, but that was an operating plan for handling those destroyers with which I am not familiar. In the first part of the war I dealt largely with matériel, practically entirely with matériel. There was not anything else.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have anything to do with the personnel during the first few months of the war?

Capt. LANING. No, sir, not until July 16, 1917.

The CHAIRMAN. I think you have stated that on July 16 we had need of something more than 6,000 officers, and we actually had somewhere around 2,400.

Capt. LANING. We had 2,394 officers in the line of the Navy, that is, the combatant class of officers, on July 16, 1917, which was the date when I took charge of the officer personnel division in the Bureau of Navigation. The actual situation at that time called for about six or seven thousand trained officers, and we had gotten pretty desperate and had begun to take officers off of the dreadnoughts. When I arrived in the Bureau of Navigation they had already stripped the dreadnoughts down to 22 commissioned officers of the line, when the complement of those ships called for something like 37 or 39 commissioned line officers. Even by reducing those large ships in that way the shortage was still so great that I had to make plans for more officers, and that is entirely explained in my hearings before the House Naval Committee, which I have inserted here, where I told the plans that we had to formulate to get officers to carry on the war. It was a very desperate situation at that time. We were only able to put those plans into effect and carry them out because we felt that the battleships would not have to fight on less than three months' notice. We made our estimates for handling the officer personnel situation on the basis that the dreadnoughts would not have to fight;

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that is, that the dreadnoughts that were on this side would not have to fight on less than three months' notice, and we based that on this, that if the German Navy came out and offered a general engagement while there was the possibility that they would not win, we always had to figure on the possibility that through some chance they might win, but we believed that if they did win in a general engagement with the British fleet, it would take them at least three months after that to get ready to fight against us, and that we would have at least three months in which to get our personnel ready; so that was the basis of our plan for handling the officer personnel situation on July 16, 1917.

The CHAIRMAN. When did the first volunteer officers begin to be used?

Capt. LANING. When did they begin to enter the Navy?

The CHAIRMAN. When did they begin to be used as officers after training?

Capt. LANING. Do you mean by that men who were not trained before?

The CHAIRMAN. Men who were not trained before.

Capt. LANING. I suppose you mean at sea?

The CHAIRMAN. And in connection with that, when was the training of volunteer officers first begun?

Capt. LANING. That was begun before I went into the Bureau of Navigation, because when I arrived there they already had one class of reserve officers at the Naval Academy undergoing a three months' course of intensive training. That was started before my time in the Bureau of Navigation, and that is something about which I can not answer, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. You can answer as to when they first began to graduate from this training and to be used in the Navy.

Capt. LANING. I could not answer that without refreshing my memory. I think it was some time in September, 1917.

The CHAIRMAN. So that during the time between July 1 and September you were still going ahead with only about 2,300 officers when you needed 6,000 officers?

Capt. LANING. Yes. As a matter of fact you might say that the only really highly trained officers we had during the war were those 2,394. Of course, other officers took up the training in a remarkable way. Those reserve officers were of the very highest class, and the temporary officers were of a high class, but they were not experts in all branches of the naval service, even when the war ended, but they were mighty expert along certain lines on which they had been working during the war. Of course, when a big war like that starts, you naturally want enough officers and men to man all your ships. We did not have anything like enough at that time. Of course, we could not have had enough at that time unless we had had legislation some years before to provide for it.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the shortest amount of training that a civilian, who is not familiar with naval affairs, would need to have before he could be utilized in the Navy as an officer, in an emergency?

Capt. LANING. We did use them after about three months, that is, after they had had that intensive training at the Naval Academy in the reserve class. Then we started other classes at other places.

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Almost everywhere where we had a station, we had a little training school for officers, and we would turn them out in about three months. We would send them out with the rudiments of a naval education, and put them to work; but of course, they were not all-around officers by any means. We put them on one single job and they would master that, and as soon as they had mastered that they would begin to study another; and they gradually took up one thing and another at sea, and developed into right excellent officers.

The CHAIRMAN. So that, if early in February an attempt had been made to train civilians as officers, you might have had some of those men ready to take part by the 1st of May?

Capt. LANING. Yes, we could have had some of them ready to use them to very excellent advantage, as we did use them later.

The CHAIRMAN. But that was not done?

Capt. LANING. No, sir; that was not done around February at all.

The CHAIRMAN. The war began early in April. At what period should you say that the fleet was ready as regards matériel and personnel, to have engaged in a battle with the German fleet if it had escaped through the blockade?

Capt. LANING. With regard to matériel I think it was ready about the 1st of September. With regard to personnel, it was not ready until about the end of the war. You see, the battleships were used very largely for training purposes. We trained officers on them and we trained men on them, but it was a long time before we had enough permanently in what we called the active fleet, battleship force, to use its official title, before we had enough permanently in the personnel for them to be actually ready for battle. Of course, the ships that were sent to Europe were ready, I think, before the others were. I could not say just when the fleet was actually ready. You would have to ask the commander in chief that, sir—that is, in regard to personnel. In regard to matériel it was not ready until the late summer.

The CHAIRMAN. You say that the department probably had some plan at the beginning of the war. You can not tell me what that plan was, or what was the initial step to be taken in it?

Capt. LANING. No, sir; I have not seen that plan, but it is always customary to have a more or less well-drawn up plan to meet any emergency.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not mean in connection with this particular war, but you mean in connection with any war, the plan would be ready?

Capt. LANING. Yes; in connection with any war that might come up; but whether they had such a plan or not, I do not know positively.

The CHAIRMAN. And you do not know that there was any such plan for this war ready before war was declared?

Capt. LANING. For the war with Germany?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Capt. LANING. No; I do not think there was any plan that would meet the submarine situation as it was then.

The CHAIRMAN. What was there to meet other situations that might come up?

Capt. LANING. Well, there is a general outline of a plan that might have been used in a war with Germany if she had been fighting us alone.

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The CHAIRMAN. When was that plan outlined?

Capt. LANING. That I do not know, sir. That would probably be handled by the General Board, and did not come under our office.

The CHAIRMAN. Was it in existence some time before April, 1917?

Capt. LANING. I think it must have been. I think there must have been a plan before that.

The CHAIRMAN. But you are not familiar with the details of it?

Capt. LANING. No, sir; there was not any plan for carrying on a war along the lines that we actually had to carry this one on. I am sure of that.

The CHAIRMAN. In his annual report for 1918 the Secretary of the Navy says:

Before the President went before Congress on the 2d day of April, 1917, and delivered his epoch-making message, which stirred the hearts of all patriots, and in the climax said, "America is privileged to spend her blood and her might for the principles that gave her birth and happiness and the peace which she has treasured; God helping her, she can do no other," the Navy from stem to stern had been made ready to the fullest extent possible for any eventuality. More than a year before war was declared the President approved the three-year program of increase in the Navy, a radical departure from the long-accepted custom of making yearly authorizations for naval construction, and Congress gave the authority and appropriation for this new policy and large expansion. From that day to this hour, with appreciation of its pressing needs and with large vision of the future development of the Navy, the Congress has given everything that could be desired to insure effectiveness to the naval arm. It has done this after thorough study and full investigation, not only of the necessity of providing the required personnel and material, but also after the most searching investigation of the administration of the Naval Establishment.

Would you say that that statement was borne out by the facts?

Capt. LANING. No, sir; I do not think the Navy was ready from stem to stern when war was declared. I know it was not ready as to matériel or personnel, and those are the things that make up the Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think it was possible for the Secretary of the Navy to have done anything which he did not do, which could have reasonably been foreseen, either to prepare for war after it became imminent or to have hastened its successful termination?

Capt. LANING. Yes; I think there were many things that he could have done. When war became imminent, he could have insisted that we have a plan of procedure. We could have laid out those plans and could have been prepared to go before Congress immediately and state what was needed to carry out those plans. But we did not do that. We did not do anything.

The CHAIRMAN. One other matter that I omitted to ask you about: Do you know anything about the conditions of our submarines at the commencement of the war?

Capt. LANING. No, sir. While I was in the office of Matériel and Operations, I did not handle the submarines and I am not familiar with their condition.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, have you any questions which you desire to ask?

Senator KEYES. No.

Senator BALL. No.

Senator TRAMMELL. Capt. Laning, you speak of not being prepared in matériel and personnel. Was the Navy built up to the limit in personnel as far as authorized by law?

Capt. LANING. Approximately; yes.

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Senator TRAMMELL. Then the Navy Department was exercising its full authority, and to its full limit, as far as authorized by law in regard to personnel?

Capt. LANING. Yes; it had all it could get.

Senator TRAMMELL. Whose neglect was it that you were not equipped as far as the law authorized you in matériel?

Capt. LANING. That was due to the fact that we did not have the funds to provide all the matériel that was essential. That is, on battleships, for instance, we are always developing new things in the way of fire control—that is, the control of the firing of the guns—and frequently those things were not put in because we did not have the funds available to put them in.

Senator TRAMMELL. The Navy Department was doing the best it could then, as far as matériel was concerned, considering the available funds?

Capt. LANING. Oh, yes; there is not any question about that; but the point I made was that it had not presented the facts to Congress so as to get the funds that it ought to have had to do those things.

Senator TRAMMELL. Do you know whether or not Congress would have approved of it if they had requested it prior to our entrance into the war?

Capt. LANING. Well, yes; I think Congress would have, because they wanted at that time to be sure that we were ready. At least it ought to have been put up to Congress. That is the way I think.

Senator TRAMMELL. After all, that was a matter of conjecture on your part, as to what Congress would have done?

Capt. LANING. Yes.

Senator TRAMMELL. As a matter of fact, Congress had not authorized any greater personnel or any greater expenditure for equipment than you were operating under at that time?

Capt. LANING. No, sir; it had not.

Senator TRAMMELL. Now, between February and April 6, the day upon which war was declared, did Congress pass any law authorizing an enlargement of the Navy?

Capt. LANING. On March 3 it passed the regular annual appropriation bill, and in that bill it made all of the funds appropriated immediately available, and made a particular appropriation of $115,000,000 for an emergency fund to be spent at the discretion of the President in preparing things that were needed by the Navy. I do not remember the exact wording of the bill, but it had that emergency fund in it.

Senator TRAMMELL. On March 3, a little over a month prior to the declaration of war, somebody did bring about legislation making available the appropriations then in existence. Do you think that the Navy Department had anything to do with that?

Capt. LANING. I do not know. I can not answer that question. I do not know whether they did or not.

Senator TRAMMELL. You do not know whether that was done at the suggestion of the Navy or not?

Capt. LANING. No, sir; I do not.

Senator TRAMMELL. If that is true, then, Captain, you do not know whether the Navy Department was active prior to our entrance into the war, as far as getting appropriations and trying to make some preparations?

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Capt. LANING. No, I do not know what it did about appropriations. The thing I brought up particularly about that time was the plan. They had no plan of using the appropriations and they had no way of knowing what appropriations to ask for, as they had no plans.

Senator TRAMMELL. You are more familiar with the proprieties, at least of the Navy, and probably of the Government, than myself; but would it have been proper for the Navy Department to outline and get out a war plan a month prior to the time we entered the war—a war plan for a war with Germany?

Capt. LANING. Yes. We ought to have had one. You do not talk about it, but you are always supposed to have plans for any emergencies that may arise.

Senator TRAMMELL. Now, I am not talking about the question of preparation in different departments, and different operations, etc. You stated that there was preparation being made by different departments. They were doing quite a good deal. But I am talking about a plan, just as though you were going into war with them, and have it circulated all through the Navy and advise the Navy, generally speaking, that these are our war plans for war with Germany or any other country? Would that have been proper?

Capt. LANING. Not to have spread it broadcast, Senator, no. But it was proper to have a war plan for use in an emergency. You do not tell the whole Navy about it, but you only tell those who are concerned in getting certain parts of it ready so that they may know how to carry on their results. You should have such a war plan and you should have it years before, if you can get it.

Senator TRAMMELL. Of course I realize the wisdom of that in a general way, but I mean a specific plan. You say there was no general plan, but I believe you did state that there was quite a good deal of activity in the Navy after the ambassador, for instance, had been given his papers.

Capt. LANING. Yes.

Senator TRAMMELL. There was something being done?

Capt. LANING. Yes.

Senator TRAMMELL. There was not total inactivity on the part of all the different branches of the Navy throughout those months?

Capt. LANING. No, sir; there was not total inactivity. I stated that in the memorandum.

Senator TRAMMELL. The neglect, then, if there was neglect, consists in the fact that the plan was not general, prior to our entrance into the war?

Capt. LANING. Well, that was the principal thing. That is the greatest defect, that there was not a general plan. No one knew what to do, and what anybody did do was rather on his own guess.

Senator TRAMMELL. You were connected with the Bureau of Navigation, were you, in 1918?

Capt. LANING. Yes, sir. I went there on July 16, 1917, and stayed there until the 31st of March, 1919.

Senator TRAMMELL. Do you recall having a letter brought to your attention by—I do not know whether it is Admiral Pratt or what his rank was at that time; anyway, I will say Admiral Pratt—by Admiral Pratt from Admiral Sims; a letter dated August 13, 1918, in which an officer by the name of Carter made more or less criticism in regard to the manning, I believe it was, of the destroyers abroad?

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Capt. LANING. Yes, sir; I remember that letter. I think it was on the question of manning submarines, Senator. He had a letter in there the subject of which was "Set a Thief to Catch a Thief." Is that it?

Senator TRAMMELL. Yes, "Set a Thief to Catch a Thief." That seems to be the subject in the letter.

Capt. LANING. Yes, I remember it.

Senator TRAMMELL. Do you recall whether or not under the date of August 26, 1918, you wrote a letter to Admiral Sims in reply to Carter's letter?

Capt. LANING. Yes, I wrote a letter.

Senator TRAMMELL. Mr. Chairman, Capt. Laning admits that he wrote a letter to Admiral Sims on August 26, 1918, in reply to a complaint, it seems, by some officer by the name of Carter. The letter of Carter seems to have been entitled, "Set a Thief to Catch a Thief." I would like to present the letter of Capt. Laning. It just gives some of the Captain's views on August 26, 1918.

The CHAIRMAN. Capt. Laning's views?

Senator TRAMMELL. Yes; Capt. Laning's views.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you read the letter?

Senator TRAMMELL. It is a pretty long letter. I will read it, though. [Reading:]

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
BUREAU OF NAVIGATION,
Washington, D. C., August 26, 1918.

DEAR ADMIRAL: Pratt called me in this morning and handed me your letter of August 13 with its inclosure, "Set a thief to catch a thief." We are always glad to have criticism of our work especially from you, and inasmuch as the criticism in this paper reflects on my office as well as on Operations it behooves me to sit up and take notice. While I am not a part of Operations and therefore do not formulate the working plans it is nevertheless my mission to distribute the officer personnel to carry those plans out. I lay no claim to genius in carrying out that mission, and I have no doubt made many mistakes, but they can not be laid to a lack of careful consideration of the problems I have been confronted with although Carter says that is the reason for his paper. On the contrary I have studied the plans and have made new estimates almost daily with the result that even after reading Carter's screed, I am not convinced that Operations has erred in its general plans or that my office has erred greatly in carrying out its mission under them.

I find myself criticized along similar lines by officers from every force and yet when those officers come to my office and had the general plans explained, they saw the thing in a new light. Whereas before they had seen the situation from the point of view of their own force, after an explanation of the general plan thay have altogether changed their minds. Undoubtedly we on this side have erred in not making the general plans more widely known to the service, but there are two reasons for not doing so, first, because it might not have been advisable to spread them broadcast; and, second, had it been advisable, the few of us who are in the jay bird seats over here haven't had the time to do it. It of course is not my province to disseminate that information for I am not the plan maker but I will endeavor to give you some idea of the line we are working on as a matter of justification both to Operations and the Bureau of Navigation. If, after my explanation, you feel that Carter is right and we are wrong, would you mind telling us where we have erred? If you will I promise you that the Bureau of Navigation will at once try to rectify, as well as it can, the mistakes it has made, and I am sure Operations will change the plans if they are unsound in principle.

To grasp the situation we must start from the beginning. When the war was declared we had commissioned in the Navy about 2,394 line officers. Of these about 350 (two classes) had just left the Naval Academy and could hardly be called experienced, but for the sake of argument let us accept it that we had 2,394 experienced officers of the line. Now, these officers were all and the only trained officers we have had to carry on the war. Everything else we have is green and untrained, or at least was. It was therefore necessary for those 2,394 officers to not only plan our part in the war

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and carry out the operations, but also to provide and train all the other officers and men that might be required. It should be remembered that that number of officers was entirely inadequate to man the ships of the United States Navy as they then existed and much less adequate to meet the enormous expansion of activities that has taken place.

Senator TRAMMELL. It is all right, Mr. Chairman, to put the rest of letter in the testimony without reading it, if you are agreeable to that.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you familiar with the contents of this letter, Captain?

Capt. LANING. I remember writing it, but I do not remember everything that is in it; no, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you care to have the letter read in full?

Capt. LANING. If you want to question me about it, I will be very glad to be questioned about it. I do not remember everything that is in it.

The CHAIRMAN. Then perhaps it would be well to complete the reading of it.

Senator TRAMMELL. Very well. [Continuing reading:]

It is evident that a decision had to be made, and made at once, as to what the Navy should do in the war. We could take our 2,394 officers and our 57,000 enlisted men, man what ships we could, and let it go at that, or we could use those officers and those men as a foundation on which to build a truly great Navy, one that could actually deal some blows to the Huns. It was evident that what we then had could not win the war, so that the second plan had to be adopted. We may have made our initial error at that time, and should have been content with a 57,000-man Navy, instead of the 400,000-man Navy we are rapidly coming to. Up to the present, however, we have no reason to think we have erred in adopting the plan of an expanding Navy. We took advantage of the enemy's inability to strike hard while we were building up our Navy for such a great war. The problem as it seems to us was not to deliver a puny and futile blow at the start, but to build for the blows that in the end must crush the enemy. To have wasted our strength to strike quickly when that strength was not sufficient to win would have been foolish. We would have sacrificed all, and in the end could have been only worse off than at the start.

Our mission was and is to decisively beat the enemy. If we accept some smaller mission we won't win the war. The first mission, subordinate to but a part of grand mission, was to defeat the U boats. Almost everyone assigned a task in that first mission immediately ran away with the idea that it was about the only mission we had. They were fortunate enough to get in the game, but once there they saw only their part in it. Even you yourself questioned the advisability of keeping our battleships in commission, and suggested putting them out to send the personnel over there. To have done that would have been disastrous, for those battleships have trained over 100,000 men and thousands of officers, which we would not have now, had we carried out the suggestion.

We recognize the importance of the work against the U boats, but we did not think that their extinction could alone win the war, nor that even by sending all our 2,394 officers over we could extinguish them. As early as July 1 last year it became known on this side that no matter how much we curtailed the U boats the war would be lost if we did not get troops to France. How were the troops to get there unless the Navy took them? The situation in our merchant marine was such that they simply could not carry out the task of transporting those troops, even assuming that their officers were sufficiently skilled in handling ships in convoys. The Navy not only had to convoy the troops across, but also it had to operate all the transports flying the United States flag. It at once became evident every cruiser we have would be a vital factor, and that transports were even more vital.

Suppose the transport service had not been developed early; where would we and our allies have been to-day? Just as the little force we put in against the "subs" swing the balance in our favor on the sea, so the transport and cruiser force later swing the balance on land to our side. Hasn't it turned out that making your force go and making the transport and cruiser force go were the allied salvation? We now operate over 40 troop transports and several hundred cargo transports. We could not have had either the officers or men to man them had we stripped this side for your side early in the war; yet without them could the enemy have been stopped on land?

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Those troops of ours are saving the day, and I believe it would be unfair to put blame on the department for putting them across instead of sending the personnel to chase submarines. Both things were essential, but neither one by itself could save the day. By sacrificing something in our\U-boat efforts the transports have gotten across, but had we sacrificed the transports to sink U-boats our troops wouldn't have gotten over, and without them where would our allies be now?

Surely, we must concede that there were at least two important missions under our general mission, (1) the curbing of the U-boats and (2) the delivery of troops to France. Were these our only missions? I don't believe so, and certainly not after being privileged to read some of your own letters on the subject of battleships. Already we have been called on to send some battleships across, and I daresay all the other first-line ships will sooner or later be called on, perhaps not with the Grand Fleet, but for some other important duties in the war area. Will anyone question the advisability of our keeping those ships ready? Because they are not being used on the line to-day is not proof that they won't be called on to-morrow. Anyhow, we believe they must be ready, and surely in this you agree. This will account for our dreadnoughts; now, what about our older battleships? There is the rub. What are those old tubs doing? They are the groundwork of the whole scheme for a Navy big enough to win this war. Without them we would practically have no training place at sea for the hundreds of thousands of men and the thousands of officers required to man new battleships, new destroyers, transports, cargo ships, mine sweepers, submarines, subchasers, and the many other types of craft we are turning out in great numbers.

We have an average of 10 regulars on each of these ships, or 180 in all. Hidden away from all excitement and all chances of honor and renown, those fellows work harder than anyone and make possible the manning of our thousands of ships. Does young Carter mean that we should cut off our sole means of preparing personnel for the expansion to send more officers to the chasers? For the present we might get more U-boats, but in the long run we would do less to win the war. I believe that the missions of our battleship forces are an essentail part of the general mission and that neither of these subsidiary missions can logically be sacrificed to insure the better carrying out of another subsidiary mission. The missions are (3) (for dreadnoughts) to be instantly ready for battle, and (4) (for predreadnoughts) to train combatant officers and men to man the ever-expanding Navy.

I have so far covered our major operating forces, but have endeavored to show how the role each is playing is essential and one that can not be cast aside. We have other forces, of course, such as the submarine force, the district forces, etc. Of these only the submarine force has any regular officers, and then only in small numbers. The Caribbean patrol is made up almost entirely of reserve and Coast Guard officers. In fact, every force has only a leaven of regulars. The vast majority of officers attached permanently to any naval vessel on this side are newly made. On dreadnoughts on this side we now have a total of 14 regulars; on predreadnoughts, average, 10; on armored cruisers, 10; on first-class cruisers, 7; on smaller cruisers, 4; on gunboats, 3, etc. As new construction comes on the regulars will become fewer and fewer on each ship. Each regular is actively at work, each is engaged on the general plan, and each is doing what we believe will finally bring the total defeat of the enemy.

So far I have touched only officers afloat. There are a considerable number of regulars who, much to their disgust, are held on shore duty. It may be contended that these do not belong there, but if one looks into the situation even casually he would be amazed that we have gotten along with so few on that duty. As a matter of fact the feeling here is that because of the lack of officers for the handling of the shore end, that end is probably not succeeding as well as it should. Although every retired officer that can function has been called to active duty, and hundreds of reserve officers have been put in such positions ashore as they are competent to fill, the shore end is having a difficult time to carry on its work. We are spending billions of money for material the providing of which must be handled by experienced officers. We have 200,000 men in training alone on shore for which we must have some experienced officers. Great Lakes Training Station, with 47,000 men, has three regulars of the active list. Others are similarly curtailed. I could recite the details, and they would astonish you, but there is no use. I am sure you will believe me when I tell you that to-day regular officers are working to the limit of their endurance on shore, and their accomplishments would have been considered impossibilities 18 months ago. But the situation on shore is such that we are open to severe criticism because we have not sufficient officers to do the work as it should be done or to properly safeguard the expenditure of billions of dollars.

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One of the big tasks that has fallen to the Navy is to man and operate the 2,000 merchant ships now being built by the Shipping Board. The supply of merchant officers and merchant sailors is exhausted, and the Navy alone has the facilities and organization to provide the personnel. While the cry that "ships will win the war" may not be correct, it is pretty certain that we can't win without them. And so the Navy will train and provide 20,000 officers and 200,000 men for these ships. It doesn't take many regulars to handle this task, but it takes some. Is their task such that they can be taken from it?

Perhaps it may be illuminating to tell you of our estimates of personnel which we presented to Congress recently. We figured that to merely man the permanent ships of the regular Navy on July 1, 1919, we would require 131,000 men, or counting men under training to fill vacancies caused by expiration of enlistment, men to cover casualties, and men for aviation (regular), 152,000. Of the latter figures we will not speak. The former, mind you, are needed to man only regular vessels; vessels temporarily in were not counted, such as transports, yachts, sweepers, "sub" chasers, cargo ships, coast-patrol craft, etc. To properly officer and run just the regular Navy ships would require 5,263 regular officers. But, in addition to that, we have to run other ships, where combatant officers are required, to the point of making the number of officers required about 8,600. To meet this we have now not 2,394 officers, but only about 2,370, so we can have regulars, where regulars ought to be, only in about one out of three places. You can see the veneer or leaven of regulars has to be spread pretty thin in every force. I have spread it just as thin as I have dared. I know each force would do a great deal better it it had more regulars, but I can't make them, and as each force has to operate, we give them all we can and count on them to get away with the job with the only tools we have.

We can't win the war with anything less than all our forces. We might throw battleships in the discard, but would you advise it? We can't throw our training ships (old battleships) out and continue to expand. We can't cut down our cruisers and transports without curtailing our troops movements. We can't cut down our shore end lest the sea end fails because of a shore-end failure. And so it goes all along the line. I have studied the situation—in fact, do nothing else but study it—and I can't see any way to send a larger proportion of trained men to the chasers over there than we are sending. I admit it would be well to do it if we could, but it can be done only by sacrificing something else. Looking at it in the broad light, what would you sacrifice?

Reading over Carter's article, do you believe he has my conception of the total effort of the United States Navy? He has written a very convincing article. His caption is good and his logic sounds plausible, provided his premises are correct. He makes a general estimate of the situation from the one point on the line that he sees, though general deduction from local and incomplete information are valueless. The great trouble with such arguments presented as his is, is that when spread around it weakens the morale. Over there you give us the devil because we don't do all you want us to do. You feel we are failing you. Does it help the morale over there or over here to do that? I know we, over here, are not in the limelight; that no matter how hard we work and how carefully we plan, there is no glory coming to those of us who are tied to the swivel chair. But please don't think we are quitting on the job. The Navy is paying the penalty of past shortsighted policy. That, we can not correct at once, but I am sure we strive now, have strived in the past, and will strive in the future, to meet your necessities as far as we can with the small personnel we have. We know your needs and meet them as far as we can, but we can't give you all you ought to have, for the officers simply don't exist.

I suppose we must suffer disagreeable criticism for not sending more officers of the regular service over there, but when you count those permanently there and those that go over and come back with the convoys and transports, I think you will find a very large per cent of regulars are quite actively engaged and that the small number who want to be similarly engaged but can't be that are on this side are doing just as vital work without whimper and without chance of reward. It is bad enough not to get a chance in this war, but to have our motives and efforts impugned by young officers who do not know of anything but the little part they can see is disheartening.

Let me point out where Carter is dead wrong. In his opening paragraphs he assumes that the most important work of the United States Navy is either one of two things, the defeat of the Germans on the sea or the defeat of the Germans undersea. With that premise and the use of false logic he proves his case. Both his premise and logic are wrong. The important work of the United States and its Allies is to beat the Huns. It doesn't make any difference where we beat them, just so we do. It may be on the sea, but it is much more likely to be on land. It is the Navy's business to use its efforts to beat them whether it be done on land or sea. If we can more cer-

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tainly beat them on land, and it looks like that is where we must beat them, then our principal effort must be to help beat them on land. And after all, beating them on the sea is only secondary, for the final decision must be on land. We can win this war if we can beat them on land and can prevent them beating us on the sea, and it looks like our plan to that end will be successful. Carter fails to see this; fails to grasp what the Allies' general plan is, and therefore his whole idea is illogical.

But Carter is wrong elsewhere than in his assumptions. He apparently thinks the end of submarine warfare is the cure-all. Suppose we had done as Carter implies we should, stop everything that doesn't tend to curb the U-boats. Wouldn't the Allies be in a nice mess to-day if we had adopted that plan a year ago and forsaken our transportation of troops? Suppose we had kept up our troop arrangements and cast aside battleships, wouldn't "Fritz" have a better chance to win on the sea with our reserve fighting force irreparably out of business? The mere fact that even if he should lick the British Grand Fleet, there is another fleet ready to fill the gap must have had some effect on his plans, and anyhow if it didn't, it is a mighty good thing to have a strong reserve fleet against the slight possibility of his success. As a matter of fact, there simply isn't any cure-all. We have got to work along all our lines, doing each as best we can, keeping in mind that defeating the enemy on one line can not and will not by itself win the war in a reasonable time.

Coming down to cases, or brass tacks as Carter calls them, I admit we have not put the best men on hunting vessels. We have, however, put the best men there we could get. That we should have sacrificed our heavy battleships or our training ships to get these men, I don't agree; neither do the officers in Operations, and I don't believe you do. I know that many officers over there are of that opinion, but have they weighed the entire situation in coming to it? And is the calling of our battleships to the front the remote contingency Carter calls it? It does not seem so to us; in fact, quite the contrary.

Carter asks, "Does it require more brains and experience to handle convoys and escorts than it does to hunt submarines?" and then says that if the answer is "no," "there should be a new deal." Even if the answer were "no," it doesn't follow that there should be a new deal, because we must always consider the relation of the task to the general plan. Here is where his false premise looms up. You can't get this country to believe that the putting of troops into France is second to anything. But in my opinion the answer to his question is "yes." The biggest thing we are doing to-day is putting fighting men into France and our best brains must be concentrated on its successful accomplishments. I don't believe we would facilitate troop transport in the least by putting the brains now doing that work on hunting boats, do you?

I don't think 11 regular officers are enough for the hunting squadrons, but since they were all we could beg, borrow, or steal, sending that many was a "Hobson's choice." The Lord knows we wanted to send more, would have been only too glad to send them, but for the life of us we can't see the wisdom of stopping other Navy efforts to do it. But after all are those hunting officers so rotten as to be a scandal? They are not as good as regulars, but won't they, like the rest of us, get away with the job? We are chasing subs over here these days and the need is quite close at home, yet with it we still see no wisdom in changing our policy.

To read the blasé way Carter says that a goodly percentage of submarine officers should be taken from subs and put on chasers one might think we had a few hundred such kicking around loose. It shows how little he understands the situation. Our subs will soon have but one regular on board and even that many will be hard to provide. Subs, destroyers, chasers, cruisers, battleships, and everything are running on, but few regulars. No juggling can raise the number of them we have. If, as Carter says, submarine officers should be chosen from those in the war zone and sent to chasers, I am sure the bureau has no objection to your so assigning them. Of course we keep our hands off of reassignments over there, but has Carter's argument convinced you that it would be a wise move?

Carter says that the question comes up because it does not appear to be considered in the light of relative importance by those in authority. Appearances are often deceitful and have proved so in this case. As a matter of fact, we have probably studied the question more hours than Carter has minutes. If he thinks the swivel chair artists haven't sat up nights over the vital importance of swatting the "subs" he is very much mistaken. We have weighed the question both alone and in connection with the general plan, which I do not believe he has done, and our decisions have been reached on the broad basis of the general plan instead of on the narrow basis of a subsidiary plan.

As for the Eagle boats, we have not yet decided on their organization, for the simple reason that until they are tried out it isn't certain how they can best be organized. He jumps at the conclusion that the commanding officers won't be equal to the job,

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because they did not graduate before 1914. If we carried out his ideas it would take 117 officers prior to the 1914 class just for commanding officers and division commanders of those boats, about 9 per cent of the officers below captain and above the 1914 class. As some 600 officers must come out of that same group for destroyers and the rest of the Navy must also be run to a large extent by them, I can't quite see how the supply can anywhere near meet the demand. This illustrates the futility of telling how to do things when one doesn't know the situation or ignores it merely to prove his case.

It is a good thing to act a thief to catch a thief, but if you haven't the thieves you can only put your best substitutes on the job, and that is what we are doing.

Carter's argument doesn't bother us much because it is based on incomplete information and false assumptions from which anyone who sees only his immediate task is unable to get a correct perspective. Your own short letter, however, in its first paragraph states as follows:

"When the history of this war comes to be written there will be a number of features that will not be very creditable to the United States Navy. If hearings are held on the conduct of the war, a number of rather disagreeable facts must inevitably be brought out. Without going into details I may say that as far as the Navy is concerned we will have fought this war with the bulk of our experienced personnel of the Navy on the side of the ocean where there is no war. We will have to be able to show that it was entirely necessary that we should have had to fight the war over here with a very large proportion of reserve officer who did not have the necessary experience."

And it is that paragraph that hurts. Are you sure that the bulk of our experienced personnel is on this side of the water now? Of course if you don't count the cruisers and transports you are right, but if you do count them as being engaged in active work you are wrong. Do you realize that ultimately two-fifths of our experienced personnel will be on destroyers alone and of the remaining three-fifth at least half will be over there before the war is over, provided of course transports and cruisers may be considered as working in the danger zone? The bulk may not be there to-day but we are expecting them to go and are planning for it. Please remember experienced officers number all told only about 2,370 and there is much for them to do over here that may be less spectacular and not deserving of credit, yet for all that it is work that without which the Hun can't be licked.

Please don't think for a minute that I alone can change the situation even if we have erred. It is not my province to determine operating plans. Such plans are not made in our bureau but it is our task to provide personnel to carry them out when they are made. We have endeavored to do that and at the same time have fought hard to get proper consideration for the personnel. We started with a handicap we havn't been able to work off. Criticism is easy, and just criticism beneficial, but there is nothing more lowering to the morale than unjust criticism, and criticism made without full knowledge and thought is apt to be unjust. I am not claiming that we don't deserve a lot of it, but that which comes from a paper like Carter's is not just.

I am sorry to have taken so much of your time and I will consider it a favor if you will come back at me and point out where we are wrong. I certainly hate to think that though I have to stay on this bum job I am also making a mess of it. I want to feel that even if there is no honor or glory in it that after all it wasn't so badly done. And don't lose sight of the fact that it is only by loyalty to the general plan and by the holding to it that decisions are gained.

Before closing there is one question I want to ask. In your opinion, when the entire Navy has an actual and vital part in the war, is it advisable to separate the bulk of experienced officers from the bulk of the naval forces, in order that some particular forces with particular missions should the better accomplish their missions, and in so doing disregard the fact that we actually interfere with the Navy's primary mission in the war? Carter's article is based on the answer yes to that question as are also the "disagreeable facts" that you tell us we must face.

With best wishes to you and all of your gang, one of which I long to be, because I believe I belong there, I am as always,

Sincerely yours,

HARRIS LANING.

Was that letter expressive of your views on August 26, 1918, upon the points that it touched upon?

Capt. LANING. Yes, sir.

Senator TRAMMELL. You have not changed your views in regard to the matters that you touched upon at that time?

Capt. LANING. No, sir.

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The CHAIRMAN. I suggest, that if you have a copy of Mr. Carter's statement or letter, you produce that and let it be included in the record also, along with this.

Senator TRAMMELL. I have not a copy of that. We might see if we could get it.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you try to get it from the department?

Senator TRAMMELL. Yes; I will see if I can get it.

(The letter referred to is here printed in full in the record as follows:)

SET A THIEF TO CATCH A THIEF, OR WHY SUBMARINES ESCAPE.

What is the most important work of the war to be done by the United States Navy? Obviously it is not that of preparing to defeat the German High Seas Fleet it it should move out to contend for mastery of the surface of the sea. The British Grand Fleet has been pretty successfully attending to that for three years before our entry into the war.

If it isn't that, then it must be defeat of the German Undersea Fleet. If this defeat of the German Undersea Fleet (the U boats) be accepted as the most important work of the United States Navy, the only thing to be sure of is that we are going about it in the best available known way.

The way which we have adopted consists of building merchant ships to replace those sunk; convoying ships as much as possible by light craft, to prevent as far as possible the submarine from sinking them; hunting the submarine with light craft fitted with specially designed detection devices; and patrolling certain beats with a very small force of submarines, whose only weapon of destruction is the torpedo.

There can be no doubt that all of these elements should be employed, but there may be some short-sightedness as to which should be given the most thought. It is already realized that it would be folly to try to build ships faster than they could be sunk with enemy submarines roaming unhampered about the waters through which merchant shipping must pass. It has already been stated by competent judges, that the convoy system alone will not protect them. It has however, also been stated that an offensive which will destroy or drive the submarine from these waters is the answer to the problem. Such an offensive has already been inaugurated by assigning to the task, hunting vessels with specially designed detection devices and means of destruction. Nevertheless, until the personnel of the vessels assigned to the task are capable of solving the problem, the problem will continue to exist.

To give up talking in generalities and get down to brass tacks have we put the right men on the hunting vessels? We have not. The problem is one which requires the best brains and experience that can be obtained. Most of our regular officers are assigned to other vessels than those employed in hunting. The battleships in home waters have an average of eight regular officers below the rank of captain, and above that of the Naval Academy class of 1915. They have in addition many lieutenants and some lieutenant commanders, of the reserve force. If it is true that the British Grand Fleet can be expected to successfully deal with the German High Sea Fleet, then what would be the harm of using some of these officers in more important work, even if we had to go to the extent of stripping the battleships to the condition of the reserve battleships of four or five years ago? They would still have full crews of enlisted men and a sufficient number of officers to keep them in perfect condition as regards material and probably could hold considerable drill and training as well.

Is it more important to keep these ships with full complement of officers of them "standing by" for a condition which most all are morally certain will never exist, than it is to leave them in a perfect condition as regards material, and use their officers to make successful the hunting of enemy submarines?

Does it require more brains and experience to keep ships "standing by" for a remote contingency, than it does to prosecute an offensive against the wily and tricky submarine?

Does it require more brains and experience to handle convoys and escorts than it does to successfully hunt the wily and tricky submarine officered by the pick of the German Navy?

If the answers to any of these questions are no, then there should be a new deal, a reapportionment of the experienced regular officers.

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On our battleships in home waters alone there is an average of eight regular officers of useful qualifications. In the entire Navy there are approximately 1,300 officers, junior to Captain, but senior to the Naval Academy class of 1915, and of that number there are but 11 now assigned to hunting vessels.

Is that a fair assignment?

Is the task before this hunting force of such little importance or of such ease of accomplishment that 11 regular experienced officers are sufficient?

The hunting vessels are being officered mainly by young inexperienced reserves; bright, keen, and willing men who it is believed will eventually learn the game and "deliver the goods." Undoubtedly they will eventually learn a lot about the game, but I believe that like the allied armies they will always be a lap behind the enemy. By the time they have learned what to do to cope with the submarine tactics of to-day it will be to-morrow and there will be new tactics by the submarines.

Our regular officers, on the other hand, can learn the game in much less time and then will have a fund of knowledge from past naval experience upon which to draw for initiating advances, change and amplifications of tactics against the submarine.

No matter how bright and keen the reserves are, is it to be expected that they can learn in a few minutes that which regular officers have acquired in from 4 to 20 years?

Many of these young reserve officers are men who were lawyers, bankers, and mercantile men with no technical training prior to entering the Navy. They are in charge of vessels fitted with mechancial devices of an extremely complicated nature, and if they learn them at all it can only be in a merely superficial way.

Is it to be expected that they can ever learn these devices as well as regular officers who have been brought up on mechanical "gadjets"?

Is it to be expected that officers who do not have the capabilities and eccentricities of the devices of their vessels at their finger tips, can handle their vessels in as efficient a manner as officers who do?

There will be times when certain devices will not be suitable, and certain others will be. For example—at certain times a submarine runs at a very slow, practically noiseless speed, or balances, or rests on the bottom, obviously a listening device will be of little value in detecting her. Here a magnetic, electrolytic device, or a sweep must be used and in using it, frequently the listening device must also be used to be sure the submarine has not started to run at an audible speed; or, it may be that depth charges judiciously used will start the submarine running away at an audible speed. In all these cases careful judgment resulting from naval experience will be needed to decide what to use and when and where to use it. It might be advisable to sweep or hunt along a re-tiring search curve. How many of our reserve officers are there who would realize that such a maneuver was the thing; and how many could do it after realizing it?

In connection with knowing the submarine's tactics, who would know more what to expect and who would be expected to size up a situation more quickly than a submarine officer? In other words, should there not be a liberal percentage of experienced submarine officers taken from submarines and put into hunting vessels?

Furthermore, should they not be the best submarine officers; that is, chosen from those who have had experience in the war zone?

This whole question of experienced officers for hunting vessel is brought up because it does not appear to be considered in the light of comparative importance by those having the authority to control it. Capt. R. H. Leigh has repeatedly emphasized the necessity of having experienced officers with the 110-foot chasers, but up to date there have been but two added. There are at Corfu four regular officers of the required experience, and one reserve officer of that experience. These 5 officers must be utilized on 1 tender, 36 chasers and a shore base.

Is it a sufficient number considering the importance of the task?

The Navy Department is about to assign officers to the first of the Eagles, 500-ton, 18-knot hunting vessels, and has cabled that they will be officered by four officers—a commanding officer not senior to the class of 1914 Naval Academy, an executive officer formerly a boatswain or gunner, an engineer formerly machinist or specially trained reserve, and a communication officer who will be a reserve officer. The department has also stated that no division commanders for these vessels are contemplated.

The commanding officer at the most will have had but four years' experience since graduating from the Naval Academy, and there will be no division commanders of any greater experience to guide them.

Would it not be better to assign to every group of six one commanding officer of considerably great experience, to act as division commander as well as commanding officer?

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Would it not be still better to have more Eagles commanded by officers senior to 1914 and assign an independent division commander as well?

Is there so much other work of greater importance than hunting the submarine, that these officers can not be spared for hunting?

Has it not been due to a natural trend of thought inherited from the past that the importance of the work went with the size of the ship, and the curve of battleship, cruiser, destroyer, submarine, etc., followed right down to chasers, in the assignment of officers?

Is this a correct view of the importance of the work of the Navy in this war?

It is not meant that reserve officer should be replaced by regular officers, but rather that the regulars should be added and the reserves kept as well. The question of quarters for officers, which is bound to arise, need be given very little consideration. Take off some of the lower ratings of enlisted men and all hands fleet downward for quarters, etc.; junior officer take chief petty officers' quarters, etc. If necessary, the officers will steer, hoist signals, do electrical work, etc. An educated man can do this as well or better than an uneducated one, and when the emergency arises we then have his brains available. In most all exploration expeditions, etc., there have been a majority of scientific men who have roughed it (cooked, cut wood, slept on the ground, etc.), just as the guides, carriers, and others did. The Army officers are doing worse in the trenches now.

German submarines corresponding in size to those of ours which have three officers as a complement, carry five or six as their complement.

Is it not because they realize the advantage of many officers?

German submarines are manned by the most skillful and experienced officers it is possible to obtain.

Should we pit against them in hunting tactics our least skillful and experienced officers?

German submarines are manned by officers who have been trained in submarine shore schools, submarine school boats, and in war submarines.

Should we not pit against them as many similarly trained officers as possible?

"Set a thief to catch a thief!" Let's try that and set against the submarine many officers—the most skillful and experienced officers possible to obtain—and as many trained submarine officers as possible.

W. R. CARTER.

Captain, I just want to ask one or two more questions. One of the extracts from that letter is as follows:

I am not convinced that Operations has erred in its general plans, or that my office, Navigation, has erred greatly in carrying out its mission under them.

You stated that in your office in 1918. You still agree to that?

Capt. LANING. Yes, sir.

Senator TRAMMELL. I judge from that letter—I am not going to attempt to put in any more extracts from it—that you had a broad vision of the entire situation, Captain, and you considered that you did not only have to consider this side, and that you were looking at the situation with a vision covering not only the operations abroad, but in this country, in preparation, and everything of that kind?

Capt. LANING. Yes, sir.

Senator TRAMMELL. And that was the reason that you said that secondary devices, or "subsidiary devices," using your language, should not be made superior to the primary, main mission of carrying out the general plan?

Capt. LANING. Yes, sir.

Senator TRAMMELL. As far as you felt at that time the general plan of—I do not know whether you called it, you might call it—the Bureau of Navigation or Operation, you felt that it was being carried out upon proper lines?

Capt. LANING. At that time, yes, sir.

Senator TRAMMELL. Yes.

Capt. LANING. That was August, 1918; yes, sir.

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Senator TRAMMELL. Well, in August, 1918. You were not connected with it until July, 1917, were you?

Capt. LANING. Connected with what?

Senator TRAMMELL. The Bureau of Navigation.

Capt. LANING. Yes; I reported there on July 16, 1917.

Senator TRAMMELL. That is what I say, July, 1917.

Capt. LANING. Yes.

Senator TRAMMELL. You seem to defend, in this letter, the policy of the department in the matter of the handling of the officers and the personnel, as to its plan of distribution, and so on, between this side and the other side; and as between the war zone and the transport zone. Was that policy at that time, when you wrote that letter in 1918, any different from what it was, say, 18 months prior to that time?

Capt. LANING. Yes, sir. Up to the time I went in Navigation, in July, 1917, we did not have any general plan, and we built up a general plan after that. That is, it was built up a part here and a part there until the Bureau of Navigation had a pretty definite idea of what its mission was, and we were carrying out that plan in 1918, doped on this piecemeal method. We were carrying that out when I wrote that letter to Admiral Sims.

Senator TRAMMELL. But even prior to the time that you became connected with the Bureau of Navigation there had been a little done, I believe. You said in your direct testimony that they had withdrawn certain officers from some of the dreadnoughts. They had done something of that kind, had they not?

Capt. LANING. Before July, 1917?

Senator TRAMMELL. Before you went in there.

Capt. LANING. Yes, sir.

Senator TRAMMELL. They were doing something, were they not, Captain, when you got into the bureau?

Capt. LANING. They certainly were. They were doing all they could.

Senator TRAMMELL. Prior to July, 1917?

Capt. LANING. Yes, sir.

Senator TRAMMELL. I do not question the efficiency of your service, and I think you no doubt rendered a splendid service, but I just wanted to find out if all these other officers were doing nothing up to the time you got into the Bureau of Navigation in July, 1917.

Capt. LANING. Did my testimony give you that idea? I did not intend it so.

Senator TRAMMELL. No; it did not; but you made a remark a while ago that after you got in they got everything all right.

Capt. LANING. No; I did not say they got it all right. I told you I spent some sleepless nights about that time.

Senator TRAMMELL. That was the substance of it; that they got things pretty well organized and going after you got in.

Capt. LANING. Well, it took a long time to do it.

Senator TRAMMELL. I know you did splendid work. I have the impression, though, that it is a fact that a very large percentage, nearly all, of these naval officers did fine work. I do not feel like one man did it all, and I do not feel like one man made all the mistakes. I believe officers are just about like everybody else; some of them

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make some mistakes and some of them do some good work. I was rather impressed that most of them were doing pretty good work. That was just my casual observation.

Well, anyway, the department was at work on this problem, and you were connected with the bureau here?

Capt. LANING. On the problems of personnel.

Senator TRAMMELL. Yes.

Capt. LANING. Certainly; yes, sir.

Senator TRAMMELL. I do not think I have anything further to ask.

The CHAIRMAN. The statements made in this letter, Capt. Laning, approving of the general plan, refer to the plan in operation in August, 1918, when this letter was written?

Capt. LANING. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That does not, as I understand it, refer to the first six months of the war?

Capt. LANING. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And to the matters that were connected with Admiral Sims's letter of January 7?

Capt. LANING. No, sir; that dealt with the time at which the letter was written, August, 1918, if I am correct in the month. By that time a more or less well-defined plan had been built up, and I stated in my direct testimony that especially a correct and sound general plan was built up, and this was the result of it. But it was in the early stages that we should have had a plan and did not have it.

The CHAIRMAN. And it does not approve of the lack of support that was not given to Admiral Sims during the first few months of the war or the failure to furnish him with a sufficient staff to conduct his work?

Capt. LANING. Not at all. This letter dealt only with the question of manning some submarine chasers. The question of supplying officers to Admiral Sims's staff came up largely before I entered the Bureau of Navigation. You see, I did not get there until July 16, 1917. I do not remember now what arrangements had been made, but subsequent to that time we did try to send him officers whenever he asked for them; and ultimately I think we got him practically all he needed.

The CHAIRMAN. What were the circumstances leading up to the writing of this letter? Were you asked to write that letter by the department, or was it a private letter?

Capt. LANING. No, sir; this was all personal correspondence. Capt. Pratt had received a letter from Admiral Sims inclosing a paper entitled, "Set a thief to catch a thief," and the idea was that if you wanted to catch German submarines the thing to do was to put our submarine officers on subchasers, and that they knew the tricks of the submarines and would catch them; and it went on in any way to rather criticize the distribution of officers. Capt. Pratt handed me the letter and said something about its being one of my pigeons and not his, and that I had better prepare a reply; so that I wrote this long letter to Admiral Sims, so that he would get an idea of what the personnel situation was with us at that time. That was in 1918, a year after the war started. I think I made pretty clear in that letter that the personnel situation was still pretty bad.

Senator TRAMMELL. The chairman's question suggests another inquiry on my part. Of course, the letter speaks for itself. That

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is the best evidence. The letter is a very strong defense of the action of the Navy Department up to that time in the matter of the subjects touched there in the letter. Now, while the subject involved in the original Carter criticism, of setting a thief to catch a thief, might have been in regard to providing officers for those chasers, you went ahead and elaborated on several other subjects in the letter, discussing the general plan of the Navy and going into the transport question and everything of that kind; and the chairman, as I understand, wants to rather make it appear that this was at the inception or the dawn of this plan. If that was true, why did you go ahead and recite in here the accomplishments that had been made by the department up to that time?

Capt. LANING. I do not understand the question, Senator.

Senator TRAMMELL. I do not say you agree with that idea, but the chairman wants to convey the idea, apparently, that this was at the beginning of the plan.

The CHAIRMAN. I wanted information.

Capt. LANING. He did not convey that idea to me.

Senator TRAMMELL. Yes.

Capt. LANING. When he asked me the question he conveyed the idea that at this time there was a plan and that it was not a plan that was evolved in the first two or three or four or five months of the war, and when I answered him I told him that it was not a plan that was evolved in the first three or four or five months of the war, but it was evolved in the course of the war up to that time. That was a year and a half, approximately, after the war started.

Senator TRAMMELL. Now, if we are going to bring in the question of a year and a half after the war, at the period of this letter, August 26, 1918, what had the Navy done toward furnishing transportation for troops?

Capt. LANING. They had furnished a great deal of transportation for troops?

Senator TRAMMELL. As a matter of fact, we had over a million soldiers over there at that time, and you took the position in your letter that that was even probably more important than the submarine proposition. You gave importance to each, but you emphasized the question that the man that was dealing with the submarine proposition must not lose sight of the other problem.

Capt. LANING. Yes, sir.

Senator TRAMMELL. Now, this letter was really commenting very largely not only upon the plans, but you also recited more or less as to the accomplishment of the plans, on August 26, 1918; told what number of officers you had in training and men and about the 47,000 at camps on the Great Lakes; and you did not utter any criticism at that time about what had not been done during the first three or four months of the war.

Capt. LANING. Why, of course, I did not; no, sir. I would never have uttered as much to anybody, until I was called before this committee.

Senator TRAMMELL. I notice that you rather resented Admiral Sims's threat about investigation. That is one part that you seemed to take to heart more than anything else, may be.

Capt. LANING. Yes, sir; I was personally concerned in that.

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Senator TRAMMELL. Here is an extract from Admiral Sims's letter. It seems that he had in mind investigations back in 1918. [Reading:]

When the history of this war comes to be written there will be a number of features that will not be very creditable to the United States Navy. If hearings are held on the conduct of the war, a number of rather disagreeable facts must inevitably be brought out. Without going into details, I may say that as far as the Navy is concerned, we will have fought this war with the bulk of our experienced personnel of the Navy on the side of the ocean where there is no war. We will have to be able to show that it was entirely necessary that we should have had to fight the war over here with a very large proportion of reserve officers who did not have the necessary experience.

You say this, in reply to that. [Reading:]

And it is that paragraph that hurts. Are you sure that the bulk of our experienced personnel is on this side of the water now? Of course, if you don't count the cruisers and transports you are right, but if you do count them as being engaged in active work you are wrong. Do you realize that ultimately two-fifths of our experienced personnel will be on destroyers alone and of the remaining three-fifths at least half will be over there before the war is over, provided, of course, transports and cruisers may be considered as working in the danger zone? The bulk may not be there to-day, but we are expecting them to go and are planning for it. Please remember experienced officers number all told only about 2,370, and there is much for them to do over here that may be less spectacular and not deserving of credit yet for all that it is work that without which the Hun can't be licked.

You, at least, did not agree with Admiral Sims's criticism in that particular letter. Admiral Sims had his criticism about the way you were handling the personnel and the officers, and you at that time joined issue with the admiral on that question, and stated that you were doing the best you could with the whole plan considered, and that the primary mission should not be set aside for a secondary mission. That is what you said in that letter. I have just read that extract there. That is all, I think.

The CHAIRMAN. Capt. Laning, in August, 1918, the submarine sinkings were what, do you remember?

Capt. LANING. No, sir; I have no statistics on that.

The CHAIRMAN. I think the testimony shows that at that time there was something like 100,000 tons a month.

Capt. LANING. They had been greatly reduced at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. They were greatly reduced and the submarine menace was practically under control at that time, was it not?

Capt. LANING. Well, it was only about the middle of the summer, or immediately after the middle of the summer, that the sinkings began to decrease materially; but the exact statistics I do not know. But we began to feel certain, then, that we were going to get the troops there in time.

The CHAIRMAN. At that time we were still sending troops over in large numbers?

Capt. LANING. Oh, yes, sir; the troop shipments each month were very heavy, I think.

The CHAIRMAN. So that with the submarine situation under control and with the vital importance of sending troops over, might not that account for a change in plans?

Capt. LANING. Yes, sir; but I do not——

The CHAIRMAN. Whereas, in the early part of 1917, it might have been vital to take care of the submarine situation, in August, 1918, that had ceased to be a vital matter?

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Capt. LANING. Oh, the situation changed very materially in that time.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all.

Senator TRAMMELL. Well, now, you express an opinion in this letter on the question of the relative importance of the submarine and the providing of transports. You stated in this letter that the matter of providing transports and being sure to make arrangements for getting the troops over was really of greater importance than the matter of the temporary victory over the submarine, at that time. You stated that in that letter, in substance, I, of course, am not quoting it exactly. I just ask you that because the chairman asked you the other question.

Capt. LANING. Yes; I stated that.

Senator TRAMMELL. You stated, once, that if we took all our little force and sent it over there and they defeated our little force, by an effort, with the submarines, then we would have nothing left. You stated that in this letter, in substance?

Capt. LANING. Yes; I stated we could not rob the other cause to send everybody over to hunt submarines.

Senator TRAMMELL. Your letter went into the policy very largely in regard to that of the department, on this side and the other side, and your views were then in harmony with the policy adopted by the department. Any man that reads your letter fairly can not say anything else.

Capt. LANING. No, and I do not say it.

Senator TRAMMELL. Your views were thoroughly in harmony with those of the department when you wrote that letter?

Capt. LANING. Yes, and they still are, even at this time, Senator.

Senator TRAMMELL. That is all I have.

The CHAIRMAN. We will adjourn at this point until tomorrow morning.

(Thereupon, at 1 o'clock p. m., the subcommittee adjourned until to-morrow, Thursday, March 25, 1920, at 10 o'clock a. m.)

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NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

THURSDAY, MARCH 25, 1920.

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON NAVAL AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 o'clock a. m., in room 235, Senate Office Building, Senator Frederick Hale presiding.

Present, Senators Hale (chairman), Keyes, Pittman, and Trammell.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. Capt. Palmer, will you take the stand?

TESTIMONY OF CAPT. L. C. PALMER, UNITED STATES NAVY.

(The witness was sworn by the chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Capt. Palmer, will you state what official position you had during the war and what were the general responsibilities or duties of that position?

Capt. PALMER. I was Chief of the Bureau of Navigation of the Navy Department from approximately the latter part of August, 1916, just before the war, until the last day of October, 1918, when I was detached for duty with Admiral Rodman abroad.

The duties of the Bureau of Navigation apply generally to personnel, the recruiting, training, and enrollment of both officers and men, and the assignment of these officers and men to the various activities required by the Chief of Naval Operations. Under the bureau are the United States Naval Academy and the four great training stations at Norfolk, Newport, Great Lakes, and San Francisco, and various receiving ships and seaports, and the recruiting bureaus and offices which are scattered all over the country.

In addition, we have charge of the Hydrographic Office, which provides charts and sailing directions, and the Naval Observatory, which has to do with the nautical instruments and time system.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you state the condition of the personnel of the Navy at the time when you were assigned to the Bureau of Navigation, as to the sufficiency of the officers and enlisted men to man the ships then in the Navy, together with the requirements of shore duty?

Capt. PALMER. I do not believe I will be able to give it in actual figures, except what appeared in the printed reports at the time and the printed report of the present Chief of the Bureau of Navigation.

Just generally, when I came into the office there were approximately 2,100 regular line officers and about 51,000 men, with an addition of only 400 reserves.

There were about 9,000 militia, I should say, but they were not in service and did not get into the service until the war started. Of course, you remember that this was the basis; this was the little force

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from which we expanded to over 30,000 officers and half a million men. That is, it was a tenfold expansion. But we had only the 2,100 regular officers and approximately 51,000 men.

The CHAIRMAN. Was that the limit allowed by the law at that time?

Capt. PALMER. The law was just put into effect about the month that I came there, and the new law I will tell you about in a moment. This force here that I have mentioned, which took advantage of the opportunity to produce the very large force later on, was the force about which Sir Eric Geddes, of the British Admiralty, wrote, which was quoted here in Congress. I have taken it from the printed record. [Reading:]

The dauntless determination which the United States has displayed in creating the huge trained body of seamen out of landsmen is one of the most striking accomplishments of the war. Had it not been effectively done one would have thought it impossible, but words fail me to express our admiration of this feat undertaken and accomplished by your Navy Department, of which Mr. Daniels is the civil chief.

I knew, of course, from my duty at sea as chief of staff of the battleship force just before I was called to the department, that our Navy was short a very great number of officers and men, so that I got from the chief of navigation a list of the officers that he will probably need for mobilization, and I took that as the basis on which I would make the estimates for our needs.

The CHAIRMAN. That was when?

Capt. PALMER. That was as soon as I came into the bureau.

The CHAIRMAN. In 1916?

Capt. PALMER. In 1916, yes, sir; in the latter part of August. I drew up the mobilization estimate, for personnel, and sent this to all the flag officers and to the captains and to the chiefs of bureaus, so that they could criticise it and send it back to me and say whether those were the actual needs they required, or whether it would not give them enough; and that was the basis on which we made up our personnel assignments.

At that time, when that sheet was drawn up, and this dates back to before my annual report of October 10, 1916, that is before the war, and very shortly after I came in the bureau, we found that we were approximately 950 regular officers short and 1,600 to 1,700 reserve officers short, and about 28,000 regulars, I believe, short, and about 23,000 reserves short.

The CHAIRMAN. That was, short of the numbers allowed by the law?

Capt. PALMER. No, sir. Well, that was short of the number allowed by law. We had plenty allowed by law at that time; but that was short of the number which we required to man the vessels which the chief of naval operations said were necessary to be manned for mobilization; and we had this shortage after we made use of the 9,000 militia and after we made use of the 400 reserves that we had available. This was an actual shortage, and that shortage did not include a per cent for sickness and transfers, etc. I tried to base that shortage on just the actual ships and the shore stations that were required by the office of naval operations.

Now, this is shown in my hearings of December 5, and is also in a memorandum to the department on the subject, which stated this fully; but in my hearing of December 5——

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The CHAIRMAN. Of that year?

Capt. PALMER. Of 1916, just before the war; the hearings state that we were short at that time approximately 28,000 regulars and 23,000 reserves, after using 9,000 militia and 463 reserves.

Later the chief of naval operations gave us an additional list of vessels which would be required for war, and as those came I revised my list from time to time. I furnished the department with information on the above subject again on February 20, 1917, and on that date I was before the Senate committee on the subject of our urgent need of more officers in the Navy.

In that report I have stated the numbers that we were short for mobilization. And at that time the shortage of reserves on account of the number of ships that Operations wanted us to man for war was 39,000. They had modified their figures.

I also took advantage of that opportunity on February 20, in that memorandum to note that this number did not include any working surplus; that the additional estimates would be necessary to be considered because of the sudden impetus which war or mobilization would give to shipbuilding, which might result in the rapid construction of a great many submarines and destroyers, all of which required active enlisted men at the rate of 9,000 per 100 destroyers; and I outlined the several needs, adding up, roughly, 20,000 for certain definite things.

After that it was found that 96 men per destroyer was not sufficient for war needs, so that had to be modified. However, it was modified, making the shortage still greater.

This thing was generally based on the three-year building program which Congress had just put through. They gave this program, which showed that ships would be completed approximately in 1921; that is, the total would be completed then. So I sent to the Chief of the Bureau of Construction and Repair and asked him to give me the best information he could as to dates of completion of the vessels so that I could prepare the personnel beforehand, and could ask the department to ask Congress for the necessary people. The Chief of the Bureau of Construction and Repair sent me a list of estimated dates of completion, and he put a paragraph in there saying, "This is our estimated date, and things may arise which may change this from time to time"; but generally it showed that the three-year building program would be completed at the middle of 1921, and on that I made my basis of our personnel needs, because Congress had given us a continuing program then on which to work.

The CHAIRMAN. That was in 1917?

Capt. PALMER. This was started before that. In fact, it was the first thing that was started in the bureau, and in my first annual report, which was printed on the 10th of October, 1916, there was contained a statement that I had prepared this estimate sheet, and it stated on the first page that I estimated, for instance, that we would need 93,000 men plus 10 per cent, roughly something over 100,000 men to mobilize that immense force of the three-year building program plus approximately 43,000 reserves.

The CHAIRMAN. But that was before we had gone into the war?

Capt. PALMER. Yes.

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The CHAIRMAN. And the plan was not a war plan? It was simply a peace plan, providing for the increase that Congress had provided for.

Capt. PALMER. Yes. We really had no authority to go ahead with arranging anything on a war-plan basis. In fact, there was quite enough to do to get action on the peace plan work because of that large increase. Most of this data was presented to the department and submitted to the Congress in the recommendations to bring out particularly our necessity for more officers. We were away behind, and I wanted to get the course at the Naval Academy shortened to three years, simply to make up the number of people who would be required to make this material building program a real live one. For instance, one thing we had to start on was the recruiting service. The recruiting service had not been required to do any special work, because we had only a certain number allowed by Congress, and the machinery was not in operation. It was necessary to have it in operation, so that was one of the principal things that I had to undertake—to reorganize the recruiting service.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you tell me what provisions of law existed under which expansion of the regular personnel could have been accomplished by means of reserves?

Capt. PALMER. Yes. I can refer best——

The CHAIRMAN. Pardon me. Did you have something further to say on the other matter?

Capt. PALMER. No, sir. I can refer best to Admiral Washington's report of this year—he is the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation—in which report he has very ably laid out the things that were done by Congress to give us ample provision to provide personnel. The first step, of course, was the law that Congress put through, the act of August 29, 1916. That gave the authority for an increase of the enlisted personnel to a total of 68,000 enlisted men plus 6,000 for apprentice seamen. That is a total of 74,000 men. This further gave the President authority to increase this number of 68,000 to a total of 87,000, and we assumed that that would allow 6,000 apprentice seamen also, and that authority was equal to 93,000. That was to be given in case of emergency. And the President, when he was asked to do that, when the request was taken to him by the Secretary on the 5th of May, 1917, signed it immediately. The President signed the thing immediately as an emergency measure. There was also a reserve bill which was worded so that it was quite difficult to give it a definite, legal interpretation on many of the points, but it was also so worded that a favorable interpretation would permit you to do anything with it. It is one of the best things we have ever had. We could do anything we wanted in order to advance the interests of the war.

Senator TRAMMELL. What was the date of the passage of that?

Capt. PALMER. August 29, 1916.

Senator TRAMMELL. August 29?

Capt. PALMER. Yes. Now, the further things that were done: On May 22, 1917, Congress authorized a temporary increase from 87,000 to 150,000, and also an allowance for an additional 10,000 apprentice seamen.

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The next thing was on July 1, 1918, when Congress authorized a permanent increase to 137,485 men, including apprentices, and also gave a temporary force of 181,000 plus 24,000 apprentices, and increased the flying corps from 350 to 10,000. That latter was quite a jump. I must say that Congress was practically unanimous in giving us everything that the department asked for and for pushing the war to a successful conclusion.

The CHAIRMAN. The same was true just before war was declared, was it not? The large increase was provided?

Capt. PALMER. Yes. This dates back as long as I was in the bureau, which goes back to the latter part of August, just before the war. All that the Navy Department had to do was to ask and Congress gave things. Our naval committees in both the Senate and House showed the most hearty spirit of cooperation, and the whole attitude was plainly "Just show us how we can help you and we will do it."

I remember particularly in this Senate Naval Committee the two party leaders were assigned to the committee for naval work and to handle our war needs. There was the acting chairman, and later the chairman, Senator Swanson, and Senator Lodge. They impressed me that they were going around like two brothers. They could be found together most of the time, and they were all working to do everything they could for us. They let it be known that they could be reached at any time, day or night. Senator Swanson and Senator Lodge, who were charged with this thing, let it be known that they could be reached at any time, day or night, for anything so far as the department was concerned, and that was the attitude as to everything.

The CHAIRMAN. Also that prevailed before the declaration of war?

Capt. PALMER. Yes. In fact they were of the greatest help to me. Senator Swanson and Senator Lodge, who represented the committee at that time, were of the greatest help to me.

Of course in peace times a navy should have a sufficient number of regular officers and men to properly man all the vessels of the active fleet, together with a certain percentage for shore allowances, and then for the vessels in the reserve force we should have 50 per cent of active personnel and allow for the other half for reserve personnel. Of course it would be a great deal better for us to have all regulars to man all the ships, active and reserve, but it is a question of congressional appropriation, and if they cut down it is best to make some plans such as having 50 per cent of the personnel on the reserve ships to be composed of regulars and 50 per cent of reserves. Of course that is my opinion after going over the personnel situation during the war. Of course that was not the condition at the time war was declared, and the naval peace personnel was far short of the peace requirements. That is simply to man the vessels, which the Chief of Naval Operations told me had to be manned. That is just for peace time and the mobilization business.

The shortage of regular personnel at the declaration of war was, of course, the initial handicap of the Navy's activities, because the Navy had to begin at once and have our officers and men afloat. The main point is that lots of people can talk understandingly of number of ships and their money value, but a very much smaller number realize that ships are only effective when they are efficiently manned. There is no charge against people for not knowing that,

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because it is quite human to talk in material things, but when you are dealing with personnel and know what the needs are, that is the main point about it.

Personal requirements do not receive sufficient attention from my point of view. When a ship is authorized, of course the personnel should be authorized by Congress in sufficient time to have that personnel recruited and trained. Now, I have spoken of that in my annual reports, and I think people are generally in accord with that idea now. It was not originated by me, but I brought it out at several places in the printed report, that a proper procedure would be, if it is possible to authorize the necessary enlisted personnel approximately two years before the estimated date of completion of the ships, where that can be done. Of course, the estimated date of completion will change, but that two years was what I assumed was a reasonable allowance for the time taken to recruit and to train them.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, what recommendations did you make prior to the war and during the first few months of the war to prepare for the necessary personnel, with particular reference to the enlisted men; and also state whether the department did everything possible to assist the personnel bureau in these recommendations, or if it did not, in what particulars it opposed them.

Capt. PALMER. I do not know that I can——

The CHAIRMAN. What recommendations did you make personally about the enlisted men?

Capt. PALMER. I do not know that I can give that in detail. I have not all the papers on the subject. My recollection would cover a good many of the points, but I would not say that I could give them all.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you tell us in a general way?

Capt. PALMER. Let us see. Of course the first thing was to reorganize the bureau, to put that on a business basis that would produce the proper number of men and officers, that we were ordered to prepare. It did not take much time to organize the bureau.

The CHAIRMAN. This was done prior to the war and during the first few months?

Capt. PALMER. Yes; it did not take much time to prepare a few simple organization principles, and we carried out that organization during the war. I have stated it in my annual reports here. I first started the organization of the recruiting service, put it on a practical basis, so that we worked up from practically no enlistments, to 1,300 in January. We were gradually working up.

The CHAIRMAN. What was that date?

Capt. PALMER. Just roughly, in January. I have not any accurate dates on the subject.

The CHAIRMAN. Nineteen hundred and seventeen?

Capt. PALMER. Nineteen hundred and seventeen. Of course the war was not then an assured fact, and we did not have that inducement to make the young men come in. I think if they had known that war was really coming, they would have jumped in just as they did as soon as they found it out, but it did not start immediately. It took some time to work up the recruiting districts. You see the recruiting districts which were under my bureau were spread all

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over the country, and these had to be increased largely in number and in personnel. In the month of January the recruiting service, of course, got more than had been obtained in the whole year before, but that was simply due to the fact that they were not authorized to recruit any more in the year before. There was a certain limited number of men allowed by Congress.

The bureau itself was first organized to meet all those conditions. Now one point for instance in preparation. We got our Navy recruiting publicity bureau in New York speeded up, and they did wonderful work in enlisting and enrolling the assistance of the newspapers, and we got the newspapers and periodicals all over the country, through that bureau, to help us out and they gave us assistance unpaid. I should say we recruited about everybody in the country to help us, and they did come across. In fact, I do not know of anyone who did not help us, in the various activities of civil life. The churches got into it, the amusement houses, the business people, the artists, the clubs, in fact, everybody without distinction of class or profession, and we also reaped the benefits of the work that was being done by the officers and members of the Navy League all over the country who had been endeavoring to help us out on recruiting. That organization was not prominent at the time as far as coming to me about things was concerned, but we reaped the results of their work, and they were actively engaged in helping out the Navy. I know that they offered large cash sums to promote different works in the Navy. When we were before the House Naval Committee in order to get sites for places to build barracks, we were told that we could get a site somewhere on Long Isalnd. I think Mr. Hicks told us that, and we began to look into those sites, because we had no authority to expand the training station at Newport, which, of course, was the proper place to expand it. However, I think those people of the Navy League heard about our needs for barracks there and they offered to furnish the money and build all the barracks if we would get the land. That was not done, because I think Mr. Franklin Roosevelt about that time took up the subject with Newport, and we thought that we were going to get the ground there, which would have been very much better for us to expand from a place which we had than to establish a new overhead by going to a new place.

In common with a good many other people at this time I believed that the war was coming very soon, and so I speeded up all the activities that I could. I arranged, for instance, with the commander in chief of the Atlantic fleet, while his force was still in West India waters, to put five petty officers on each battleship in active training to be officers in case we should enter the war.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you remember when that was?

Capt. PALMER. No; it was several months before the war started when that was initiated.

The CHAIRMAN. So that several months before the war started you were very certain that war was coming?

Capt. PALMER. Yes. That is, I was certain as far as my belief was concerned, that war was coming.

The CHAIRMAN. That was your belief.

Capt. PALMER. Yes.

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The CHAIRMAN. Was that the belief generally in the department?

Capt. PALMER. That was the thing I was going on, in order to provide personnel, and that was the belief on which I acted when I came down here before the various committees on the propositions that we required to put through. In that particular case, that was just an incident to show that there were several steps taken to push this thing: and that was the first definite step toward making commissioned officers from enlisted men. We had not done that before, except through the ordinary course of events, but it was evident that we were so far behind in officers that we had better take some steps so I wrote to the commander in chief a confidential letter, because we could not state anything about getting into the war; but we knew we must have officers, and I wanted to start that and try it out, and all the officers in the fleet were anxious to advance every enlisted man who had ability. They have always been that way, and they thought they could put it over. So they put these men on watch, just took the officers off and put the enlisted men on watch, those who were capable, and they came across beautifully.

It was rather slow getting it started, but they had them trained, and Admiral Mayo reported that the thing was an entire success. Although that was started by the bureau then, that was not an original idea of mine, because officers had suggested that from time to time, and as far as that is concerned all the things that were done by the bureau during the war were really not original propositions. They had been suggested from time to time by officers who had been thinking about this.

Now, at that time I urged the listing of merchant ships under the American flag. This was along in December, I think, that I suggested that, so that we could enroll that personnel. That was a kind of personnel that we needed very much during the war, because we had nothing in the way of a merchant marine. We did not have sailors and navigators, as some of the other countries had.

The CHAIRMAN. This was in December, 1916?

Capt. PALMER. In December, 1916, before the war. We wanted to be able to employ those officers and such men of them as were capable.

Another important point about that was that we could enroll them, and if we had authority to enroll them, then we could start in teaching them and give them the necessary instruction as to naval ways, so that when war did start we would have that force prepared instead of having to do all the teaching afterward.

This matter of listing merchant ships was started. It was considered by naval operations to be most important, from our personal viewpoint, and I think we got them partially listed somewhere along in January or February. That was one of the steps of preparation.

Now, in the printed hearings before the Senate Naval Affairs Committee on February 20, 1917, quoting a memorandum that was given to the department at the time, it was shown that we would speed up on shipbuilding. All our work in the Bureau of Navigation was based on the estimate that we believed the war would last about three years. Of course, that was simply our own estimate, in order to go ahead with work. Actually, in coming down to the definite preparation of personnel we worked out a sheet which was good for a

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year in advance, from the knowledge we had of the things that ought to be undertaken, and from the orders we had from the Chief of Naval Operations. So that we knew at any time where we were going to get the personnel and how we were going to train it and where, at all the different schools, training stations, and colleges, and just how long it would probably take to deliver these men to the Navy, that is to follow out what the Chief of Naval Operations wanted us to do.

In all this work, as it continued during the war, every activity of Naval Operations whether afloat or ashore was carried out, certainly to the extent of numbers of officers and men. That is, we had the men and officers ready by the time the ships were ready to start; but, of course, that is not saying they were trained. They were trained as well as they could be in the time that had been given us.

Now, in this work of the war activities, whether afloat or ashore, the few regular officers that we had to start with in both the line and the staff, and the few regular men we had to start with, were responsible for the wonderful work that was accomplished afterward, because they expanded ten-fold, and while they were expanding and training other officers and men they were doing all these active things that were asked for by the department.

The CHAIRMAN. Captain, what I want to find out is whether you yourself made any recommendations to the department about preparing for the necessary personnel to be used in the Navy?

Capt. PALMER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. About enlisted men especially?

Capt. PALMER. Well, I wanted to get in the enlisted men.

The CHAIRMAN. Whether you made direct recommendations to the department?

Capt. PALMER. Oh, yes: I made direct recommendations to the department, based on the knowledge of our great shortage of regular personnel, simply for peace needs, at the beginning of the war. This, of course, was based on the instructions from the Chief of Naval Operations, and I urged the department to do everything in their power to assist the recruiting of regular enlisted men.

I should state generally that the department did this. The Secretary backed it up. He liked to see the members of the enlisted men coming in, and he spoke of it and wrote about it many times. He wanted to see the enlisted men come in. Of course, some of the things about getting them in were very difficult for us, because at that time, or before the war, the Secretary would not let us employ retired officers, and we were so far short of men that we needed officers at all those stations to be able to recruit the men, and without being able to employ officers and other men we could not recruit the men. That was the great difficulty; that is, the delay in getting the use of retired officers who were willing to come. I do not know just why it was that that was not allowed, but I know it was not allowed.

The CHAIRMAN. They delayed you in getting the necessary enlisted men?

Capt. PALMER. Yes. I will not say that that delayed us—that it delayed anything in the war though. It delayed us in getting men in order to fill out our schemes, and, of course, it had something to do with delaying the training of them.

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The CHAIRMAN. But, in general, the Secretary approved of the plan of the increasing of the enlisted men?

Capt. PALMER. He did.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, how about officers? Did you make any recommendations about increasing the officers?

Capt. PALMER. If I may finish on the subject of the enlisted men first——

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Capt. PALMER. As I understand it you want to know what steps I took, and whether I did my part of the job as well as I knew how?

The CHAIRMAN. No; we do not question that, Captain. You are not on trial. We simply want information about whether you were backed up by the department.

Senator TRAMMELL. I think what we want to get is the facts, all of them, not whether the facts reflect on anybody or commend anybody. We want commendatory facts if there are any, just as well as facts that reflect on anybody. That is the fair thing to do.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Capt. PALMER. I think I am open to as much criticism as anybody else on this, and if I did not do the things correctly, I think now is the time to bring it out.

The CHAIRMAN. But you yourself are not on trial in any way.

Senator TRAMMELL. The defendant is absent to-day.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not know that there is any defendant.

Capt. PALMER. It does not make any difference to me. I would just like to mention here that in all this business I am very keenly appreciative of the wonderful work that our naval officers and our regular enlisted men did, to buck against all the obstacles that we had, which, from my point of view, personally, were due to the original shortage of personnel. I have never had the opportunity to say before how keenly appreciative I am of the wonderful work that these officers and men did; but I want to say that in addition to the regular service people in line and staff, when we got hold of the reserves and militia and national naval volunteers and coast guard people, and the reserves of various classes, including the yeowomen, who helped us out so wonderfully during the early part of the war, they are deserving of just as much credit.

We got, during the war, of, course, a great many of the retired officers in. In fact, there were five retired rear admirals and five of the armed guard commanders who had been in my bureau for years and years, and they came across beautifully; and they not only were thoroughly loyal in the way they did things, but they had the ability, too. They showed up beautifully.

Now, I started schools, or rather I did not do it, but my training officers, Commander Overstreet and Lieut. Bennett at the time, were responsible for any good from those; they started schools in the training camps and in colleges and technical schools in every place all over the country; and these schools were added to from time to time as the additional requirements came in for those things. I make a reference to the scope of these schools by referring to about what they were, to show what the Navy was doing. They had schools for practically all trades, and that including courses for divers and electricians and radio men, carpenters, machinists, blacksmiths, cop-

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persmiths, shipwrights, painters, bakers, cooks, stewards, hospital corps men, fuel-oil men, winch men, camoufleurs, musicians, yoemen, gunners, coxswains, signalmen, steel and concrete construction men, enginemen, water tenders, firemen, quartermasters, helmsmen, gyro-compass men, optical mechanics, lookouts, armed-guard crews, submarine crews, motor-boat men, hydroplane crews, kite and free balloon specialists, mine-laying and mine-sweeping experts, paravane operators, torpedo men, hydrophone specialists, aviators, aviator mechanics of all classes, etc.

It just goes on for any operations we were called upon for. That was a part of the work of the bureau on that, and in addition to that we had hundreds of universities and technical schools and manufacturing establishments and hotels and civilian organizations, all very keen to help out themselves on this.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you make recommendations about these different schools?

Capt. PALMER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Were those recommendations followed out?

Capt. PALMER. At the training stations I gave instructions to the commandants about the schools, and they carried them out. They were indoctrinated with the bureau's idea of what was necessary for the war, and I really was able to keep hands off altogether. I delegated the authority to them, and they came up to the mark and delivered the goods.

As far as the other schools were concerned, where they were initiated at places outside of the training stations, at schools, we had a good deal of difficulty in getting them through. There was the question as to whether we needed the people. I think it was all due to the fact that the department could not see the need of getting hold of the men long before and training them. They did not appreciate that it took time to train people for engineering duties, and so forth; and there was the general attitude of "Well, we can postpone that"; but we could not postpone it. I know how long it took to take these people and train them, and we could not postpone it; and we really had a great deal of difficulty in getting the schools through.

The CHAIRMAN. When did you first take up the question of starting the schools?

Capt. PALMER. Well, we started schools of one kind and another before the war. We took up that question with the department and of course at that time war was not declared. But my opinion was that we were going in war; and there was another thing that moved me very strongly, and that was that the office of naval operations would say, "Well, we will probably have to do this, and that"; and that meant, for me, going far enough back to get the men recruited and trained in time so that I could deliver the goods when they were called for.

And another thing was that the general board had some paper which the Chief of Naval Operations sent to me, on which to base my work and prepare for work, and that paper said that the Bureau of Navigation should have the personnel ready within a week of the time that the operation was ordered. Of course you can not get the personnel within a week of the time, unless you have taken steps long before, and that was the point that I brought up to the department.

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This was before the war, and during the war this was a continuing thing. There was just lack of appreciation of how long it takes to train people, how long it takes to build the barracks, and get things started in order to carry out the instructions that came indirectly from the general board. To be prepared when the ships were prepared with the personnel, I had to start long before.

Senator KEYES. Capt. Palmer, who had that lack of appreciation?

Capt. PALMER. Mr. Daniels, the Secretary of the Navy, was the one with whom I was most closely associated on these things. That is my opinion of it. Mr. Daniels, as you know, wanted to have these things done, and I know that he was badly worried on it in the end. I could refer to his annual report and to his speeches, and so forth, as showing this, and I know that he was really delighted that these things were done; but it is my impression that he did not—he could not appreciate the needs as we saw them. I was charged with the personnel business, and I had studied the thing carefully; and not only I myself, but all my officers; and we were convinced that certain steps were necessary for preparation in order to be able to carry out the chief of naval operations' orders to provide men in time. Now, of course the chief of naval operations frequently said, "It is probable you will have to man so many ships of this kind, and you had better get the men for them." The important thing for me to know was when those men would be required; and in each case, operations required "We want them as soon as we can get them. We would like to have them now, or within a few weeks." Of course I knew we could not recruit men and train them and get barracks for them in a few weeks. So that, after one or two orders of that kind, and things that operations could not have foreseen the need of, I decided that it was up to me to be prepared for any operation they had, and to take the responsibility of going ahead and working this organization into a production plant, keeping it up to peak load all the time so that I would be prepared for anything that came across.

The CHAIRMAN. And you took matters in your own hands and went ahead?

Capt. PALMER. Yes; I did. I did not do that, however, until after I had exhausted every means to get the thing done. I think, though, the whole thing was due to procrastination.

The CHAIRMAN. On the part of the Secretary?

Capt. PALMER. Yes, sir. I was forced——

The CHAIRMAN. Did the Secretary give you any reasons for delaying the carrying out of the plan?

Capt. PALMER. Well, no reasons, of course, that appealed to me or appealed to our people that were charged with personnel; but he would say "We have too many reserves now. We don't want any more."

The CHAIRMAN. This was within two or three months immediately preceding the war?

Capt. PALMER. And after the war.

The CHAIRMAN. And after the war had begun?

Capt. PALMER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. He said that we had too many reserves?

Capt. PALMER. Yes, sir. That was due to a lack of appreciation of what was required in order to get the people together. On the one hand, I had the office of Naval Operations stating that things

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were to be done—were to be started—and I knew that if I did not have them on time I would not be doing what I was ordered to do. I was charged with seeing that the personnel was provided in time; and on the one hand I was pushed by Operations to get them, and on the other hand I could not make any headway with the department in getting the steps necessary to take in order to get them. For instance, take the subject of housing the men, and a good many other items; I simply got the statement, after many trials and presenting the thing in its most forcible manner, "We have no appropriation," and I think that was the correct statement. But still, Operations wanted me to do these things. They said, "We have got to have the men at that time;" and this meant getting ready months before, for each one of these things. So that when I came to that point and came to a stone wall on it, I decided it was best to go ahead and take steps necessary to deliver the men in the time, even if we did not have the appropriation or did not have the authority.

The CHAIRMAN. One minute, Captain.

Capt. PALMER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In regard to appropriations, you have already stated that Congress was ready to appropriate anything that the department asked for?

Capt. PALMER. Yes, sir. I know the members of this committee said, "We will do anything we can for you, any time," and I felt confident that Congress would do anything the department asked; and I also felt confident that if I took the responsibility of going over the—getting around the law, in order to get the appropriations in time—I had heard all the Senators and all the Representatives, and the statements of the people all over the country that they were going to fight the war to the limit; and so I thought they meant it, and believed they meant it, and I thought there was no reason for delay on an appropriation that would delay our works for months, and the best thing would be to go ahead with it, to take such steps as I could and go ahead with the thing.

So I arranged, for instance, with the captains of the training stations, particularly with the Great Lakes training station, and we came to the conclusion that the work could be done, and that we could get it done without having full authority of Congress at that time, and waiting; and by the time it could be presented to Congress by the department we might be along a couple of months on these training stations, and be just that much in advance, so that we would have some place to put the men, for instance, in cold weather.

I would like to say that the Congress did not come across that way. I was called before the Appropriations Committee and was asked why—they said that they had heard that barracks were actually being built out at Great Lakes and some other places, and they asked how they were built without any money, and I told them that it was my responsibility; that when I could not get authority to do it, when I could not get the department to take the authority on that point—and I do not question whether they should have taken it or not. There may have been things that kept them from taking it, but when they would not take it, I went ahead, with the assistance of the commandants at the stations. And you probably all have heard of

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the Great Lakes Station and the way it boomed ahead, but we never had even at that station enough quarters for the men in the time. But we were very much further on to the required number than we would have been had we delayed and waited on the appropriations.

Now, before that Appropriations Committee they mentioned the fact that I had, in a way, taken the law into my own hands; but they also were very pleasant about it, showing that they approved it, and they actually did approve all the expenditures.

The same thing happened before the House Naval Investigating Committee which investigated the war, I think some time in the latter part of 1917, and they note here in their report of investigations:

> At the commencement of the war our training stations could only accommodate about 6,000 seamen; but the Chief of Navigation early assumed the responsibility of increasing the housing room at the various stations, and we now have at the various training stations barracks for more than 50,000.

That is, they approved the action taken in advance.

That is about all I can remember for the time on the subject of enlisted personnel.

The CHAIRMAN. What about the enrollment of officers and men in the Reserve Force?

Capt. PALMER. As I said, that reserve law, you could do anything with it. The first thing was to get legal decisions on it. It took considerable time to do that. It was signed in the latter part of August, and it took a long time to do that; but it gave us authority to do anything we wanted, so that we got favorable decisions, one at a time, and started in enrolling. I sent some officers out to the Great Lakes district, for instance, to get hold of those officers and men who were seamen, and there were a few we had in the country, seamen, who were tied up on account of the ice in the Great Lakes, and we actually got them before the war and sent them down to Admiral Mayo's fleet, and had quite a number of them down there.

But in January there was something appeared in the papers stating that we now had over 1,000 reserves, and I am not sure where it was published; but, at any rate, it was brought to the Secretary's attention, and he said that he wanted the enrollment stopped. He said, "We have got enough men now. We have got enough men for a year." Of course, we told him what our needs were, and that we did not have enough men; that we were just on a peace basis, and we were short about 1,600 reserve officers and 39,000 reserve men and we ought to hump it along and enroll just as fast as we could and get these people in. He said, "No; I want it stopped."

The CHAIRMAN. Who said that he wanted it stopped?

Capt. PALMER. The Secretary.

The CHAIRMAN. He said that he wanted the enrollment stopped?

Capt. PALMER. Yes; and he gave the order that they should be stopped.

I would like to say that I had a talk with the Secretary just a few days ago, and the Secretary does not remember anything about that. He said, "I have no recollection of it." I told him some of the details that happened at the time. The Secretary asked me, "Can you produce the written order?" I told him that I could not; that it might be there. But he gave me the order directly, and told me he

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wanted them stopped, and that was the first time. I mean, he frequently told me to stop. The reason he frequently told me to stop was because we had to go ahead and get them.

The CHAIRMAN. That was the first time he told you, and that was when?

Capt. PALMER. The latter part of January.

The CHAIRMAN. 1917?

Capt. PALMER. Yes, sir. I do not remember the exact date, but I remember it was very strongly impressed on my mind, because our whole scheme of getting officers and men and training them for the war depended on whether we could get the people in early; and I frequently got the statement, as an argument, "Well, the ships are not ready yet; so, just wait until we get a little more information about them." But I knew they were going to be ready, and I knew that the day they were ready we could not get the people started; so that I did enroll them. I made exceptions——

The CHAIRMAN. That is, you did not stop the enrollments?

Capt. PALMER. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Later on, after the war had started, did the Secretary again order the enrollments stopped?

Capt. PALMER. Yes, sir; they were ordered stopped—oh, I should say three or four times. But in the meantime——

The CHAIRMAN. Up to about what time?

Capt. PALMER. Oh, I should say—this is just a general guess, but I should say—along about the latter part of 1917.

The CHAIRMAN. The latter part of 1917?

Capt. PALMER. Yes, sir; and it was done later, too; but, for instance, when I was ordered by the department to prepare, or when we were told we would have to prepare, for taking over all the merchant marine vessels, I knew that that would require more than six months' preparation before we would get anything of value; and later on we actually did get the order from them to man a sufficient number of vessels, and they called for 222,000 officers and men. That was one single order. And I had the machinery going so that we could deliver those men by the time the ships were ready, all of them. They would not be the best trained men in the world, but they were the best we could do, and that was possible because we went ahead with enrollments in time.

The CHAIRMAN. At the close of the war, of the 500,000 men, substantially, that we had in the Navy, how many were in the reserves?

Capt. PALMER. There were more men in the reserves than in the regular service. When I left the bureau, which was the last day of October, 1918, I think we had approximately 290,000 reserves.

The CHAIRMAN. Practically 3 to 2?

Capt. PALMER. Yes, sir; 290,000 reserves; and at that time we had approximately—well, we had over 30,000 reserve officers. Now, just that fact, that we got those people and that they kept on going, showed me that the department was really pleased that it was done after it was done. I know we were often called on to give the number of reserve officers and men, when the Secretary was to make a speech, and it was always a question in my mind whether the storm would not break after he found out that more men had been enrolled than he knew of the last time; but in pretty nearly every case the Secretary was pleased with the numbers. He was pleased with the fact

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that the barracks were built. He went out and inspected the Great Lakes, and he was delighted with the barracks, and I really believe that everything that was done along that line was done so that it redound to the department's credit. In fact, so far as the enrollment of reserves was concerned, and when it was ordered stopped at one time, I told Mr. Daniels, "Those people are going to save the day for the Navy. We can not afford to stop enrolling them." I said, "We started with an initial shortage, and this will get us out of a very difficult predicament." If we had been required, of course, to go into the war with a single enemy on the 6th of April, 1917, we would not have been able to take any of the officers and men from the ships which would be required to go into the area of operations and engage in actual battle. I could not have induced anybody to let me get them off the ships; and therefore it would have not been possible for us to do any of that training. I want to say that conditions were very favorable so far as the conditions of this particular war are concerned, and we ought not to make conclusions that because we won out on that proposition we could win out again if we had to go right out and fight.

The CHAIRMAN. Did the Secretary ever criticize you for not carrying out his orders; or did he ever talk to you about the fact that you had not done so??

Capt. PALMER. Well, the Secretary sent for me several times on the subject. In fact, I was in the Secretary's office at least a dozen times each day. This was all, generally, in regard to the details of assignment of a man or an officer, or something like that, that he wanted to ask about. He said, "I told you to stop the reserves, and it has not been done. Now, I want to see the order about stopping the reserves"; and he wanted them stopped. Pretty soon he would find out that some one was in some place, and he would ask me about it. I would say, "Mr. Secretary, we had to go ahead. We needed these people and those people." And I said, "We got the word from Operations and we simply had to go ahead." Well, the general thing was, "Well, don't get any more." That was the general idea.

The CHAIRMAN. If you had not done so, the Navy could not have performed the signal service during the war that it did perform?

Capt. PALMER. It could not have done anything, sir. It could not have done anything.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, Capt. Palmer, can you tell me anything about the plan to shorten the course at the Naval Academy?

Capt. PALMER. Well, yes, sir; I can. I was very much interested in that. It all comes back to the shortage at first. I took up the question of increasing the number of men there, and Congress was always willing to do that; and I took up the question of reducing the course from four years to three years for such a period as would be necessary to provide the necessary officers for the three-year building program. Even if we reduced the course to three years, the best we could do, as far as graduates of the Naval Academy was concerned, was to be in 1921 still shy about 500 officers.

Now various people had different opinions on that, and the idea of the Secretary was that the course should be increased. In fact, that was what he said time and again. He said, "My idea is that we should increase the course to five years." I was not in accord with

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him on that. I was in accord with keeping it at four years provided it could be done, and I think every officer felt that way about it, provided it could be done; but we were face to face with the conviction of a shortage of officers, which meant continued lack of efficiency in the field due to that shortage, and I think they all agreed that we should have it reduced to three years. At any rate I know that the Chief of Naval Operations said that he believed it, and the Superintendent of the Naval Academy, Admiral Eberle, believed it, and I felt it was so important that I talked with the Secretary time and again about it, but he said he did not believe it, he did not want it.

The CHAIRMAN. This was immediately preceding the war?

Capt. PALMER. That was when I first started in. This was to get officers for the three-year building program on a peace basis, in order to make the program a live one. I think I mentioned that in my first annual report of October 10, 1916. On page 4 of that report I said:

For this reason—

That is the great shortage of officers—

further action is now necessary by Congress to make the completed program a live one.

And I stressed in that and in the memorandum to the department the need for officers. That was really much more important than the need for men, because it takes so much more time to train an officer; and I stated that the output of the Naval Academy should be doubled for a limited period, returning to normal conditions when the shortage of officers had been made up.

I further stated:

As the definite recommendation in this report the bureau recommends that the appointments allowed each Senator and each Member of the House of Representatives be increased, that the course at the Naval Academy be reduced to three years until the shortage is made up, and that the present first class be graduated on April 1, 1917.

You see that was a measure that was necessary in my mind, and in the minds of the officers who were attached to the department at that time, in order to prepare for our three-year building program that Congress had given us. I said:

This step is of primary importance in order to properly meet the wishes of Congress to provide an efficient first arm of defense as expressed in the large program provided in the recent bill.

That was my statement in my regular annual report, October 10, 1916.

The Secretary was against that. He was against the reduction of the course. He was looking along the educator's line, which was quite right for him to do, and I was looking along the line of the needs of the Navy, and it was a question which was the right step.

I did not want the young officers from the academy to come out in a half-baked condition, so before I put this proposition up I got the superintendent of the Naval Academy to go over this thing, he being the chief educator, and I got him to tell me what he thought of it. He drew up a course and said that by modifying certain of the things and speeding up during certain parts of the year he could do it; and also, since the war was coming on, he felt perfectly confident that the increased incentive of war would make the midshipmen work hard enough to get away with a four-year course in three years, which was actually the case.

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In addition we had precedents in regard to that. Several classes had been graduated before their time, and I got a list of the officers, taken at random, who had been graduates of those classes, as an argument to show the Secretary that we still could get good officers when it was necessary to take a strenuous step and reduce the length of the course for any purpose, and that I regarded this time as very much more important than previous times. I got a list of those officers, and I had it ready for the Senate committee. There were five from each class for instance, taken at random, and the Secretary's aid happened to be one of them at the time, a very able officer, and the others were all about the same.

I took this thing up again in my hearings before the House Naval Committee on December 5, 1916, and again as appears in the printed hearings before the Senate committee on February 20, 1917. On February 20, the time of February 1, when I wanted these officers graduated, had already passed, and as the war clouds seemed to be approaching very much nearer, it was still more important to get them out, because we were so short of officers to start the war.

The CHAIRMAN. When was the length of the course finally reduced?

Capt. PALMER. The Secretary said that he did not agree with it, and he would never listen to it. I told him Admiral Benson was for it and Admiral Eberle, and that practically all the officers who had been talking on the subject were for it. He said, "Well, I am not for it," and he would not listen to further argument about the needs as far as the Navy was concerned. I think he was just wedded to the educational value of the four-years' course, and I think it was quite right for him to be so in ordinary times; but when I went before the Senate committee they put it in the bill, and when the Secretary saw it incorporated in the bill, he said that that was dead against his ideas, and that I should not have gone down to the Senate committee on that.

The CHAIRMAN. That was February 20?

Capt. PALMER. Yes. I told the Secretary that I had authority from him to go; that I had one not down without the authority, which he had given for the chiefs of bureaus to go before the committees and say what they thought was best for the Navy; that I had acted on that authority, and my responsibility in the case, as chief of the bureau only, was such that I ought to present it, and that therefore I did present it. He told me then that he was dead against it, and that he would try to knock it out, and I think it was altered in regard to the number of years that this should stand; but at any rate it gave us a start, and I knew that if we got it started, the break of the war would show that it was absolutely necessary to continue it, even if they had not thought so before. But Congress put it through, and later I remember the Secretary spoke about it in one of his speeches at the academy, or in his talk to the people, and said that these young men had come out and developed in a fine way by this intensive course of three years at the academy.

The CHAIRMAN. If the plan had been adopted in December instead of in February, would you not have had available a certain number of officers in the first part of the war?

Capt. PALMER. Well, no, sir, we would not have had any more officers available the first part of the war if it had been adopted in December, before the war, instead of in February, but we would

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have had the officers ready, and in training as actual officers afloat on the ships, which the Chief of Naval Operations said must be put in commission before the war, for mobilization. In fact, that was the reason of all our troubles just before the war, that we were not permitted to put in the mobilization plan. Now when I speak of the mobilization plan I do not mean the board matter of mobilizing the interests of the country and so forth, such as they had abroad, but I mean simply that thing that would get the ships together wherever the department wished to have them, wherever the Chief of Naval Operations wanted to have them, and put them on a war organization rather than on a peace organization. To do that meant a good many more officers, and for that reason I wanted to make use of the retired officers, to put them in places where active officers might be withdrawn and sent to sea. I wanted to get them from the War College, I wanted to get them from the post graduate course at the Naval Academy—the post graduate course, not the midshipman course—and I wanted to get that first Naval Academy class, because there were 170 men in it, and when you are very short 170 men go a long way. With those people we could have put the ships in condition as far as our allowance of personnel was concerned, and we would not have been required to shift officers and men from day to day, from one kind of ship to another kind of ship simply because we could not get on the war plan instead of the peace plan. Ships of the reserve force were required to be put in the active organization while active ships were being sent to yards for some purpose, and that meant taking the officers off the active ships.

The CHAIRMAN. Captain, what were your instructions from the department as to sending officers abroad for Admiral Sims's staff?

Capt. PALMER. Admiral Sims had gone abroad, as far as I knew, to get certain information and bring it back to the Navy Department, so they would know what plans to work on. That was my general idea. I do not know whether that was it or not, but at any rate he was under the Chief of Naval Operations and went over as a representative of that office.

The Chief of Naval Operations had told me that he would not have any people under him submitting direct requests for personnel to the bureau. Even some of his assistants and subordinates, when wanting to get a thing through, would say, "Now we must have this," and would come down and talk to us about it and say, "We want to get this officer or that officer." There were a great many requests, and in order to get them together Admiral Benson said, "I am going to issue an order to the people in my office to the effect that all requests for personnel must come through me." So all the requests for personnel from Admiral Sims were sent by cable and letter to Operations or to the department.

We in the bureau were called on by Operations to put 20 ships in commission, 40 trawlers, tugs, 100 Ford boats, merchant vessels, transports, etc., and there were hundreds of things, the armed guard, aviation, etc., and we provided the personnel as best we could for those operations. We did not get an order to send a definite number of people abroad to Admiral Sims, but I knew that he had asked for Capt. Pratt frequently, and I knew that from conversation with the people up in Operations. I heard later—I am not sure that it was not through some of the officers in Opera-

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tions, possibly through Capt. Pratt himself—he said, "We ought to get some people over there to Sims. Can't you do something for us?" Well, whenever such a request as that came in, we speeded it up and I got the detail officer, who was Capt. Laning, or Commander Baldridge, and asked them what they could do, and invariably they could get people if Operations were willing to give them up from some other activity. At any rate we went as far as we could toward giving them, but the request did not come to us from Admiral Sims, except later on in the war when he sent personal requests, and later in the war also Operations began to send down the carbon copies of those cablegrams. I do not think they were prepared to do that earlier in the war, because, as you may remember, we did not have any clerks and we were scattered all over the city in dozens of places, and I think it was probably very difficult for Operations to have that work just up to date. It got very much better when we supplied them with the yoewomen as clerks, and I think it was after that date that we used to get carbon copies of the cablegrams.

The CHAIRMAN. At substantially what date was that?

Capt. PALMER. I think it was somewhere along in the latter part of 1917, but we did not get any orders from Operations to send the people over, except when they definitely said, "We want such and such a person sent," and then we always sent him. I know that Admiral Sims asked by name for a good many people from Admiral Benson's office, but Admiral Benson felt that it was necessary to keep them there. I remember Admiral Sims later asked by name for an officer in my office, and I did not let him go. I thought it was best to keep him in my office, because he was in charge of an important work from my viewpoint—that is, the supplying of the personnel on the big expansion that was required. But later on this officer went over and the Chief of Naval Operations sent several of his officers over to Admiral Sims.

I am not very clear about any of the dates there, because I have not kept any files. When I left the bureau in October, 1918, I did not take any files with me. My recollection is that later on he got the officers that he required and also the enlisted men that he required.

As far as enlisted men were concerned, the department was not responsible for his not getting enlisted men. I was responsible for that. I did not know that he had not gotten the number of enlisted men until it was brought out here the other day, and I was told I would be questioned on that. We got the enlisted men to him as far as we could get them trained, with the kind of a start we had, and I do know that the reserve and enlisted men for the destroyers who went to Queenstown were sent as soon as they possibly could have been sent, with all the activities that the Chief of Naval Operations directed us to perform in putting ships in commission from day to day. With all those activities it required a great many enlisted men, so that they could not be gotten together and trained in time. All this had to do with things before the war, preparation, training stations, etc. But at any rate, when the enlisted men got over there I know that they did not have the barracks ready for the number we sent. However, that is so only——

The CHAIRMAN. But so far as it was concerned during the first months of the war, when Admiral Sims was calling for officers on the

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other side, so far as the Bureau of Navigation was concerned, if the Bureau of Operations had been willing to send them over, you could have provided the men?

Capt. PALMER. We could have provided them by taking them from other activities, provided Operations said, "You can do so." They were to decide which were the most important activities; and I think Operations at that time decided, "We can not afford to take these men from these places."

The CHAIRMAN. You say, however, there was one officer sent over?

Capt. PALMER. Yes; Lieut. Commander Daniels—now Commander Daniels. I noticed in reading Admiral Sims' statement, that he was sent there on April 30. Our detail officer in Operations came to us one day, and he said, "I was just up in Operations, and I saw a cablegram from Sims asking for Daniels, and I have already ordered him, and if Operations asks you about this, you can say he is already ordered and on his way." That was Commander Daniels. He was to be sent over as an aide, and he did go over with the destroyers. Of course, in a good many of those cases it was difficult to get space in vessels to send officers and men, but Commander Daniels did go there very early in the game. I think Admiral Sims's testimony shows that he received word on April 30 that Daniels had been sent; and then the detail officer also picked up an officer from the mine force, Davis, I think it was, a radio officer or communication officer; he picked him up out of the mine force at the same time, and they made use of him over there. I think they made use of him at Queenstown. An officer was free, for instance, temporarily; Commander Daniels was just temporarily free, and then we would hear something about that Sims had said that he wanted some officers, and we would take one of those that was available, without saying anything to anybody. If I had taken that up to Operations, they would have said, "Certainly; send him if you can." When the second batch of destroyers went over we sent five officers that they could use with the destroyers. As far as the personnel was concerned, we had, I think, about as fine a personnel as it was possible to have. They had the pick, when they went over there. They had five regular officers, and a trained crew. This number was greater than the number of regular officers that the British had in their destroyers, according to the statements that were brought back. In fact, we got word that the majority of the British destroyers had but two regular officers, at the most, and that the others were made up of reserves. So that my impression is that our personnel over there was as fine as it could be, and that we did not have a great fund of regular officers to put over as a reserve, for any of the activities, because we started initially with 2,100 total line officers, and they had to expand to ten times, so that you can see one officer had to fill the place of 10.

The CHAIRMAN. What instructions did you get from the department about not permitting enrollments or promotions on the other side?

Capt. PALMER. Well, there was an order for no enrollments on the other side, and I am generally in accord with that idea. That is, I did not think that we should go over there and take any one who happened to offer himself. The idea was that we here on this side had all the real personnel there was available, and we could send it over as soon as practicable, as soon as it had some training; but

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there were other considerations. The department took the stand right at first that we should not have any enrollments abroad, and I think that general stand was good. But then came the request for definite numbers of people. "We must have them for this and that, because we have not any regular officers right here." We kept getting those requests. I did not get those requests; they did not come to me until a good deal later, because all of the personnel business went to Operations, and I do not remember just whether Operations took that up or not, or whether they knew the department had laid down the general policy that there should be no enrollments abroad and took no steps along that line.

For instance, when they had the investigation as to what the department had done in regard to giving Admiral Sims the proper backing up in personnel abroad I was called before that committee, and they asked me if I knew that Sims did not have the personnel that he asked for. This was before the House Naval Investigating Committee in 1917, the latter part of the year. I told the committee there that I did not know about that, for all the orders about personnel came to Operations; but that I had received a letter from Admiral Sims shortly before that, saying that as far as he was concerned, the bureau was doing very satisfactory work. He did not mention his shortage to me; but of course it was quite proper for him to send his recommendations to his chief direct.

At that time I did not know that the department had sent a telegram to Admiral Sims asking him about what was the condition of his personnel, and I did not know that the reply came from him to the department. I did not know anything about that until I saw that in the hearings the other day. Although that was a personnel subject it did not come to me. Admiral Sims either wrote me or wrote to Capt. Pratt, and Capt. Pratt told me, or some armed guard told me, that he was just in the most urgent need for six decoding officers in his place at London. I am rather inclined to think that Capt. Pratt told me about it, but I am not sure, because he often mentioned the fact that we had better send so and so over to Sims, and in every case where we had the authority to do it we did it. At any rate, we had the order out about enrollments, and the Secretary did not want to enroll anybody abroad, and even in that case—so that later on another letter came over about it, and then I decided, as I told the Secretary a few days ago, that it was a necessity, and I gave an armed guard officer the necessary enrollment blanks not only for the 6 that Admiral Sims asked for, but for 12, because I thought maybe he might want to open it up a little bit more. But the general principle of enrollments abroad still existed, and I think the general principle was right; but I think it was also right that we should send over a few when he made that urgent appeal for the particular thing.

The CHAIRMAN. You did send over enrollment blanks, so that he could enroll them on the other side?

Capt. PALMER. They were enrolled.

The CHAIRMAN. And that was not under the orders of the Secretary of the Navy?

Capt. PALMER. No, sir. Now, about promotions abroad.

The CHAIRMAN. How about promotions abroad?

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Capt. PALMER. The promotions abroad the department is not responsible for. I am responsible for those—or the lack of promotions. I had charge of the personnel and I got requests from all officers in all these important operations that we had, in all parts of the world and of the country, and in each case they had most urgent need for officers and trained officers; all of them had that; so that I had to size up the situation and consider all the requests. And then each officer thought that the people closest to him were the best officers concerned, and I think they were, from each man's viewpoint. I thought I had the only officers in the Navy in my bureau, and I wanted to make them all admirals, and I think everybody felt that way about it, and the only reason they felt that way was because all officers were doing just wonderful work against odds. It was not any one-person-win-the-war business; it was the whole business working as a team.

About the reserve officers, the reserve law, as I have said, was a difficult thing to interpret, and things did not get along for a considerable length of time. We had no persons in the different districts to enroll these people; so that, for instance, their records giving the enlistments were months behind at the beginning of the war. We did not have officers there to do it. And the promotion business, of course, came up not immediately but later on, and I think we could have done better in promotions. I think that I could; that is, not "we." I think I could have done better in promotions if I had started in a little earlier, but I had a good many calls for a little more important things than promotions, and the promotions in classes 1, 2, and 3, which took in a great number of the men of the reserve forces, were approved by all concerned—both sides.

The only other classes were class 4, who were coast defense people, off-shore duty, really, and class 5, for flying officers.

As for the coast defense people, it was necessary for us to adopt at headquarters a plan for promotions and not allow any particular person or force in any place to establish a plan, and I think that is the proper thing to do now. I may be wrong, but I think headquarters should adopt that, so that all forces would get an equal chance, and promotions should not be made on various bases. I do not believe there is much comment about the fourth class either.

But about the flying corps, Admiral Sims made a recommendation of 16 officers. I think he mentioned at that time two of them who had injured German planes, and one of them who had done just as active service, but had not quite accomplished what he was intended to do, through no fault of his own, and I have forgotten why the others were. Some of them, I think, were for advancement so that they could be in a better administrative position. But all of those men were very young, and I did not get out a good plan of promotion for them until along in July, 1918. You will remember that a great many of them were not in the war very long at that time, and that promotion was really a secondary thing, from my viewpoint, at that time, and I felt that as we would get along towards the end of the war a great stress should be placed on that, so that we would give all those people their just dues before they left the service. I did work out a plan of promotion for class five officers, which were very young officers in aviation, and I only made it out because they were all very young, and it would give them something

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to look forward to. That plan was for more raipd promotion than came to any other class, but it was not in active operation early in the war nor in the middle of the war. It was only late in the war that that plan was in active operation.

And the principal thing, I think, Admiral Sims desired was to be able to give the men promotion on the field, as he spoke of. If a man does an heroic thing—brings down a plane or something of the kind—to give him promotion on the field. I admit that that is a good viewpoint, but mine was different, and the department was not responsible for this. I felt that knowing the conditions abroad and the number of heroic acts that were being done day after day, and the number of men that had brought down 5, 10, and 20 machines, actually to their credit, and were still either enlisted men or young officers, the principle of promotion for heroic deeds was not the proper one; that promotion to a higher grade should be for qualified services in that grade after comparison with other officers, and not for special heroic duties. We can find a great many men who are very heroic, but have no ability beyond that. So that I felt that if we promoted a man on the field for an act of heroism of that kind, we might have to promote him the next week for an act really as brave, and lots of the men were doing that week after week, and our total limit of promotions was to the rank of lieutenant commander. I thought that recognition should have been given by appropriate medals, or if the medals were not available, by letters of appreciation until such time as the medals could be given. So that, on that subject of promotion, the department is not responsible. I am responsible.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that Admiral Sims's testimony will show his officers had very low rank who were connected with his staff.

Capt. PALMER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. In order that they might have proper rank in dealing with——

Capt. PALMER. Foreigners.

The CHAIRMAN (continuing). Officers of similar positions of the Allies.

Capt. PALMER. Well, that was very much discussed at the time between officers in all services. Our limits, you see, were lieutenant commander, and during the first year of the war we were allowed only lieutenants in the reserve. Lieutenant commander was then given, a rank which would correspond to the most expert duties of a man along certain lines. I remember, for instance, it was given by Mr. Daniels to Mr. Vandyke, for instance—lieutenant commander. And then for administrative people all along. And Mr. Daniels gave it to Mr. Osborn, whom he had in charge of the naval prison, because he considered him the foremost in his line; and that was the idea of the lieutenant commander's rank—to give it to the leading men. As to the value of rank with the foreigners, it is really an important thing; but you could see that our officers—commanders, ensigns, and lieutenants—were conferring all the time with people like captains and admirals in foreign navies, and we could never hope to get up to anything like that, because the law of Congress would not permit it beyond lieutenants, and not until the last half of the war to lieutenant commanders. They had the same trouble here in the bureaus; but the ranks were apportioned in accordance with the ability of the people to carry out certain technical duties. That point was brought

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out when the bureaus came to the Secretary and asked for technical men of certain ranks in the bureaus. That was just before the war and in the early months of the war.

They said they were at their wits' end to get the proper people because they did not have any officers, and they could get very valuable men on the outside who were worth $10,000 or more, and get them to come into the Navy with the rank of lieutenant commander, which called for a pay, I think, of $3,000 a year plus allowances, and they could get in that way men that they could not possibly buy outside for from $7,000 a year up. In fact, I remember that one particular bureau, that of Construction and Repair, made an estimate of the men that they really needed of that kind in the early part of the war, in the first months of the war, and they showed that they needed approximately 70 or 80 high-class men at a total cost per year of $350,000, whom they could get just by giving them ranks of the grade of lieutenant commander at $3,000 and lieutenants at $2,400, etc. They showed that it would be a great saving. But the Secretary did not want to let them in. He said he did not want anybody but seagoing people to come in the department. Of course seagoing people could not do that business, and we did not have the seagoing people in the country. That was one bureau that submitted that request, and they also said that if the war kept on they would need a much greater expansion. Now, I do know that all the bureaus got together, time after time again, with the Secretary, and urged the great necessity for these technical men to give them a little rank, and therefore get them, because they knew that they were going to all sorts of other organizations, in the Army and other big organizations, everywhere, and that they would be lost to us unless we got our percentage at the time; but we never got them except in a few cases. I know, for instance, in the Bureau of Construction and Repair they wanted to have 70 or 80 of these high-class men, and they got only a few, later on, after a great delay.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, Captain, can you tell me what plan of operations was given you by the department, or by the Chief of Naval Operations, on which to base in logical manner your general future assignment of personnel to different forces?

Capt. PALMER. I did not quite understand the question.

The CHAIRMAN. What plan of operations, if any, was given to you by the department or the Chief of Naval Operations on which to base your assignments, your general future assignments, of personnel in a logical manner, to different forces?

Capt. PALMER. Oh, well, we had no plan. We had only a mobilization sheet which was a sheet stating the vessels which would be required for mobilization. That was gotten up by the Office of Naval Operations, but we had no definite plan on which to base future assignments. I could not go on the plan that we were going to go into a battleship warfare or a submarine warfare or anything of the kind. I could not look far enough ahead and specialize on those people both as regards numbers and duties; but I did receive from Operations from time to time—they said "We will have to take away 10 ships here probably within a month"; or the next day it might be, "We must have trawlers"; probably had to have 20 or 40 trawlers. And another time it would be, "We are going to undertake this mine force business now, and we want to have the

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vessels ready on a certain date." Of course the mine force is a very large organization, and the transport force was another that was a very large organization; the ships that we required to take over the Army, and later to bring the Army back. I must say they were a fine lot, too. The Navy takes off its hat to the Army on the kind of men they sent over there, and the way they looked and the way they acted. They were splendid. We had various calls of that kind from time to time, and in each case, when I would say, "When are these to be ready," they would say, "Oh, we want them now, or just as soon as you can possibly get them; in fact, in a month or two months." Just ordinarily the training of any people, enrolling them, and so forth, and getting barracks ready for them, nothing can be done in two months to speak of.

The CHAIRMAN. But was there any general plan in the department under which all the bureaus could cooperate together, and which was to be followed out throughout?

Capt. PALMER. Not that I know of, sir. Not in my bureau. We did not get anything of that kind. In fact, we had simply that thing from the general board which said that we should be prepared to furnish in a week after the order the personnel. Well, that was not any plan. I understood, though, that a plan was being prepared in Operations, and I went up and asked for it several times—that is, an estimate of the situation and what we were going to do, because it was very valuable for me to have such a plan so that I could place the personnel in a logical way, and endeavor to train them; but I was told that there was a plan in process; that they were getting one at that time. That was just before the war. And I heard again that it was being drawn up during the first months of the war. But I did not get that plan. I do not know whether it was actually gotten out or not; but I understand that the thing that affected personnel was some letter, which I think was mentioned in Capt. Laning's hearing yesterday, some letter about personnel which showed the priorities of ships in July or August; that is, which ships were to have the call for personnel; that is, whether they were to be battleships or destroyers.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you get any orders about priority of ships?

Capt. PALMER. Not until that time.

The CHAIRMAN. What time was that?

Capt. PALMER. I do not remember what date that was. It was July or August.

The CHAIRMAN. 1918?

Capt. PALMER. No, sir; 1917.

The CHAIRMAN. 1917?

Capt. PALMER. Yes, sir. But, of course, that was not the kind of plan we could go on in personnel. We had already established our own priorities. Since I found that there was not any plan such as I expected them to have; that is, I had been led to believe from the War College course up there—which I have not had the opportunity to take yet, but I had been led to believe—that each thing would generally have a plan drawn up for the particular situation which existed at the time, and say what you are to do, "Each force is to prepare this and prepare that," and so I thought there would be such a plan. But when I found that there was not, and we could not get a definite order of the kind, I went ahead and

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made my plan. To be sure, that is not a very good way to do, because I did not have the information which should have been had before you tried to work out any plan. I established my own priorities on vessels, but that really was a very small part of it. In fact, we established the priorities which the department got out in that letter, later on, of July and August. But I remember one particular point was, I wanted to know enough about the war to decide whether I could make use of personnel on battleships to train other personnel. Of course, we were short on personnel right at the start, and I asked Operations if they could give me any probable date before which our battleships would not be actively required in the war area for actual fighting, and I was told they could not. Then I asked, "Can you give me six months?" "No." Just in general, they did not feel justified in saying, "Well, you can go on the plan that they will not go in action for six months, or one month." There was the cry always to have the battleships ready for anything; and, of course, if they were to be ready for anything they could not, of course, take people off of them to train others; so that I worked out in my own bureau, with my own planning section in the bureau, a scheme for making use of the officers that we had, and in order to do that I had to establish some definite propositions, one of which was, I made the assumption that the battleships of the active fleet would not be required to take active part in the actual operations of the war zone within six months at least.

Of course that was a decision which was made without adequate information. It just happened that they were not called in that time; but I had to adopt something, so that I took that plan and then decided to take off 6 officers from the 36 or 34 out of the actual battleships, and then put them in to train other people for the enormous expansion in the other activities. In fact, the battleships were training people all the time. Every ship afloat was a training ship, including the destroyers afterwards on the other side. But this thing of taking 10 officers off of the battleships when they considered that they did not have enough officers, was a very important step, and I would not have been able to do it at all if I had not communicated with Admiral Mayo and gotten his cooperation. He took a remarkable view of the situation, and I think it shows just what type of man he is. I explained to him what I thought were the probable duties and the great expansion we needed for forces everywhere, and he would have been perfectly justified in saying, "Well I am in command of the battleships of the Atlantic Fleet, and we are short of personnel, and I am going to keep them"; and I believe if he had taken that stand I could not have gotten them. But he sized up the whole situation from a broad viewpoint, and he said, "I hate to do it, but I think it is not best for me, for my battleships, but it is best for the way we have got to win this war." So that, off came the officers, one at a time: and the captains rightfully objected. I think I would have made a great deal more objection than any one of them did; and they did object and persisted in their objections, but at the same time they went to the job. They said, "Well, it is an order, and we will deliver the goods"; and they did. Of course that was a step that I had to take on the assumption that

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we would not have them in the war for six months. If they had gone to war in two months, I mean if they had—not gone to war but had gone over on the other side and been put in battle in two months—my assumption would have been wrong and I would then have gotten what I deserved.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you do not know of any definite plan of procedure in the conduct of this particular war, worked out and given to you, on which your bureau could make complete preparations to proceed logically with the personnel?

Capt. PALMER. I do not.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all. Senator Keyes, have you any questions?

Senator KEYES. None.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Trammell?

Senator TRAMMELL. In January, 1917, Captain, was the regular Navy enlisted up to its full strength?

Capt. PALMER. No, sir.

Senator TRAMMELL. You were carrying on enlistments and making enrollments in the Regular Navy and also in the reserve, then?

Capt. PALMER. We were going ahead with enlistments just as fast as we could do it.

Senator TRAMMELL. Both in the Regular Navy and in the reserves?

Capt. PALMER. Up to the latter part of January we were doing it in the reserves, but in the latter part of January the Secretary stopped the enrollments. Up to that time—we had just gotten the reserve organization on its feet and were about to get things started, and were just beginning to deliver the goods then. But the regular enlisted men, we forged right ahead on them, right up to the time of the war.

Senator TRAMMELL. At the time the Secretary stopped the enlisting in the reserves, was the Regular Navy enlisted up to its full strength?

Capt. PALMER. No, sir; not by any means.

Senator TRAMMELL. It was not?

Capt. PALMER. No, sir.

Senator TRAMMELL. I believe you stated there was some difficulty in making enlistments up to the time that it was very apparent that we were very likely to go into war?

Capt. PALMER. Yes, sir; there was a good deal of difficulty in that. I remember the Secretary was very anxious about those enlistments at the time and so were the members of the House Naval Committee, before which I was called on that subject, and they offered all sorts of suggestions in order to aid enlistments. I had the organization going then, had divided the country into four districts with four inspectors in charge, and had the various people go into a very hearty campaign with the assistance of the organizations that I have told you of, and it took some time to get at the fathers and mothers of the boys that we wanted to get in and explain the thing. We went to the outlying districts to get them, and, in fact, we asked for little Ford automobiles to have in each recruiting station, so that we could get the boys we wanted most—that is, the country boys. We asked for an appropriation of $21,600, but by some accident that was approved, except the $21,600. That, however, I would say did not delay us.

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Senator TRAMMELL. You failed to get an appropriation?

Capt. PALMER. Yes.

Senator TRAMMELL. For the purpose of carrying on the enlistments?

Capt. PALMER. Yes. That did not delay us, though. We were going ahead with enlistments, and Mr. Daniels was very anxious we should go ahead. He would call me in sometimes and say, "Can we do anything more towards getting the enlisted men?" I always told him no, except to put retired officers in charge of the stations.

Senator TRAMMELL. Along about the time in January when he ordered the discontinuation of enlisting in the reserve, was he encouraging the idea of enlistments in the Regular Navy, or was he also against that?

Capt. PALMER. No, sir; he was not against enlistments in the Regular Navy. He was for it.

Senator TRAMMELL. He wanted all possible enlisted in the Regular Navy, and the Regular Navy was not enlisted up to its full strength at that time?

Capt. PALMER. No, sir. The idea was, of course, that the reserves would go in for the war period, as the other people would not come in except for four years, but the reserves would come in for the war period, and therefore we could get an enormous number of those if we would just try for them.

Senator TRAMMELL. After the draft law was enacted was there any question then about continuing or discontinuing enlistments in the reserves?

Capt. PALMER. After the law was passed?

Senator TRAMMELL. Yes; after the draft law was passed.

Capt. PALMER. When the draft law actually came into operation we had to do away with the reserves altogether then, but that was very much later in the war.

Senator TRAMMELL. Yes; that was some time later. It was my recollection that there was some conflict, possibly, and they felt that they had to shut them off in order to keep some of them from not going into the Army under the draft. They wanted to go into the reserves.

Capt. PALMER. Yes; we actually did shut them off then, but we did not want them to go in at that time.

Senator TRAMMELL. Yes.

Capt. PALMER. But by that time we had a very considerable number of reserves. We had gone ahead and enrolled them so that we would have the people along these special lines; so that we would have these various kinds and classes of people. It was very easy to get any kind of man and take him in from the draft, but we did not want men that were uneducated—not well educated but illiterate—put in charge of these important things at sea.

Senator TRAMMELL. You had charge of the personnel. Did you provide the necessary men for manning the ships and destroyers and for other duties as they were required?

Capt. PALMER. I had the personnel actually ready at the seaports to be put on vessels before the vessels were ready. We never had a delay of a vessel on account of not having the officers and men, but I will not say that they were very highly trained, because with a very short war such as we had and with the ordinary idea that it takes

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about two years to train a recruit so that he will an ordinary man-of-war's man, and 10 years to train officers, you can see that we did not have any more trained men than we had in the beginning.

Senator TRAMMELL. You provided them and they had at least sufficient training to meet the situation?

Capt. PALMER. To get the ships going. I do not mean that they would meet the situation in the most efficient way, by any means, but they were the best under the circumstances, with the amount of time given for training. They trained them intensively at all these places, and they did very fine work.

Senator TRAMMELL. The point I wanted to get at was, were they sufficiently trained and equipped to get the desired results?

Capt. PALMER. It would be pretty hard to tell, Senator. I know that in specific cases we had people—for instance, Admiral Sims said that a certain bunch he had on little yachts or trawlers, I have forgotten which, over on the French coast, were very inefficient; and I think he used the words, "Their inefficiency was deplorable." I have forgotten whether it was on yachts or trawlers; some small vessels. But, at any rate, I would not be sure that he was not correct in that. I do not know about the actual adjectives in the case, but I think there were a good many cases where there was a good deal of inefficiency among the organizations, that is, I mean among the individuals in organizations.

Senator TRAMMELL. As a matter of fact, would not that apply to people in the regular Navy? Would it not apply to some particular individual connected with any man's staff? Some particular individual connected with your bureau, for instance, might not measure up to the highest standard?

Capt. PALMER. I will agree with you on all except my bureau. [Laughter.]

Senator TRAMMELL. That is what I thought.

Capt. PALMER. Oh, yes——

Senator TRAMMELL. I did not mean to reflect on anybody, but human nature and the frailties of human nature and the accomplishments and achievements of human nature run throughout the Navy just as through any ordinary, everyday bunch of men; that is the point I am making.

Capt. PALMER. That is exactly right.

Senator TRAMMELL. But the broader point is, taking it as a whole, did not the men that you provided accomplish results?

Capt. PALMER. I should say that the results accomplished by the Navy were perfectly wonderful during this war. I would say that they were accomplished in spite of the obstacle of not having people to start with, and having a short time to train, and their newness in the war. I think the results were wonderful.

Senator TRAMMELL. That is my opinion. I would not pick out some isolated case of some fellow that made a failure, and cite it as the precedent for the Navy or for the reserve forces.

Capt. PALMER. No, sir.

Senator TRAMMELL. I would take it into consideration as a whole.

Capt. PALMER. I know what a fine showing our battleships, for instance, and our destroyers, made. In fact, all the comments we have seen in the papers and in books, bear that out; and Admiral

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Sims, for instance, speaks of the wonderful lot of men we had on our destroyers, and that they were ready for anything. Also Admiral Rodman says about his people in the battleship force in the North Sea; and I know we have occupied a very high position with the British Grand Fleet. I could mention also the mine forces; I could go on and name all the forces.

Senator TRAMMELL. I believe you stated you began to take measures looking to the enlargement of the Navy, and looking toward preparation of the Navy, very shortly after you went into the Bureau of Navigation office in 1916, did you not?

Capt. PALMER. Yes, sir; I undertook activities; I undertook to prepare. Yes, sir; I did.

Senator TRAMMEL. Was that restricted alone to the bureau with which you were connected or did that same activity go in the Bureau of Operations, or Operations, I believe you call it?

Capt. PALMER. Yes, sir. Senator, I do not want to put in anything about anything out of my own bailiwick. I could only give opinions so far as anything else is concerned. I know that Admiral Benson and his associates stated to me, "We know this is a big job so far as personnel is concerned because we have not any to start with, but we would like to help you." That was the attitude of Admiral Benson and all his officers, and I must say that they helped us, and if the Bureau of Navigation did any good work, it was because the Bureau of Operations helped.

Senator TRAMMEL. I presume in providing personnel and trying to equip the men to meet the situation, that you would not have been doing that if the Operations had not been making some preparation to provide additional craft for the utilization of those men. It would have been the merest folly to have been doing that?

Capt. PALMER. No, sir; I would not have made any preparation unless I had some data on which to go about the number of ships. They had a mobilization sheet on which I worked.

Senator TRAMMEL. They did have a mobilization sheet on which you worked?

Capt. PALMER. Yes, sir. That was providing for vessels that we then had, not with regard to my future operations of supplying men to the regular vessels in the Navy, the kinds that would be with them and say those would be with them in the mobilization. Of course we had the men ready so far as the mobilization was concerned when the vessels were ready. In fact some of our greatest troubles at the training stations were because we could not send men that we had away and put them on the ships on the mobilization dates, because the ships were not ready, a certain number of them, so we had the training stations congested and that meant there was difficulty in handling those men and getting them properly housed.

Senator TRAMMELL. It is very evident from your testimony that you had sufficient information on which to equip as best you could in the short length of time a sufficient number of men to meet the requirements upon different vessels and in other different places where personnel was required, at the time that it was required?

Capt. PALMER. Yes.

Senator TRAMMELL. You had sufficient information to do that because you did that.

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Capt. PALMER. I had sufficient information, not in regard to the details of them, but I went on and worked the Navy to the full; getting all officers and all men of all kinds as soon as I could.

Senator TRAMMELL. Now, there has been more or less said about the question of the general plan. What if a general plan for entering the war and carrying out the conduct of the war so far as we were concerned had been made in January, 1916? Would the subsequent developments during the war have justified the carrying out of that plan in detail?

Capt. PALMER. I should say that any plan of the kind would have had to be modified here and there, but I should say also that a plan might have been made looking toward, for instance what the character of the war was from the information that could have been accumulated from the two previous years that the foreign countries were at war.

Senator TRAMMELL. Do you not think that those things were taken into consideration in the manner of making preparation in the way of ships and different equipment and also in the question of mobilizing the personnel? Do you not think that that had something to do with it?

Capt. PALMER. That plan that they had?

Senator TRAMMELL. That was an element of consideration?

Capt. PALMER. Well, I should think so; but, of course I did not get the benefit of any of that because my instructions from operations were from day to day, "We think we are going to do this," and the next day or the next week, "We have to shift from this to that." For instance, they would say, "Here, we want so many regular officers, aviators on these ships, or we want armed guards, and we want to provide for two of the new ships, and for the armed guards crews on them," and the next time would be the establishment of a patrol force, and really nothing I could go on as to picking up the kind of men or doing anything——

Senator TRAMMELL. Do you not think that the developments as they were developing rapidly day by day would have a great deal to do with it?

Capt. PALMER. Very much.

Senator TRAMMELL. You spoke of the armed guards. It was not until February that Germany declared that there was going to be an unrestricted submarine campaign.

Capt. PALMER. That could not have been foreseen.

Senator TRAMMELL. That could not have been foreseen, and no definite policy could have been formed, when the Germans did not adopt the unrestricted submarine policy until February.

Capt. PALMER. The necessity for armed guards came out of a clear sky.

Senator TRAMMELL. The submarine menace did not reach its height until July, 1917.

The CHAIRMAN. April.

Senator TRAMMELL. It did not reach its height until July, 1917, according to the chart filed by Admiral Sims.

The CHAIRMAN. There were 800,000 tons of shipping sunk in April, which was the highest number.

Senator TRAMMELL. But its height was not reached until July. There might have been a greater number at some previous time, but

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the number did not begin to fall off until after July 1. I am going by the chart filed by Admiral Sims. I do not know whether it is correct or not. I presume that it is reasonably so. So a general plan that might have been made in December, 1916, or January, 1917, might have proved totally inadequate to have met the situation as it developed?

Capt. PALMER. It might.

Senator TRAMMELL. Was there such delay on the part of the Navy in performing its part of the war after we entered the war as to prolong the war for any great length of time, in your opinion?

Capt. PALMER. Well, it would be just an opinion. I do not know how much it prolonged the war. I should say—I can give an opinion only as far as my personnel is concerned, I mean that it would be the only thing I am qualified to talk on—I should say that all those delays we had were simply due to postponement—well, I guess "procrastination" would be the word—and when I found things could not be done after taking every step I could, I went ahead and provided a personnel so we did not really have many delays, as far as personnel was concerned, on winning the war, on the total thing. I would not say that we had a week's delay or a month's delay as far as the Bureau of Navigation was concerned. But I do not know about the general plan.

Senator TRAMMELL. I believe you stated that you did begin preparations in 1916 to enlarge and increase the efficiency and strength of the Navy?

Capt. PALMER. Yes, sir.

Senator TRAMMELL. Congress passed a law in August, 1916, providing for a considerable increase, did it not?

Capt. PALMER. August 29 they passed a splendid bill, a slpendid act.

Senator TRAMMELL. Do you know whether or not the Secretary of the Navy was in sympathy with that measure?

Capt. PALMER. I think he was fully in sympathy with that measure. It is my impression. I would not like to speak for him, but I think he was fully in sympathy with it.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is all, Capt. Palmer. You may be excused.

(Thereupon at 12.45 o'clock p. m. the subcommittee adjourned until to-morrow, Friday, March 26, at 10 o'clock a. m.)

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NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

FRIDAY, MARCH 26, 1920.

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON NAVAL AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 o'clock a.m. in Room 235, Senate Office Building, Senator Frederick Hale presiding.

Present: Senators Hale (chairman), Keyes, and Trammell.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. Capt. Taussig, will you take the stand?

TESTIMONY OF CAPT. J. K. TAUSSIG, UNITED STATES NAVY.

(The witness was sworn by the chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Capt. Taussig, can you give the committee any information as to the steps that were taken by the Navy Department in preparing and conducting activities in the recent war, and especially with regard to the personnel of the Navy and the destroyer situation, and will you please state what duties you performed from the beginning of the World War in 1914 up to the present time, showing your facilities for observation, and stating in your own way your observations of any matters pertinent to this investigation?

Capt. TAUSSIG. I will, sir. I have a prepared statement which, with the permission of the committee, I will present.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Capt. TAUSSIG. The following duty was performed by me just prior to and during the World War:

1. Assistant to officer in charge of enlisted personnel, Bureau of Navigation, Navy Department, from April, 1912, to May, 1915, a period of three years.

2. On duty in connection with and commanding U. S. S. *Wadsworth* from July, 1915, to November, 1917, a period of two and one-half years, of which eight months was after the United States declared war.

3. On duty in connection with and commanding the U. S. S. *Little*, a destroyer, from January, 1918, to August, 1918; eight months during the war.

4. In charge of Enlisted Personnel Division, Bureau of Navigation, Navy Department, from September, 1918, to May, 1919, a period of nine months.

On account of the length of time necessary to educate officers and to recruit and train enlisted men in times of peace, it will be necessary in showing to the committee the state of the naval personnel when this country entered the Great War, and the reasons for its condition at that time, to begin as far back as 1914, when the European conflict began, and when it became practically certain that this country would sooner or later become involved. Unless measures had been taken as early as 1914 to place our personnel on a proper and adequate

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basis it could not possibly have been done by the time this country declared war, two and a half years later.

It is proposed to show to the committee that, first, from 1914 on, the policy of the department in regard to personnel—and especially the enlisted force—was such that the Navy was far from being ready for war when we became a belligerent; and, second, the result of this unpreparedness on the efficiency of the fleet and especially the destroyers, two of which I commanded during the war.

In 1914, while on duty in the Bureau of Navigation, it was evident, and clearly recognized by the officer in charge of enlisted personnel and myself, his assistant, that the enlisted personnel was entirely inadequate for the proper manning of our already completed ships on a peace basis, and dangerously deficient should we be suddenly thrown into war.

These facts were repeatedly brought to the attention of the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation by Capt. Blakely and myself, and a memorandum prepared showing that to man the ships and stations, even in accordance with the inadequate "peace" complements, the authorized enlisted strength of the Navy was more than 18,000 men short of what was needed.

The inadequacy of the personnel made it impossible to assign proper complements to the ships of the fleet. Not only was it impossible to assign sufficient complements to the ships, but the fact that there was no reserve to call on made it impossible to keep the inadequate assigned complements filled. In fact, if the ships were manned in accordance with the recommendations of the general board and the commander in chief of the Atlantic fleet, the authorized numerical strength of the Navy was such that there would be no naval personnel for about 225 ships carried on the Navy list, and none for any of the shore stations or under training. As, in 1914, the Navy was recruited to the full strength authorized by law, and as new construction was being completed for which additional personnel was needed, the unsatisfactory conditions in regard to personnel were continually growing worse.

One of the worst features caused by the inadequacy of the personnel was the lack of permanency of officers and men on all the ships of the fleet. There were, of necessity, so many and so frequent changes in personnel that the efficiency of all ships was seriously impaired. I will shortly quote from official reports to show that these unsatisfactory conditions actually existed, and continued to exist up to the time that the United States entered the war.

The general board of the Navy, in its 1914 annual report to the Secretary of the Navy recognized that the unsatisfactory personnel conditions greatly impaired the efficiency of the fleet, and made recommendation to the department that an additional 19,600 enlisted men be immediately requested. The Secretary of the Navy did not accept the report of the board with this recommendation, but returned the report to the board, with the request that all mention of a numerical increase be eliminated. This, the board did in order that the other important features of the report be not lost to the public.

I suggest that the facts in regard to that had better be obtained from Admiral Fiske, who was on the general board, and the aid of Operations at the time, if he is to appear as a witness before the committee.

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The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Capt. TAUSSIG. The report, in its changed form, was published in the appendix to the annual report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1914, and that part relating to personnel, follows:

39. The general board can not too strongly urge upon the department the necessity of using its best endeavors to carry out the repeated recommendations of the general board, made from year to year, to provide the fleet with a personnel, active list and trained reserve, equal to the manning of the fleet for war.

40. In the opinion of the general board this is a matter of even more serious import than that of construction, for it can not be too often repeated that ships without a trained personnel to man and fight them are useless for the purposes of war. The training needed for the purpose is long and arduous, and can not be done after the outbreak of war. This must have been provided for long previous to the beginning of hostilities; and any ship of the fleet found at the outbreak of war without provision having been made for its manning by officers and men trained for service can be counted as only a useless mass of steel whose existence leads only to a false sense of security.

41. The strength of the fleet is measured too often in the public mind by the number and tonnage of its material units. The real strength of a fleet is a combination of its personnel—with their skill and training—and its material; and of these two elements the more important—the personnel—is too often forgotten and neglected in making provision for our fleet. The general board can not impress this point too strongly on the department and recommend too earnestly that every effort be made to correct it, and that legislation be urged to provide for a personnel on the active list, supplemented by a trained reserve sufficient to man every vessel of the fleet when the call comes.

42. No nation in time of peace keeps all the ships of its navy fully manned and in full commission. But all leading nations except ourselves provide an active list, officers and men sufficient to keep the best of their fleet in full commission, and all the serviceable ships of their fleet in a material condition for war; and in addition a trained reserve of officers and men sufficient to complete the complements and fully man every serviceable ship of their navies, and furnish a reserve for casualties. Thus every nation with which conflict is possible is prepared to mobilize its entire navy, by order, with officers and men trained for service. We alone of the naval powers provide no such reserve, and an active personnel too scant, and trust to the filling of the complements of our ships by untrained men recruited after war is imminent or delcared. To quickly man all of the ships of the Navy serviceable for war (including ships which are now in reserve or ordinary) with trained crews is impossible owing to the absence of a trained reserve.

43. In view of all that has been herein set forth, the general board recommends:

(*a*) That legislation be asked for providing an active personnel, officers and enlisted force, capable of keeping in full commission all battleships under 15 years of age from date of authorization, all destroyers and submarines under 12 years of age from authorization, half of the cruisers and all gunboats, and all the necessary auxiliaries that go with the active fleet; and of furnishing nucleus crews for all ships in the Navy that would be used in time of war, and the necessary men for the training and other shore stations.

(*b*) That the general policy be adopted of expanding the active personnel with the expansion of the fleet in the proportion indicated in (*a*).

(*c*) That immediate steps be taken to form a national naval reserve of trained officers and men, and that this work be pushed until this reserve, in connection with the Naval Militia, has reached the point where, combined with the active list, it will be possible to fully man the entire fleet with war complements and furnish 10 per cent additional for casualties.

(*d*) That the Naval Militia be expanded in number and that the department encourage the continuation and improvement of its training to the end that it may still more efficiently serve to reinforce the regular service at need.

GEORGE DEWEY.

This report in itself shows that the Navy was in a very unsatisfactory state so far as personnel was concerned.

In referring to paragraph 43 (*a*) of the just quoted report of the General Board, which paragraph is the one from which the recommendation for an immediate increase of 19,600 men had been removed, the Secretary stated in his annual report, dated December 1, 1914:

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By wisely utilizing the present personnel all ships of the classes named can be maintained in full commission without addition to the present enlistment and therefore no legislation is needed to carry out their recommendations. This is clearly shown in a report by the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, which is printed in the Appendix on page 64.

The figures submitted by the chief of the bureau in this report did not allow for adequate complements for the ships mentioned in the General Board's report, and did not provide for nucleus crews of the other 225 ships of the Navy required manned by the General Board. As the officer in the Bureau of Navigation who actually worked out the details of the enlisted personnel to ships and stations, and as I personally prepared the orders for such details, I know that the personnel as it existed at that time could not be utilized so as to maintain ships as recommended by the General Board.

The General Board had found that in order to carry out its recommendations an immediate increase of 19,600 men of the active Navy was needed.

We in the enlisted personnel division of the Bureau of Navigation who were charged with the administration of the personnel found that the immediate increase should be approximately 19,000 men.

The Secretary requested no additions for the active enlisted force. Consequently, the unsatisfactory personnel situation continued.

While in the Bureau of Navigation, and immediately after leaving the bureau in 1915, I made an exhaustive study of the whole Navy personnel situation. The official records were at my disposal, and I had an experience of three years in the administration of the enlisted personnel force of the entire Navy. This study resulted in my writing in 1915 a paper on the subject of "Naval Personnel."

It was shown in this paper among other things:

1. That the allowed complements of the Navy ships in commission were "peace" complements and were from 15 to 30 per cent less than would be required in time of war.

2. That, in spite of the inadequacy of the peace complements, the ships did not even have these allowed peace numbers on board—the battleships in full commission having an average of 100 vacancies per ship in the enlisted force.

3. That there were 42 ships with only three-tenths of their peace complements on board, 16 ships with only one-tenth of their peace complements on board, 38 ships out of commission with no naval personnel on board. No personnel was available to fill these up.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you a copy of this paper with you?

Capt. TAUSSIG. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to have a copy of it inserted in the record.

Capt. TAUSSIG. I have here the only copy extant, one of the orignal copies; but the committee is welcome to have it.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to have it put in the record. That was an official paper?

Capt. TAUSSIG. No, sir; this paper that I am talking about was not an official paper. It is a study that I made.

The CHAIRMAN. Was it presented to the department?

Capt. TAUSSIG. I mention that later, here. If you will just let me finish this point, then I will bring out just that point about it, which shows its status.

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The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Capt. TAUSSIG. The next point is:

4. That there were in the Navy in 1915 a total of 1,920 commissioned line officers and 53,000 enlisted men.

5. That to put what material we had (plus 75 auxiliaries to be immediately purchased) in operation for war there would immediately be required a total of 4,440 line officers and 106,900 enlisted men, which was 2,520 line officers and 53,900 more men than we had in actual service.

6. That the staff corps were correspondingly weak.

7. That after impressing into service all our available organized and unorganized reserves, including the Naval Militia, we would still be short of immediate requirements 1,088 line officers and 29,000 enlisted men.

8. That much additional personnel would be required as the war progressed.

9. That the Naval Reserve Force consisted of only 150 men.

10. That it took considerable time to educate officers and to recruit and train enlisted personnel.

This paper on naval personnel was submitted to and accepted by the Naval Institute for publication. It received "first honorable mention" in the prize essay competition for that year.

In accordance with Navy regulations, the department's authority for publication was requested. The Navy Department refused authority for its publication without giving reasons, and as a result it has never been printed. That answers the question you asked me.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; that answers my question. I would like to have this paper inserted in the record.

(The document referred to is here printed in full in the record as follows:)

NAVAL PERSONNEL.

Motto: "Historically, good men with poor ships are better than poor men with good ships."

INTRODUCTORY.

The Government of the United States has so neglected the opportunities for placing the country on a proper defensive basis, we are, to-day, in a position which, in the event of war with a first-class power, would be precarious. Our enemy would have sufficient initial advantage to deal us a staggering blow from which our recovery would be slow, and very difficult at the best. While recent events abroad have forced our people to a realization of the country's unpreparedness, there appears to be a general impression that this condition of affairs applies mainly to the inadequacy of the Army personnel, and to the insufficient number of Navy ships. The true situation in regard to the personnel of the Navy has been overlooked. It is evident that the people of this country do not appreciate the necessity for an adequate and efficient naval personnel.

The object of this paper is to discuss only that phase of unpreparedness which relates to the personnel of the Navy. It is realized that all the intricate questions involved can not be thoroughly elucidated, and some can not even be touched on; but it is hoped that by stating the facts, and by making a few observations and suggestions, a better understanding as to what we have, what we need, and what we probably can obtain, will be imparted to those who need enlightenment, and to those who seek it.

That we have an insufficient number of ships, and that those we have are not in the proper proportion as to classes, has, through the medium of the European conflict, become apparent to all. That we have not sufficient personnel to man our insufficient number of ships, and that such personnel as we have are not in the proper proportions as to corps and grades, seems to interest comparatively few. Not only is our personnel

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inadequate for manning the ships now on the Navy list, but no provisions have been made for supplying the necessary personnel for the vessels under construction, and those recently authorized. The country, through the press, is crying for more ships. The country apparently does not care whether or not the ships are officered and manned. This is certainly a most peculiar state of affairs. That it exists must be due to the fact that the people do not understand the true situation. They do not know the facts. The reason for this ignorance is their lack of interest in personnel matters. To them the ships are everything. They see a division or squadron of ships steam majestically by. Each vessel has the Stars and Stripes displayed at the peak. The onlookers pride themselves on being Americans, and say to one another, "We can lick anything afloat." It is the valor of ignorance. It never occurs to them that these ships have on board only about three-quarters of the personnel necessary to man them properly; that, owing to this lack of personnel, they are not prepared to "lick anything afloat."

This lack of knowledge concerning naval personnel applies not only to the people at large, but also to their Representatives in Congress, and (what is most unfortunate) to the Navy itself. We can rest assured that there is no such lack of knowledge among the naval attachés of the various foreign embassies in Washington.

That the Navy, as a whole, does not appreciate the true situation and does not know the facts, is shown by the conflicting testimony given by those high in authority before the House Naval Committee during the consideration of the last appropriation bill. It was held by some that there was sufficient personnel for all immediate needs. It was held by others that we were short of requirements many hundreds of officers and 18,000 enlisted men. In view of such conflicting opinions, it is not to be wondered at that Congress failed to pass any personnel legislation. So our lack of policy of continuing the building of ships, without making provision for the necessary personnel, remains with us year after year with our present weak personnel as a result. It is hoped that the fallacy of this inane procedure will be realized before it is too late; that the country will awake to a realization of the fact that an unmanned ship is worse than no ship at all, as it requires protection instead of giving it; that a partially manned ship is more or less of a menace in that it would be called on to accomplish what is required of a fully manned ship, with probably disastrous results.

The quality of the personnel has steadily improved. The quantity of the personnel has spasmodically increased until to-day it is numerically greater than ever before. But while this numerical increase has been developing, the material has also increased and at a much more rapid rate than the personnel. Consequently we find ourselves with less personnel in proportion to our material than at any previous time. Even if it were true that "man for man we are as good as other navies," this condition would avail us little if, in case of war, the average must be lowered by the introduction of a large untrained element. Such a contingency confronts us at present. It behooves us to remedy this condition as soon as practicable. It is not sufficient that only in peace times our personnel be as efficient as that of any possible enemy. It is essential that the personnel be in a status where there is every reason to believe we would be as efficient as, or more efficient than, any possible enemy with whom we might be drawn into a war. That our personnel is not on this basis is unfortunately true. In fact the greatest need of our Navy to-day is an adequate and efficient personnel.

Practically all of our personnel legislation has been done piecemeal. The nonexistence of a general staff has resulted in the absence of a progressive program. In appropriating for ships, provision is made for armor, armament, and equipment. Sometimes necessary ammunition is authorized. Never is provision made for manning the ships when completed. This procedure continues year after year until the personnel becomes so inadequate it is imperative that something be done. Then, and not until then, a rider is attached to an appropriation bill providing for a limited increase in the number of men, or relieving some intolerable condition among the officers. The provision for men is always inadequate, as the fact that it takes time to recruit and train men for service on board ship is repeatedly overlooked. As a result, when the additional quota has been recruited and passed through the training courses, we find, owing to the completion of new vessels and the authorization of others, the same unsatisfactory conditions prevailing as existed a few years previously when the additional men were authorized. The relief for unsatisfactory conditions among the officers has usually been temporary in character, as almost without exception, such relief to the officers of one corps or grade, has, in the course of a few years, resulted in an intolerable situation in some other corps or grade. Naval officers must be held partly responsible for this unsatisfactory legislation. They have differed so widely in their opinions as to what is necessary and what is best, that Congress has had great difficulty in ascertaining the true state of affairs. But practically all officers

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have realized the necessity for a general staff and have advocated legislation for the creating of such a body. Consequently in so far as the lack of such a staff has effected our unsatisfactory personnel condition, it seems equitable that Congress should be held to blame. There is no doubt that had Congress authorized a general staff on which all corps are properly represented, such a staff would have welded together the various and diversified opinions as to what is desirable, with the result that a bill having the confidence of the Navy, the Navy Department, and the Congress would have been presented and enacted into law. We would not then have had the extremely unsatisfactory personnel conditions that now exist. There appear to be no immediate indications of the authorization for a general staff, in view of which there is not much prospect of satisfactory personnel legislation. However, if we could produce a champion among our officers high in rank, who is willing to take up the cudgel and fight for the desirable and necessary reforms, there would be an excellent chance of his obtaining satisfactory results. The Navy has, on several occasions, produced officers who through their ability, zeal, magnetism, and force of character, have, by their sheer persistency, succeeded in getting for the service many reforms that were otherwise unobtainable. The efforts of these officers have been along material or administrative lines. They have neglected the personnel. A personnel champion is what is needed at present.

The statistical portions of what follows relate to the entire enlisted force, and, in the main, only to the line officers of the commissioned personnel. The various staff corps are neglected—not because of a lack of appreciation that these corps are most important and an absolute necessity for suitable naval organization, but because that which is true concerning conditions in the line is equally true of conditions in the staff corps, and too much statistical data becomes boring. For these reasons, therefore, the line, as a rule, is used for illustrating our weakness.

THE FACTS CONCERNING OUR ACTIVE FORCES.

On November 1, 1915, the active list contained 1,920 commissioned line officers. These were distributed in the various grades as shown in the following table:

TABLE I.—*Distribution of commissioned line officers.*

Grade.	Number in grade.	Percentage of whole number.
Rear admiral	24	1.3
Captain	90	4.7
Commander	122	6.4
Lieutenant commander	204	10.6
Lieutenant	351	18.3
Lieutenant (j. g.)	761	39.6
Ensign	368	19.1
Total	1,920	100.0

There are included in the above, as extra numbers, 6 rear admirals, 20 captains, and 10 commanders. This makes the percentage of the whole number higher in these grades than they would be under normal conditions.

The active list of commissioned warrant officers and warrant officers of the line comprises approximately 670, distributed as follows:

Chief boatswains and boatswains	200
Chief gunners and gunners	200
Chief machinists and machinists	270

The law authorizes an enlisted force of 48,000 men and 3,500 apprentices, making a total of 51,500. This number is exclusive of men performing duty on ships assigned to the Naval Militia, and of those prisoners in confinement who are sentenced to dishonorable discharge. Included in the number are approximately 1,500 men of the hospital corps. These men can not be considered as a part of the fighting force. At present the Navy is recruited to its full authorized strength, so the total number of enlisted men, including those on naval militia ships, and the prisoners, is about 53,000.

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In order to illustrate the extent to which this personnel is distributed the following table is inserted showing the status of all serviceable vessels:

TABLE II.—*The status of ships.*

Class of ship.	In full commission.	In reserve, 0.3 of crew.	In ordinary, 0.1 of crew.	Not in commission.	Under construction.	Authorized.	Total.
Battleships:							
First line	7	1			6	3	17
Second line	13	8	1	3			25
Armored cruisers	6	3	1				10
Cruisers:							
First-class	2	3					5
Second-class	1	1		2			4
Third-class	10	4	1	1			16
Destroyers	38	17		2	11	6	74
Monitors	5	2		2			9
Submarines	38				19	19	76
Transports	2			3	1		6
Gunboats	21	1		7			29
Supply ships	4				1		5
Fuel ships	22			1	1	1	25
Converted yachts	5			11			16
Tugs	48						48
Tenders	7				2		9
Special types	7	2		1			10
Torpedo boats	1		13	5			19
Total	237	42	16	38	41	29	403

In addition to the large number of ships, there is our extensive shore establishments that must be provided with personnel. This comprises the Navy Department with its bureaus, offices, and important boards; the War College, Naval Academy, and four training stations; the numerous trade schools; 18 navy yards and stations, with their various adjuncts; an aeronautical station; and many smaller stations, such as hospitals, magazines, recruiting stations, and radio stations. The shore establishment is so large its requirements demand 25 per cent of the total commissioned line officers, 35 per cent of the commissioned chief and warrant officers, and 20 per cent of the enlisted force.

Below is shown the number in each grade and the percentage in each grade of the officers performing duty on shore:

TABLE III.—*Officers performing shore duty.*

Grade.	Total number in grade.	Number performing duty on shore.	Percentage performing duty on shore.
Rear admiral	24	16	67
Captain	90	59	65
Commander	122	63	50
Lieutenant commander	204	103	50
Lieutenant	351	99	30
Lieutenant (j. g.)	761	147	20
Ensign	368	20	5
Chief boatswain and boatswain	200	80	40
Chief gunner and gunner	200	83	40
Chief machinist and machinist	270	80	30
Total	2,590	747	29

Although such a large percentage of the officers and enlisted men are performing duty on shore, their numbers are reduced to the lowest practicable limits. The shore establishment is for the proper maintenance of the fleet. The fleet would be better maintained if the personnel on shore were increased. Those of us who go to sea know that the ships do not get as good service at the navy yards as they should; and those

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of us who are responsible at the yards, or who are performing duty at the yards, know that the ships are not getting the efficient service that would be forthcoming if adequate personnel were available. To further reduce the shore complements in order to augment the depleted fleet complements would result in a reduction in efficiency throughout the service.

The inadequacy of the personnel on shore is very unfortunate. The inadequacy of the personnel afloat is most deplorable. From Table II we ascertain that there are 42 vessels in reserve having only three-tenths of their full commissioned complements, and 16 vessels in ordinary having only one-tenth of their full complements. There are 38 vessels out of commission with no personnel on board (except a few ship keepers). In addition, there are 41 vessels under construction and 29 vessels authorized, but not commenced, for which there is no personnel, and for which no provisions have been made to obtain the necessary officers and crews.

One would suppose that the vessels in full commission had their full authorized crews on board. Unfortunately such a supposition is a grievous mistake. The full commissioned complements, as now authorized, are "peace" complements, and not "war" complements. These peace complements are from 15 to 30 per cent less (both officers and men) than are necessary properly to fight the ships. But what is still worse, is the fact that these full commissioned ships have not even their allowed peace complements on board. All of them are short a number of officers, and the battleships have an average vacancy list of over 100 men per ship. It was recently necessary to reduce the complements of destroyers by 20 per cent in order to provide crews for other vessels. There are no reserves—either officers or men—available for emergency calls. If a new ship is to be commissioned, one or more already in service must be placed out of commission, or the personnel for the new ship provided by a general reduction all along the already depleted line. This general reduction process has been in operation for some time. The Navy lives from hand to mouth so far as the personnel is concerned, and the living is most frugal. But there is no relief in sight, and with the new construction nearing completion, the conditions must continue to grow worse until such time that any provision Congress may make for additional personnel may become effective.

The foregoing statements of the facts leave no doubt as to the inadequacy of the personnel. We can survive, with discomfort, this state of affairs in times of peace. Could we successfully overcome the handicap in case of war? Not unless our enemy were as badly off as we are, and there are no prospective enemies in sight who have been shortsighted enough to permit themselves to decline to such an extent.

Not only is the number of line officers inadequate, but the various grades are not properly balanced. Captains are performing the duties of rear admirals, lieutenant commanders those of commanders, lieutenants those of lieutenant commanders, and lieutenants (junior grade) those of lieutenants. They perform the duties and have the responsibilities of the higher grades, but they receive neither the rank nor the corresponding pay. The seriousness of this situation is added to by the gact that promotion is practically at a standstill, except in the case of ensigns to junior lieutenants, which latter grade is being increased at the rate of about 125 a year. This state of affairs has caused a current of unrest and a feeling of discontent among the commissioned personnel that is detrimental to the efficiency of the service. With some officers this undercurrent is made manifest by a spirit of indifference; with others there is a tendency to worry. All officers feel that the time has arrived when something must be done to relieve the present unsatisfactory condition. They know that legislation is contemplated for the purpose of providing a remedy, and they are confident that such legislation as has recently been recommended will not produce the improvements so necessary to place the commissioned personnel on a proper basis. The Navy's esprit de corps is to-day at a lower ebb than at any time during the past 20 years.

What changing policies have been evident from time to time have been based on material conditions, and not on the personnel situation. A few years ago the vessels were assigned to home yards in accordance with the characteristics of each ship, and the necessity of the various yards. These assignments were supposed to be permanent, and, accordingly, the Bureau of Navigation took steps toward assigning and transferring the personnel so that both officers and men could serve on ships that went to the navy yard nearest their homes. The lack of permanency in the assignments of vessels to home yard is made manifest by a comparison of the details made a few years ago with the assignments to-day. Numerous cases have occurred where vessels' home yards have been changed owing to certain material conditions in the vessels themselves, the needs of a navy yard for more or less work, or even for political reasons.

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The effect on the personnel appears not to have been considered, and if considered, dismissed without serious thought. Only recently have the home yards of vessels been changed from Portsmouth, N. H., to New Orleans, La. The effect on the personnel was clearly defined by the commanding officer of one of those vessels, but, as usual, personnel considerations were subjected to the material viewpoint. This policy of subjugating the personnel to the material survives in spite of the fact that, "Historically, good men with poor ships are better than poor men with good ships." We appear to ignore a fundamental principle when we make the personnel subordinate to the material. The mere possession of good material can not produce an efficient personnel, but an efficient personnel will, by reason of its very efficiency, bring the material to a high standard.

Despite the lack of collective efficiency as represented by the whole Navy, and which is due to inadequacy in numerical strength and weakness in organization and administration, it must be conceded that the individual efficiency and capabilities of officers and men has steadily improved. The reason for this is the higher moral and duty standards required. The selecting-out board produced a healthy impulse to individual effort, and increased the average efficiency through the elimination of many below the average. The establishment of post-graduate schools for officers, and the facilities offered for special instruction along various lines, have had a marked effect in boosting individual efficiency. The general trend of the times in demanding a higher state of individual efficiency in all walks of life, has left its impression on the naval personnel. As for the enlisted men, one has only to look back to the days prior to the Spanish-American War in order to appreciate the great advancement that has been made. Higher qualifications for enlistment, more stringent rules for advancement, improved methods of discipline, a firm stand against liberty breaking and drunkenness, and the establishment of training stations and trade schools, have all had a salutary effect.

And yet, with this marked advance in individual efficiency, the collective efficiency has failed to keep pace through no fault of the personnel actually assigned to ships and stations, but because the inadequacy of this personnel has been too much of a handicap, and because the personnel in general has received repeated setbacks for the benefit of the material. The inadequacy of the personnel has not only produced the singular result of having all our ships underofficered and undermanned, but has caused so many and such frequent changes in the personnel, that the necessary team work required to make an efficient fighting machine can not be developed. Our target-practice rules prevent the employment of artificial means so far as material is concerned, but there is not a ship in the Navy that is not forced to use artificial means in the employment of its personnel during target practice. It is regretted that the confidential nature of "Report of Battle Practices, Spring, 1915" prevents the quoting in full of the remarks made by the commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet concerning the shortage of personnel in his fleet during the last battle practice. It is unfortunate that no matter what legislation the next Congress enacts, the present state of affairs must continue for some time, as officers and men can not be made over night, owing to the length of time required to educate the officers, and to recruit and train the enlisted men.

PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS IN CASE OF WAR.

Should the country be involved in war it would be necessary, in order properly to man our ships and shore stations, to have an immediate increase of 2,520 line officers, 647 commissioned warrant and warrant officers, and 53,900 enlisted men. The respective percentages of increase over what we now have are 130 for the line officers, 100 for the commissioned warrant and warrant officers, and 102 for the enlisted men. These figures are so astonishing it is not sufficient to pass them by with the mere statement of fact, but, in order to make the truth impressive, it is considered necessary to give in detail and in tabulated form the requirements of the various units which compose the Navy as a whole. First, the requirements for services afloat will be shown:

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TABLE IV.—*Requirements for immediate service afloat in case of war.*

Number of ships.	Class of ships.	Flag officers.	Captains.	Commanders.	Lieutenant commanders.	Lieutenants.	Lieutenants, junior grade.	Ensigns.	Total line officers.	Chief boatswains and boatswains.	Chief gunner and gunner.	Chief machinist and machinist.	Total warrant officers.	Enlisted men.
12	Dreadnoughts	5	12	12	48	96	96	216	485	24	36	48	108	14,400
8	Battleships (16,000 tons)	2	8	8	32	72	72	120	314	16	24	32	72	8,800
5	Battleships (15,000 tons)	1	5	5	20	45	45	75	196	10	15	20	45	5,000
8	Battleships (12,000 tons)	2	8	8	32	48	48	112	258	8	16	32	56	6,400
4	Battleships (small)	1	4	4	16	16	16	32	89	4	8	16	28	2,800
10	Armored cruisers	2	10	10	40	70	70	140	342	20	30	40	90	10,000
5	Cruisers, first class	1	5	....	20	25	25	50	126	5	10	40	55	4,500
4	Cruisers, second class	....	4	....	8	12	12	24	60	4	4	16	24	2,000
16	Cruisers, third class	2	....	16	16	48	48	64	194	16	16	32	64	4,800
9	Monitors	1	....	9	9	27	27	36	109	9	9	9	27	2,250
26	Destroyers (1,000 tons)	1	2	....	26	52	52	.....	133	....	....	....	....	2,600
26	Destroyers (750 tons)	1	2	....	26	52	52	.....	133	....	....	....	....	2,340
16	Destroyers (450 tons)	1	1	....	....	32	32	.....	66	....	....	....	....	1,280
19	Torpedo boats	....	1	....	....	38	19	.....	58	....	....	....	....	800
54	Submarines	2	4	....	....	108	108	.....	222	....	....	....	....	1,350
9	Tenders to torpedo vessels	....	....	9	....	18	18	.....	45	9	9	18	36	1,800
21	Gunboats (large)	1	....	21	....	42	42	42	148	21	21	21	63	3,150
9	Gunboats (small)	....	....	....	....	9	9	9	27	....	....	....	....	450
5	Transports	....	....	5	....	15	15	.....	35	5	....	5	10	1,000
4	Supply ships	....	....	....	4	8	....	.....	12	16	....	4	20	600
23	Fuel ships	1	....	....	23	....	....	.....	24	69	....	23	92	3,000
16	Converted yachts	....	....	1	5	26	16	16	64	....	....	....	....	1,000
13	Fleet tugs	....	....	....	....	13	....	.....	13	26	....	13	39	500
34	Tugs	....	....	....	....	....	....	.....	....	34	....	....	34	680
7	Special types	1	....	5	2	14	14	14	50	5	10	5	20	1,700
75	To be purchased	2	4	15	15	50	50	50	186	25	25	25	75	7,500
	Staff duty	4	10	10	30	60	60	.....	174	....	....	....	....	600
	Totals	31	80	138	372	996	946	1,000	3,563	326	233	399	958	91,300

In this table are included all vessels on the Navy list excepting those specially designated by the department as unsuitable for war purposes; all vessels under construction that should be completed by January 1, 1917; all the fuel ships that are now manned by merchant crews, and 75 vessels, which is the minimum number that probably would be purchased. The number of officers and men required adequately and efficiently to man these vessels are not a matter of hearsay or guesswork. They are the numbers which experience has shown to be necessary.

It is assumed that all vessels excepting those designated as unfit for war purposes would be manned in case of war, provided the personnel could be obtained. This assumption is based on what actually happened in the Spanish-American War; and it can not be supposed for an instant that the Government is spending large sums of money for the maintenance of men-of-war that would not be used in case of war. Such an expenditure of the public funds would be an extravagant waste.

Of the 23 fuel ships, all but 4 are manned by merchant crews. Two of the four manned by Navy crews are engaged in surveying duty, and the other two have experimental machinery which the department evidently considers can not be satisfactorily operated by merchant crews. There can be only two good reasons for operating these auxiliaries with merchant crews. One reason is because there is not sufficient naval personnel to detail for this duty; the other is because it is cheaper. The auxiliary service as now conducted operates more or less satisfactorily in peace times, but it can not give efficient service in time of war unless the merchant crews are replaced by Regular Navy crews. This is due to the unfortunate fact that the crews of these vessels are composed of practically all nationalities except Americans. In case of war many of the crews would have to be discharged, many would desert, and the rest could not be trusted. There are no American merchant sailors to take their places. Therefore we should have to provide naval personnel for them.

The beginning of the Spanisn-American War found the Navy Department making strenuous efforts to purchase vessels of all descriptions, and as a result of these efforts a large number were obtained and manned with Navy crews. Should we again have a war it would be necessary to purchase vessels and convert them into mine layers, mine sweepers, patrol boats, supply ships, fuel ships, and transports. In the absence of a large merchant personnel, and a lack of organization among our

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fishermen, towboat men, and yacht crews, there will be much difficulty in finding crews for the purchased vessels. But we may rest assured that they will be purchased, nevertheless.

As our organization on shore has always been inadequate for the proper administration and maintenance of the fleets, and as the local organizations of the various navy yards and stations have been undergoing frequent and disorganizing upheavals, an estimate of the actual requirements for the entire shore establishment, in case of war, can not be so accurately made as for the vessels of the fleet. That a large number of officers and men would have to continue on duty ashore after the beginning of hostilities there is no doubt. An estimate of the requirements is made in the following table:

TABLE V.—*Requirements for immediate service on shore in case of war.*

Station.	Flag officers.	Captains.	Commanders.	Lieutenant commanders.	Lieutenants.	Lieutenants (junior grade).	Total line officers.	Chief boatswains and boatswains.	Chief gunners and gunners.	Chief machinists and machinists.	Total warrant officers.	Enlisted men.
Navy Department, operations	5	5	5	5	5	.....	25	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Navy Department, bureaus	3	3	10	10	10	.....	36	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Navy Department, offices	1	5	5	5	5	.....	21	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Navy Department, boards	5	5	5	5	5	.....	25	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Naval Academy and War College	4	6	10	10	10	.....	40	5	1	2	8	200
Training stations	.....	4	4	8	15	.....	31	10	4	8	22	6,000
Navy yards and stations	10	30	30	60	80	.....	210	65	60	60	185	3,000
Inspection duty	5	15	15	15	15	.....	65	10	30	30	70	.....
Recruiting duty	.....	10	25	25	25	.....	85	.....	.....	.....	.....	500
Aviation duty	1	1	1	2	25	25	55	2	2	2	6	300
Radio duty	1	1	10	20	20	20	72	.....	5	.....	5	500
Total	35	85	120	165	215	45	665	92	102	102	296	10,500

A 30 per cent increase over the number of officers now performing shore duty must be considered a very modest estimate when contemplating the probability that the amount of business to be accomplished will at least be doubled and that a higher degree of efficiency will be demanded from the shore establishment than is evidenced at present.

There is an impression in some quarters that, in case of war, it will be a simple matter immediately to send to sea all officers performing shore duty. Not only is it the impression that this could be done, but many believe that it would be done. Those who entertain this conviction fail to comprehend that the fleets can not exist without the assistance of the shore establishment, and that this is the reason for the existence of and for the maintenance of the shore stations with their numerous adjuncts. The fleet must depend on the navy yards and stations for stores, provisions, repairs, and docking. The fleet must depend on the War College, Naval Academy, and training stations for the necessary trained personnel. The fleet must depend on the Navy Department for information and instructions, and for the administration of all affairs not directly concerned with the internal management of the various units. In fact the efficiency of the fleet depends in a great measure on the efficiency of the shore establishment. Surely, in view of this, it can not be expected that the Navy Department, when war is imminent, will cripple the fleet by depleting the shore stations of the personnel necessary for their proper conduct. This brings us to the important question as to what personnel is necessary for the proper conduct of the shore establishment. The answer must be—the sea-going personnel. Only men who go to sea can appreciate the necessity of having the shore establishment controlled and operated by men who thoroughly understand the personnel and material requirements of vessels employed on active duty. And only men who have been to sea can thoroughly understand these complex requirements. It is essential, therefore, that line officers continue on duty at the Navy Department, the navy yards, and other shore stations after the beginning of hostilities, and any reduction in the number of line officers performing such duties will result in a corresponding reduction in the efficiency of the fleet. Navy yards are military establishments and must be operated in accordance with military principles and methods. In order to do this successfully, a line

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officer high in rank must be the controlling factor. An officer of any other corps can not possibly have the necessary experience or education along the proper lines to enable him to cope with the difficulties that would confront him in time of war. Any attempt to place the navy yards under civilian control would undoubtedly have a calamitous result.

The Naval Academy and the training stations must continue in operation unless, as the war progresses, we are to fill vacancies in the numerous vessels with personnel that is entirely untrained. There should be not less than 5,000 apprentices under training at all times, and the training period should be reduced to two months. Even this would give us only about 80 men a day to send to the fleet. To conduct the training stations would require 1,000 men as a minimum. The navy yards and stations where recruits and ex-enlisted men are being enlisted and assembled will require at all times no less than 3,000 men. The large number will be due to the fact that men can not be distributed without first collecting them. The process is continuous.

In addition to the officers and men required for duty afloat and duty on shore, it is absolutely essential that there be a 5 per cent excess to allow for casualties, sickness, leave, and those traveling to and from their stations. If this percentage is not provided, it will mean that our ships and stations will never have their full complements, and it is of the utmost importance that this condition be not allowed to confront us in war times.

Having determined the numbers of officers and enlisted men required for service afloat, the numbers required for duty ashore, and the 5 per cent additional necessary to allow for casualties, etc., it is a simple matter by combining these to ascertain the total personnel required at the beginning of hostilities. If from this total we subtract the active forces now possessed, the result will be the necessary additions that must be provided by our reserves and such recruits as can be mustered into service. These figures, tabulated below, are most impressive:

TABLE VI.—*Total requirements for immediate service in case of war.*

	Flag officers.	Captains.	Commanders.	Lieutenant commanders.	Lieutenants.	Lieutenants (j. g.).	Ensigns.	Total line officers.	Chief boatswains and boatswains.	Chief gunners and gunners.	Chief machinists and machinists.	Total warrant officers.	Enlisted men.
Required for sea duty—Table IV..	31	80	138	372	996	946	1,000	3,563	326	233	399	958	91,300
Required for shore duty—Table V...	35	85	120	165	215	45	.....	665	92	102	102	296	10,500
5 per cent for casualties, etc.....	3	8	13	27	61	50	50	212	21	17	25	63	5,100
Total active forces required immediately..	69	173	271	564	1,272	1,041	1,050	4,440	439	352	526	1,317	106,900
Total active forces available—Table III.....	24	90	122	204	351	761	368	1,920	200	200	270	670	53,000
Total to be supplied by reserves and recruits.....	45	83	149	360	921	380	682	2,520	239	152	256	647	53,900

THE SOURCES OF SUPPLY.

There are two main sources of supply for providing the personnel required, as shown in the foregoing table. The first of these sources consists of the retired list, the Naval Militia, the Naval Reserve, and the Naval Academy. The second source consists of the unorganized ex-officers and ex-enlisted men, and the untrained masses.

The line officers on the retired list have been retired because of old age, length of service, physical disability, undesirability, or personal request. There is no doubt but that all of these officers, if assigned to active duty in time of war, would give to the country the very best that is in them. While a number of them are well qualified

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or duty ashore, only a comparatively few could be expected to perform efficient duty afloat. Many of these officers would undoubtedly be assigned to duty by the Navy Department, and arrangements have been made for the necessary details in cases where the officers' ages or physical condition permit of active service. However, in view of the fact that most of these officers were retired because considered unsuitable for active duty in times of peace, we should not count on many lasting for any great length of time under the strain that war conditions impose.

Below is shown the number of retired officers of the line and the number in each grade to be assigned to active duty in case of war:

TABLE VII.—*Retired officers of the line.*

Grade.	Number on retired list.	Number to be assigned to active duty.	Percentage.
Rear admirals	144	23	16
Commodores	45	22	50
Captains	63	31	50
Commanders	105	80	76
Lieutenant commanders	40	26	65
Lieutenants	44	35	80
Lieutenants (junior grade)	18	15	83
Ensigns	30	28	93
Chief engineers	23	2	9
Past assistant engineers	20	7	35
Assistant engineers	13	10	77
Chief boatswains	42	28	67
Boatswains	17	15	88
Chief gunners	20	15	75
Gunners	17	14	82
Chief machinists	19	16	84
Machinists	41	37	80
Total	701	404	58

As the commodores to be assigned to active duty were advanced to their present grade on retirement, and never performed the duties of flag officers, they must be considered as captains. The engineer officers are of such age and have been retired for so long that there are only a few duties to which they can be assigned.

There are fewer than 600 men who have been retired on the completion of 30 years' service in the enlisted force. In view of their ages, not more than 100 could be profitably assigned to active duties.

The Coast Guard, which in time of war would probably be placed under the Secretary of the Navy, has the foundation for an excellent reserve provided the Navy Department will arrange with the Treasury Department for the training of the personnel along the lines that would make them the most useful in case of war. But even if this were done, the Coast Guard can not be considered as an organized reserve so far as the manning of the Navy material is concerned, because the entire personnel would be required to man its own vessels and stations. Therefore no assistance in manning our ships in time of war can be obtained from the Coast Guard.

There is authority for the formation of a reserve of 25,000 ex-enlisted men who have received honorable discharge from the Navy. The actual strength of this organization is at present less than 150 men, so its value as a resetve must be considered as negligible.

While the Naval Militia is the only organized reserve, unfortunately it can not be considered an efficient trained reserve. The units composing this organization are a conglomerate assembly, each having its own standard of efficiency. Until the passage of the Naval Militia act by the last Congress, there were no apparent attempts on the part of the Central Government to make the various units into a well rounded body. In some States the organizations resembled social clubs. In only a few of the States were there any semblances of real efficiency. That the organization as a whole is not so efficient as it should be is not the fault of the individuals who, through their sense of patriotism, join this service. These men deserve much credit for giving their time to such drills and such service as are practicable. The fault has been partly with the State governments in not making suitable laws and appropriating sufficient funds, and partly with the Central Government in not insisting on suitable laws and in not withholding financial aid until assured that the money provided would bring an adequate return.

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The new Naval Militia act, if conscientiously enforced, will be conducive to a great advance in efficiency throughout the entire organization. It provides for the organization of the militia in units of convenient size, in each of which the number and rank of officers and the distribution of the total enlisted strength among the several ratings of petty officers and other enlisted men shall be established by the Secretary of the Navy, who shall also establish the number of officers, petty officers, and other enlisted men required for the organization of such units into larger bodies for administrative and other purposes. Provision is made for the examination of officers and men, and for the appointment of instructors from the regular naval service. The President is given authority to call the Naval Militia into the service of the United States when he deems it necessary; and when so called the militia shall be governed by the Navy regulations and the articles of the government of the Navy. Naval Militia officers mustered as such into the regular service shall rank with but after officers of the Regular Navy in the same grade and rank; except that for the purpose of determining who shall exercise command over a combined force composed of vessels commanded by Naval Militia officers and of vessels commanded by officers of the Navy in conjunction, all officers of the Naval Militia of or above the rank of lieutenant commander will be regarded as junior to lieutenant commanders of the Navy. The Naval Militia when called into the service of the United States shall, during the time of service, be entitled to the same pay and allowance as provided for the Regular Navy, but no officer or enlisted man shall be held to service beyond the term of his existing commission or enlistment.

Although there are some defects in the provisions of the Naval Militia act, there is a great opportunity, by taking advantage of its many good points, to make a really efficient reserve for the naval service. The Navy Department has enthusiastically taken up the matters allotted to the general government, and it is to be hoped that the several States will respond with an equally enthusiastic endeavor to do their part. The general order issued by the Navy Department sets forth in detail the unit of organization, rank of officers, ratings of enlisted men, qualifications of officers and men, and scope of the examinations required. This order states that the various Naval Militia organizations in order to be eligible to participate in Federal funds; to be supplied with arms, uniforms, equipment, etc.; and in order that they will be eligible to be mustered into the service of the United States without further professional examination, must comply with the provisions of this general order before February 16, 1917.

The organizations from the several States would be much better prepared for efficient service at the beginning of hostilities if the Navy Department would require their training to be along certain specific lines, instead of along general lines as is now the case. The militia units get practically all their training on small vessels which are considered of little value for war purposes. A few days each year a so-called cruise is made on a comparatively modern vessel. But with the limited amount of training practicable it can not be expected that the militiamen can become efficient all-round men-of-warsmen.

The idea then of making them all-around men-of-warsmen should be abandoned, and instead they should be trained for duty on the auxiliaries such as supply ships, fuel ships, mine layers, mine sweepers, and patrol vessels. We would then have, at the beginning of hostilities, a force which could relieve the large number of trained regulars now assigned to auxiliaries. This would enable the department to transfer them to the fighting ships where their services will be urgently required.

In the regular service no man may first enlist if he is over 30 years of age. In the naval militia, men may first enlist up to the age of 45 years, and they may continue to serve until they reach the age of 62. We who go to sea know that under modern conditions the enlisted man over 45 years of age who is capable of performing efficient service afloat is the exception. There are no places for old men on modern men-of-war, and this will be more apparent in war times than in peace. Since the sole object of the Naval Militia is to supply a reserve for the active service in time of war, every endeavor should be made to have the militia composed only of officers and men who are capable of performing active duty. This will not be the case if the militia's ranks are partly filled by men between the ages of 45 and 62. As our reserve forces are so limited we must avoid the tendency to make the organizations effective on paper only, instead of in reality. That there is such tendency is shown not only in certain provisions of the general order setting forth the Naval Militia requirements, but also in the law providing for the reserve composed of ex-honorably discharged men. The latter reserve takes the form of a graded retired list for the enlisted men, instead of an actually effective fighting force to be called on when the emergency demands.

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As men of the Naval Militia when mustered into the service of the United States can not be held beyond the term of their enlistments, steps must be taken toward making the term of enlistment of sufficient length to eliminate the probability of a large percentage of the militia being short-time men at the crucial moment when their services may be required.

Twenty-one States and the District of Columbia are represented by Naval Militia organizations. Each State makes its own laws in regard to the numerical strength of its organization. But whatever this strength may be, the units must be in accordance with the Navy Department's requirements. On July 1, 1915, the total Naval Militia strength authorized by the State laws was 12,574. On this date there were actually enrolled 606 officers and 7,706 enlisted men—only 65 per cent of the allowed quota. Of the 606 officers, 483 are of the line and are distributed as follows:

TABLE VIII.—*Line officers of the Naval Militia.*

Grade.	For line duties only.	For engineering duties only.	Total.
Commodores	1		1
Captains	5		5
Commanders	20		20
Lieutenant commanders	35	6	41
Lieutenants	119	26	145
Lieutenants (junior grade)	93	14	107
Ensigns	122	27	149
Warrant officers	7	8	15
Totals	402	81	483

As the commodores, captains, and commanders become subject to the orders of lieutenant commanders of the regular service when operating together, they must be considered as lieutenant commanders in making assignments to active duty.

To provide the requisite number of junior officers it will be necessary to send the two or three senior classes of midshipmen to sea. If two classes are sent, about 400 officers will be obtained; if three classes are sent there will be an additional 250 officers. There will be some reluctance about sending these young men to the front, and it is certainly is a reflection on our methods that our personnel has become so depleted as to make it necessary in time of war to reduce the amount of instruction considered essential to prepare the midshipmen for service afloat in times of peace. But there is no question that the midshipmen, with from one to four years military training at the Naval Academy, will make much better junior officers than can be obtained from any other source; and the great demand for junior officers will force the Navy Department to detail them to active duty with the fleet. During the Spanish-American war a large number of naval cadets were sent home on leave until the war ended, and at the same time, a number of acting naval cadets were appointed from civil life. It is to be hoped that political influence will not again be able to force such a fiasco on the service.

There are a few ex-officers and many ex-enlisted men who would immediately answer the call to the colors in case of hostilities. Some of the officers are now serving with Naval Militia organizations, and, therefore, have been included in Table VIII, leaving only a small number to be included among the unorganized reserves. The thousands of enlisted men who would enlist, constitute a valuable potential reserve that is of the utmost importance to the country. The Navy Department desired to organize these men and succeeded in obtaining legislation, authorizing such an organization, which must not exceed 25,000 men. The plan has proved a failure as the men will not enlist in the reserve owing to certain conditions imposed. For example, the law authorizes the Navy Department to require a large amount of annual service of all men in the reserve; and although the department has waived the requirement, the men will not enlist as long as the power to call them into service during peace times remains. The small amount of compensation does not warrant the taking of unnecessary chances on their part. They undoubtedly feel that they are discriminated against when it is considered that, as trained personnel, they would be liable for one or two months' active service each year, while the untrained men of the Naval Militia are required to perform only a few days of active duty with the regular service. But even if these men do not enlist in the reserve, they are a valuable asset, as it is probable that there are about 15,000 of them whose ages and physical condition are such that they could be counted on to enlist in the regular service in

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time of need. Besides these 15,000 honorably discharged men there are about 3,000 men whose connection with the Navy has been severed by other than honorable means, and who could be counted on to enlist if the department will permit, and if, in the cases of deserters, the President will grant them amnesty. Our need for trained men will be so great it will be necessary to take these men back into the service, just as was done during the Spanish-American war. It is another case where our shortsighted policy in not providing sufficient personnel will require us in war times to depend on men whom we do not consider suitable in peace times. The numbers of trained personnel available as a reserve in case of war have been enumerated. If the various units are added together and the total thus obtained is subtracted from the numbers actually required at the beginning of hostilities, the remainder will be the number of recruits that must be obtained from the untrained masses. This summary is made in the following table:

TABLE IX.—*Summary of organized and unorganized reserves.*

Source.	Flag officers.	Captains.	Commanders.	Lieutenant commanders.	Lieutenants	Lieutenants (junior grade).	Ensigns.	Total line officers.	Chief boatswains and boatswains.	Chief gunners and gunners.	Chief machinists and machinists.	Total chief warrant and warrant officers.	Enlisted men.
Retired list, Table VII	23	53	80	28	42	25	28	279	43	29	53	125	100
Naval Militia, Table VIII	.....	.....	.....	67	145	107	149	468	4	3	8	15	7,706
Naval Reserve	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	150
Naval Academy	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	650	650	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Exofficers and exenlisted men	.....	.....	.....	5	10	10	10	35	.....	.....	.....	.....	18,000
Total available reserve	23	53	80	100	197	142	837	1,432	47	32	61	140	25,956
Total required reserve Table VI	45	83	149	360	921	380	687	2,520	239	152	256	647	54,900
Additional required from untrained sources	22	30	69	260	724	88		1,088	192	120	195	507	28,944

A study of this table reveals a really startling state of affairs. It can not be possible that the naval authorities, the Congress, and the people realize that with all our available personnel—both active and reserve—there would still be required at the very beginning of hostilities, in order to man such material as we possess, an additional 1,100 commissioned line officers, 500 warrant officers, and 29,000 enlisted men. Can it be realized that this additional personnel must be recruited and partially trained before they become available for active service, and in order to recruit and train them from one to two years will be required? And can it be realized that during these two years there will be many ships added to the Navy, and there will be many casualties, so that large numbers of additional officers and men must be continually provided? The true situation can not be appreciated or we would not continue to hear the loud cries for more ships, more ships, and only a faint peep for additional personnel. We do need more ships, but we need the personnel much more urgently, and if disaster is to be averted, our first duty should be to obtain sufficient personnel to man at least such material as we could use at the beginning of a war. It will be hard enough to obtain the additional officers and men required for new ships and to replace casualties, after the war has started, without leaving until that time the providing of our immediate necessities.

The only way to obtain the higher officers required would be to promote the officers from the lower grades. It is doubtful, though, if the promotions would actually be made. The lower officers would be required to perform the duties of the higher grades without receiving the corresponding rank and pay. This, of course, is an injustice that is appreciated only by the officers concerned, and consequently there is not much likelihood of a remedy, especially as the usual status of the Navy list has required such

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assignments for some years past. Whether or not the promotions are actually made, it would be necessary under present conditions to assign officers to perform the duties of higher grades, as follows: Twenty-two captains perform flag officers' duties, 52 commanders perform captains' duties, 121 lieutenant commanders perform commanders' duties, and 381 lieutenants perform lieutenant commanders' duties.

As there are only 351 lieutenants on the active list, it is evident that every one of them would be called on to perform lieutenant commanders' duties, provided the department desires the duties of that grade to be efficiently performed. The important watch duties would of necessity have to be done by those who are now junior lieutenants and ensigns, and the 1,100 places for junior officers would have to remain vacant until some means of filling them could be found.

The 500 warrant officers could be furnished by promoting chief petty officers. There are a number of such petty officers who have passed the required examinations, but have not been advanced owing to the policy of the Navy Department to keep the number of warrant officers down to the lowest possible limit the Navy can struggle along with.

So the really big problem that would confront us immediately on the outbreak of hostilities is how to obtain 1,100 junior line officers, and 29,000 enlisted men. It must be confessed that we can not possibly obtain them. Therefore it is absolutely necessary that immediate steps be taken towards placing our naval personnel on such a basis that in the case of war overtaking us in the future, we will not be in the critical predicament that we now find ourselves.

While the figures concerning officers relate to the line only, the fact must not be overlooked that the various staff corps are just as deficient in numbers as is the line; and what has been stated in regard to these deficiencies of the line is equally true for the staff.

There should be, in peace times, sufficient personnel, active and reserve, to man immediately all our ships and stations on the outbreak of hostilities. What percentage of this force should be active, and what portion should be reserve, depends on the policy of the Navy Department with reference to the status of the vessels of the fleet in peace times, and on the number of reserves that can be organized so as to be immediately available on the outbreak of hostilities. It is manifest that the number of vessels kept in full commission should be as large as possible if the fleet is to be efficient at the beginning of a war. Therefore it is essential that our active naval forces should, at all times, be as large as the financial problem involved admits.

Our present status with reference to the proportions between active forces and reserve forces, and in comparison with the total forces required is shown below:

TABLE X.—*Proportion between present active, reserve, and required forces.*

	Commissioned officers.		Warrant officers.		Enlisted men.	
	Number.	Per cent.	Number.	Per cent.	Number.	Per cent.
Present total active force, Table III	1,920	43	670	51	53,000	49.5
Total required force, Table IX	1,432	32	140	11	25,956	24
Additional required force, Table IX	1,088	25	507	38	27,944	26.5
Total force necessary, Table VI	4,440	100	1,317	100	106,900	100

From this table we learn that our active and reserve forces together are only 75 per cent of what they should be in the case of commissioned officers, 66 per cent in the case of warrant officers, and 73.5 per cent in the case of enlisted men. It is imperative that immediate steps be taken to make up these deficiencies. The important question is what proportion should be allotted to active forces and what proportion to reserve. In view of the fact that a large percentage of our reserves are not organized and are not in any way under obligation to serve in the Navy, and in view of the unsatisfactory results obtained from all efforts to form a satisfactory naval reserve, we must conclude that the greater part of the additional forces necessary immediately on the outbreak of war should be obtained by adding to our active forces, and such additions should be made as soon as possible. In other words our active naval forces should be 75 per cent of the total forces needed, and the ratio between actives and reserves should be as three to one.

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An exact comparson between the personnel of our Navy and of the other leading naval powers is impracticable owing to the unreliability of the information at hand. But we do know that while the active personnel of the navies of Great Britain, Germany, France, Japan, Italy, and Austria approximate the same per 1,000 tons of ships as in our Navy, the effective trained reserves in each of these countries is so much greater than ours as to make comparisons startling. In the powers mentioned the reserve forces average 85 per cent as large as the active forces, while in this country the organized reserve is only 12 per cent as large as the active forces, and if we include the unorganized reserves whom we guess will offer their services in case of war, the total reserve is only 50 per cent as large as the active force. We also know that the reserves of these foreign countries are organized from men who have actually served in the Navy, or from men who are in the merchant marine. The differences in the forms of government and the differences in the characteristics of the people enable these foreign governments to organize well-trained reserves which appears to be impracticable in the United States. These foreign countries also have merchant marines which are subsidized by the governments, thereby giving a claim on the personnel in the event of war, which is not the case in this country. In addition, the personnel of the merchant marine in these foreign countries are natives or citizens of their respective countries which is a distinction that the United States can not claim.

A further comparison between our personnel and that of foreign countries shows that while our total actives and reserves give us 83 officers and men per 1,000 tons of ships built and building, the average in the six navies previously mentioned was, just prior to the beginning of the present war, 123 officers and men per 1,000 tons of ships built and building. It is therefore evident that not only is our personnel deplorably inadequate when we view it without reference to the foreign navies, but it is alarmingly so when we consider the great extent to which the foreign countries surpass us in this most important element of national defense and preparedness. The comparisons emphasize the necessity for immediately improving our personnel conditions.

There is a movement on foot to organize a naval reserve in this country, to be composed of the personnel on yachts, motor boats, and fishing vessels. That such organizations are desirable and necessary in order to place the country on a proper defensive basis, must be conceded by all who have followed the European war. But we must not allow ourselves to be deceived into believing that such reserves will in anyway relieve the personnel shortage as shown to exist on our men-of-war and at the naval stations. If such reserves are organized they will be required to man the yachts, motor boats, and fishing vessels, and will not be available for any of the vessels shown in Table IV.

It has been shown in Table VI that, in case of war, we would require 4,440 commissioned line officers, 1,317 warrant officers, and 106,900 enlisted men. As, owing to our inability to organize a large reserve, the active forces should be 75 per cent of the total requirements; to be properly prepared for an emergency we should now have in the active naval forces 3,330 commissioned line officers instead of only 1,920; 990 warrant officers, instead of 670; and 80,000 enlisted men, instead of 53,000. Having determined the needs it becomes necessary to devise a means of supplying the shortage:

THE REMEDY.

Our status has fallen so very far below what it should be that, it is, of course, impossible to effect a remedy in a short time. Unless we throw discretion to the winds and clamor for legislation that will be impracticable, or that will not be satisfactory, it will be necessary for a period of from 5 to 10 years to elapse before the naval personnel can be increased sufficiently and brought to that standard of efficiency which is necessary to carry us through an extended campaign. To do this in the shortest practicable time, our first move must be to obtain more officers and men. The providing of the men is a comparatively simple matter. We have not more of them now for the simple reason that the law does not allow them. We are recruited to the full authorized strength, and have been so recruited for a year or more. There should be immediate provision made for an increase of 50,000 enlisted men, at the rate of 5,000 a year.

Fifty thousand men are required because in 10 years the added construction will make it necessary to have 20,000 men in addition to the 30,000 required at the present time. We could not get all these men at once, and in view of the inability of our organization to handle so large an increase it is not desirable that we endeavor to obtain them immediately. However, an increase of 5,000 a year will permit a healthy expansion of personnel that can be trained and distributed without any great upheaval. This number of additional men can be enlisted each year provided enough recruiting stations are established and sufficient funds made available for properly carrying on

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the business. The question of distribution in the various ratings is now in the hands of the Navy Department. This is as it should be, and, in consequence, no legislation concerning the enlisted force is essential other than that which simply provides for an increase.

The two great defects in the officers' lists are lack of numbers and lack of proper flow of promotion. Now that the selection-out board has been abolished, and the Navy Department has adopted the policy of not accepting voluntary retirements, the lack of numbers will be partially remedied by the normal sized graduating classes from the Naval Academy. These classes, with the present number of appointments authorized by law, should average 175 graduates a year. The number of retirements, resignations, and deaths in the line of the Navy should average about 30 a year. Therefore under present laws and rules we can count on the total number of line officers increasing at the rate of 145 a year. In 10 years we would have 1,450 more line officers than at present, and the total would then be 3,370 line officers or 40 more than the number required for efficient service with our Navy at its present size. But it is certain that in 10 years from now there should be at least 4,000 line officers, and after that total is reached, the policy in regard to ridding the service of obsolete ships will be so well established that there will not be any great numerical increase in our vessels, but as new ships are completed, a corresponding number of old ones will be discarded. In other words, if a regular building program of proper balance is to be adopted, we can expect that in 10 years the Navy will have reached the numerical strength in ships beyond which Congress and the people will be unwilling to go, and from that date the new construction will be for the purpose of replacing the obsolete vessels. The Navy will then require 4,000 commissioned line officers on the active list to provide the 75 per cent of the total that would be necessary to properly man the ships and shore stations in case of war. As there are now only 1,920 commissioned line officers, it is evident that we must furnish 2,080 in the next 10 years—an average of 208 a year. The Naval Academy is the only source from which these officers can be properly supplied, and we have seen that under the present regimé the academy only furnishes sufficient graduates to give an average increase of 145 officers annually. Therefore it is necessary to increase the academy output so that the average graduates for the next 10 years will be 238, which is the 208 increase required, plus the 30 vacancies which will be created by retirements, resignations, and deaths. However, any increase authorized in the number of midshipmen will not be felt in the service until 4 years have elapsed, so no matter what is done in this respect, for the next 4 years our increase will average only 145 which gives a total of 580 during that period. The increase in the number of midshipmen must be such that in the 6 following years there must be supplied the difference between 2,080 (the number required in 10 years) and 580 (the number obtained in 4 years), a total of 1,500. This means an average increase during this 6-year period of 250, or 105 more than the present output. Although the number required will not be twice that being furnished, it will be necessary to double the number of appointments to the Naval Academy in order to permit of the desirable and necessary weeding-out process that is so essential in order to obtain graduates who can reasonably be expected to make good officers. We must conclude, then, that in order to obtain the necessary number of line officers as soon as practicable, there should be legislation authorizing the doubling of appointments to the Naval Academy for a period of 6 years.

One of the greatest faults in all personnel legislation affecting the officers has been the rule to fix definitely the number of officers allowed in each of the grades of lieutenant and above, instead of having the number in each grade determined by a definite percentage basis so that any increase in the total numbers would be felt in the proper proportions in each grade. The fallacy of such legislation as we are now laboring under can not better be illustrated than in the case of the lieutenants (junior grade). In 1905 there was not an officer of this grade in the Navy. To-day there are over 700 of them and the number is increasing more than 100 a year. Under the present laws and rules the officers at the bottom of this list must remain in their present grade for 30 years. This condition has been brought about mainly through the absence of a proper distribution of the officers in the various grades. Our second conclusion, therefore, must be to the effect that immediate legislation should be enacted which places and keeps the various grades in a definite ratio to each other. What should this ratio be? There is an apparent tendency towards making such a ratio depend on a tonnage basis; that there should be so many flag officers, captains, commanders, etc., for each 1,000 tons of ships. This basis may be satisfactory for a few years, but after that, unless the proportions between the ships of various classes do not change, there must be a readjustment. Changes are bound to take place and therefore readjustments will be necessary. These can easily be made, but as they

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will be necessary, a better basis for apportioning the officers in the various grades would be in accordance with our actual requirements for each grade in case of war, rather than on a continually changing tonnage basis.

In Tables I and VI are shown the numbers of line officers now in each grade and the numbers there should be for immediate war service. By placing these numbers in parallel columns together with the percentages in each grade, it is a simple matter to determine what the numbers in each grade should be with our present total and what they should be based on a total of 4,000 commissioned line officers, which number has been determined on as being requisite for a peace basis 10 years from now.

TABLE XI.—*Proportion of commissioned line officers in grades.*

Grade.	1[1] Number now on active list (extra numbers in parentheses).	2 Percentage in each grade.	3 Number required for war purposes, Table VI.	4 Percentage in each grade.	5 Number should be in each grade at present, based on column 4.	6 Number that should be in each grade, based on total of 4,000.	7 Increase required in each grade within next 10 years.
Flag officers	24 (6)	1.3	69	1.6	34	65	41
Captains	90 (20)	4.7	173	3.9	75	155	65
Commanders	122 (10)	6.4	271	6.1	117	245	123
Lieutenant commanders	204 (4)	10.6	564	12.7	244	505	301
Lieutenants	351 (1)	18.3	1,272	28.6	550	1,145	794
Lieutenants (junior grade)	761	39.6	1,041	23.4	450	935	174
Ensigns	368	19.1	1,050	23.7	450	950	582
Totals	1,920	100	4,440	100	1,920	4,000	2,080

[1] The high percentages of captains and commanders are due to the numbers in those grades designated as "extra numbers" and who are in addition to the authorized total. Extra numbers are not included in column 5.

Column 2 shows the present distribution of the commissioned line officers in accordance with the percentages of the total. Column 4 shows what these percentages should be in order to make the distribution equitable, and column 5 shows the numbers that should now be in each grade in accordance with the percentages given in column 5. In order to make this redistribution there should be immediate legislation to the following effect:

Immediately on the passage of the act the various grades of commissioned line officers shall be readjusted so that the percentage of the whole number in each grade will be:

	Per cent.
Flag officers	1.6
Captains	3.9
Commanders	6.1
Lieutenant commanders	12.7
Lieutenants	28.6
Lieutenants (junior grade) and ensigns	47.1

Another section should provide that on the 1st day of July of each year an adjustment in the various grades shall be made on this same percentage basis, which shall remain effective for 10 years, when the Secretary of the Navy shall require a board of officers to recommend whether or not the percentage basis should be changed. Such readjustment to be made thereafter in accordance with the recommendations of the board.

So far as the commissioned line officers are concerned, these two provisions, together with the increase of midshipmen at the Naval Academy, are all that are necessary to place this personnel on a proper basis. That this is so will be demonstrated.

The first provision which requires an immediate readjustment would result in the following promotions: Sixteen captains to flag officers, 21 commanders to captains, 26 lieutenant commanders to commanders, 70 lieutenants to lieutenant commanders, 270 lieutenants (junior grade) to lieutenants.

The numbers thus promoted are not large when it is considered that in each case a greater number of officers are performing the duties of the next higher grade. This readjustment will remedy the injury done by the abolishing of the selection-out board and the policy of the Navy Department not to accept voluntary retirements.

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All of the lieutenants (junior grade) who would be immediately promoted are now performing the duties of the senior grade, and all of them will have been six years or longer in their present grade.

The provision for adjusting the numbers in each grade on the 1st of July each year will provide for the necessary flow of promotion. It has been shown that during the next four years there will be an average annual increase of 145 line officers. This total increase when properly distributed in accordance with the percentages recommended, will give a yearly increase in the allowed numbers in each grade as follows:

Flag officers	2
Captains	6
Commanders	9
Lieutenant commanders	18
Lieutenants	41
Lieutenants (junior grade) and ensigns	68

Therefore this annual readjustment, without the aid of resignations, retirements, and deaths, would result in the following numbers of promotions on the 1st day of each July:

Captains to flag officers	2
Commanders to captains	8
Lieutenant commanders to commanders	17
Lieutenants to lieutenant commanders	35
Lieutenants (junior grade) to lieutenants	76

But, even without the assistance of the selecting-out board and the voluntary retirements, we know from the results of recent years that the resignations, deaths, and retirements due to age and disability will make the following averages in promotions:

Above the grade of captain	7
Above the grade of commander	9
Above the grade of lieutenant commander	12
Above the grade of lieutenant	16
Above the grade of lieutenant (junior grade)	22

These added to the numbers to be promoted due to the annual increase in the various grades will give an average yearly advancement as shown below:

Captains to flag officers	9
Commanders to captains	17
Lieutenant commanders to commanders	29
Lieutenants to lieutenant commanders	51
Lieutenants (junior grade) to lieutenants	98

Four years after the 1st of next July the total line officers would (owing to the increase in midshipmen) be augmented annually by 250. We would then have during the six years following an average increase in each grade as follows:

Flag officers	4
Captains	10
Commanders	15
Lieutenant commanders	32
Lieutenants	72
Lieutenants (junior grade) and ensigns	117

This would result in the following promotions on the 1st day of each July:

Captains to flag officers	4
Commanders to captains	14
Lieutenant commanders to commanders	29
Lieutenants to lieutenant commanders	61
Lieutenants (junior grade) to lieutenants	133

As the total line officers increase, the number of vacancies due to resignations, deaths, and retirements for age and disability must increase also, so the average yearly vacancies created from these causes during the six-year period may reasonably be counted on as—

Above the grade of captain	10
Above the grade of commander	13
Above the grade of lieutenant commander	17
Above the grade of lieutenant	22
Above the grade of lieutenant (junior grade)	30

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The following annual promotions would be obtained by adding these numbers to those showing the annual increase in the various grades:

Captains to flag officers	14
Commanders to captains	27
Lieutenant commanders to commanders	46
Lieutenants to lieutenant commanders	83
Lieutenants (junior grade) to lieutenants	163

The foregoing demonstrates the important fact that, if the present law requiring ensigns to serve as such for three years remains effective, and if new legislation is obtained doubling the number of midshipmen for a period of six years and fixing the numbers of officers in each grade on a definite percentage basis, we can, during the next 10 years, bring the line of the Navy up to a satisfactory strength and at the same time provide a proper flow of promotion without resorting to any schemes contemplating selection up, selection out, or the formation of an active reserve list.

The legislation necessary for the satisfactory operation of any plans requiring any form of promotion by selection is complicated. The opinions, both within and without the service, as to the best form of selection are numerous and varied. The best method for deciding who are to be selected has not been demonstrated to the satisfaction of a large majority of the officers concerned. Consequently, there is, at present, no prospect of obtaining any legislation pertaining to promotion by selection that will produce the desired results. There will be so much opposition to any forms of selection out or selection up that have been suggested or contemplated, that the mere presence of any such clause in a proposed bill will probably be sufficient to prevent its passage. Therefore the present needs for practicable legislation necessitates the elimination of any recommendation for promotion by selection. The greater efficiency that would result in satisfactory legislation of this character must be sacrificed owing to more pressing needs that have better prospects of being remedied. We need now, more than anything else, numbers and a proper flow of promotion. As both of these can be obtained by simple legislation that does not involve any method of selection, or the formation of anything resembling an active reserve list, every proper endeavor should be made to obtain the simple legislation, especially as the chances for passage are increased in proportion to the simplicity of the proposed bill.

It will be 10 years before sufficient numerical strength can be obtained to make it desirable or necessary to deplete the number of officers by any method of selection out or selection up. Before this time arrives there probably will have been organized a general staff composed of officers from all corps, and on which the seagoing personnel will be in the majority. Such a staff, created by act of Congress and containing some of the most efficient officers of all the various corps, will, of necessity, have the confidence of the Congress, which creates it, the Secretary of the Navy, and of the entire service. This staff will be able to devise the best and most satisfactory form of selection and to arrange the method for carrying it into effect.

The subject is one that requires the mature deliberation and action of such a staff. If, when the time approaches, indicating the necessity for promotion by selection, a general staff has not been created, it will be necessary to have a board appointed to make recommendations for the necessary legislation. But no board will be able to make a report that meets with the approval of and has the support of the service at large unless the board is composed in the main of seagoing officers both of the line and of the staff corps. As the various staff corps are in practically the same unsatisfactory numerical condition as in the line, any legislation for the purpose of improving personnel conditions must include those corps. It is essential that these corps be not discriminated against in any way, and therefore there should be enacted into law the following provisions:

First. That in the various staff corps the percentage of the whole number in each grade shall be the same as that authorized for the line.

Second. That for each annual increase in the number of line officers there shall be the same percentage of increase in each of the various staff corps.

These two provisions are all that are necessary to place the staff on an equitable footing with the line so far as numbers in each grade, total numbers, and flow of promotion are concerned.

To summarize, it is concluded that in order to take immediate steps to place the commissioned personnel on a satisfactory basis as soon as practicable endeavors should be made to have the following simple legislation enacted:

1. The doubling of the numbers of midshipmen for a period of six years.
2. The readjustment of the various grades of line officers on a proper percentage basis.
3. The retention of this percentage basis as the total number increases.

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4. The staff corps to have the same percentages in each grade as authorized for the line.

5. The percentage of increase in the various staff corps to be the same as the annual percentage of increase in the line.

The active service, 10 years from now, should have 4,000 commissioned line officers, and 100,000 enlisted men. These numbers are only 75 per cent of the totals that would be required to man all the material in case of war. It will therefore be necessary to increase our available reserves to 1,350 line officers and 33,000 enlisted men. There are now this many officers if we include 650 undergraduates at the Naval Academy. Efforts should be made to produce this total without making it necessary to send the midshipmen to sea. The total of 33,000 men can be obtained if the undesirable portions of the naval reserve act are expunged and if endeavors are made to increase the Naval militia organizations. The naval militia is the best medium through which to obtain the necessary reserve officers.

Warning must again be given against the organization of reserves that are qualified for service in peace times only. The maintenance of such reserves is a waste of public money and their attempted training a waste of time. In addition, the presence of such a reserve on paper leads to a false sense of security that may prove disastrous when reliance must be placed on them in case of war. It must also be reiterated that such desirable organizations that may be composed of the fishermen, tugboat men and yachtsmen for the purpose of manning their own vessels in time of war, can not in any way be considered as an effective reserve so far as the manning of the regular Navy ships and shore stations is concerned.

CONCLUSION.

The apathy concerning the naval personnel has resulted in the adherence to false principles which account for the present unsatisfactory conditions. These false principles are:

First. The sacrifice of efficiency to economy.

Second. The subordination of the personnel to the material.

Third. The construction of new vessels and the establishment of additional shore stations without provision for the personnel necessary to man and to operate them.

Fourth. The restriction of the number of officers in each of the upper grades instead of having a percentage basis as the means for determining the number in each grade.

Legislation which will enable the Navy to abandon these false principles has long been needed. The European war has shown our people that preparedness is essential for successful military and naval operations. Our representatives in Congress appreciate this. They are ready to enact the required legislation provided the actual needs of the Navy are presented in clear and concise form, without the introduction of complicated and complex features. It has been shown that only simple legislation is necessary to produce the much desired improvements in our personnel situation. Therefore it would be better for the present, to abandon the advocacy of any legislation that by reason of its mere complexity may defeat the ends in view.

Although good men with poor ships are better than poor men with good ships, we must awake to the realization that in order to be successful in war as it is waged to-day we must have both good men and good ships in adequate numbers to make defeat impossible.

Capt. TAUSSIG. The inadequacy of the personnel, as shown by the report of the General Board, and by the figures deduced by the officers of the enlisted personnel division of the Bureau of Navigation, was clearly demonstrated at this time, 1915, and in the following years. As the department did not recommend and did not strive to obtain an increase in the personnel at this time, the efficiency of the entire Navy was clearly adversely affected both preceding and during the Great War.

This will be shown by quoting from official reports.

SERIOUS SHORTAGE OF PERSONNEL IN ATLANTIC FLEET.

In the spring of 1915, which was only a few months after the General Board recommended an immediate increase of 19,600 enlisted

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men, and the Secretary reported no additional enlisted personnel was needed, Rear Admiral F. F. Fletcher, the commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet, made the following report to the Navy Department on the personnel situation of the fleet:

Shortage of personnel.—The most vital weakness in the Atlantic Fleet is the shortage of officers. It takes approximately 10 years to educate and train an officer, and no amount of legislation can provide officers when trouble is imminent. Expansion of the Navy is limited by the number of officers available. The fleet is handicapped not alone by the shortage of officers but by the inexperience of the large number of young officers that have been added to the Navy in the past few years.

This condition, coupled with the shortage of officers, has resulted in officers being ordered to duties beyond their capacities and for which their experience and judgment do not fit them. Owing to the short enlistments, our men require continuous training, and any shortage of officers is certain to result in a lessening of efficiency. The shortage of officers is not confined to battleships, but exists in all types of ships. Second in importance to the shortage of officers is the shortage of men. The shortage of men is put as of secondary importance to the shortage of officers, since there will always be a reserve of trained men; and untrained men can be made efficient in much less time than is required for developing officers. The shortage of men in the Atlantic Fleet, coupled with the shortage of officers, has prevented the fleet from attaining the degree of efficiency that is to be expected. Too much emphasis can not be placed on what I believe to be the most serious weakness in the fleet to-day—lack of trained officers and shortage of enlisted men. To equalize the shortage in the different vessels there results a constant exchange of officers and men tending to promote instability and to weaken the efficiency of the various units of the fleet. With a few exceptions every vessel of the Atlantic Fleet is short of the complement of officers and men necessary for battle. The shortage of enlisted men in the battleships alone, as I reported in January, 1915, exceeds 5,000 men. It is evident that undermanned and underofficered ships can not be kept in a state of preparedness and efficiency to meet on equal terms similar types in other navies. I believe that all ships in full commission attached to the active fleet should be kept fully manned for battle, ready for any duty to which they might be called. In no other way can the units of the fleet be kept in a thoroughly efficient state.

Emphasis must be placed on this report of the commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet, coming at a time when the department reported no additional enlisted personnel as necessary. It is an admission that the units of the fleet were not in an efficient state, and this admission is made by the commander in chief.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the date?

Capt. TAUSSIG. It was made in the spring of 1915, and immediately after the target practice that year. The exact date I have not, but it was in the spring of 1915.

That this shortage of personnel was felt by all classes of vessels, and was recognized by officers of wide difference in rank as very detrimental to efficiency, and that it did adversely affect the efficiency of the Navy, is shown by the following extracts taken from official reports made to the Navy Department in 1915 by fleet gunnery officer, Atlantic Fleet, Lieut. Commander, now Capt., T. A. Kearney.

The CHAIRMAN. These reports were made when?

Capt. TAUSSIG. These were all made in 1915, at the time that the department reported that we needed no additional personnel. [Reading:]

I feel that we can not too strongly urge that immediate attention be given to the question of providing an adequate and permanent personnel. Every problem, every exercise, every practice, that we have engaged in during the past year has but emphasized the fact that we have neither the officers nor the men necessary to the efficient manning of our battle stations. The constant changing of officers, coupled with the all too prevalent practice of assigning to juniors duty beyond their years, experience, and ability, is wrong. The unsatisfactory conditions as regards personnel are so apparently common to every organization in the fleet—battleships, destroyers, sub-

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marines, and auxiliaries—and have during the past year been made the subject of repeated report.

Gunnery efficiency is concomitant with general efficiency, and both are directly dependent upon the efficiency of the commissioned and enlisted personnel.

Gunnery officer, Atlantic Fleet (Lieut. Commander, now Capt., T. A. Kearney):

"Improvement and incentive will also come if the department will direct its efforts—

"(*a*) To an increase in complements of both the enlisted personnel and commissioned personnel.

"(*b*) To the prevention of inopportune detachments of officers and transfers of men and to the creation of such impediments as will render discharge, either by pruchase or expiration of enlistment practically impossible, except during overhaul periods.

"Recent investigations along entirely independent lines fully confirm the contentions set forth in the target practice reports of the *Wyoming*, *Texas*, *Arkansas*, and *Georgia*, and other ships, that our present maintained complements, including both officers and men, are inadequate to even peace time target practice requirements. Continued cruising under war conditions would be physically impossible; even now, when continuing night and day practices are indulged in, a large percentage of the personnel remain more or less, continuously on active duty until the practices are completed. Not only do we lack a reserve to draw upon for replacements due to daily casualties, but we are so hard pressed to man existing and essential stations that a considerable proportion of both officers and men are doing double duty to the detriment of their paramount activities. Broadside battery crews are in part but paper organizations; and the personnel of handling room crews are all too frequently a heterogeneous combination of engineer's force, marines, and such other men as can be best spared from some other less exacting employment—men whose initial interest and allegiance are to other duties and divisions. These are conditions that exist to-day and have existed for some time. It is pertinent to ask what would we do should war be declared to-morrow.

"The shortages in personnel are as apparent in the flotilla as in the other vessels of the fleet. With the present complements it is manifest that the exacting requirements of continuous service could not be met."

Executive officer, U. S. S. *Florida* (Commander, now Capt., W. S. Crosley):

"It is a fact that every effort has been made to retain individuals at their stations in which they have drilled, and it is probable that the *Florida* does not suffer more than other ships on account of shifting personnel. However, it can not be denied that the complement is so small that the loss of one man is felt, and that the shifting personnel decreases efficiency."

Commanding officer U. S. S. *Georgia* (Capt., now Admiral, R. E. Coontz, Chief of Operations):

"The serious shortage of officers and men on board all battleships and especially the old ones, is a matter of record. The extreme seriousness of this condition must be known by the department."

Commanding officer U. S. S. *Kansas* (Capt., now Rear Admiral, H. F. Bryan):

"The existing shortage of personnel on ships of this class was shown by the means that had to be employed to man properly the 8-inch turrets of this ship."

Gunnery officer U. S. *Nebraska* (Lieut., now Commander, G. V. Stewart):

"This ship suffers severely from the lack of officers and men and more from the lack of permanence in their duties and stations."

Commanding officer U. S. S. *New Jersey* (Capt., now Rear Admiral, J. L. Jayne):

"The efficiency of a ship or a fleet at the commencement of war will depend upon its preparation before is declared, and if not ready with an aggressive enemy, there may not be an opportunity to complete the preparations before a disaster has occurred. It is therefore highly important that each ship in commission be kept ready. With the frequency with officers and men are now transferred, together with the scarcity of both, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to do this."

Gunnery officer U. S. S. *South Carolina* (Lieut., now Commander, T. G. Ellyson):

"There was a certain amount of artificiality in connection with this practice, owing to the shortage of complement."

Commanding officer U. S. S. *Utah* (Capt., now Rear Admiral, H. P. Niblack):

"At every battle drill or practice the serious shortage of trained officers and men in one particular or another is forcibly brought to our attention."

Commanding officer U. S. S. *Kansas* (Capt., now Rear Admiral, H. F. Bryan):

"* * * It must be admitted that we are not making progress in gunnery that we should. This lack of progress is believed to be due principally to two conditions which affect all ships—the shortage of commissioned and enlisted personnel; the constant shifting of the personnel."

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Commander First Division, Atlantic Fleet (Rear Admiral Mayo):

"Particular attention is invited to the remarks of the gunnery officer, *New York*, relative to the lack of permanency of personnel and to the fact that the ship is underofficered and undermanned."

Gunnery officer U. S. S. *New York* (Lieut. Commander G. J. Rowcliff):

"I consider the lack of the permanency of the personnel the most fruitful producer of inefficiency that we have. It seems that it is impossible to depend on the continuance on board of either officers or men longer than to get a smattering of what is expected of them. Add to this that the ships are underofficered and undermanned and the situation resolves itself into one where stations are filled because the names are written in the book rather than because the individual is chosen to fill the station."

Gunnery officer U. S. S. *New York* (Commander G. J. Rowcliff):

"In previous reports I have made the statement that one of the principal reasons why our target practice work is crude and never progresses further than the elementary stages is that the personnel changes so fast that it is impossible to put the work on a stable footing. Everyone admits that the situation in regard to personnel has been growing more active day by day. Those responsible for the detail of officers and men have for some time been living an existence from hand to mouth because there is no reserve to call upon when it becomes necessary to fill vacancies."

Commander in chief Asiatic Fleet (Admiral W. C. Cowles):

"The *Saratoga* was at the navy yard, Olongapo, from the 19th of February until the 20th of May undergoing repairs, and during this time her ordinance officer was detached on April 1, and it was impossible to send any officer to the *Saratoga* to replace him. In the meantime there were 70 men in the deck force short of complement, and there was a shortage of officers in addition."

Executive officer U. S. S. *Florida* (Commander, now Capt., W. S. Crosley):

"The shortage in personnel, however, was amply emphasized by this practice * * *."

Gunnery officer U. S. S. *Rhode Island* (Lieut., now Commander, W. R. van Auken):

"There should be more officers on board to provide for war conditions.

"In order to simultaneously man both sides of the 6-inch and 3-inch batteries 75 more men are necessary.

"It is believed that the deficiencies and changes in personnel are the most important factors which prevent ships being at all times in a top-notch state of battle efficiency."

REPORT OF ELEMENTARY PRACTICE, 1915–16.

Commander Third Division, Battleship Squadron (Rear Admiral Coffman):

"The division commander can not too strongly impress upon the department the great handicap the ships of this division suffer because of lack of adequate personnel in men and officers. The allowed complements are considered far too small to properly man battle stations, and this deficiency is always accentuated by a shortage of personnel below allowed complements. Such a condition of affairs necessitates the doubling up of duties, some of which are more or less incompatible, with consequent loss of efficiency."

Commanding officer U. S. S. *Arkansas* (Capt., now Rear Admiral, W. R. Shoemaker):

"The pressing need just now for battle efficiency is a fair degree of performance in personnel. Absence of it is serious with the men, but especially so with the officers. Perhaps the *Arkansas* is no worse off than others, but these conditions do not conduce to efficiency."

Commanding officer U. S. S. *Utah* (Capt., now Rear Admiral, A. S. Halstead):

"The obvious defect in the ship is the lack of permanence of personnel, presumably caused by the shortage of officers and men. No lasting results will be obtained until some degree in permanency in personnel is brought about."

Executive officer U. S. S. *Utah* (Commander, now Capt., E. H. Watson):

"The incredible number of changes in officers and men in every ship is the principle reason for lack of efficiency."

The above reports just quoted mostly come from our battleships in full commission, those few ships which in accordance with the General Board and Commander in Chief should be fully manned at all times.

There are many other reports and letters in the files of the Bureau of Navigation and department which substantiate this deplorable condition of the personnel. In the Secretary of the Navy's annual report, dated December 1, 1915, recommendation was made that

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Congress authorize an increase of 10,000 men, which would bring the total authorized enlisted strength to 61,500.

In 1915 the General Board recommended:

With full war complements for all ships of the Navy ready for service in 1917 and a minimum number required at shore stations 74,700 men will be needed. In addition upon the outbreak of war the personnel of the Navy must be greatly expanded to provide for aviation, coast-defense districts, patrol craft, and other auxiliary duties of every sort, as well as for a reserve of men under training to replace casualties. The Coast Guard, Naval Militia, and Naval Reserve will be far from sufficient to meet these demands. The Navy is the first line of defense of the country. For peace requirements in the fiscal year 1917 the General Board regards as inadequate any smaller force than 67,000 men in the regular Navy.

The department requested a strength of only 61,500 men, which was 5,500 less than the smallest force the General Board recommended for peace requirements. The General Board's estimate was figured on the inadequate complements allowed at the time, and not on the adequate complements recommended by the Commander in Chief and other officers. The department continued to take no adequate steps toward providing sufficient trained personnel for war purposes. The Naval Reserve law which had been passed would not provide trained men in large numbers for years to come.

The very unsatisfactory condition in which the Navy had become, owing to inadequacy of personnel, was fully appreciated by the Chief of Bureau of Navigation in August, 1916. He recommended to the department an immediate increase of enlisted personnel to an active force of 93,957 men. He also recommended that "from 5 to 10 per cent be added to this number for increased complements and working surplus, and the authorized enlisted strength should be increased to this number in time for the necessary recruiting and training." The reserves were considered to be necessary in addition to the above. While up to this time the department recommended an active force of only 61,500 men, we suddenly find the number jumping to 93,957 men plus 5 to 10 per cent for casualties, 10 per cent of this number would make the total for the three-year building program 102,000, or approximately 49,000 more than the department a few months previously had recommended.

The chief of bureau, Admiral Palmer, also recommended that in order to provide for the shortage of officers "that the appointments allowed each Senator and each Member of the House of Representatives be increased; that the course of the Naval Academy be reduced to three years until the shortage is made up; and that the present first class be graduated on February 1, 1917."

Congress authorized, on August 29, 1916, an immediate increase in the active enlisted personnel to 74,700 men and authorized the President in emergency to bring the total to 93,000. The Secretary had recommended only 61,500 men. This was the first really adequate steps toward placing the personnel on a proper footing.

These recommendations and the corresponding action of Congress came too late to permit having an adequate personnel by the time this country entered the war, a few months later. In the meantime the efficiency of the entire fleet was adversely affected as shown by the following official reports made to the Navy Department in 1916 and in the spring of 1917 up to the time of our actual entry into the war.

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I will read extracts from some of these reports. These were in 1916. [Reading:]

SPRING OF 1916.

Fleet gunnery officer, Atlantic Fleet (Lieut. Commander, now Capt., T. A. Kearney):

"The demand for an increase in personnel has been general and insistent throughout all organizations of the fleet.

"With adequate complements and a permanency of detail we may reasonably expect a corresponding increase in general efficiency."

Commanding officer U. S. S. *New York* (Capt., now Admiral, Hugh Rodman):

"So much has been said by others concerning the frequent changes in personnel that there is little or nothing that can be added to it. Yet if is one of the glaring causes of poor target practice. * * *

"This (team work) can not be obtained when officers and men are continually changed, as at present."

Gunnery officer U. S. S. *South Carolina* (Lieut., now Commander T. G. Ellyson):

"Failure to obtain better results from gunnery in the fleet is primatily due to the fact that the officers who are running the gunnery jobs have not the necessary rank or experience. * * *"

Gunnery officer U. S. S. *Arkansas* (Lieut. Commander, now Commander, D. A. Weaver):

"Lack or permanency of personnel seriously affects the battle efficiency of the fleet * * *."

Gunnery officer U. S. S. *New Jersey* (Lieut., now Commander, L. N. McNair):

"There are not enough officers on the ship to properly man all battle stations and at the same time carry out the requirements of the Navy Regulations. * * *"

"There are not enough men on the ship to properly man 6-inch and 3-inch batteries while all other battle stations are manned."

Gunnery officer U. S. S. *Wyoming* (Lieut., now Commander, R. S. Holmes):

"The shortage in personnel was especially noticeable at division practice. Handling-room crews were depleted to such an extent that continuous loading would have been impossible. The shortage and lack in permanence of personnel is most discouraging."

Gunnery officer U. S. S. *San Diego* (Lieut., now Commander, G. C. Pegram):

"The ship is seriously handicapped by the shortage of personnel and officers to properly man the complete battle stations without having to shift from one station to another. This and the constant shifting of personnel prevents attaining a high state of efficiency."

REPORT OF BATTLE PRACTICE, AUTUMN, 1916.

Commander battleship force, Atlantic Fleet (Vice Admiral Coffman):

"During the preparation most of the ships in one way or another called attention to the shortage and changes in personnel and in some cases to the lack of suitable material for training. This condition is well known and a matter of record and considerable correspondence, and will not be enlarged upon. It is sufficient to say that adequate personnel is essential not only to man the battle stations, but there must be a reserve to draw on in order that expirations of enlistments may be adequately anticipated."

Commander battleship division 5 (Rear Admiral Dunn):

"The division commander is of the opinion that the paramount cause for the failure of the above-mentioned ships to make a better showing was due to their long stay at navy yards with reduced complement and lack of permanence in personnel."

Commander battleship division 7 (Rear Admiral T. S. Rodgers):

"During the year ending September 30, 1916, the *Florida* took up on the pay rolls 33 officers and transferred 25; the *Florida* received 530 men and transferred 535. The *Utah* received 36 officers and transferred 25; the *Utah* received 466 men and transferred 512. A fair degree of permanency of personnel is necessary for a high standard of efficiency, and no amount of drill and standardization can counteract the evil effects of constant changes in personnel."

Gunnery officer U. S. S. *Arkansas* (Lieut., now Commander, W. E. Eberle):

"The same obstacles which always exist, lack of permanency of personnel and lack of time for training were met with in the preparation for this practice. * * * If the first obstacle, lack of permanency of personnel, can be overcome, the second one, lack of time for training, will automatically disappear."

Turret officer U. S. S. *Arkansas* (Lieut., now Lieut. Commander, Monroe Kelly):

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"In the preparation for short-range battle practice one of the greatest troubles the division officer had to contend with was the frequent changes in personnel. It has been stated quite often that one reason why our work in target practice is so crude and never progresses beyond a certain stage is that the personnel changes so fast that it is impossible to put the work on a stable footing."

Commanding officer U. S. S. *Michigan* (Capt., now Rear Admiral, Brittain):

"It has been necessary to train almost a complete new outfit of pointers for each broadside and turret gun, due to the big changes being continually made in the personnel."

Gunnery officer U. S. S. *Delaware* (Lieut., now Commander, Logan Cresap):

"No other fact has been so forcibly brought out by this practice as the effect of shifting personnel. Altogether some 28 officers on this vessel were utilized in conducting the ship control, fire control, and gunnery work. Of these some 15 (including the commanding officer, executive officer, navigator, and gunnery officer) or some 55 per cent had joined the ship since she last fired, and 6, or 22 per cent, were in the same or equal positions as held on previous practice. Figures can be given on loading crews, pointers, etc., but figures are unnecessary in this report in this respect. Suffice it to say that the situation was as bad, if not worse with the crew than with the officers.

"* * * Altogether the complement of the ship is short, on a peace basis, some 75 men."

Gunnery officer U. S. S. *Minnesota* (Lieut., now Lieut. Commander, J. H. Collins):

"The same trouble is still being experienced with lack of permanency of personnel. For several years this unfortunate condition has existed, and there seems to be no immediate relief in view."

Gunnery officer, U. S. S. *Texas* (Lieut., now Commander, H. L. Pence):

"On this ship there is a serious lack of men to properly man stations for battle."

Commanding officer U. S. S. *Vermont* (Capt., now Rear Admiral, H. O. Stickney):

"The necessity for permanence of personnel can not be too much emphasized. So long as the Navy has too few men to man those ships that must be kept in service, just so long will it be inevitable that many changes will be required, and ships will often be short-handed. To remedy this there should be a surplus of men. * * *."

Commander battleship force, Atlantic Fleet (Vice Admiral Coffman):

"The commander battleship force considers that the provision at all times of an adequate personnel is necessary. It is apparent that a large number of faults of material are chargeable in the final analysis to the inadequacy and inexperience of personnel, caused by the fact that there has not been available an excess of personnel for training in time of peace.

"The deficiencies in operation can best be handled by improving the methods and opportunities for training. In this respect there are two fundamental difficulties that can not be well handled by the commander battleship force. In order that the personnel may be highly developed, it is necessary that there be maintained on each ship not only a full complement of officers and men, but a surplus complement in order that reliefs for anticipated vacancies may be put in training to occupy designated positions when prospective vacancies occur. This condition, it is evident, is very hard to realize, but it is hoped that eventually the effectiveness of training and the efficiency of operation may be increased by a proper adequacy and permanence of personnel."

Those are the reports we had up to the 1st of January, 1917, a few months before we entered the war.

The foregoing extracts deal almost entirely with the condition of the battleship force up to a few months before our entry into the war. It should be pointed out that the battleships were, on the whole, better provided with personnel than any other force.

These quoted extracts taken from official reports show:

1. That the entire Navy, for several years prior to the entrance of this country into the war and up to the time of actual hostilities was not as efficient as it should be owing to lack of necessary personnel.

2. That this state of affairs was reported to the department by the General Board, by the commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet, and numbers of other officers.

3. That the department took no adequate steps to remedy the situation.

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4. That the department's policy in regard to personnel was one of unpreparedness rather than one of preparedness.

It is not my province to point out the result of this lack of preparedness policy so far as it affected the entire Navy during the war, as there are many with first-hand information that can do this better than I.

However, as I commanded destroyers before and during the war, and was for some time the senior destroyer commander in the Navy, I desire, with the committee's permission to make a statement in regard to this service.

The CHAIRMAN. What committee is that?

Capt. TAUSSIG. With regard to the destroyer service.

Before leaving the Bureau of Navigation in 1915 it was necessary in order that destroyers recommended by the General Board to be kept in full commission be retained in this status to reduce their then allowed peace complements by 25 per cent. After a trial was given in operating on these reduced complements the experiment proved a failure, and the old complements were reestablished. However, the reestablishment of these old complements did not mean that the destroyers would be provided with the personnel required. In fact, they could not be so provided, as the personnel was not available; it did not exist, and it was manifestly impossible to provide that which did not exist.

The following extracts from the official reports made during 1916 show how the bad personnel situation affected the destroyers.

These are the reports made during the year previous to our entry into the war. [Reading:]

Commander Destroyer Force, Atlantic Fleet (Rear Admiral, now Admiral, Gleaves):

"Throughout the period of training the complements of ships were short, so much so, in fact, that from time to time it became necessary to transfer men from ship to ship in order that all vessels might operate. Such transfers frequently broke up gun crews and pointer groups in training."

(This is followed by a table showing the average per cent of vacancies in the 24 destroyers to be 15 per cent of their allowed complements.)

Spring and fall, 1916.

Gunnery officer U. S. S. *Nicholson* (Lieut., now Lieut. Commander, L. C. Shiebla):

"The shortage of personnel made it necessary to employ men at stations that they could not man in time of war."

Gunnery officer U. S. S. *Nicholson* (Lieut., now Lieut. Commander, L. C. Shiebla):

"This ship is operating on a reduced complement, which makes it necessary to employ engineer's force on stations that should be manned by deck force. Consequently either the battery or the engineer's work is neglected."

Gunnery officer U. S. S. *Nicholson* (Lieut., now Lieut. Commander, L. C. Shiebla):

"* * * it is felt that the practice was artificial, inasmuch as there were not enough officers and men on board to properly man the battle stations necessary for war conditions."

Gunnery officer U. S. S. *Aylwin* (Lieut., now Commander, J. S. Barleon):

"The present reduced complement absolutely necessitates the use of every man in the deck force as a member of a gun's crew.

"It is considered that five officers is the minimum requirement for a war complement of vessels of this type.

"The present reduced complement is utterly inadequate."

Commanding officer U. S. S. *McDougal* (Lieut. Commander, now Commander, A. P. Fairfield):

"The practice showed conclusively that four officers are not sufficient in time of war.

"If a destroyer is worth the time and money spent in preparing her for war, she is also worth the slight additional cost of two more officers to afford her the protection of accurate gunfire."

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Commanding officer U. S. S. *Wadsworth* (Lieut. Commander, now Capt., J. K. Taussig):

"The complement, both officers and men, is not sufficient for a proper ship control, guns and torpedo tubes, and at the same time keep an adequate ammunition supply and run the engines with fires under all four boilers."

Gunnery officer U. S. S. *Balch* (Lieut. J. M. Cresap):

"The shortage in personnel is an ever-present handicap, one gun crew being composed of a ship's cook, coppersmith, and four firemen. There are not enough men on the ship to man all guns and torpedo tubes, magazines, and handling rooms with enough men below for full-power steaming, as would be necessary in time of battle."

Commanding officer U. S. S. *Dale* (Lieut., now Commander V. K. Coman):

"* * * with a shortage of one-seventh of the ship's company, are the direct and attributable reasons for the division as a whole not making better success."

Gunnery officer U. S. S. *Ericsson* (Lieut., now Lieut. Commander R. M. Doyle, jr.):

"This ship was placed at a serious disadvantage on account of nonpermanence and shortage of men."

Commanding officer U. S. S. *Jacob Jones* (Lieut. Commander, now Commander W. S. Pye):

"This ship has been from 12 to 14 men short of her complement during the preparation period."

Commanding officer U. S. S. *Wainwright* (Lieut. Commander, now Commander F. H. Poteet):

"During the quarter in which this practice was held this ship had 85 changes in personnel."

The bad effect of this shortage in personnel, together with the operations of the destroyer force during the year preceding the entrance of the United States into the war, is shown by the unsatisfactory results of the target practice for the year preceding the war. These target practices were held, of course, with the view of making ships efficient for war, and as many vessels as possible were supposed to take part in them. However, only seven destroyers of the whole force held a sufficient number of practices during the year to be classified in the usual manner. In regard to this the department announced to the service in reference to the destroyers:

The gunnery trophy will not be awarded for the gunnery year 1916 because of the small number of vessels completing the year's work and because the scores obtained by these vessels do not warrant the award of the trophy.

Therefore, it is seen that at the outbreak of war even the department recognized that the destroyer force was not as efficient as it should be.

OVERHAUL OF DESTROYERS.

It was customary for the destroyers to go to the navy yards twice a year for overhauling. These periods usually came in the spring and fall.

From January to April, 1917, the destroyer I commanded, the *Wadsworth*, was operating with the fleet in West Indian waters. In addition to carrying on the prescribed target practices, we were, after diplomatic relations were broken off in Febraury, employed on patrol duty and in picketing the fleet. The service was unusually hard and arduous. In fact, from January 8, 1917, the day the *Wadsworth* left the navy yard, until April 13, 1917, the day orders were received to proceed to the navy yard to prepare for distant service—a period of 99 days—the *Wadsworth* was actually under way on 75 of these days. As a result we had had practically no time for general overhauling of hull and machinery.

The other five destroyers selected to accompany the *Wadsworth* had been operating in a similar manner.

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Although I had nothing to do with the selection of the six destroyers which composed the first division to be sent across, I understood that they were selected as being in the best state of preparedness at the time. Although these six destroyers were in fairly good condition, they were, after three months of hard and continuous duty, approaching the time when they should go to the navy yards for their regular spring docking and overhauling, the necessity for which was beginning to be apparent.

Instead of a thorough overhauling we had six days in which to dock and make repairs and to prepare for distant service, and for any and every duty on which we might be called.

What this duty was to be we did not know. The division, without tender or supply ship and without knowledge of how or where our next supplies were to be obtained, sailed under sealed orders for an unknown port.

As an example of what had to be done on account of the lack in personnel preparedness, my experiences while commanding destroyers operating in the submarine danger zone may be cited.

For every new destroyer placed in commission, 25 of the best men of their crews were taken from those destroyers actually operating in the face of the enemy in order that these new destroyers could have any really trained men at all.

This resulted in practically all destroyers that remained in the danger zone a year having nearly a complete turnover in their crews. This instability of personnel was the greatest detriment to efficiency. While the destroyers could operate against submarines with some degree of success, I am safe in saying that not a single one of our destroyers in the war zone, shortly after the turnover in personnel commenced, was in really satisfactory or efficient condition for taking part in a fleet action or engaging enemy destroyers. If it had been the intention for the destroyers to engage in such operations it would have taken at least a four months' period of preparation with stable crews away from the war zone before they could have been expected to operate successfully.

It is recognized that this procedure of depleting the class of the destroyers in the war zone was absolutely necessary under the existing conditions of lack of trained personnel in order that the new destroyers could operate. In fact Admiral Palmer, the chief of Bureau of Navigation, cabled Admiral Sims that unless this procedure was taken proper personnel could not be provided for the new destroyers. But such procedure should not have been necessary, nor would it have been necessary had our personnel been adequate at the beginning of the war.

CONCERNING THE NEW DESTROYERS.

I was one of the first destroyer commanders sent home from the war zone to take command of the new war program destroyers. My orders assigned me to duty in connection with the U. S. S. *Little* and to command that vessel when commissioned. The *Little* was the first of the war program to be completed. Owing to delays for various reasons, she was not placed in commission until April 6, 1918, one year after we entered the war.

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All destroyer commanders placed in charge of fitting out these new vessels had the greatest difficulty in obtaining suitable crews. In fact it was not possible to get suitable crews, because the trained personnel did not exist. Each crew was made up approximately of 25 men returned from the war zone, of about 25 additional trained men that were picked up from various sources, and about 50 men with practically no seagoing experience. We could and did operate on convoy duty immediately on being placed in commission.

It would have required a long period of training before we could have operated efficiently or successfully against enemy destroyers or have taken part in fleet action.

SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE.

To summarize the testimony just given it is evident that the following facts have been established:

1. That when the World War started in 1914 the personnel of the United States Navy was entirely inadequate for peace purposes and deplorably deficient should this country be thrown into the war, an event which was apt to occur at any time.

2. That this deplorable and unsatisfactory condition of the personnel was brought to the department's attention by the General Board of the Navy, by the commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet, by the officers of the Enlisted Personnel Division of the Bureau of Navigation, and by many other officers of high rank.

3. That these same officers made repeated and emphatic recommendations to the department that immediate steps be taken to remedy these unsatisfactory conditions, showing conclusively in their reports and recommendations that the efficiency of the entire Navy was adversely affected by the great shortage of personnel.

4. That the department not only ignored these recommendations but took steps to prevent the reports as to the unsatisfactory personnel conditions from being made public, and the Secretary of the Navy in his annual report to the President in the fall of 1914 stated that the numerical strength of the enlisted personnel was adequate, and in his report of 1915 that only an additional 10,000 men were needed, while the General Board in its 1914 report had stated that 19,600 men were immediately needed.

5. That the department did not take adequate steps to provide personnel absolutely necessary for proper conduct of the Navy on even a peace basis, with a result that when this country entered the war in 1917 the ships of the fleet were not as efficient as they should have been and for a large number of ships there was no trained personnel at all.

6. The policy of the department in regard to personnel was one of unpreparedness rather than of preparedness. Such steps as were finally taken were too late to place the personnel on a proper basis by the time this country became involved in the war a few months later.

7. That as a result of this department policy of unpreparedness the larger part of the ships of the Navy operated throughout the war with inadequately trained personnel, and in consequence they were not as efficient as they should have been.

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8. That the efficiency of the destroyers in the war zone was decreased by the necessity caused by our unprepared personnel of sending many of their most efficient men to the United States to form nucleus crews for the new destroyers.

9. That unless these nucleus crews had been taken from those destroyers actually operating in the face of the enemy the department would not have been able to provide sufficient trained personnel for the new destroyers to permit their operating.

10. That the new destroyers commissioned during the war were not efficient for fighting purposes on account of the large proportion of untrained personnel on each one.

The CHAIRMAN. Then, Capt. Taussig, what have you to say in regard to the statement of the Secretary of the Navy in his annual report of 1918 that the Navy from stem to stern had been made ready to the fullest extent possible for any eventuality?

Capt. TAUSSIG. I think, sir, that my statement here covers that.

The CHAIRMAN. You would not say that the personnel of the Navy was ready?

Capt. TAUSSIG. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You have spoken of many changes in personnel on the ships of the Navy. Was that a necessity, to make the changes as they were made?

Capt. TAUSSIG. The instability of the personnel, that is the lack of permanency of officers, was caused entirely by the inadequacy of the numbers. The whole system of providing personnel was one from hand to mouth. There was practically nobody on the receiving ships to fill any vacancies. The consequence was that men were discharged at the expiration of their enlistments, and there was nobody to fill their places, and a man's place was not filled until some man turned up. That could only have been prevented by an adequate personnel. There was no possible way of preventing shifting, so long as we did not have sufficient numbers.

The CHAIRMAN. It was not the custom to assign men to battleships, for certain training on battleships, and then to assign them to destroyers?

Capt. TAUSSIG. Not prior to the war; no, sir. They had to do that after the war commenced, in order to get a trained personnel.

The CHAIRMAN. But prior to the war that was not the system employed in the Navy.

Capt. TAUSSIG. No, sir; we did not have them to train in that way. There were not enough men to fill the complements, much less to have any men on board to train.

The CHAIRMAN. I think you have stated that Admiral Fletcher said it would take 10 years to thoroughly equip an officer.

Capt. TAUSSIG. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. That does not mean, does it, that officers could not be equipped to be of value in the Navy in a much shorter time.

Capt. TAUSSIG. Why, no, sir. It means that an all-around naval officer, one who should be able to perform any duty and every duty commensurate with his rank, can not be trained in less than 10 years.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, officials for the higher commands?

Capt. TAUSSIG. Not necessarily the very highest commands. Subordinate officers on the battleships, such as the heads of various departments, the gunnery officer, the navigator, and men of that

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sort, those officers, in order to be efficient, require at least 10 years' service. We can not possibly do it in less than 10 years.

The CHAIRMAN. But if the recommendations of the officers of the fleet in regard to increase in personnel and in officers, made in 1914 and 1915 had been followed, it would have been possible to have trained officers who would have been of use after the war began.

Capt. TAUSSIG. Oh, yes, it would have given us those younger officers that much sooner and given them that much more training.

The CHAIRMAN. And it would have released the other officers for higher duties.

Capt. TAUSSIG. It would have released them for higher duties. They would have stepped up. It was a step-up process anyway. It was an essential process where the younger officer had to fill the place of the older officer, because the older officer was needed for something else higher up.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Trammell, have you any questions to ask the witness?

Senator TRAMMELL. Admiral Fletcher made that criticism in what year?

Capt TAUSSIG. In the spring of 1915, sir.

Senator TRAMMELL. If you would take that literally then you would have had to start in 1905 with the getting ready of more officers for this war than could have been prophesied probably in 1917—I mean, if we were going to rely upon his statement?

Capt. TAUSSIG. There was a great difference——

Senator TRAMMELL. The present Secretary was not in charge of the Navy Department in 1905, was he?

Capt. TAUSSIG. No, sir.

Senator TRAMMELL. Construing his criticism literally then there was a neglect on the part of the Navy Department in 1905?

Capt. TAUSSIG. No, sir, I do not agree with you there. There were steps being taken in 1905. The great trouble came when the big extension of the matériel of the Navy commenced. The big expansion of the matériel, when those big battleships began to go out, was after 1905. Practically up to 1912 the personnel situation was not acute, because we did not have so much material. It became acute in 1912, when Congress then authorized that the strength be placed at 51,500. In 1905 there was no war imminent. In 1914 there was war imminent, and all the officers of high rank in the Navy believed we were going to be forced into that war, and not only the officers of the highest rank believed that, but the lower ones like myself.

Sanator TRAMMELL. The point I have in mind is that you have always got to be anticipating war 10 years in advance, so far as your officers are concerned, according to his statement, and I do not know of anybody in this country who is so prophetic in his vision of the future that he can anticipate a war 10 years ahead, if it is a matter of preparing for war that is imminent.

Capt. TAUSSIG. There were a good many who anticipated it, sir.

Senator TRAMMELL. That is what you would call purely a matter of guess.

Capt. TAUSSIG. No, sir, it is a study of history.

Senator TRAMMELL. A good many people thought that the world was coming to an end.

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Capt. TAUSSIG. But they had no historical evidence to go by.

Senator TRAMMELL. The Good Book says that there shall be wars and rumors of wars, and soon the end will come. They thought the world would have come to an end by now, but it has not come to an end yet, so you can not always tell about those things.

In 1916, when the recommendation was made that the Navy be increased to 93,750, with a margin of 5 to 10 per cent additional, do you know whether or not that legislation was favored by the Navy Department?

Capt. TAUSSIG. I know this: That in the Secretary's annual report for 1915 he stated that an increase of 10,000 men, which would make the total 61,500, was all that we needed. I know that the testimony before the committee which resulted in a big increase, showed a decided adversity on the part of the Secretary at that time to this increase; that the General Board, represented by Admiral Badger before the committee, made an urgent appeal for the increase, and that the legislation was made, I think, because Congress appreciated that it was necessary—not because the department urged it. That is my view of the situation.

Senator TRAMMELL. That is your view of it, but do you not know whether the Secretary recommended that increase or not in August, 1916?

Capt. TAUSSIG. The only official recommendation of the Secretary that I have seen was in his annual report of 1915, made a few months before these hearings of the committee were held, in which he said that only 10,000 more men were needed. That is all I can give you on that, sir.

Senator TRAMMELL. In the same month in 1915 was the General Board recommending ninety-seven thousand and odd men? Have you any evidence to show that the General Board at that time recommended any more than the 10,000 additional?

Capt. TAUSSIG. The General Board said that——

Senator TRAMMELL. I think you said that they recommended about 5,000 more than the Secretary recommended at that time.

Capt. TAUSSIG. I happen to know something about the inside workings of the General Board at that time, but I do not think it is in my province to tell it because I was not there, and I would suggest that some member of the board be called on to tell you. I do know this—that the General Board knew they had to submit figures that the Secretary would accept. I know that they were restricted.

The CHAIRMAN. Who was at the head of the General Board at that time?

Capt. TAUSSIG. I think Admiral Dewey was still at the head of it. I know that they were restricted in their recommendations, and in order to get this critical situation before the public they were restricted to making a report that the Secretary would accept, and all their figures were founded on this basis. Now, for instance, I know how they arrived at the figures that 67,000 men were the least number that they would be willing to recommend—67,000 the least possible number. They based this on the very inadequate complement which the ships then had, which everybody knew to be inadequate. They took those complements. They did not take the complements that were really needed. If they had taken the complements that were really needed, as it came out afterwards, they would have had

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to ask for approximately 93,000 men, and it was shown that the day we went into the war we should have had at least 106,000 men in the Navy—that is, to be on board the ships and man the necessary stations on that day. That is what we should have had, and we were very far short of it.

Senator TRAMMELL. The point I am getting at is that you stated that the General Board and the secretary differed in the latter part of 1915 to the extent of less than 5,000 men in what they asked for in this increase?

Capt. TAUSSIG. I said they differed in that, in the report of the General Board on the peace basis, not for preparation for war. This was to maintain the ships as if no war was in sight, and that they said it was the smallest number that they were willing to say, and that they had to come down to a small number because they knew that if they put in a big number that recommendation would never get out.

Senator TRAMMELL. I understand what you are trying to do. You are trying to make it appear that the secretary in August, 1916, did not favor the bill that was passed at that time, as far as personnel was concerned. So far the logic of your suspicion and your contention is that he had recommended in the latter part of December considerably less. Now, your own testimony shows that in the year 1915 the General Board recommended only 74,700. Then, if the secretary is guilty of not being in sympathy with this measure in 1916, in August, and you based it upon the fact that his recommendation was less in the latter part of 1916, why is it that you do not say that the board were opposed to it because they recommended less in the latter part of 1915?

Capt. TAUSSIG. You will notice that the way the General Board reported is that they came in with this minimum number. They had to come down to the minimum. Every officer in the Navy knew that if we went into the war we would need over 100,000 men. There is no question about that. The figures in this report show conclusively that the General Board were restricted. That is the whole trouble. The General Board were not free to come out with what they thought, because if they came out with what they thought, they could not get anything out at all. Ask Admiral Fiske what happened. I suggest that you ask him. He was there, and he can give you the actual information as to why even the figures of the General Board are inadequate. I will admit that those figures were inadequate, and the General Board knew they were inadequate, but they had to do it to get anything.

Senator TRAMMELL. The point in my mind is that I can not quite see why you charge the Secretary of the Navy with not being in favor of this, and base it upon these figures, and yet you do not charge the General Board with that. That is the point I am getting at. In other words, you seem to think that the General Board had a right to revise its figures, but that the Secretary of the Navy did not have a right to revise his figures six months afterwards.

Capt. TAUSSIG. After this legislation went through the secretary came out and praised it very highly. In fact, I think he came out in his annual report, and stated afterwards that this legislation, which brought the Navy up to a total of 93,000 men, was the first time that adequate legislation had been provided.

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Senator TRAMMELL. Your idea then was that they should have made preparation in 1914 for a war that did not come for five years later?

Capt. TAUSSIG. Yes; that is my idea.

Senator TRAMMELL. I suppose if we had not gotten into the war though, you would have considered that this country had pursued a very wise policy in not expending an enormous amount of money in preparing for five years for a war that they did not get into?

Capt. TAUSSIG. No, sir; I think we ought always to be prepared for war.

Senator TRAMMELL. That is a difference of opinion.

Capt. TAUSSIG. I am only stating my opinion, sir. My opinion is that we should always be prepared for war.

Senator TRAMMELL. I find that a good many people think this country should not be a military power and maintain an enormously large Navy at an enormous expense to the people of the country, and that it should not maintain an enormously large Army in peace times. Some others think you should do it. That is purely a matter of opinion. You favor that and the Secretary does not favor that. I think I do not care to ask any more questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Capt. Taussig, the increases you speak of that you and other officers recommended in the personnel, were not the necessary number for a war basis, were they, for the Navy?

Capt. TAUSSIG. This minimum number, this 67,000, were in order that the ships could have their peace-time complement, the minimum number of men to be in the service in peace times. For instance, as I say, when we went into the war, I can give you exactly how many our ships did not have on board in personnel, if you would like to have it.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it would be well to put that into the record.

Capt. TAUSSIG. On March 31, 1917, the last date of complete record prior to the entry of the United States into the war, we had in full commission 250 ships. We had what were known as in reserve, with considerably less than half their complements on board, 47 ships. We had what were known as in ordinary, 16 ships with just barely enough men on board to prevent absolute deterioration. We had out of commission with no Navy personnel on board 51 ships. Now these are the figures as they were on the 31st of March, 1917, six days before we declared war. That was the last complete compilation. The total number required to man those ships, even with their inadequate peace complement, was 72,622, which was considerably more than we had in the Navy at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. But to give them an adequate complement and to keep up with the building program that had been laid out, the 97,000 recommended by Admiral Palmar would not have been any too many?

Capt. TAUSSIG. It would not have been enough to put them in condition for war and to run the shore establishment. Of course we could not take everybody off the shore.

The CHAIRMAN. And that had not anything to do with the general plan of increase for the war such as came up later on?

Capt. TAUSSIG. No. I can not give firsthand information on that. The further increase to 137,000 was forced through after that.

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The CHAIRMAN. It was simply a plan to put all the ships that we had in the Navy at that time on a basis where they would be ready in case war came up, was it not?

Capt. TAUSSIG. Yes. I should like to call your attention to the fact that in this paper I spoke of only 75 auxiliaries that would immediately need to be manned by Navy crews the instant we went into the war. The General Board in some report which I saw about that time said that the required number of auxiliaries would be at least 400. The number of 106,000 which I deduced came up only on a basis of 75 instead of 400 auxiliaries. Of course, we knew that those figures were based on the number required immediately, the day we went into the war. We all knew we would have to get an enlarged number of men in addition to that to be trained, and for the expansion of the shore establishment. We could not abandon that. You can not run ships without people on shore to look out for them. That is an impossibility.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not think this is within your province, but for the information of the committee can you tell me whether it is customary for the Secretary of the Navy or the Chief of the Bureau of Operations to consult with the General Board before a report is made by the board?

Capt. TAUSSIG. I do not know, sir.

Senator TRAMMELL. I want to ask you a little about those ships. Had any of those ships that you say were not manned at that time been practically discarded because they were out of date as far as more modern equipment and more modern war vessels were concerned?

Capt. TAUSSIG. Yes, sir; there were a few.

Senator TRAMMELL. Did you think they ought to keep those constantly manned?

Capt. TAUSSIG. I think we should not in time of peace carry any ship on the Navy list that we are not going to use in war, and that therefore every one of those ships being required, if only for housing purposes, for housing the men, for which purpose we did not have enough, every one of those ships would have to be used, and would have to have men on board them to take care of them.

Senator TRAMMELL. The main trouble then was that they were on the list. It was not the main trouble that they did not happen to be manned?

Capt. TAUSSIG. Every one of them was used in the war. They were not all used to fight with, but every one of them was used. Although some of those ships are put down as unfit for war purposes, even the few that were so put down were used for housing purposes or something, and we had to keep men on board them, and men were kept on board during the war. Out of the 400 I think about 12 were classified by the department as unfit for war service, but as I say they were used for housing purposes or something.

Senator TRAMMELL. Did you have any trouble in getting men to put on them during the war—ships of that character?

Capt. TAUSSIG. Of course we had trouble.

Senator TRAMMELL. Did you not put men on them?

Capt. TAUSSIG. Yes; there were men eventually put on everything.

Senator TRAMMELL. In other words, you think those ships that

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were put down as unfit for war should have had a full quota of men on them from 1914?

Capt. TAUSSIG. I think we ought to have commenced in 1914 to put on the full quota, which we did not do. I will not say that those ships had to have the same number of men as if they were going to fight, but they had to have a certain number of men on board to keep them in a sanitary condition.

Senator TRAMMELL. Why did you not tell us in the first instance that there were a number of those ships that were unfit for war purposes, instead of trying to create the impression that they had 50 ships with no men on them, and that it was a great neglect to have no men on them, although you knew there were 12 of them that were put down as being unfit for war purposes?

Capt. TAUSSIG. I do not understand your idea at all, sir.

Senator TRAMMELL. I just want to get at the fairness of the situation.

Capt. TAUSSIG. I wish to state emphatically that I have said nothing with any idea of creating a wrong impression in any way. I have quoted from official documents throughout to substantiate what I have said, and I can not believe anybody around here thinks I am trying to create a wrong impression. I am out to tell the truth.

Senator TRAMMELL. Part of it, but not all of it.

Capt. TAUSSIG. If I told all the truth, sir, I would be here a week.

Senator TRAMMELL. That is what we want you to do, to tell all the truth. You may feel that it is exceedingly fair to try to make it appear that the Secretary of the Navy was not in favor of 97,000 men in August, 1916, because he recommended less in 1915. Yet you think that same logic does not apply to the other people who recommended only 74,000 in 1915, but were favorable to the larger number in 1917. You stated in answer to a question by the chairman that this 97,000 men was authorized just for the manning of the ships then in existence. Do you know whether that is correct? That was done for the purpose of making preparation to man the new ships that were also authorized in the same bill in August, 1916, as a part of the whole program, was it not?

Capt. TAUSSIG. My understanding is that it was partly for both.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that was included in my question.

Senator TRAMMELL. No; you stated the ships then in existence.

The CHAIRMAN. I think I stated both.

Senator TRAMMELL. Of course, the record will show what you asked. I did not understand it that way. That is the reason I wanted to find out about it. Now, Captain, it seems you have had a good deal of experience in connection with the personnel. Did you experience any difficulty in 1914 in enlisting the required men into the Navy?

Capt. TAUSSIG. Not in 1914; no, sir. We did previous to that.

Senator TRAMMELL. Did you in 1916?

Capt. TAUSSIG. I was not in the Bureau of Navigation in 1916, sir. I had nothing to do with it then.

Senator TRAMMELL. The reason I asked the question, Capt. Palmer said yesterday that they had some difficulty in recruiting even up to their authorized strength in 1916 and even in the early part of 1917 until the war was very imminent, and then they did not have so much trouble.

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Capt. TAUSSIG. I can not state at first-hand as to that. I can only give an opinion on it.

Senator TRAMMELL. Was not that constant changing and shifting due quite a bit to the difficulty in holding people in the Navy, especially the enlisted personnel that you speak of, and that they wanted to get out when their time ran out?

Capt. TAUSSIG. We were recruited up to our full strength allowed by law in 1914. We had every man the law allowed. We had to stop recruiting for a couple of weeks, except the men who reenlisted, whom we had to take in. In 1914 we set up our recruiting stations for about two weeks except as to reenlisted men, because we were full up to what the law allowed. We could have gotten all the men that could have been needed.

Senator TRAMMELL. But you do not know as to what the conditions were in 1916, as to whether they had recruited up to the full strength or not authorized by law in 1916?

Capt. TAUSSIG. Oh, yes; they were recruited up, up to the time the authorization for the increase came in.

Senator TRAMMELL. Do you know when the naval reserve law was passed?

Capt. TAUSSIG. There were several naval reserve laws. There was a law passed first, I think, in 1914. It was while I was still in the Bureau of Navigation. I am not sure of the date when they passed the law later providing for the big reserves. I think it was August 29, 1916. It was modified several times. I can not give those dates

Senator TRAMMELL. I think I have no more questions.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is all. You may be excused.

Capt. TAUSSIG. May I have my testimony sent to me to Newport for correction? I should like to get back to my station.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL C. P. PLUNKETT.

(The witness was sworn by the chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Will you please state to the committee what your duties were which you were performing just previous to the entrance of the United States into the World War and what duties you performed during the war?

Admiral PLUNKETT. In the summer of 1915, while I was at the Naval War College, in September, Mr. Daniels sent for me to come to Washington, and on my arrival here I was acquainted with the fact that on the recommendation of Admiral Benson, commander of the fleet, I had been selected for director of gunnery exercises and engineering performances, director of target practice. As I still had three months of my work to do at the War College I wanted to finish the course there, and, further, I wanted to go to sea, although I was not due for sea. However, the gunnery situation in the Navy was pretty bad. I think Capt. Taussig's testimony pretty fully substantiates the situation at that time. I received orders which provided for my traveling back and forth between Newport and Washington until the end of the War College course, when I could take up the duties permanently, the idea being to get the run of the office as soon as possible and see what the general situation was.

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So in the latter part of December, 1915, I took over the active direction of gunnery under the Chief of Naval Operations as one of his assistants.

I remained on that duty until July, 1918, when I went abroad, but the last four or five months of my tenure of office, beginning along in February, most of my time was taken up with the organization and training of the naval railway batteries which went to France in the middle of that year, so that I did not take a very active part in the gunnery training of the fleet during those last few months. Owing to the shortage of officers, no officer was sent there to relieve me, but the situation in the fleet, under the able command of Admiral Mayo, was such that nothing that I could have done would have in anyway influenced the successful progress of gunnery training, it being pretty well standardized and systematized by that time.

At the very beginning, when I took over the duties of gunnery training in the Navy Department, I went to Mr. Daniels and stated in the most positive manner that there could be no gunnery without people, and we did not have the people. To make a long story short, I argued with him, first and last, for two years, without ever making any impression upon him whatever, that we could have no successful gunnery in the American Navy until we had a sufficient personnel.

I want to say right now that in all my dealings with Mr. Daniels I have never been treated with greater courtesy by anyone, but he is the only man that I ever had anything to do with that I practically left little or no impression upon. I make that preliminary statement in order that you may understand the situation perfectly.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, will you state what your duties were after July, 1918?

Admiral PLUNKETT. After July, 1918, I was in France in command of the 14-inch naval battery.

The CHAIRMAN. Until the end of the war?

Admiral PLUNKETT. Until the end of the war; yes. At the end of March, 1917, when we were on the verge of entry into the war, the gunnery was at the highest state of efficiency that it has been in the history of the American Navy. In my opinion this was due to two things: First, to the commander in chief of the fleet, Admiral Mayo; second, to a full realization of the number of men that were needed in any ship of war to fight her efficiently in battle.

In 1915, when the question of shortage of personnel was most acute on the vessels which were in commission, there was a great deal of loose talk, and there were memoranda and reports and other things as to the number of men required to man a ship efficiently. As a matter of fact, we have some definite information from the people who designed the ship that the number of men that we thought we needed to fight those ships efficiently could not be berthed in the ships. They were not big enough to hold the crews that we needed to fight the guns in the ships.

Having had considerable experience as executive officer of four ships, three of them battleships, and having commanded a couple of first-line ships, and having given the best part of 15 years of my service to the question of organization, I felt that I was in a pretty fair position to estimate what a ship needed to fight her.

When Admiral Mayo became the battleship-force commander he made a report, or when he was division commander he made a report

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in regard to shortages of personnel, which I think Capt. Taussig quoted. When he took over the more important command of all the battleship force he took up this matter very seriously, the question of what was the proper force aboard of a battleship in order to fight the ship efficiently.

I might say right now for the benefit of Senator Trammell that no officer in my recollection ever dreamed or ever thought of having a personnel sufficient to man everything carried on the Navy list and have it ready for battle at the outbreak of the war. All we figured on was that the ships which were turned over to us to operate, and which we called our fleet, should be fully manned and should be ready for war; that is all.

As the result of Admiral Mayo's efforts, in which I heartily concurred, we finally arrived in the course of two years at what was the correct number of men and officers in order to man our ships which were then in commission so that they would be efficient in battle. The numbers which we arrived at were far in excess of the numbers which were contemplated in the original design of the ships.

I might say as bearing directly on this and also having an influence on the number of these men, that in 1915 we woke up to the fact that we had built a number of very excellent ships, but we had not found out how to fight them. Before 1915 there was a fire-control board ordered, which went right into the question, not of using the guns of the ship one at a time but how to use all the guns at the same time so as to bring the greatest volume of fire to bear upon the enemy, and it was the report of that board that pretty nearly turned the Navy upside down, and was the first step in the direction of showing us what we actually needed in the way of officers and men on our ships in order to fight them in battle and to bring all their offensive and defensive weapons into action at the same time. Naturally the money was asked for at once, but it takes time to produce the instruments that were required to be installed in those ships, and also naturally our latest ships were the first ones to receive them.

Again, owing to the methods which were taken up under Admiral Mayo's direction, and in fact mostly by his orders, the people of the Navy had brought home to them what gunnery should be and how to arrive at those results. This board was in intimate touch with the most efficient methods for using our guns and torpedoes.

Up to 1915 we had been conducting battle exercises by opening the engagement by firing a single gun in order to get the approximate range of the enemy, followed by another gun after that shell had landed, some 20 seconds later, also with a view of getting the range, some correction being applied to that second shot; in other words, a method of approximation. The question of range finding was taken up seriously. Up to 1915 we had comparatively no efficient range-finding instruments. Those are instruments of prime importance, and at the outbreak of the war we had only a sufficient number of them for our first-line ships. The ships in reserve had practically no range finders worth mentioning.

All those things and the concentration on gunnery training brought home to us the fact that we were terribly undermanned, and it was those reports that Capt. Taussig speaks of here which flowed over my desk in volumes, which kept me pegging away at the Secretary of the Navy all the time asking for more men, and representing to him the fact that we needed those men.

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Now, it may seem odd, when I was a subordinate officer, that I took those memorandums to the Secretary of the Navy; but I assure you that I took them there because the Chief of Naval Operations had exhausted all the talk he had in his system.

The CHAIRMAN. Who was the Chief of Naval Operations?

Admiral PLUNKETT. Admiral Benson. He said, "If you can get them, go and get them. I can not get them."

In 1917, shortly after I took over the direction of gunnery, the controversy arose, which you probably remember of Representative Gardner, Representative from Massachusetts, who offered resolutions in the House of Representatives, which were adopted, calling on the Secretary of the Navy for a statement as to the gunnery efficiency of the fleet. The resolutions were referred to me for answer as the data with reference to gunnery efficiency of the fleet were in my office, and therefore the answer which went to the House of Representatives, to the Speaker, and later a similar answer which went to the United States Senate in response to resolutions submitted by Mr. Lodge, was prepared by me in my office from the actual data which were there.

At that time Mr. Daniels took a very live interest in gunnery in the Navy and was very much pleased with the answers that we were able to send in, because these answers clearly showed that while we were down and had been down, we were on the up grade; that things were being rectified in gunnery, and eventually, about a year afterwards, when we had made considerably more progress, Mr. Gardner visited my office, by permission of the Secretary of the Navy, and we convinced him thoroughly that he was on the wrong tack, and that we were doing everything that was possible to build up the gunnery of the Navy.

But that applied only to the ships which were in commission, and the gunnery knowledge which was going on to the Navy at large was practically restricted to the officers who were actually on the ships in commission. Those who were on shore and other duty had not enough time to take up these matters. But never in the history of the Navy has there been anything more intensive than the gunnery training of our fleet which took place in 1916 and 1917 and 1918. The result of that was that when the war broke out, although we were still undermanned, the gunnery efficiency of the ships that were in commission was higher than it ever had been in my recollection of the Navy. As a matter of fact, we had just one battleship, the *Wyoming*, fire in practice at nearly 20,000 yards, the longest range that has ever been fired by the service, and she made the phenomenal score of 20 per cent of hits under battle conditions.

I was with the fleet in the spring of 1917, and left there about the middle of March and came back to Washington, and on my arrival here, shortly afterwards, I submitted to the Chief of Naval Operations the report of the status of gunnery operations in the fleet, in which I summarized the practices that had taken place, in a general way, in order that he might have first-hand information as to the state of affairs, just before the outbreak of the war. I did not comment in this report on the excellence of the training, but just merely stated what forms of target practice had been carried out, and made a recommendation that the training continue just as it had been; that there were no changes to make; that I was in full agreement with the

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commander in chief that everything had been done in the way of laying down correct lines for gunnery training, and that, war or no war, we saw no reason for making any change in that direction. That the one thing was to insure the permanence of the personnel; that is to say, of the people who were actually in the fleet when the war broke out, in the battleships and our destroyers; to retain those people absolutely intact in order to hold our gunnery efficiency which we had reached at that time, and which, I say, was the best in the history of the American Navy.

If you remember, about that time, or shortly before it, the armed-guard duty was ordered by the President; the question of putting guns on merchant ships and assigning crews. As I said before, the only trained men we had in the Navy were the men in the fleet, because anybody who had been out of the fleet was behind the times. We were moving fast. And the first call for 400 armed guard crews in the fleet, naturally the people sent were the people who were manning guns of the type we were putting on the merchant ships, and also those who could be spared without impairing too greatly the turret efficiency of the ships; so that the first people that went were the crews which manned the secondary torpedo defense batteries of our battleships, and the officers and petty officers which went with them.

But, as a division on a battleship of secondary battery guns only has two or three officers, and as they amount to no less than 22 guns in some ships, and it only required at the outset from two to three guns on armed guard ships and three only on the liners, you can easily see that the officers capable of directing the fire of those guns were a little insufficient; and therefore we had to have more officers for this armed guard duty, and that was where the trouble began.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the date of that?

Admiral PLUNKETT. I forget now. It was continuous. It began just before our entry into the war and continued right along practically the whole of the year 1917. In fact, it ran up to 1,700 or 1,800 vessels; I do not know how many; a very large number. So that the officers who were capable of being assigned to this duty were soon exhausted. But it involved our going into our turrets and taking a turret off; for instance officers who had had anywhere from two to three years' experience; officers who were thoroughly conversant with our gunnery training methods; officers who were of the highest possible sort in regard to our gunnery training and were in sympathy with it. And that was the beginning of the downfall, you might say, of the fleet efficiency; and I have seen nothing on record to indicate that they ever fully recovered from it, not even when the armistice was signed. Of course, they were as efficient as human perseverance and the mentality of the men at the head of it could make them; but, as testified by Admiral Palmer here, in October, 1917, he had to begin a process of forcing the battleships to give up their reduced allowance of officers still further, nearly 50 per cent, and in filling up the vacancies in the battleships—the total number of officers—from officers of very little or no experience; officers, for instance, who were not in the Navy before the war at all; some of them college men, and others who were sent to Annapolis for short courses of training, and reserve officers.

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In the fall of 1917, when Admiral Rodman took his ships abroad and arrived on the other side, the condition in those ships was pretty much as it was in our battleships that stayed behind. They were very much depleted of the number officers that they had in the spring of the year, when we entered the war, and had practically only a nucleus of those officers; and naturally they were not ready for battle when they got over there. The *Texas* actually had, later on, pretty nearly 75 per cent of her crew green men. She was the ship that had carried the gunnery trophy as the result of her work just previous to the war, and when she arrived on the other side had not fired a gun for six months. That was due, in her case, that she had been unfortunate enough to get ashore, and had to go to the navy yard and have her bottom repaired. But at the same time, with 75 per cent of green men on a ship, the wildest imagination would not claim that that ship was ready for battle, and I believe that is the way she was reported, on his arrival, to Admiral Rodman. The truth of the matter is that when we entered the war we were forced to take the defensive. Instead of the offensive, we took the defensive. The first move was the organization of the patrol forces of the Atlantic coast, a purely defensive measure. That force brought into being practically all the light craft we had in the Navy—destroyers, gun boats, and everything that could be converted into a scout. We had on the west coast most of our big cruisers, which had been in reserve there for some time. They had to be brought around. In fact, I think some of them started immediately before we entered the war. I do not remember exactly what the situation was. We had one, of course, which was the flagship of the destroyers, the *Seattle*. But it called into being practically all the small craft we had, of whatever type, that could be used for patrol purposes; and that, in a measure, is how some of these craft in that list that Capt. Taussig showed you here, which were of very little military value, were called into being; the idea being that in the patrol, if you saw one of these submarines, although the fellow sunk you, you gave warning to many of the other craft, and then they could start and search for him right away. It was not that these craft contained military value enough to offer a military offensive, but they were there for scouting purposes.

This force that was created, the defensive force that I speak of, was in the course of time turned into the splendid force that we had on the other side. In fact, in Admiral Sims's letter he refers particularly to this force being organized on this side for operations here, instead of being organized on the other side for operations over there.

It was not long, however, before the situation began to clear up a little bit; because I think you must realize by this time that we had no plan when we entered the war—no war plan. We had a mobilization plan, that is a plan giving the list of ships and the number of men and officers to go to them, but there was no plan for making war—using those ships for war purposes. It simply called for their mobilization. So that, as soon as we entered the war, I expect the Chief of Naval Operations was flooded with all sorts of suggestions as to how to make war on the Hun. I know that I offered such a suggestion; and likewise, I guess, a good many others did. But all our suggestions were based on a lack of information, because, when all was said and done, when we entered this war I think the majority of us thought that the war was pretty nearly over. As a matter of fact, it was at

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its most critical stage. Our information was insufficient and defective. In fact, in many cases it was absolutely wrong, as we afterwards found out.

However, there was no plan for the offensive action. Whatever plans there were, or whatever plans were first evolved, were entirely defensive.

I am not aware how long that continued, as I was not in such intimate touch with the orders which went to the different force commanders as would indicate when the attitude changed; but in the absence of any plan, the most natural thing to do was to take the defensive until you find out "where you are at," and that was our situation.

To man the ships that were in the mobilization plan there, even partially, exhausted practically everything in the way of personnel that we had, and I think that Capt. Palmer and Capt. Taussig both clearly brought out what we expected to happen; in other words, that we were not surprised.

The CHAIRMAN. That you were not what?

Admiral PLUNKETT. That we were not surprised. In other words, that we expected it. I do not think there was anything in the first few days of the war that turned up that surprised us in any way whatever. I do not think that there was any reason why we should have any other mental attitude in regard to it; that it was pointing away off; that we had been a long time trying to get more men and to impress upon everybody that a navy without men was no navy; and that a ship without a proper complement was no ship. We had not had any luck, but we realized that the moment we got in the war this stuff would flow in so fast that you would not know what to do with it; and that is just what happened. Money came tumbling in! Lord! There was money to a finish. Men offered their services. We would have broken up Gen. Crowder's conscription plan if we had taken everybody that wanted to go in the Navy. When it comes to the question why we could not recruit our people in 1915 and 1916, the answer is that the era of profiteering had gotten under full headway in this country, and men could make so much money outside, and there being no prospect of a war in 1916, why should they go in the Navy? So that when war actually did come upon us, we were short-handed, and it was nothing but the natural instinct of the American that saved the day. They came in vast numbers, more than we had quarters for, more than we could handle, more than we had anything for. These people came and offered their services.

Men were willing to throw up big positions in order to come to us at a meager salary. I think that was testified to by Capt. Palmer, here. He said here that the Bureau of Construction and Repair had 70 men on their list who were willing to come with the Navy, who had salaries running from $10,000 a year up, and who were perfectly willing to come with the Navy for $3,000 a year. We met that everywhere. But that does not make a Navy. That is simply material to work with. And so fast was this thing traveling, and so fast were we expanding that in June, or in the early part of May, 1917, Mr. Daniels sent for me one day and he said, "I want you to go to Boston and New York and Philadelphia and Norfolk, and look into this reserve business." He said, "I do not want you to say a word to a living soul, but I want you to come back here and tell me what you think

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about it." Mr. Chairman, I went right straight to Mr. Palmer, just as straight as I could walk, and I said, "The Secretary is getting a little doubtful about this reserve business."

The CHAIRMAN. What was the date of this?

Admiral PLUNKETT. It was in May.

The CHAIRMAN. May, 1917?

Admiral PLUNKETT. May, 1917. I said, "I do not know anything about the reserve business. I am here in Washington. I do not know what you fellows have been doing, but I know that you must be getting some pretty good people. Now, it would not be a good thing to have this thing suddenly stopped, even though you made a good many mistakes."

However, I started off, and I went to these various places and when I came back I made a report to the Secretary, saying that under no circumstances should he do anything to stop the increase in enrollments in the Naval Reserve; that we were having brought to us the best material there was in the country, and that, in time, we could mold that material into what we needed to carry on the war. And I think that proved true, for without those people we never could have carried on this war. Of course I do not know whether he took my advice or not. He probably did not. But, at all events, I tried to impress upon him as fully as possible the importance of the recruiting question, which Admiral Palmer testified. The struggle he had with him on the question of reserves continued long after that. He was afraid of getting too many people, so that he would not know what to do with them. But, considering the shortage we suffered with, and our facilities for handling these people and for taking care of them and preventing them from getting sick, etc., we wanted to take all we possibly could all the time.

Now, this change from a purely defensive attitude to an offensive attitude came about through a realization that the war was over there and not over here; through the fact that we began to understand that the British secret service was of such a high class that nothing could come to our coast and do material damage—anything which would really tend in a material way to win the war—without ample warning. I think that is fully borne out in the reports which came from time to time, in which their predictions are nothing short of phenomenal I think they must have used the ouija board or something like that.

I do not see how they ever got the information, it was so exact. But it has the effect of gradually reducing the patrol force which we had on our coast here of vessels which could be used in the anti-submarine campaign, and their replacement by other types, submarine chasers, etc. It is entirely probable that we could not have replaced these ships within one month or two months of the outbreak of the war, because we did not have the personnel, nor did we have, nor could we get without the most strenuous opposition, probably, the types of vessels which could be used for purely coastal patrol purposes. But my private opinion is that the reason we did not take quicker action on taking the offensive is the fact that we were short of personnel—skilled and trained personnel. In other words, we were making our suit to fit our cloth. I might say, in passing, that this armed-guard proposition, which was clearly beyond any foresight, although the Allies had been doing this for some time, was the cause of the breaking up of the efficient condition of what we

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had in commission at the outbreak of the war, for the simple reason that when you put a military man on board of a merchant ship they want to deny him the air necessary for his sustenance. They hate to have him around. As a matter of fact, I think the putting of guns on merchant ships is very much against the wishes of the merchant people; but they did put them aboard, and in order to avoid any possible disruption or disputes, although there were a few minor ones, of course, we sent the highest type of our chief petty officers in charge of these guards, and officers, so that if any questions did arise, they would be handled in the proper manner; and I might say, in passing, that if the members of this committee have never read the reports of our armed guards, especially those written by our chief petty officers, they have missed some of the most illustrious history that has ever been written of the sea. The work that those people did is thrilling and I do not know a single, solitary case in which they failed to measure up to what was expected of them. But it raised Cain with the American Navy.

That also was a defensive move. The first solution of that was in the adoption of the convoy system, which was an offensive move. That is to say, if a submarine wanted to get a merchant ship he had to fight for it. If you remember, there was great stress laid on the arming of merchant ships, which was a purely defensive measure. I think I am correct in that, am I not?

The CHAIRMAN. Why would not the submarines have to fight to get the ships that were armed?

Admiral PLUNKETT. As Admiral Sims explained to you, they got them without their ever seeing them.

The CHAIRMAN. But they had to get them by torpedo instead of guns?

Admiral PLUNKETT. Yes; they had to get them by torpedo instead of guns.

Senator TRAMMELL. I think the admiral is correct in saying that it is to be considered a defensive measure. I think the President took the ground that we had a right to arm them, without our even being at war with Germany, and they were armed before we were at war with Germany, so that it certainly was defensive then. If it had not been, it would have been an act of war.

Admiral PLUNKETT. Yes; I think that I am right in that.

Senator TRAMMELL. Yes; it is considered so in international law. We were not at war with Germany when we first armed our merchant ships.

Admiral PLUNKETT. I have not any familiarity with international law.

Senator TRAMMELL. I am just saying that I think you are correct in stating that that was a defensive measure.

Admiral PLUNKETT. I am simply saying that it was not a measure of offense against the enemy, but it was purely a defensive measure.

The CHAIRMAN. I was just getting the point in my own mind.

Admiral PLUNKETT. So that if we continued it after we went into the war, we were still adopting a defensive measure and not an offensive measure. In other words, our trained personnel was being used for defensive purposes and not for offensive purposes. Do you get my point?

The CHAIRMAN. I get your point. I wanted it explained.

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Admiral PLUNKETT. Yes. There is the parting line, as referred to in the letter of January 7 that Admiral Sims wrote, and that is the prime reason why the fleet—and when I speak of the fleet I mean the battleships—were not ready for war at the end of the war, because it takes years to train officers and men to conduct the gunnery of a modern battleship.

The question has come up here, how long we should have started ahead in order to get officers. Ten years is not a minute too soon. But whether we should have all our ships fully manned and ready for battle is a matter of policy with which we are not concerned in any way whatever. But when you attempt to keep 16 battleships in full commission, unless you keep them fully ready for war they are not worth the money you are spending on them, because everything is absent when a ship does not understand that the reason of their existence is their ability to fight and fight effectively; and a ship which is undermanned can not fight effectively, no matter what the skill of the people may be.

Now, if you noted, in the hearing Capt. Taussig says that if the destroyers which we sent over on the other side had been required to take up general fleet work—by which he means work in the defensive screen, scouting and possible action against destroyers, action against battleships and other types of ships, the general work that destroyers are capable of doing—he wanted four months to go away from the war zone to train. Now, this is the officer who, when he arrived at Queenstown and was asked how long it would take for him to get ready for business, said that he was ready. What he meant was, he was ready to go after submarines just as you find in Capt. Laning's testimony he states that in August, 1917, there is a memorandum from the Chief of Naval Operations, paragraph 4, I think it is, signed by Capt. McKean here—saying that in August the fleet will be ready for anything. He does not mean that. He does not mean that it will be ready for anything, but he means that it will be materially ready; they will have the material; they will have the guns, and will have the instruments for handling them, and all that sort of thing, because he is too good a gunnery man to mean anything else. The truth of the matter is that if we had been up against Germany at the outbreak of this war we would be paying the indemnity to-day instead of their paying it; and all because we did not have a sufficient personnel. Because, ship for ship right through the line, as we know their gunnery was, although they stood the British on their heads in the battle of Jutland, we were ready for them if we had the men. We did not have them. The reason we did not have them is because Mr. Daniels would not let us get them. He would not let us argue with the committees in Congress, would not let us do anything toward getting more men, in spite of the fact that everybody from the top clean through to the bottom knew that we must have men.

Now, whether it is a question of 71,000 or 61,000 men, they are away short of the number; and no officer of the ability of the officers who were on the general board would recommend, except under the most extraordinary pressure, a recommendation so far short of the needs of our fleet as the recommendation of 67,000 men, for what we had. I know that I never have at any time acquiesced in the view that we had sufficient personnel. I have never acquiesced in any of

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the statements in any of these reports that we were ready from stem to stern; and I do not acquiesce in any report to-day that indicates in any way that our fleet is anything but a wreck of what it was.

The CHAIRMAN. A wreck now?

Admiral PLUNKETT. Right now; to-day.

The CHAIRMAN. How about when the war commenced?

Admiral PLUNKETT. I have given you a statement of what the condition was when the war commenced.

The CHAIRMAN. The same would apply, that we were not ready from stem to stern when the war commenced?

Admiral PLUNKETT. All that were ready were the ships that were actually full manned, or nearly fully manned, and in commission. Those ships, in my opinion, were ready, but those were the only ones. And by that I mean the battleships and destroyers. I do not include the submarines, because I understand there was not one of them that was ready. I do not know. That you can probably get from Admiral Grant. But I limit my statement absolutely to those two types of ships alone, which do not go to make a fleet, by long odds. They are only part of a fleet. Our scouting force we had not.

As for the auxiliaries that go with the fleet, we had just a few, enough for our peace-time purposes and no more.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know what ships we had that were ready and in an adequate state of preparation at that time?

Admiral PLUNKETT. What ships that were?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; other than destroyers and battleships.

Admiral PLUNKETT. Well, I could get that information if you want it. I have not got it right at hand.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to have that information put in the record.

Admiral PLUNKETT. We had one battleship that had just come out, the *Arizona*. At the outbreak of the war she was not ready for war in any sense of the word, because she was a brand new ship. She had been in the navy yard up to December of the previous year, fitting out. She was a beautiful ship, and is to-day probably one of the most efficient ships, they say, in the fleet. But she had not conducted any firing to speak of. In fact, I do not remember just when we conducted her firings, but we fired all of those 14-inch gun ships, the *Pennsylvania*, the *Oklahoma*, the *Arizona*, and the *Nevada*, in order to find out what caused the tremendous dispersion of our guns; and we have also conducted experiments ever since then—that was, in 1916—and we are no nearer the answer to-day than we were then. One reason for it, I think, is due to the fact that when Congress practically offered us a proving ground, to cost $10,000,000, the Secretary only allowed $1,000,000. I remember going to him with the Chief of Ordnance. He said, "We have got to get this proving ground and find out why these shells are flying all over creation instead of where they are intended to go, and we must have a proving ground where we can fire the guns and then go and dig up the shell later and find out why this thing is going on." We understand that the German dispersion is very much less than ours, and the British, even, is considerably less than ours.

There is one thing sure, that one salvo goes down here, and it is beautiful, and the next one that comes down here, they are scattered all over the lot. I think you were probably shown one salvo that

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the Pennsylvania fired, and that was published with big headlines on it, "Wonderful shooting of the Navy," and that was a case where one salvo that they fired had 12 shots in a very small pattern. As a matter of fact, they have not solved that thing yet. Of course, the gunnery man does not mean to cuss his tools until he is pretty sure that he has exhausted all possible errors that the personnel can make, and therefore I have never been on the side of the people who condemn things because they do not work just the way you expect them, right off the bat. In fact, I have been an advocate of analyzing everything—every shot that we fired—with the idea of getting all the information out of it that we can possibly get, so that if we make any errors, we are going to find out what they are, and so that we can take steps to avoid them. That is the only way to make improvements in gunnery, just through intensive observation and analysis.

But here was a case where we had this opportunity, and the Chief of Ordnance said, "For Heaven's sake, go and see the Secretary. We have got this thing all tied up, and they have given us $10,000,000 for a proving ground, and he will not allow us but $1,000,000." So I went down again and argued the matter with him, and he was as lovely and pleasant as usual, but he thought $1,000,000 would be enough just then, and he could get more later. We never got the "more" later. That was the time for getting it, if ever; and as a matter of fact, we are still up the stump. We do not know to-day about the dispersion, and I guess the best standard we got was the firing of this same type of gun, 14-inch 50-caliber guns, that I took over to France, where we fired at ranges very, very much in excess of what would be the battle ranges on the battleships, so that those data could not be of very great value.

But it does show that those guns are phenomenally accurate at very long ranges. Of course that is where the projectile goes up in the air 17 miles, and comes down. It is almost like going up to the moon and dropping down on the earth again. It is an entirely different problem, firing at those high angles. The angle of firing on the ships at present does not give a range much in excess of 23,000 yards, although with the later types of ships we are building, the range will be up to 30,000 yards because of the increase of elevation of the guns in operation. But, as a matter of fact, we are to-day right where we were 4 years ago on that. We have not got it solved yet.

The CHAIRMAN. You stated that the reason you could not get men to enlist in the Navy in 1916 was because the cost of living had gone up and wages and salaries had gone up, and there was no prospect of war at that time. You mean so far as the people of the country were concerned in general?

Admiral PLUNKETT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Not as far as you in the Navy were concerned?

Admiral PLUNKETT. Nobody thought there was going to be any war. In 1916 the majority of the people in the country were glad they kept out of war. They were pretty well satisfied about it. I think everybody was.

The CHAIRMAN. I mean the Navy?

Admiral PLUNKETT. Yes; the Navy, too.

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The CHAIRMAN. There was a feeling that we might go into war, was there not?

Admiral PLUNKETT. Well, I don't know; not if there was any way of keeping out of it. Of course, after the *Lusitania* note, a good many of us thought that there was no way of keeping out of it. We were sure we were going into it. There was no doubt about it. Of course you could not tell. You were dealing with a mighty uncertain fellow when dealing with the Hun. If you can guess four things only that they can do, they are pretty sure to do the fifth.

The CHAIRMAN. But was there a feeling that our Navy should be prepared if the war should come?

Admiral PLUNKETT. I never heard of anybody that exercised any other feeling.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all.

Admiral PLUNKETT. In other words, I think the vast majority of our people took the idea that these notes, where the President was writing to the German Government, were getting stronger and stronger all the time, and if the situation became absolutely desperate over there, there is no telling what they would do, and that eventually we would get into the war. It was no surprise when we went into the war; none at all.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, the gunnery practice of the fleet, you said, was excellent in 1916.

Admiral PLUNKETT. In 1916? No; this was in March, 1917. We had just completed some long-range practices down there off the coast of Cuba, firing at greater ranges than we ever fired at before, and I think that the average percentage of hits of the ships that fired—and there were probably 8 or 10, at least, that fired at this long range—was about 12 per cent of hits, because I remember writing to Admiral Sims, who was at the War College when I came back, telling him what we had been able to do, and that he would have to modify the game-board rules up there at the War College; that we had discovered we could hit at much longer ranges than they had allowed for in their rules for plotting the war games there in the War College, and I believed if we could keep on the way we were going and hold our people for another year, we would double our scores. I was very enthusiastic about it.

The CHAIRMAN. The statement that we were efficient——

Admiral PLUNKETT. That just only applies to those ships that were in full commission down there, and the battleships.

The CHAIRMAN. That does not mean that the personnel conditions had been improved by that time?

Admiral PLUNKETT. No, no; we still did not have the full complements in the ships. This is just the gunnery thing. Of course the only thing that was particularly encouraging about the gunnery was the fact that we had everybody with us, and the information that we had on all possible things that can enter into efficiency—gunnery efficiency—were widely circulated in the fleet, in the ships there; the officers were thoroughly conversant with what we found out by means of cable and from intensive training under Admiral Mayo, and the fact that these people were tremendously impressed by these things and were using it and doing everything that they could to bring up the gunnery of the fleet, was most encouraging.

The CHAIRMAN. But you were still short of men?

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Admiral PLUNKETT. Still short of men.

The CHAIRMAN. And what you had was simply enough for the ships that were actually there?

Admiral PLUNKETT. Right there. Admiral Palmer brought that out very clearly. We entered the war with 2,300 officers, and I forget what the number of men was, but that was what we had. I had 523 men with me in a naval battery. Five hundred of those men had never seen a gun prior to the war. I had six graduates of the seaman gunnery class down there, four former warrant officers who were temporarily entered as junior lieutenants at the time. I had one national naval volunteer officer who was a lieutenant, a professor of international law at the University of Michigan—he had the fifth gun—and then there were 25 other officers that I made out of anything from seamen, second class, to chief machinist's mate. They were young men, college men, that we had on our rifle ranges around at the various naval stations; all young men of intelligence and ability, some of them of rare ability. Those people did the stunts they did, and what they did they did remarkably well—perfectly, as a matter of fact. I would not ask for better people. But that is not turning out people of the Navy. I have got them to-day down at Guantanamo. I have two of the destroyers now, on which, outside of the commanding officer of the destroyer, the rest of them are all very young people, and none of them, except in some very exceptional cases, will qualify for the ranks they now hold. But they are willing, they are intelligent, and they have got snap and push enough, they want to learn, and we are giving them the chance. They will get there after awhile. But I do not know how many of them are going to stay with us. Most of them are worried to death with their family affairs, and how they are going to make both ends meet. But they are doing remarkably well under the circumstances.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any further questions to ask, Senator Trammell?

Senator TRAMMELL. I do not think so.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Keyes, have you any questions?

Senator KEYES. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any further statement to make, Admiral Plunkett?

Admiral PLUNKETT. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Then we will adjourn until Monday morning next.

(Thereupon, at 1 o'clock p. m., the subcommittee adjourned until Monday, March 29, 1920, at 10 o'clock a. m.)

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NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

MONDAY, MARCH 29, 1920.

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON NAVAL AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 o'clock a. m., in room 235, Senate Office Building, Senator Frederick Hale presiding.

Present: Senators Hale (chairman), Keyes, Pittman, and Trammell.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. Admiral Grant, will you take the stand?

STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL A. W. GRANT, UNITED STATES NAVY.

Will you please state to the committee what duties you performed from the beginning of the World War in 1914 up to the present time, and what positions you occupied in the Navy?

Admiral GRANT. At the beginning of the World War in 1914 I was a captain in the Navy, in command of the battleship *Texas*, on the coast of Mexico, and continued in command of that vessel until June 10, 1915, when I was ordered by the department to command the submarine force of the Atlantic Fleet and to supervise all submarines in commission on the Atlantic, Pacific, and Asiatic stations.

I was promoted to the rank of rear admiral September, 1915.

This duty continued until the 20th of August, 1917, when, by orders of the department, I assumed command of battleship Force 1, United States Atlantic Fleet, with the rank of vice admiral.

This duty continued until March 31, 1919, when I was detached from duty afloat and ordered to command the navy yard at Washington.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you state to the committee what steps were taken by the Navy Department in preparing and conducting naval activities during the war, and especially in regard to the submarine and battleship situation? I would rather have you make a statement in your own language rather than to——

Admiral GRANT. To answer that question, I will have to tell you what the submarine force was—its evolution. Up to and including the year 1915, the Government owned 38 submarines afloat, which included those named, from *A–2* to the K type of boat, inclusive. I have a table here which I will give you, which you can put right into the record, showing the type of boat, the number of boats in their type, and the dates of acts authorizing their purchase.

The CHAIRMAN. The table will be inserted in the record.

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(Admiral Grant here read from the table referred to, which is here printed in the record, as follows:)

Type.	Number of boats in type.	Date of act authorizing purchase.	Type.	Number of boats in type.	Date of act authorizing purchase.
A-boats	6	June 7, 1900	K-boats	4	Mar. 3, 1911
B-boats	3	Apr. 27, 1904	L-boats	7	Aug. 22, 1912
C-boat	1		M-boat	1	
C-boats	4		L-boats	4	Mar. 4, 1913
D-boats	3	June 29, 1906	AA-boat	1	June 30, 1914
G-boat	1		N-boats	7	
E-boats	2	May 13, 1908	AA-boats	2	Mar. 3, 1915
F-boats	4	Do.	O-boats	16	
G-boats	2		R-boats	27	Aug. 29, 1916
G-boat	1	Mar. 3, 1909	S-boats	21	
H-boats	3		Do.	20	Mar. 4, 1917
K-boats	4	June 24, 1910			

These vessels were bought at intervals from 1900 up until 1911. I am speaking of the first down to and including the K's there. They were not built upon designs prepared by the Government but upon designs submitted by contractors. Their tonnage, surface displacement, varied from approximately 100 tons for the A-boats to 392 tons for the K-boats.

The first seven L-boats were contracted for under the act of August, 1912.

The first four of these boats were placed in commission in 1916.

Under the act of March 4, 1913, four more L-boats were appropriated for, three of them being in commission the latter part of 1916, and these boats were of contractors' designs, generally speaking, with slight modifications made by the Bureaus of Construction and Repair and Steam Engineering.

There were two other boats, *M–1* and *AA–1*, contracted for under previous acts, which were single vessels of a type built upon contractors' plans.

Under the act of June, 1914, the department contracted for the M type of submarines, about equal in size to the *G–4*, which was built under the act of August, 1908. The ordering of this type of submarine was in my opinion a decided step backward, and during my service as submarine force commander I repeatedly expressed this opinion.

During the summer of 1915 tests were provided in the Bureau of Steam Engineering and the Bureau of Construction and Repair for officers selected for their knowledge of submarines, who were to have special charge of submarine construction and design so far as pertained to these bureaus, and also to coordinate the efforts of bureaus with respect to the building of the submarines under contract appropriated for or in contemplation. As early as 1915 I recommended the construction of submarines of approximately 800 tons surface displacement, and continued to talk upon this subject until Congress passed the act of August 29, 1916, appropriating for three 800-ton vessels.

In the initial naval acts appropriating for the N boats and the first of the 800-ton S boats, Congress appropriated for the O boats in March, 1915. The O boats were a decided improvement over anything that had preceded them, having a surface displacement of approximately 500 tons.

The R boats provided for in the act of August, 1916, were approximately 50 tons larger than the O boats. It took more than two years of propaganda to bring department officials to recognize the importance of having a submarine capable of performing equal duty with the German 800-ton U boats.

The L boats, which I have previously mentioned, were the latest type placed in commission while I had command of the force up to August, 1917, and of them or previous types I can speak knowingly of their practical use. Their design was not good as regards machinery, with especial reference to the oil cooling and lubricating system.

Four K boats, from July 1 to October 1, 1915, were sent to sea for 10 days, and then returned to the yard on account of breakdowns, for a period of three months for further overhauling due to the poorly designed engines.

The L boats were but a trifle better.

The main trouble with the engines in the K and L types of boats was, as specifically mentioned above, due to the fact that they were of the two-stroke cycle instead of four-stroke cycle engines. The act that called for the building of the R boats called for the building of three 800-ton boats. It was decided to build these three vessels upon designs as follows:

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One to be upon the design of the Lake Boat Co. and the third upon the department's design. This was late in 1916. It was the first time, so far as I know, that the department undertook to provide and design completely a submarine vessel.

As regards getting the submarine force in readiness for war between 1915 and 1917, there was very little that could be done to get the submarines belonging to the United States in an efficient condition for war or for any other purposes, on account of the unreliability of poorly designed engines.

In July, 1917, I received an order from the chief of operations, via the commander in chief, for compliance, reading as follows:

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, July 2, 1917.

Operations 17-C.

From the Chief of Operations to the commander in chief Atlantic Fleet.

To the commander submarine force, Bureau of Construction and Repair, Steam Engineering, Navigation.

Subject: Submarines on Atlantic coast for service in European waters.

1. Designate to the department and prepare the 12 most suitable submarines on the Atlantic coast for service in European waters against German submarines.

2. Report fully on all work and on all arrangements necessary to fit these vessels for service, to transfer them to European waters, and to maintain them there in active and efficient service.

3. August 15 is tentatively assigned as the date when the expedition shall be in readiness to sail.

This is my reply. Do you want me to read it?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral GRANT. This is my reply.

SUBMARINE FORCE, ATLANTIC FLEET,
U. S. S. "CHICAGO," FLAGSHIP,
July 13, 1917.

From: Commander submarine force, U. S. Atlantic Fleet.
To: Commander in chief U. S. Atlantic Fleet.
Subject: Submarines on Atlantic coast for service in European waters.
Reference: (*a*) Department's letter to commander in chief Op-17-C dated July 2, 1917.
Inclosures: Listed in paragraph 14 of within letter.

1. The following submarines are in commission on the Atlantic coast:

Vessel.	Length.	Displacement.	Engines.	Battery installed.[1]	Oscillator.[1]	Gun.	Remarks.
	Feet.	*Tons.*					
D-1	135	288	Gas, 4-cycle	February, 1915	No	No	Used for instructional purposes, Officers' Submarine School, New London.
D-2	135	288	do	January, 1915	No	No	
D-3	135	288	do	January, 1916	No	No	
E-1	135	288	Oil, 4-cycle	August, 1916	No	No	
E-2	135	288	do		No	No	
G-1	161		Gas, 4-cycle	February, 1911	No	No	Experimental purposes; of little military value.
G-2	161		do	June, 1912	No	No	
G-3	161		Oil, 2-cycle		No	No	Do.
G-4	157	360	Gas, 4-cycle	August, 1912	No	No	
K-1	154	392	Oil, 2-cycle	July, 1917	Yes	No	
K-2	154	392	do	January, 1917	Yes	No	
K-5	154	392	do	July, 1917	Yes	No	
K-6	154	392	do	do	No	No	
L-1	167	450	do	do	Yes		3-inch gun being installed at navy yard, Philadelphia.
L-2	167	450	do	do	Yes		
L-3	167	450	do	do	Yes		
L-4	167	450	do	do	Yes		
L-9	167	450	do	September, 1916	Yes	1 3-inch	
L-10	167	450	do	April, 1916	Yes	do	
L-11	167	450	do	March, 1916	Yes	do	Detection tests off Nahant.

[1] Out of commission, navy yard, New York; will be ready as soon as better is installed.

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2. It is from the above list of submarines that the 12 most suitable for service in European waters against German submarines are to be designated to the department and prepared for such service.

3. The department's order is being carried out, but it is well to consider before final action is taken the following precepts or doctrine concerning war service of submarines in distant waters:

(*a*) No gas engine submarine should be sent away from the United States.

(*b*) No two-stroke (cycle) oil engined submarine should be sent away from the United States if possible to avoid.

(*c*) No vessel not fitted with an oscillator should be sent away from the United States.

(*d*) No vessel not fitted with a gun of not less than 3-inch caliber should be sent away from the United States.

(*e*) No vessel that can not submerge (flood tanks) in less than one minute, the average for the K boats is 1 minute 48 seconds, for L boats 2 minutes 23 seconds. These averages are of best performances.

(*f*) No vessel with faulty periscopes which includes nonhousing.

(*g*) No vessel that does not carry fuel oil enough to make the trip across the Atlantic unaided, taking into consideration that each vessel while en route must trim down and submerge daily, not only for drills but possibly for offensive or defensive work.

(*h*) No vessel under 800 tons displacement.

4. The D, E and G classes have no oscillators nor guns and with the exception of the two E's and *G–3* have gas engines. These vessels may be excluded from the above list at once and consideration given only to the K and L type of submarines.

5. The 11 vessels (four K's and seven L's) are all equipped with two-stroke (cycle) oil engines which in service lack sufficient reliability to warrant their use on distant war service. The four K boats have no guns, a 3-inch gun is being installed on the *L–1*, *L–2*, *L–3*, and *L–4*, while the installation is complete on the *L–9*, *L–10*, and *L–11*.

6. The table (par. 1) shows that new batteries have been installed on all boast during 1917 except for the *L–9*, *L–10*, and *L–11*, which have batteries that were installed last year. Each one of these vessels carry four tubes and eight torpedoes.

7. Orders have been given to expedite the completion of all repairs on the *K–1*, *K–2*, *K–5*, and *K–6; L–1*, *L–2*, *L–3*, and *L–4;* and *L–9*, *L–10* by August 5 if possible in order that the crews may have 10 days for shakedown cruise to New London and daily submergence trials thereafter.

8. The department is aware that the *L–11* is equipped for and engaged in most important tests in connection with submarine-detection work off Nahant, and I have given no order concerning taking this vessel away from this duty, which would completely stop all tests, leaving the department to decide whether this shall be done or not, as sufficient time will be had after Monday, July 16, 1917, to overhaul and complete work on the *L–11*.

9. In order to make a twelfth vessel as directed in paragraph 1, reference (*a*), the *E–1* is therefore designated; attention is invited however to the fact that this vessel has neither an oscillator nor gun installed, and it is very doubtful whether these weights could be added to this vessel. The 12 vessels designated are: *E–1*, *K–1*, *K–2*, *K–5*, *K–6*, *L–1*, *L–2*, *L–3*, *L–4*, *L–9*, *L–10*, and *L–11*.

10. To transfer these vessels to European waters and maintain them there for operative and efficient service, the following plan is recommended:

FLOTILLA.

First division (tender *Bushnell*): First section—*E–1*, *K–1*, and *K–2;* second section—*K–5*, *K–6*, and *L–1*. Supply vessel *Y*.

Second division (tender *X*): First section—*L–2*, *L–3*, and *L–4;* second section—*L–9*, *L–10*, and *L–11*. Supply vessel *Z*.

X to be a vessel having quarters for 24 officers and 200 men, in addition to those for vessel's own officers and crew; to have well-equipped machine shop; to have stowage room for ammunition and torpedoes; to carry fuel and lubricating oil in stores; to carry spare parts for engines, etc., for six submarines.

Y and *Z* supply vessels: To be vessels of large stowage capacities with staterooms and space for additional officers and crew if possible.

An expedition of this nature going abroad must be self-sustaining from the day they leave the coast of the United States for a period of not less than six months, if possible and practicable.

The two tenders and two supply vessels should carry for the 12 submarines, equally divided, about 3,500 tons of fuel oil, and 700 tons of lubricating oil.

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Provisions, clothing, ammunition, spares for engines, batteries, auxiliary machinery, medical stores, one gyro compass each, periscopes, stock materials, raw materials for repair work, hose and gear for refueling submarines at sea.

Stores should cover a period of six months.

Each tender and supply vessel shoud be fitted with towing gear for towing submarines at sea.

Tenders and supply vessels should be armed with a battery of not less than four 5-inch guns capable of all-around fire if possible.

Extra men for submarine service should be carried by these vessels and will man the batteries provided, while spare officers for submarine service would handle the fire control of these vessels.

11. *Oscillators.*—Tenders (*Bushnell* and *X*) should be fitted with two oscillators, skin installation with thin diaphragms to be used in connection with detector commutator device, a third oscillator for signalling purposes, keel installation should also be fitted.

Supply vessels (*Y* and *Z*) should be fitted with two oscillators, skin installation, thin diaphragm, for use with commutator detector device for listening purposes only.

12. Additional convoy, torpedo boat destroyers, if available, should accompany the expedition.

13. *Personnel.*—For the trip across the Atlantic three officers should be supplied to each submarine. The vacancies shown in the table shown below can be supplied from officers who have had submarine experience:

Submarine flotilla.

Commander: —— ——.
Aid, Flag: —— ——.
Aid, Secretary: —— ——.

First division.		Second division.	
Commander: Lieut. Lewis D. Causey. Aid: —— ——. Tender Bushnell: Commander, Lieut. W. L. Friedell.		Commander: —— ——. Aid: —— ——. Tender X: Commander, —— ——.	
First section.	Second section.	First section.	Second section.
E-1. 1. Ensign V. A. Clarke. 2. Ensign D. F. ——. 3. —— ——.	K-5. 1. Lieut. J. R. Lorrison. 2. Lieut. (J. G.) T. C. Berrien. 3. —— ——.	D-2. 1. Lieut. (J. G.) E. E. Logan. 2. Lieut. (J. G.) P. C. Ransom. 3. —— ——.	L-9. 1. Lieut. (J. G.) P. T. Wright. 2. Lieut. (J. G.) R. R. Thompson. 3. —— ——.
K-1. 1. Lieut. (J. G.) J. R. Webb. 2. Lieut. (J. G.) H. L. Ingram. 3. —— ——.	K-6. 1. Lieut. S. O. Creig. 2. Lieut. (J. G.) H. E. Keisker. 3. —— ——.	L-3. 1. Lieut. (J. G.) D. J. Friedell. 2. Ensign R. O. Davis. 3. —— ——.	L-10. 1. Lieut. J. C. de Carr. 2. Lieut. (J. G.) W. J. Ruble. 3. —— ——.
K-2. 1. Lieut. (J. G.) E. M. Williams. 2. Lieut. (J. G.) J. C. Sowell. 3. —— ——.	L-1. 1. Lieut. (J. G.) C. A. Rood. 2. Lieut. (J. G.) H. L. Abbott. 3. —— ——.	L-4. 1. Lieut. (J. G.) L. Hancock. 2. Lieut. (J. G.) K. R. R. Wallace. 3. —— ——.	L-11. 1. Lieut. (J. G.) A. C. Bennet. 2. Lieut. (J. G.) F. J. Cunneen. 3. —— ——.
Supply vessel Y: Commander, —— ——.		Supply vessel Z: Commander, —— ——.	

14. *Tactics.*—There are inclosed:

(*a*) Instructions to submarine force concerning "formations for cruising" when the force consisted of three divisions, each division of one tender and three or four submarines. As these instructions are very flexible one tender or supply vessel and a section of three submarines could form a group.

(*b*) Special signals for submarines, file 2642-P, March 31, 1917.

(*c*) Watch plans, file 2642-88-F, March 30, 1917, governs watches to be stood by tenders and supply vessels.

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(*d*) Instructions regarding torpedo defense, etc., file 2710–S, dated April 8, 1917.
(*e*) List of spare parts, oil engines (blanks only). Date to be furnished by commander submarine force and Bureau of Steam Engineering.

15. Considering the facts concerning the 12 designated boats, principally:
(*a*) Unreliability of engines.
(*b*) All have fixed periscopes.
(*c*) Five of the 12 do not carry guns.
(*d*) *E–1* has no oscillator.
(*e*) Lack of habitability and radius of action. I am of opinion that should the expedition arrive safely in European waters, the majority of the vessels would be laid up continually for repairs, as all of them have been except the *E–1* since being placed in commission.

Further, that the first contingent of United States submarines that should be considered for duty abroad are the eight O class of boats building at Quincy (*O–3* to *O–10*, inclusive).

16. These vessels (O boats) have the following characteristics:
Length, 172 feet; displacement, surface, 520 tons; oscillators, yes; guns, one 3-inch, 30 rounds; torpedo tubes, 4; torpedoes, 8; engines, 4-cycle oil E. B.; batteries, Gould W. L. L., 29 Plante Peate; motors, electrodynamic; normal fuel-oil supply, 10,126 gallons; maximum fuel-oil supply, 20,586 gallons; lubricating oil, 1,185 gallons; fresh water, 900 gallons; estimated radius at 11 knots, 3,000 miles; maximum radius at 11 knots, 6,000 miles.

These eight boats are on the building ways at Quincy and I was informed by the president of the Fore River Shipbuilding Co., Joseph W. Powell, that the *O–3* would be launched August 15, and have her trials six weeks later—that the remaining boats will follow at intervals of a week or 10 days.

17. These O boats have some size and their four-cycle engines, all of the same type, should prove immeasurably superior to the two-cycle engines of the K and L classes. The spare parts necessary would be interchangeable and greatly reduced in amount as compared with spares for *E–1*, *E–1*, and *E–2*, five different designs; *K–5* and *K–6* of engines; *L–1*, *L–2*, *L–3*, *L–4*, *L–9*, *L–10*, *L–11*.

These vessels may do the work required but the K's and L's never. Even these O boats would be no match for a German 800-ton vessel on the surface.

18. If the department decides to send the 12 above-mentioned boats to European waters, sailing August 15 or at a later date, I would recommend:
(1) That the tender *X* and supply vessels *Y* and *Z* be sent immediately to the navy yard, Philadelphia, to fit out and receive stores.
(2) That a paymaster with submarine experience be sent to the *Bushnell* and one to tender *X*.
(3) That urgent orders be issued to commandant, navy yard, Philadelphia, regarding the fitting out of these vessels.
(4) That urgent orders be issued to commandant, navy yard, Boston, Mass., to complete all work, repairs, and overhaul to *L–9*, *L–10*, and *L–11*.
(5) That urgent order be issued to commandant, navy yard, New York, relative to repairs and overhaul of *E–1* and *K–1*.
(6) That urgent orders be issued to commandant, navy yard, Philadelphia, relative to repair and overhaul of *K–2*, *K–5*, *K–6*, *L–1*, *L–2*, *L–3*, and *L–4*.
(7) That all vessels, submarines, rendezvous at New London for 10 days' drill before date fixed for departure.

19. Attention is invited to the fact that the tenders accompanying these submarines are not provided with facilities for charging and boosting batteries, for charging air banks, or for providing pure distilled battery water, except the *Bushnell*. The above-mentioned facilities should either be provided on the tenders prior to their departure or such facilities be provided at a base abroad.

20. Also, all experimental work with submarine *L–11* at Nahant must cease at once.

A. W. GRANT.

The reliability of the submarines sent abroad may be understood better by reading the reports of commanders of flotillas upon their arrival abroad. I have not got them. You will have to get those from the department.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you get them for the committee so that we can have them put into the record?

Admiral GRANT. I have not a solitary thing except from my own memory. These are papers that I happen to have. I have nothing from the department. That is, I have not all the reports. I happen

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to have one, Capt. Hart's report. He took the first five of those abroad, but there are other reports, which detail the troubles that they had in getting across, especially with reference to a gale they got into east of the Bermudas. One of them returned to Boston, one or more to Bermuda, and one or more of them arrived under their own power in the Azores. I have not the details, and do not know anything about that.

The CHAIRMAN. If you think it is important to put those reports in the record, please get them for us.

Admiral GRANT. They show the efficiency of the boats that were sent there, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. If you will indicate the numbers of the reports, we can get them from the department. You can get that later on.

Admiral GRANT. I will read this letter from Capt. Hart, dated U. S. S. *Bushnell*, tender, November 6, 1917:

[Confidential.]

U. S. S. "BUSHNELL," TENDER,
November 6, 1917.

From: Commander, Submarine Flotilla Two.
To: Commander, Submarine Force.
Subject: Recent voyage of the U. S. S. *Bushnell*, convoying U. S. S. *K-1*, *K-2*, *K-5*, and *K-6*.
Reference: (*a*) Force Commander's letter No. 5484, of October 21, 1917.

1. In accordance with reference, the following report is submitted:

2. The U. S. S. *Bushnell* left Philadelphia Navy Yard, convoying U. S. S. *K-2*, *K-5*, and *K-6*, October 7, 1917, 6 a. m. The *K-5* had reported ready but was unable to run either engine and had to be taken in tow within 3 miles. All three had been very hurried in their preparations for sea because of the considerable delays in completion of navy yard work. *K-2* and *K-6* ran to New London, Conn., satisfactorily on both engines, while *Bushnell* towed *K-5* the entire distance; smooth seas; speed 11.

3. Arrived New London, October 8, p. m. Submarine completing preparations for sea and doing some training submerged. All were overweight, when full of fuel and oil, even when stripped of some equipment; took out deck anchors and chains, torpedo davits, distillers, miscellaneous small weights, and four torpedoes out of *K-2*. *Bushnell* finished loading all K-class spares available; had their spare crankshafts, main motor armatures, spare cells, etc.; was full to capacity of fuel, oil, water, provisions, fresh and dry supplies, and had the submarine compartment, torpedo and war-head staterooms full of K-class spares and equipment, and extra dry provisions had mean draft of 15 feet 10 inches; her complement of boats was short by two 34-foot motor boats.

4. On October 9, 8 p. m., *K-1* joined—from New York Navy Yard. This submarine had enjoyed a most "thorough engine overhaul" at New York Navy Yard, had new circulating water pumps attached to main engines, had her engines completely assembled about 10 days before leaving the yard and was expected to be the most reliable one of the four. She proved the least reliable. On October 10, 1917, Lieut. Commander McWhorter relieved Lieut. Commander Morrison of command of *K-5;* during the long leg of the voyage *K-5* became second in reliability.

5. *Bushnell*, *K-1*, *K-2*, *K-5*, and *K-6* got underway from New London, October 12, 7 a. m., having been delayed four hours by fog. *Bushnell* towing *K-5*, speed 11. Proceeded to Cape Cod Canal, cast off two and passed through, submarines following; moderate southeast gale. *K-1* arrived east end of canal with both engines temporarily disabled. Sent *K-2*, *K-5*, and *K-6* to Provincetown and *Bushnell* towed *K-1* to the same port, where reported to and joined the Commander Submarine Force, in *Chicago*, 10 p. m. *K-1* effected repairs during night.

6. On October 13, 10.30 a. m., got underway with *Bushnell*, *K-1*, *K-2*, *K-5*, and *K-6*, in company with *Chicago*—latter towing *K-1* and *K-2*, the *Bushnell* towing *K-5* and *K-6*. Proceeded to Halifax; smooth seas entire distance, speed about 8; arrived off Halifax, cast off tows and entered harbor, *Bushnell* and submarines mooring at Imperial Oil Co.'s Wharf, October 15, 9 a. m. *Bushnell* escaped a serious accident while mooring by dropping an anchor when engine-room force failed to obey a signal to go astern. Filled submarine to capacity of water, gas, engine, and lubri-

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cating oil, and provisioned them for 10 days—with additional emergency supply. *Bushnell* refilled with fuel oil and water.

7. On October 16, 6.30 a. m., got underway with *Bushnell*, *K–1*, *K–2*, *K–5*, and *K–6*, in company with *Chicago;* latter took *K–1* and *K–2* in tow. *Bushnell* took *K–5* and *K–6* in tow. Proceeded toward final destination, on great circle course; fresh west wind, rough, choppy sea, speed about 8. At 12.45 p. m., shackle bolt between towing engine wire and hawser broke, or worked out, and left *K–5* with 120 fathoms 10-inch hawser hanging from bow, by her towing pennant. Had *K–6* slip her towline and after three hours work succeeded in recovering hawser from *K–5;* while maneuvering she cut or chafed it very nearly off and 15 fathoms was discarded. Too rough to get towing pennants back on and make up tow; proceeded ahead of *Chicago*, she being unable to make the submarines one-engine speed about 8½.

8. Strong west to southwest breeze until October 19, 1 a. m., with rough sea. *Chicago* then about 65 miles astern; hove to until daylight, then laid on oil slick and got *K–5* and *K–6* in tow again. They had run about 485 miles and were in good condition, except that *K–5* was beginning to consume too much lubricating oil. Rejoined *Chicago*, *K–1*, and *K–2* at 9 a. m. (Oct. 19) and proceeded toward destination, via great circle course, both ships towing two submarines as before; calm, moderate northwest swell; towing easily, speed about 8.

9. Until October 22, 9 a. m., towed as before, calm weather, sea smooth or with long, low swell, speed 8 knots plus; *Chicago's* boat had communicated, October 21, p. m., with *Bushnell* and all submarines and took mail and two passengers. *Chicago* cast off tows October 22. 9 to 10 a. m., directed them to report to flotilla, commander in *Bushnell*, cleared ship and headed westward at about 11 a. m. *Bushnell* proceeded towing *K–5* and *K–6* and attempting to make the one-engine speed of *K–1* and *K–2*, then running broad on each bow, 2,000 yards. East wind and sea getting up; decided not to make over 94 revolutions per minute with *Bushnell*—10 revolutions per minute less than had tested the gear at. Using one 10-inch and one 9-inch hawser—one on towing engine, one on 20 fathoms wire railed on; apparently towing easily.

10. From time of *Chicago's* parting company until midnight, October 22: At 1 p. m., *K–2* experienced scaventer-receiver explosion which disabled port engine for three days. At 3 p. m. towing pennant of *K–6* carried away at link of pelican hook; she had been on the towing engine with long scope of wire out—assume cause to be defective metal. This was not a serious mishap, as it would probably have been necessary to cast her off early in the ensuing bad weather and she was in condition to run the remaining distance, as she did. Shifted *K–5's* hawser to the towing engine and went ahead at about 80 revolutions per minute. At 5 p. m. *K–1* began stopping, which continued more or less frequently during the night; she reported "minor casualties" occurring on both engines. At 6.30 p. m. *K–5* broke adrift, pelican hook accidently tripping. This was a serious mishap, since it later became necessary to tow here in good weather through more dangerous water. Proceeded with all the submarines normally on the *Bushnell's* bows, but usually scattered on account of stopping for *K–1* and the rough sea. Running with dimmed side and stern lights; very rough, submarines closed except induction ventilator; making 5 to 6 knots while running; wind one point on port bow.

11. From October 22, midnight to October 23, midnight, same weather conditions, but the sea rougher; wind force 6 to 7 and increasing somewhat. *K–1* running somewhat more continuously, after stopping from 4 a. m. to 7.30 a. m., but *K–2* beginning to stop for considerable periods. Making 5 to 6 knots while running, drifting windward 1 to 2 knots while stopped. While running, *Bushnell* pounding heavily. Submarines most under water; *K–6* able to keep an officer on the platform at top of periscope—all others handling from conning tower by what they could see from eye ports.

12. From October 23, midnight, to October 24, midnight, at first wind and sea increased with wind force 7, or more in the gusts; then began moderating and hauling seaward. But became somewhat thick and during a long stop for *K–1* and *K–2*; submarines became scattered and not all in sight at daylight. Made an oil slick and got *K–2* in tow. At 9 a. m., by which time others assembled, proceeded fairly steadily, weather condiderably better, *K–1*, *K–5*, and *K–6* on one engine. *Bushnell* towing *K–2* until 3 p. m., when her pelican hook accidently tripped. Then proceeded as before with all running and slowing only occasionally for *K–1* and *K–2*; making good 6 to 7 knots while running.

13. From October 24, midnight, to October 25, midnight, wind died out and remained clam for remainder of the voyage. Sea soon became smooth. Became cloudy and rainy, no position fix for 50 hours before making landfall. At 7 a. m. stopped and sent boat with provisions to all submarines; division commander went in *K–1*. Took *K–2* in two and proceeded as before; *K–1*, *K–5* and *K–6* running on one engine ahead and on bows; speed 8½. At noon division commander reported *K–1* to be

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almost entirely disabled. *K-2* reported starboard engine ready and that repairs to port engine were nearly completed. At 1.30 p. m. cast off *K-2* and picked up *K-1*; division commander shifted at *K-2*. Proceeded as before, running steadily.

14. From October 25, mid. to October 26, mid., proceeded as before, running steadily until 10 a. m., then took *K-5* in tow, lubricating oil nearly expended. Continued towing *K-1* and *K-5*, speed about 8, *K-2* and *K-6* zigzagging on bows, running one engine. Made excellent landfall at 7.30 p. m.

15. Continued to destination as above and moored *Bushnell* in the harbor October 27, 6 p. m. Submarines moored alongside, in condition as follows:

U. S. S. *K-6*. Entirely ready for service, having run fartherest of all of them—about 1,300 miles, much of it in bad weather. She was at no time a source of worry or delay and contributed to the *Bushnell's* protection by her continued patrol on the bows.

U. S. S. *K-5*. Ready to run but consuming lubricating oil at an excessive rate, probably through leaky piston head gaskets. Had run through all the bad weather, made about 1,000 miles, mostly on starboard engine. (Port engine is evidently all right with its starboard crank-shaft, however.

U. S. S. *K-2*. Arrived ready for service, having effected repairs but considered less reliable than *K-5* Had run about 675 miles.

U. S. S. *K-1*. Arrived with both engines entirely disabled, having run about 550 miles. Several cracked working cylinders and pistons, one cracked scavenger-cylinder, cracked exhaust header, all scavenger valves badly burned and numerous minor defects. Examination had been only partial and estimated time to effect repairs was 15 days, material and spares were available. The probable cause of most of the trouble—generally burning up—was the increased back pressure caused by the muffler installed at the New York Navy Yard.

16. The flotilla commander's only previous experience with submarines was with the four sister ships in Hawaiian waters. Their engine reliability is such that they all could have probably run the last leg of this voyage within 8 days and have arrived in far better average condition than did the *K-1*, *K-2*, *K-5*, and *K-6*. Materially, the difference is that the *K-3*, *K-4*, *K-7*, and *K-8* are about as they were completed, with only minor changes made by their own personnel to effect small improvements, which were first properly developed. Of all the alterations made in *K-1*, *K-2*, *K-5*, and *K-6*, some are improvements but some are quite the reverse, and the effect has been to make them less war-worthy than are the other four. The funds expended in alterations appear to have been a little worse than wasted. However, *K-1*, *K-2*, *K-5*, and *K-6*, are, in material, quite capable of the duty they are now stationed to perform. Their personnel, now being upon their own resources and knowing they must do the work with the tools they have, will improve in efficiency. Good service may be expected of them.

17. Upon arrival, cabled the commander, United States Naval Forces in European waters of the fact and that three submarines were ready for service. Found commander, United States Navy, in port whose orders placing him in charge of our activities in those waters. Director Commander Division Four to report to him and submit a campaign order as soon as in touch with the situation.

18. On October 28, 4 a. m., began unloading *Bushnell*, using the lighters and storehouse provided; completed discharging at 9.30 p. m., and *Bushnell* sailed for Philadelphia, Pa., at 10 p. m. (October 28), via southern route. Landed all of Fourth Division spares and equipment, a considerable amount of supplies and approximately 5-months supply of dry provisions for 400 men. Filled the submarine with water, fuel, and lubricating oil and left 1,250 gallons lubricating oil in gasoline drums obtained from a naval collier; no supply of fuel and oil had arrived.

19. The submarines will moor to a sea wall on the inner face of the breakwater. They have plenty of room on the wall and breakwater and will use arches in its barracks, ready storerooms, etc. These arches each have a concrete floor about 20 by 25 feet and are closed at one end; as soon as boarded up at the other they will be quite suitable. The storehouse is across the harbor, in the city, and is not a particularly good one.

The submarines intend to install themselves on the breakwater, build galley, etc., and become as independent of tender as practicable. They will be about two weeks in settling, tuning up machinery and exercising, and in the meantime will probably not go far from port in the absence of information concerning enemy submarine movements.

20. Relations with local officials may not be at all times satisfactory. As far as known those officials are not wrongly disposed but appear closely tied down by their Government. Perhaps the fact that there is quite a local element which openly desires annexation to the United States may influence the situation.

21. The last information concerning enemy submarine movements was of one of their new ones, carrying 6-inch guns, which operated from vicinity of Madeira

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northward, during first half of October; she evidently passed about 200 miles east. It is considered that the first thing to be apprehended is enemy submarines attacking shipping in that harbor. The only reason they have not already made such attack must be their fear of mines. But there are none and the enemy may ascertain that, or a submarine that has run its course and can't get home might take that way of finishing his course mines or no mines.

As the *Bushnell* found the harbor, there were several ships into which a submarine could run torpedoes from outside the harbor entrance or could even enter on a dark night without much chance of detection. Any submarine could easily sink several ships there at most any time, which would also ruin the harbor until they were raised. The local officials are making a net; it is about 8-inch mesh but made of weak fence wire; a torpedo would go through it as if it were paper.

If allied shipping is to make a considerable use of that harbor under our management it is emphatically recommended that we supply a strong torpedo net or nets, the required length is relatively very short. There are lighters available for the net gate; there will be required in addition to net, with its buoys and anchors, two hand wrenches for opening and closing the gate. It will probably be more satisfactory, if the Government concerned will authorize it, for our forces to plant, maintain, and operate the net. Pending the installation of a net and while the harbor contains much shipping, I have given our S. O. P. in those waters my own opinion that our submarine's best field of operations is off the harbor entrance; at least until there is information of enemy activity elsewhere in the vicinity.

22. *Bushnell* arrived at Philadelphia Navy Yard November 7, noon; returned via southern route. This route 350 miles farther than great circle course was chosen to avoid northwest winds and get better weather for carrying out ship drills. Encountered considerable wind, all forward of beam. Held ship drills and semiannual battle inspection. Fuel consumption was a little greater than the rather scant data on board indicated would be the case; economical speed is not yet known. Uneventful voyage returning; sighted several merchantmen, including three tramp-steamers in company.

THOS. C. HART.

Admiral GRANT. Of course during the period 1915 to 1917, there was a lot of correspondence entered into upon the subjects herein mentioned, such as organization of the submarine flotillas, location of submarine bases on our coast, requirements of a standard shore base, methods of inspecting submarines, submarine training, submarine mobilization, and various other related subjects.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the date of the trip you have just described?

Admiral GRANT. The date of this letter is November 6, 1917. I think you asked me something about plans in your previous question.

The CHAIRMAN. About what?

Admiral GRANT. Plans for war or something of that sort.

The CHAIRMAN. I asked you about the battleship situation, and the general activities of the department with regard to this subject.

Admiral GRANT. I do not recall ever having received a plan from the Navy Department looking to the use of available submarines in this war. I did, however, plan to operate them from bases upon this coast. My particular efforts after taking command of the submarines in 1915 were devoted to getting the submarines afloat into operating conditions, and more particularly to getting submarines of proper size and dimensions appropriated for. I was confident in my own belief that the war would continue for some time, and that we could within a reasonable period of time, 18 months, supply ourselves with submarine vessels of suitable dimensions and capabilities to meet all of our needs.

As Congress had appropriated in March, 1915 for 16 O boats and 2 seagoing submarines, which made 3 of the AA type, I found it very hard to get much real assistance so far as winning advocates for a larger and more efficient size type of boats was concerned. The main opposition came from members of the General Board.

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In February, 1916, I was called before the House Naval Committee to make a statement concerning submarines, and everything that I said there may be found on pages 1553 to 1678 of the report of the hearings before the Committee on Naval Affairs, House of Representatives.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you give us a general idea of what you submitted to the committee at that time?

Admiral GRANT. Yes. It was from the members of this committee, the House Naval Committee, that I received the first encouragement toward obtaining a submarine of not less than 800-tons surface displacement, except, of course, from those officers who were actually serving on submarines afloat.

I was in constant touch with the Chief of Operations and the chiefs of bureaus concerning both personnel and material, and all were equally aware of the condition of the submarine force.

The service was practically new, not only to the department, so far as operation was concerned—I refer to the operation of the boats—but to nealy 100 per cent of the officers and enlisted personnel in the service.

As a submarine is a highly technical instrument, it became necessary to educate officers and men to meet the expansion of material appropriated for in March, 1916.

This led to the establishment of a base and submarine school for enlisted men and officers at New London, Conn., and the location of outlying stations at other points upon the Atlantic coast.

In these remarks I have briefly set forth the submarine situation in our Navy at the beginning of the World War. As I have previously stated, the only vessels we had in commission up to as late as 1916 were boats of the K type. The first of the L boats came in that year. We did not have a submarine of the proper type and dimensions or the personnel trained for entering the World War, in my opinion; all of which was largely due to want of education.

Senator KEYES. In order that I may understand your last statement—I am not sure I clearly understood you—let me ask you a question. Had we any submarines in April, 1917, when we entered the war, that, in your opinion, were ready and suitable to meet the conditions of the war?

Admiral GRANT. We had not.

Senator KEYES. We had none?

Admiral GRANT. We had none suitable for entering the war.

The CHAIRMAN. And when did you first begin to make recommendations for these larger boats?

Admiral GRANT. In 1915.

The CHAIRMAN. And you kept recommending from time to time to the department that they build larger boats?

Admiral GRANT. Yes; I talked to everybody that had anything to do with it, members of the General Board, and every member of the House Naval Committee, and members of the Bureau of Construction and of the Bureau of Steam Engineering, and officers in Operations.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you receive any support from the department?

Admiral GRANT. No; I did not.

Senator PITTMAN. Did you receive any report from anywhere?

Admiral GRANT. Any report?

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Senator PITTMAN. Any support, from anywhere?

Admiral GRANT. From the House Naval Committee.

Senator PITTMAN. That is all.

Admiral GRANT. One officer in the General Board assisted me. I can not recall anyone else in Washington.

Coming to the battleship force, I assumed command on August 20, 1917, shortly after the reorganization of the fleet. This force consisted of 17 battleships assigned to four divisions, as follows:

Fourth Division: *Minnesota, Louisiana, Kansas, New Hampshire; Minnesota*, flagship.

Third Division: *Virginia, Rhode Island, Georgia, New Jersey, Nebraska.*

Second Division: *Missouri, Maine, Ohio, Wisconsin.*

First Division: *Alabama, Illinois, Kentucky, Kearsarge.*

We have no records to refer to, but as near as I can recall, on August 3, 1917, there were two or three of these vessels that had not joined the force. The fleet had been recently reorganized and most of the vessels forming battleship force one were placed in full commission from having been in reserve. These missing vessels had not reported for duty from the navy yards. The material condition of these vessels was not good. This subject will be referred to later.

I am unable to quote the department's order concerning the primary and secondary missions of battleship force 1. My impression now is that in August, 1917, the primary mission of battleship force 1 was to prepare for and maintain itself in a state of readiness for war and the secondary mission was the training of personnel. This policy was later changed so that the primary mission of battleship force 1 became the training of personnel, with the ultimate mission to fit itself for battle. Although sadly in need of urgent repairs, none of these vessels were permitted during 1917 and the winter of 1917–18 to visit a navy yard for a longer period than 10 days, during which time they were supposed to dock, have their bottoms cleaned, check sights, have performed other urgent work, and were expected to effect repairs upon all material requiring it. In the majority of cases letters and correspondence concerning the numerous items of repairs for any of these vessels had either not been acted upon or were awaiting the arrival of the vessel at the yard for an inspection, examination, planning and estimates, approval, and orders for the execution of the work. Obviously nothing was accomplished at the navy yards toward the upkeep of the vessels in question beyond the routine docking work.

The commander in chief wrote the following order, file 3719, dated December 3, 1917, concerning the Atlantic Fleet in home waters:

File 3719.

UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET,
U. S. S. "PENNSYLVANIA," FLAGSHIP,
December 3, 1917.

From: Commander in chief.
To: Atlantic Fleet in home waters.
Subject: Readiness for distant service.
Reference: (*a*) Fleet regulations, article 4.

1. Under present conditions it is possible that any unit of the fleet now operating in home waters may be called upon for distant service without previous warning.

2. Commander in chief desires that all units of the fleet shall be maintained at all times in such condition that it will be practicable to proceed on distant service at any time after filling up with fuel.

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3. To avoid unnecessary hardship, officers and men should so arrange their private affairs that no warning will be necessary in case of orders to distant service.

4. Whenever units of the fleet proceed to sea, commanders of units shall ask themselves the following question:

"Is the unit under my command in such a condition of readiness that if orders are received to proceed on distant service no further communication with the United States will be necessary?"

5. Commanders of all United States vessels shall take the initiative in carrying out the above-stated policy.

H. T. MAYO.

On February 25, 1918, file 13, the commander in chief addressed the Atlantic Fleet in home waters concerning the Navy Department's policy concerning repairs:

File 13.

UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET,
U. S. S. "PENNSYLVANIA," FLAGSHIP,
February 25, 1918.

From: Commander in chief.
To: Atlantic Fleet in home waters.
Subject: Navy Department's policy concerning repairs.
References: (*a*) Navy Department's letter No. Mat-T-M1 20778-246, of February 12, 1918, to C. in C. (*b*) C. in C.'s letter to Atlantic Fleet in home waters, file 3719, of December 3, 1917.

1. For the information and guidance of the fleet, there is quoted below reference (*a*), outlining the policy of the department with regard to repairs to ships.

"Subject: *Rhode Island.* Request for repairs and inspection report.

"References: (*a*) Letter of commander Division 3, battleship force 1, to commander battleship force 1, file No. 69, January 27, 1918. (*b*) Letter of commander battleship force 1, to C. in C., file No. 812-33, January 28, 1918, and end. (*c*) Letter from commander Division 3, battleship force 1 to commander battleship force 1, file No. 69, January 27, 1918. (*d*) Letter from commander battleship force 1 to C. in C., file No. 812-33, January 28, 1918. (*e*) Letter from C. in C. to C. N. O., file 426, January 29, 1918. (*f*) Letter from C. in C. to Sec. Nav., file 426, January 21, 1918.

"(*i*) From the statements contained in the letters of commanders, battleship force 1 and Division 3, it appears that there is not a proper realization of the importance of the material inspection. As carried out, it would appear to be a very superficial inspection which gives no real information as to the ship's condition. In the letter of the division commander it is stated:

"'12. NOTE.—In regard to all items which would call for detailed examinations, it is evident that these could be covered in the admiral's inspections in most cases only by getting the opinions of the ship's personnel.'

"If this is taken to mean that such source of information is disregarded, the department can not understand the disregard of a source which would give the best information obtainable. The department depends on these reports for information as to the material readiness of ships for any service, and reports which cover her readiness for some less exacting service on a standard prescribed by the force commanders and of which the department knows nothing are of absolutely no value.

"2. The department does not consider that lack of knowledge of its policy in the use of these ships warrants any doubt as to what should be the ship's condition. The policy of the ship and force commanders should be to keep the ship in readiness for any service, and this should be the standard on which material reports are founded. With any lower standard the department is not in position to use ships to carry on the task they are called on to perform by its policy. This tendency to lay faults to lack of information of the department's policy is manifest throughout and can not in any way be accepted as reason for misleading reports.

"3. From the letter of commander, battleship force 1, it would appear that too much dependence was placed on 'standard fixed by various yards' as to what repairs were necessary. The yards are not to fix such standards. The ship's personnel are, or should be, more familiar with the needs of the ship and their standards should govern. Lack of definite knowledge as to conditions forces the yards to set standards, but the ship should know whether or not a cylinder needs boring without going to a yard and having a yard workman caliper it for them. The department holds the ship, not the yard, responsible for her material condition, and when differences arise as to the necessity for certain work the department will make the decision on hearing both sides, but

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the ship must present better information than they would appear to possess, if the spirit of the letters referred to indicate what they are now expected to have.

"4. The *Rhode Island* was sent to the navy yard, Boston, October 3, 1916, for repairs and remained there until March 6, 1917, a period of 154 days, and it is evident that she left the yard in a poor state of repair, as the deteriorated condition revealed by request for repairs can hardly be due to her 11 months' service.

"5. The department did away with the 'overhaul period' as it considered a considerable amount of unnecessary time was being taken at the yard, that the tendency was for ships to let repairs go, pending arrival at the yard, and not fully utilize the ship's facilities for upkeep. The department did not intend to keep ships away from yard when in need of repairs and can not understand how its policy can be considered a reason for ships not reporting their actual material condition. It only insists that every possible effort be made to keep ships away from the yard and on work being confined to that necessary for military efficiency. The department realizes its responsibility in the matter of sending ships to yard for repairs, but must insist on the ship and fleet responsibility in keeping the department fully informed, in having itself accurate information of conditions, in eliminating all work except for military efficiency, and in making every effort to doing work with fleet facilities.

"JOSEPHUS DANIELS."

2. It is desired to emphasize the importance of keeping proper officials informed of the need for repairs, through channels provided for that purpose by the Navy and Fleet Regulations, i. e., "Quarterly report of material readiness for active war service," "Availability reports," "Reports of necessary work beyond the capacity of the ship's force," "Requests for repairs," etc.

3. It is also desired to emphasize the importance of the ship's forces, carrying out their own repairs wherever possible.

H. T. MAYO.

I read that letter because it has reference to repairs on the *Rhode Island* and calls attention to the fact that she was 154 days in the navy yard, until some time in 1917, and yet was completely out of repair.

Her sister ship, the *New Jersey*, was in exactly the same condition. In fact, most of the vessels of the division were.

A board of investigation was held in connection with the *New Jersey* which lasted a period of two or three months. I have not a copy of the report of that board—only from memory.

During the time from August, 1917, until the spring of 1918, I repeatedly tried to get these ships to the yard here to effect certain repairs, before the 10-day limit was the order.

In April, 1918, the 10-day schedule for docking and repairing of vessels of battleship force 1 at the navy yards had been completed so far as those vessels are concerned; but as little or no work had been accomplished upon the ships in question, the commander of battleship force 1 addressed the following letter to the commander in chief [reading]:

UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET,
BATTLESHIP FORCE 1,
U. S. S. "MINNESOTA," FLAGSHIP,
April 18, 1918.

From: Commander battleship force 1.
To: Commander in chief.
Subject: Preparing ships for distant service.
References: (*a*) C. in C., file 3719, dated December 3, 1917. (*b*) Opnav 1st ind. 20392-748, dated November 7, 1917. (*c*) C. B. F. 1, let. 2690-153 of April 17, 1918.
Inclosure: Copy of reference (*c*).

1. In compliance with reference (*a*) ships of this force have submitted lists of repairs and alterations which would be necessary to fit them for distant service.

2. In many cases these alterations though not very extensive will require approximately 30 days at a navy yard to properly complete them.

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I may enter here, which is not in the letter, that these alterations were the removal of certain intermediate batteries, for their own military efficiency, contained in the repair. [Continuing reading:]

The last docking schedule was arranged on the basis of 10 working days and in consequence important major items of work have not been accomplished, as there was not sufficient time available to warrant the yard's undertaking the work and ships of this force have left the yards with work undone, the completion of which must be accomplished to insure a material readiness for distant service.

3. This force is at present engaged as a primary mission in training, with an ultimate mission to fit itself for battle.

4. Reference (*b*) directs to that end it shall maintain a permanent nucleus battle organization of both officers and men sufficient to keep the material in constant readiness for battle and to permit rapid preparations for battle when battle complement is assigned.

5. These vessels are deficient in their material readiness for battle as indicated in the several reports submitted by them to which reference was made in above paragraph. Unless these repairs and alterations are made they will, when a battle complement is assigned not only be deficient from a point of view of material but they would at that time have to go to navy yards for these repairs and alterations which would occupy time of inestimable value which should be, and which reference (*b*) contemplates should be, directed to training the crew for battle.

6. In view of the very great military importance of this question, and to the serious results which might follow any misunderstanding on the part of the department in view of reference (*b*), as to the material readiness of these ships for action, I consider it my duty to bring the matter to your attention.

7. The question would appear to be one of policy to be decided by the department.

8. The list of necessary changes and alterations have been forwarded from time to time; it will require three months after these changes have been made to train a battle crew. This training can not be accomplished while ships are at a navy yard.

9. It is the object of this letter merely to present these facts in view of the expressed policy of the Chief of Naval Operations quoted above which clearly indicates an expectation that these ships can, on receipt of a battle complement, immediately begin definite battle training, as the primary mission.

10. If conditions permit it is recommended that in the order found necessary on a material inspection ships of this force be sent to navy yards to complete the repairs and alterations necessary to prepare them for distant service, so that when their services become necessary all of the time may be devoted to training their new crew for battle.

11. Reference (*c*) has been addressed to ships of this force for the purpose of obtaining full and complete lists of all work which will be necessary before being ordered on distant service. A copy thereof is forwarded herewith for information.

12. Upon receipt of these reports, material inspection of ships will be held as found necessary and a report forwarded covering all vessels of force 1.

A. W. GRANT.

On April 25, 1918, the commander in chief forwarded the letter through the Chief of Operations: First indorsement, "Forwarded, approved," as follows:

[First indorsement.]

File 1680.

APRIL 25, 1918.

From: Commander in chief.
To: Chief of Operations.
Subject: Preparing ships for distant service (letter of combat for one).
Reference (*a*) Secnav's letter No. Mat-T-M1 20778-246 of February 12, 1918, re Rhode Island. Request for repairs and inspection report.

1. Forwarded, approved.

2. Especial attention is invited to paragraphs 10 and 12 of the attached letter. As noted in previous correspondence concerning work necessary for distant service, the commander in chief recommends that such work be done as early as is practicable, in order to carry out the department's policy as expressed in reference (*a*).

H. T. MAYO.

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Following the writing of this letter I interviewed personally the Chief of Operations and suggested the holding of a conference at the Navy Department. As a result, this conference was held, as directed in the following letter:

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
April 25, 1918.

From: Chief of Naval Operations.
To: Bureaus of Navigation, Steam Engineering, Construction and Repair, Ordnance; commander in chief, Atlantic Fleet; commander battleship force 1; commander battleship force 2; commandant navy yard, Boston; commandant navy yard, New York; commandant navy yard, Philadelphia; commandant navy yard, Norfolk.
Subject: Battleships—schedule of navy-yard work.

1. The present material condition of vessels of battleship forces 1 and 2 is believed to be in general very good; and this condition may be expected to be maintained. However, there has been an accumulation of authorized new installations and long deferred extensive repair work that must be undertaken to bring these vessels to their highest state of readiness for battle.

2. To undertake this work and carry it out most efficiently, a general estimate of the situation is necessary, in order to lay down a general plan and schedule of navy-yard work. There must be a definite list of work to be undertaken on each vessel. Preparation of plans and the assembly of material must be completed before the vessels are sent to the navy yards to begin the work.

3. It is desired that these matters be fully discussed in conference of officers representing the Office of Naval Operations and the material bureaus of the Navy Department, the United States Atlantic Fleet, and the navy yards, Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and Norfolk. The conference will be held at 9 a. m., Tuesday, May 7, 1918, in the office of operations—material, Navy Department. Officers to represent the navy yards and the fleet will be nominated upon receipt of this letter, and requests for orders will be submitted to the Bureau of Navigation.

4. It is of the greatest importance that officers attending the conference be fully prepared to comment on all matters presented for discussion.

W. S. BENSON.

On May 7, the commander of battleship force 1, met in conference at the Navy Department with representatives from the navy yards at Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Norfolk, Bureaus of Construction and Repair, Steam Engineering, Ordnance, and from the material section of the office of the Chief of Operations. So far as concerned repairs to vessels of battleship force 1, every item was considered and a time estimate for the completion of the work upon each vessel was made, and the order in which the vessels were to be received at the navy yards was tentatively decided upon.

The two following letters show the schedule for the overhaul of 10 battleships at the navy yard, Philadelphia, and 7 vessels at the navy yard, Boston.

3363-132-D.

UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET,
U. S. S. "MINNESOTA," FLAGSHIP,
Base 2, May 12, 1918.

From: Commander, battleship force 1.
To: Commandant, navy yard, Philadelphia.
Subject: Tentative schedule for overhaul of vessels of battleship force 1.

1. The following table shows the tentative schedule for overhaul of vessels of this force arranged by the navy yard, Philadelphia, Pa., May 7, 1918, following conference at Navy Department:

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Vessels of battleship force 1, home yard, Philadelphia, Pa.

Vessels.	Tentative schedule arranged by navy yard, Philadelphia, May 7, 1918.	Vessels.	Tentative schedule arranged by navy yard, Philadelphia, May 7, 1918.
Kansas	May 29–June 20.	Louisiana	July 31–Sept. 11.
New Hampshire	June 5–July 24.	Missouri	Sept. 2–Oct. 28.
Alabama	June 12–Aug. 1.	Maine	Sept. 9–Oct. 28.
Minnesota	June 12–Aug. 7.	Ohio	Sept. 16–Nov. 4.
Illinois	June 26–Aug. 14.	Wisconsin	Sept. 23–Oct. 31.

2. Upon returning to the fleet, and after consultation with the commander in chief, it is found necessary to request the yard to alter this schedule, principally in regard to time of arrival of vessels of this force at the navy yard. The following table shows the schedule, and comment is requested:

Proposed schedule of time for overhaul of vessels, submitted by commander battleship force 1, May 12, 1918, to commandant navy yard, Philadelphia.

Ship.	Number of working days.	Beginning and end of overhaul period.	Ship.	Number of working days.	Beginning and end of overhaul period.
New Hampshire	40	June 6–July 27.	Kansas	20	Sept. 9–Oct. 3.
Alabama	45	June 12–Aug. 8.	Maine	40	Sept. 18–Nov. 7.
Illinois	40	June 26–Aug. 16.	Minnesota	40	Oct. 1–Nov. 19.
Louisiana	35	July 26–Sept. 10.	Ohio	40	Oct. 5–Nov. 25.
Missouri	50	Sept. 2–Nov. 2.	Wisconsin	30	Oct. 23–Nov. 30.

3. The principal change appears with vessels of the fourth division, moving the *Kansas* and *Minnesota* to later dates.

(*a*) As it will be impossible to carry out departmental orders if we follow the dates submitted in the yard's schedule.

(*b*) It would also seem desirable to lengthen the interval between the time of arrival of vessels of any division at the yard. No change is made in the time for the arrival and departure of the *Alabama* and *Illinois*, vessels of division one.

4. In studying the list of repairs on the various vessels, I find that there is with each and every ship some one controlling item that limits the period of time that vessel will be at the yard undergoing overhaul, and it would seem at present that the result of my material inspection of these vessels will have the effect of possible reducing the volume of work on these vessels rather than shortening the overhaul period.

A. W. GRANT.

BOSTON NAVY YARD,
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT,
May 11, 1918.

From: Commandant navy yard, Boston, Mass.
To: Commander battleship force No. 1.
Subject: Battleship force No. 1, repairs.

1. As a result of conference at the department between representatives of this navy yard, of the various bureaus concerned, and of battleship force No. 1, the following schedule for repairs to battleships having Boston as home port, is submitted:

	Days required for repairs.
Georgia	45
Virginia	30
Nebraska	30
Rhode Island	30
New Jersey	30
Kearsargh	35
Kentucky	30

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2. It is recommended that the *Georgia* arrive at this yard on June 5, 1918, and that the other vessels come here in the order named, each ship to arrive about 10 days before the date set for completion of the ship in precession.

W. R. RUSH.

[First indorsement.]

MAY 18, 1918.

From: Commander battleship force 1.
To: Commander in chief.

1. Forwarded.

A. W. GRANT.

These vessels required from 30 to 50 working days for necessary and urgent repairs to place them in condition for effective military service. An order from the department concerning repairs to battleship force 1 is quoted herewith:

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, June 8, 1918.

To: All bureaus; commander in chief, Atlantic Fleet; commander, battleship force 1; battleship force 2; commandant, navy yard, Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Norfolk.
Subject: Battleships, schedule of navy yard work.
References: (*a*) Commander in chief's letter No. 9–C1 (15/6), June 1, 1918.
(*b*) Departmental letter 28577–104, June 1, 1918.

1. The following repair schedule of battleship forces 1 and 2, submitted by the commander in chief in reference (*a*), is approved.

Ship.	Working days.	Period.	
		From—	To—
Vessels assigned to navy yard, Boston:			
Georgia	45	June 5	July 27.
Nebraska	30	July 26	Aug. 29.
Kearsarge	35	Aug. 8	Sept. 18.
Virginia	30	Sept. 3	Oct. 7.
Rhode Island	30	Sept. 23	Oct. 26.
New Jersey	30	Oct. 21	Nov. 23.
Kentucky	30	Oct. 23	Nov. 26.
Vessels assigned to navy yard, Philadelphia:			
New Hampshire	40	June 6	July 23.
South Carolina	30	June 7	July 12.
Alabama	45	June 12	Aug. 3.
Illinois	40	July 1	Aug. 16.
Louisiana	35	July 26	Sept. 5.
Michigan	30	Aug. 5	Sept. 9.
Connecticut	60	Sept. 1	Nov. 11.
Missouri	50	Sept. 2	Oct. 30.
Kansas	30	Sept. 9	Oct. 1.
Maine	40	Sept. 18	Nov. 2.
Minnesota	40	Oct. 1	Nov. 15.
Ohio	40	Oct. 22	Dec. 7.
Wisconsin	30	Nov. 4	Dec. 9.
Vermont	35	Nov. 18	Dec. 30.

JOSEPHUS DANIELS.

Most all of these estimated periods of time for completing the work were too short and had to be increased.

I am unable to quote from correspondence concerning the material condition of vessels of battleship force 1 previous to 1917 and have briefly stated their condition as I found them. In one instance, however, an investigation was held concerning the material condition of the *New Jersey*. The board in this case made a careful investigation as to the reasons why the *New Jersey* required so much work to be done upon her. I think the *New Jersey* was placed in reserve at the

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navy yard, Boston, in 1915, where little or no work was done upon her. This vessel took part in the militia cruise in 1916 and was then sent to the navy yard, New York, and became the receiving ship—still in reserve. She remained at the New York yard from about September, 1916, to May, 1917. During this period practically no important work was done upon her.

The report of the board of investigation referred to above also mentions the *Rhode Island*. The material condition of this vessel was similar to that of the *New Jersey*. As mentioned in the department's letter, February 12, 1918, to the commander in chief, paragraph 4, quoted above, the *Rhode Island* was sent to navy yard, Boston, October 3, 1916, for repairs and remained there until March 6, 1917 (a period of 154 days). Her material condition on August 20 was not good. To summarize the material condition of vessels forming battleship force in August, 1917, was not good.

I doubt whether a single one of these vessels could have remained afloat in August, 1917, had they received a serious underwater body explosion at that time.

I think I am making a conservative statement when I say that there were few, if any, bulkheads in any one of these vessels that was completely water-tight. They had all been pierced for electric wires or speaking tubes, water piping or steam piping, or for other purposes since the days of their construction, due to alterations having been made in the interior fittings in the ship and the holes made thereby left in the bulkheads throughout the vessels. The work of plugging these holes and placing the compartments under an air-pressure test was undertaken and accomplished by the ship's force. No mention has been made regarding the removal of the 7 and 6-inch batteries from vessels of the *Connecticut* and *Virginia* classes of vessels. These were not removed until the latter part of the year 1918.

The CHAIRMAN. What measures did you take to get these ships ready when you found that they were not in proper condition?

Admiral GRANT. I tried to get them to the navy yards, but was unable to do so for periods longer than 10 days during 1917 and the winter of 1917–18.

The CHAIRMAN. And the 10 days in a navy yard would have been inadequate in any case?

Admiral GRANT. Except to overhaul and scrape their bottoms, it would have been absoluetly impossible to undertake any work upon them.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you bring up the question of material readiness of those vessels in May or June, 1918?

Admiral GRANT. Yes; I talked with the Chief of Operations, and was instrumental in having him order this conference at the department, which consisted of representatives from the Bureaus of Steam Engineering, Construction and Repair, and Ordnance, to meet in conference with officers representing the machinery and hull divisions of the navy yards at Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and Norfolk, and to meet also in conference with represenatives from the staff of the commander in chief, Admiral Mayo, and from my own staff, consisting of the force engineer and force ordnance officer.

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The CHAIRMAN. That is the conference to which you have already referred?

Admiral GRANT. That is the conference to which I referred.

The CHAIRMAN. And after that conference were steps taken?

Admiral GRANT. After that conference the department ordered the repairs as I have stated, giving the number of days' work, and we arranged with the yards the order in which the vessels were to go to the yards.

The CHAIRMAN. If the German fleet had succeeded in breaking out and defeating the British fleet, would your fleet have been in efficient condition to meet them before that conference?

Admiral GRANT. In 1916?

The CHAIRMAN. In 1917.

Admiral GRANT. In 1917 we would have gone out and done the best we could, but it would not have been very much. We did not have the personnel.

The CHAIRMAN. You did not have the personnel?

Admiral GRANT. We did not have any trained personnel in 1917. Let me add a little there.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you make a statement to the committee about the condition of the personnel in your belief when you first took command?

Admiral GRANT. As I stated, the secondary mission early in 1917 was training. The only vessels that were doing any training to amount to anything then were vessels of the first and second divisions, eight vessels that were engaged entirely in training men for the Engineer force, oilers, engine drivers, firemen, men of those ratings. All other vessels of the force and of the fleet, too, had begun training, and the number of men that were to be delivered by each one of the ships of battleship forces 1 and 2 were laid down, but we did not meet with very much success, and I do not think that any of the vessels of battleship force 2 did any training after I went to the fleet except to take a certain number of men and train a unit of 60 or 70 men, forming the turret crews and handling crews for vessels that were building, like the Idaho and New Mexico.

Battleship force 1 undertook then the training of petty officers of all rates, and on September 1, 10 days after I took command, an order was issued which covered the training of the enlisted personnel on all ships except those of divisions 1 and 2. We had schools covering every rate of petty officer.

The CHAIRMAN. Schools on battleships?

Admiral GRANT. Yes; and we were required to turn out a certain number of men in these ratings periodically—boatswain's mates, gunner's mates, yeomen, coxswains, quartermasters, signal men, radio electricians, carpenter's mates, shipwrights, shipfitters, plumbers and fitters, blacksmiths, pharmacists, storekeepers, stewards, cooks, bakers.

This order, which I have here, covered that detail. I have no other copy of it. It is No. 665–75, dated September 1, 1917, addressed by commander, battleship force 1, to the force under his command.

In addition to that training, we began early training the armed guard crews which manned the merchant vessels fitted with one and two guns for antisubmarine work. Each one of the vessels of battle-

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ship force 1 except vessels of the first and second division had 150 men on board; young men who came from the interior, who had never seen a ship or salt water, were placed in the division known as the armed guard division, drilled and trained by two officers for a period of four weeks.

The CHAIRMAN. Were those extra men or were they a part of the ship's complement?

Admiral GRANT. They were all extra men; had nothing to do with the ship. At the end of four weeks they carried out target practice under way, day and night, and if successful the units were transferred, not men singly, but the entire unit, 8 men forming an armed guard crew, 2 crews to a ship, with a petty officer in charge, 17 or 18 men. They had to go as a unit, because, like a football team, you could not take out one man and ship him here and another one there

The CHAIRMAN. What were the petty officers who were put in charge?

Admiral GRANT. They were men who were trained with the men for the particular purpose of taking charge of the armed guard crews.

The CHAIRMAN. New men that you would train?

Admiral GRANT. Yes; men that we had trained.

The CHAIRMAN. Did they not take some of your petty officers?

Admiral GRANT. No, sir; we had to retain some few of our petty officers in order to carry on our work. We could not dispense with them.

The CHAIRMAN. But they took some of them?

Admiral GRANT. We took men that we had trained for the business.

The CHAIRMAN. These men that you trained in the various schools, were they a part of the ship's complement?

Admiral GRANT. They were not a part of the ship's complement. A ship's complement of the *Minnesota* type of vessel has approximately between 900 and 1,100 men.

The CHAIRMAN. And how many did you have on board in all?

Admiral GRANT. We had on board most of the time from 1,300 to 1,400 men.

The CHAIRMAN. Were the ships' complements full September, 1917, on the various ships?

Admiral GRANT. We had probably a great many more men than the number of the ship's company, but we had but very few trained men.

The CHAIRMAN. They were not trained men?

Admiral GRANT. Not at all.

The CHAIRMAN. So that you did not have a trained personnel on any of your battleships sufficient to properly carry out the purposes for which they were intended?

Admiral GRANT. We had not the trained personnel, neither men nor officers, on any ship that I was attached to or had anything to do with.

The CHAIRMAN. That was the condition in September, 1917?

Admiral GRANT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In what condition were the ships as to ammunition and guns?

Admiral GRANT. The condition of the ships as regards ammunition and guns was good. That question may be due to the fact that I mentioned something about removing certain guns.

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The CHAIRMAN. Certain guns were removed for the armed guard ships, were they not?

Admiral GRANT. Oh, yes; yes, to the betterment of the ships, too. We removed all of the 3-inch batteries from all of the vessels, that is on the lower decks, and sealed the ports. The only antisubmarine guns of that caliber were high up, where we could see the submarine and fire in any seaway. The other guns that were removed from the ships, *Virginia*, *Connecticut*, and *Louisiana* were 7.6 inch guns on the lower decks, which could not be fought in any kind of a seaway. However, this was not a question which came up during the war. It was a thing that had been known for 10 years. Ten years ago certain officers tried to get those guns off the vessels and seal up the ports, as being entirely useless on that type of vessel. We managed to get an order sometime in 1918, I think.

The CHAIRMAN. In what condition was the personnel of the vessels in regard to operating the guns, when you took command?

Admiral GRANT. Well, they needed a great deal of training. They had just come from reserve, and there were no full crews in any of the vessels, who were trained, in any of the turrets.

The CHAIRMAN. There were no full crews?

Admiral GRANT. No; no trained crews.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you given any plans to guide you in the part that battleship force 1 was to take in the war, when you took command?

Admiral GRANT. I mentioned that my primary mission at the beginning of the war was to prepare for battle, and a secondary mission, of training. I think that referred to the fact that one half of the force divisions 3 and 4, nine ships, were training simply petty officers.

The secondary mission referred to, training, referred particularly to divisions 1 and 2, the older type of battleships, that were engaged in training men for the engineer force. Those vessels carried approximately 300 men under training for these different engineer rates which lasted for a period of six weeks, one half coming at the end of three weeks, and half leaving.

Later in the war, when the nine vessels of divisions 3 and 4 were engaged in training the armed guard crews and petty officers—also commissioned officers, I may add—the entire mission of battleship force 1 was changed so that its primary mission was training and its ultimate mission was to prepare for war.

The CHAIRMAN. But you were not given any general battle plans for the fleet?

Admiral GRANT. Nothing beyond that. I was fully aware—no; not in the sense you mean; no. I do not think it was necessary, hardly.

The CHAIRMAN. In the case of the battleships you were under Admiral Mayo, commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet?

Admiral GRANT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. So that any report you would have made would have been made to him?

Admiral GRANT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In the case of the submarines, under whom were you?

Admiral GRANT. I was under the commander in chief, the same; although the commander in chief in the winter might be down in the

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West Indies. I wrote to the department direct, but I kept up communications to the commander in chief.

The CHAIRMAN. But you could take matters up with the department?

Admiral GRANT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you take the submarine question up with the Secretary of the Navy personally?

Admiral GRANT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you get any satisfaction from the Secretary of the Navy?

Admiral GRANT. The Secretary of the Navy—no one in the department believed in any such submarine as I wanted; no.

The CHAIRMAN. He would not listen to your plans?

Admiral GRANT. Oh, well, he would listen; but I got no assistance.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you take the matter up with the Chief of the Bureau of Operations?

Admiral GRANT. Admiral Benson; yes, sir. He was opposed.

The CHAIRMAN. He was opposed to your plan?

Admiral GRANT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. When the war broke out with Germany, Germany had submarines of the type that you wished to see the American Navy get?

Admiral GRANT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In large numbers?

Admiral GRANT. I am unable to tell you the number she had. I have forgotten. I do not recollect now. She had a large number, though.

The CHAIRMAN. By that time was it known that submarines could be used against submarines?

Admiral GRANT. There is no secret in that. Certainly.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Sims' testimony showed that the plan was not at first adopted, but during the war it turned out that that became the most serviceable way of destroying submarines.

Admiral GRANT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Was that plan considered while you were in command of the submarines?

Admiral GRANT. No plan of that nature was considered; no, sir. I had nothing to meet a German submarine; did not contemplate sending the vessels we had in commission, as late as 1917, away from our coasts. They were only fit to operate from a base here, and then for a few hours only. They were totally unreliable, absolutely so, and I considered sending those vessels abroad was a question of putting them in the hospital as soon as they got over there, and having to repair them where they were illy prepared to do such work.

The CHAIRMAN. That is, such as we had at that time?

Admiral GRANT. Which we sent over; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. But if we had had larger submarines, we would have been able to send them over?

Admiral GRANT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And they would have been of use?

Admiral GRANT. Yes, sir; they would.

The CHAIRMAN. Was there any regular plan of the department looking to the use of submarines in the war, that you know anything about?

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Admiral GRANT. Not that I am aware of; until I got that order from the department directing me to pick out several vessels and send them over.

The CHAIRMAN. That was the first you knew of?

Admiral GRANT. That was the first. I did not know where they were going to, either; that is, the particular place or port. That was, of course, immaterial so far as I was concerned.

The CHAIRMAN. And you reported to the department that the plan was unfeasible?

Admiral GRANT. Not that the plan was unfeasible.

The CHAIRMAN. With the ships you had?

Admiral GRANT. That I would not acquiesce in sending those vessels abroad, because I did not think they were fit for the purpose; and I have no doubt, and I believe, some of them did do good work over there, but it was at a tremendous cost of men and material. If our efforts had been devoted earlier in the war to obtaining a proper type of submarine, and taken control of the matter, we would have had long before 1917 or 1918, a suitable type of vessel; but the fact that we had no vessels, as I say was largely due to ignorance on the part of everybody, myself included as well as everybody else. Why, we went out and ordered submarines from a contractor the same as you would go and buy apples from a man on the sidewalk. If he had some green apples you would take those. If they were red you would take those—anything he had; and the years given in that table, the years of the appropriations, show that we bought some boats from 1900 to 1904 and then some in 1906 and then some in 1908. There was no plan. We did not have any. We did not understand the submarine question on this side of the Atlantic, at all.

The CHAIRMAN. But, in spite of that, you tried to ameliorate conditions?

Admiral GRANT. Yes; we tried to get more.

The CHAIRMAN. Immediately after you took command?

Admiral GRANT. Yes, sir; early in 1915.

The CHAIRMAN. When did you first make known to the department the condition of our submarine force?

Admiral GRANT. I think the department made known to me the condition of the submarine force when they sent for me in May, 1915.

The CHAIRMAN. When they put you in command?

Admiral GRANT. Yes, sir. I think the department was perfectly well aware of the inefficient condition of the vessels of the entire force.

The CHAIRMAN. And immediately thereafter you tried to have changes made that would have improved matters?

Admiral GRANT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And those changes were not made?

Admiral GRANT. I could not get the department or anyone else to build these larger types. They were too conservative, and wanted to stick to something smaller, especially members of the General Board. And as late as 1913, as I told you, they stepped back and provided for these little N boats; because they were perfectly worthless, in my opinion, to operate at sea away from a base more than a few miles.

The CHAIRMAN. And you wanted the larger type boats for the coast defense?

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Admiral GRANT. I wanted the larger type boat for submarine work; it does not make any difference whether for coast defense or sea, or anything else. Just leave that part out—the coast defense.

The CHAIRMAN. And you thought we ought to have a number of larger boats?

Admiral GRANT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. So that we could compete with the enemy?

Admiral GRANT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the condition of the personnel of the submarine force while you were in command?

Admiral GRANT. We only had such personnel as would man those few boats that were in commission in 1915, as I mentioned. They were young men—the enlisted personnel, gunners' mates, engineers, machinists' mates—who went to these vessels and were attached to them for a period of not less than six months, until they were capable of occupying a responsible position. Officers who were sent there were to have from three to six months, picking up such work as they could; and they only knew from the practical work of a submarine, through practical experience. They had very little knowledge of the subject. And that was the reason that in 1916 the department assisted me in establishing the school, and I was allowed to go to New London, and I managed to get, in the Bureau of Navigation, 25 officers of the first class and 50 for the next.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you want more?

Admiral GRANT. Well, it was not necessary to have more, because I did not have any vessels to put them on. I was meeting the bureau half way, and probably not taking too large a number.

The CHAIRMAN. What would you say in reference to the statements made by the Secretary of the Navy in his report of 1918, that at the outbreak of the war the Navy was ready from stem to stern?

Admiral GRANT. The Navy was what?

The CHAIRMAN. Was ready from stem to stern?

Admiral GRANT. No; I would not agree to that. No.

The CHAIRMAN. You would not say that it was ready in regard to submarines, nor that it was ready as to battleships?

Admiral GRANT. Not that the battleship force was, or the submarines.

Senator KEYES. Admiral Grant, you told us fully in regard to the condition of the submarines. I would like to ask you this question: Was there, in your opinion, in April, 1917, when we entered war, a single battleship in fighting condition, including, of course, its full war complement of trained officers and men?

Admiral GRANT. There was not a single battleship attached to battleship force 1 that was in condition to meet the requirements you mention.

Battleship force 2 was composed of the vessels of the dreadnought type. I can not speak for them, because I had not been with them for two years. I think that when I left the *Texas* in 1915 she could have whipped anything afloat. I do not see why she could not have done it in 1917. She was trained then. I do not know much about the crews then on those ships. I had been away from the fleet for two years.

Senator KEYES. But you can speak of battleship force 1?

Admiral GRANT. Yes.

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Senator KEYES. And not one of them but was not?

Admiral GRANT. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Not only in September but in April?

Admiral GRANT. Yes; I know they were not in April. They were not in September.

Senator TRAMMELL. Those battleships that you were commanding in 1917 were helpless so far as any combatant value, were they?

Admiral GRANT. Not at all. They were vessels of the *Connecticut, New Hampshire, Minnesota* type. The major batteries were 12-inch guns.

Senator TRAMMELL. They were not sufficiently manned, though, and not sufficiently in charge of trained officers and personnel to be of any value to the Navy?

Admiral GRANT. No.

Senator TRAMMELL. Were they or not?

Admiral GRANT. Yes, but their material condition was not good. The majority of them——

Senator TRAMMELL. Do you attribute that to inefficiency of officers, inefficiency of the personnel on the ships, or do you attribute it entirely to some other cause, that they were of no value?

Admiral GRANT. The cause for it was, they were all in reserve at the different navy yards, and had been for a long while, and that they did not have any trained officers on board, it was due to the fact that they were in reserve—held in reserve.

Senator TRAMMELL. This was the reserve fleet, then, that you are speaking about, and not the fleet that continued in a state of preparedness for fighting?

Admiral GRANT. Some of the vessels that formed—in fact, I think all of the vessels that formed—battleship force 1, had been in reserve. I am not absolutely positive of two or three of them, but the majority of them had been in reserve; yes, sir.

Senator TRAMMELL. When a ship is in reserve; now, I plead that I do not know just exactly what that means. What does it mean, when a ship was in reserve?

Admiral GRANT. You are tied up at a navy yard, say, in the back channel, say, at Philadelphia, with a small number of men on board just to keep the machinery and guns and auxiliaries in condition, but not enough men on board to man and train the entire batteries; men in the engineer force sufficient to keep the boilers and machinery, and all of the auxiliaries in condition.

Senator TRAMMELL. The ships, then, that were not in reserve, you do not know as to the condition of them, whether they were in condition or not?

Admiral GRANT. I can not speak for the condition of battleship force 2.

Senator TRAMMELL. These battleships that you commanded were very largely used for training purposes, were they, for awhile, more than for real service as war vessels?

Admiral GRANT. From August, 1917, until June, 1918, we went to sea with the fleet and formed a part of it, and did exactly the same work as any other vessels of the fleet; and we were at sea, and may have made 10 trips to sea, whether they were at sea a month or longer. The primary purpose at first, as I told you, was to prepare for battle, while part of the force was trained. Later that whole

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thing was changed and our primary purpose was training, and the secondary was to prepare for battle.

Senator TRAMMELL. During the time you were going to sea, then, you were capable of performing some service?

Admiral GRANT. They did exactly the same service as any other vessels belonging to the Navy.

Senator TRAMMELL. They were sufficiently equipped for that, then?

Admiral GRANT. Absolutely, as regards——

Senator TRAMMELL. So that, so far as this war was concerned, the policy of the ships you commanded was equally as valuable as the others—I say, as far as effectiveness in this particular war was concerned?

Admiral GRANT. In this particular war, yes, sir; they probably were.

Senator TRAMMELL. You said something about, I believe, the condition of ships as to the matter of them not being able to stay afloat if certain things happened to them?

Admiral GRANT. Yes.

Senator TRAMMELL. Did any accident happen to the *Minnesota*?

Admiral GRANT. Yes.

Senator TRAMMELL. What year?

Admiral GRANT. On the 29th or 30th of September, 1918.

Senator TRAMMELL. What happened to her, and was she sunk or did she survive?

Admiral GRANT. No, sir; she remained afloat just because I had given that order.

I began in August, 1917, by listing the vessels 5 degrees, and then 10 degrees, and we found the condition which I reported. I began immediately by enlarging the repair crews which went to their battle stations, from a few men up to 100 men, on each of these vessels. We furnished the men in these different departments shores, for shoring up, and we started in with every water-tight bulkhead and sealed every hole and put them under an air pressure of 4 pounds, to test their security. I think it was Friday afternoon—I have forgotten the date, but at any rate it was in the afternoon, I was on board the *Minnesota*, and I transferred my flag to the *Pennsylvania*. I called the captain of the ship and I said, "You are going to Hampton Roads to coal ship. As soon as you are coaled I want you to leave there and pass out of Cape Henry at 6 o'clock at night or there abouts, and before you do it I want you to seal every hatch and every water-tight door, and send the first and second officers below with a wrench, and see that this is done; and do not allow one of those doors opened for the next 24 hours, until you get inside the capes of the Delaware." He did that; they were sealed up; they were tried; and she went to sea. The next morning about 3 o'clock in the morning they hit a mine, under her starboard bow. That mine blew a hole in the ship which extended from somewhere about frame 6 or 8 to about frame 14, and carried away the ship's side from the armored shelf down to the keel and pushed the keel over to port. The vessel floated. She sank from her original draft, which was about 26 forward, to 28 and something aft, so that she drew 29 feet forward and about 26 aft, and in that position she went into port, and she went into port because the bulkheads had held. They were shored. The bulkheads held, and there were no leaks because we did that work on board ship; and if it had not been done she would not have been here to-day.

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Senator TRAMMELL. I gather from your recital of this accident, then, that the vigilance of the officers in command had something to do with the safety of a ship as well as the department.

Admiral GRANT. I do not think the department has anything to do with it.

Senator TRAMMELL. I just wanted to find whose fault it was that the boats were not put in proper shape so when you struck a mine——

Admiral GRANT. Every single one of those vessels had been gone through in that way, and we were working from 1917 until they were in that condition, and I do not think there was one of them but what would have come through the same way. Not only did we 'cause our orders——

Senator TRAMMELL. Had those officers in command of those ships transcended their authority and gone beyond their scope of duty in putting the vessels into condition, or were they working within their authority and their duty?

Admiral GRANT. You mean these holes and things coming?

Senator TRAMMELL. Yes.

Admiral GRANT. That had been an accumulation of years, from the time the vessels were going into commission. They would make a slight alteration and pierce a bulkhead and take out a wire, or something of that sort, and the place was not plugged up. They were unknown. They were not in the condition they should have been.

Senator TRAMMELL. I judge from what you say that you had a repair crew on these battleships?

Admiral GRANT. Yes, sir.

Senator TRAMMELL. And it was the duty of that repair crew, of course, under the direction of the commander, to make secure all these defects, where they could do it, aboard the vessels, was it not?

Admiral GRANT. Probably you misunderstand what is meant by a repair crew. In action, if a mast is shot away, or something is hanging overboard, a repair crew would be sent to clear away the wreckage. That is what I mean by a repair crew.

Senator TRAMMELL. You said you put 150 men on, I think, in your repair crew?

Admiral GRANT. I had about 100 men in each. As I stated, that is at general quarters. They were not machinists; they were men that would handle shores and wedges and shore up a bulkhead, or cut away a bit of anything held in that way afoul or adrift during action.

Senator TRAMMELL. They were supposed to make the ordinary repairs that could be made upon the ship, were they not?

Admiral GRANT. Yes. Well, those 100 men were not men that would do the work I referred to, too. Those would be special men, you know—rating.

Senator TRAMMELL. At the time there was some controversy about the length of time that a ship should be in dockage, was the department insisting that more repairing be done aboard the ship instead of running it into the dock every time you wanted to get a little piece of repair work done?

Admiral GRANT. No; I do not think so.

Senator TRAMMELL. I got that impression from an order that you read here. Of course my impression might have been wrong. That

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was that the department was trying to keep the ships afloat where you could be training men, instead of having them tied up in a dock so much, and neglecting your training of men; and they were insisting and trying to get the people that commanded the ship, from the commander immediately all the way up the line, to do that as far as possible.

Admiral GRANT. I think you are mistaken.

Senator TRAMMELL. In other words, they were trying to help along the service, to expedite the service in that way. Of course it seems they were not able to do it.

Admiral GRANT. Naturally we were all trying our best to keep the ships in condition; but the point was to get the ships into a material condition which they were not to start with, and never were.

Senator TRAMMELL. Of course, you take a locomotive engineer—I happen to know a good deal about them; I have an uncle who has been an engineer for 45 years—a good engineer who takes an interest in his business, does a good deal of little repairs, that a fellow that is more neglectful, and does not care, will not do, and puts his engine in the shop much more frequently than the engineer who does a good many little things himself on the engine.

Admiral GRANT. Yes.

Senator TRAMMELL. I do not know anything about it, but I expect, from what I gather from the hearing here thi morning, that there was a disposition on the part of the department to get as many of those things done on board the ships as could be done, without carrying the ships into the dry dock or navy yard.

Admiral GRANT. I do not think that was the department's idea; that they were trying to do that. It was work that could not be accomplished on board the ship.

Senator TRAMMELL. I realize there is some of it that could not be accomplished on board the ship; but there is a good deal of it that could be.

Admiral GRANT. I beg your pardon; there was none of the work that I recommended to be done at the navy yards that could be accomplished on board ship.

Senator TRAMMELL. I did not say that there was in your particular case, Admiral. Of course I am not speaking of the particular case; but I am speaking of the question of general policy.

Admiral GRANT. Yes.

Senator TRAMMELL. Now, the submarines; when you took charge of them in 1915 how many of those were of construction as late as a year prior to the time you took command of them?

Admiral GRANT. As late as a year? Well, the latest boat that I had in 1915—mind you, in commission—was one of the K boats, and these are the boats that went to sea that October. The act was dated June 24, 1910; five years.

Senator TRAMMELL. In other words, then, all of the boats that you found there that were so deficient and so imperfect were authorized as far back as 1910 and prior to 1910?

Admiral GRANT. And prior.

Senator TRAMMELL. Prior to 1910?

Admiral GRANT. Yes, sir. The C boats that I had charge of that were down at Panama were authorized in 1906, and the D boats that I had with me were authorized in 1906, and the K boats in 1910.

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Senator TRAMMEL. They were all authorized, then, prior to the present administration of the present Secretary of the Navy?

Admiral GRANT. Oh, yes.

Senator TRAMMELL. He entered office in 1913, was it not—the early part of 1913?

Admiral GRANT. March, 1913.

Senator TRAMMELL. Yes.

Admiral GRANT. The first boats that were appropriated for, after the present administration came into power, were June 30, 1914, when they built the N boats.

Senator TRAMMELL. In 1914 they authorized the N boats?

Admiral GRANT. The N boats; yes, sir. That was, as I stated before, a decided step to the rear. They were smaller. I mean, from a military point of view those little boats were a step backward. We ought to have kept going ahead; and the next year, 1915, they appropriated for the O boats, and then in 1916 came the R boats and the S boats. The S boat is the 800-ton boat.

Senator TRAMMELL. After the beginning of the World War, in 1914, there was quite an awakening in the submarine proposition throughout the whole world, was there not?

Admiral GRANT. I should say so.

Senator TRAMMELL. Did our people learn a good deal about it? I mean, was there a good deal for our people to learn about it? I do not mean just one man, but the Navy, generally speaking?

Admiral GRANT. There was a great deal for the entire Navy to learn; yes, sir.

Senator TRAMMELL. As a matter of fact, of course, Germany made a good deal of progress itself in the war in submarine improvement, did it not?

Admiral GRANT. I am not so certain that she did. I do not believe that their engines—any of their later engines, were any better than the original, especially the 4-cycle. We were trying to use the 2-cycle engine on board a submarine, and the Germans were using a 4-cycle.

Senator TRAMMELL. When did they first establish a district command of submarines?

Admiral GRANT. Will you explain that "district"; what you mean?

Senator TRAMMELL. I do not know about it; I mean putting them in command of one particular officer. I do not know what you call it.

Admiral GRANT. I think they have always done that, until here recently.

Senator TRAMMELL. At the time that you succeeded to the command of the submarine flotilla, had they previously had a commander with the same authority and jurisdiction that was given you at that time?

Admiral GRANT. Yes, sir; Capt. or Commander—I do not know which he was—Yates Sterling, jr.

Senator TRAMMELL. When you were called into the submarine service you received your formal order, of course, but did you receive any other suggestions or recommendations as to the question of you being called to that service with the particular purpose of trying to build it up and improve the service?

Admiral GRANT. I was sent for in May, 1915—ordered by radio, rather—to report to the department at 9 a. m. the following day, I think. I was at sea at the time, and I left the ship at Newport and

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arrived here and reported to the Secretary of the Navy, and Admiral Benson was present, and he told me he wanted me to leave the battleship *Texas* and take command of the submarine force and build it up.

Senator TRAMMELL. He wanted you to take command and build up the submarine force?

Admiral GRANT. Yes.

Senator TRAMMELL. I believe you recited that in the course of your efforts to increase the efficiency of the submarine force you did inaugurate a school for that purpose?

Admiral GRANT. Yes, sir.

Senator TRAMMELL. Did you do anything else toward trying to make the best use you could of the service during your command; looking to its betterment and the increasing of its efficiency?

Admiral GRANT. I inspected every submarine we had and reported to the department and tried to have efficient engines put on board of the submarines we had; but the department, the Bureau of Steam Engineering particularly, probably for the want of money, could not purchase, outright, engines that would make them operate successfully, in my opinion.

In addition to that I began the propaganda, as you may call it, for building a submarine of 800-ton surface displacement.

Senator TRAMMELL. And finally they authorized some of them of that size?

Admiral GRANT. The Navy Department authorized them, finally. They authorized, in the first act, I think 3 of the 800-ton type, as I mentioned, one to be constructed by the E. B. Co., one by the Lake Co., and one of our own design, and following that, later in that same session, they added, I do not recollect whether 18 or 20, and then finally 20 more, making a total of 41 800-ton boats.

Senator TRAMMELL. Even if there was a difference of opinion as to some details and some policies there was a concert of action from 1915 until 1917 looking toward the betterment and the improvement and increasing of the efficiency of the submarine force, was there not?

Admiral GRANT. Well, I can not say that there was much concerted action, because the Government had never built a submarine. We were dependent largely upon contractors. I was almost at the point of commandeering their establishments and starting the building of these larger, more efficient boats instead of taking what they would build for us.

Senator TRAMMELL. I did not say there was a concert of action as to details or in regard to policies as to this type of boat or any other type of boat; but there was a unanimity of desires and impulses toward trying to better the submarine service; that is the point I was trying to get at.

Admiral GRANT. Yes; we all wanted it.

Senator TRAMMELL. Now, you say it was the policy of the Government to buy them from private institutions or concerns. When was that policy inaugurated?

Admiral GRANT. I think the first submarines were bought, say, in 1900.

Senator TRAMMELL. In 1900?

Admiral GRANT. That is when we bought the first A boats—I mean, authorized.

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Senator TRAMMELL. They were authorized then?

Admiral GRANT. Yes, sir.

Senator TRAMMELL. When was the first departure from the policy of purchasing submarines from private concerns?

Admiral GRANT. We have never departed from the policy of buying submarines from private concerns. The departure I referred to was designing our own submarines and having the contractors build them upon our designs, and not taking submarines built upon their designs.

Senator TRAMMELL. If there has ever been any departure from the old policy of being governed by the designs of a private builder, when was that departure made?

Admiral GRANT. That was late in 1916.

Senator TRAMMELL. Then prior to the year 1913, as far as it was within your knowledge, it was the general policy of the Navy Department to purchase submarines from private concerns of the designs as built by the private concerns?

Admiral GRANT. Yes; up to as late as March, 1915.

Senator TRAMMELL. You consider that it was an improvement—I know that from your statements—for the department to adopt a policy of making its own designs?

Admiral GRANT. Yes, sir.

Senator TRAMMELL. According to your statement, that policy was effectuated in 1916?

Admiral GRANT. Yes, sir.

Senator TRAMMELL. Was that brought about in connection with your command of the submarines?

Admiral GRANT. I think so.

Senator TRAMMELL. I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any questions, Senator Pittman?

Senator PITTMAN. Admiral, what portion of your fleet was eventually ordered to European waters?

Admiral GRANT. Of the submarines?

Senator PITTMAN. Of battleship force 1?

Admiral GRANT. None of them were ordered to European waters to act in concert with our Allies. Our battleship force were engaged in the latter part of the war, that is to say in 1918, doing convoy duty from here to longitude 20, say, and return; but none of them were sent to the other side to act in concert with the Allies' fleet.

Senator PITTMAN. What battleship force was sent to European waters?

Admiral GRANT. The fifth division of battleship force 2.

Senator PITTMAN. Battleship force 2?

Admiral GRANT. Those were the *New York*, *Texas*, *Florida*, *Delaware*, and *Arkansas*. Later it was supplemented by sending the *Oklahoma*, *Utah*, and *Nevada*.

Senator PITTMAN. When did the battleships of force 1, under your command, commence to act as convoys?

Admiral GRANT. I think it was about August or September, 1918.

Senator PITTMAN. What were you doing with those battleships up to that time?

Admiral GRANT. Why, from August, 1917, up to that time?

Senator PITTMAN. Yes.

Admiral GRANT. We were engaged in training personnel and preparing for war.

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Senator PITTMAN. During all of that time?

Admiral GRANT. All of the time.

Senator PITTMAN. And what other vessels, outside of the battleships, were in this force 1?

Admiral GRANT. There were no vessels that belonged to battleship force 1 except the battleships themselves, which, when the war ended, consisted of 24 battleships; everything that we had built from the *Indiana* to the *Connecticut* type of vessels—no, everything up to the *South Carolina* and the *Michigan*, rather. Of course the training which supplied us supplied the battleship force as well.

Senator PITTMAN. Now, I understand that prior to our entry into the war—probably prior to that time—undoubtedly prior to that time—you recommended the building of these large submarines?

Admiral GRANT. Yes, sir.

Senator PITTMAN. With a great cruising radius?

Admiral GRANT. Yes, sir.

Senator PITTMAN. And the board did not approve of the recommendation at that time?

Admiral GRANT. Which board?

Senator PITTMAN. Well, the general board?

Admiral GRANT. I do not know what the general board did. I only know from individual members. There was only one man on that board, so far as I am aware, who believed in these larger submarines.

Senator PITTMAN. What was their argument against it, Admiral?

Admiral GRANT. Well, I can not tell you. I do not know.

Senator PITTMAN. In 1917, what were the principal vessels that we were building? We were building some vessels in 1917, were we not?

Admiral GRANT. Battleships, do you refer to?

Senator PITTMAN. I simply want the information.

Admiral GRANT. We were building battleships and submarines and destroyers; building all sorts of vessels; but unless I had something to refer to I could not specify the vessels under construction.

Senator PITTMAN. How many navy yards did we have at that time capable of building a superdreadnought?

Admiral GRANT. The New York Navy Yard, I think, was the only yard capable at that time.

Senator PITTMAN. Do you know how many navy yards we had that were capable of building destroyers at that time, on the Atlantic coast?

Admiral GRANT. You refer to those, now, being specially fitted with ways, and things of that sort? I do not think we had any that were specially fitted for building destroyers at that time, excepting you dispensed with building battleships at New York. I can speak for the Philadelphia yard. I was commandant there for three years and a half. I could have built a destroyer there. But it was not specially fitted for building them.

Senator PITTMAN. Was it not the opinion of the British Admiralty as well as of the General Naval Board here that what we needed most was vessels of the destroyers type and of the chaser type, to go out and meet the submarine menace?

Admiral GRANT. I believe so.

Senator PITTMAN. And were not all of the available yards and the personnel of those yards engaged in the building of destroyers and chasers?

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Admiral GRANT. No, they were not.

Senator PITTMAN. Which ones were not?

Admiral GRANT. Well, let me see. I recollect seeing at the New York yard in 1915, a large number of chasers being built. I do not know whether they were building any at any of the other yards or not. I had no occasion for visiting them.

Senator PITTMAN. I realize that it is very difficult to remember all these things, and I do not expect you to remember all of them.

Admiral GRANT. No.

Senator PITTMAN. But what I am getting at is simply this, Admiral, that possibly the reason of some of the admirals not approving the building of these supersubmarines was because they believed that the demand for other characters of vessels was more immediate, and there was a limit to the power of construction in this country.

Admiral GRANT. Oh, I can not agree to that.

Senator PITTMAN. Do you not think so?

Admiral GRANT. I think that if I had given an order to the E. B. Co. or to the Fore River Shipbuilding Co., I would get as many boats as you would appropriate for.

Senator PITTMAN. Was it not necessary for the Fore River Co., with the assistance of the Government, to enlarge its plant?

Admiral GRANT. They certainly did.

Senator PITTMAN. So as to build destroyers?

Admiral GRANT. Yes, and submarines, too.

Senator PITTMAN. But they had to enlarge?

Admiral GRANT. Yes.

Senator PITTMAN. Was there any difficulty in getting skilled laborers when they increased the size of these various shipyards and shipbuilding plants?

Admiral GRANT. Yes, I think they had difficulty in getting skilled labor; but it was not as serious as one might be led to suppose.

Senator PITTMAN. Was it not necessary for us to stop building battleships under our 3-year program by reason of that fact?

Admiral GRANT. Yes; yes.

Senator PITTMAN. You consider battleships very essential to a well balanced fleet, do you not?

Admiral GRANT. Yes.

Senator PITTMAN. Do you suppose it would have been a practically unanimous verdict that we should stop building these great battleships, unless there was a shortage both of space and mechanics?

Admiral GRANT. Yes; the force in the shipyards at that time was working upon the conversion of merchant vessels, upon armed vessels, upon producing that type of vessels to carry provisions and men abroad. But I think that if I had gone to the E. B. Co. and stopped the building of submarines for other people, and the doing of a great deal of other work in their shipyards, that they were working upon at that time, I could have begun to construct the submarine long before we ever attempted it—long before 1917.

Senator PITTMAN. These submarines that were being built for other people, as you say, they were being built for the Allies, were they not?

Admiral GRANT. I do not know where they went.

Senator PITTMAN. You feel perfectly confident they did not go to the enemy?

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Admiral GRANT. I know they were building engines for Spain at the E. B. plant in Connecticut. They were not for us.

Senator PITTMAN. Do you not know that the building of all ships was stopped except for the Allies and for us?

Admiral GRANT. Generally speaking, yes.

Senator PITTMAN. The reason I ask you particularly about these battleships is that there were some of the Naval Affairs Committee of the Senate who were very fearful by reason of the stopping of these battleships, for fear that the policy might be abandoned after the war; and some of us who knew nothing but that one idea, were urging the continuance of the building of these battleships, and they said it was impossible because there were other vessels more needed.

Admiral GRANT. That is right, too.

Senator PITTMAN. I believe that the question was asked you, or you answered to that effect—I do not remember your answer now, but you will remember what I am referring to—that if the German fleet had overcome the British fleet or had gotten out of those waters, we would have been in no condition to fight them, or that we could not have put up a very good fight.

Admiral GRANT. I referred to battleship force 1.

Senator PITTMAN. You referred to battleship force 1?

Admiral GRANT. Yes; I was talking about that.

Senator PITTMAN. As a matter of fact, that never was in any fighting force, was it, during the war?

Admiral GRANT. I beg to differ with you; we were training for battle all the time.

Senator PITTMAN. I was drawing the distinction between training for battle and——

Admiral GRANT. While we were training personnel, we were also preparing for battle.

Senator PITTMAN. But when they ordered vessels, or battleships, over as the complement to the British fleet in the North Sea, they did not send any of your ships over?

Admiral GRANT. None at all.

Senator PITTMAN. Did you ever believe that the German fleet could ever overcome the British fleet and get into the Atlantic?

Admiral GRANT. I did not think that the German fleet could overcome the British fleet and get into the Atlantic. I was fearful that German battle cruisers would get adrift and get into the Atlantic; yes.

Senator PITTMAN. Now, you did not have any battleships that could run down one of those battle cruisers, did you?

Admiral GRANT. No, sir.

Senator PITTMAN. Your policy would have been to hold as close to ports, and protect the coast, as possible, would it not?

Admiral GRANT. I am not so certain.

Senator PITTMAN. Well, what would be your theory about that?

Admiral GRANT. Fearful they would come out and destroy our vessels, convoying vessels abroad. I did not think they would go anywhere near our battleships, if they could avoid it.

Senator PITTMAN. If they could have gotten out, what did you have that could have——

Admiral GRANT. That could have overtaken one of them?

Senator PITTMAN. Yes.

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Admiral GRANT. I did not have anything.

Senator PITTMAN. You had no vessels in the Navy that could?

Admiral GRANT. Yes; we had vessels abroad.

Senator PITTMAN. Which could have overtaken their battle cruisers?

Admiral GRANT. No, sir; not which could have overtaken them, but which could have given them battle.

Senator PITTMAN. That is, if they had come in contact with them?

Admiral GRANT. Yes.

Senator PITTMAN. As a matter of fact, your ships, so far as these battle cruisers were concerned, could only have fought a defensive fight?

Admiral GRANT. No; it would have been an offensive. I would never fight a defensive fight if I got into it, myself.

Senator PITTMAN. I like to hear that, and I approve of it, Admiral.

Admiral GRANT. Yes.

Senator PITTMAN. And I am perfectly satisfied that is the kind of fighting you believe in; but, as a matter of fact, the cruisers would have had to come within range of your guns or there would not be any fight?

Admiral GRANT. Yes.

Senator PITTMAN. What was the range of the guns on the battle cruisers?

Admiral GRANT. On the battle cruisers?

Senator PITTMAN. The German battle cruisers?

Admiral GRANT. Battle cruisers, did you say?

Senator PITTMAN. Yes.

Admiral GRANT. Oh, I do not know. I suppose they would range up to 25,000 yards; possibly 20,000 to 25,000 yards. I do not know what range they had.

Senator PITTMAN. You do not know what their range was?

Admiral GRANT. No, sir.

Senator PITTMAN. I was wondering how many of your battleships carried guns of that range.

Admiral GRANT. It is not a question of the guns having the range. It is a matter of material construction of the turrets which gives them that range.

Senator PITTMAN. I was speaking of range.

Admiral GRANT. Yes.

Senator PITTMAN. I was led to believe that none of the battleship force one had ships which had guns with equal range with the Germans.

Admiral GRANT. No; we could not get those ranges on account of the material construction of the turrets.

Senator PITTMAN. That is what I had in mind.

Admiral GRANT. That is right.

Senator PITTMAN. All of these battleships that you had were constructed years ago, were they not?

Admiral GRANT. Yes; the latest ones were the *Michigan* and the *South Carolina*. I have forgotten the year of their appropriation—when they were appropriated for.

Senator PITTMAN. As a matter of military policy, did you believe that we should have some battleships on this coast—on our own coast?

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Admiral GRANT. That we should have some here?

Senator PITTMAN. Yes.

Admiral GRANT. Well, I had not given that a thought. It was my belief that we should have a fleet in European waters which was sufficient to overcome without any doubt the German fleet; and beyond that, the sending of battleships abroad was useless.

Senator PITTMAN. And do you think there was any necessity during the war of battleships along the Atlantic coast?

Admiral GRANT. Not for our defense. I hardly thought that the German vessels would ever get out and get over here to this coast.

Senator PITTMAN. What did you think about the battle cruisers?

Admiral GRANT. As I have said, I thought that it would be possible for German battle cruisers to get out; but the mission of a German battle cruiser would have been the destruction of transports and convoys. I think she would have avoided an engagement with any vessel.

Senator PITTMAN. Now, if we are right in the supposition that they were faster vessels than anything we had in the American Navy, and that by reason of their construction they had a greater range, it would have been possible for those vessels to have carried on a fight with any of our ships?

Admiral GRANT. Yes; singly.

Senator PITTMAN (continuing). And always have been out of range of our guns?

Admiral GRANT. Yes, singly; that is theoretically so.

Senator PITTMAN. In that kind of a case, what would you do?

Admiral GRANT. That is theoretically so.

Senator PITTMAN. Would you keep up a fight when the enemy's ship was able, by reason of this speed, to keep out of range, and yet fire at you?

Admiral GRANT. Yes, if he would fight me. But they would not have fought us.

Senator PITTMAN. That is depending, probably, upon the German disposition. I think that is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, while the German battle cruisers, being faster than our ships, could keep out of range and perhaps destroy one of our ships, they could not if we had three or four of our ships operating together, could they?

Admiral GRANT. No. I did not mention that. It did not amount to much. Two or three ships operating against a battle cruiser, the features of the battle might change in 10 seconds. The conditions of weather at sea might put our ships alongside, very close, within our range or within the range of our ships, alongside of one of theirs. I have been out here at sea with two fleets fighting and we have come upon one another, in thick weather, very suddenly. Often, it occurs. This question was hypothetical, that I was asked.

The CHAIRMAN. After you took command of the submarine forces in 1915, and about that time, was there a general feeling that the United States would probably go into the war?

Admiral GRANT. I hardly think so, as early as 1915.

The CHAIRMAN. When did that feeling first begin to appear?

Admiral GRANT. The *Lusitania* was sunk in May, 1915?

The CHAIRMAN. May, 1915.

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Admiral GRANT. Even then, we felt that we might have gone into it, as I recall; but I did not think that we would, at that time. If we had gone into the war as an active member, I thought that the conditions were such that we should prepare ourselves for that; so that I felt that we had quite sufficient time to provide ourselves with submarines of the type and character that would do the work of the German submarines. That was in 1915. I felt as though the war was going to be a long one.

The CHAIRMAN. After February 5, 1917, after the German ambassador had been given his papers, was any doubt in the minds of the Navy that we would probably be engaged?

Admiral GRANT. I do not think there was.

The CHAIRMAN. The submarine situation by that time had become very menacing?

Admiral GRANT. Yes, sir; exceedingly so.

The CHAIRMAN. At that time or prior to that time had any officers been sent abroad on behalf of the Navy Department to study the submarine situation that you know anything about?

Admiral GRANT. In 1917? I do not think any officer had been sent abroad to investigate the submarine situation in any aspect, so far as I know, at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. When was an officer first sent abroad?

Admiral GRANT. The first officer that I recall, I think it was in 1918 that Lieut. Commander Grady was sent abroad, and about that same time there were other officers that were acquainted with submarines. An officer named Pierce——

The CHAIRMAN. But not until 1918, according to your best recollection?

Admiral GRANT. I think, 1918. I may be mistaken, but I think those were the first two that I can recall now.

The CHAIRMAN. On February 5, 1917, did we have any submarine building in this country?

Admiral GRANT. Oh, yes; February 5, 1917. In February, 1917, there were several of the L boats that had not been delivered. The M boat was under construction. The *AA–1* was under construction. Seven N boats were under construction. The 16 O boats appropriated for in March, 1915, were under construction; and on January 8, 1917, contracts were signed—appropriation having been made in August, 1916, contracts were signed on January 8, 1917—for 20 R boats with the E. B. Co.

On December 30, 1916, the Lake Boat Co., of Bridgeport, signed a contract for building six.

On January 9, 1917, the E. B. Co. signed a contract for building one 800-ton boat.

The Lake Boat Co. on December 30, 1918, signed a contract for building the *S–2*, an 800-ton boat, and the Government of the United States gave the order to build *S–3*, one of the 800-ton boats, at Portsmouth, N. H., on November 14. Those are the only vessels.

The CHAIRMAN. So far as you know, was there any attempt made to speed up the construction and delivery of any of these boats?

Admiral GRANT. Nothing that I can specifically remember now and refer to. Of course we were after the contractors, and I was after everybody all the time. I can not refer to any particular instance.

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The CHAIRMAN. If after February 5 the department had taken steps to install the proper engines in the submarines that we already had, and put them in commission where they could effectively operate, could they have been used to advantage in the early days of the war?

Admiral GRANT. No; because we had no control over the companies that could build those engines. We could not have gotten them.

The CHAIRMAN. And the engines could not have been changed, as you suggested in your testimony?

Admiral GRANT. I do not think so.

The CHAIRMAN. So that our submarine force which we had was practically an ineffective force?

Admiral GRANT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, when the war first began I think you stated that the original duties of the battleship force were to prepare for battle, and second, to train personnel?

Admiral GRANT. That was the mission, as I recall it. I have not any papers to refer to, but that is to the best of my memory.

The CHAIRMAN. Later that was changed?

Admiral GRANT. Later it was changed.

The CHAIRMAN. And their first mission was to train personnel, and secondly, to prepare them for battle?

Admiral GRANT. That was the second mission.

The CHAIRMAN. But still to prepare for battle?

Admiral GRANT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And Senator Trammell brought out the fact by his questions that battleship force 1 did what it was supposed to do in the the war, that is to train personnel?

Admiral GRANT. It did.

The CHAIRMAN. It did not have to take part in any battle, and therefore the fact that it was not prepared for battle did not come out; but it could not have taken part in a battle if it needed to do so, could it?

Admiral GRANT. Well, we would have taken part in a battle to the best of our ability.

The CHAIRMAN. But it would not have been as effective as it might have been?

Admiral GRANT. Not as effective as if we had our crews and fleet trained and built; there is no doubt about that.

The CHAIRMAN. And the fact that you did not suppose that the German fleet could break through and get over into these waters, would not be warrant enough for keeping our battleship forces in ineffective condition over here, would it?

Admiral GRANT. No, indeed.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is all. Have you anything else, Senator Trammell?

Senator TRAMMELL. I do not believe you stated, Admiral, that all our battleships were in an ineffective condition, did you?

Admiral GRANT. No, sir; I only referred to battleship force 1. I had nothing to do with the others.

Senator TRAMMELL. Only to your battleship force 1?

Admiral GRANT. Yes.

Senator TRAMMELL. Which were the reserve ships?

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Admiral GRANT. They had been in reserve, principally. Senator, I specifically stated that there were some of those vessels, as to which I am unable to state specifically whether they had been in the reserve or with the fleet or not. There had been some transfers from the battleship force, the *Connecticut*, *South Carolina*, and *Oregon*, that had not been with the reserve, but had been in the fleet; but the majority of them had been in reserve.

The CHAIRMAN. Ships are not in reserve when they are with the fleet, of course.

Admiral GRANT. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Then they are in active commission?

Admiral GRANT. Yes.

Senator TRAMMELL. Were those ships in as good condition to perform service within their capacity as the destroyer force and the chaser force and all that had been sent abroad, and a great many of them had reserves, I think? Were your ships in as good condition as they were for rendering some service?

Admiral GRANT. Yes, they would have rendered some service, but not to the extent that a destroyer would or did.

Senator TRAMMELL. Your force, then, was not as capable as the force that was abroad—the destroyers—and of course the destroyers, as I understand were largely——

Admiral GRANT. The nature of the preparation is entirely different. The preparation of men for a destroyer is one thing and the preparation of men for a battleship of the Michigan type is another. It is an entirely different proposition. You can not liken the two in any way—I do not think you can.

Senator TRAMMELL. One of the faults, then, was the particicular type of the ships and the complements for the two. That seems to have been one of the faults.

Admiral GRANT. The training of a destroyer's crew to fire their guns in opposition to a submarine, or the training, after they were used as detectors, to drop bombs on them, was one thing; but to train men on a battleship with a thousand men on board, and the preparation of handling crews and fire control and engineer force and everything of that sort, is an entirely different proposition. You can not liken the two in any way.

Senator TRAMMELL. These ships were some of them antiquated; they were not the more modern type of ships?

Admiral GRANT. Yes; they were the predreadnoughts.

Senator TRAMMELL. The degree of the efficiency—of these ships that you commanded—was due to quite an extent, then, to the particular construction and type of the ships, was it not?

Admiral GRANT. To the old vessels; certainly it was.

Senator TRAMMELL. When were they constructed?

Admiral GRANT. Well, I told you the oldest vessel that we had, that came to me in May or June, 1918, for training the engineer force, was the *Indiana* and *Massachusetts* and *Iowa*, appropriated for along about 1894, and the latest was the *Michigan* and *South Carolina*, appropriated for, I should say, about 1908—something like that. I do not recollect. I can not tell you.

Senator TRAMMELL. I suppose at the time they were built they were considered——

Admiral GRANT. Nothing finer in the world.

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Senator TRAMMELL. Yes; all right.

Admiral GRANT. Of each type.

Senator TRAMMELL. There seems to have been some progress in the construction of war vessels.

Admiral GRANT. Yes.

Senator TRAMMELL. As well as everything else. No particular blame attaches to anybody for the construction of these ships of that particular type at the time they were constructed.

Admiral GRANT. The *Indiana* and *Massachusetts*, that type of vessel was the wonder of the world when they were contracted for and built; but we have advanced.

Senator TRAMMELL. However, they were constructed prior to the administration of the present Secretary of the Navy, were they not?

Admiral GRANT. Twenty years before, nearly: yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, you may be excused now, and the committee will stand adjourned until to-morrow morning at 10 o'clock.

(Thereupon, at 1 o'clock p. m., the subcommittee adjourned until to-morrow, Tuesday, March 30, 1920, at 10 o'clock a. m.)

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NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

TUESDAY, MARCH 30, 1920.

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON NAVAL AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met pursuant to adjournment at 10 o'clock a. m. in room 235, Senate Office Building, Senator Frederick Hale presiding.

Present: Senators Hale (chairman), Keyes, Pittman, and Trammell.

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL H. T. MAYO, UNITED STATES NAVY.

(The witness was sworn by the chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Mayo, will you state to the committee what positions you held in the Navy from the beginning of the World War to the present time?

Admiral MAYO. I was commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet from the beginning of the war until June 30, 1919. Since that time I have been on duty as a member of the General Board at the Navy Department.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you give the committee any information which you may have about the preparation and conduct of the war by the Navy which you may deem pertinent to this investigation? Will you make your statement in your own language?

Admiral MAYO. I have a statement, and, with your permission, I will read it.

In order that my opinions and conclusions regarding the points that have been raised by Admiral Sims may be clearly understood, I consider it advisable to summarize briefly my duties, work, and observations in connection with the preparedness of the Atlantic Fleet for war and its activities during the war.

It is noted that under the general heading of "Period of the war covered by this letter" and "Motives for my letter," Admiral Sims makes the following statements:

I now come to a very essential feature of my letter which seems to have failed in being clearly recognized and understood. It is very important. An examination of the letter will show that the period which it covers is almost wholly concerned with those critical months immediately preceding our entry into the war and for about the first year or less of our participation. In considering the letter, therefore, the case must not be confused with the conduct of the war as a whole.

* * * * * * *

That we entered it (the war) with no well-considered policy or plans and with our forces on the sea not in the highest state of readiness.

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Any consideration of the general question of the preparedness of the Navy for war should cover a period of several years preceding our entry into the war; therefore, I shall begin this summary from the date of my assignment to the fleet in 1913.

In November, 1913, I was detached from duty as aid for personnel, Navy Department, and in December, 1913, I reported to the commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet for duty in command of the Fourth Battleship Division, hoisting my flag December 28, 1913, on the U. S. S. *Connecticut*, off Vera Cruz, Mexico.

My division was dispersed and in conjunction with other battleships was doing gunboat duty. By gunboat duty is meant the protection of American interests in Central American ports. The use of many of the main units of the battle fleet for gunboat duty not only prevented the training of the battle fleet as a whole, but to some extent also prevented routine target practices and the engineering runs. This dispersal of the battleships had a very detrimental effect on the fleet and the efficiency of many of the ships was greatly reduced.

In April, 1914, practically the entire Atlantic Fleet, including the destroyer flotilla, was rushed to the Mexican coast, and Vera Cruz was occupied. After the Army had taken over Vera Cruz and conditions had quieted somewhat, many of the ships returned north; nevertheless, a few battleships continued on detached service.

War had broken out in Europe in August, 1914, while the fleet was still dispersed. This situation forced attention on the unsatisfactory condition of the fleet, and plans were made to assemble the fleet and put it into as good shape as possible.

In the fall of 1914, when Admiral Fletcher became commander in chief, I was assigned command of the first battleship division of the battle fleet.

The attention of the division was invited to the fact that a higher standard of efficiency was readily obtainable and that necessary action should be taken by all concerned.

At this time there was a strong feeling among all officers that the Atlantic Fleet should be prepared for any duty and that as many ships as possible should be in full commission. In December, 1914, the department issued instructions to all navy yards to so arrange the authorized work that all battleships could assemble in January, 1915, for the work in Cuban waters. The policy with regard to routine overhauls was abandoned. Thus certain ships failed to receive their routine overhaul. The new policy was to the effect that ships should not be sent to a yard for an overhaul unless there were evident signs of deterioration. In this connection, the experiences of the war have demonstrated that the facilities available for repair and upkeep can best be used if there is a routine for examination, and consequent overhaul as found necessary.

The desire to keep a large number of vessels in commission in order to develop a well-rounded fleet, emphasized the fact that available personnel was not sufficient. If ships were given a small complement a larger number of ships could be kept in commission, if they were given a large and adequate complement then the reverse was true. The larger the number of ships in commission, the better the training of the higher commands of the fleet; that is, the flag officers. The individual units could never obtain their maximum efficiency if adequate complements were not allowed. This subject; that is, ade-

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quate personnel, became acute and was discussed and considered by the department and the Congress. This discussion continued but did not result in the addition of any adequate number of trained men or officers to the fleet prior to our entry into the war.

The orders of the department of December, 1914, resulted in the assembling of the fleet in Cuban waters in 1915 for exercises.

The material increase in the number of vessels attached to the fleet led to a reorganization of the fleet in order to relieve the commander in chief of numerous details and to insure flexibility of command.

The reorganization was made effective in July, 1915, and I was assigned command of the battleship squadrons, consisting of all the battleships on active duty, and with the additional duty of second in command of the fleet.

There was a very general feeling that the training should be intensified and no effort spared to get the ships ready for war. The subject was discussed with the division commanders and instructions regarding the subject were issued.

In accordance with general instructions issued by the Commander in Chief Admiral F. F. Fletcher, very thorough and detailed inspections were held by special and routine boards of inspection. Interest was stimulated and the improvement in general efficiency was very gratifying during the summer and fall of this year; that is, 1915.

From time to time special instructions were issued to cover certain phases of the training in order to coordinate all effort and to crystallize service opinion. These instructions were revised from time to time as experience and available information from the war might dictate.

It is almost needless to say that accurate information as to the lessons of the war was difficult to obtain, as this country was strictly neutral.

Upon completion of the target practices in the fall of 1915 a strategic problem issued by the department was carried out by the fleet. Such problems were and are essential for the development of the fleet and the home defenses. In view of the dispersal of the fleet on gun boat and other duty the number of such problems had not been as great as it should have been.

The new organization proved very effective and was continued in force. That the fleet could have been more effective if more vessels and personnel had been available, goes without saying.

It will be recalled that the general subject of preparedness was being discussed throughout the country at this time and was an intensely live one.

In the following year, that is, 1916, a very large building program was authorized; also in August, 1916, additional personnel was authorized. Our entry into the war came before these increases became effective.

At the beginning of 1916 the Atlantic Fleet, under command of Admiral Fletcher, proceeded to Cuban waters in accordance with the routine schedules for training. Owing to the shortage of personnel, many vessels were in reserve and not with the fleet.

The shortage of personnel was acute as before, nevertheless, very satisfactory progress in the training was made.

Tactical and strategical problems were held en route to and from Cuban waters and during the stay there.

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Upon arrival at home yards in April instructions were issued by the department in accordance with the recommendations of the commander in chief to proceed with authorized work on vessels and to complete all major and important items, especially on battleships in the active fleet. This policy was abandoned a few weeks later when the department issued orders to prepare the units of the active fleet for instant service. It was understood that these orders were the result of a study of the international situation arising from the sinking of the *Sussex*.

These orders could not be literally carried out because practically all the vessels were disabled and undergoing overhaul, as previously noted. The urgency apparently passed and certain work was accomplished.

Before the fleet reassembled, and in June, 1916, I relieved Admiral F. F. Fletcher as commander in chief, hoisting my flag on the flagship *Wyoming* at New York on June 19, 1916.

There were attached to the active fleet when I assumed command the following vessels:

BATTLESHIP FORCE.

Predreadnoughts (including *Michigan* and *South Carolina*), 7.
Dreadnoughts: Coal burners, 7; oil burners, 2.
Cruiser force, 14.
Destroyer force (2 tenders), 24.
Submarine force: Submarines, 19; tenders, 10.
Mine force, 4 ships, 4 tugs.
Training, 10.

It will be noted that there were two oil burning and seven coal burning (not including the *Michigan* and *South Carolina*) dreadnoughts attached to the fleet.

It is obvious that officers generally felt that no effort should be spared to:

(1) Train intensively.
(2) Increase the personnel.
(3) Increase the number of vessels with the fleet.

The two latter matters were not within the power of the commander in chief.

The fleet was reassembled in July and intensive training begun, taking into consideration available information regarding the lessons of the war. As previously stated, information was difficult to obtain, nevertheless we did our best to picture the conditions existing in the war zone and planned the work of the fleet accordingly.

Shortly after the fleet was assembled definite instructions were issued regarding the "scope of training and the preparation of the fleet for war."

It is necessary to quote only the first paragraph of these instructions, which is as follows:

In order to attain the desired degree of battle efficiency and to make progress in preparation for war, proficiency in the following exercises must be obtained and maintained.

This letter pointed out to each force the nature of the duties to which they were to devote special attention.

The instructions to which I refer were issued by the commander in chief.

Senator TRAMMELL. About what date?

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Admiral MAYO. This was about August, 1916.

Senator TRAMMELL. August, 1916?

Admiral MAYO. Yes. The details of training were left to the force commanders, except that they were instructed to follow as closely as possible the departmental and other approved instructions, which were to be considered authoritative.

The routine reports of operations and inspections were carefully considered and the training directed accordingly. A typical example of instructions that were issued as found necessary is as follows:

OCTOBER 20, 1916.

To: Commander submarine force.

1. It is noted that very little gunnery training is being done by the surface vessels of the submarine force, and that few plans have been made for such training.

2. It is desired that a small amount of daily training be undertaken and that this training be thoroughly systematized in order that the maximum benefit be derived therefrom.

3. Please issue necessary instructions and on December 13, 1916, report what action has been taken.

During this period the organization put into effect the previous year under Admiral Fletcher was developed, and force commanders were encouraged to take the initiative in their work. Tentative instructions covering the general policies were issued, and after a thorough trial in the early months of 1917, they were embodied in a revised edition of the Fleet Regulations.

A few of the paragraphs of these instructions are quoted to show that the approved principles of command were in use and that the idea of readiness for war was always emphasized in the fleet:

The essential principle of efficient organization is that there shall be due subdivision of labor with corresponding decentralization of responsibility among subordinates, each being given duties in the chain of command which he can perform adequately.

At the same time central control and coordination of subordinate parts for the attainment of the common end.

The mission of the fleet is to maintain itself in a state of readiness for war which includes not only material readiness but also readiness of the personnel to operate the material.

All vessels of the fleet must be as nearly self-sustaining as possible and shall endeavor to reduce the work done at a navy yard to a minimum.

No recommendations or arrangements shall be made which tend toward limitation or restriction of the mobility of the fleet or the component parts thereof.

Vessels in commission in reserve or with reduced complements shall be maintained and shall operate on a cruising basis so far as practicable.

The auxiliary service of the fleet was reorganized as the fleet train. This unit of the fleet enabled the most efficient use to be made of the available auxiliaries, such as supply vessels, colliers, oilers, tugs one ammunition ship, and one hospital ship.

It may be noted at this point that the training and development of the fleet was somewhat retarded because there were no mine sweepers attached to it. Tugs were fitted and trained as mine sweepers when not engaged in towing targets and in dispatch and other duties. The progress made by the mine force under Capt. R. R. Belknap was exceedingly gratifying. Although it consisted of only a few vessels, the lessons and experience gained by this unit of the fleet resulted in the successful development and laying of the greatest mine field ever known.

Shortly after I assumed command of the fleet, the reserve fleet was definitely placed under the commander in chief, and its relation

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to the active fleet was given consideration. Considering the available personnel, officers and men, progress was made in preparing this force for active service. There was inadequate personnel available to place these ships in anything like the condition desired, though they were able to perform the duties required of them upon our entry into the war. Had these ships been required for other than the training, convoy, and patrol work to which they were later assigned, time would have been needed to get them into shape.

In the fall of 1916 there was an authorized increase in the available enlisted personnel, and plans were made for the more active use of the vessels in reserve, especially the destroyers and battleships. These plans were made in conference with the Chief of Naval Operations and his assistants and enabled the best use to be made of the new personnel that became available when war was imminent.

The CHAIRMAN. Who was the Chief of Naval Operations at that time?

Admiral MAYO. Admiral Benson. The department's strategic problem was conducted during this period, and the mission assigned by the department to the force under my command was accomplished—that is, a constructive landing of troops was effected on our coast in the vicinity of Far Rockaway. The vessels of the Reserve Force were manned largely by Naval Reserves and Naval Militia.

After the holidays, 1916, the fleet proceeded to Cuban waters in accordance with the annual schedule for the employment of the fleet, carrying out such exercises as were considered essential for the preparation of the fleet for any emergency. As previously stated, instructions regarding such exercises were issued shortly after I assumed the command of the fleet. Force commanders were directed to and did submit comment on the suitability of these exercises in preparation of the fleet for war, and the instructions were modified accordingly.

The international situation and our own foreign relations were daily becoming more confused and complex. On February 2, 1917, the press news received from the cable station at Guantanamo quoted the text of the appendix to the note received by the United States Government from the German Government. The text of this appendix was such that it appeared probable that diplomatic relations with Germany would be broken off.

In order that the work, duties, and responsibilities in the final preparations of the fleet for war may be clearly understood, the various activities will be considered practically daily from this date, February 2 until April 6, 1917.

In view of the previously received press reports of the activity of German submarines in the Gulf of Mexico and in South American waters, a consideration of the defense of the fleet in Guantanamo Bay against surprise attack by German submarines was immediately taken up.

It was decided that the situation did not warrant the suspension of the program of training, but that the fleet should be guarded during this training to as great an extent as possible.

Guantanamo Bay offered inadequate area for the conduct of training operations and is very difficult of defense against a submarine without an adequate supply of antisubmarine and antitorpedo nets which were not available.

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It was therefore decided to shift the fleet base to the Gulf of Guacanayabo as soon as the fleet had completed taking provision and fuel, and had finished long-range day-spotting practice, which involved the entire fleet, unless the department ordered to the contrary.

A plan for the defense of the fleet in Guantanamo Bay was prepared. It was decided that upon February 5 the fleet would commence the movement to Guacanayabo.

February 3, at 1.36 a. m., Six Alnav. was received, as follows:

In view of present international situation, take every precaution to protect Government plants and vessels.

The active fleet with the flag consisted of the following vessels: Battleships, 12; destroyers, 22; training ships, 3; cruiser (destroyer flagship), 1; destroyer tenders, 2; the cruiser, *Seattle*, carried seaplanes.

At 11.45 a. m. the commandant of the naval station informed the commander in chief that unofficial information had been received to the effect that diplomatic relations between the United States and Germany had been broken off.

At 2 p. m. a fleet campaign order was issued putting into effect the plan for defense of the fleet in Guantanamo Bay. The necessary shifting of berths and preparation for defense was completed during the afternoon.

At 3.45 p. m. received orders to "Mobilize naval communications," which in effect, was placing communications on a war basis.

At 10.15 p. m. received "Alnav. availability," which directed all vessels to report their actual readiness for war; the reports submitted will be given later.

At 11.37 p. m. received "German ambassador has been given his passports."

The above preparations indicate that the preparedness of the active fleet was proceeding in accordance with a prearranged plan.

February 4, at 3.59 p. m. sent following to operations:

Unless instructions are received to the contrary, propose to shift fleet base to Gulf of Guacanayabo after spotting practice, February 5, then proceed with schedule of all gunnery exercises.

At 5.20 p. m. received the following from operations:

Position of fleet well known to everybody. If considered advisable on account of submarines, shift base to Gulf of Guacanayabo or elsewhere at discretion. Inform department confidentially.

It is a remarkable coincidence that the message from the commander in chief to the department stating his intention to shift the fleet base to Guacanayabo antedated the message from operations directing a shift of base by just 10 minutes. The two messages were en route simultaneously. The message "Alna. availability" required a report as to the condition of the fleet for active service. This report covering general conditions was made by dispatch.

This message is quoted below as it indicates in general terms the condition of the active fleet:

From: U. S. S. *Pennsylvania*.
To: Sec. Nav., Washington.

16,003 commanders submarine, cruiser, reserve, forces instructed report direct to department. Information regarding active fleet follows:

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Battleships have full ammunition allowance except antiaircraft ammunition. U. S. S. *New York*, U. S. S. *Florida*, U. S. S. *Utah*, lack antiaircraft guns; U. S. S. *Oklahoma*, U. S. S. *Nevada*, have only half searchlight equipment; condition engine U. S. S. *Arkansas*, U. S. S. *Utah*, U. S. S. *Arizona*, known to department; otherwise, battleships present with flag have adequate fuel, provisions, and stores.

Mine force have full ammunition allowance except U. S. S. *Sonoma*, U. S. S. *Ontario*, which also lack guns.

These were the tugs.

Conditions machinery U. S. S. *Baltimore* known to the department, otherwise mine force will have adequate fuel provision by 6 p. m. Sunday; condition U. S. S. *Hannibal*, U. S. S. *Leonidas*, not known accurately.

Train all vessels attached to fleet ready for sea except U. S. S. *Culgoa*, U. S. S. *Kanawha;* taking cargo U. S. S. *Mqumee* 6,400 tons; U. S. S. *Cyclops* has 8,600 tons; U. S. S. *Neptune*, U. S. S. *Jupiter*, U. S. S. *Celtic*, empty, now proceeding north; U. S. S. *Kanawha*, U. S. S. *Cyclops* lack guns and ammunition; condition *Culgoa* known to department.

Destroyer force practically full ammunition allowance except *Fanning*, *Drayton*, *Porter*, lack machine-gun ammunition; *Cassin*, *Cummings* defective maneuvering valves; *Jarvis* condenser needs retubing; *Dunkin* cracked steam cylinder head starboard main air pump; *MacDougal* evaporator shell needs renewing; condition machinery *Cushing*, *Davis* known to department; *Wilkes* evaporator inadequate, otherwise destroyers present will have adequate fuel provisions stores but *Dixie* stock provisions, stores, depleted to 15 per cent. Destroyers not present estimated have full ammunition allowance, fuel condition unknown, armament believed ready except ships out of commission, machinery estimated ready as follows: *Flusser*, February 15; *Lamson*, 30 days' work; *Reid*, March 1, 20 days' work; *Perkins*, *Roe* March 1; *Sterrett*, *Trippe*, *Burrows*, ready; *Terry* June 1; *Beale*, *Patterson*, *Jouett*, *Warrington*, defective boilers water drums; *Henley*, *Mayrant*, *Dotnes* need new engines; *Ammen* April 15; *Jenkins*, *Benham*, February 15; *Paulding*, March 15, *Salem*, *Chester*, *Jacob Jones*, known to department. *Birmingham*, 30 days' work, provisions stores of destroyers not present estimated, 50 per cent capacity; *Montana* ready. Letter follows. 16304.

U. S. S. "PENNSYLVANIA"

A letter was sent to force commanders present, reading in part as follows:

In so far as the Atlantic Fleet is concerned, the commander in chief desires, at the earliest possible moment, that force commanders make report in two categories, namely: (*a*) Ships present with the flag. (*b*) Ships not present with the flag.

For category A make report on actual readiness of material for war service except stripping ship, having regard for the same items as in paragraph above.

A radiogram was addressed to the commanders of the submarine reserve and cruiser forces, directing them to report on Alnav, availability direct to the department, and also to the commander in chief The reports in detail from the commanders of the battleship force, destroyer force, and train are appended to this statement, marked "B"

February 5: The department was informed of the contemplated movement the fleet to Guacanayabo.

The department directed that the *Olympia* and *Machias* be sent to the Danish West Indies to observe conditions in and about islands, especially as regarded existence of German submarine base. *Olympia* and *Machias* ordered.

The fleet left Guantanamo for Guacanayabo, except the *Montana*, which was left to guard the naval station. The *Arkansas* joined the fleet at sea.

At 9 p. m. issued radio orders for disposition of fleet and base defense force at Guacanayabo.

The defense of the fleet in Guacanayabo Gulf consisted of a destroyer patrol from Cape Cruz to Lavissa Bank; picket boats in all

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channels practicable for submarines; airplane reconnaissance of Gulf and sea area in the vicinity, twice daily.

February 9: Dispatch was received indicating dates submarines would be available for service. The condition, according to this report, appeared to be good, but the submarines were considered (at that time) unreliable except for work near their shore bases. Rear Admiral Grant, who was in command of the submarine force at the time, can give their actual condition. A copy of this dispatch is appended, marked "C."

February 10: The condition in the navy yards was not definitely known to the commander in chief, but the following radio indicated that the yards had not been adequately expanded to meet the needs of preparation for war. The radio was:

Due to conditions in navy yards *New Hampshire, Vermont, Illinois, and Maine* can not be prepared there. Ordered to report to fleet for such work as can be done with fleet repair facilities.

These vessels had been operating in Mexican and Caribbean waters with reduced complements. Upon their arrival at Guacanayabo skilled mechanics from other battleships were detailed to assist in putting them in condition.

February 11: The commander in chief was informed that the destroyers in reserve and reduced commission in the Pacific would be sent to the Canal Zone as soon as they could be gotten ready.

February 12: On this date received the following radio from Chief of Naval Operations:

Do you feel that the fleet is properly protected from possible submarine attack. If not, what changes do you suggest. Do you advise bringing the fleet north or not?

This message was answered as follows:

From: U. S. S. *Pennsylvania*.
To: Op. nav. Washington.

16,012. Protection as per campaign order 3 of February 6 as complete as practicable in foreign waters open to commerce. Ships fleet carrying out target practice schedule. Ships changing anchorage frequently and darkening except during gunnery work. Recommend fleet remain south for the present. *Paducah* join fleet for channel guard. *Eagle* be designated dispatch vessel Haiti, San Domingo. U. S. S. *Hannibal*, U. S. S. *Leonidas* be immediately fitted to join mine force. Visit Colon, Panama, be canceled. Fleet northern rendezvous be Long Island Sound. Army arrange to close it to submarines and to protect Block Island Sound. Commander cruiser force be relieved military governor to devote himself to development cruiser work. 22,412.

The trip to Panama had been on the approved fleet schedule.

On this date I issued an order in regard to taking special precautions for the preservation of the military integrity of the vessels of the fleet. Copy appended marked "D."

February 13: The decision with regard to the fleet was received, as follows:

Fleet will remain south for the present. Visit to Panama settled later depending on developments. Surveying vessels referred to engaged in important work. If urgent necessity arises, will order any or all to report to you at once.

February 16: The *Drayton* and *Aylwin* having been in a collision while on patrol against submarine activities, were ordered to Charleston for repairs.

At this time the situation in Cuba was serious, a revolution existing. The liberal element had seized the city of Santiago de Cuba, and it had been necessary for the commander in chief to send vessels to several points. Each vessel so detailed from the fleet reduced the

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effectiveness of the protection against submarines should the Germans endeavor to attack the fleet before or upon a declaraction of war. The commander in chief recommended that no further ships be detailed from the fleet for duty in connection with the Cuban insurrection.

In view of the unsettled conditions in Cuba, the following classes of vessels were to some extent diverted from their training for war: Battleships, destroyers, cruisers, mining vessels, and surveying vessels.

February 20: Information was received that orders had been issued to put destroyer flotillas 1 and 2 in material readiness for service.

February 23: Received letter from Secretary of the Navy re. campaign order No. 2, as follows:

FEBRUARY 13, 1917.

To: Commander in chief, Atlantic Fleet, U. S. S. *Pennsylvania*, flagship.
Subject: Fleet campaign order No. 2, February 5, 1917.

1. In the Atlantic Fleet campaign order No. 2, of February 5 it is noted that orders in paragraph 3 (*a*) direct the scouting force to "clear Quatro Reales Channel of * * * submarines and mines." The order to "clear" the channel of submarines could have been interpreted as uathorizing the use of force against any submarines found therein. The department assumes that it was the commander in chief's intention to sweep the channel for possible mines and to search for and report submarines, not to operate offensively against them.

JOSEPHUS DANIELS.

Reply was sent as follows:

Secnav. letter February 13, subject fleet campaign order No. 2 of February 5, C. in C. intention was to distinctly authorize use of force against such vessels found in vicinity of Fleet or approaching to fleet.

Similar orders are now in force and are considered essential safety fleet as intentions any such vessels assumed hostile if found as above.

March 2: Information was received that destroyers of flotillas 1 and 2 would be required by the department for neutrality duty and would not be available for duty with the fleet.

March 3: The *Illinois* and destroyers *Jarvas*, *McCall*, *Wainwright*, *Ericsson*, *McDougal*, *Tucker*, *Duncan*, and *Cushing* were ordered to home yards for repairs, leaving 14 with the fleet.

March 8: Received following radio from Operations:

Trip to Panama will not be made. About what date can fleet finish all desired exercises South and depart North? What do you recommend?

Reply was sent as follows:

From: U. S. S. *Pennsylvania*.
To: Opnav, Washington.

15008. All gunnery exercises finished before April 1, on completion fleet proceeds Guantanamo Bay for benefit personnel. Recommend start north about April 5. 18602. 08409.

Flag "PENNSYLVANIA."

March 11: An order was received to send north 30 guns crews for armed guard duty. A copy of this order from the Bureau of Navigation is appended. This order, issued by a bureau, reduced the military efficiency of the antitorpedo defense of the battleship force. The policy on which such order must have been based was not made known to the commander in chief except by inference from the bureau order.

Under the law, the Bureau of Navigation has cognizance of personnel matters, and was acting within its province in directing the

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transfer of personnel. It was assumed that the policy had the approval of the Chief of Naval Operations.

The transfer of such a large number of officers and men led to a consideration of the future situation with regard to personnel. It was realized that the active fleet contained the major part of the trained personnel of the service, and that it would have to supply the demands for personnel for armed guard and other duties, hence full and hearty cooperation was then and subsequently given the Bureau of Navigation in its great work of expansion.

The guns' crew for armed guard duty were sent by destroyer to Key West, from which place they went north by rail.

March 14: Thirty more gun crews ordered north by the Bureau of Navigation.

March 16: Received information that the department contemplated sending *Alabama* to Guacanayabo with 800 enlisted men for active fleet. This personnel did not reach the fleet until its arrival in Hampton Roads, due to the fleet's orders to proceed north.

(This was handed to the reporter on March 31 with a request to add to page 20 of Admiral Mayo's manuscript:)

Detail immediately 30 trained torpedo defense gun crews consisting of two gun pointers, sightsetter, plugman, gun captain, each crew. Above crews to be divided into groups, each group to consist of 39-men crews. Detail immediately 10 lieutenants (senior grade) competent to command each group three guns. Detail in addition one gunner's mate, one petty officer for each group of three guns. Above personnel to be placed aboard United States merchant vessels as armed guard for defense against German submarines. The above personnel to be detailed from 13 vessels battleship force now with flag. Send above personnel to receiving ship *New York* via destroyer to Key West and rail to New York. Radio probable date arrival party at New York. Be prepared for additional details. Acknowledge.

March 20: The commander in chief was directed to proceed with the fleet to Hampton Roads.

March 21: The fleet base was shifted to Guantanamo preparatory to movement to the north. The dispositions for defense of the fleet in Guantanamo were much the same as before the fleet moved to Guacanayabo, no additional facilities having become available.

March 22: The submarine force, although carried on the organization sheets as part of the Atlantic Fleet, had been operating independently because of the conditions which prevented their active work with the fleet. Reports were made, as a rule, direct to the department. This condition, though faulty, had been accepted, due to the large number of units whose material condition was not good, and because of the restricted operations of which this force was capable.

This condition is indicated clearly by a dispatch sent from Operations to the commander submarine force on March 22, as follows:

There appears to be need of additional submarines New London for training purposes, and in view of present conditions it appears to department advisable entire submarine force proceed there immediately. Make recommendation by dispatch.

This message was not sent to the commander in chief, nor was his recommendation requested. This was expected, more or less, as the commander submarine force had constantly been in direct touch with the department.

March 23: The battleships and most of the destroyers sailed from Guantanamo Bay for Hampton Roads.

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The estimate of the situation with regard to the movement of the fleet north, indicated:

(*a*) That if enemy submarines were preparing to strike the fleet without warning and were informed of the probable movement of the fleet to the north, they would probably lie in wait for the fleet in the Crooked Island Passage where the passage is narrow, and the maneuvering of a large number of ships to avoid submarines impossible.

(*b*) That the number of destroyers with the fleet was inadequate to its efficient protection if it proceeded in one formation at low speed.

It was, therefore, decided to proceed with the active battleships and available destroyers at maximum sustained speed via Cacos Channel, and to permit the train, mine force, and old battleships to proceed in company via the Crooked Island Passage at a later date.

The battleships and destroyers arrived at Hampton Roads at 9.30 a. m., March 27; the train, mine force, etc., on March 30.

March 28: Upon arrival at Hampton Roads destroyers were stationed in the lower bay to act as lookouts. When the mine force arrived it was assigned to cooperate with the fifth naval district in placing antisubmarine nets in the entrance to Chesapeake Bay and at Hampton Roads.

I proceeded to Washington to consult with the Chief of Naval Operations with regard to possible activities.

March 28–31: No written plan or policy was given to me at this time, but from conversation I understood the policy as follows:

> The Atlantic Fleet to be maintained in readiness for active operations. No vessels to be sent to navy yards unless in need of major repairs. Fleet to continue intensive training of gun crews for armed guard duty.

I was directed to shift the fleet base to York River, Va., in accordance with my recommendation.

Information was received in Washington of the contemplated formation of the patrol force, consisting of vessels from the several fleet forces.

The formation of a fleet force to do a task was an entire change of organization policy. The basis of previous fleet organization was that vessels of a type would form a force.

April 3: The fleet base was shifted to York River, Va., and positions for the defense of the fleet against possible attack and against floating mines were put into effect. Patrols were also established on shore and in the river, the latter consisting merely of armed launches from the battleships.

April 4: Orders were received to organize the patrol force on April 8, and to assign all destroyers that could be spared to this force.

An increase in the mine force was recommended to permit it to accomplish its assigned task of placing antisubmarine trap nets. The department asked what destroyers with the battle fleet could be spared for duty with the patrol force. I replied that all then present were required with the fleet, and also recommended that destroyer flotilla 3 be kept intact for use with battle fleet.

In this connection it should be noted that no policy with regard to the future service of the battleships had been decided upon, except as previously noted. In view of the possibility that the fleet might be called upon as a fleet, I considered it essential that at least one flotilla of destroyers remain with the battleships.

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April 5: No orders for the patrol force having been received, instructions were requested as to the mission to be assigned to the patrol force. The answer to this request was:

The mission of the patrol force will be issued by the department through the commander in chief.

This was the start of what the commander in chief believed to be a false policy, namely, control of active operations of subordinate forces by the department. In view of the fact that at this time I was present in the area of operations to be covered by the patrol force, the mission, in my opinion, should have been assigned to me, with discretion to use such of my forces as might have been required to do the task.

The preceding remarks cover the preparedness of the fleet upon our entry into the war, April 6, 1917.

When the active fleet arrived in Hampton Roads about the 1st of April after its training period in Cuban waters, it was in the best state of preparedness that it had ever been, and there was a feeling of confidence in the personnel of being able to cope with any emergency; the personnel was, however, on a peace basis and the transfer of trained personnel for armed guard and other duty was already being felt in a decrease in efficiency. The destroyers that were first despatched to the war zone, though they were assigned to operations for which they had not been specially trained, showed the effect of their general training by the efficiency with which they at once entered into their new duties.

However, it should be pointed out that this fleet was lacking in types of vessels essential to efficiency, such as battle cruisers, scout cruisers, light cruisers, and fleet submarines; and, furthermore, there are none even now available.

The material readiness of the active fleet was from good to very good. That such was the condition, was demonstrated again and again by the duties performed by the vessels during the war. The material condition is stated in detail in the several despatches and letters that are a part of this statement.

The preceding remarks apply to the readiness of the available personnel and to the soundness of the methods of training and operation in use at the time.

I will quote a few paragraphs from a letter which was addressed to the fleet regarding certain phases of the work in Cuban waters:

Subject: Atlantic Fleet—Gunnery exercises, spring, 1917.

1. Practically all the reports of gunnery exercises held during the spring, 1917, have been received and considered. Notwithstanding the many interruptions in the schedules and the conditions under which the exercises were necessarily held, the reports indicate steady progress in the ability and confidence of the personnel to prepare for, maintain, and control the fire of the different batteries under varying conditions, and it is believed that the final analysis of the scores will show a marked increase in the rapidity of fire and a reasonably satisfactory increase in accuracy.

* * * * * * *

3. The following extracts from the reports are very gratifying to the commander in chief in that they show an understanding and appreciation of the efforts which have been and are being made to improve the battle efficiency of the fleet:

"More seems to have been accomplished during the past gunnery year than ever before with less effort which stands to prove that present methods, while not complete or perfect, are fundamentally sound.

"The training that torpedo officers have derived from the work on the *Montana* is being strongly felt in the flotilla, and the time has now arrived when destroyers have become dangerous factors to the enemy fleet in day as well as night engagements.

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"Day individual practice is merely an exercise of battle procedure, in which ammunition is limited and the ship hedged short with certain other restrictions, none of which, however, interfere in the slightest with ordinary battle procedure.

"Day action procedure is well standardized now and it is a pleasure to visit another ship during a major caliber fire control drill and be able to tell what she is doing without asking countless questions."

4. The commander in chief has watched with great pleasure, the steady growth in the efficiency of the fleet, and he takes this opportunity of extending to the officers and men of the fleet his appreciation of their loyal support and assistance, and he is confident that the entire fleet will be ready in the near future to render valuable service on the scene of active operation in the same spirit as those units of the fleet which have already responded quickly and effectively to the sudden call for active service against the enemy.

H. T. MAYO.

In this connection, see my annual report dated December 17, 1917, especially remarks on personnel, copy appended, marked "E."

The operations of the fleet during the period, April 6, 1917, to October 23, will now be considered. October 23, 1917, is selected as the date on which I again hoisted my flag on the U. S. S. *Pennsylvania* after my first inspection and observation of conditions and forces in European waters.

April 6: At 1.33 p. m. received 16 Alnav, "The President has signed act of Congress which declares that a state of war exists between United States and Germany."

A signal was immediately sent to the fleet: "War has commenced."

At 5.50 p. m. orders were received as follows:

Mobilize for war in accordance department's confidential mobilization plan of March 21. Particular attention invited to paragraphs 6 and 8.

Paragraph 6 assigned rendezvous of various forces, and paragraph 8 instructions with regard to fitting out at navy yards.

As has been indicated previously the disposition for the protection of the fleet at anchor in York River had been in operation during the period of strained relations.

The policies of the department with regard to the use of the fleet with which I was conversant were:

(1) The fleet will supply armed guard personnel and train men of all ratings for general service.

(2) A patrol force has been formed to patrol the Atlantic coast.

(3) The battleship force will be maintained intact. At this time I had no information as to any contemplated employment of any vessels in European waters in cooperation with the Allies.

Under these conditions. no modification of existing conditions in the fleet were required except the establishment of censorship and the commencement of war diaries. These points had been covered by fleet orders and were put into effect with the order to mobilize.

Under the existing conditions the adopted general mission of Atlantic Fleet was as follows:

To efficiently train the increased personnel required by the Navy for war, and to maintain a patrol of the coast, without seriously reducing the efficiency of the battle fleet.

April 8: The patrol force was formed under command of Capt. H. B. Wilson, United States Navy. Its mission had been assigned by the department, as follows:

To give the maximum possible protection to the trans-Atlantic commerce of the United States and of friendly powers in the area to seaward of and contiguous to the areas guarded by naval district forces.

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The submarine trap net at entrance to New York River was completed by the mine force.

April 9: Information was received that Vice Admiral Browning, Royal Navy, and Rear Admiral Grasset, French Navy, would arrive Hampton Roads morning April 10 for conference with the Chief of Naval Operations, commander in chief, and commander patrol force.

The organization of naval forces, dated March 21, 1917, made no mention of the United States Atlantic, Pacific, or Asiatic Fleets, and formed a scout force which had not previously existed. There were several questions of command left unsettled, and consequently the commander in chief communicated with the department and received a reply which materially changed that part of the mobilization plan pertaining to command. (Letters appended marked "F" and "G.")

April 10: Conference with foreign officers was held at Hotel Chamberlin; representatives of Governments as follows:

Admiral W. S. Benson, United States Navy, Admiral H. T. Mayo, United States Navy, Capt. H. B. Wilson, United States Navy, United States; Vice Admiral Browning, Royal Navy, Great Britain; Rear Admiral Grasset, French Navy, France.

At this conference Vice Admiral Browning explained the mission of his force, and read a communication from the British Admiralty interrogating the representatives of the United States as to the nature of the assistance the United States Navy was prepared to render, and stating the desire of the British Admiralty for assistance, especially in antisubmarine craft. Rear Admiral Grasset explained the mission of his division and requested that the United States assist in the patrol of the Caribbean.

Admiral Benson stated that the present policy of the United States Navy was to maintain the fleet intact and to assist in the patrol of the Atlantic and Gulf coasts of the United States and waters adjacent thereto.

The conference adjourned to meet the following day in Washington, D. C., to take up the suggestions of the foreign Governments with the Secretary of the Navy, as Vice Admiral Browning considered his instructions required a conference with the Secretary of the Navy.

April 11: Conference held in Navy Department.

Present: Mr. Daniels, Secretary of the Navy; Admiral W. S. Benson, United States Navy; Admiral H. T. Mayo, United States Navy; Vice Admiral M. Browning, Royal Navy; Rear Admiral Grasset, French Navy; Capt. H. B. Wilson, United States Navy; and members of the general board.

The subjects discussed were similar to those of the previous day. The following decisions were reached:

(*a*) Although the present policy of the United States required that the fleet be kept intact, a division of destroyers will be sent to European waters to cooperate with the allied antisubmarine forces in that area.

(*b*) United States to patrol off Atlantic coast of United States and assist in the patrol of Caribbean Sea and Gulf of Mexico.

Oral instructions were received to prepare six destroyers for distant service, selecting those boats which were most reliable from the point of view of material.

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April 16: Fleet exercised in antisubmarine operations. Submarine division 5 operating in York River to train personnel in observation and fire control.

April 18: Information was requested of Operations as to destination of destroyers fitting for distant service in order that orders might be issued.

The department directed that orders be issued to the commander, destroyer division 8 (fitting out for distant service) to proceed when directed by the department. Orders were later issued to this division by the department.

Destroyer division 8 left Boston 5.30 p. m. en route to Queenstown, Ireland, to cooperate in antisubmarine operations with the British force at Queenstown.

April 26: Orders received to direct six destroyers proceed to home yards to fit out for distant service.

No change in policy was received. The order to send six additional destroyers gave no information or plan on which this order was based.

April 28: Orders received to send six more destroyers and *Melville* to home yards to prepare for distant service.

System for intensive training of engineering personnel was put into effect.

While in Washington, I was informed of the new policy relative to assignment of destroyers to assist in antisubmarine operations in cooperation with the British.

I, also, at this time, made an oral recommendation to the Chief of Naval Operations that the commander in chief should proceed to Europen waters, as the United States forces which would be assigned there would in all probability be the only forces to see active operations. This was not concurred in.

May 1: Twenty-four additional destroyers and *Dixie* ordered to prepare for distant service.

May 4: Destroyer division 8 arrived Queenstown. The commander of this division had orders to communicate his orders and operations to Rear Admiral Sims at London, and to be guided by such instructions as he might give.

Beginning in May a number of torpedo defense guns were removed from battleships to make the guns available for arming merchant ships defensively.

The instructions under which I acted in sending destroyers to the navy yards to fit out for distant service were such that it was impossible to retain the previous division organization. Had the policy been settled earlier the division organization could have been retained, thus adding to efficiency.

May 5: Up to this time I had received no definite statement of the department's policy in regard to material readiness of the battleships for possible active service in European waters.

In order that the policy might be definitely stated, and in order that the department might have the latest information in regard to the material defects which existed in the active battleship force, on May 5, 1917, I addressed a letter to the department from, which I will quote several paragraphs (full copy appended, marked "H"):

1. The material condition of battleships of divisions 5, 6, 7, and 8 when they left the navy yards in January last for the winter's drills and exercises was, in general, good, although all had some uncompleted authorized work at the time of departure.

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This was reported in detail in correspondence forwarded to the department by the commander in chief's first indorsement, file 124, of February 27, 1917. Requests for additional work have been submitted by all these vessels from time to time since leaving the navy yards, but except in some few cases—*Arkansas* turbine work, for example—no special report of this additional work has been made to the department.

2. Relative to the uncompleted work when the battleships went South, the commander in chief in his letter, file 124 of 1313, March, 1917, in reply to the department's radio 141, March 12, stated that no work was necessary in the immediate future, but that if the vessels were to be put in condition for war service at some indefinite future date certain work was required, as was specifically mentioned in the letter above referred to. The commander in chief in this letter also invited the department's attention to a previous comment on the material readiness of the fleet as follows: "In case of mobilization or war the commander in chief assumes that the department, from its fuller knowledge of conditions, will determine the policy to be followed—whether the fleet is to be first put in the best material condition or whether all ships which can possibly keep the sea are to do so from the time of mobilization."

3. The commander in chief is without definite information as to the department's policy regarding material matters and therefore considers it necessary to present certain facts to the department for consideration.

5. It is evident that battleships are not expected to "keep the sea" or to do any cruising outside inclosed waters for some time to come, but what may be required of them in future is problematical. While the vessels mentioned can continue based in Chesapeake Bay or inclosed waters, or could operate near our coasts, if necessary, without any work being done at navy yards, they are, in general, not now in proper material condition to permit them to operate indefinitely from some foreign base. Such operation may not be required, but conditions may demand just that. All vessels should not go to the navy yards at once, nor should any vessel be sent to a navy yard unless the yard is fully prepared to undertake all authorized work. If, however, action is deferred, and a demand is made later for one or more divisions of battleships, they would necessarily be sent to navy yards and there would be a congestion of work and delay in readiness for service that could be avoided if they are sent in now from time to time as the yards can handle the work.

6. If there was an actual emergency immediately existing, the vessels are able to meet it but to send them away from the Atlantic coast to operate for an indefinite period is not in their present condition advisable. To send any vessel away with her auxiliary machinery, hull, or engine, or with any of her fittings or appliances in any but the best condition would be a mistake, as breakdowns after arrival, even if within the capacity of the ship's force to make good, would impair efficiency at a time when it should be highest. There is hardly a vessel in the four divisions mentioned, however, that is not now without a number of items of authorized work on each vessel, which, while not requiring any immediate action, can not be made good under present conditions. Material conditions will not improve even, as is hardly possible, should they get no worse. Except for training the personnel, there is at present no demand for these battleships; there may be a demand for them as fighting units later on. Now, while there is a favorable opportunity, they should be put in the very best material condition.

8. In view of the above, the commander in chief recommends that the department decide without delay upon a policy by which work on the battleships may be taken in hand at the earliest practicable date.

H. T. MAYO.

May 8: Recommendations were renewed that all destroyers not on detached service be assigned to the destroyer force in order that they might be trained and also be available to operate with the battle fleet.

NOTE.—Many of the destroyers were still assigned to the patrol force.

May 9: Recommendations were made in regard to submarine trap nets and it was recommended that the mine force be relieved from work on nets except in vicinity of fleet bases. Letter appended, marked "I."

May 15: All destroyers attached to patrol force were detached from that force, and ordered to the destroyer force.

May 18: Nine converted yachts were ordered prepared for distant service.

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June 3: Received from Operations the following dispatch:

11501. Rear Admiral Gleaves has been given full verbal instructions of duty t which department wishes vessels of destroyer force assigned.

Rear Admiral Gleaves had been ordered to Washington by Operations, and given instructions as to the use to which a portion of the fleet was to be put without the commander in chief being consulted or informed of the probable use to which the destroyer force was required. Conditions with regard to the proper exercise of command were unsatisfactory as the department was handling many operations of fleet units direct from Washington.

June 4: The department had gradually detached colliers and oilers from the fleet train until at this time no colliers and only one tanker was assigned to the train.

June 7: The first troop convoy was assembling at New York. The details of this expedition were learned while I was in Washington.

Copies of department's confidential orders to Vice Admiral Sims, reorganization of United States forces operating in European waters, and to Capt. W. B. Fletcher, re patrol duty off French coast, were received.

June 13: The first convoy expedition was known to be assembling at New York under Rear Admiral Gleaves, and a detachment of yachts was assembling in New York for duty on the French coast under Capt. W. B. Fletcher. I was not properly informed of these activities, nor the status of the various commanders to whom the department was issuing orders direct.

In order that the status of all concerned might be definitely understood the commander in chief addressed the following letter to the department:

File 1445.

UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET,
U. S. S. "PENNSYLVANIA," FLAGSHIP,
June 13, 1917.

Confidential, 28754–20–46.
From: Commander in chief.
To: Secretary of the Navy (Operations).
Subject: Status of naval forces operating in the Atlantic.

References: (*a*) C. in C. let. No. 1445, April 9, 1917; (*b*) Secnav. let. No. 28754–3:28, April 14, 1917; (*c*) Dept. mobilization plan, dated March 21, 1917; (*d*) C. E. O. conf. let. No. Op–10 to Vice Admiral Sims, dated June 6, 1917; (*e*) C. E. O. conf. let. No. Op–10 to Capt. W. B. Fletcher, dated June 1, 1917; (*f*) Secnav. (Bunav) conf. let. No. 2808–178, May 29, 1917; (*g*) Secnav. conf. let. No. Op–10, date May 9, 1917, to Admiral W. B. Caperton, C. in C., Pacific Fleet.

1. The status of certain naval forces operating in the Atlantic is not quite clear t the commander in chief, Atlantic Fleet.

2. The naval forces in question are those operating in general as follows:

I. European waters.
II. Convoy operations in the Atlantic.
III. South Atlantic waters.

3. Reference (*a*) made certain inquiries regarding the department's mobilizati plan dated March 21, 1917. Reference (*b*) is the department's reply thereto, an paragraph 2 of reference (*b*) is explicit in regard to the jurisdiction of the command in chief Atlantic Fleet, in so far as concerns forces and units existing in the Atlant at that time (Apr. 14, 1917).

4. Practically all destroyers in the Atlantic Fleet, except destroyer division 1, h been ordered to home yards to fit out for distant service by April 30, 1917; the d stroyer tenders *Melville* and *Dixie* had similar orders. Certain destroyer divisio not generally composed of the same destroyers as laid down in reference (*c*), w given orders direct by the department to proceed to European waters, reporting

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Rear Admiral (now Vice Admiral) Sims for duty, copies of the orders being furnished to the commander in chief Atlantic Fleet. It is understood that at the present time there are four destroyer divisions for service under the orders of Vice Admiral Sims that are contemplated in reference (*d*), but these divisions are at present operating under the orders of Rear Admiral Gleaves, who in reference (*f*) was designated as "commander of United States convoy operations in the Atlantic," in addition to his other duties. In reference (*e*) there was constituted a force designated as "United States patrol squadron operating in European waters," to be composed largely of converted yachts which were originally assigned to the patrol force, Atlantic Fleet.

5. Reference (*d*) constitutes a force to be known as "United States forces operating in European waters," under the general command of Vice Admiral Sims. It is composed of two parts, "United States destroyer flotilla operating in European waters," under the immediate command of Vice Admiral Sims, and "United States patrol force operating in European waters," under the command of Capt. W. B. Fletcher. Reference (*e*), mentioned in paragraph 4 above.

6. The destroyers, destroyer tenders, yachts, and the recently ordered fuel vessels and supply vessels belong to the Atlantic Fleet and have never been formally detached from the Atlantic Fleet, although intent to do so might be inferred from the fact that reference (*d*) makes no mention of responsibility of the "Commander of United States forces operating in European waters" to the commander in chief Atlantic Fleet.

7. The forces employed in convoy operations in the Atlantic are likewise largely composed of vessels and units assigned to the Atlantic Fleet (some of them evidently to be assigned eventually to "United States forces operating in European waters"), and are now being organized and operated by Rear Admiral Gleaves, designated as "commander of United States convoy operations in the Atlantic" in reference (*f*) under oral orders and instructions received direct from the department. The commander in chief Atlantic Fleet has only a very general knowledge of the activities of this force.

8. Reference (*a*) constitutes a "Scout force on distant service" for operations in the South Atlantic, composed chiefly of vessels which appear in reference (*c*) as part of the "Scout force." No mention is made therein to responsibility of the commander of the said force to the commander in chief Atlantic Fleet. Two fuel vessels assigned to the Atlantic Fleet have been ordered by the department to service in supplying this force.

9. The situation has been stated above somewhat at length in order to assemble the facts in one letter and so that the department may appreciate the viewpoint imposed on the commander in chief, Atlantic Fleet, who can not allow himself to forget that any active employment of the Atlantic Fleet as a whole (1) will require the assembly of practically all the forces herein mentioned, and (2) that their coordination and cooperation is not a matter that can be dealt with hurriedly, but must be prepared and arranged for as much as possible in advance of active operations. The department is aware of what steps have been taken during the past year to exercise and otherwise prepare the Atlantic Fleet for active operations. Not the least part of such preparation has been the development of means of supervising the readiness of material and of personnel to perform their proper functions and to keep informed of the employment of the forces and units composing the Atlantic Fleet as a guide to their condition of readiness for active service.

10. It is therefore recommended that all vessels in the Atlantic which are suitable for operations on the high seas and which would be assembled in case of active operations of the Atlantic Fleet remain assigned or be assigned to the Atlantic Fleet, in order that the commander in chief may perfect the necessary arrangements for the coordination and cooperation of the several forces and units composing the fleet and be kept advised of their readiness for service, both as to material and personnel, and also as indicated by their correct employment.

11. It is fully appreciated that the department will in many cases wish to issue orders direct to commanders of the several forces and units in order to expedite operations and the commander in chief considers that he is as fully informed as conditions permit when he is furnished a copy of such orders or instructions or is included in the multiple address of such dispatches.

12. Referring to paragraph 10 above, it is requested that the commander in chief be informed of the department's decision in this matter, and in any case as to the exact status of the several naval forces now operating in the Atlantic.

E. T. MAYO.

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To this letter the department replied, on June 9:

Op–11. 28754–20 : 46.

JULY 9, 1917.

Confidential.
From: Chief of Naval Operations.
To: Commander in chief, Atlantic Fleet.
Subject: Status of naval forces operating in the Atlantic.
References: (*a*) Commander in chief's letter, file 1445, June 13, 1917; (*b*) Operation's letter to commander United States naval forces operating in European waters of July 5, 1917; (*c*) Operation's letter to commander in chief Pacific Fleet of July 3, 1917; (*d*) Operation's letter to commander convoy operations in the Atlantic of Wn July 3, 1917.
Inclosures: References (*b*), (*c*), and (*d*).

1. Receipt is acknowledged of reference (*a*).
2. The status of naval forces operating in the Atlantic is defined in the inclosures forwarded herewith.

W. S. BENSON.

JULY 3, 1917.

From: Chief of Naval Operations.
To: Commander, convoy operations in the Atlantic.
Subject: Forces engaged in convoy operations in the Atlantic to be subject to the orders of the commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet.

1. The forces assigned to convoy operations in the Atlantic are attached to the Atlantic Fleet.
2. The commander of convoy operations is authorized to communicate direct with the department when necessary.
3. Keep the commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet informed of the employment of forces under your command and submit to the commander in chief such reports as may be necessary and required by him to enable him to supervise the readiness of material and of personnel to perform their proper functions in the event of fleet operations.

W. S. BENSON.

Copy to commander in chief, Atlantic Fleet.

JULY 2, 1917.

From: Chief of Naval Operations.
To: Commander United States naval forces operating in European waters.
Subject: Assignment of United States naval forces operating in European waters to Atlantic Fleet.

1. The United States naval forces operating in European waters are hereby assigned to duty with the Atlantic Fleet.
2. The force commander will continue to communicate direct with the department, as heretofore.
3. Keep the commander in chief, Atlantic Fleet, informed of the employment of the forces under your command and submit to the commander in chief such reports as may be necessary and required by him, to enable him to supervise the readiness of material and personnel to perform their proper functions in the event of fleet operations.

W. S. BENSON.

Copy to commander in chief, Atlantic Fleet.

It should be noted that for nearly a month the commander in chief was without definite knowledge of the status of the forces operating in the Atlantic.

June 23. Commander in chief received a copy of a letter from the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of State enunciating policy of the Navy Department:

Confidential.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, June 23, 1917.

SIR: Referring to the cablegram from Amabassador Page in London, dated June 23, 1917 (copy attached). After careful consideration of the present naval situation, taken in connection with possible future situations which might arise, the Navy Department is prepared to announce as its policy in so far as it relates to the Allies.

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(1) The heartiest cooperation with the Allies to meet the present submarine situation, in European or other waters, compatible with an adequate defense of our own home waters.

(2) The heartiest cooperation with the Allies to meet any future situation arising during the present war.

(3) A realization that, while a successful termination of the present war must always be the first allied aim and will probably result in diminished tension throughout the world, the future position of the United States must in no way be jeopardized by an disintegration of our main fighting fleets.

(4) The conception that the present main military rôle of the United States naval forces lies in its safeguarding the lines of communication of the Allies. In pursuing this aim there will, generally speaking, be two classes of vessels engaged—minor craft and major craft—and two rôles of action: First, offensive; second, defensive.

(5) In pursuing the rôle set forth in paragraph (4), the Navy Department can not too strongly insist that in its opinion the offensive must always be the dominant note in any general plans of strategy prepared. But, as the primary rôle in all offensive operations must perforce belong to allied powers, the Navy Department announces as its policy that, in general, it is willing to accept any joint plan of action of the Allies, deemed necessary to meet immediate needs.

(6) Pursuant to the above general policy, the Navy Department announces as its general plan of action the following:

(*a*) Its willingness to send its minor fighting forces, comprised of destroyers, cruisers, submarine chasers, auxiliaries, in any numbers not incompatible with home needs, and to any field of action deemed expedient by the joint allied admiralties, which would not involve a violation of our present State policy.

(*b*) Its unwillingness, as a matter of policy, to separate any division from the main fleet for service abroad, although it is willing to send the entire battleship fleet abroad to act as a united but cooperating unit when, after joint consultations of all admiralties concerned, the emergency is deemed to warrant it and the entire tension imposed upon the lines of communication due to the increase in the number of fighting ships in European waters will stand the strain upon it.

(*c*) Its willingness to discuss more fully plans for joint operations.

Sincerely, yours,

JOSEPHUS DANIELS.

The honorable the SECRETARY OF STATE.

July 4: Orders were received to direct *Cleveland, Raleigh, Albany* to proceed to New York without delay and prepare for convoy duty. Probable date of convoy sailing, July 8.

This was the beginning of a new policy, that of using United States cruisers to escort merchant convoys.

July 6: Department's letter assigning of the Pacific Fleet was received.

July 7: A number of gunboats and small cruisers ordered to navy yards to prepare for distant service.

July 10: I had been unable to obtain satisfactory information as to conditions in the navy yards with regard to the possibility of undertaking work on ships of the battleship forces. I requested and received permission to send the fleet material officer to visit the principal navy yards to determine what work could be done on the battleships and when.

As a result of this conference between the fleet material office and the various navy yards, I submitted a proposed schedule of overhaul which was approved by Operations. (Copy of proposed schedule appended, marked "J.")

July 15: Eleven yachts which were assigned to the patrol force were ordered to fit out for distant service and proceed singly to Gibraltar.

July 16: The patrol force organization was practically abandoned, except for the detachment operating from Key West and the Mexican patrol detachment, most of the destroyers, yachts, and gunboats having been ordered on distant service. On this date all Coast Guard

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cutters which had been assigned to the patrol force were ordered to report to the commandants of naval districts, under which the units of the fleet were now operating. A new campaign order was issued to the various forces and detachments. This order indicated the latest changes in the organization of the fleet and stated the tasks assigned to the various detachments.

July 20: Squadron 2 of the cruiser force was assigned to escort duty.

August 12: On this date I and a portion of my staff left the U. S. S. *Pennsylvania* and proceeded to Washington on temporary duty at the Navy Department prior to sailing for Europe for the purpose of observing conditions and operations in European waters and of inspecting the activities of that portion of the Atlantic Fleet.

From August 27 until October 4, I was engaged as just mentioned. Upon my return to Washington I submitted a long report of conditions in Europe, the result of my conferences with the British and French Admiralties and a statement of specific requests for naval assistance desired by the Allies.

I will read certain quotations from my report, all of which except inclosures is appended, marked "K."

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS FROM NAVY DEPARTMENT.

(*a*) The instructions received from the Navy Department as to the purpose and object of the visit to England and France were not in definite and concrete form, but were readily to be inferred from the substance of conversations with the President, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Chief of Naval Operations, supplemented by memoranda from the Chief of Naval Operations and his assistants. A summary based on the above-mentioned conversations and memoranda was made (while en route to England) in order to enable definite inquiries to be made to the Governments concerned.

(*b*) The summary was of the following general character. It will be noted that the principal matters of inquiry were understood to be for the purpose of getting more closely in touch with:

(1) What has been done—historical—in order that knowledge of original plans and modifications thereof, together with their elements of success or failure, might enable the present situation to be understood and proposals for future operations to be appreciated.

(2) What is being done—present situation—following history of naval plans and operations up to present time, showing underlying causes of plans and operations now in force—the part that the United States plays in present plans and operations—the present naval strength and resources of the Allies and of the enemy—the situation in the several areas of operations, e. g., the North Sea, the Helgoland Bight, the Skagerrak, the Baltic Sea, the English Channel, the Dunkirk-Zeebrugge district, the Mediterranean Sea, the Adriatic, etc.

(3) What is to be done—future operations—following the history of plans and operations in their evolution and development to the present time. What new plans and operations are proposed and for what reason? What part are the several allies and the United States expected to take? What are the allied and enemy building programs?

(4) Particular inquiry into the anti submarine measures under way and proposed, as being the field of endeavor requiring immediate attention—assistance desired from the United States.

(5) The aircraft situation, particularly with regard to construction under way and proposed—and wherein the United States can assist to best advantage for all concerned.

(6) The shipping situation, in so far as it bears on the communications of the Allies.

(7) The transfer of United States troops to France, in so far as the available number will have effect on the outcome of the war, and particularly with regard to the shipping necessary not only for transport of troops but chiefly for the upkeep and supply of the troops after their arrival in France.

(8) Certain inquiries in the matters of seeking for trade, the employment of oilers belonging to private companies, and the rumored transfer of men-of-war after the war.

(9) An international naval conference which the United States had requested the British Government to arrange for.

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(10) Later additions to the purposes of the visit appeared in dispatches from the Navy Department in regard to Norway entering the war on the side of the Allies and certain inquiries regarding the possible capture of Russian capital ships by the enemy.

(11) General impressions regarding political, economic, and morale conditions in the allied countries, in so far as such conditions have been bearing on the general military-naval situation.

THE INTERNATIONAL NAVAL CONFERENCE IN LONDON ON SEPTEMBER 4–5, 1917.

(*a*) A report has already been made on the proceedings of this conference; it is now supplemented by a copy of the official minutes.

(*b*) Attention is invited to the fact that answers (to be addressed to the British Government) are expected in regard to:

(1) Old battleships and cruisers available for use in proposed operations to effect the blocking of German harbors.

(2) Additional cruisers, perhaps even old battleships, for service as escorts to merchant ship convoys.

GENERAL IMPRESSIONS REGARDING CONDITIONS IN BRITISH ADMIRALTY.

(*a*) There is little doubt that the British Admiralty is at a loss when asked for the history of the war to date. Reports of operations are so isolated and scattered and without system that there is not available any comprehensive record of original plans, the governing reasons therefor, and the degree of success or failure in each case. The inevitable inference is that the war has been carried on from day to day, and not according to any comprehensive policy to serve as a guide to plans looking to the effective coordination and cooperation of effort against the enemy.

(*b*) It is apparent that, despite the so-called war staff arrangements put into effect in the admiralty during the past three years, until very recently there has been no planning section, nor was there any definite body of men charged with the function of looking ahead, or even of looking back to see wherein lay the causes of success or failure, nor any means of furnishing the heads of the admiralty with analysis and summaries of past operations in order that decisions as to continuing old operations or undertaking new ones, might be reached with a due sense of "perspective," both as to past operations and as to the coordination of new operations in a general plan.

(*c*) The statement of present admiralty policy, originally dated July, 1917, now revised to September 17, 1917, not really a statement of policy but rather a summary of current activities. That these activities are based on an underlying idea of the defensive may readily be inferred from the leading words in the subparagraphs of paragraph 1 of the paper referred to, namely, "proaction," "prevention, "protection," "resistance."

(*d*) The statement of proposed future admiralty policy dated September 17, 1917, indicate growing appreciation of the necessity for more energetic offensive measures against the submarine in the way of preventing his egress from the North Sea.

(*e*) While the development of the submarine menace has been gradual and the measures undertaken to meet it have had to be evolved and applied to new developments as they appeared, the present dispersion of allied naval effort against the submarine menace has reached large dimensions, and the actual offensive against the ubmarine has suffered through the accumulation of large numbers of vessels to carry out protective measures. The number of vessels engaged in protective (defensive) effort includes practically the entire British Navy in northern waters except the grand fleet, many of whose destroyers and other small craft are also engaged in protective work.

(*f*) Referring again to the proposed plan of future antisubmarine operations in the North Sea, it appears that it may be necessary to withdraw some vessels engaged in protective work in order to make the offensive effective. However, the effectiveness of the offensive should be cumulative, thus enabling perhaps nearly all of the available vessels gradually to be diverted from the protective (defensive) to the offensive.

GENERAL IMPRESSIONS REGARDING THE GRAND FLEET.

(*a*) The grand fleet appears now, after three years' experience in war, including the battle of Jutland, to be in good material condition, ready for all likely operations, and of very good morale.

(*b*) The probable operating conditions have been studied and arrangements made to make the best possible use of the fleet. Plans and detailed instructions are complete and voluminous, and have been conceived and framed for probable operations

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in the North Sea only, with the view that the situation in the North Sea is the only one requiring present consideration, as it involves the encounter of the two major opposing fleets.

GENERAL IMPRESSIONS OF UNITED STATES NAVAL FORCES IN EUROPEAN WATERS.

(*a*) The Queenstown force, consisting of 35 destroyers and 2 destroyer tenders (*Melville* and *Dixie*) are almost wholly employed in the convoy system under the orders of Vice Admiral Sir Lewis Bayly, R. N., commander in chief at Queenstown.

(*b*) This force is in good material, personnel, and operating condition; the morale is excellent. Admiral Bayly appears to be much pleased with their work, which requires much time at sea and constant exercise of seamanship, navigation, and judgment.

(*c*) The Brest force is hampered in its operations by general unsuitability of the available vessels for high-seas work and by lack of organization, and of general plans to serve as a guide in carrying the necessary work; there is also difficulty in effecting even minor repairs and upkeep.

(*d*) The force at Gibraltar and at Bordeaux were not visited owing to lack of time, but are understood to be accomplishing all that can be expected of the number of vessels now available.

(*e*) The present aviation force is nearing the completion of its training and is due to receive a marked increase of personnel, after which it is expected that active employment may be begun.

(*f*) The operations in the air have reached such magnitude and are of such great importance that there can be little doubt that assistance in personnel and material for air service will be the most rapid as well as the most useful way of reenforcing the Allies both by land and by sea.

NOTES ON THE GENERAL NAVAL SITUATION.

(*a*) Apparently the naval plans of the Allies have been in most general terms. Great Britain to control the North Sea and Channel; France her west coast and the French Mediterranean coast; Italy, assisted as necessary by France, to control the Adriatic. British forces based on Gibraltar, Malta, Alexandria, assisting in the Mediterranean; recently the Japanese have given assistance in the Mediterranean, having there one cruiser and 12 destroyers. United States forces are operating from Queenstown, Brest, and Gibraltar.

(*b*) (1) It is apparent from conversations with officers attached to the Operations Division that up to the present there have been no definite naval plans. So far as can be learned there has been no statement of British naval policy previous to that issued by the Admiralty in July, 1917, which is in reality a defense of what was being done and not a real statement of policy.

(2) The defensive nature of this so-called policy is plainly indicated by the paragraph stating the objects to be attained by naval power; the leading words of the four subparagraphs which state these objects are: (1) Protection, (2) prevention, (3) protection, (4) resistance.

All of these objects and many more would be obtained by the destruction of German naval power.

(*c*) (1) In the first month of the war the offensive policy was much more pronounced than at present. The British fleet was in fact undergoing a test mobilization when the probability of war became evident. The forces were maintained in a mobilized condition and therefore began the war in a most advantageous state.

(2) The disposition of the fleet was made with a view to opposing the movements of enemy forces out of the North Sea. The main battle fleet was based in the North of Scotland but kept the sea almost continuously. A second battle force was based in the south of England to prevent the passage of any force of less strength than the high sea fleet through the Channel. The armored and light cruisers were continually on scouting duty in the North Sea. The British submarines were stationed in the Helgoland Bight with a view to attacking the German Fleet if it came out. No mines were laid in Helgoland Bight by the British during this phase.

(3) The frequent attacks on British cruisers by German submarines, especially the catastrophe in which the *Hogue*, *Cressy*, and *Aboukir* were lost, caused a change in plan as follows:

(4) The main fleet was withdrawn from continuous service under way and placed in a base adequately protected from submarines. The heaviest cruisers were withdrawn from scouting work and their place taken by light cruisers and destroyers. The mining of Helgoland Bight was begun. The development of the auxiliary services of mine sweeping and patrol was made more rapid.

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(5) The present operations are merely developments of this plan. The fleet is ready and anxious to fight a major action, but it is only sent to sea as a fleet when the German fleet is out or thought to be coming out, or occasionally for exercises. The various divisions of the fleet are often under way for target practice, etc.

NOTES ON THE SUBMARINE SITUATION.

(*a*) The increase in the number of patrol vessels and mine sweepers has been brought about in the endeavor to combat the successful operations by enemy submarines, especially mine-laying submarines.

(*b*) The convoy system was developed with the hope of reducing the submarine sinkings. By concentrating the shipping into convoys it was hoped to reduce the chances of the submarine sighting merchant vessels; to guard against raiders by ocean escorts; and to guard against submarines by destroyer escort within the submarine danger zone.

(*c*) The Channel was closed by net barrage but due to strong tides and heavy weather and the nature of the bottom (sandstone, poor holding ground) this net barrage has never been efficient. Mines and mine nets have also been used in the Straits of Dover, but the German U–B and U–C boats based upon Ostend and Zeebrugge seem to pass the barrage at will. The U–boats do not use the Channel.

(*d*) (1) The most successful operations against enemy submarines have been carried out by British submarines and decoy ships. The submarine versus submarine will probably prove effective in the future, though the German submarines, due to the excellence of optical instruments, have a decided advantage and undoubtedly sink more British boats than are lost by themselves. However, this system has proved quite successful and is being pursued as vigorously as possible. The decoy ship has accounted for more submarines than any other measure. However, the enemy submarines are becoming very wary and it is doubtful if in the future they will obtain such good results.

(*f*) (1) The submarine is by far the most serious menace to ultimate allied victory. At the present rate of destruction (500,000 tons of shipping a month), it is estimated that by October, 1918, the Allies will be constructing shipping at a rate which will be above the losses. This does not necessarily mean a victory; for if the war goes on that length of time without suppression of the submarine the restriction upon food and fuel may reduce the will to win of the population of Italy, France, and Great Britain to such an extent as to force these Governments into a compromise peace.

(2) It seems essential that operations to reduce the efficiency of the submarines must be devised. The German nation is basing its hope of victory on the success of the submarine. A powerful offensive against this type will effectually raise the morale of the Allies and lower that of the Central Powers. Therefore, if the conditions point to the failure of the submarine campaign in the distant future it must be recognized that in waiting for that time there is grave danger of the failure of the morale of some of the allied nations.

(5) In view of the impracticability of offensive operations against the enemy submarines or their bases at this season of the year, the first consideration should be given to the improvement of existing plans and a study of the modifications that may be required due to possible operations of cruising submarines, raiders, and battle cruisers against the convoys.

GENERAL NOTES ON THE CONVOY SYSTEM AND THE SHIPPING SITUATION.

(*a*) (1) The principal antisubmarine effort is to-day being exerted in escorting convoys through the submarine danger zones in the Atlantic and North Sea and Channel. A convoy system will soon be in operation in the Mediterranean.

(2) The reduction in the per cent of losses of vessels in convoy has given rise to hopes that the adoption of the convoy system by all ocean-going vessels will reduce the submarine menace below the danger point.

(4) The convoy system is strategically defensive though tactically offensive. This offensive is merely a counter attack. Such operations on land are never decisive, and unless coupled with strategically offensive operations are more than apt to fail on the sea. Convoy operations can not win the war. They may, if successful, prevent defeat. Unless the navies of the allied forces are satisfied to let the armies or political conditions settle the war, a more offensive plan is essential.

(*b*) (2) National morale is to-day the vital point, and the effect on allied morale of a successful check to the submarines would be to raise it beyond any possibility of breaking. Likewise, this would so reduce the enemy's chances of winning the war that the morale of the Central Powers would be likely to break.

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(c) The convoy system should be regarded merely as a defensive operation carried on while preparing for an offensive. Such an attitude does not prevent thoroughness in carrying out the operation, and in order that it may be successful in its rôle it requires careful study to anticipate the changed conditions of the winter and the possible operations which may be conducted by the Central Powers to break up the system.

(d) (1) The convoy system requires the assembly of from 15 to 20 vessels, most of which are run on a schedule of one every eight days. Assuming that on the average there is a delay of two days in and two days out in a round trip, and that the average time for a round trip is 50 days, it will be seen at once that this is equivalent to a reduction in shipping of 8 per cent. In addition to this there is the congestion of ports due to arrival and departure of large groups of ships practically simultaneously, which reduces the rapidity of discharges and loading.

(5) The efficient employment of such shipping as is available for the transportation of materials essential to the conduct of the war offers one of the most promising fields for reducing actual shortage of shipping.

(e) Defense of convoys against raiders.

(1) The means at the disposal of the enemy with which to attack the convoys are:

1. U-boats.
2. Deutschland type of submarine cruisers.
3. Raiders (armed merchant ships).
4. Cruisers, and
5. Battle cruisers.

(2) It appears that the system of protection for convoys now in operation is efficient so far as the resources available permit. The losses of vessels in convoy to the losses of vessels not in convoy is at present about 1 to 20. Of course the greater safety of the submarine in attacking vessels not under escort leads to a prevalence of this form of attack and undoubtedly when all vessels are in convoy the proportion of ships sunk will not decrease in the above ratio.

(f) (2) The dispersion of convoys and the difficulty of maintaining position in convoy during fogs and gales will seriously reduce the efficiency of this system during the winter.

(g) (1) The introduction of the cruising submarine with its long radius of action will move the submarine menace farther from the coast of Europe and thus necessitate more extensive destroyer escort operations. At present the force available does not permit this extension but as the number of submarines of this type is limited (probably six) this disadvantage must be accepted.

(2) This type of submarine is fitted with one or two guns 5.9-inch caliber and is designed to use this gun as its primary weapon. The system of ocean escort is a partial answer to this form of attack.

(h) (1)) The raider and cruiser menace are similar and can be considered together. It is quite possible that the raiders or cruisers so employed would have a battery of 6-inch guns and therefore the ocean escorts should be vessels with batteries not less than 6-inch.

(2) In view of the difficulty that would be experienced by one cruiser in guarding a convoy of 15 or 20 ships against a raider of equal speed, it seems that the enemy will use fast ships and those of merchant ship type with sufficient speed being rare, they probably will be cruisers.

(i) (4) The threat from raiders or cruisers could best be met by increasing the number of ocean escorts with each convoy, but due to lack of suitable vessels this is an impossibility unless escort by battleships is adopted.

(l) (1) The most serious threat is that by enemy battle cruisers. If one of these vessels accompanied by a fast supply ship, and preceded by a submarine scouting force, could get to sea the possible damage that could be done would enormous.

(2) Very serious thought must be given to this possibility and the sercet service of the Allies should be directed to ascertain information indicating that any such arrangements are in preparation or even contemplated.

GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS.

(a) The military-naval situation among the Allies is such that it is strongly recommended that the United States make the earliest possible decision as to what forms and extent the assistance to be given shall take and then proceed to exert every effort to expedite the production, despatch, and employment of such assistance. Too much stress can not be laid on the importance of the time element.

(b) It is further recommended that time be not lost in attempting greater development or improvement of material which has already reached a fairly satisfactory state of development abroad but that all energy be directed to reproducing such satisfactory material at the maximum possible rate.

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The requests of the Allies for naval assistance, from my special report on that subject, are appended, marked "W."

I have likewise appended a copy of a portion of the proceedings of the naval conference held in London September 4 to 6, 1917, marked "M."

A detailed statement regarding personnel conditions in the battleship force is inserted herewith:

Transferred prior to April 6:	
Officers	20
Chief petty officers	117
Men	539
Enlisted personnel shortage, April 6:	
Seaman branch	624
Artificer engineer branch	489
Special	29

Slight excess in artificers, commissary, and messmen. This shortage was based on a peace complement which was known to be inadequate for war.

Total enlisted (trained) men transferred, to May 26:		
For armed guard duty—		
Chief petty officers	48	
Decrease, returned	2	
		46
Men	1,157	
Decrease, returned	181	
		976
For recruiting duty—		
Chief petty officers	16	
Decrease, returned	7	
		9
Men	75	
Decrease, returned	69	
		6
For other duty, at least		475
Total		1,512
Transferred in June:		
Armed guard duty—		
Chief petty officers	17	
Men	98	
		115
Other duty—		
Chief petty officers	17	
Men	263	
	42	
		322
Total		437

During this period the battleships remained based at Yorktown, except for a short period spent in Long Island Sound. Battle exercises were conducted by the battle fleet en route to and on return from Long Island Sound.

The schedule while based on Yorktown provided one week at anchor and two weeks exercises underway. Target practice for the training of gun pointers for armed guard and escort vessel duty was almost continuous.

One squadron of battleships was assigned to the exclusive duty of training engineer personnel. Engineer personnel was also trained on all other vessels but not to the exclusion of all other activities.

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One week at anchor out of each three-week period gave time for routine overhaul of machinery in order that the state of material readiness might be maintained.

The training of enlisted men and temporary and reserve officers was entered into with energy and enthusiasm and the results were most gratifying. Had the conditions not permitted the use of the battleships for training the personnel, the ability of the Navy to man transports, antitorpedo craft, and cargo ships would have been seriously decreased.

Such a condition can not be considered satisfactory, and the country should realize that shortage of officers and enlisted personnel was at the beginning of the war, and is to-day, the most serious handicap under which the Navy is, almost hopelessly, striving for efficiency.

The quotations I have made from my report on my trip to Europe in 1917, indicate plainly my opinion of the conditions existing at that time.

Upon my return to the United States, I strongly advised the Chief of Naval Operations to:

(*a*) Proceed with the North Sea mine-barrage project.

(*b*) To send a division of battleships to operate with the Grand Fleet.

(*c*) "That the United States make the earliest possible decision as to what forms and extent the assistance to be given shall take and then proceed to exert every effort to expedite the production, dispatch, and employment of such assistance. Too much stress can not be laid on the importance of the time element."

I have quoted certain observations regarding my opinion of the plans and policies of other nations in order that it may not be overlooked that our experience has taught us to look critically at our past history with a different point of view from that generally held before the war. I hope the lesson of unpreparedness has been brought home to the country and to Congress. The present tendency seems to be toward a return toward the unsatisfactory condition which is the cause of this investigation.

In a consideration of the effect of our failure to be prepared, and of our progress in preparation after the policy was definitely settled upon, it must never be forgotten that these preparations were made under conditions which may never happen again, and that to rely on such conditions existing again would be folly. These conditions were—the enemy fleet contained by an allied navy and the enemy army fully engaged with allied armies. These conditions permitted the United States Navy to prepare uninterruptedly, for even no enemy submarines appeared in United States waters for nearly 14 months after the declaration of war.

CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY FROM OCTOBER 23, 1917, TO NOVEMBER 11, 1918.

By November, 1917, the conditions with regard to personnel were improving and the individual ships were again in condition to take up work as a fleet. About the 1st of November, 1917, missions were assigned by the department for the various forces of the fleet. Copy of letter appended marked "M–1."

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During the trip to Europe my staff had studied the British naval tactics, signals, and methods of operations and upon my return immediate steps were taken to modify our tactics, methods of operation, signal, and radio procedure, in such respects as were necessary to insure efficiency in joint operations with the Grand Fleet should such operations later become necessary.

Intensive training and instruction in British signals and radio procedure was initiated in all ships of Battleship Force 2.

The mine force had been training and experimenting with the new mine with which it was hoped that the mine barrage could be made effective, and in October the mine barrage project was approved.

The department still adhered to its decision with regard to not sending any battleships to European waters in response to the request of the British Admiralty, and this policy was not changed until after Admiral Benson arrived in London.

In conversation with Admiral Benson I had advised sending abroad the four coal-burning dreadnoughts that the British desired, but was informed that it was not the policy of the department to permit any division of Battleship Force 2, that is, the battleship force which had been in active service when the war started.

On November 12 I received the following dispatch from the department:

It is the department's desire to expedite sailing Division Nine Battleship Force at the earliest moment compatible with efficiency period. To that end expedite completion any necessary target practice then send ships needing it to Boston and Norfolk to dock. After docking proceed to home yards to fit for distant service. The probable sailing date is requested.

These vessels sailed on November 24. Some criticism has been made that this delay should not have been necessary. In this connection it should not be forgotten that the detachment of a battleship division had been consistently opposed by the department and consequently no special preparations had been made to meet this unexpected change in policy.

These vessels could have sailed in 24 hours had the conditions warranted such haste, but it was surely the better plan to dock the ships and fit them with spare parts necessary for protracted service abroad.

This slight delay (it had been many months since the request was made) permitted the ships to arrive in Europe with clean bottoms ready to make their maximum speed and with additional ammunition which might have been necessary at any time.

Another criticism has been made because these ships were of different classes. At this time there was no choice. The British had requested coal-burning dreadnoughts on account of the shortage of oil. There were eight of these vessels attached to the fleet, but the *Texas* had unfortunately hit the bottom off Block Island, the *Utah* and *Arkansas* had had turbine trouble with their backing turbines, and the *North Dakota* was in unsatisfactory condition.

As soon as the *Texas* was repaired she was sent over, as by that time five ships were requested. The *Arkansas* followed later on to relieve the *Delaware*, in order to make the division more homogeneous.

Beginning with November and extending to May, the battleships conducted exercises at sea on a schedule of one week at sea, one week gunnery, torpedo and ship-control exercises, one week at anchor for machinery overhaul.

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I had several times stated to Admiral Benson that as the main operations against the enemy were being carried on in European waters, the commander in chief should be on that side.

On February 2 I submitted in writing an estimate of the situation with regard to the efficient development of the operations of the Atlantic Fleet.

A copy of this estimate of the situation is appended, marked "N," but I desire to quote a few paragraphs [reading]:

In view of the fact that practically all of the vessels of the Atlantic Fleet available for service, except the battleship forces, less battleship division 9, are, or soon will be employed in active operations against the enemy, and of the possibility that the remainder of battleship force 2 may soon be so engaged, it has been considered necessary to estimate the situation to determine what, if any, changes in the existing conditions can be made in order to increase the efficiency of contemplated operations and of possible future operations.

The forces in European waters are to operate as follows:

(*a*) Battleship division 9 and such other battleship units as may be assigned to service abroad, are to cooperate with the British Grand Fleet or the high-seas forces of some other of the Allied countries.

(*b*) The mine force is to cooperate with the British Navy in planting a deep sea mine barrage.

(*c*) The remainder of the combatant vessels to operate as one task force in operations against enemy submarines and in the protection of transports and trade.

(*d*) In addition to the operations by forces of the fleet, there are aviation forces which will operate against enemy submarines from bases on the coast of Great Britain and France.

The four types of operations mentioned in the paragraph above divide logically into two general classes as follows:

(1) The operations of battleships in cooperation with the British Fleet and the operations of the mine force are distinctly high-sea operations.

(2) The operations of the force engaged in antisubmarine operations for the protection of transports and trade and of the aviation forces operating from bases on shore, are essentially of the nature of coastal or district operations.

The distinction between these two general classes of operations has been thoroughly recognized abroad. The high-sea force—the fleet—operates under the commander in chief, while the forces engaged in antisubmarine operations in defense of trade, operate under command of district commanders. Cooperation between forces of different districts is accomplished by fixed policies or orders from the Admiralty.

The high-sea operations of the Atlantic Fleet in European waters is in an early stage of development. It is believed, however, that the future development of the operations of this fleet lies primarily in offensive high-seas operations in cooperation with the British Grand Fleet.

The operations of that portion of the fleet engaged in antisubmarine operations for the defense of transports and trade, has reached a state of development such that the methods of conducting operations, the systems of communication, and the con siderations governing the cooperation with the allied forces is practically standardized.

Another condition which does not directly affect the operations of the fleet, but which is necessarily considered in an estimate of the situation, is the necessity for a representative of the Office of Naval Operations and naval attaché at London.

The preceding analysis of the situation in Europe and in home waters indicates that:

(*a*) There are two distinct types of operations in progress in European waters in which the forces of the Atlantic fleet are engaged—

(1) High sea operations.

(2) Antisubmarine operations for the protection of transports and trade.

(*b*) There is an important duty to be performed as the representative of the Office of Naval Operations and as naval attaché at London.

(*c*) That active command by the commander in chief, or direct supervision by him, over the operations of those units of the fleet based on and operating from the United States Atlantic coast is not now essential to their efficient development in accordance with their respective missions.

In the preceding analysis of the situation the conclusion was reached that the following functions must be performed in Europe to insure efficiency in the present operations of the fleet and in the development of future operations in cooperation with the naval forces of the Allies:

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(*a*) Command of the forces engaged in high sea operations.
(*b*) Command of the force of the fleet engaged in antisubmarine operations for the protection of transports and trade.
(*c*) Representative of the Office of Naval Operations and naval attaché at London.

HIGH-SEA OPERATIONS.

The operations of battleship division 9 and of such other battleships as may be assigned to service abroad, and of the mine force, are essentially high-sea operations and are in no manner allied to the operations of the force now engaged in antisubmarine operations for the protection of transports and trade.

The effective cooperation of the forces engaged in antisubmarine operations was materially advanced by the presence of the commander of that force in Europe for some time previous to the arrival of any of his force. His proximity to the force with which such operations were to be coordinated and to the Admiralty in London, where the plans for such operations were formulated, permitted him to make detailed plans for such cooperation and insured its effectiveness with the least possible delay.

Plans for the cooperation of high-sea forces likewise should be developed. Such plans are of much wider scope, much more complicated, and the failure in such cooperation would be attended by much more serious results.

The future development of the operation of the Atlantic fleet in European waters is believed to lie primarily along the line of offensive high-sea operations. If the North Sea and Channel mine barrages are effective, the submarine menace to transports and trade will be reduced and much of the force now engaged in antisubmarine operations will become available for high-sea operations. It is considered probable that an effective mine barrage will lead to offensive high-sea operations by the German fleet. If the mine barrage is not effective, it may become necessary to adopt a policy requiring offensive high-sea operations against the enemy submarine bases.

The opinion expressed above is confirmed by the mission assigned by the department to the vessels of battleship force 2—"To maintain themselves in instant readiness for battle."

This mission can be accomplished under present conditions if cooperation with allied forces is not implied, but it should be thoroughly understood that there are no accepted plans for cooperation with any allied navy in high-sea operations. Efficient cooperation will require many changes in the methods of maneuvering, signaling, radio procedure, etc., and until such plans are made effective cooperation is impossible.

The commander in chief has endeavored to make the tactics employed by the battleship forces similar in principle to those employed by the British Grand Fleet, with the idea of future cooperation in view, but the detailed plans for combined operations which would be required for effective cooperation do not exist. The duty of formulating these plans can be performed only by the officer who is to direct and supervise the operations of the high-sea forces and can only be accomplished from a location in Europe in proximity to the force with which such operations are to be coordinated, and within reasonable distance of London, where plans for allied naval operations are formulated.

In view of the facts expressed above it appears that the mission of the commander in chief—"To prepare the fleet for, and to successfully conduct war"—can only be advanced toward accomplishment by a change in the present conditions such that he will be in position to plan for the cooperation of the high-sea forces with those of the allied navies.

The development of the high-sea operations should be directed and supervised by the officer whose position and experience best fits him for this duty. Such officer should be the commander in chief of the fleet. Personal considerations should not be permitted to interfere with the selection of the officer under whom such development is to take place, and this selection should be made immediately.

ANTISUBMARINE OPERATIONS FOR THE PROTECTION OF TRANSPORTS AND TRADE.

The detachments of the force engaged in these operations are based at Queenstown, on the French coast, at Gibraltar, and at the Azores. The aviation detachments will operate from bases on the coasts of Great Britain and France.

The operations of this force are primarily antisubmarine operations, and although the destroyers of this force operate well at sea, the distribution of the forces, the nature of their employment, and the nature of command required, make these operations essentially coastal operations. This fact is recognized by the British and French Admiralties and similar forces of these navies are under command of district commanders. The cooperation of the forces of several districts are governed by fixed policies or by orders from the respective Admiralties. Forces engaged in this type of opera-

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tions are distinct from high-sea forces except in the immediate vicinity of the fleet bases.

Efficiency in this type of operations requires an organization similar to that of the naval districts of the United States, and it is believed that the present organization of this force is of this character. The exercise of command by its commander should be governed by the same principles as would govern the control of district forces by the Navy Department.

The relations between this force and the commander in chief should remain as at present prescribed by operations letter 20392–640, of July 2, 1917, but it should be recognized that when the commander in chief is in European waters he has authority, in case of emergency, to divert such part of this force as may be required for offensive operations with the high-sea force, for which diversion the commander in chief would assume full responsibility.

The preceding consideration of the duties and organization of the forces engaged in antisubmarine operations for the protection of the transports and trade indicates that no change is necessary or desirable.

REPRESENTATIVE OF THE OFFICE OF NAVAL OPERATIONS AND NAVAL ATTACHÉ.

A consideration of the functions of the representative of the office of naval operations at the Admiralty in London is required in this estimate only in order that the relations between this officer and the commanders of naval forces operating abroad may be carefully considered in order to avoid misunderstandings. The functions of a naval attaché are well defined and do not conflict with those of commanders of forces.

The status of this representative appears to be that of an assistant to the chief of naval operations to whom has been delegated the authority to communicate direct with the British Admiralty and with forces operating abroad. At present this last is simplified by the dual capacity of this officer as commander of United States naval forces operating in European waters and as representative of the office of naval operations in London.

It should be recognized that the function of the representative of the office of naval operations is distinct from that of the commander of the naval forces, and there appears to be no probability of misunderstandings so long as this distinction is kept in mind.

The necessity for such a representative is apparent, and a change in the functions of this officer, or even in the personality of this officer, would not be conducive to efficiency.

CONCLUSION.

In order to insure the efficient development of the operations of the Atlantic Fleet in European waters, it is necessary to recognize three distinct functions to be exercised abroad by high ranking officers of the United States Navy:

(*a*) Command of forces engaged in high-sea operations. This function undoubtedly belongs to the commander in chief of the fleet.

(*b*) Command of the forces engaged in antisubmarine operations for the protection of transports and trade.

(*c*) Representative of the office of naval operations and naval attaché at London.

(Functions (*b*) and (*c*) are now being performed by Vice Admiral Sims.)

The commander in chief should perform the following:

(1) Supervise the development and cooperation of the forces engaged in high-sea operations and assist in the formulation of plans for future high-sea operations.

(2) In cooperation with the British commander in chief make plans for the cooperation of such high-sea forces as may be available for such operations.

(3) Direct such changes in the present methods of conducting operations, of radio procedure, signaling, etc., as may be required to facilitate immediate cooperation by the battleships and such other types of vessels as may later become available for high-sea operations.

(4) Assume active command of the United States forces cooperating with the British Grand Fleet or other allied high sea force when the strength of the United States force reaches that of a squadron.

(5) Assume active command of any independent high sea operations to be performed by United States vessels of more than one type.

The commander of the forces engaged in coastal operations should conduct the operations of that force in identically the same manner as it is being conducted now. The only change in the status of the commander of this force would be—that battleship division 9 now assigned to his force, and the supervision of plans concerning the operations of the mine force now under his jurisdiction, would be transferred to the jurisdiction of the commander in chief.

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The representative of the Office of Naval Operations should conduct the functions of that office exactly the same as it is being conducted at present. He should be permitted to address to the force commanders such communications as would normally be addressed to commanders of fleet forces by the Office of Naval Operations without reference to the commander in chief, except that orders should not be sent direct to forces engaged in high sea operations unless they are repetitions of orders received from the office of Naval Operations in Washington, in which case copies should be sent to the commander in chief.

DECISIONS.

(*a*) The commander in chief should proceed immediately in his present flagship, to a base in proximity to the British Grand Fleet, and with reasonable distance of London.

(*b*) The force in European waters at present engaged in antisubmarine operations for the protection of transports and trade should continue its operations under existing conditions.

(*c*) Battleship division 9 and the mine force should be assigned as task forces of the fleet, independent of the force engaged in antisubmarine operations.

(*d*) Designate the senior vice admiral in home waters as "senior officer, home waters," and delegate to him authority to act for the commander in chief in matters pertaining to forces in home waters.

(*e*) The representative of the Office of Naval Operations to conduct the functions of that office exactly the same as it is being conducted now. He should be authorized to send direct to task force commanders such communications as would ordinarily be addressed to the commander of a fleet force by the Office of Naval Operations without reference to the commander in chief, except that orders to forces engaged in high sea operations should not be issued except when they are repetitions from the Office of Naval Operations in Washington, in which case copies should be furnished to the commander in chief.

Approval of the decisions reached in this estimate of the situation is requested.

The department did not approve these recommendations.

In the latter part of March, 1918, the Germans started their offensive with great gains in the direction of Amiens and the allied military situation appeared serious. It appeared to me that the Germans were intent on isolating the channel ports and that they might sacrifice their fleet to stop the flow of ammunition and troops across the channel, or to defeat the mine barrage operation in the North Sea.

I, therefore, on April 12, 1918, submitted to the Navy Department a letter on the subject "Development and operations of the battleship forces of the Atlantic Fleet." A copy of this letter is appended, marked "O," but I desire to quote a few paragraphs. [Reading:]

In February, 1918, the commander in chief submitted reference (*a*), in which the following decisions were reached:

(*a*) The commander in chief should proceed immediately in his present flagship to a base in proximity to the British Grand Fleet and within reasonable distance of London.

(*b*) The force in European waters at present engaged in antisubmarine operations for the protection of transports and trade should continue its operations under existing conditions.

(*c*) Battleship division 9 and the mine force should be assigned as task forces of the fleet, independent of the force engaged in antisubmarine operations.

(*d*) Designate the senior vice admiral in home waters as "senior officer, home waters," and delegate to him authority to act for the commander in chief in matters pertaining to forces in home waters.

(*e*) The representative of the Office of Naval Operations to conduct the functions of that office exactly the same as it is being con-

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ducted now. He should be authorized to send direct to task force commanders such communications as would ordinarily be addressed to the commander of a fleet force by the Officer of Naval Operations without reference to the commander in chief, except that orders to forces engaged in high seas operations should not be issued except when they are repetitions from the Office of Naval Operations in Washington, in which case copies should be furnished to the commander in chief.

The request for the approval of the decisions reached in this estimate are hereby renewed and enlarged. The general situation in Europe to-day is similar to that existing at the time when the estimate of the situation of reference (*a*) was made, except that the military situation is more serious and the terrific intensity of the German military effort indicates what is generally conceded—that Germany's maximum effort is to be exercised this summer.

It is reasonable to suppose that this tremendous military effort will be accompanied by a similar naval effort. An estimate of how this naval effort may develop should be carefully made and consideration given to the desirability of supporting the present allied naval forces in European waters by United States battleship forces.

It would be a serious mistake to consider that the German Navy has acknowledged defeat. The German Navy is jealous of its reputation and skill and it may be considered a certainty that Germany will never acknowledge defeat without making at least one more effort to gain at least a partial control of the sea.

The initiative of the German nation in the development of material for use in war has been superior to that of the Allies and it is not unreasonable to suppose that when the German Fleet again accepts an engagement that the British Grand Fleet will be subjected to attack by weapons of new inventions or old ones greatly developed.

The above conclusions briefly summarized are as follows:

(*a*) In order to prevent the development of the mine barrage, which may defeat their submarine campaign, a victory over the British Grand Fleet is essential.

(*b*) The inferiority of the German High Seas Fleet makes an action in which gunfire plays the major part disadvantageous.

(*c*) An action in which the torpedo plays the major part would be advantageous to the German Navy.

Now, can an action in which the torpedo will play the major part be developed?

In order to develop an action in which the torpedo is to play a major part the following must be available:

The high sea fleet—Maximum number of submarines, maximum number of destroyers, maximum number of torpedo planes.

Such an action can not be developed unless—

(*a*) The Germans can select the place and time.

(*b*) The British Fleet can not decline the engagement.

(*c*) The location is such as to insure the arrival of the high sea fleet intact and close enough to the German coast or territory controlled by Germany to be within the radius of action of her torpedo planes.

The governing features of the locations mentioned above indicate that the location must be in the vicinity of the English Channel in order that the torpedo planes may use Ostend and Zeebrugge for bases.

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The earliest time is, of course, dependent upon the development of the weapons. It is reasonable to suppose that a Government which has prepared such a powerful military offensive as that now in progress can equally well prepare the much simpler naval offensive.

Germany must realize that this is the crucial year of the war, for the next year the United States Army will turn the balance in favor of the Allies.

Military principles demand a naval offensive in conjunction with the military offensive in order that if either fails the success of the other can counterbalance the moral effect of partial defeat.

A successful naval campaign against the lines of communication in the channel would drive France and Italy out of the war. The stake is large and the enemy has shown a willingness to accept great sacrifices to obtain the desired result.

A naval offensive against the channel ports and traffic would without question bring the British Grand Fleet into the area selected and may be expected at any moment in cooperation with the Army in its present offensive.

There are available for use the following battleships of the Atlantic Fleet: *Pennsylvania*, *Arkansas*, *Arizona*, *Mississippi*, *Utah*, *Oklahoma*, *Nevada*.

These seven ships would increase the power of the British battle fleet by 15 per cent in the number of ships and fully 20 per cent in strength. Can this force be neglected when an engagement is probable and when enemy success might readily mean defeat in the war?

Allied difficulties have mostly been caused by lack of foresight. Reenforcements have been sent too late. Probably enemy campaigns have not been foreseen. This is the crucial year of the war and the Allies can not be too strong on land and sea. Is not the strength which could be added to the British battle fleet worth the sacrifice in transportation which would be entailed by the presence of the additional United States battleships on the field of battle?

DECISION.

The decisions arrived at in reference (a) seem to have been correct, but under changed conditions should be modified to the extent that the commander in chief should proceed with his flagship and also all available superdreadnaughts of the battleship force to join and operate with the British fleet.

H. T. MAYO.

My recommendations were again disapproved by the department.

In May the first enemy submarines appeared off the United States coast and, due to the fact that there were no destroyers with the battleships, their activities were thereafter confined to Chesapeake Bay except for such trips as were necessary to reach navy yards and later to escort convoys.

I had insisted in my recommendation that the number of destroyers with the battleships should not be less than three, but even these were withdrawn and submarine chasers substituted in greater numbers.

When the enemy submarines appeared off the coast the only vessels available for antisubmarine operations except the small number of submarine chasers with the battleships were being operated by the department or by the naval districts.

The possibility that the Germans might use their battle cruisers in a raid on our convoys was pointed out in my report of my trip to Europe and had been under consideration for some time. This subject was discussed upon several occasions with the Chief of Naval Operations.

In August I received orders to send the *Utah*, *Nevada*, and *Oklahoma* to the navy yard to fit out for distant service and was given to understand that they were to base on Bantry Bay as a defense against battle-cruiser raiders.

In my opinion this was a half measure. The situation on land had become favorable to the Allies and with the aid of the United States

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Army it was becoming apparent that Germany must win in the fall of 1918 or never. It was my opinion that the German Navy would make a desperate effort before it would acknowledge defeat.

I, therefore, on August 12, submitted another estimate of the situation. A copy of this estimate is appended, marked "P," but I desire to quote my letter of transmittal. [Reading:]

Secret.

AUGUST 10, 1918.

From: Commander in chief.
To: Secretary of the Navy (Operations).
Subject: Estimate of the naval situation and recommendation for the employment of the Atlantic Fleet.
References: (*a*) C. in C. secret file 211, February 2, 1918, subject: "Estimate of the situation with regard to the efficient development of the operations of the Atlantic Fleet." (*b*) C. in C. secret file, April 12, 1918, subject: "Development and operations of battleship fórces of the Atlantic Fleet."

1. Since submitting the above references the military and naval operations that have taken place seem to demonstrate that the general situation is now as follows:

MILITARY SITUATION.

(*a*) The successful operations of the allied armies between Soissons and Rheims have definitely checked any offensive by the German armies in this vicinity for the remainder of this year.

(*b*) The withdrawal of German forces from the salients between Hangard and Morisel and between Cantigny and Assainvillers indicates that no offensive against Amiens is anticipated. This withdrawal was made voluntarily and these salients would not have been abandoned if offensive operations in this vicinity were contemplated. The reason for these withdrawals appears to be to strengthen their defensive positions.

(*c*) If any further offensive operations by the German armies on the west front are contemplated this year, the indications point strongly to that point of the line to the northward of Albert.

(*d*) The morale of the Teutonic armies and peoples has been greatly depressed on account of the defeat of the Austrian offensive against Italy, and the German offensive in the vicinity of the Marne.

(*e*) Any further offensive operations undertaken by the German armies this year will have for their immediate object the restoration of the Teutonic morale. A successful operation against British and American forces will do the most to raise this morale and consequently the greatest danger, from a military point of view; is to be anticipated by an offensive against the northern part of the western front and by increased activity against transports carrying United States troops.

NAVAL SITUATION.

2. In reference (*b*) the possibility of the German High Seas Fleet attempting a major action with the British Grand Fleet, was discussed at some length, and the decision was reached that there was a possibility of such an operation. It was considered that such an operation would be conducted in conjunction with a military offensive against the northern part of the western front, and that in such an engagement the German Fleet would undoubtedly use poison gas and the torpedo planes. The probable place for such an engagement would be the eastern end of the English Channel, in the vicinity of the German bases at Zeebrugge and Ostend, from which bases the German torpedo planes would operate.

3. In view of the possibility of such an engagement the commander in chief recommended that all United States superdreadnaughts be based in European waters to support the British Grand Fleet.

4. That such a campaign has not yet taken place indicates that the previous decision was wrong; or, that such operation has been delayed pending the resumption of a military offensive against the northern part of the western front; or, that the enemy is not yet prepared for such an attack; or, that some more promising plan (from his point of view) is being developed.

5. The enemy submarine campaign is decreasing in efficiency, and in view of the progress in shipbuilding there is little probability that the submarine menace will ever again approach the position of a dominating factor in the result of the war.

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6. The development of the cruiser type of submarine has permitted an extension of the zone of operations, but the operations so far conducted by this type have not been sufficiently serious to warrant the belief that the development of this type will add greatly to the losses by submarines.

7. The season of the year favorable to raiding operations is now approaching, and due to the prominence lately given to the ability of the American troops as fighters and to the statements of the number of troops transported and the insignificant losses so far met in these operations, it is quite possible that a determined campaign against our transports is being planned.

8. Assuming that the enemy's probable intentions are to conduct the type of naval operations which will be most serious to the Allies, we must consider one of the following types of campaigns as being the most probable:

(*a*) Engage in extensive raiding operations during the fall and winter months, using submarines and all types of fast surface vessels, including major ships. This campaign directed primarily at our transports.

(*b*) Seek engagement with the British Grand Fleet in the vicinity of the German bases at Zeebrugge and Ostend, in which case poison gas and torpedo planes will play an important part in the engagement.

9. In view of the above the commander in chief believes that the following should be adopted as the mission of the Atlantic Fleet:

(1) To guard all troop and mercantile trans-Atlantic convoys against German or Austrian raiders of any type (including submarines) or strength.

(2) To support the British Grand Fleet against any attempt of the German High Seas Fleet to gain temporary control of the British Channel.

10. An estimate of the situation has been prepared with the above as a mission. A copy of the estimate is inclosed.

11. As a result of this estimate of the situation the following decisions were arrived at:

(1) To assign to the commander in chief Atlantic Fleet the mission of guarding all trans-Atlantic convoys against raiders.

(2) To base the superdreadnaughts *Pennsylvania*, *Arizona*, *Utah*, *Oklahoma*, *Nevada* (*Mississippi*, *New Mexico*, and *Idaho*, when ready) at Brest.

(3) To base the seven armored cruisers at Berehaven as scouts and eastern ocean escorts.

(4) To base *North Dakota* and *Delaware* on home coast, Halifax or Guantanamo, as detail plans may indicate best.

(5) To use *South Carolina*, *Michigan*, and six *Minnesota* type as ocean escorts for troop convoys.

(6) To base five *Georgia* type on home coast.

(7) The commander in chief to assume direct control over any offensive operations.

(8) To base squadron 1 and Division A on home coast and operate them as training units.

H. T. MAYO.

I desire to point out that so far as can be learned, the estimate of the enemy's probable intentions very closely approximated the operation which the high command directed the German Fleet to carry out in October, 1918, but which was never executed, due to the revolutionary state of the naval enlisted personnel.

My recommendations were again disapproved by the department.

On the 30th of August I sailed for Europe in the U. S. S. *Utah*, which was later in leaving than the *Nevada* and *Oklahoma*. My mission on this trip, as in 1917, was an inspection of the forces of the Atlantic Fleet in European waters and an observation of conditions and operations.

I have now completed the chronological record of my activities during the war. I have indicated, I believe, that, so far as was within the province of the commander in chief, the fleet was prepared for any emergency. I have quoted from my estimates of the situation at various times not so much to indicate that the department did not approve my recommendations as to point out that there was never a time when I or my staff failed to keep in touch with the general situation or neglected, so far as we are aware, any action or

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recommendation which we believed would increase the effectiveness of our Navy in the World War.

I shall now comment on a few points which have been brought out in the testimony given by Admiral Sims.

Referring to the statements regarding the policies and plans of the department—our inability to throw the full weight of our resources into the war upon our entry into it, was due primarily, as is well known, to our national policies.

I consider that there should be recalled to mind all the circumstances preceding and leading up to the war, namely, the consistent neutrality which was the enduring national policy; the views of the people confirming neutrality and the status quo, as evidenced by the outcome of the national elections in November, 1916; the final trend of events which was initiated by the announcement of "unrestricted submarine warfare" in January, 1917; the overt acts against the United States ships which resulted in the declaration of a state of war in April, 1917.

It must not be forgotten, in looking back to our entry into the war, that there existed throughout the country and extending not only to at least some of our legislators, but also to some extent into the military departments a feeling that the participation of the United States in the war might consist principally in the furnishing of money, munitions and supplies of all kinds. An army in France of the size which that army finally reached, was hardly thought of by anyone at that time.

As brought out by me in my preceding remarks, I always considered that it was my duty to have the active fleet under my command ready for any emergency. Its record during the war is sufficient proof that it was.

As to the broad general plans and policies of the department for the conduct of war—the office of the Chief of Naval Operations was not authorized until 1915 and only against considerable opposition. Its scope never was and is not now, sufficiently comprehensive to ensure the best plans and policies for the preparation for or the conduct of war. Without the office of the Chief of Naval Operations, conditions in the Navy immediately preceding and during the war would have been chaotic, and no one can say what would have happened. In so far as the fleet was concerned, I always felt that I had the support of the Chief of Naval Operations though I did not always agree with his plans and policies.

After our entry into the war, the department, in keeping with the spirit of the country, manifested great energy in expanding our naval forces in the direction indicated by information from abroad as most necessary.

Furthermore after a careful consideration of what was learned regarding the plans, policies, and result of work of the British, French, and Italian Admiralties as revealed to me during my tours in Great Britain and Europe in 1917 and 1918, I am of the opinion that our preparedness as regards general plans upon our entry into the war compared favorably with that of the powers mentioned. Nevertheless I do think that if the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations had been in existence longer, with even more power and responsibilities, a better state of preparedness would have resulted.

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In regard to the criticism of the policy of docking vessels and giving them a final examination and short refit before sending them into the war zone:

In view of the demands on the facilities and equipment in European waters for repairing and refitting and the many differences between the British ships and our own, just plain ordinary common sense required that a vessel about to sail for an indefinite time on a foreign service should be sent to a yard for a few days. It can not be reasonably held that such delays materially influenced the war one way or another. In this connection it may be of interest to state that there was difficulty in obtaining suitable stowage for certain stores of our battleships attached to the Grand Fleet.

In regard to the emphasis laid upon the accurate information furnished regarding the movements of submarines:

In taking the battle fleet to sea after entering the war I insisted on having screening vessels. The impression given by previous testimony is that submarine movements were accurately followed from the day of our entry into the war, hence no screening vessels were needed over here. As a matter of fact, it was not until the latter part of 1917, or the early part of 1918, that the system of locating the submaries by radio compass bearings was accurate and reliable. Even then, all that a submarine had to do to avoid being located was not to use the radio. Upon our entry into the war, the only dreadnoughts that could be counted upon were seven coal burners and four oil burners. Hence keeping them in condition as recommended by Admiral Sims required work on the high seas, and taking them to sea without screening vessels was not justified.

Referring to the discussion of the northern mine barrage:

The discussion of the northern mine barrage is misleading. In 1917 I took over a memorandum regarding a mine barrage, which included the details of the mine. The British Admiralty discussed this question with myself and staff and proposed modifications which were later accepted by our department. I incorporate this statement in order that there can be no doubt on the subject. Furthermore, I do not concur in the statement that the barrage was a subsidiary measure, but I will not attempt to go into the details because the committee will presumably call officers who are more familiar with the details than I am.

In regard to the several discussions regarding the reduction in the losses of shipping by submarines:

In order that no erroneous conclusions may be drawn, it is considered advisable to record my belief that the reduction in the losses of shipping by submarines were due to—

(*a*) Organization of the shipping.
(*b*) Instruction and training of the merchant marine officers in handling their ships.
(*c*) Development and use of depth charges.
(*d*) Arming of merchant ships, thereby forcing submarines to remain submerged and to use the torpedo instead of guns.
(*e*) Adoption of the convoy system.
(*f*) Increased number of antisubmarine craft.
(*g*) Aircraft patrols.
(*h*) Mine barrages.
(*i*) Listening devices.

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Referring to the assignment of our destroyers to Queenstown and the use of British destroyers to escort our battleships with the Grand Fleet and the mining vessels:

The British destroyers at Queenstown were withdrawn after the arrival of our destroyers, notwithstanding that the area of operations there was repeatedly spoken of as being the critical one. If British destroyers had been kept there and the number increased, some of our destroyers could have been assigned with our battleship squadron and our mining force instead of depending on the British destroyers, as pointed out by Admiral Sims. Furthermore, the experience of our destroyers in all phases of their work would have been beneficial, and this certainly was desirable.

Referring to the remarks about the dissimilar ships that were sent to reinforce the Grand Fleet:

There were only eight coal-burning dreadnoughts—*New York*, *Texas*, *Wyoming*, *Arkansas*, *Florida*, *Utah*, *Delaware*, and *North Dakota*. The ships sent were *New York*, *Wyoming*, *Florida*, and *Delaware*, the *Texas* and *Arkansas* following later. It must be emphasized that it was impossible to get a division of four similar coal-burning dreadnoughts, as there were only two of each type. The four that should have gone were the *Wyoming*, *Arkansas*, *Florida*, and *Utah*, all of similar maneuvering qualities. The *Arkansas* and *Utah*, respectively, developed trouble with one of their backing and cruising turbines, and measures had been taken to assemble the material to repair them. While these vessels were in condition to operate, they were not in a sufficiently high state of efficiency, due to this defect, to warrant sending them across.

The *Texas* had run aground and was in bad shape. The *North Dakota* was unreliable and uneconomical, having been sent to the navy yard for reengining early in 1916. This, however, was not accomplished until 1918. The department had, furthermore, consistently indicated its disapproval of sending a division of battleships across, notwithstanding Admiral Sims's recommendations, supplemented by my own. Therefore no extreme urgency existed.

There are many points in Admiral Sims's testimony that I do not feel that I am in a position to give an opinion on, such as the department not completely approving and immediately carrying out his recommendations with regard to the convoy system, not promoting officers in accordance with recommendations, placing of officers in important commands without first obtaining his approval, etc.

Capt. Laning in his testimony attempts to bring out that the active fleet would have been in much better condition when war was declared had the battleships been sent to the yards in the winter 1916–17 and work concentrated on placing them in material readiness.

I do not agree with this contention, as there is no question of doubt in my mind that the winter's work of the active fleet in 1916–17 was most essential, and that the effect of this intensive training was conducive to a high degree of efficiency in the personnel which had a great effect on the whole Navy when the Navy was expanded for war.

Referring to the statement of Capt. Laning relative to condition of battleships that it would take over 100 days to get all battleships of even the active fleet ready for war:

This statement is misleading as all were practically ready for operations on our coast, but certain items as specified in my letter of May

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5, 1917, were necessary if the ships were to operate independently from a foreign base, i. e., ready for every kind of service.

In my opinion, there are three faults which were the principal causes of our failure to support the Allies more promptly and with greater efficiency. These are indicated in the following summary:

SUMMARY.

It is my opinion that the material unpreparedness of the vessels in reserve and out of commission, and the shortage of personnel, was due primarily to the national policy of strict neutrality, with its resultant effect of a failure to prepare against war. It should be recalled that Holland and Switzerland remained neutral during the entire war. They were ready to defend their neutrality.

War is the ultimate resource of foreign policy by which the nation seeks to impose its will upon its enemies in defense of its honor, its interests, and its existence. The armed forces of the Nation are the instruments by which the national policies are supported and enforced.

The strength of the Navy to be maintained during peace or mobilized for war is a matter of policy for which the Government (the President and Congress) is responsible. The Navy Department is responsible for advising the Government as to the strength of the Navy and the extent of the naval bases and industrial establishments which will be required to enforce our foreign policies.

The Navy Department is responsible for the efficiency of the Navy for war so far, and only so far, as efficiency can be attained with the appropriations granted by Congress.

A Navy can not be built and trained in a year or two years, and consequently the foresight necessary to provide for the construction and maintenance of a navy adquate to its future task is of the utmost importance.

Efficient management consists not only in dealing with events as they occur, but in foreseeing and forestalling events. Money expended in building and maintaining a Navy larger than required to enforce our foreign policies, is extravagance; but the expenditure of less money than required for a Navy strong enough to enforce our foreign policies, is folly, for failure to make adequate preparation during peace causes the waste of millions when war is eventually forced upon us.

The difference of opinion as to what constitutes an adequate Navy can be traced to our lack of definite foreign policy, which differences of opinion are the cause of much of the discussion as to naval appropriations which takes place annually before the Congressional Naval Committees.

The remedy for this condition lies outside of the Navy Department, but is vital to the question at issue.

Those responsible for the foreign policy of the United States should definitely inform the War and Navy Departments as to the foreign policies of the United States which the Army and Navy are to be prepared to enforce.

These policies must plan for the future, they must be foresighted, and changes in such policies should be notified to the War and Navy Departments at once.

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The future can be foreseen only in proportion as we know the conditions and the laws of nature. As our knowledge of both is imperfect we can anticipate the future only approximately for a limited time, but enough can be done to be of the greatest value in preparing the armed forces for the work which they will be required to perform.

Efficient management adopts definite and correct ideals and seeks to obtain them resolutely and courageously. Until the Navy is provided with a definite ideal in the form of a definite statement of the foreign policies of the United States which it is to be prepared to enforce, the management of the Navy can not formulate building programs and war plans except on hypotheses as to the foreign policy of the United States.

The next most serious detriment to efficient preparation is the organization of the Navy Department. The laws and regulations under which the Navy was operating during the war, and is operating to-day, are unsatisfactory. Under the present regulations:

(*a*) The General Board is charged with devising measures and plans for the effective preparation and maintenance of the fleet for war.

(*b*) The Chief of Naval Operations is responsible for the preparation and readiness of plans for the use of the fleet in war.

(*c*) The General Board is charged with the preparation of plans of campaign.

(*h*) The Chief of Naval Operations is responsible for the operations of the fleet.

The Chief of Naval Operations has no authority to coordinate the work of the bureaus whose business it is to supply and maintain the material and personnel. The General Board has no executive functions.

Under such regulations coordination of the various officers, boards, and bureaus can be obtained only by voluntary coordination or through the civilian secretary.

So long as the present organization exists the maximum efficiency, either in preparation for war, in the conduct of war, or in economical development of the Navy in peace, can not be obtained.

In the present organization responsibility for the readiness of the Navy for war can not be placed anywhere but with the Secretary of the Navy, who, under the present organization, must coordinate 13 offices, boards, and bureaus.

Every dollar spent on our Navy should be spent with a view to the accomplishment of a definite plan of preparation for war. The Navy is built for war, and unless the Chief of Naval Operations, under the Secretary of the Navy, is held responsible for the preparation, readiness, completeness, and effectiveness of plans for national defense, including plans for the development of the Navy, plans for its maintenance and plans for its use, and is given power under the Secretary of the Navy to to exercise supervision through the bureaus, boards, and offices, over all naval activities, the maximum efficiency can not be attained.

In my opinion, the faulty organization of the Navy Department, and the absence of definite foreign policy, except that of strict neutrality, were the primary causes of failure to prepare the entire Navy for war.

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After definite policies and plans were definitely settled upon, after money was appropriated, and after the bureaus voluntarily coordinated with the Chief of Naval Operations, the work was pushed with energy and vigor. The accomplishments were excellent. But our delay in preparation did no doubt delay our assistance to the allies at a critical time, and if such conditions regarding our preparation for war exist in the future they may result in disaster.

My statement also includes criticisms of another nature, namely, that I was not kept informed of policies nor properly consulted with regard to operations in the western Atlantic. As an example, the failure to consult me before ordering Rear Admiral Gleaves to organize and conduct the first troop escort operation.

In my opinion, authority was so centralized in the department that it resulted in the neglect of the principle of "due subdivision of labor and decentralization of responsibility." Centralized control over policy and general plans is sound, but centralized control over details of execution most often results in loss of efficiency.

That finishes my statement, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. The committee will now stand adjourned until 10 o'clock to-morrow morning; and will you appear before the committee again at that time, Admiral?

Admiral MAYO. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

(The documents submitted by Admiral Mayo in the course of his statement, and marked "A" to "L," respectively, are here printed in full in the record as follows:)

JUNE 1, 1916.

United States Atlantic Fleet (active):
- Wyoming (fleet flagship).
- Yankton (tender).

Battleship squadrons:
- Third squadron—
  - Fifth Division—
    - Minnesota (flag of division commander).
    - Michigan.
    - South Carolina.
    - Vermont.
  - Sixth Division—
    - New York (flag of division commander).
    - Delaware.
    - Oklahoma.
    - Texas.
- Fourth Squadron—
  - Seventh Division—
    - Florida (flag of division commander).
    - New Hampshire.
    - Utah.
  - Eighth Division—
    - Arkansas (flag of commander battleship squadrons and Eighth Division).
    - Kansas.
    - Nevada.

Cruiser squadron:
- Memphis (flag of squadron commander).
- Castine.
- Des Moines.
- Dolphin.
- Kentucky.
- Machias.
- Marietta.
- Montana.
- Nebraska.
- North Carolina.

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Cruiser squadron—Continued.
Prairie.
Sacramento.
Salem (in reserve acting as receiving ship at Boston).
Wheeling.
Destroyer flotillas:
Birmingham (flag of commander of flotillas).
Third flotilla—
Melville (tender).
Fifth division—
O'Brien.
Fanning.
Jarvis.
Jenkins.
Paulding.
Warrington.
Sixth division—
Wadsworth.
Cassin.
Cummings.
Ericsson.
McDougal.
Winslow.
Seventh Division—
Balch.
Aylwin.
Benham.
Cushing.
McCall.
Nicholson.
Eighth Division—
Conyngham.
Duncan.
Jacob Jones.
Porter.
Tucker.
Wainwright.
Operating with reduced complement:
First Flotilla—
Panther (tender).
First Division—
Smith.
Flusser.
Lamson.
Preston.
Reid.
Second Division—
Walker.
Monagha .
Perkins.
Roe.
Sterrett.
Terry.
Second Flotilla—
Dixie (tender).
Third Division—
Drayton.
Henley.
Mayrant (out of commission).
Perker.
Patterson.
Fourth Division—
Jouett.
Ammen.
Beale.
Burrows.
Downes (in ordinary).
Trippe (in ordinary).

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Operating with reduced complement—Continued.
Submarine flotilla—
Columbia (flotilla flag).
Fulton (tender).
Macdonough (tender).
Worden (tender).
First Division—
Charleston (tender).
Severn (tender).
Potomac (tender).
C–3.
C–1.
C–2.
C–4.
C–5.
Second Division—
Ozark (tender).
D–1.
D–2.
D–3.
E–1.
Third Division—
G–1.
G–2.
G–4.
Fourth Division—
Tallahassee (tender).
K–5.
K–1.
K–2.
K–6.
Fifth Division—
Bushnell (tender).
L–1.
L–3.
L–4.
Mining and Mine Sweeping Division—
San Francisco (flag).
Baltimore.
Dubuque.
Lebanon.
Ontario.
Patapsco.
Patuxent.
Sonoma.
Auxiliary Division—
Vestal (flag).
Arethusa.
Celtic.
Culgoa.
Cyclops.
Jupiter.
Neptune.
Orion.
Prometheus.
Solace.

UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET,
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, February 4, 1917.

From: Commander, battleship force.
To: Commander in chief, Atlantic Fleet.
Subject: Battleship force: Readiness for war service.
Reference: (*a*) Commander in chief's file No. 842 of February 3, 1917.

1. Complying with reference (*a*), the following report is submitted:
(A) Ships present with the flag: *Connecticut, South Carolina, Michigan, New York, Texas, Oklahoma, Delaware, Florida, Utah, Pennsylvania, Wyoming, Nevada.*

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(1) Ammunition on board. All ships have their allowance of ammunition on board, except that the following ships are short 410 rounds of 3-inch antiaircraft ammunition: *Connecticut*, *Michigan*, *South Carolina*, *Texas*, *Oklahoma*, *Delaware*, *Pennsylvania*, *Wyoming*, *Nevada*, and the following ships have no antiaircraft ammunition on board: *New York*, *Florida*, *Utah*.

(2) All ships present with the flag are practically full of fuel, varying from 72 per cent of capacity for the *Delaware* to 97 per cent for the *Pennsylvania*.

(3) Condition of ordnance material of all the ships is satisfactory with the following minor exceptions:

(*a*) *New York*, *Florida*, *Utah* have no antiaircraft guns.

(*b*) *Oklahoma* and *Nevada* have about 50 per cent searchlight equipment.

(*c*) *Connecticut* 7-inch battery has fired an average of 160 rounds.

(*d*) *Wyoming* 12-inch battery has fired an average of 45 rounds.

(4) Condition of propelling plant. The condition of the propelling plant of all ships is satisfactory with the following exceptions: (*a*) *Connecticut*, one main circulating pump out of commission. Can operate indefinitely with other.

(*b*) *Oklahoma*, defective brick work in boilers. Can operate indefinitely.

(*c*) *Utah*, one astern turbine stripped. Can operate indefinitely.

(5) Condition of hull. The condition of the hull of all vessels is satisfactory with the exception of the *Oklahoma*, *Pennsylvania*, and *Nevada*, each of which has a structural weakness in the overhang of the stern, but all can operate indefinitely.

(6) Provisions on board. All ships are practically full of fresh provisions and about 70 per cent full of nonperishable provisions.

(7) Stores on board. All ships have about 75 per cent capacity of naval supply account stock and clothing and small store stock.

(B) Ships not present with the flag: *Arkansas*, *Arizona*.

The *Arkansas* is in satisfactory condition under all seven of the headings mentioned in paragraph 4 of reference (*a*), except:

(*a*) Under item (1) she is short 410 rounds of 3-inch antiaircraft ammunition.

(*b*) Under item (4) one backing turbine is stripped, but not to the extent of preventing her from operating with the fleet indefinitely. The *Arkansas* is expected to join the fleet to-morrow.

The *Arizona* has the following deficiencies of material, which will prevent her operating with the fleet immediately:

(1) Short 410 rounds 3-inch antiaircraft ammunition.

(2) Has a small supply of fuel on board.

(3) Fifty per cent searchlight equipment.

(4) Stripped turbines, now being repaired at the New York yard.

(5) Structural weakness of the overhang of the stern.

It is estimated that she will be materially ready to join the fleet about March 1, 1917.

2. From the above it will be seen that all ships of the battleship force, except the *Arizona*, are practically ready for immediate war service so far as their material is concerned.

D. W. COFFMAN.

GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA, *February 4, 1917.*

From: Commander destroyer force.
To: Commander in chief.
Subject: Readiness for war service, destroyer force.
Reference: (*a*) Commander in chief file 842, of February 3, 1917.
Inclosures: (2).

1. There are forwarded herewith, in compliance with reference (*a*), reports as follows:

(A) Ships present with the flag.

(B) Ships not present with the flag.

ALBERT GLEAVES.

CATEGORY A.—SHIPS PRESENT WITH FLAG.

SUBJECT NO. 2.—FUEL ON BOARD IN TERMS OF CAPACITY.

Seattle, filled to capacity.
Flotilla 1: *Panther*, estimated 60 per cent.
Flotilla 1, Division 1: None present.
Flotilla 1, Division 2: None present.
Flotilla 2: *Dixie*, 90 per cent.
Flotilla 2, Division 3: None present.

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Flotilla 2, Division 4: *Cummings*, filled to capacity; *Jarvis*, estimated 60 per cent; *McCall*, filled to capacity; *Fanning*, 30 per cent.

Flotilla 2, Division 5: *Cassin*, filled to capacity; *Drayton*, 60 per cent (schedule to hold full power trial; Feb. 4; will refuel to capacity within 2 hours after return).

Flotilla 3, Division 6: *Balch*, *Aylwin*, *Parker*, filled to capacity; *Duncan*, 60 per cent (scheduled to hold full power trial Feb. 4; will refuel to capacity within 2 hours after return).

Flotilla 3, Division 7: *Ericsson*, *O'Brien*, *Winslow*, filled to capacity; *Cushing*, 50 per cent; *McDougal*, 60 per cent (scheduled to hold-full power trial Feb. 4; will refuel to capacity within two hours after return).

Flotilla 3, Division 8: *Conyngham*, 60 per cent; *Tucker*, *Wadsworth*, *Wainwright*, *Porter*, filled to capacity.

Flotilla 3, Division 9: *Davis*, *Wilkes*, filled to capacity.

Condition of Ordnance Material.

Organization.	Ship.	Conditions of ordnance material.
Force flag	Seattle	Ready for service.
Flotilla tender	Panther	Do.
Flotilla 1, Division 1	None	Do.
Flotilla 1, Division 2	.....do	Do.
Flotilla tender	Dixie	Do.
Flotilla 2, Division 3	None.	
Flotilla 2, Division 4	Cummings	Do.
	Jarvis	Do.
	McCall	Do.
	Fanning	Do.
Flotilla 2, Division 5	Cassin	Do.
	Drayton	Do.
Flotilla 3, Division 6	Balch	Do.
	Parker	Do.
	Aylwin	Do.
	Duncan	Do.
Flotilla 3, Division 7	Ericsson	Do.
	O'Brien	Do.
	Cushing	Do.
	McDougal	Do.
	Nicholson	Do.
	Winslow	Do.
Flotilla 3, Division 8	Conyngham	Do.
	Tucker	Do.
	Wadsworth	Do.
	Porter	Do.
	Wainwright	Do.
Flotilla 3, Division 9	Davis	Do.
	Wilkes	Do.

[1] Training gear easily thrown out of line by heavy seas, needs additional bracing; job orders for this has been authorized by the Bureau of Ordnance at the various navy yards.

SUBJECT NO. 4.—CONDITION OF PROPELLING PLANT.

Seattle.—Excellent. One boiler temporarily out of commission awaiting receipt of side box upright.

FLOTILLA 1, DIVISION 1.

Panther.—Condition very good; ready for service.

FLOTILLA 1, DIVISION 2.

None present.

FLOTILLA 2.

Dixie.—Very good. Auxiliary feed pumps old and worn. No. 2 boiler furnaces somewhat weak. *Dixie* is ready for service.

FLOTILLA 2, DIVISION 3.

None present.

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FLOTILLA 2, DIVISION 4.

Cummings.—Excellent except for maneuvering valve which is erratic in action and leaks badly. New valve being made by New York navy yard. Can perform active service pending completion of valve.

Jarvis.—Condenser tubes thin. Estimated life of condensers six months. Ready for service operating from a home base. Not ready for distant service. Except for condensers, condition good.

McCall.—Fair. Hole in crank case of circulating pump engine. Can be repaired by force repair ship after which *McCall* will be ready for service.

Fanning.—Very good. Ready for service insofar as machinery is concerned.

FLOTILLA 2, DIVISION 5.

Cassin.—Maneuvering valve leaks badly. New valve being made by navy yard New York, N. Y., otherwise condition excellent. *Cassin* ready for service pending receipt of new valve.

Drayton.—Very good. Center and starboard shaft slightly out of alignment but not sufficiently to interfere with movements of ship. Ready for service.

FLOTILLA 3, DIVISION 6.

Balch.—Very good; ready for service.

Aylwin.—Very good; ready for service.

Parker.—Excellent; ready for service.

Duncan.—The *Duncan* has proved to be constitutionally weak in the past and a continuous succession of defects has been encountered. Starboard main air pump has a cracked steam cylinder head which has been patched, but which should be renewed before the vessel is sent on distant service. It is considered that the *Duncan* is now in better condition than at any time in the past and with the exception mentioned she is ready for distant service. In the meantime she is in condition to operate from a home base.

FLOTILLA 3, DIVISION 7.

Ericsson.—Excellent. Top casing of circulating pump turbine cracked and patched. No trouble is anticipated but as a matter of precaution a new top casing should be provided before the vessel is sent on foreign service.

O'Brien.—Very good; ready for service.

Cushing.—Poor. Rotors of both main engines have excessive fore and aft movement due to weak or improperly secured thrust supports. Fifteen blades in the low pressure stage of the port engine have been removed, but it is not considered that this will affect her availability. Thrust horseshoes on starboard engine require rebabbitting. All possible work within the resources of the force is being prosecuted to place the *Cushing* in condition for service. Work should be completed and trial run made by February 12. If the work now being done does not entirely eliminate the troubles which have been experienced, the *Cushing* should be sent to a navy yard for thorough overhaul and strengthening of the main engine thrust arrangement.

McDougal.—Evaporator shells require renewal, otherwise condition excellent. New shells should be installed before vessel is sent on distant work.

Nicholson.—Very good. There is an outstanding order on two boiler safety valves to alter them from ball seat to 45° angle seat, but it is not considered that this should interfere with the availability of the *Nicholson.*

Winslow.—Excellent; ready for service.

FLOTILLA 3, DIVISION 8.

Conyngham.—The last row of rotor blades in the second stage of the low pressure main engine, the first two rows of rotor blades in the third stage, and the first three rows of fixed blades in the third stage have been removed on account of stripping. This engine has been cleaned out and reassembled and will hold the trial run on February 4. If no further weakness develops it is considered that the *Conyngham* can operate at moderate speeds with but slight reduction in economy. It is considered unsafe to operate at high speeds and it recommended that this engine be rebladed as soon as the necesary material can be assembled..

Tucker.—Very good; ready for service.

Wadsworth.—Excellent; ready for service.

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Wainwright.—Very good. Minor troubles with main augmenter condensers, but within the control of the ship's force. Ready for service.

Porter.—Excellent. Has had some trouble in the past with leaky main condenser which is now believed to be under control by the ship's force. Ready for service.

FLOTILLA 3, DIVISION 9.

Davis.—Excellent. The air pumps, fuel-oil service pumps and booster pumps have given trouble with their model valves. This can easily be remedied and new valves are now being made.

Ammunition on board in terms of allowance.

Organization.	Ship.	Terms of allowance.
Force flag	Seattle	100 per cent.
Flotilla tender	Panther	100 per cent (estimated).
Flotilla 1, Division 1	None	
Flotilla 1, Division 2	....do	
Flotilla tender	Dixie	100 per cent.
Flotilla 2, Division 3	None	
Flotilla 2, Division 4	Cummings	98 per cent.
	Jarvis	100 per cent (estimated).
	McCall	100 per cent.
	Fanning	95 per cent (no ammunition on board for machine gun).
Flotilla 2, Division 5	Cassin	100 per cent.
	Drayton	95 per cent (no ammunition on board for machine gun).
Flotilla 3, Division 6	Balch	100 per cent.
	Parker	Do.
	Aylwin	Do.
	Duncan	98 per cent.
Flotilla 3, Division 7	Ericsson	100 per cent.
	O'Brien	Do.
	Cushing	Do.
	McDougal	95 per cent (no rifle ammunition).
	Nicholson	100 per cent.
	Winslow	Do.
Flotilla 3, Division 8	Conyngham	Do.
	Tucker	Do.
	Wadsworth	99 per cent.
	Porter	95 per cent (no machine-gun ammunition and only ½ allowance of rifle ammunition).
	Wainwright	
Flotilla 3, Division 9	Davis	100 per cent.
	Wilkes	Do.

Provisions on board in terms of capacity.

Organization.	Ship.	Per cent.	Organization.	Ship.	Per cent.
Force flag	Seattle	90	Flotilla 3, division 7.	Cushing	50
Flotilla 1, flotilla tender.	Panther	75		Ericsson	50
				McDougal	50
Flotilla 2, flotilla tender.	Dixie[1]	90		Nicholson	50
				O'Brien	50
Flotilla 2, division 4.	Cummings	50		Winslow	50
	Fanning	50	Flotilla 3, division 8.	Conyngham	50
	Jarvis	50		Porter	50
	McCall	50		Tucker	50
Flotilla 2, division 5.	Cassin	50		Wadsworth	50
	Drayton	50		Wainwright	50
Flotilla 3, division 6.	Aylwin	50	Flotilla 3, division 9.	Davis	50
	Balch	50		Wilkes	50
	Duncan	50			
	Parker	50			

[1] Dixie will fill destroyers to capacity with provisions and then will have about 15 per cent capacity left.

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Stores on board in terms of allowance.

Organization.	Ship.	Per cent.	Organization.	Ship.	Per cent.
Force flag	Seattle	85	Flotilla 3, division 7.	Cushing	66⅔
Flotilla 1, flotilla tender.	Panther	85		Ericsson	66⅔
				McDougal	66⅔
Flotilla 2, flotilla tender.	Dixie [1]	75		Nicholson	66⅔
				O'Brien	66⅔
Flotilla 2, division 4.	Cummings	66⅔		Winslow	66⅔
	Fanning	66⅔	Flotilla 3, division 8.	Conyngham	66⅔
	Jarvis	66⅔		Porter	66⅔
	McCall	66⅔		Tucker	66⅔
Flotilla 2, division 5.	Cassin	66⅔		Wadsworth	66⅔
	Drayton	66⅔		Wainwright	66⅔
Flotilla 3, division 6.	Aylwin	66⅔	Flotilla 3, division 9.	Davis	66⅔
	Balch	66⅔		Wilkes	66⅔
	Duncan	66⅔			
	Parker	66⅔			

[1] Dixie will issue sufficient stores to the destroyers to bring their capacity to about 80 to 85 per cent. Dixie will then have only about 10 to 15 per cent of maximum stock.

FLOTILLA 3, DIVISION 9.

Wilkes.—The evaporators of the *Wilkes* are of insufficient capacity. Under normal conditions of water consumption and with a full supply of water, the *Wilkes* can safely operate to the extent of her cruising radius. The insufficient capacity of the plant, however, renders her continuous operation under all conditions uncertain. Before proceeding on distant service new evaporators should be installed. In the meantime the *Wilkes* may be considered ready for service.

No information available concerning the *Salem* and *Chester*.

The above-noted defects, except those which have occurred since leaving navy yard, have been made the subject of special report or request for repairs.

SUBJECT NO. 5—CONDITION OF HULL, ETC.

The hull and hull fittings of all vessels with the flag are in condition for active service with the possible exception of the *Fanning*, which may have suffered injury due to grounding on February 3, 1917.

As far as can be determined at present time, *Fanning* has sustained no injuries.

CATEGORY "B."

Ammunition on board in terms of allowance.

Organization.	Ship.	Terms of allowance, per cent estimated.
Flotilla flag	Birmingham	100
Flotilla tender	Melville	100
Flotilla 3, division 6	Benham	100
	Downes	100
Flotilla 3, division 8	Jacob Jones	100
Flotilla 3, division 9	Rowan	100
	Samson	100
	Allen	100
	Shaw	[1]

[1] In hands of builders.

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Ships not present with flags.

Organization.	Ship.	Stores on board in terms of allowance (estimated).
		Per cent.
Flotilla flag	Salem	.....
Flotilla 1, Division 1	Flusser	50
	Lamson	50
	Preston	50
	Reid	50
	Smith	50
Flotilla 1, Division 2	Monaghan	50
	Perkins	50
	Roe	50
	Sterett	50
	Terry	33⅓
	Walke	50
Flotilla flag	Chester	10
Flotilla 2, Division 3	Beale	50
	Henley	75
	Mayrant	(1)
	Patterson	75
	Warrington	75
Flotilla 2, Division 4	Ammen	75
	Burrows	75
Flotilla 2, Division 5	Jenkins	75
	Jouett	30
	Paulding	75
	Trippe	75
Flotilla flag	Birmingham	80
Flotilla tender	Melville	98
Flotilla 3, Division 6	Benham	50
	Downs	50
Flotilla 3, Division 8	Jacob Jones	85
Flotilla 3, Division 9	Allen	75
	Sampson	80
	Rowan	66⅔
	Shaw	(2)

[1] Out of commission. [2] Not completed.

NOTE.—Salem, Chester, and Birmingham could be filled to maximum capacity of stores in about 3 days. Destroyers should be filled in about 1 day.

Ships not present with the flag.

Organization.	Ship.	Provisions on board in terms of capacity.
		Per cent.
Flotilla flag	Salem	.....
Flotilla 1, division 1	Flusser	33⅓
	Lamson	33⅓
	Preston	33⅓
	Reid	33⅓
	Smith	33⅓
Flotilla 1, division 2	Monaghan	33⅓
	Perkins	33⅓
	Roe	33⅓
	Sterett	33⅓
	Terry	33⅓
	Walke	33⅓
Flotilla flag	Chester	10
Flotilla 2, division 3	Beale	33⅓
	Henley	50
	Mayrant	(1)
	Patterson	75
	Warrington	75
Flotilla 2, division 4	Ammen	50
	Burrows	50
Flotilla 2, division 5	Jenkins	60
	Jouett	33⅓
	Paulding	60
	Trippe	75
Flotilla flag	Birmingham	75
Flotilla tender	Melville	98
Flotilla 3, division 6	Benham	33⅓
	Downes	33⅓
Flotilla 3, division 8	Jacob Jones	66⅔
Flotilla 3, division 9	Allen	33⅓
	Sampson	80
	Rowan	80
	Shaw	(2)

[1] Out of commission. [2] Not completed.

NOTE.—Salem, Chester, Birmingham could be filled to maximum capacity of provisions in 2 days. Other vessels, except Melville, could be loaded to maximum capacity provisions in 1 day.

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Ammunition on board in terms of allowance.

Organization.	Ship.	Terms of allowance (estimated).
		Per cent.
Flotilla flag	Salem	100
Flotilla 1, Division 1	Smith	100
	Flusser	100
	Lamson	100
	Preston	100
	Reid	100
Flotilla 1, Division 2	Walke	100
	Monaghan	100
	Perkins	.....
	Roe	100
	Sterett	100
	Terry	100
Flotilla flag	Chester	100
Flotilla 2, Division 3	Warrington	100
	Henley	100
	Beale	100
	Patterson	100
	Mayrant	(1)
Flotilla 2, Division 4	Ammen	100
	Burrows	100
Flotilla 2, Division 5	Jouett	100
	Trippe	100
	Jenkins	100
	Paulding	100

[1] Out of commission.

Ships not Present with Flag.

Fuel on board in terms of capacity.

Subject No. 2:

There is no available information with regard to the amount of fuel on board ships not present with the flag.

Condition of ordnance material.

Organization.	Ship.	Condition of ordnance material.
Flotilla flag	Birmingham	Ready for service.
Flotilla tender	Melville	Do.
Flotilla 3, division 6	Benham	Do.
	Downes	Do.
Flotilla 3, division 8[1]	Jacob Jones	Do.
Flotilla 3, division 9[1]	Rowan	Do.
	Sampson	Do.
	Allen	Do.
	Shaw	In hands of builders.
Flotilla flag	Salem	Out of commission.
Flotilla 1, division 1	Smith	Ready for service.
	Flusser	Do.
	Lamson	Do.
	Preston	Do.
	Reid	Do.
Flotilla 1, division 2	Walke	Do.
	Monaghan	Do.
	Perkins	In ordinary.
	Roe	Ready for service.
	Sterett	Do.
	Terry	Do.
Flotilla flag	Chester	Do.
Flotilla 2, division 3	Warrington	Do.
	Henley	Do.
	Beale	Do.
	Patterson	Do.
	Mayrant	Out of commission.
Flotilla 2, division 4	Ammen	Ready for service.
	Burrows	Do.
Flotilla 2, division 5	Jouett	Do.
	Trippe	Do.
	Jenkins	Do.
	Paulding	Do.

[1] Training gear easily thrown out of line by heavy seas, needs additional bracing; job orders have been authorized by the bureau for this at the various navy yards.

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SUBJECT NO. 4.—CONDITION OF PROPELLING PLANT.

Flotilla 1, division 1.

Smith. Fair. I. P. C. casing has crack in top and bottom flanges. Starboard L. P. and port L. P. lower casing distorted. Engines have been operating satisfactorily for the past three months. Safety valves leak, but it is believed that they will be made satisfactory by the ship's force. The *Smith* is ready for service out of a home base but not for distant service.

Flusser is now undergoing overhaul at the navy yard, Charleston, S. C. The assigned date of completion is February 12. Upon completion of authorized work, the *Flusser* will be in excellent condition and ready for service.

Lamson. Poor. Oil pumps (lubricating) require complete overhauling. Condenser tubes thin. Requires general overhaul of auxiliary machinery and rebricking of boilers. The *Lamson* can be put in very good condition by a navy yard in thirty days.

Preston. Poor. Blowers are badly worn and although they can be operated they will probably not stand up under continuous or high speed cruising. New blowers have been contracted for to be delivered at the navy yard, Charleston, S. C., March 15, 1917. To place the *Preston* in condition for service will require the installation of the new blowers, realignment of the center shaft, overhauling of the starboard air pump and circulating engine and several minor items which have been previously authorized. The *Preston* is capable of operating at moderate speeds for several months.

Reid. Now undergoing overhaul at the navy yard, Charleston, S. C. Assigned date of completion, February 21, 1917. Progress of work indicates that this date will not be met. Upon completion of authorized work the *Reid* should be in very good condition and ready for service.

Flotilla 1, division 2.

Walker. Undergoing extensive overhaul at the navy yard, Norfolk, Va. Work delayed due to concentrating efforts on other ships and nonarrival of material. Assigned date of completion unknown, but probably not before April 1, 1917. Upon completion of authorized work the *Walker* should be in very good condition and ready for service.

Monagham. Fair. Minor troubles under control of the ship's force. Fifteen to twenty days at a navy yard for minor overhaul and repairs will be necessary to place the *Monagham* in condition for service.

Perkins. Now completing extensive overhaul at the navy yard, Charleston, S. C. Assigned date of completion, February 21, 1917. Should be in excellent condition at that time and ready for service.

Roe. Now at Charleston, S. C., undergoing overhaul. It is believed the authorized work will be completed by March 1, 1917. The *Roe* should then be in very good condition and ready for service.

Sterett. Fair. Ready for service from a home base. Minor overhaul necessary to place in very good condition.

Terry. Undergoing extensive overhaul at the navy yard, Charleston, S. C. Date of completion dependent upon delivery of forced-draft blowers, probably about June 1, 1917, unless steps are taken to expedite delivery. Upon completion of authorized work the *Terry* should then be in very good condition and ready for service.

Flotilla 2, division 3.

Warrington. The water drums of all boilers have developed a characteristic pitting of boilers of this type. The installation of struts in the drums has been authorized and this work should be done before the *Warrington* can be considered ready for extensive or high-power cruising. She also requires repairs to furnace walls, realignment and straightening of main shafts and overhaul of port main circulating pump. Until this work is undertaken the *Warrington* may be considered in readiness for light duty.

Henley. Main engines unreliable; new engines are being built. Minor repairs are needed. The *Henley* may be considered ready for very light service until the new engines are ready for installation.

Beale. At navy yard, Philadelphia, Pa., undergoing extensive repairs to boilers. Progress slow and completion uncertain. When repairs are completed, *Beale* should be in excellent condition.

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Patterson. Boilers have the characteristic of pitting found in water drums of boilers of this type. She can not be considered in condition for extended or high-power cruising until struts are installed or drums renewed, but until this work is undertaken, she can do light duty. Otherwise in excellent condition.

Mayrant. Out of commission, awaiting installation of new main engines, which, it is understood, will not be completed until spring.

Flotilla 2, division 4.

Ammen. At navy yard, Philadelphia, Pa., undergoing overhaul. Date of completion April 14, 1917. On completion of authorized repairs, *Ammen* should be in very good condition and ready for service.

Burrows. Good. Ready for service.

Flotilla 2, division 5.

Jouett. All of the *Jouett's* water drums are cracked and have been patched. Steam pressure reduced to 200 pounds. New drums are being purchased; date of delivery indefinite. Center tail shaft bent and new one authorized. The *Jouett* is ready for light duty until arrival of new drums, the installation of which, together with the center tail shaft, will place her in good condition.

Trippe. In good condition; ready for service.

Jenkins. Now undergoing overhaul at the navy yard, Boston. Assigned date of completion, February 11, 1917. The completion of authorized work will place the *Jenkins* in very good condition.

Paulding. Now undergoing overhaul at the navy yard, Philadelphia, Pa. Assigned date of completion, March 14, 1917. The completion of this work will place the *Paulding* in very good condition and ready for service.

Flotilla 3.

Birmingham. Now at navy yard, New York, N. Y., for extensive overhaul. It is believed that the amount of work to be done on the *Birmingham* can be materially shortened and the ship placed in readiness for service within less than 30 days.

Melville. Excellent; ready for service.

Flotilla 3, division 6.

Benham. At navy yard, Norfolk, Va., undergoing repairs to both the main turbines and minor overhaul. Date of completion, February 15, 1917. Completion of authorized work will place *Benham* in very good condition.

Downes. Undergoing overhaul and awaiting installation of new main engines at the navy yard, Philadelphia, Pa. It is understood that no date of completion has been set.

Flotilla 3, division 7.

All vessels are present.

Flotilla 3, division 8.

Jacob Jones. Undergoing repairs or alterations prescribed by the board of inspection and survey in order to enable the ship to make her contract speed. Estimated date of completion, 5th to 10th of February, 1917. The *Jacob Jones* is ready for service except for her inability, by a small margin, to make full speed.

Flotilla 3, division 9.

Rowan.—Excellent. Ready for service. Now at Pensacola, Fla; scheduled for final acceptance trials on February 5, 1917.

Sampson.—Excellent. Undergoing hull repairs, navy yard, New York, N. Y. Probable date of completion 10th to 12th of February, 1917. Due at Pensacola, Fla., on completion of repairs for final acceptance trials. Ready for service.

Allen.—Recently commissioned. No reports of derangements have been received and it is believed that she is in excellent condition.

Shaw.—Uncompleted.

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SUBJECT NO. 5.—CONDITION OF HULL, ETC.

Salem and *Chester*.—No information available.

Trippe.—Plating abreast one oil tank and cofferdam dished, causing slight leak, and will require repair.

The hulls and hull fittings of all other vessels of the destroyer force not present are, in so far as known, in condition for active service.

U. S. S. ATLANTIC FLEET,
TRAIN, U. S. S. "VESTAL," FLAGSHIP,
GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA,
February 4, 1917.

From: Commander Train.
To: Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet.
Subject: Readiness for general service.

Inclosures: (1) Reply to 3 (*a*), (2) Reply to 3 (*b*), and (*a*) C in C's file 834, February 3.

1. The only ships present with the flag are the *Vestal*, *Jupiter*, and *Solace*.

2. The estimates given under 3 (*b*) were composed by looking up the present duty that the ship is on, and I believe the data fairly accurate. In regard to answers under query 2, where colliers and oilers are concerned, the fuel is divided into two parts; the upper part shows the amount of cargo, coal or fuel oil as the case may be, and the lower part the bunker coal or fuel oil. Coal is given in tons and oil in gallons.

3. All ships of the Atlantic Fleet (Train) are on active duty except the *Culgoa*, and are ready for sea.

W. L. ROGERS.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	Rounds.	*Tons.*				*Days.*	*Days.*
Jason [1]							
Mars	[2]	2	[3]	[3]	[3]	20	40
Vulcan [1]							
Nero [4]							
Brutus [5]							
Arethusa	[3]	1,000,000	[3]	[3]	[3]	20	40
Promethus	400	1,200	[6]	[6]	[6]	60	90
Celtic	180	350	[6]	[6]	[6]	90	80
Culgoa	180	100	[6]	[7]	[7]	[2]	[2]
Glacier [8]							
Hancock	[9] 100	500	[6]	[3]	[3]	30	90
Prairie [9]							
Buffalo [10]							
Naumee	400	1,000,000	[6]	[3]	[6]	30	60
Kanawha	[2]	1,000,000	[3]	[6]	[6]	30	90
Cyclops	[2]	4,000	[2]	[11]	[6]	30	45
Neptune	400	2,000	[3]	[12]	[3]	10	30
Orion	[2]	0	[3]	[3]	[3]	45	90
Proteus	[2]	1,000	[2]	[3]	[3]	60	90
Nereus	[2]	1,000	[2]	[3]	[3]	30	60
Vestal	400	1,000	[6]	[6]	[6]	30	90
Solace	[13]	680	[13]	[14]	[14]	60	90
Jupiter	400	2,000	[15]	[16]	[6]	45	45

[1] Can not estimate; at navy yard.
[2] None.
[3] Very good.
[4] Can not estimate; on west coast of Mexico.
[5] Can not estimate; at Mare Island.
[6] Excellent.
[7] Hull and machinery damaged; date of completion, June 1.
[8] Per cent.
[9] At Philadelphia.
[10] No estimate possible.
[11] Winches need slight overhaul.
[12] Winches need renewal; can issue coal.
[13] No.
[14] Good.
[15] Port after gun damaged beyond repair; no range finder.
[16] Very good; 13½ knots sustained speed.

[Translation.]

From: U. S. S. *Columbia*.
To: Secretary of the Navy, Washington.

12009. U. S. S. *C–1*, March 15; *C–2*, March 15; *C–3*, March 15; *C–5*, March 15; *C–4*, February 10; *L–1*, February 10; *L–2*, February 10; *L–3*, February 10; *L–4*, February 10; U. S. S. *Bushnell*, February 10; *L–9*, February 23; *L–10*, February 23; *L–11*, February 23; U. S. S. *Ozark*, February 28; U. S. S. *D–1*, February 2; *D–2*,

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February 2; U. S. S. *Fulton*, February 2; U. S. S. *Tonopah*, indefinite; *D–3*, March 1; *E–1*, February 11; U. S. S. *Worden*, February 20; *K–1*, May 1; *K–2*, May 1; U. S. S. *MacDonough*, February 24; *K–5*, February 20; *K–6*, February 20; U. S. S. *Tallahassee*, February 25; U. S. S. *Columbia*, February 10.

Estimate based on assumption that engines and batteries will remain reliable. 18009.

FLAG COLUMBIA.

UNITED STATES FLEET,
U. S. S. "PENNSYLVANIA," FLAGSHIP,
Base 2, April 9, 1917.

From: Commander in chief.
To: Secretary of the Navy (Operations).
Subject: Organization of fleet after mobilization; questions re.
References: (*a*) Department's mobilization plan, March 21, 1917; (*b*) OPNAV dispatch 18005, April.

1. Reference (*a*) especially paragraph 2, gives the organization of "The fleet" for war.

2. I have interpreted this to mean that upon receipt of reference (*b*):

(*a*) The following force was established under my command: United States fleet—Battleship force, scout force, cruiser force, patrol force, destroyer force, submarine force, mine force, train.

(*b*) The following forces were established not under my command: Coast divisions—Atlantic coast division, Pacific coast auxiliaries, Philippine divisions, naval districts (Government vessels).

3. Paragraph 6 of reference (*a*) states that the rendezvous for Pacific coast auxiliaries and Philippine divisions is "as directed by commander in chief."

4. My present orders and my appointment by the President as Admiral designate me as commander in chief, United States Atlantic Fleet.

5. Decision is requested as to:

(*c*) Correctness of paragraph 2 above.
(*d*) The commander of the Scout Force.
(*e*) Present status of Admiral Caperton and Admiral Knight.
(*f*) Officer referred to in paragraph 3 above.
(*g*) Status of Coast Divisions.
(*h*) Status of Mexican patrol.
(*i*) Whether "United States Fleet" is the proper designation for the force listed in 2 (*a*) and, if so, whether any further authority than the order to mobilize is necessary for me to assume the title "Commander in Chief United States Fleet," or if my present orders and appointment from the President are sufficient authority.

H. T. MAYO.

APRIL 14, 1917.

From: The Secretary of the Navy.
To: Commander in Chief, United States Atlantic Fleet.
(Copies to commanders in chief Pacific Fleet and Asiatic Fleet.)
Subject: Organization of fleet after mobilization.
Reference: (*a*) Your 1445, April 9, 1917.

1. The "commander in chief, United States Atlantic Fleet" shall continue to be the title of the officer commanding the United States Fleet in the Atlantic.

2. The forces and units of the forces enumerated in paragraph 2 (*a*) of reference (*a*), are under the command of the commander in chief, United States Atlantic Fleet when they are operating in the Atlantic but not at other times, unless specially so ordered.

3. The forces enumerated under paragraph 2 (*b*) of reference (*a*) are not under the command of the commander in chief United States Atlantic Fleet except as provided for in the Naval Regulations.

4. The commanders in chief of the Pacific and Asiatic stations will continue to exercise command in their respective areas over vessels of the fleet within these areas until otherwise ordered.

5. Command of the Atlantic Coast Division will be decided upon at a later date. At present this division is not available for any service.

6. The Mexican patrol is under the direction of the Navy Department, but assigned to assist and cooperate with the fourth patrol squadron in patrol work.

7. The fleet operating in the Atlantic shall be named the "United States Atlantic Fleet."

JOSEPHUS DANIELS.

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UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET,
U. S. S. "PENNSYLVANIA," FLAGSHIP,
Base 2, May 5, 1917.

From: Commander in Chief.
To: Chief of Naval Operations.
Subject: Status of work on battleships, divisions 5, 6, 7, and 8.

1. The material conditions of battleships of divisions 5, 6, 7, and 8, when they left the navy yards in January last for the winter's drills and exercises, was, in general, good, although all had some uncompleted authorized work at the time of departure. This was reported in detail in correspondence forwarded to the department by the commander in chief's first indorsement, file 124, of February 27, 1917. Requests for additional work have been submitted by all these vessels from time to time since leaving the navy yards, but except in some few cases—*Arkansas* turbine work, for example—no special report of this additional work has been made to the department.

2. Relative to the uncompleted work when the battleships went south, the commander in chief in his letter file 124 of March 13, 1917, in reply to the department's radio 14112, March, stated that no work was necessary in the immediate future, but that if the vessels were to put in condition for war service at some indefinite future date, certain work was required, as was specifically mentioned in the letter above referred to. The commander in chief in this letter also invited the department's attention to a previous comment on the material readiness of the fleet as follows: "In case of mobilization, or war, the commander in chief assumes that the department, from its fuller knowledge of conditions, will determine the policy to be followed, whether the fleet is to be first put in the best material condition or whether all ships which can possibly keep the sea are to do so from the time of mobilization."

3. The commander in chief is without definite information as to the department's policy regarding material matters, and therefore considers it necessary to present certain facts to the department for consideration.

4. Under normal conditions the vessels referred to would have gone to their home yards for docking and work during the period April 15 to May 15 and some of them would have remained for a longer period for more extensive work. So far only the *Oklahoma* and *Nevada* have been sent to a navy yard since the fleet's return from Cuban waters, both to Norfolk on March 29, where the *Nevada* remained until April 24, and the *Oklahoma* is to remain until June 9. Arrangements have also been made, as reported in commander in chief's letter, file 1566, of May 4, 1917, for docking certain battleships at Norfolk commencing May 6, and instructions have been received from the department to undertake certain work on the *Pennsylvania* at Norfolk during the period June 4 to June 30. No instructions relative to work on other vessels of battleship divisions 5, 6, 7, and 8 have been received by the commander in chief.

5. It is evident that battleships are not expected to "keep the sea," or to do any cruising outside inclosed waters for sometime to come, but what may be required of them in future is problematical. While the vessels mentioned can continue based in Chesapeake Bay or inclosed waters, or could operate near our coasts, if necessary, without any work being done at navy yards, they are, in general, not now in proper material condition to permit them to operate indefinitely from some foreign base. Such operation may not be required, but conditions may demand just that. All vessels should not go to the navy yards at once, nor should any vessel be sent to a navy yard unless the yard is fully prepared to undertake all authorized work. If, however, action is deferred, and a demand is made later for one or more divisions of battleships, they would necessarily be sent to navy yards, and there would be a congestion of work and delay in readiness for service that could be avoided if they are sent in now from time to time as the yards can handle the work.

6. If there was an actual emergency immediately existing, the vessels are able to meet it, but to send them away from the Atlantic coast to operate for an indefinite period is not, in their present condition, advisable. To send any vessel away with her auxiliary machinery, hull, or engine, or with any of her fittings or appliances in any but the best condition, would be a mistake, as breakdowns after arrival, even if within the capacity of the ship's force to make good, would impair efficiency at a time when it should be highest. There is hardly a vessel in the four divisions mentioned, however, that is not now without a number of items of authorized work on each vessel, which while not requiring any immediate action, can not be made good under present conditions. Material conditions will not improve even, as is hardly possible, should they get no worse. Except for training the personnel, there is at present no demand for these battleships; there may be a demand for them as fighting units later on. Now, while there is a favorable opportunity, they should be put in the very best material condition.

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7. Without going into minute details of outstanding items of work certain items will be specifically brought to the department's attention as requiring action before the vessels concerned can be considered ready for any service:

Pennsylvania: Subdivision of after torpedo room and stiffening of stern. Installation of two remaining antiaircraft guns.

Arizona: Replacing of four-bladed propellers with three-bladed propellers or such other action as may be found necessary after further trials to reduce the present excessive vibration.

Wyoming: Straightening anchor engine crank shaft; providing stowage for antiaircraft ammunition, installation of engine revolution telegraph systems.

Arkansas: Repair of starboard H. P. A. turbine; examination and repair as necessary of other turbines; installation of engine revolution telegraph systems.

New York: Installation of antiaircraft guns.

Texas: General overhaul of main engines, including truing up bearing surface of six crosshead slippers; rebabbitting 14 horse-show thrust collars and truing up and grinding both H. P. piston rods and renewing packing.

Florida: Installation of antiaircraft guns; installation of new bake ovens; renew and reline salt-water piping in various locations; repair all Waterbury variable-speed gear motors for gun elevating; turn down and true up commutators of main turbo generators numbers 1 and 3.

Utah: Installation of antiaircraft guns; installation of new bake ovens; overhaul all deck winches; overhaul steering engine; overhaul both boat cranes; overhaul and realign elevating system of both guns of No. 5 turret; make new shells for both L. P. evaporators. Repair H. P. C. turbine; blading of main turbines, reported very dirty, S. M. H. P. and both L. P. turbines have not been opened since the fall of 1914.

Connecticut: Overhaul 8-inch cross connecting gear; take up lost motion in 7-inch battery. Install new cast-steel sea chest after starboard ash chute; overhaul air compressor; scrape in all lower brasses of main engine bearings.

Michigan: Overhaul both boat cranes; overhaul anchor windlass.

South Carolina: Overhaul both boat cranes; renew 12 elements in mainmast; overhaul flushing system; reblade, renozzle and rebalance Nos. 2 and 4 generators.

Nevada: Install turret training control gear for left side all turrets now being manufactured at Norfolk, probably ready for installation about June 1, will require about 12 days to install. Ship now has no duplicate turret training control.

Oklahoma: All work will probably be completed during present stay Norfolk.

Delaware: No items of immediate importance.

North Dakota: (This vessel did not accompany the fleet south, is now in division 7.) New main engines, installation of director firing, etc.

8. In view of the above the commander in chief recommends that the department decide without delay, upon a policy by which work on the battleships may be taken in hand at earliest practicable date.

H. T. MAYO.

UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET,
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, FLAGSHIP,
Base 2, May 9, 1917.

From: Commander in Chief.
To: Chief of Naval Operations.
Subject: Submarine trap nets, recommendations regarding.
Inclosures: Three.

1. The inclosures contain information of the submarine trap nets and obstructions as developed by the British Navy and of the experience of the United States mine force with the trap net at Cape Henry.

2. From the British experience augmented by that of the mine force, it is apparent that:

(*a*) Submarine trap nets to be efficient must be made very much heavier than those at present in place in United States waters.

(*b*) The sections of such nets should not exceed 600 feet and that the moorings must be very heavy.

(*c*) The work of planting such nets requires careful, skillful work and that such work can be efficiently performed only under favorable weather conditions.

(*d*) Each net requires extensive patrolling and repair.

(*e*) It has been estimated that a period of two months would be required to plant a proper net defense of New York.

(*f*) To adequately protect the naval bases and commerce.

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(*g*) The mine force of the Atlantic Fleet has been engaged for over a month in fabricating and planting trap nets at Chesapeake entrance, Hampton Roads, and at base 2.

3. The mine force is an integral part of the fleet and as such must be retained near the main fleet base to perform its allotted share of the work in the defense of the fleet. The commander in chief considers that planting of submarine trap nets, except as part of the local defense of the fleet base, is not the legitimate duty of the mine force.

4. In view of the additional security furnished to the fleet by the nets at Cape Henry and Hampton Roads, this work has been considered in line with the policy expressed above, but the use of the mine force to plant nets, which furnish no additional security to the fleet, is contrary to such policy and is strongly disapproved.

5. As the activities of this Nation in the war become more and more marked the danger of attack by enemy submarine on this coast becomes greater. The entire available mine force, and, in fact, a greatly augmented mine force should be constantly at the disposal of the commander in chief for mine sweeping and other operations for local defense.

6. In order to expedite the placing of Chesapeake Bay in a moderate state of security, the present net must be extended from the Middle Ground to the shoal near Fisherman's Island. As yet (May 4) no definite orders have been received by commandant to place this additional section, nor have orders been issued to purchase the required material.

7. The commander in chief most strongly recommends that the mine force be considered unavailable for work in connection with submarine trap nets, except in the immediate vicinity of the fleet base.

8. Should the department approve a change of fleet base to Long Island Sound, in order to obtain a greater maneuvering area inside of net defenses, the commander in chief considers that the mine force may be considered available for planting the submarine trap-net defenses in that area.

H. T. MAYO.

JULY 10, 1917.

From: Commander in Chief.
To: Chief of Naval Operations (material).
Subject: Repairs to battleships of divisions 5, 6, 7, 8, *San Francisco* and *Montana*.
Reference: (*a*) Department's letter No. 28754—18:29 of June 18, 1917; (*b*) Department's letter No. 22820–161 of July 19, 1917.

1. In accordance with paragraph 5 of reference (*a*) and paragraph 2 of reference (*b*), the following schedule of arrival of ships at yards has been prepared and is submitted for the department's approval:

Ship.	Time required (days).	At yard ready for work.	Yard to complete—
Navy yard, Portsmouth:			
San Francisco [1]	45	July 23	Sept. 10
Montana [2]	48	July 20	Do.
Navy yard, Boston:			
Delaware	25	July 23	Aug. 18
Navy yard, New York:			
New York	30	July 5	Aug. 6
Wyoming	25	Aug. 1	Aug. 27
Texas	30	Aug. 22	Sept. 23
Navy yard, Philadelphia:			
South Carolina	25	Aug. 6	Sept. 1
Connecticut [3]	25	Aug. 30	Sept. 25
Michigan	25	July 16	Aug. 11
Navy yard, Norfolk:			
Florida	35	Aug. 6	Sept. 13

[1] San Francisco; Requires 35 days in dock for shaft work and upon completion this work could, if necessary, leave the yard, although it is highly desirable that she remain for 10 days additional to complete authorized work.

[2] Montana; The estimated time for the Montana is that required for installation of aeroplane launching equipment to complete all authorized work on the vessel, including fire control installations, will require 68 days, attention is invited to commanding in chief's first indorsement, file 2717, of July 10, 1917, forwarding commanding officer Montana's letter.

[3] Connecticut; Has an outstanding job order covering installation of new generators. It is understood that these are to be delivered about August 15. If the vessel is to have the new generators installed during her stay at the yard 20 days additional will be required, making her stay at the yard from August 30 to October 16.

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2. It will be noted that the schedule does not include the *North Dakota*, *Arkansas*, *Oklahoma*, *Nevada*, or *Arizona*. Reference (*a*) states that instructions as to the *North Dakota* would be issued later. As far as can be ascertained from information now available, there are about 35 days' work required on the *North Dakota* for necessary repairs, fire-control changes, etc. It is believed, in view of the amount of work in hand at New York, that it will be preferable for the *North Dakota* to repair at Boston.

Arkansas: The Bureau of Steam Engineering's radio 15425, June, states that purchase of new high-pressure astern rotor drums would be recommended, and that no extensive turbine repairs would be done on the *Arkansas* until new drums were ready for installation. Norfolk yard estimates 60 days required for the turbine work, during which time all outstanding work on the vessel can be completed. There is no information at present available as to when new rotor drums will be available, and it is therefore impracticable to set a date for the *Arkansas* to arrive at the yard.

Oklahoma and *Nevada:* Norfolk yard estimates 50 days required for the installation of the new forced-draft blowers on these vessels. Recent information obtained from the industrial manager as to the status of piping required for this installation is that the Bureau of Steam Engineering has arranged for a partial delivery within from four to six weeks' time, but that no satisfactory arrangements have so far been made for the remainder of the piping, which is principally 6 inches in diameter. Until a definite date for receipt of this piping material can be assured, it is impracticable to set any date for these vessels to go to the yard for work.

Arizona: The *Arizona* is now at the New York yard for about a 10-day stay, and will not require, as far as known, any navy yard work in the near future.

3. It will be noted from the schedule forwarded that work on all battleships of divisions 5, 6, 7, and 8 except *Arkansas*, *Oklahoma*, and *Nevada* will have been completed prior to October 1. If possible to obtain material required for these three vessels prior to August 1, 1917, it is believed that work on them can also be completed by this date. To do this, however, it will be necessary to send either the *Oklahoma* or *Nevada* to some yard other than Norfolk, probably New York, as Norfolk will be unable with the men available to undertake the forced-draft blower work on both ships at the same time.

H. T. MAYO.

Copy to: C. B. F.

[Secret. Passage, Liverpool to New York.]

S. S. "ST. LOUIS,"
October 11, 1917.

From: Commander in Chief, United States Atlantic Fleet.
To: Secretary of the Navy (Operations).
Subject: General report on visit to England and France in August–September, 1917.
References:

(*a*) Official Minutes of International Naval Conference in London, September 4–5, 1917, inclosure A.
(*b*) Present Admiralty Policy—July, 1917, revised September, 1917, inclosure B.
(*c*) Proposed Future Admiralty Policy dated September, 1917, inclosure C.
(*d*) Proposed Mine Barrage across the North Sea, inclosure D.
(*e*) Chart to accompany reference (*d*), inclosure E.
(*f*) I. The Policy of Blockade; II. The Policy of Defense of Trade; III. Antisubmarine Policy, inclosure F.
(*g*) Situation Regarding Northern Neutral Countries, inclosure G.
(*h*) Situation on the Belgian Coast, inclosure H.
(*i*) Policy in the Mediterranean, inclosure I.
(*j*) Policy in Asiatic and East African Waters, inclosure J.
(*k*) Specific requests for assistance inclosure K.

1. *General description of report.*—(*a*) The report herewith rendered is intended to cover, in general terms, the scope of the information gained, observations made, and impressions received by the commander in chief and by members of his staff while in England and France. Detailed report of information, observations, and data are submitted herewith and as separate papers.

(*b*) This report is presented under the following general headings:

1. General Description of Report.
2. General Instructions from Navy Department.
3. General Attitude of British and French Governments.
4. The International Naval Conference in London on September 4–5, 1917.
5. General Impressions Regarding Conditions in British Admiralty.
6. General Impressions Regarding the Grand Fleet.
7. General Impressions Regarding Coastal Commands.

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8. General Impressions of Naval Conditions in France.
9. General Impressions of Naval Conditions in Italy.
10. General Impressions of U. S. Naval Forces in European Waters.
11. General Impressions of Political, Economic and Moral Conditions Among the Allies.
12. General Impressions Regarding the Northern Neutrales.
13. Notes on the General Naval Situation.
14. Notes on the Submarine Situation.
15. General Notes on the Convoy System and the Shipping Situation.
16. Notes on the Blockade.
17. General Notes on Aviation Matters.
18. Comment on Proposed Future Policy, including Future Mining Policy.
19. The Fuel Oil Situation in Europe.
20. Other Matters reported on.
21. General Recommendations.
22. General Results of Visit.

2. *General Instructions from Navy Department.*—(*a*) The instructions received from the Navy Department as to the purpose and object of the visit to England and France were not in definite and concrete form, but were readily to be inferred from the substance of conversations with the President, the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations, supplemented by memoranda from the Chief of Naval Operations and his assistants. A summary based on the above-mentioned conversations and memoranda was made (while en route to England) in order to enable definite inquiries to be made to the governments concerned.

(*b*) The summary was of the following general character. It will be noted that the principal matters of inquiry were understood to be for the purpose of getting more closely in touch with—

(1) What has been done—historical—in order that knowledge of original plans and modifications thereof together with their elements of success or failures might enable the present situation to be understood and proposals for future operations to be appreciated.

(2) What is being done—present situation—following history of naval plans and operations up to present time, showing underlying causes of plans and operations now in force—the part that the United States plays in present plans and operations—the present naval strength and resources of the Allies and of the enemy—the situation in the several areas of operation, e. g., the North Sea, the Helgoland Bight, the Skagerak, the Baltic Sea, the English Channel, the Dunkirk-Zeebrugge district, the Mediterranean Sea, the Adriatic Sea, etc.

(3) What is to be done—future operations—following the history of plans and operations in their evolution and development to the present time. What new plans and operations are proposed and for what reason? What part are the several Allies and the United States expected to take? What are allied and enemy building programs?

(4) Particular inquiry into the antisubmarine measures underway and proposed, as being the field of endeavor requiring immediate attention—assistance desired from the United States.

(5) The aircraft situation, particularly with regard to construction underway and proposed—and wherein the United States can assist to the best advantage for all concerned.

(6) The shipping situation, in so far as it bears on the "communications" of the Allies.

(7) The transfer of United States troops to France, in so far as the available number will have effect on the outcome of the war and particularly with regard to the shipping necessary not only for transport of troops but chiefly for the upkeep and supply of the troops after their arrival in France.

(8) Certain inquiries in the matters of seeking for trade, the employment of oilers belonging to private companies, and the rumored transfer of men of war after the war.

(9) An international naval conference which the United States had requested the British Government to arrange for.

(10) Later additions to the purposes of the visit appeared in dispatches from the Navy Department in regard to Norway entering the war on the side of the Allies and certain inquiries regarding the possible capture of Russian capital ships by the enemy.

(11) General impressions regarding political, economic, and morale conditions in the allied countries, in so far as such conditions have bearing on the general military-naval situation.

3. *General attitude of British and French Governments.*—(*a*) It appears fitting to record at the outset that the reception on the part of the British Government was all

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that could be desired. The files and records of the Admiralty were thrown open and there was constant evidence of cordial and hearty intention to give full information and explanation in regard to plans, operations, and material.

(*b*) Visits to the Grand Fleet at Rosyth, Harwich, and Portsmouth took place, as well as a visit to Dunkirk followed by observation of a bombardment at Ostend. Several officers of the party accompanied Grand Fleet detachment in a reconnaissance toward Helgoland Bight, and two officers accompanied the Grand Fleet during its change of base from Rosyth to Scapa Flow.

(*c*) The official entertainment in England included accommodations for the party at the Carlton Hotel up to the time of departure for France. There was a dinner given by the Admiralty to the commander in chief and his staff. There was also a luncheon given by the Admiralty to the representatives (and their staffs) from the several governments to the International Naval Conference held on September 4–5, 1917. In addition to numerous conferences at the Admiralty with Sir Eric Geddes (First Lord of the Admiralty) and with Admiral Sir John Jellicoe (First Sea Lord), the commander in chief had an interview with Mr. David Lloyd-George (Prime Minister), and had a private audience of His Majesty King George.

(*d*) The reception of the commander in chief and his party in France was marked by the most cordial expressions of appreciation for the friendly feeling between France and the United States, of appreciation of help already given, and of grateful anticipation of the assistance which the United States is preparing to render to the Allies.

(*e*) The commander in chief and staff had the opportunity of visiting Brest and St. Nazaire, and also of making a trip through the region from which the enemy retreated last spring, approaching to within a couple of miles of the present front.

(*f*) The official entertainment in France included accommodations at the Hotel Crillon during the stay of the party in Paris. There was a luncheon given by M. Painleve, Premier, and a dinner given by M. Chaumet, Minister of Marine. The commander in chief had luncheon with Gen. Petain, commanding French forces in the field, at his headquarters in Compiegne and had an interview with Vice Admiral Du Bon, Chief of Naval Staff.

(*g*) The commander in chief had an interview with Maj. Gen. Pershing, United States Army, the substance of which will be transmitted in separate correspondence.

(*h*) The commander in chief and staff proceeded to Queenstown where they heard of, and noted with pleasure, the excellent work being done by the 35 destroyers and 2 destroyer tenders now operating out of that port on escort-of-convoy duty, under the immediate orders of Vice Admiral Sir Lewis Bayly, R. N.

4. *The International Naval Conference in London on September 4–5, 1917.*—(*a*) A report has already been made on the proceedings of this conference; it is now supplemented by a copy of the "official minutes" which appear herewith as reference (*a*) and inclosure A.

(*b*) Attention is invited to the fact that answers (to be addressed to the British Government) are expected in regard to—

(1) Old battleships and cruisers available for use in a proposed operation to effect the blocking of German harbors.

(2) Additional cruisers, perhaps even old battleships, for service as escorts to merchant ship convoys.

5. *General impressions regarding conditions in British Admiralty.*—(*a*) There is little doubt that the British Admiralty is at a loss when asked for the history of the war to date. Reports of operations are so isolated and scattered and without system that there is not available any comprehensive record of original plans, the governing reasons therefor, and the degree of success or failure in each case. The inevitable inference is that the war has been carried on from day to day and not according to any comprehensive policy to serve as a guide to plans looking to the effective coordination and cooperation of effort against the enemy.

(*b*) It is apparent that, despite the so-called war-staff arrangements put into effect in the Admiralty during the past three years, until very recently there has been no planning section, nor was there any definite body of men charged with the function of looking ahead, or even of looking back to see wherein lay the causes or success or failure, nor any means of furnishing the heads of the Admiralty with analyses and summaries of past operations in order that decisions as to continuing old operations or undertaking new ones might be reached with a due sense of "perspective," both as to past operations and as to the coordination of new operations in a general plan.

(*c*) The statement of present Admiralty policy, originally dated July, 1917, now revised to 17 September, 1917 (reference (*b*) and inclosure B), is not really a statement of policy but rather a summary of current activities. That these activities are based on an underlying idea of the defensive may readily be inferred from the leading words in the subparagraphs of paragraph one of the paper referred to, namely, "protection,"

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"prevention," "protection," "resistance." See also references (*h*) (*i*) (*j*) and inclosures H, I, J.

(*d*) The statement of proposed future Admiralty policy dated September 17, 1917 (reference (*e*) and inclosure C). indicates growing appreciation of the necessity for more energetic offensive measures against the submarine in the way of preventing his egress from the North Sea.

(*e*) While the development of the submarine menace has been gradual and the measures undertaken to meet it have had to be evolved and applied to new developments as they appeared, the present dispersion of allied naval effort against the submarine menace has reached large dimensions and the actual offensive against the submarine has suffered through the accumulation of large numbers of vessels to carry out protective measures. The number of vessels engaged in protective (defensive) effort includes practically the entire British Navy in northern waters except the Grand Fleet, many of whose destroyers and other small craft are also engaged in protective work.

(*f*) Referring again to the proposed plan of future antisubmarine operations in the North Sea (reference (*c*) and inclosure C), it appears that it may be necessary to withdraw some vessels engaged in protective work in order to make the offensive effective. However, the effectiveness of the offensive should be cumulative thus enabling perhaps nearly all of the available vessels gradually to be diverted from the protective (defensive) to the offensive.

6. *General impressions regarding the Grand Fleet.*—(*a*) The Grand Fleet appears now, after three years' experience in war, including the Battle of Jutland to be in good material condition, ready for all likely operations, and of very good morale.

(*b*) The probable operating conditions have been studies and arrangements made to make the best possible use of the fleet. Plans and detailed instructions are complete and voluminous and have been conceived and framed for probable operations in the North Sea only, with the view that the situation in the North Sea is the only one requiring present consideration, as it involves the encounter of the two major opposing fleets.

7. *General impressions regarding costal commands.*—(*a*) The coastal commands in Great Britain (of which Harwich, Portsmouth, Dover-Dunkirk, and Queenstown were visited) are all very well organized and efficiently handled up to the limit of available vessels, material and personnel.

(*b*) The activities at coastal stations include training of personnel, aerodromes, bases for submarines, trawlers, destroyers, motor craft, mystery ships, etc., and the direction of traffic and of patrol and convoy operations.

8. *General impressions of naval conditions in France.*—(*a*) At the outbreak of war naval activities in dockyards and arsenals were either allowed to lapse or diverted to the production of matériel for the Army, with the result that no vessels other than small low-powered craft can now be constructed.

(*b*) The French main fleet is based on Corfu in readiness to operate against the Austrian fleet, should opportunity occur, with or without the cooperation of the Italian fleet.

(*c*) The personnel of the French navy appears to be in as relatively a depleted state as the matériel, having been largely diverted to operations on land, chiefly in the defense of Belgium. There is a proposal (mentioned in report of International Naval Conference, Reference (a) and Inclosure A) to man cruisers for escort-of-convoy duty with personnel from the older battleships, provided the United States will replace the said older battleships in their duties (in the eastern Mediterranean).

(*d*) French naval views are strongly inclined to the offensive, especially against the submarine menace, and every effort to this end is being made that the conditions of matériel and personnel will permit.

9. *General impressions of naval conditions in Italy.*—(*a*) Italian naval views regarding the part that the Italian navy can take in allied naval operations is well indicated both in the report of a naval conference held in Paris on July 25–27, 1917, and in the report of the recent naval conference held in London on September 4–5, 1917.

(*b*) There is an evident reluctance to undertake any cooperate measures which might result in losses which would affect popular opinion in Italy. This reluctance extends even to the question of proper guarding of the hundred or so British drifters which maintain a drifter-net barrage in the Straits of Otranto.

(*c*) The Italians are understood to have 34 destroyers available, to which the French have added 10 for service in the Italian fleet. The Austrians are reported to have 22 destroyers available.

10. *General impressions of United States naval forces in European waters.*—(*a*) The Queenstown force, consisting of 35 destroyers and 2 destroyer tenders (*Melville* and *Dixie*) are almost wholly employed in the convoy system under the orders of Vice Admiral Sir Lewis Bayly, Royal Navy, commander in chief at Queenstown.

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(*b*) This force is in good matériel, personnel, and operating condition; the morale is excellent. Admiral Bayly appears to be much pleased with their work, which requires much time at sea and constant exercise of seamanship, navigation, and judgment.

(*c*) The Brest force is hampered in its operations by general unsuitability of the available vessels for high-seas work and by lack of organization and of general plans to serve as a guide in carrying out the necessary work; there is also difficulty in effecting even minor repairs and upkeep.

(*d*) The forces at Gibraltar and at Bordeaux were not visited owing to lack of time but are understood to be accomplishing all that can be expected of the number of vessels now available.

(*e*) The present aviation force is nearing the completion of its training and is due to receive a marked increase of personnel, after which it is expected that active employment may be begun.

(*f*) The operations in the air have reached such magnitude and are of such great importance that there can be little doubt that assistance in personnel and matériel for air service will be the most rapid as well as the most useful way of reenforcing the Allies both by land and by sea.

11. *General impressions regarding political, economic, and moral conditions among the Allies.*—(*a*) The following observations are general and are mentioned only with a view to consideration of all the varied elements that affect the military-naval situation.

(*b*) Great Britain: (1) The Government in power appears to hope that it may not be called upon to impose restrictive or other positive measures, and to endeavor to avoid such measures until they can no longer be avoided, with the result that this procrastination has had the regrettable effect that when the Government is obliged to act there is likely to be serious opposition; whereas, if a directing policy had been carried out from the beginning, the people would undoubtedly have acquiesced and approved, in the belief that the measures introduced were essential to the proper conduct and outcome of the war. Illustrations of conditions indicated are principally found in the labor situation, in which strikes occur repeatedly, and in the reluctance to introduce a general rationing system, though shortage of sugar has finally developed to such a degree that sugar rationing has recently had to be put into force.

(2) The labor question is serious, especially with regard to shipbuilding, and it is proposed to withdraw 80,000 men from the army to return to their work in shipyards. Personnel for the air services is becoming scarce and of poor quality, while naval personnel is apparently expanded to the limit of available men.

(3) The morale in general is good, subject to above remarks regarding labor.

(*c*) France: (1) The Government in power in France is beset with labor troubles which are emphasized by the fact that M. Thomas, the chief labor leader, has declined a portfolio in the recently formed ministry of M. Painlevé.

(2) There is a shortage of coal in France which causes great concern, in view of the possible moral effect of the privations about to be endured in the coming winter. France seems to be fairly well off as regards food, except that there are now two meatless days a week. Personnel is depleted except as boys become of draft age; especially is this the case in regard to naval personnel, for the army has the preference, due to the relatively greater need.

(3) The morale is now very good; though greatly reduced last spring after the huge losses attending the French spring offensive, the entry of the United States into the war and success in retaining the ground won has served, in the course of time, to restore the morale to the extent that it now appears to largely depend on getting through the coming winter without serious suffering on account of the shortage of coal.

(*d*) Italy: (1) The Government in power is apparently unwilling to risk anything at sea on account of effect of possible losses on public opinion, which may indicate an unsatisfactory attitude of the people toward the war.

(2) The coal shortage in Italy is serious; so much so that it is reported that people are being transferred in large numbers from the north to the south of Italy. Shortage also exists in regard to raw materials for the manufacture of munitions, aircraft, and shipping.

(3) The state of the morale of the Italian Army is indicated by their operations against Trieste, but the same test applied to the Italian Navy does not indicate an encouraging state of affairs. The attitude of the Government, which apparently is apprehensive of the effect of naval reverses, at least, may be taken to indicate that popular opinion is not united and needs careful handling.

(*e*) Russia: (1) The political, economic, and moral conditions are bad, as is well known, but they can hardly fail to improve provided a strong Government succeeds in control.

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(2) It can not be again said that all the troubles that usually exist between allied countries engaged in military operations are present among the Allies in some degree. There is believed to exist suspicion and even jealousy of the dominant political and naval power, and the growing military power of Great Britain. All the countries involved undoubtedly give present consideration to probable future arrangements which will take place on completion of the war, with the result that there is a tendency to suspect motives and that proposals for cooperation and coordination are approached with reserve.

(3) The only country whose motives and aims in the war are unquestioned appears to be the United States, whose influence can probably be brought to bear to clear up existing doubts and resultant friction to the end that real and full cooperation and coordination may produce the result that can be attained and is so much desired—the complete victory of the Allies.

12. *General impressions regarding the northern neutrals.*—(*a*) The following observations are general and are mentioned for the purpose of covering all matters that affect the military naval situation. The chief and almost the only characteristic of the attitude of Holland, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden is their common desire and intention to remain neutral as long as it is possible for them to do so.

(*b*) Holland has an army of about 600,000 men now kept under observation by a German force, estimated to be at least 200,000 men. Holland's entry into the war on the side of the enemy would therefore bring at least some half million men against the Allies, would enable the enemy to use Dutch ports as bases for submarine and destroyer operations and thus seriously increase the difficulties of the Allies. The entry of Holland into the war on the side of the Allies is unlikely, as Holland has but to contemplate the fate of Belgium and of Roumania and to regard how little assistance the Allies can give her. All of which sums up in the determination of Holland to remain neutral if she possibly can.

(*c*) Denmark has neither army nor navy to enable her to resist vigorously, as Holland does, infringements of her neutrality by the enemy. Her entry into the war on the side of the enemy is unlikely in view of the feeling regarding Schleswig-Holstein, while her entry into the war on the side of the Allies would mean that she would quickly be overrun and subdued, as assistance from the Allies is not to be expected. Denmark has no seaports on the North Sea coast which can be made of use as outposts against the enemy.

(*d*) Norway is apparently willing to enter the war on the side of the Allies but has no army nor navy of consequence, so that she might well be a hindrance rather than a help, especially in view of her openness to attack by Sweden, whose army is vastly superior and whose navy is relatively much better. The chief reason for consideration of Norway lies in her coastal frontage on the North Sea and the Skagerrak, with the numerous harbors which would be useful as bases and outposts for operations against the enemy. But Norway can not protect herself, is apprehensive of attack by the enemy, and would require military assistance which the Allies are not prepared to furnish.

(*e*) Sweden has a proenemy government and ruling class supplemented by the Conservative party recently in power. The Socialist party, which is large and powerful, is determined that Sweden shall continue her neutral status. The Liberal party is apparently friendly to the Allies, or rather anti-German. The balance of power is against the pro-Allies, and it is likely that Sweden will remain neutral in order to continue to recieve the huge war profits which are of benefit so the entire people. The revolution in Russia has relieved Swedish apprehensions of aggressions from that quarter and has thus reduced the tendency to join the war on the side of the enemy, if at all.

(*f*) See details in reference (*g*) and inclosure "G."

13. *Notes on the general naval situation.*—(*a*) Apparently the naval plans of the Allies have been in most general terms. Great Britain to control the North Sea and Channel; France her west coast and the French Mediterranean coast; Italy, assisted as necessary by France, to control the Adriatic; British forces based on Gibralter, Malta, Alexandria assisting in the Mediterranean. Recently the Japanese have given assistance in the Mediterranean, having there 1 cruiser and 12 destroyers. United States forces are operating from Queenstown, Brest, and Gibraltar.

(*b*) (1) It is apparent, from conversation with officers attached to the Operations Division, that up to the present there has been no definite naval plans. So far as can be learned, there has been no statement of British Naval policy previous to that issued by the Admiralty in July, 1917, which is in reality a defense of what was being done and not a real statement of policy.

(2) The defensive nature of this so-called policy is plainly indicated by the paragraph station the objects to be attained by naval power; the leading words of the

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four subparagraphs which state these objects are: (1) Protection, (2) Prevention, (3) Protection, (4) Resistance.

(3) All of these objects and many more would be obtained by the destruction of German naval power.

(*c*) (1) In the first month of the war the offensive policy was much more pronounced than at present. The British Fleet was in fact undergoing a test mobilization when the probability of war became evident. The forces were maintained in a mobilized condition and therefore began the war in a most advantageous state.

(2) The disposition of the fleet was made with a view to opposing the movements of the enemy forces out of the North Sea. The main battle fleet was based on the North of Scotland but kept the sea almost continuously. A second battle force was based in the south of England to prevent the passage of any forces of less strength than the high sea fleet through the channel. The armored and light cruisers were continually on scouting duty in the North Sea. The British submarines were stationed in the Helgoland Bight with a view to attacking the German fleet if it came out. No mines were laid in Helgoland Bight by the British during this phase.

(3) The frequent attacks on British cruisers by German submarines, especially the catastrophe in which the *Hogue*, *Cressey*, and *Aboukir* were lost, caused a change in plan as follows:

(4) The main fleet was withdrawn from continuous service underway and placed in a base adequately protected from submarines. The heavier cruisers were withdrawn from scouting work and their place taken by light cruisers and destroyers. The mining of Helgoland Bight was begun. The development of the auxiliary services of mine sweeping and patrol was made more rapid.

(5) The present operations are merely developments of this plan. The fleet is ready and anxious to fight a major action, but it is only sent to sea as a fleet when the German fleet is out or thought to be coming out, or occasionally for exercises. The various divisions of the fleet are often underway for target practice, etc.

(*d*) See references (*h*), (*i*), (*j*), and inclosures "H", "I", "J."

14. *Notes on the submarine situation.*—(*a*) The increase in the number of patrol vessels and mine sweepers has been brought about in the endeavor to combat the successful operations by enemy submarines, especially mine-laying submarines.

(*b*) The convoy system was developed with the hope of reducing the submarine sinkings. By concentrating the shipping into convoys it was hoped to reduce the chances of the submarines sighting merchant vessels; to guard against raiders by ocean escorts; and to guard against submarines by destroyer escort within the submarine danger zone.

(*c*) (1) Mining operations in Helgoland Bight have been quite extensive, the main object being the destruction of submarines. The mine fields seem to have been laid at widely separated periods of time and without a general plan. In view of the difficulties attendant upon locating the exact position of a mine field planted out of sight of land, it has been necessary to leave gaps of about six miles between fields in order to avoid chances of striking their previously planted fields.

(2) The difficulties of effective mining have been accentuated in the North Sea by bad weather and the great rise and fall of tide.

(3) Mines laid at such depth as to be effective at high water are as a rule plainly visible from Zeppelins at low water. The ineffectiveness of mine fields which can not be defended has been repeatedly demonstrated.

(4) It is generally conceded that a mine field is only effective when the surface can be guarded against mine sweepers, which in reality means against the enemy's main fleet as a support. This condition can be changed only by the development of nonsweepable mines. Until nonsweepable mines are a demonstrated success it should be accepted as a principle that no effective mine barrage can be maintained in a position where the power of the whole fleet can not be developed in its defense.

(*d*) The channel was closed by net barrage but due to strong tides and heavy weather and the nature of the bottom (sandstone, poor holding ground) this net barrage has never been efficient. Mines and mine-nets have also been used in the Straits of Dover, but the German U-B and U-C boats based upon Ostende and Zeebrugge seem to pass the barrage at will. The U-boats do not use the channel.

(*e*) (1) The most succesful operations against enemy submarines have been carried out by British submarines and decoy ships. The submarine against submarine will probably prove effective in the future though the German submarines, due to the excellence of the optical instruments, have a decided advantage and undoubtedly sink more British boats than are lost by themselves. However, this system has proved quite successful and is being pursued as vigorously as possible. The decoy ship has accounted for more submarines than any other measure. However, the enemy submarines are becoming very wary and it is doubtful if in the future they will obtain such good results.

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(2) The most recent developments in antisubmarine devices are the hydrophones and aircraft (planes and kite ballons). Eight shore stations fitted with hydrophones are in operation and several "hunting flotillas" have been organized which rely on the hydrophone as their initial means of detection.

(3) "Hunting groups" of destroyers carrying kite balloons have also been in operation and it is felt that the development of this plan may, during the summer months especially, yield valuable results. In any attempt to block the North Sea by patrol or mine barrage this type of operation should be developed to the utmost.

(4) Several coastal air stations have been completed and many others are contemplated. Seaplanes and airplanes operate from these bases in patrolling the sea. When submarines are sighted the planes endeavor to bomb them. It is doubtful if much positive damage has been done by these bombs, but upon several occasions ships have been saved by the submarine being forced to dive to avoid bombs from aircraft.

(5) A circling torpedo has been devised and has passed satisfactory tests. So far as known none have as yet been issued to the service.

(*f*) (1) The submarine is by far the most serious menace to ultimate Allied victory. At the present rate of destruction (500,000 tons of shipping a month), it is estimated that by October, 1918, the Allies will be constructing shipping at a rate which will be above the losses. This does not necessarily mean a victory, for if the war goes on that length of time without the suppression of the submarine the restriction upon food and fuel may reduce the will to win of the population of Italy, France, and Great Britain, to such an extent as to force these Governments into a compromise peace.

(2) It seems essential that operations to reduce the efficiency of the submarine must be devised. The German nation is basing its hope of victory on the success of the submarine. A powerful offensive against this type will effectually raise the morale of the Allies and lower that of the Central Powers. Therefore, even if the conditions point of the failure of the submarine campaign in the distant future it must be recognized that in waiting for that time there is grave danger of the failure of the morale of some of the Allied nations.

(3) The season of the year is not propitious for offensive operations against submarines, so at present all energies must be bent to operations in defense of commerce and equally, if not more important, to the preparation for offensive operations during the period from April to October 1918, at which time the restrictions will be the greatest, and the conditions for offensive operations the most advantageous.

(4) In order to adequately prepare for this offensive, plans must be made immediately and every effort exerted to make the operation a success. The proparation of material and equipment of ships require much time, and unless a plan is decided upon the spring will find the Allies unprepared to take advantage of the favorable conditions.

(5) In view of the impracticability of offensive operations against the enemy submarines or their bases at this season of the year, the first consideration should be given to the improvement of existing plans and a study of the modifications that may be required due to possible operations of cruising submarines, raiders and battle cruisers, against the convoys.

(*g*) See details in reference (*f*) and inclosure "F."

15. *General notes on the convoy system and the shipping situation.*—(*a*) (1) The principal antisubmarine effort is to-day being exerted in escorting convoys through the submarine danger zone in the Atlantic and North Sea and Channel. A convoy system will soon be in operation in the Mediterranean.

(2) The reduction in the per cent of losses of vessels in convoy has given rise to hopes that the adoption of the convoy system by all ocean-going vessels will reduce the submarine menace below the danger point.

(3) Such an assumption is dangerous without more experience than has been had as yet, and as the convoy system had only been in operation during the latter months of the fair weather of summer the difficulties attendant upon operations in the gales of winter and the fogs of fall and spring must be carefully considered.

(4) The convoy system is strategically defensive though tactically offensive. This offensive is merely a counter attack. Such operations on land are never decisive and unless coupled with strategically offensive operations are more than apt to fail on the sea. Convoy operations can not win the war. They may, if successful, prevent defeat. Unless the navies of the Allies forces are satisfied to let the armies or political conditions settle the war a more offensive plan is essential.

(*b*) (1) From present prospects the decision on land is far distant. The people of the European nations at war are war weary, the losses on land are enormous. Unless the Navy can unmistakably check the submarine menace the war is apt to be decided by political or labor conditions.

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(2) National morale is to-day the vital point, and the effect on allied morale or a successful check to the submarine would be to raise it beyond any possibility of breaking. Likewise this would so reduce the enemy's chances of winning the war that the morale of the Central Powers would be likely to break.

(c) The convoy system should be regarded merely as a defensive operation carried on while preparing for an offensive. Such an attitude does not prevent thoroughness in carrying out the operation and in order that it may be successful in its rôle, it requires careful study to anticipate the changed conditions of the winter and the possible operations which may be conducted by the Central Powers to break up the system.

(d) (1) The convoy system requires the assembly of from 15 to 20 vessels, most of which are run on a schedule of one every eight days. Assuming that on the average there is a delay of two days in and two days out in a round trip, and that the average time for a round trip is five days, it will be seen at once that this is equivalent to a reduction in shipping of 8 per cent. In addition to this there is the congestion of ports, due to arrival and departure of large groups of ships practically simultaneously, which reduces the rapidity of discharge and loading.

(2) In order to make up for the loss in tonnage due to controlled sailings, it is necessary to attain the highest efficiency of employment of all ocean-going merchant tonnage. In order to accomplish this it is essential that all merchant shipping be controlled as to route, ports, and cargo by the Government, and that the Government representatives coordinate their efforts with the corresponding representatives of the Allies.

(3) An instance will indicate where the savings can be made. There are about 40 ships a month trading from the southeast coast of South America direct to the United States. Most of these ships are American or neutral, operating on an American time charter. This trade is no doubt profitable, but it is doubtful if it is essential to the conduct of the war.

(4) The United States and the Allies must consider carefully what peace-time trade can be dispensed with to meet the very serious shipping situation now before us.

(5) The efficient employment of such shipping as is available for the transportation of materials essential to the conduct of the war offers one of the most promising fields for reducing the actual shortage of shipping.

(e) Defense of convoys against raiders.

(1) The means at the disposal of the enemy with which to attack the convoys are—

1. U-boats;
2. *Deutschland* type of submarine cruisers;
3. Raiders (armed merchant ships);
4. Cruisers;
5. Battle cruisers.

(2) It appears that the system of protection for convoys now in operation is efficient so far as the resources available permit. The losses of vessels in convoy to the lossels of vessels not in convoy is at present about 1 to 20. Of course the greater safety of the submarine in attacking vessels not under escort leads to a prevalence of this form of attack; and undoubtedly when all vessels are in convoy the proportion of ships sunk will not decrease in the above ratio.

(f) (1) The merchant captains state that in the bad weather of winter it will be impossible for ships in ballast to operate in convoys, so it seems that the proportion of shipping in convoy can never (for the next few months) exceed 50 per cent.

(2) The dispersion of convoys and the difficulty of maintaining position in convoy during fogs and gales will seriously reduce the efficiency of this system during the winter.

(3) The bad weather and long nights will, however, seriously reduce the efficiency of the submarine and it is believed that the rate of sinkings from U-boats will remain practically constant.

(g) (1) The introduction of the cruising submarine with its long radius of action will move the submarine menace further from the coast of Europe and thus necessitate more extensive destroyer escort operations. At present the force available does not permit this extension but as the number of submarines of this type is limited (probably six) this disadvantage must be accepted.

(2) This type of submarine is fitted with one or two guns 5.9 inches in caliber and is designed to use this gun as its primary weapon. The system of ocean escort is a partial answer to this form of attack.

(h) (1) The raider and cruiser menace are similar and can be considered together. It is quite possible that the raiders or cruisers so employed would have a battery of 6-inch guns and therefore the ocean escorts should be vessels with batteries not less than 6 inches.

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(2) In view of the difficulty that would be experienced by one cruiser in guarding a convoy of 15 or 20 ships against a raider of equal speed, it seems that the enemy will use fast ships and those of merchant ship type with sufficient speed being rare, they probably will be cruisers.

(3) The enemy cruisers, however, have rather short radius of action and consequently could not operate long on the main trade routes unless they could obtain fuel from ships engaged in unneutral service. In view of this fact particular investigation of all ships not sailing in convoy should be made and coal cargoes should be traced to destination. Vessels with cargo of fuel should be made to travel in convoy.

(4) The threat from raiders or cruisers could best be met by increasing the number of ocean escorts with each convoy, but due to lack of suitable vessels this is an impossibility unless escort by battleships is adopted.

(*i*) (1) The most serious threat is that by enemy battle cruisers. If one of these vessels accompanied by a fast supply ship, and preceded by a submarine scouting force could get to sea, the possible damage that could be done would be enormous.

(2) Very serious thought must be given to this possibility and the secret service of the Allies should be directed to ascertain information indicating that any such arrangements are in preparation or even contemplated.

(*j*) See details in Reference (*f*) and inclosure F.

16. *Notes on the blockade.*—(*a*) The so-called blockade has been in operation since the early days of the war and has been conducted with a straight-forward and direct intention to allow no contraband to reach the enemy. Contraband has, during the progress of the war, been expanded in scope of meaning until it now includes practically all material of every description and is applied not only to goods of enemy destination but that might serve to release other goods to the enemy.

(*b*) Direct delivery of goods to the enemy was practically stopped early in the war in so far as concerned shipments from all the world except the four "northern neutrals." Leakage through those countries, either direct or indirect, has been checked if not stopped by restrictions on imports into the countries concerned. In all cases pressure of some kind, but chiefly economic, has been brought to bear to cause neutrals to deny export to the enemy. This pressure has taken the form of so-called rationing of neutrals in manufactures, in raw materials, and in fodder and foodstuffs and has extended to the denial of bunker coal to ships and of exports coal to the countries concerned unless certain requirements were complied with.

(*c*) The action of the United States in restricting exports to the "northern neutrals" is very welcome in adding to the efficiency of the blockade and exerting increasing pressure on the countries concerned to so conduct their affairs that the enemy may profit as little as possible.

(*d*) These matters are set forth at length in reference (*f*) inclosure "F."

17. *General notes on aviation matters.*—(*a*) The British have two air services—the Royal Flying Corps of the army and the Royal Naval Air Service—both of which are fully up to their work to the limit of personnel and material available, but the quality of personnel for increasing the number of active machines and for replacing casualties is said to be falling off.

(*b*) The French now have one course of air service supply and two operating branches of which the army branch has the preference in men and in material over the navy branch. Personnel suitable for air-service work is depleted and material is limited.

(*c*) Assistance in air service must, in France at least, include both personnel and material and the fact must not be lost sight of that large numbers of upkeep personnel are needed to keep the machines in shape so that the flyers may operate to best advantage.

(*d*) Material should take the form of complete machines which should not be shipped in the assembled condition on account of space thus occupied and needed for other cargo on account of the scarcity of shipping. Arrangements must be made to assemble the "knocked-down" machines after their delivery in France.

(*e*) Personnel should have their preliminary schooling in the United States before crossing to France, where a greater part of their flying education should take place under the competent instructions available there and in touch with actual flying conditions.

(*f*) It is understood that the United States will establish numerous aeronautic stations on the coast of France, presumably for antisubmarine work of a protective nature. The application of all possible antisubmarine measures to the development of the offensive is so important that it would be a mistake to consider that these coastal aeronautic stations have accomplished their task when in operation to patrol coastal areas. The coastal stations should be training areas for personnel destined to be used in offensive operations, thus incidentally providing for coastal defense as long as it may be considered necessary. It is deemed particularly important that this differentiation of purpose be clearly understood and definitely carried out.

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18. *Comment on proposed future policy, including future mining policy.* (*Reference (c) and inclosure C*).—(*a*) The striking feature of the proposed future policy of the British Admiralty is the final open recognition and conviction that the submarine menace is vital and that present antisubmarine measures are inadequate to cope with it.

(*b*) It is recommended that immediate and careful consideration be given to the reference mentioned above in connection with the proposed "mine barrage across the North Sea." (References (*d*) (*e*) and inclosures D F.) This is the most promising plan for coping with the submarine menace that has yet been developed. The time required to prepare the necessary material is so great and the arrangements for instituting and maintaining the barrage require such careful working out, that the earliest possible decision should be arrived at and the intentions of the United States made known to the British Government, in order that preparations may be begun and carried forward with all dispatch as soon as an agreement shall have been reached.

(*c*) While a greater degree of foresight in the earlier stages of the war might well have enabled measures to be undertaken looking to the direct offensive against the enemy navy in its bases both in Germany and in Belgium, the situation to-day is such that attempts "to dig them out of their holes," "destroy the hornet's nest," etc., would involve such complicated and difficult operations including the employment of practically all the allied navies and exposing them to extreme risk of grave disaster should any large part of the complex operation miscarry, that such plans can not be considered in any degree advisable nor even practicable.

(*d*) The enemy fleet can only be fought when he chooses to come out of his bases. Measures to force him out of his bases are not available from a naval point of view, except in so far as the contemplated antisubmarine offensive or perhaps future bombing raids via the air may make it appear to him that he has no other alternative to final destruction, defeat, or capture.

19. *The fuel-oil situation in Europe.*—The fuel-oil situation in Europe is always a source of anxiety, as at present, and the British Admiralty is extremely desirous that a just and equitable basis for pooling oil-tanker tonnage may be arrived at. It is understood that representatives of the British Government are now in the United States in connection with these matters.

20. *Other matters reported on.*—Separate reports will be made on the following matters:

(*a*) Requests for assistance made by the Allies.
(*b*) British shipbuilding programs.
(*c*) The shipping situation.
(*d*) British gunnery methods and fire-control material.
(*e*) British radio methods and material.
(*f*) Grand Fleet battle orders, etc.
(*g*) Etc., etc.

21. *General recommendations.*—(*a*) The military-naval situation among the Allies is such that it is strongly recommended that the United States make the earliest possible decision as to what forms and extent the assistance to be given shall take and then proceed to exert every effort to expedite the production, dispatch, and employment of such assistance. Too much stress can not be laid on the importance of the time element.

(*b*) It is further recommended that time be not lost in attempting greater development or improvement of material which has already reached a fairly satisfactory state of development abroad, but that all energy be directed to reproducing such satisfactory material at the maximum possible rate.

22. *General results of visit.*—(*a*) There is every reason to believe that the visit of the commander in chief and his staff to England and to France was heartily welcomed and greatly appreciated as evidence of the earnest desire of the United States to get as closely as possible in touch with the situation and problems that confront the Allies. It is further believed that the Governments represented at the International Naval Conference in London on September 4 to 5, 1917, likewise welcomed and appreciated the participation of United States representatives in the discussions and in the conclusions of the conference.

(*b*) It is considered that better understanding and appreciation of aims and views must be a result of the visit and that the personal contact with the officials of the British Admiralty, with the commander in chief and officers of the grand fleet and with the officials of the French ministry of marine, as well as with the representatives of the several governments at the conference above mentioned, has done much to make the participation of the United States in the war seem more real and the assistance which the United States is capable of rendering much more tangible.

(*c*) The visit was of very great individual professional profit to the commander in chief and to the members of his staff, as well as of collective profit to the staff as a whole.

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(*d*) There is recommended for consideration the matter of the United States maintaining in the operations division of the British Admiralty and in the flagship of the commander in chief of the grand fleet one or more officers of high rank and of suitable attainments to keep in intimate touch with operations both underway and contemplated. Such officers should return to Washington after a short period (when replaced by officers sent over for similar duty so that continuous touch may be kept) in order to acquaint the Navy Department fully and in detail with the situation in the field of actual operations. Such an arrangement would insure a constant and invaluable exchange of information and ideas regarding operations which could not fail greatly to promote better cooperation and coordination of effort. There would seem to be no reason why the above-proposed liaison system should not be extended, if desired, to the sending of British officers to the Navy Department and to the Atlantic Fleet, and further, to a similar interchange of officers with the French and other allied ministries of marine and principal fleets. It is known that the British Admiralty, at least, would be very glad to have liaison arrangements put into force.

H. T. MAYO.

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY (Operations).

[File 8012. Confidential.]

UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET,
THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF,
PASSAGE, LIVERPOOL TO NEW YORK,
S. S. "ST. LOUIS," *October 11, 1917.*

From: Commander in Chief, United States Atlantic Fleet.
To: Secretary of the Navy (Operations).
Subject: Specific requests for assistance from the several allied powers.
References:
(*a*) Report of international naval conference in London on September 4 to 5, 1917, extracts, inclosures A.
(*b*) Memorandum from first sea lord of British Admiralty, dated September 22, 1917, inclosures B.
(*c*) Memorandum of requests from France, inclosures C.
(*d*) Memorandum of requests from Italy, inclosures D.
(*e*) Memorandum of requests from Russia, inclosures E.

1. The following summary of specific requests for assistance from the United States made by the several allied powers is assembled from references and from notes the made in inter with Government representatives.

2. It is recommended that immediate and careful consideration be given to these requests and that decision or views in the premises be communicated to the several Governments concerned as soon as possible in order that the necessary arrangements for cooperation and coordination of assistance to be rendered may be made, as in practically all cases the time element is of very great importance.

3. Not only should there be the least possible delay in replying to the several requests in order that the Governments concerned may plan accordingly, but where material assistance is involved, care should be taken to concentrate effort on the production of material already found even fairly satisfactory for the purpose intended rather than to institute research and experimental work for development of nesw apparatus or forthe improvement of existing apparatus, thus causing delays in production which would operate to markedly reduce, and perhaps even to nullify, the value of the assistance rendered.

4. The summary of requests is arranged as follows:
(A) Requests made during international naval conference in London, September 4–5, 1917, inclosure A.
(B) Requests made by Great Britain, inclosure B.
(C) Requests made by France, inclosure C.
(D) Requests made by Italy, inclosure D.
(E) Requests made by Russia, inclosure E.

5. The commander in chief has made no written recommendation regarding these several requests, but is prepared to discuss them and to explain the points that were presented in connection with them when they were made.

H. T. MAYO.

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Requests made by Allies during naval conferences:

The following points for consideration by the Navy Department came up during the international naval conference in London, September 4–5, 1917.

1. The question of a close offensive in German waters.

(*a*) The conference agreed that the question should be carefully considered by the Allies, and that they should indicate in due course to the British Admiralty the contribution of old war ships (for sinking in blocking German channels), which they would be prepared to provide if such operation was considered practicable.

(*b*) The suggested contribution from the United States Navy was 12 battleships and 8 cruisers.

2. (*a*) In considering the question of a mine barrage it was stated that the British shortage of skilled personnel (especially fitters) required for the assembly of mines, limited their output.

(*b*) The United States and Italian representatives undertook to ascertain how far their respective countries could assist in supplying the deficiency.

3. The conference agreed that the convoy of all craft, including neutrals in the service of the Allies, would require additional ocean escort vessels, and the various representatives agreed to ascertain what further cruisers or old battleships their respective nations could assign to this service.

4. (*a*) The questions of—I, concerted measures for preventing the establishment of enemy submarine bases overseas; and, II, the development of a wireless warning system and intelligence center in the Azores, were referred to a committee formed from representatives present.

(*b*) The report of the committee, adopted by the conference, was as follows:

(i) That the respective admiralties and ministries of marine should communicate with their colonial ministers and ask for instruction to be given to their colonies and oversea possessions to keep supervision over all harbors and anchorages to gain intelligence of German submarines or suspicious vessels.

(ii) That steps should be taken to insure close cooperation between allied ministers in neutral countries to make such representations as will insure adequate action to prevent submarines or suspicious vessels being succored or allowed to make use of territorial waters.

(iii) That the question of fitting certain ships in convoys with powerful W/T to pass messages should receive consideration whenever convoys should be established, having particular regard to the difficulty of receiving W/T intelligence from vessels attacked off the coast of South America and in the South Atlantic generally.

(iv) That, with the permission of the Portuguese Government—

(*a*) A United States naval force should be based in the Azores.

(*b*) A British intelligence center should be established in the Azores.

(*c*) British directional W/T stations should be established in the Azores.

(*d*) A British long-distance W/T station should be established in the Azores for the war.

NOTE.—Any British units would work under the general direction of the United States senior naval officer.

5. Vice Admiral Cusani read a statement from which the following is a quotation:

(*a*) "Besides the various active cooperation by armed forces, there is another field in which the United States can bring to us a welcome, a precious, and I would say a most needed contribution, that is in giving us those supplies and materials of which we and our other allies are short for making ships, machinery, and munitions of war."

(*b*) We would welcome any declaration from the American delegation to that effect, and we would be then on a firmer ground, so far as Italy is concerned, to bring this conference to useful conclusions.

(*c*) He had before him a list of the material required, and emphasizing the delay which his government experienced in obtaining the delivery of important orders already placed in the United States.

(*d*) Admiral May undertook to make representations to his Government with a view to securing an expeditious delivery of the orders referred to. As regards further material help, he professed himself unable to give any undertaking, and suggested that the correct procedure would be for the Italian Government to make representations to the United States Government through the usual channel.

6. Previous to the conference, the First Lord of the Admiralty, in conversation with Admiral Mayo, invited attention to the fact that Great Britain had not commandeered any shipping under construction for any of the Allies, and intimated that he hoped the United States would not commandeer any shipping building in the United States for Great Britain.

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REQUESTS MADE BY GREAT BRITAIN FOR FURTHER ASSISTANCE DESIRED FROM THE UNITED STATES.

Memorandum from First Sea Lord.

The further assistance desired from the United States from available forces or resources is as follows:

1. Four coal-burning battleships of the dreadnought type to replace three or four Grand Fleet dreadnought battleships which it is desired to send to foreign waters to relieve older battleships which are being paid off for want of personnel.

2. An increase in the number of destroyers, in order to enlarge the convoy system and to provide better protection for each convoy.

3. An increase in the number of convoy cruisers for the same reason.

4. An increase in the number of patrol craft, tugs, etc., for antisubmarine work.

5. The rapid building of merchant ships.

6. The supply of a large number of mines for the proposed barrage between Scotland and Norway, and assistance toward laying them by the provision of United States mine-laying vessels.

Notes: As regards (1), the increase in the number of destroyers during the war has forced us to pay off the older capital ships to provide trained personnel for the light cruisers, flotilla leaders, and destroyers. This policy must still continue, as officers and crews will be required during the next 18 months for the 19 light cruisers, 12 flotillas leaders and 119 destroyers now in various stages of construction. Should the United States Government see fit to send over four coal-burning dreadnoughts, they would be attached to the Grand Fleet and form an integral portion of it, working together as a division of a battle squadron; (2) the United States destroyers are more suitable for convoy work on the western approaches to Great Britain than British destroyers, owing to their size and greater radius of action. Any increase possible in this direction would enable more British destroyers to be used in the North Sea to operate offensively against enemy submarines; (3) an increase in the number of convoy cruisers would enable the number of convoys to be increased, or, alternatively, the number of merchant ships in each convoy could be reduced and better control and protection be assured; (4) the proposed barrage of mines between Scotland and Norway will entail the provision of large numbers of patrol vessels. Any assistance from the United States in this respect will be most welcome either to cooperate in patrolling the barrage, or, alternatively, to release British patrol vessels for this purpose.

Naval staff (D. C. N. S.), September 22, 1917.

7. Note with regard to mines: (*a*) It is considered essential that mines used in a barrage where patrol craft are numerous, should become inoperative upon breaking away from their moorings; (*b*) the British Admiralty desires to know what type of sinker can be used with the United States mines.

8. Fuel-oil situation: (*a*) the situation with regard to fuel oil is still unsatisfactory. The amount on hand for naval use is approximately 600,000 tons. Of this possibly as much as 150,000 tons will not be available at the particular point where it is required. This leaves a real available supply of approximately 450,000 tons; (*b*) the normal monthly consumption under the present conditions of operation (the fleet practically immobilized) is 225,000 tons; (*c*) the amount on hand available is therefore approximately two months supply; (*d*) the greatest efficiency in oil supply can only be obtained by pooling the tonnage of the large oil companies and controlling their sailings by a joint committee representing the United States and Great Britain.

Requests made by France:

1. During the time the commander in chief was in France conferences were held with Maj. Gen. Pershing, United States Army, Vice Admiral DuBon, Chief of Staff of the French Army, and with officers of the United States Navy on duty in France.

2. At the suggestion of Lord Derby and Gen. Murray, Gen. Pershing had already cabled to the United States suggesting that he proceed to London for a conference with British authorities and Admiral Mayo, to fully consider all of the demands which will be made upon shipping in order to supply the United States Army and the necessities of the allied nations. He had received an answer to the effect that the President did not consider such conference advisable as the United States Shipping Board was confident that they would be able to supply the United States Army with United States ships only.

3. In view of the above, after general conversation in regard to the great demands that would be made to support the Army, and in the belief that it is quite possible that the magnitude of these demands now, and in the future, may not be fully realized at home, it was agreed both Gen. Pershing and Admiral Mayo would recommend early and serious consideration, and that the question of supplying United States colliers, either naval or otherwise, for transporting English coal to France for the use

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of the United States Army would be taken up at once. The amount of coal required by the United States Army is estimated as 80,000 tons per month.

4. During a conference at the Hotel Crillon, Paris, Admiral Du Bon submitted the following points for consideration: (*a*) That Gen. Pershing confer with Admiral Mayo and arrive at a definite conclusion as to the ports to be used in connection with the transportation of troops, and the proportion of troops to be sent to each port, and that Admiral Mayo should take back the general scheme to the United States; (*b*) he further recommended that as the larger ships can not go to French ports for landing troops without great difficulty, that the utilization of Liverpool and Southampton be considered, and further that the troops be transported from the above places to Cherbourg, so as not to interfere with the British cross-channel transportation; (*c*) he requested that the ships that are being constructed in the United States for the French and have been commandeered by the United States, be released for the use of the French Government for military purposes; (*d*) the question of transportation of coal from England for the French fleet at Corfu is most important as the general shortage of coal is most marked; (*e*) the French Navy is very short of enlisted personnel. The French have some cruisers laid up in ordinary for want of men and the French Government is willing to turn these cruisers over to the Allies for any purpose desired, if men can be provided; (*f*) it was suggested that several French battleships could be replaced by predreadnaughts of the United States fleet and the crews of the French battleships thus relieved, could be used to man these cruisers; (*g*) the question of aviation assistance was mentioned, but full reports on this subject have been submitted by the officers detailed for this special branch; (*h*) Admiral Du Bon presented a memorandum concerning assistance desired in adding to the efficiency of the ports of debarkation of the Army. The principal points are: (1) The French Marine has bought in the United States, some three months ago, 15 patrol and tug boats, and with these boats expects to strengthen the services of dredging the ports of Brest, St. Nazaire, and Pauillac; (2) for 8 of these vessels the transfer of flag and the ratification of sale has been obtained, but they are kept in America for repairs; (3) for the 7 others the transfer of flag and the ratification of sale are not yet realized; (4) assistance in lessening the delay caused by the necessary formalities, and in hastening the repairs would be very much appreciated; (5) even with this reinforcement, the means at the disposal of the French will not permit the gathering; (6) in order to maintain each of these ports at its maximum efficiency dredging vessels from the United States are required in each port.

5. (*a*) The French Government is much concerned lest the necessary arrangements for the transport, disembarkation, and upkeep of United States troops should be underestimated in any degree with the result that the number of United States troops available for service in France in the spring and summer of 1918 might fall materially below the estimates; (*b*) at numerous interviews both French and British representatives repeatedly referred to and emphasized the seriousness of the situation that might ensue if, for any reason, the United States should be unable to forward troops to France in the numbers now expected, and, especially, if the necessary supplies for United States troops in France should be insufficient whether on account of underestimate, lack of shipping, or of shipping losses, thus throwing even for a time the burden of supply on the limited resources of France; (*c*) it is very apparent that real fear exists lest the shortage of coal in France during the coming winter should have an injurious effect on the morale of the country. In this connection attention is invited to the advisability, and even necessity, that the needs of the United States troops in coal shall not be allowed to increase the embarrassment which the coal shortage in France may bring about; (*d*) powerful tugs of seagoing type are needed at the ports of debarkation of United States troops and supplies in France. These tugs should be armed, and when not engaged in debarkation work could be usefully employed in salvage work or even on patrol. Two such tugs should be sent to St. Nazaire as soon as possible, to be followed by others for Brest and Pauiliac as rapidly as they become available.

(*d*) REQUESTS MADE BY ITALY.

CARLTON HOTEL,
London, England, September 8, 1917.

From: Commander in chief.
To: Secretary of the Navy (Operations).
Subject: Italian Government; request for expeditious delivery of material.
Reference: (*a*) Letter from Rear Admiral Cusani-Visconti, Italian naval representative at international naval conference.
Inclosure: (1).

1. The reference (inclosure) is forwarded for consideration.

2. The Italian naval representative at the international naval conference desired to bring up the question of material to Italy. It was deemed advisable not to discuss

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this matter in conference, and it was promised that a request of the Italian Government would be duly presented to the Navy Department. The reference (inclosure) is the Italian presentation of the matter in question.

H. T. MAYO.

LONDON, *September 6, 1917.*

DEAR ADMIRAL MAYO: With reference to our conversation regarding the supply of material to Italy, I beg to inclose herewith a detailed list of those materials which are particularly needed by the Italian Navy, for the most urgent and immediate requirements.

In order to partly replace the heavy loss of tonnage, caused by enemy submarines, it will be necessary to Italy to obtain some cargo boats, of from four to five thousand tons, to be employed in the coal transport, the deficiency of which is now becoming alarming.

I shall be extremely obliged for any good work you will use toward obtaining from the United States Government that the material already asked for, or now being asked, may be sent to Italy as soon as possible.

Please accept, my dear Admiral, with kindest regards, my personal and cordial salutations.

Yours, sincerely,

CUSANI-VISCONTI.

LIST OF THE MATERIALS AND MACHINERY BEING ORDERED IN THE UNITED STATES BY THE ITALIAN MINISTRY OF MARINE.

Nine thousand tons of steel sections and plates for shipbuilding (part in mild steel and part in high-tensile steel); 6,000 tons of steel sections and plates for shipbuilding (part in mild steel and part in high-tensile steel), 1,000 tons per month; 50 motor launches from Messrs. the "Elco" (submarine chasers); 36 "Standard" motors with 18 auxiliary sets; 60 "Sterling" motors for motor launches. Spare parts for "Standard" and "Sterling" motors.

Probable requirements.—Special steels for motor-launch motors and aviation motors (being built by the Fiat, Isotta-Fraschini); tool steel; boiler tubes; semi-Diesel motors, of reliable types; machine tool for new works; cargo boats (from 4,000 to to 5,000 tons).

(*e*) REQUESTS MADE BY RUSSIA.

1. No specific requests for assistance from the United States were made by Russia, but indirect assistance would undoubtedly result from the increase of United States vessels operating with the British Navy, thus enabling additional British vessels to be sent to cover the approaches to the White Sea.

ALLIED NAVAL CONFERENCE.

Sir Eric Geddes, on behalf of the British Government, having offered a welcome to the representatives of the navies of the powers united against Germany, reminded them that the conference was called at the suggestion of the United States Government.

Admiral Mayo explained that he came with no definite instructions, but with the desire to learn how the United States Navy could best assist and cooperate with the allied navies, particularly in dealing with the submarine menace, which his Government regarded especially serious at the present time. He also emphasized his conviction of the value of personal intercourse between officers of his own and the allied navies.

[Secret. Allied naval conference. Sept. 4, 1917.]

AGENDA AND CONCLUSIONS.

Item 1. *The question of a close offensive in German waters.*—Admiral Jellicoe made a statement in full of an offensive which might be taken by the Allies in German waters.

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After discussion on the various aspects of the matter and the steps which it would be necessary to take in order to insure its success, the conference agreed that the question should be carefully considered by the Allies, and that they should indicate in due course to the British Admiralty the contribution of old warships which they would be prepared to provide, the possibility of embarking on the proposed operation being dependent upon the supply of the number of ships indicated by Admiral Jellicoe.

Admiral Jellicoe suggested that the required number of ships might be supplied as follows:

	Battleships.	Cruisers.
British	18	13
French	5	12
Italian	3	3
Japanese	2	7
United States	12	8
Total	40	43

Item 2. The alternative of a mine or net barrage either in German waters of further afield.—Admiral Jellicoe put forward as an alternative to a close offensive in German waters, the suggestion that the activity of the German submarines might be restricted by the laying of an effective mine field or minenet barrage. If such an operation were undertaken, he proposed that it should take the form of:

(*a*) An efficient mine barrage so as to completely shut in the North Sea. This operation necessitated the provision of at least 100,000 mines, which would not be available for some considerable time.

(*b*) He had considered the question of a barrage of mine nets, which was considered to be impracticable by him.

In the view of the conference it was felt that alternative (*a*) could not be undertaken until an adequate supply of mines of a satisfactory type was secured. Failing the adoption of alternative (*a*), an improvement and extension of the present system of minefields was desirable and the conference agreed that a barrage of mine nets was impracticable.

In this connection the British shortage of skilled personnel (especially fitters) required for the assembly of mines was noted, and the Allies undertook to consider how far they could assist in supplying the deficiency.

Item 3. Offensive measures against enemy submarines in the North Sea.—The question of the best offensive measures which should, as far as possible, be taken against enemy submarines in the North Sea was discussed at length. It was agreed that the measures desirable were: (*a*) To attack the submarine bases; (*b*) to mine the submarines ineffectively; and (*c*) to attack the submarines at sea. And it was felt that these measures should be amplified as far as possible on the lines explained in detail by Admiral Jellicoe, which received the general concurrence of the conference.

Item 4. Measures to deal with enemy submarine cruisers of large radius of action on the high seas.—Admiral Jellicoe put forward for the consideration of the conference the following measures which might be taken to deal with enemy submarine cruisers with a large radius of action on the high seas:

(1) The use of decoy ships, working in concert with submarines, for defensive action.

(2) Concerted measures for preventing the establishment of enemy submarine bases overseas.

(3) The convoy of all craft, including friendly neutrals as far as possible.

(4) The development of a wireless warning system and an intelligence center in the Azores.

Item 1 would require additional cruisers, and the conference decided that the Allies should see whether they could provide cruisers or old battleships for this purpose.

Items 2 and 4 were referred to a committee consisting of Admiral Oliver, Admiral Hall, Admiral Salaun, Lieut. Rottiacob, Capt. Twining—Capt. lieut. de Carvalbo, Portugese naval attaché, being invited to join them—it being agreed that their report should be adopted as embodying the view of the conference.

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Item 5. Establishment of convoys universally for outward and homeward trade and organization necessary.—Admiral Jellicoe made a statement on the general convoy situation and the conference agreed to accept it as embodying its views. The question of additional cruisers for convoy work to be further considered by the Allies at the first opportunity.

Item 6. Establishment of convoy system in Mediterranean. Necessity for this system in order to insure adequate supply of coal to Italy and to economize tonnage.—After this question had been discussed at some length, it was referred to a committee composed of Rear Admiral A. L. Duff, C. B. (chairman); Vice Admiral de Bon; Rear Admiral Salaun; Rear Admiral Majishiro Funakishil; Capt. Massimiliano Lovatelli; to consider and bring up a report at the conference. The report having been duly presented, it was, after consideration by the conference, approved and adopted.

It was also decided that the Allied council sitting at Malta on the general question of trade protection in the Mediterranean should be informed that the International Naval Conference in London the council wishes to know that the conference regarded it of the utmost importance that in their deliberations the necessity of economizing tonnage by avoidance of delays should be constantly borne in mind. This matter was agreed to be of prime importance and it was proposed to discuss it further at the next meeting after the reports of the Malta Council were received.

Item 7. The laying of the Otranto barrage and its defense by Allied destroyers—Aircraft and submarine patrol for the barrage.—Admiral Jellicoe having explained the present situation with regard to the laying of the *Otranto* barrage and having drawn attention to the unprotected condition of the net drifters, stated that a protective force composed of six destroyers constantly on patrol duty at night was necessary. Of this Great Britain is prepared to provide the number required to maintain or patrol three, and asked that the Italian naval authorities should provide the exchange necessary to maintain the other three.

Vice Admiral Cusani-Visconti promised that he would consider the point referred to by Admiral Jellicoe and would take steps to ascertain from headquarters whether three destroyers could be provided by the Italian Navy.

Vice Admiral de Bon stated that the French Ministry of Marine would have no objection to some of the French destroyers allotted to Italy being used for this work, in conjunction with the Italian destroyers.

Item 8. Offensive measures in the Adriatic against enemy bases.—Vice Admiral Cusani-Visconti was invited to state his views as to a possible offensive against the Austrian naval forces located in the Adriatic, it being suggested that an operation having for its object the occupation of the island of Curzola might be successfully undertaken, and if this were carried through beneficial results would accrue to the Allies. It was further suggested that bombing operations by aircraft might be carried out against the Austrian submarine bases in the Adriatic.

Vice Admiral Cusani-Visconti explained the present situation and the difficulties involved in the occupation of Curzola, and stated that this proposal had been considered in the earlier stages of the war. He explained the bombing operations that had already been carried out against Austrian bases and referred to the Anglo-Italian operation of this nature which had just been attempted.

The question of an attack on Durazzo was also discussed.

Item 9. Assistance by allied fleet in the protection of Archangel route and White Sea in submarine attack.—At the request of Rear Admiral Kedroff this matter was considered by the conference. He urged the importance of the immediate provision of protective forces in the Kola Inlet, as he anticipated that the Germans would keep their submarines on the White Sea route for a longer period this autumn than they did last year, because Russia had just established a new naval base at Kola Bay open during the whole winter and connected with Petrograd by a new railway line. He asked whether Great Britain could not supply 12 armed trawlers for the purpose.

Admiral Jellicoe, whilst giving expression to the desire of Great Britain to render all the assistance in their power in dealing with the position which Rear Admiral Kedroff anticipated would occur, stated that owing to the shortage of the number of armed trawlers available we could not hold out hope that Great Britain would be able to provide the force for which Read Admiral Kedroff asked.

Admiral Jellicoe expressed doubt as to whether the anticipation voiced by Rear Admiral Kedroff as to the German submarines remaining in the White Sea for a longer period than was the case last year would be realized, but undertook to consider what could be done to meet the requirements which had been indicated by Rear Admiral Kedroff.

Item 10. Assistance to Italy by the United States of America in the direction of supplying material.—Vice Admiral Cusani-Visconti asked that this subject might be

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discussed by the conference. He had before him a list of the material required, and emphasized the delay which his Government experienced in obtaining the delivery of important orders already placed in the United States. He hoped that Admiral May might help his Government to overcome these delays. He gave in detail the main requirements of the Italian Navy.

Admiral Mayo undertook to make representations to his Government with a view to securing an expeditious delivery of the orders referred to. As regards further material help, he professed himself unable to give any undertaking, and suggested that the correct procedure would be for the Italian Government to make representations to the United States Government through the usual channel.

Arising out of the discussion upon this matter, the question of the provision of United States or British destroyers for the Mediterranean was discussed, and Admiral Jellicoe stated that if the United States destroyer program resulted in relief of British destroyers from the duties upon which they were at present engaged, further British destroyers would no doubt be sent to the Mediterranean for antisubmarine work or trade protection.

CONCLUSIONS OF SUBCOMMITTEE.

Agreed.—(1) That the respective admiralties and ministries of marine should communicate with the colonial ministers and ask for instructions to be given to their colonies and oversea possessions to keep supervision over all harbors and anchorages to gain intelligence of German submarines or suspicious vessels.

(2) That steps be taken to insure cooperation between allied ministers in neutral countries to make such representations as will insure adequate steps being taken to prevent submarines or suspicious vessels being succored or allowed to make use of territorial waters.

(3) That the following steps be taken as regards the Azores, the Portuguese Government being first asked permission: (i) A United States naval force to be based in the Azores; (ii) a British intelligence center to be established; (iii) British directional W–T stations to be established; (iv) British long distance W–T stations to be established for the war.

British units to work under the general direction of the United States senior naval officer.

The French representative brought up the question of the difficulty of receiving W–T intelligence from vessels attacked by submarines in the South Atlantic, and more particularly off the coast of South America.

It was agreed that question of fitting certain ships in convoys with powerful W.–T. to pass messages should receive consideration whenever convoys should be established.

AGENDA (SECRET).

1. The question of close offensive in German waters.
2. The alternative of a mine or net barrage either in German waters or further afield.
3. Offensive measures against enemy submarines in the North Sea.
4. Measures to deal with enemy submarine cruisers of long radius of action on the high seas.
5. Establishment of convoys universally for outward and homeward trade and organization necessary.
6. Establishment of convoy system in Mediterranean. Necessity for this system in order to insure adequate supply of coal to Italy and to economize tonnage.
7. The laying of the Otranto barrage and its defense by allied destroyers, aircraft, and submarine patrol for the barrage.
8. Offensive measures in the Adriatic against enemy bases.

AGENDA (5TH SEPTEMBER).

1. Report of committee appointed by conference to consider questions arising out of item No. 6, on the agenda of September 4.
2. The laying of the Otranto barrage and its defense by allied destroyers. Aircraft and submarine patrol for the barrage.
3. Offensive measures in the Adriatic against enemy bases.
4. Assistance to Italy by United States Army in the direction of supply material.
5. Assistance by allied fleets in the protection of the Archangel route and White Sea against submarine attack.

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UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET,
U. S. S. "PENNSYLVANIA," FLAGSHIP,
December 17, 1917.

From: Commander in Chief.
To: Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: Annual report; July 1, 1916, to July 1, 1917.
Reference: (*a*) Naval Instructions 916 (4).

1. The following report of the commander in chief Atlantic Fleet is submitted for the fiscal year 1917.

2. Due to war conditions it has not been considered advisable to go into detail in this report, as much of the data which might be included would be of possible use to the enemy as indicating the methods and principles followed in preparing the fleet for battle. Full detailed reports of all matters mentioned will be found in the department's files.

3. Since the declaration of war on April 6, 1917, the activities of the fleet have been recorded in the war diary which, it is assumed, will take the place of the annual report.

ORGANIZATION.

4. On July 1, 1916, the fleet consisted of the following forces: Battleship force, cruiser force, destroyer force, submarine force, mine force, train, reserve force.

5. The general principle which actuated the commander in chief during the period preceding the war was a proper coordinating of the various forces comprising the fleet, so that the fleet should be in a true sense of the word a "fleet" and not a collection of more or less independent forces. To accomplish this end the commander in chief endeavored to instill into the fleet a proper realization of the importance of "decentralization of authority" and "initiative of the subordinate." The principle was followed of passing down the chain of command the handling of all details to the lowest link in the chain which could properly handle them, and, on the other hand, gathering in and coordinating into the high command the control of all policies and matters of major importance from all the units of the fleet.

6. In carrying out this policy the commander in chief with the full support of the department and of the Chief of Naval Operations and it is believed that mobilization found the fleet and the department working in the closest cooperation.

7. Upon mobilization certain changes in organization became necessary, due to the general and special situations arising from the declaration of war, but the fleet has been able to assimilate new units and a greatly increased number of ships and personnel without undue strain on the organization.

8. As indicating the general policies followed by the commander in chief in preparing the fleet for war, the following extracts are quoted from the Fleet Regulations:

"SECTION II.—GENERAL FLEET POLICIES.

"4. The mission of the fleet is to maintain itself in a state of readiness for war, which indicates not only material readiness but also the readiness of personnal to operate the material.

"5. All vessels of the fleet must be as nearly selfsustaining as possible and shall endeavor to reduce work to be done at a navy yard to a minimum.

"6. No recommendations or arrangements shall be made which tend toward limitation or restriction of the mobility of the fleet or of the component parts thereof.

"7. Vessels in commission in reserve or with reduced complements shall be maintained and shall operate on a cruising basis as far as practicable.

"8. All work done in the fleet and all training of the fleet or of its component parts shall be carried on according to a prearranged plan, which should, in general, cover employment for at least one week ahead.

"9. (*a*) It is expected and required that all persons in the fleet shall conduct affairs in accordance with the Naval Regulations and Naval Instructions, which are not only orders and instructions but also guides to standard practice and hence aids to uniformity, coordination and cooperation.

"(*b*) The same is true of these regulations and instructions, the Gunnery Instructions 1913, the Ship and Gun Drills, the Infantry Drill Regulations, etc.

"10. Since the organization, both of the fleet and within the ship, is arranged on a 'group and leader' basis, consideration shall be given to this fact in the management of affairs not only in regard to operations but also in matters of administration.

"11. For purposes of training and in order to impress upon force and other subordinate commanders their proper responsibilities and authority, endeavor shall be made to issue orders and instructions which, as far as practicable, are stated in definite terms as to the results desired but in general terms as to the manner of execution.

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"12. The general methods of exercising supervision on the part of superior commanders shall be: (1) Giving careful attention to results attained; (2) giving careful attention to inspections, reports of employment, reports of readiness, etc. (see chapter re Inspections, etc.); (3) taking steps to correct defective execution and faulty practice."

COMMUNICATIONS.

9. In the training and development of the fleet the vital need for most efficient communications has been shown in exercising both command and administration.

10. The communication system throughout the fleet has been standardized, and strategic and tactical exercises held have impressed all officers with the necessity for making every effort to increase the efficiency of all communications.

11. Complete cooperation with the shore establishment has been had and mobilization did not develop any defects in the principles of the communication system, but every effort will be made to continue improvement along all lines.

12. *Visual signaling.*—To improve the efficiency of visual signaling the commander in chief has recommended the establishment of a separate signal branch similar to the radio branch, with proper warrant ranks and ratings.

13. *Radio material.*—Minor improvements in radio standard plans and apparatus have been made for all classes of vessels during the past year. The most important improvements have been in the development of the radio compass and the improvement and increase in numbers of ships long-range arc transmitters. Due to the increasing numbers of naval vessels in active service, it will soon become necessary to increase the number of communications by radio which can be carried on simultaneously without interference. Development work on apparatus which will accomplish this has alrady been started.

14. *Radio personnel.*—Radio personnel has improved steadily during the past year in both efficiency and numbers. The battleship force has greatly assisted in supplying personnel for ships which have been added to the fleet since the outbreak of war by maintaining large classes under intensive instruction on all battleships. The increase in the number of radio gunners will soon provide one for each capital ship of the first line.

15. *Radio organization and operation.*—The fact that our radio organization is sound and that its development has been for use in war is shown by the small number of changes found necessary in going from a peace to a war basis.

16. A new system of handling routine radio traffic has been developed and put into use which makes much more time available for radio drills.

TACTICAL AND STRATEGICAL TRAINING.

17. The maximum amount of time available was devoted to tactical and strategical exercises.

18. The first series of tactical exercises for the year was held during the week July 10–14, 1916.

19. These exercises indicated the necessity of continued training. The practical difficulties of continued operations, of unfavorable weather conditions, of communication in code and cipher, of assembling forces at night or in foggy weather, brought home to all the vast difference between actual maneuvers at sea and the theoretical maneuvers of the game board.

20. The second series of tactical exercises was held August 11–15, 1916.

21. In many respects the second series of exercises showed improvement in the handling of tactical situations. The conditions due to low visibility were particularly trying. While continual bad weather somewhat reduces the value of the exercises, it emphasizes the necessity of continued training to meet these disturbing conditions. The exercises with the submarines were particularly valuable to that force.

22. The third series of tactical exercises was held December 13–19, 1916.

23. The exercises started with a review of the fleet by the Secretary of the Navy, in Hampton Roads. The commander in chief and several force and division commanders were absent from the fleet, being on temporary duty in Washington in connection with the selection board.

24. These exercises were conducted in inclement weather conditions, low visibility, rain and sleet. The small number of vessels available reduced to a considerable extent the value of the exercises, but the experience gained by those who participated made the exercises well worth while.

25. These exercises showed again that the clothing of officers and men had not been designed for winter weather and emphasized the need of special winter clothing.

26. A fourth series of tactical exercises was conducted while the fleet was enroute from San Domingo City to Port au Prince, Haiti.

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27. This series consisted of two night attacks by the destroyer force on the battleship force and one simulated major engagement. The work of the destroyers was much more effective than during the exercises held during the summer.

28. The major engagement emphasized the necessity for rapid deployment into battle formation from cruising formation and the serious disadvantage of funnel smoke interference with gunnery.

29. It is believed that the success of these tactical exercises have aroused a lively interest in this subject and that a continuation of such exercises whenever opportunity exists is the best means of developing tactical skill and of developing battle instructions.

30. From August 20 to 26, 1916, department strategic maneuver No. 3 was carried out utilizing all available forces afloat, and the Atlantic coast shore establishment including the Navy Department.

31. These strategic maneuvers on a large scale which originate with the department are extremely valuable. The use of the reserve force as a defending fleet gave it valuable experience. This practice should be continued in time of peace in order to test out the material condition of the reserve force and to furnish training to additional officers and men.

32. Strategic exercises were also held during the passage of the fleet from home yards to its winter base at Guantanamo.

33. The first exercise was conducted during weather which was detrimental to efficient scouting by destroyers. Frequently the maximum speed of such craft did not exceed 15 knots, but again indicated the necessity for scouting vessels of sufficient size and power to maintain a high speed in a moderate sea.

34. Strategical and tactical exercises are of the greatest importance in the development of the fleet for war and the policy of conducting such exercises upon every possible occasion will be continued.

GUNNERY.

35. Upon the completion of the gunnery year, 1916–17, the country had been at war three months, and the fleet had been operating under war conditions since about the 6th of February and many of the exercises prescribed by the Orders for Gunnery Exercises, 1916–17 had to be delayed or were held under modified conditions.

36. Notwithstanding the many interruptions in the schedule and the conditions under which the exercises were necessarily held steady progress in the ability and confidence of the personnel to prepare for, maintain, and control the fire of the different batteries under varying conditions was made.

37. At the beginning of the gunnery year in July, 1916, the system of training which had produced satisfactory results in the battleship force during the gunnery year of 1915–16 was put into effect on all vessels of the fleet, and when diplomatic relations with Germany were broken off in February, 1916, it was unnecessary to make many changes in the prescribed system. Details of the system have been fully covered in special reports to the department, which have been published in the Reports of Practices. Very full reports have been submitted on this subject as it is considered that future progress depends on a careful study of the work of the past.

38. At the time of the entry of this country into the war, the fleet was finishing the prescribed gunnery exercises. The demands for experienced personnel to place in full commission old ships and to commission new ships had to be met by the active fleet to a large extent, and the withdrawal of many men and officers necessarily reduced the gunnery efficiency of a large part of the fleet. The situation was realized to be one of necessity and every effort has been made to maintain efficiency of the ships to as great a degree as possible.

39. Facilities for conducting gunnery exercises were provided at various points along the Atlantic coast in order that vessels might conduct the exercises according to the prescribed methods as closely as possible. The facilities should be extended in order that all vessels should carry on systematic exercises.

40. Beginning in March the demands for crews as armed guards of merchant ships began and in the early part of April it was necessary to have the battleships conduct an intensive form of training to provide the crews. This training is considered to have had a very beneficial effect upon the morale of the battleships as it added a great deal of interest during a time when many officers and men were being transferred.

41. The spirit and efficiency with which the officers and men of the fleet met the demands for experienced personnel, not only for crews for armed guards but also for other purposes, was particularly gratifying to the commander in chief and reflects great credit on the officers and men concerned.

42. Generally speaking, the material condition of the batteries is satisfactory, though it has become apparent that certain very radical alterations must be made in

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the design of the ammunition supply of certain of the battleships. The meterial questions have been taken up in the usual manner and have been and are being given constant consideration. No effort should be spared to expedite the completion of all authorized and contemplated changes as it is realized that steady progress in efficiency can not be made if ships are continually undergoing repairs and alterations.

43. Available information as a result of the naval engagements of the present war have been considered and studied with a view to taking advantage of them in determining the proper forms of gunnery exercises. The Orders for Gunnery Exercises, 1917-18, were prepared by the department in conference with officers of the fleet and it is considered that they present representative types of exercises which should be held during the war in order to insure a satisfactory degree of gunnery efficiency.

MATERIAL UPKEEP.

44. Constant effort has been made to make the fleet materially self-sustaining, and it is believed much has been accomplished in this direction. This is due to increased tool equipment on the part of the ships and tenders, more permanent attendance with the fleet of tenders and repair ships, the presence of a second repair ship with the fleet during the last six months of the year, and especially to the fuller realization on the part of all concerned of the importance and necessity of keeping ships away from navy yards.

45. Operating schedules for all forces of the fleet have provided frequent and adequate periods for material upkeep and machinery overhaul, and as far as practicable these have not been interfered with.

46. The commander in chief has emphasized in every way possible his belief that ships should not go to navy yards for work unless it is absolutely necessary; that no ships should go to a navy yard until the yard has all material ready and is fully prepared to carry out expeditiously the authorized work; and that ships away from the flag for necessary yard work should rejoin at the earliest possible time.

47. By allowing suitable periods for machinery overhaul, there should, aside from casualties and major alterations, be no necessity for ships that have been overhauled at navy yards to go to yards, other than for the semiannual dockings of about a week or 10 days at a time, for a period of, say, two years. After that length of time in active service a ship should be given an opportunity for a comprehensive and thorough examination and repair. No fixed time can be allowed for this as it will depend on conditions existing at the time.

48. As far as possible alterations should be deferred until the refit period.

49. Since early in February the fleet has been operating under war conditions, but no serious material defects have occurred. There have been a number of casualties during the year, but except for the total loss of the *Memphis* at San Domingo City, Santo Domingo, all material damage resulting from casualties has been made good or arrangements have been made for effecting early repairs.

50. When the fleet went south, early in January, the material condition was, in general, very good. There was, however, more or less outstanding work on nearly every vessel. Much of this was accomplished by the ship's force, assisted by repair ships and tenders.

51. The material condition of battleships of the active fleet when they returned from the winter's work was very good, and except for docking and routing work, no battleship of the active force has had to go to a navy yard for repair work. Advantage has been taken, however, of favorable opportunities to send in three battleships from the active fleet, for desirable alterations and necessary repairs, and a schedule is now being prepared by which other battleships of the fleet can have work, primarily alterations necessary for war efficiency, undertaken at the navy yards.

52. A number of destroyers operating with the fleet developed machinery troubles during the year and the casualties due to service under war conditions were more numerous than ordinarily. All defects have, however, been made good and necessary repairs effected so that the end of the year finds the destroyer force and its tenders in a generally excellent material condition.

53. No special comment is necessary on the material condition of vessels of the cruiser and gunboat classes, submarines, or vessels attached to the train. In general, these vessels are in a reasonably satisfactory material condition. Full information as to their condition is contained in the detailed reports that have been submitted to the department from time to time and in the semiannual reports submitted by force commanders.

SUPPLY.

54. Supply has been satisfactorily maintained during the year, and relations between the fleet and various bureaus and offices of the department in regard to supply have been most satisfactory. The functions of the train have been gradually extended

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until now it handles practically all supply matters, keeping the commander in chief advised. This procedure is very satisfactory. It accomplishes the desired results, and the commander in chief is not hampered with many details of supply, while being in possession of all the necessary information.

55. During the latter part of the year the *Bridge*, supply ship, was added to the fleet and is at present on her first service. She will no doubt be of great value and will increase the efficiency of the supply service of the fleet.

56. Additional oil-carrying vessels have been attached to the fleet—the *Maumee* and *Cuyama*.

57. There is great need in the fleet for extra seagoing tugs for use of commander train, especially during gunnery exercises.

PERSONNEL.

58. The situation as regards enlisted personnel showed no improvement in the beginning of this fiscal year over that reported in the last annual report. Large numbers of vacancies existed in all ships, especially in the artificer, engineer, and special branches. This left barely enough men in these branches for operation and naturally had its effect upon upkeep of machinery and material generally. It also necessitated frequent changes in personnel, as labor conditions throughout the country enticed men from reenlistment, and their places had to be filled by men from other ships. These changes in ships' personnel would undoubtedly have affected adversely the efficiency of the fleet had there not been a full appreciation of the situation and extra effort on the part of both officers and men.

59. Schools for the instruction of machinists' mates were established in the fleet repair ships, but the effect was not felt until the close of the year.

60. The necessity recommended in former reports for increased complements of ships was recognized and the enlisted strength of the Navy increased by the act of August 29, 1916. Unfortunately, recruiting continued slow, and the fleet did not feel the effects of this increase until relations with Germany became strained.

61. Boards were convened to recommend standard organizations and complements for the various classes of vessels in the fleet, and these without exception recommended that complements be increased.

62. With the beginning of the war the personnel situation took on an entirely new aspect. Large numbers of men have been sent to the ships of the fleet for training and the fleet has become practically the only source of supply for the men of experience who form the nuclei of crews of new ships fitting out and for men comprising the large number of crews of armed merchant ships. At the same time every effort has been made to maintain the highest practicable military efficiency.

DISCIPLINE.

63. The discipline of the fleet for the past year has been good. The action of Congress in authorizing force commanders to order general courts-martial has produced excellent results. The declaration of a state of war which necessitated trial by general court-martial for such offenses as absence over leave has resulted in a large increase in the number of general courts, but considering the largely augmented force involved the percentage is small.

SANITATION AND HEALTH.

64. The general health of the fleet personnel has been excellent during the year, with the exception of the continuation of measles, German measles, mumps, scarlet fever, and chicken pox among the nonimmunes. These diseases increased markedly during the last quarter and became a matter of grave concern when cerebrospinal fever appeared in the drafts from the Great Lakes Training Station. This increase can be accounted for by a number of factors, namely, their unusual prevalence in all parts of the United States during this period, rapid recruiting and marked increase in the size of the Navy after the declaration of war, the necessity for transferring recruits to the fleet without the usual detention and weeding-out at the training stations and overcrowding both at these stations and on some of the older ships of the fleet.

65. At the end of the year all these diseases, except mumps, have markedly decreased owing to a correction of most of the causes above mentioned and a diminution of the susceptible human material.

66. Except for the time lost during necessary quarantine and fumigation, the incidence of the various diseases has practically not interfered with the drills and exercises and general military efficiency of the fleet.

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67. The hospital ship *Solace* has rendered valuable service during the year. She has remained with the fleet continuously, except for necessary absences or docking, repairs, coaling, and transfer of patients. During the last quarter she became frequently overcrowded with cases of contagious diseases and was obliged to perform also the function of an ambulance ship and transport her surplus cases to naval hospitals.

ATHLETICS.

68. Athletics were considerably interfered with during the year due to conditions under wihch the fleet was operating.

69. In the summer of 1916 at Newport the citizens of that city were most helpful in extending the facilities of the city to the fleet.

70. During the winter cruise there was not much opportunity for athletics, due to the location of the fleet base during the greater part of the time.

71. After mobilization the Navy League was most helpful in assisting the fleet to provide facilities for athletics and amusement at the new fleet base.

72. The commander in chief considers that the encouragement of athletics is most important in maintaining the morale of the fleet, particularly when leave and liberty must be restricted due to war conditions.

H. T. MAYO.

[First indorsement.]

JANUARY 17, 1918.

From: Chief of Naval Operations.
To: General Board.
Via: Bureau of Navigation, Bureau of Construction and Repair, Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, Bureau of Steam Engineering, and Bureau of Medicine and Surgery.
Subject: Annual report, July 1, 1916, to July 1, 1917, Atlantic Fleet.

1. Forwarded, for information and file.

W. V. PRATT.

[Second indorsement.]

JANUARY 21, 1918.

From: Bureau of Navigation.
To: General Board.
Via: Bureau of Construction and Repair, Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, Bureau of Steam Engineering, and Bureau of Medicine and Surgery.
Subject: Annual Report, July 1, 1916 to July 1, 1917, Atlantic Fleet.

1. Forwarded; noted.

THOMAS J. SENN,
Captain, United States Navy,
Acting Chief of Bureau.

[Third indorsement.]

JANUARY 30, 1918.

From: Bureau of Construction and Repair.
To: The General Board.
Via: Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, Bureau of Steam Engineering, and Bureau of Medicine and Surgery.
Subject: Annual report, July 1, 1916 to July 1, 1917, Atlantic Fleet.

1. Forwarded; contents noted.

TAYLOR.

[Fourth indorsement.]

FEBRUARY 1, 1918.

To: The General Board, via Bureau of Steam Engineering and Bureau of Medicine and Surgery.
Subject: Annual report, July 1, 1916 to July 1, 1917, Atlantic Fleet.

Forwarded; contents noted.

McGOWAN.

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[Fifth indorsement.]

FEBRUARY 4, 1918.

From: Bureau of Steam Engineering.
To: The General Board, via Bureau of Medicine and Surgery.
Subject: Annual report, July 1, 1916 to July 1, 1917, Atlantic Fleet.

1. Forwarded; contents noted.

O. W. KOESTER,
Assistant to Bureau.

[Sixth indorsement.]

FEBRUARY 7, 1918.

From: Bureau of Medicine and Surgery.
To: The General Board.
Subject: Annual report, July 1, 1916, to July 1, 1917, Atlantic Fleet.

1. Forwarded. Contents noted.

W. C. BRAISTED.

UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET,
U. S. S. "PENNSYLVANIA," FLAGSHIP,
Base 2, February 2, 1918.

Secret.
From: Commander in Chief.
To: Secretary of the Navy (Operations).
Subject: Estimate of the situation with regard to the efficient development of the operations of the Atlantic Fleet.

1. In view of the fact that practically all of the vessels of the Atlantic Fleet available for service, except the battleship forces, less battleship division 9, are or soon will be employed in active operations against the enemy and of the possibility that the remainder of battleship force 2 may soon be so engaged, it has been considered necessary to estimate the situation to determine what if any changes in the existing conditions can be made in order to increase the efficiency of contemplated operations and of possible future operations.

THE PRESENT SITUATION.

2. The present situation must be considered in two parts, namely:
(*a*) The situation in Europe.
(*b*) The situation in home waters.

THE SITUATION IN EUROPE.

3. The task forces of the Atlantic Fleet now operating in European waters comprise the following vessels of the fleet:
(1) All available destroyers.
(2) Battleship division 9.
(3) All vessels of the patrol force except the American patrol detachment.
(4) All available yachts suitable for escort or patrol duty, except those assigned to the American patrol detachment.
(5) All submarines at present available for duty abroad.
(6) All available trawlers suitable for mine sweeping at sea.
(7) In addition to these combatant vessels there are numerous tenders, repair ships, and cargo ships operating abroad.

4. Orders have been issued for the mine force to prepare for distant service and it will soon be operating in European waters.

5. The forces in European waters are to operate as follows:
(*a*) Battleship division 9 and such other battleship units as may be assigned to service abroad, are to cooperate with the British Grand Fleet or the high seas forces of some other of the allied countries.
(*b*) The mine force is to cooperate with the British Navy in planting a deep-sea mine barrage.
(*c*) The remainder of the combatant vessels to operate as one task force in operations against enemy submarines and in the protection of transports and trade.
(*d*) In addition to the operations by forces of the fleet there are aviation forces which will operate against enemy submarines from bases on the coast of Great Britain and France.

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6. The four types of operations mentioned in the paragraph above, divide logically into two general classes as follows:

(1) The operations of battleships in cooperation with the British fleet and the operations of the mine force are distinctly high sea operations.

(2) The operations of the force engaged in antisubmarine operations for the protection of transports and trade, and of the aviation forces operating from bases on shore, are essentially of the nature of coastal or district operations.

7. This distinction between these two general classes of operations has been thoroughly recognized abroad. The high sea force—the fleet—operates under the commander in chief, while the forces engaged in antisubmarine operations in defense of trade operate under command of district commanders. Cooperation between forces of different districts is accomplished by fixed policies or orders from the Admiralty.

8. The high sea operations of the Atlantic Fleet in European waters is in an early stage of development. It is believed, however, that the future development of the operations of this fleet lies primarily in offensive high seas operations in cooperation with the British Grand Fleet.

9. The operations of that portion of the fleet engaged in antisubmarine operations for the defense of transports and trade has reached a state of development such that the methods of conducting operations; the systems of communication; and the considerations governing the cooperation with the allied forces is practically standardized.

10. Another condition which does not directly affect the operations of the fleet but which is necessarily considered in an estimate of the situation, is the necessity for a representative of the Office of Naval Operations and naval attaché at London.

THE SITUATION IN HOME WATERS.

11. The conditions existing in home waters are:

(*a*) At base 2 with the flag are the battleships available for service except Battleship Division 9.

The policies of the commander in chief, are the necessary instructions, concerning the operations of this type of vessel are complete except such changes as may be found necessary to insure efficient cooperation with allied forces, which changes can not now be made due to insufficient information and plans for such cooperation.

(*b*) The remainder of the forces operating on or from the United States Atlantic coast are comprised in the following:

(1) Cruiser force.
(2) Transport force.
(3) Submarine force.
(4) American patrol detachment.
(5) Mine force.
(6) Train.
(7) Vessels under extensive overhaul or newly commissioned.

12. The cruiser and transport forces are operating independently of direct command by the commander in chief; in most cases under direct orders from the office of naval operations. These operations have been standardized and instructions to govern their activities have been issued by the force commander.

13. The submarine force is in part, engaged abroad as a detachment of the force engaged in antisubmarine operations, and part on this coast as an independent detachment whose mission is "To train personnel for service in new vessels that may operate against the enemy." The conditions of training are such that operations in cooperation with the battleship forces is impracticable.

14. The American Patrol Detachment is operating in the Caribbean Sea and Gulf of Mexico. The primary duty of this force so far has been the examination of possible enemy submarine bases and as an assistance to diplomacy in Central America and Mexico. The operations of this force have for the most part been carried on under orders direct from the Office of Naval Operations. The future operations of this detachment will probably be the same unless enemy submarines appear on this coast, in which case this detachment would probably be assigned to duty in connection with naval district forces.

15. The mine force, although still on this coast, is preparing for distant service, and its operations have been previously discussed.

16. Most of the vessels of the train have been detached for service abroad. At present there remains at the fleet base only the *Vestal*. One collier and two supply ships are operating for the battleship forces, but one of these has just been called upon for temporary service abroad. This situation makes the value of the train commander practically negligible.

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17. The vessels under extensive overhaul and newly commissioned except battleships, will probably have little time to train before being sent abroad. Such time as is allowed will be sufficient only to shake down to develop individual efficiency.

CONCLUSION AS TO THE SITUATION.

18. The preceding analysis of the situation in Europe and in home waters indicates that:

(*a*) There are two distinct types of operations in progress in European waters in which the forces of the Atlantic Fleet are engaged: (1) high sea operations; (2) antisubmarine operations for the protection of transports and trade.

(*b*) There is an important duty to be performed as the representative of the Office of Naval Operations and as naval attaché at London.

(*c*) That active command by the commander in chief, or direct supervision by him over the operations of those units of the fleet based on and operating from the United States Atlantic coast, is not now essential to their efficient development in accordance with their respective missions.

THE MISSION.

19. The mission adopted is: "To insure maximum efficiency in the command and administration of the task forces of the Atlantic Fleet engaged in operations against the enemy."

20. In the preceding analysis of the situation the conclusion was reached that the following functions must be performed in Europe to insure efficiency in the present operations of the Fleet and in the development of future operations in cooperation with the naval forces of the Allies:

(*a*) Command of the forces engaged in high-sea operations.

(*b*) Command of the force of the Fleet engaged in antisubmarine operations for the protection of the transports and trade.

(*c*) Representative of the Office of Naval Operations and naval attaché at London.

HIGH-SEA OPERATIONS.

21. The operations of Battleship Division 9 and of such other battleships as may be assigned to service abroad, and of the mine force, are essentially high-sea operations and are in no manner allied to the operations of the force now engaged in antisubmarine operations for the protection of transports and trade.

22. The effective cooperation of the forces engaged in antisubmarine operations was materially advanced by the presence of the commander of that force in Europe for some time previous to the arrival of any of his force. His proximity to the force with which such operations were to be coordinated and to the Admiralty in London, where the plans for such operations were formulated, permitted him to make detailed plans for such cooperation and insured its effectiveness with the least possible delay.

23. Plans for the cooperation of high-sea forces likewise should be developed. Such plans are of much wider scope, much more complicated, and the failure in such cooperation would be attended by much more serious results.

24. The future developments of the operation of the Atlantic Fleet in European waters is believed to lie primarily along the line of offensive high sea opeartions. If the North Sea and Channel mine barrages are effective, the submarine menace to transports and trade will be reduced, and much of the force now engaged in antisubmarine operations will become available for high sea operations. It is considered probable that an effective mine barrage will lead to offensive high sea operations by the German fleet. If the mine barrage is not effective it may become necessary to adopt a policy requiring offensive high sea operations against the enemy submarine bases.

25. The opinion expressed above is confirmed by the mission assigned by the department to the vessels of battleship force 2—"To maintain themselves in instant readiness for battle."

26. This mission can be accomplished under present conditions if cooperation with allied forces is not implied, but it should be thoroughly understood that there are no accepted plans for cooperation with any allied navy in high sea operations. Efficient cooperation will require many changes in the methods of maneuvering, signaling, radio procedure, etc., and until such plans are made effective cooperation is impossible.

27. The commander in chief has endeavored to make the tactics employed by the battleship forces similar in principle to those employed by the British Grand Fleet, with the idea of future cooperation in view, but the detailed plans for combined operations which would be required for effective cooperation do not exist. The

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duty of formulating these plans can be performed only by the officer who is to direct and supervise the operations of the high sea forces, and can only be accomplished from a location in Europe in proximity to the force with which such operations are to be coordinated, and within reasonable distance of London where plans for allied naval oprations are formulated.

28. In view of the facts expressed above it appears that the mission of the commander in chief—"To prepare the fleet for, and to successfully conduct war"—can only be advanced toward accomplishment by a change in the present conditions, such that he will be in position to plan for the cooperation of the high sea forces with those of the allied navies.

29. The development of the high sea operations should be directed and supervised by the officer whose position and experience best fits him for this duty. Such officer should be the commander in chief of the fleet. Personal considerations should not be permitted to interfere with the selection of the officer under whom such development is to take place, and this selection should be made immediately.

ANTISUBMARINE OPERATIONS FOR THE PROTECTION OF TRANSPORTS AND TRADE.

30. The detachments of the force engaged in these operations are based at Queenstown, on the French coast, at Gibraltar, and at the Azores. The aviation detachments will operate from bases on the coasts of Great Britain and France.

31. The operations of this force are primarily antisubmarine operations, and although the destroyers of this force operate well at sea, the distribution of the force, the nature of their employment, and the nature of command required makes these operations essentially coastal operations. This fact is recognized by the British and French admiralties, and similar forces of these navies are under command of district commanders. The cooperation of the forces of several districts are governed by fixed policies or by orders from the respective admiralties. Forces engaged in this type of operations are distinct from high sea forces except in the immediate vicinity of the fleet bases.

32. Efficiency in this type of operations requires an organization similar to that of the naval districts of the United States, and it is believed that the present organization of this force is of this character. The exercise of command by its commander should be governed by the same principles as would govern the control of district forces by the Navy Department.

33. The relations between this force and the commander in chief should remain as at present prescribed by Operations letter 20392–640 of July 2, 1917, but it should be recognized that when the commander in chief is in European waters he has authority, in case of emergency, to divert such part of this force as may be required for offensive operations with the high sea force, for which diversion the commander in chief would assume full responsibility.

34. The preceding consideration of the duties and organization of the forces engaged in antisubmarine operations for the protection of transports and trade indicates that no change is necessary or desirable.

REPRESENTATIVE OF THE OFFICE OF NAVAL OPERATIONS AND NAVAL ATTACHÉ.

35. A consideration of the functions of the representative of the Office of Naval Operations at the Admiralty in London is required in this estimate only in order that the relations between this officer and the commanders of naval forces operating abroad may be carefully considered in order to avoid misunderstandings. The functions of a naval attaché are well defined and do not conflict with those of commanders of forces.

36. The status of this representative appears to be that of an assistant to the chief of naval operations to whom has been delegated the authority to communicate direct with the British Admiralty and with forces operating abroad. At present this last is simplified by the dual capactiy of this officer as commander of United States naval forces operating in European waters and as representative of the Office of Naval Operations in London.

37. It should be recognized that the function of the representative of the Office of Naval Operations is distinct from that of the naval forces, and there appears to be no probability of misunderstandings so long as this distinction is kept in mind.

38. The necessity for such a representative is apparent and a change in the functions of this officer, or even in the personality of this officer, would not be conducive to efficiency.

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CONCLUSION.

39. In order to insure the efficient development of the operations of the Atlantic Fleet in European waters, it is necessary to recognize three distinct functions to be exercised aborad by high ranking officers of the United States Navy:

(*a*) Command of forces engaged in high sea operations. This function undoubtedly belongs to the commander in chief of the fleet.

(*b*) Command of the forces engaged in antisubmarine operations for the protection of transports and trade.

(*c*) Representative of the Office of Naval Operations and naval attaché at London.

(Functions (*b*) and (*c*) are now being performed by Vice Admiral Sims.)

40. The commander in chief should perform the following:

(1) Supervise the development and cooperation of the forces engaged in high sea operations, and assist in the formulation of plans for future high sea operations.

(2) In cooperation with the British commander in chief, make plans for the cooperation of such high-sea forces as may be available for such operations.

(3) Direct such changes in the present methods of conducting operations, of radio procedure, signaling, etc., as may be required to facilitate immediate cooperation by the battleships and such other types of vessels as may later become available for high-sea operations.

(4) Assume active command of the United States forces cooperating with the British Grand Fleet or other allied high-sea force when the strength of the United States force reaches that of a squadron.

(5) Assume active command of any independent high-sea operation to be performed by United States vessels of more than one type.

41. The commander of the forces engaged in coastal operations should conduct the operations of that force in identically the same manner as it is being conducted now. The only change in the status of the commander of this force would be that battleship division 9, now assigned to his force, and the supervision of plans concerning the operations of the mine force now under his jurisdiction would be transferred to the jurisdiction of the commander in chief.

42. The representative of the Office of Naval Operations should conduct the functions of that office exactly the same as it is being conducted at present. He should be permitted to address to the force commanders such communications as would normally be addressed to commanders of fleet forces by the Office of Naval Operations without reference to the commander in chief, except that orders should not be sent direct to forces engaged in high-sea operations unless they are repetitions of orders received from the Office of Naval Operations in Washington, in which case copies should be sent to the commander in chief.

43. Questions of policy affecting the general conduct of operations or the particular operations of the high-sea forces should be referred to the commander in chief for his recommendation before action is taken by the representative of the Office of Naval Operations in London.

44. The only difficulty to be anticipated in home waters is the necessity for the administration of forces remaining there. This can best be met by assigning the senior vice admiral in home waters as "senior officer in home waters" and delegating to him authority to act for the commander in chief in matters pertaining to forces in home waters.

DECISIONS.

45 (*a*) The commander in chief should proceed immediately to his present flagship, to a base in proximity to the British Grand Fleet, and within reasonable distance of London.

(*b*) The force in European waters at present engaged in antisubmarine operations for the protection of transports and trade should continue its operations under existing conditions.

(*c*) Battleship division 9 and the mine force should be assigned as task forces of the fleet, independent of the force engaged in antisubmarine operations.

(*d*) Designate the senior vice admiral in home waters as "senior officer home waters," and delegate to him authority to act for the commander in chief in matters pertaining to forces in home waters.

(*e*) The representative of the Office of Naval Operations to conduct the functions of that office exactly the same as it is being conducted now. He should be authorized to send direct to task-force commanders such communication as would ordinarily be addressed to the commander of a fleet force by the Office of Naval Operations without reference to the commander in chief, except that orders to forces engaged in high-sea

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operations should not be issued except when they are repetitions from the Office of Naval Operations in Washington, in which case copies should be furnished to the commander in chief.

46. Approval of the decisions reached in this estimate of the situation is requested.

H. T. MAYO,
Admiral United States Navy.

[Secret.]

UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET,
U. S. S. "PENNSYLVANIA," FLAGSHIP,
Base Two, April 12, 1918.

From: Commander in chief.
To: Secretary of the Navy (Operations).
Subject: Developments and operations of battleship forces of the Atlantic Fleet.
Reference: (*a*) C. in C. Secret File, February 2, 1918, subject: "Estimate of the situation with regard to the efficient development of the operations of the Atlantic Fleet."

1. In February, 1918, the commander in chief submitted reference (*a*), in which the following decisions were reached:

(*a*) The commander in chief should proceed immediately in his present flagship to a base in proximity to the British Grand Fleet, and within reasonable distance of London.

(*b*) The force in European waters at present engaged in antisubmarine operations for the protection of transports and trade should continue its operations under existing conditions.

(*c*) Battleship division 9 and the mine force should be assigned as task forces of the fleet, independent of the force engaged in antisubmarine operations.

(*d*) Designate the senior vice admiral in home waters as "Senior officer home waters" and delegate to him authority to act for the commander in chief in matters pertaining to forces in home waters.

(*e*) The representative of the Office of Naval Operations to conduct the functions of that office exactly the same as it is being conducted now. He should be authorized to send direct to task force commanders such communications as would ordinarily be addressed to the commander of a fleet force by the Office of Naval Operations without reference to the commander in chief, except that orders to forces engaged in high-seas operations should not be issued except when they are repetitions from the Office of Naval Operations in Washington, in which case copies should be furnished to the commander in chief.

2. The request for the approval of the decisions reached in this estimate are hereby renewed and enlarged. The general situation in Europe to-day is similar to that existing at the time when the estimate of the situation of reference (*a*) was made, except that the military situation is more serious and the terrific intensity of the German military effort indicates what is generally conceded—that Germany's maximum effort is to be exerted this summer.

3. It is reasonable to suppose that this tremendous military effort will be accompanied by a similar naval effort. An estimate of how this naval effort may develop should be carefully made and consideration given to the desirability of supporting the present allied naval forces in European waters by United States battleship forces.

4. It would be a serious mistake to consider that the German Navy has acknowledged defeat. The German Navy is jealous of its reputation and skill and it may be considered a certainty that Germany will never acknowledge defeat without making at least one more effort to gain at least a partial control of the sea.

5. The initiative of the German nation in the development of material for use in war has been superior to that of the Allies and it is not unreasonable to suppose that when the German Fleet again accepts an engagement that the British Grand Fleet will be subjected to attack by weapons of new inventions or old ones greatly developed.

6. The inventions which may be developed for practical use are: (*a*) The torpedo plane, (*b*) antitorpedo protection, (*c*) gas shells.

7. The torpedo plane: The torpedo plane has been long advocated as an auxiliary of naval warfare. Reports indicate that it has been successfully used by the Germans during the past summer against merchant ships in the North Sea. The British Admiralty has ordered 100 such planes for the service of the British Grand Fleet. It is more than probable that in the next major naval engagement the torpedo plane will play an important part provided suitable means for transportation can be developed or the action should take place in or near waters adjacent to German territory or to alien territory now occupied by Germany.

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8. Antitorpedo protection: The fact that many German ships which have been torpedoed have succeeded in returning to port may indicate that some additional protection against torpedoes has been devised. It has been reported that nearly all stores have been removed from the German ships other than those required for a short cruise. It has been reported also that the crews usually reside in barracks and take on board with them only such necessities as are required for use during the short cruises they make.

9. The reduction in weight thus made has probably been equalized by additional watertight bulkheads, blisters, etc., with a view to protection against torpedoes. The exact value of such protection can not be estimated but it is logical to suppose that ships so fitted can withstand torpedoes to a greater extent than can the British or United States battelships which, by the nature of their service, require large storerooms and fuel capacity.

10. Gas shells: This term is used in its broadest sense to apply to all forms of gas attack. It is well known that the gas shells used by the Germans in land warfare are successful and it can be demonstrated that a gas element can be inserted in naval armor-piercing shell without loss of penetration or fragmentation. It is only reasonable to suppose that the next major naval action will find the gas shell in evidence and in addition to the gas shell possibly smoke boxes producing gas clouds of material size and density.

11. The above developments of naval weapons and ship protection may reasonably be expected and the initiative of the German nation in technical and military development makes it probable that when such development is satisfactory the German Fleet will again attempt to secure command of the sea.

12. Possible plan: In formulating a plan of action one of the first considerations should be to determine—

(*a*) Which of the weapons possessed will be the most effective against the enemy.

(*b*) Which weapon possessed by the enemy will be most effective against our own force.

The weapons which may be considered available are: (*a*) The gun, (*b*) the torpedo, (*c*) the mine.

Considering these weapons from the point of view of the German and assuming that the developments above have been perfected by them, the analysis of the above questions is as follows:

Past experience in action with the British fleet has demonstrated that:

(*a*) With regard to gunfire (1) the German Navy is slightly superior in the ability to hit in the early stages of an engagement; (2) that this superiority does not exist long; (3) that the German guns are too small caliber; (4) that the superiority of the British fleet in numbers of ships and guns and superior size of guns makes a gun action of long duration disadvantageous to the German Navy.

(*b*) With regard to torpedoes (1) German torpedoes are probably better than British torpedoes; (2) that due to excessive use of torpedoes in submarines German torpedo personnel is better than British; (3) that the number of submarines which can be made available in any chosen locality at a chosen time is superior to the number of British submarines which could be concentrated after the information was obtained by them; (4) that at present the development of the torpedo plans by the German Navy is much superior to the British; (5) that the torpedo protection afforded ships of the German Navy is superior to that of the British.

(*c*) The mine: The Germans are undoubtedly aware of the development of the mine by the Allies and of the contemplated mine barrages. They realize that surface control of the area to be mined is a necessity. Therefore to prevent the further development of the mine barrage a victory on the surface of the sea is essential.

13. The above conclusions, briefly summarized, are as follows:

(*a*) In order to prevent the development of the mine barrage, which may defeat their submarine campaign, a victory over the British Grand Fleet is essential.

(*b*) The inferiority of the German high seas fleet makes an action in which gunfire plays the major part disadvantageous.

(*c*) An action in which the torpedo plays the major part would be advantageous to the German Navy.

How can an action in which the torpedo will play the major part be developed?

In order to develop an action in which the torpedo is to play a major part, the following must be available:

The high sea fleet.
Maximum number of submarines.
Maximum number of destroyers.
Maximum number of torpedo planes.

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14. Such an action can not be developed unless—
(*a*) The Germans can select the place and time.
(*b*) The British fleet can not decline the engagement.
(*c*) The location is such as to insure the arrival of the high sea fleet intact and close enough to the German coast or territory controlled by Germany to be within the radius of action of her torpedo planes.

15. The governing features of the locations mentioned above indicate that the location must be in the vicinity of the English Channel in order that the torpedo planes may use Ostend and Zeebrugge for bases.

16. The earliest time is, of course, dependent upon the development of the weapons. It is reasonable to suppose that a government which has prepared such a powerful military offensive as that now in progress can equally well prepare the much simpler naval offensive.

17. Germany must realize that this is the crucial year of the war, for the next year the United States Army will turn the balance in favor of the Allies.

18. Military principles demand a naval offensive in conjunction with the military offensive in order that if either fails the success of the other can counterbalance the moral effect of partial defeat.

19. A successful naval campaign against the lines of communication in the channel would drive France and Italy out of the war. The stake is large and the enemy has shown a willingness to accept great sacrifices to obtain the desired result.

20. A naval offensive against the channel ports and traffic would without question bring the British grand fleet into the area selected and may be expected at any moment in cooperation with the army in its present offensive.

21. Reports received indicate that the German fleet is now concentrated at Wilhelmshaven. Does this mean that the last stages of preparation are in progress?

22. The British grand fleet now consists of:

Queen Elizabeth	1
Fifth battle squadron, dreadnaughts	5
Sixth battle squadron, dreadnaughts, United States	5
Fourth battle squadron, dreadnaughts	9
Second battle squadron, dreadnaughts	9
First battle squadron, dreadnaughts	9
First and second battle cruiser squadrons, battle cruisers	9
Total, major ships	47

23. There are available for use the following battleships of the Atlantic Fleet: *Pennsylvania*, *Arkansas*, *Arizona*, *Mississippi*, *Utah*, *Oklahoma*, *Nevada*.

24. These seven ships would increase the power of the British battle fleet by 15 per cent in the number of ships and fully 20 per cent in strength. Can this force be neglected when an engagement is probable and when enemy success might readily mean defeat in the war?

25. It has been said that the supply of these ships in European waters would entail an additional burden upon the transportation service but this should be carefully examined.

26. It will be some time before our Army can reinforce the Allies to the extent of 20 per cent of the land force and to do this we are now employing 50 ships of the transport force (Army and Navy) and most of the 59 ships of the overseas transportation force. To increase the British battle fleet 20 per cent would require only about 6 ships of the transportation force—2 supply ships and 4 tankers.

27. Allied difficulties have mostly been caused by lack of foresight. Reinforcements have been sent too late. Probable enemy campaigns have not been foreseen. This is the crucial year of the war and the Allies can not be too strong on land or sea. Is not the strength which could be added to the British battle fleet worth the sacrifice in transportation which would be entailed by the presence of the additional United States battleships on the field of battle?

28. *Decision.*—The decisions arrived at in reference (*a*) seem to have been correct, but under changed conditions should be modified to the extent that the commander in chief should proceed with his flagship and also all available superdreadnoughts of the battleship force to join and operate with the British grand fleet.

H. T. MAYO.

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AUGUST 10, 1918.

Secret.
From: Commander in chief.
To: Secretary of the Navy (Operations).
Subject: Estimate of the situation and recommendation for the employment of the Atlantic Fleet.
References: (*a*) Commander in chief's secret file 211, February 2, 1918, subject, "Estimate of the situation with regard to the efficient development of the operations of the Atlantic Fleet"; (*b*) commander in chief's secret file, April 12, 1918, subject, "Development and operations of battleship forces of the Atlantic Fleet."

1. Since submitting the above reference the military and naval operations that have taken place seem to demonstrate that the general situation is now as follows:

Military situation.—(*a*) The successful operations of the allied armies between Soissons and Rheims have definitely checked any offensive by the German armies in this vicinity for the remainder of this year.

(*b*) The withdrawal of German forces from the salients between Hangard and Morisel, and between Cantigny and Assainvillers, indicates that no offensive against Amiens is anticipated. This withdrawal was made voluntarily and these salients would not have been abandoned if offensive operations in this vicinity were contemplated. The reason for these withdrawals appears to be to strengthen their defensive positions.

(*c*) If any further offensive operations by the German armies on the west front are contemplated this year, the indications point strongly to that point of the line to the northward of Albert.

(*d*) The morale of the Teutonic armies and peoples has been greatly depressed on account of the defeat of the Austrian offensive against Italy, and the German offensive in the vicinity of the Marne.

(*e*) Any further offensive operations undertaken by the German armies this year will have for their immediate object, the restoration of the Teutonic morale. A successful operation against British and American forces will do the most to raise this morale and consequently the greatest danger, from a military point of view, is to be anticipated by an offensive against the northern part of the western front and by increased activity against transports carrying United States troops.

2. *Naval situation.*—In reference (*b*) the possibility of the German high-sea fleet attempting a major action with the British grand fleet, was discussed at some length, and the decision was reached that there was a possibility of such an operation. It was considered that such an operation would be conducted in conjunction with a military offensive against the northern part of the western front, and that in such an engagement the German fleet would undoubtedly use poison gas and the torpedo planes. The probable place for such an engagement would be the eastern end of the English Channel, in the vicinity of the German bases at Zeebrugge and Ostend, from which bases the German torpedo planes would operate.

3. In view of the possibility of such an engagement the commander in chief recommended that all United States superdreadnaughts be based in European waters to support the British grand fleet.

4. That such a campaign has not yet taken place indicates that the previous decision was wrong; or, that such operation has been delayed pending the resumption of a military offensive against the northern part of the western front; or, that the enemy is not yet prepared for such an attack; or, that some more promising plan (from this point of view) is being developed.

5. The enemy submarine campaign is decreasing in efficiency, and in view of the progress in shipbuilding there is little probability that the submarine menace will ever again approach the position of a dominating factor in the result of the war.

6. The development of the cruiser type of submarine has permitted an extension of the zone of operations, but the operations so far conducted by this type have not been sufficiently serious to warrant the belief that the development of this type will add greatly to the losses by submarines.

7. The season of the year favorable to raiding operation is now approaching, and due to the prominence lately given to the ability of the Americah troops as fighters and to the statements of the number of troops transported and the insignificant losses so far met in these operations, it is quite possible that a determined campaign against our transports is being planned.

8. Assuming that the enemy's probable intentions are to conduct the type of naval operations which will be most serious to the Allies, we must consider one of the following types of campaigns as being the most probable:

(*a*) Engage in extensive raiding operations during the fall and winter months, using submarines and all types of fast surface vessels, including major ships. This campaign directed primarily at our transports.

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(*b*) Seek engagement with the British grand fleet in the vicinity of the German bases at Zeebrugge and Ostend, in which case poison gas and torpedo planes will play an important part in the engagement.

9. In view of the above the commander in chief believes that the following should be adopted as the mission of the Atlantic Fleet:

(1) To guard all troop and mercantile trans-Atlantic convoys against German or Austrian raiders of any type (including submarines) or strength.

(2) To support the British grand fleet against any attempt of the German high-sea fleet to gain temporary control of the British Channel.

10. An estimate of the situation has been prepared with the above as a mission. A copy of the estimate is inclosed.

11. As a result of this estimate of the situation the following decisions were arrived at:

(1) To assign to the commander in chief Atlantic Fleet the mission of guarding all trans-Atlantic convoys against raiders.

(2) To base the superdreadnaughts *Pennsylvania*, *Arizona*, *Utah*, *Oklahoma*, *Nevada* (*Mississippi*, *New Mexico*, and *Idaho*, *when ready*) at Brest.

(3) To base the seven armored cruisers at Bremerhaven as scouts and eastern-ocean escorts.

(4) To base *North Dakota* and *Delaware* on home coasts, Halifax or Guantanamo, as detail plans may indicate best.

(5) To use *South Carolina*, *Michigan*, and 6 *Minnesota* type as ocean escorts for troop convoys.

(6) To base 5 *Georgia* type on home coast.

(7) The commander in chief to assume direct control over any offensive operations.

(8) To base squadron 1 and division A on home coast and operate them as training units.

H. T. MAYO.

Secret:

AUGUST 10, 1918.

File.
From: Commander in chief.
To: Secretary of the Navy (Operations).
Subject: An estimate of the naval situation in the Atlantic Ocean.
References: (*a*) C–in–C. secret file 211, February 2, 1918, subject "Estimate of the situation regard to the efficient development of the operations of the Atlantic Fleet"; (*b*) C–in–C. secret file, April 12, 1918, subject: "Development and operations of battleship forces of the Atlantic Fleet."

MISSION.

1. The adopted mission of the Atlantic Fleet is:

"(1) To guard all troop and mercantile trans-Atlantic convoys against German or Austrian raiders of any type or strength. (2) to support the British Grand Fleet against any attempt of the German High Sea Fleet to gain temporary control of the English Channel."

ENEMY STRENGTH, DISPOSITION, AND PROBABLE INTENTIONS.

2. The naval forces at the disposal of the enemy may be considered as limited to those of Germany, as the Austrian forces should be contained by the combined fleets of Italy and France.

3. These forces are organized in two main forces: (*a*) The High Sea Fleet; (*b*) the submarine forces engaged in attacks on merchant shipping and transports.

THE HIGH SEA FLEET.

4. The German High Sea Fleet is inferior to the reinforced British Grand Fleet to the extent of about one-half. This inferiority precludes much danger of an attack by the high sea fleet under normal conditions. It is therefore necessary to consider what developments could be made that might be considered to put the High Sea Fleet in condition to warrant such an engagement.

5. The only developments in naval warfare which might be considered to offset the superiority of the Grand Fleet which are known are poison gas and the torpedo plane. There is little doubt but that the next naval engagement in which the High Sea Fleet takes part will find the employment of these weapons.

6. The possibility of the German High Sea Fleet using these weapons, and the conditions under which an engagement with the British Grand Fleet might be sought,

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have been discussed at some length in reference (*b*). In this previous estimate the conclusion was reached that the German High Sea Fleet might seek an engagement with the British Grand Fleet in the vicinity of the German bases at Zeebrugge and Ostend. Mine fields so placed as to let in the path of the Grand Fleet in a southward movement have been located.

7. A campaign of this nature, in conjunction with naval raids in the Channel, or a military raid on the coast of England, might, if made in conjunction with a strong military offensive against the northern part of the battle line of the western front, assume a very threatening nature, and if even partially successful could be used to bolster up the morale of the Teutonic peoples during the coming winter.

8. In view of the possibility of such a campaign, the commander in chief, in reference (*b*), recommended that all United States superdreadnaughts should be sent to European waters to support the British Grand Fleet.

9. That such a campaign has not yet taken place indicates that the above conclusion was wrong; or, that the enemy is not yet prepared for such an attack; or, that some more promising plan (from his point of view) is being developed. The logical time for such a campaign is in cooperation with a strong military offensive against the northern part of the western front, and it can not be considered that such an opportunity will be overlooked.

10. The fact that his campaign has not yet taken place does not change the previous decision that all United States superdreadnaughts should be based in European waters for the support of the British Grand Fleet, but the development of the cruiser submarine; the lateness of the season of the year, and the improbability of a sucessful military offensive by the German armies on the western front during the remainder of the season favorable to military operations, may be found to modify the decision to some extent.

CONCLUSION REGARDING THE GERMAN HIGH SEA FLEET.

11. The unfavorable turn of the military situation, from the German point of view, will probably prevent a successful military offensive against the northern part of the western front during the remainder of this year. The results of an attempt by the German High Sea Fleet could hardly be such as to insure German control of the sea against the remaining naval forces of the Allies. Such a campaign could not be justified except in conjunction with a strong military offensive, in which case interference with cross-channel transportation, which might accrue from temporary control of the channel, might offer adequate returns. It may be reasonably concluded that no such campaign will be attempted, although the possibility of such a campaign must not be lost sight of, and the disposition of the United States forces, superdreadnaughts and destroyers suitable for a major fleet action, must be such as to offer a chance to support the British Grand Fleet in case of such a campaign, and to prevent the German Navy from gaining even a temporary control of the English Channel.

THE ENEMY SUBMARINE FORCES ENGAGED IN DESTRUCTION OF COMMERCE AND TRANSPORTATION.

12. The results of the enemy submarine campaign against commerce and transports have undoubtedly been disappointing to them, and with the increase in the antisubmarine craft, and more efficient weapons for use against submarines, it is practically assured that the result of the war can no longer be considered to depend upon losses by submarine operations.

13. The tonnage available for the transportation of troops is, however, not much greater than absolutely necessary for the prosecution of the war, and a large part of the building program of both the United States and the Allies is composed of vessels which will not be suitable for troop transportation.

14. Antisubmarine operations can not therefore be replaced, but must be pressed with greater vigor due to the increased area in which this type of craft is now operating.

15. The development of the cruiser submarine has so increased the area of the submarine operations that destroyer escort for troops convoys throughout the entire trans-Atlantic voyage is desirable. Destroyer escort for merchant convoys throughout the entire voyage is also desirable, but on account of the number of destroyers required, not, as yet, practicable.

CONCLUSION REGARDING ENEMY SUBMARINE ACTIVITIES.

16. Although the efficiency of the enemy's submarine campaign is decreasing, and the construction of new tonnage is such as to practically insure adequate available tonnage for the transportation of supplies to the allied armies and nations, the tonnage available for transport of troops is no greater than that required for success.

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17. The development of the cruiser submarine has greatly increased the area in which vessels are subject to submarine attack.

18. Successful operations against transports carrying United States troops will be especially valuable to the enemy in raising his morale.

19. Every endeavor should be exerted to prevent successful submarine operations by the enemy, but in view of the greater moral effect of successful operations against our transports, the greatest stress should be placed upon the protection of all troop convoys.

OTHER TYPE OF OPERATIONS WHICH MIGHT BE ATTEMPTED.

20. Outside of the two types of operations which have been discussed above, there appears to be but one other general type of operations which might offer success, namely, extensive raiding operations against transports and merchant ships, using surface craft alone or in combination with submarine craft.

21. Considering first operations surface craft alone, we may say that there are four types of vessels to be considered: (*a*) Converted merchant shipping, (*b*) light or protected cruisers, (*c*) major ships, and (*d*) destroyers.

22. (*a*) Converted merchant shipping: This type has, except in the North Sea, been the only type of raider employed since the destruction of the German light cruisers so employed in the early part of the war. The advantage of this type lies in their harmless appearance and in the possibility of disguise. The disadvantage lies in their low speed and inferior fighting power.

23. Converted merchant shipping may be employed but the fighting power of such craft would not be sufficient to overcome the usual ocean escort, and consequently are not to be feared as a decisive factor.

24. (*b*) Light and unprotected cruisers: Vessels of these types have a real value in major action with the fleet and the use of such ships as raiders would indicate that an attempt to fight a major action with the British Grand Fleet has been abandoned. These types have the advantage of speed and fighting power, as compared to merchant raiders, but are without the latter's advantage of disguise. The fighting power of these vessels is inadequate to the destruction of the average ocean escort, and their fuel capacity is not sufficient to give them a great radius of action.

25. Vessels of these types would experience more difficulty in gaining the sea than would merchant shipping, because their character would at once become evident. They have insufficient fighting strength to force their way through the light forces that might be encountered. Their one advantage is speed. Because of their inferior power, however, attacks by either of these types can not in all probability, result in such serious losses as to affect the successful issue of the war.

26. (*c*) Major ships: In this class are included battleships and battle cruisers. Vessels of either of these types would experience considerable difficulty in getting to sea unobserved, but due to their strength would be able to fight their way through the observation forces. After gaining the sea they would be difficult to locate, and due to their strength as compared to most ocean escorts would be able to attack advantageously any convoys of merchant ships or transports that might be encountered, unless the ocean escort is greatly strengthened.

27. The great disadvantage in the use of this type for raiding is the danger that they will be cut off from their bases and be sunk by superior forces, or that they will become derelict through the exhaustion of their fuel. The disaster which might be brought upon a convoy of troop ships by an encounter with a vessel of this type, and the great influence upon the morale that a successful operation of this nature might have upon the Teutonic peoples, make the consideration of this type of operation most necessary.

28. The great superiority of the Allies in major ships can not be employed more advantageously than by assuring the safety of transports carrying United States troops to France.

29. (*d*) Destroyers: This type have not been used in raiding expeditions except in the North Sea. The limited radius of action and the inferior fighting capacity of the German destroyer compared to the modern British or United States destroyer will probably prevent their use in the Atlantic, though raids in the channel are possible. Such raids in the channel could in all probability be successfully countered by the British without assistance from our destroyers.

COMBINED OPERATIONS OF SURFACE CRAFT AND SUBMARINES.

30. The development of the cruiser submarine affords the enemy a type of vessel particularly adapted to scouting operations. If submarines do not attack, their presence can not be readily detected and, although their radio could be heard, it would

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be difficult to keep such a vessel from tracking a convoy, particularly before the destroyers joined the escort.

31. Additional smaller submarines previously directed to the positions in which the battle cruiser expected to fuel would operate as a scouting force during such time as fueling was in progress.

32. This combined operation has many advantages and appears to be the most logical procedure, provided the battle cruisers can get to sea.

CONCLUSIONS WITH REGARD TO RAIDERS IN THE ATLANTIC.

33. The possibility of successful operations against convoys of troop ships appears to be the principal menace to the successful prosecution of the war by the Allies, and every available vessel that can be successfully employed to insure their safety should be so employed.

34. The possible operations of the German Navy against which the United States Navy must prepare are:

(1) Submarine operations against transports and merchant shipping.

(2) Raiding operations by all types of surface craft, but primarily by major ships or converted merchant ships.

(3) An attempt of the German High Sea Fleet to gain temporary control of the English Channel with a view to forcing the British Grand Fleet to fight a decisive action at a point selected by the Germans.

CONSIDERATION OF OUR OWN FORCES—STRENGTH, DISPOSITION, AND COURSE OF ACTION OPEN TO US.

35. The distribution of the forces of the Atlantic Fleet at present is based upon a general plan which, to some extent, has been governed by a consideration of all types of possible operations of the enemy considered in the preceding paragraph. Such reconsideration as is deemed necessary is due to the changed conditions which were enumerated in the consideration of the general situation from which the present mission of the Atlantic Fleet was adopted.

36. The present policy with regard to the antisubmarine forces of the Atlantic Fleet is satisfactory, and the disposition of these forces appears to be efficient. No change in policy or disposition of these forces is recommended, except that, in view of the greater danger from raiders, or from a temporary control of the English Channel by the German High Sea Fleet, it should be constantly kept in mind that when and where necessary, destroyers should be withdrawn from antisubmarines escort to engage in antiraider or major fleet operations.

37. The British Grand Fleet has been reinforced by battleship division 9. Such reinforcement is considered insufficient in case the German High Sea Fleet should be able to bring the Grand Fleet to action in a position, and at a place, chosen by the Germans, if, as is anticipated in case of a major action the Germans will be equipped with poison gas and torpedo planes.

38. Further reinforcement of the British Grand Fleet is considered desirable, but in view of the danger of raiders passing out of the English Channel a strategic concentration may be deemed sufficient. The disposition of the remaining dreadnoughts of the United States Atlantic Fleet should therefore be such as to insure the maximum protection against the raiders while maintaining a strategic concentration with the British Grand Fleet.

39. The remaining forces of the Atlantic Fleet may be enumerated as follows:

(*a*) *North Dakota* and *Delaware*.

(*b*) Battleships of battleship force 1 (including division 5).

(*c*) Cruiser force.

40. All of these vessels should be used in such manner as to afford the greatest protection to convoys of troopships and merchant ships.

41. The changes in disposition of forces should therefore be based upon the following decision:

(*a*) All superdreadnoughts are to be based where they will be strategically concentrated with the British Grand Fleet in the event of a major action near the eastern entrance to the English Channel.

(*b*) The *Delaware* and *North Dakota* to be based with the superdreadnoughts or elsewhere as may appear desirable.

(*c*) The predreadnought battleships to be based and operated in the manner most efficient for the protection of trans-Atlantic convoys, against surface raiders.

(*d*) The cruiser force to be based and operated in the manner most efficient for the protection of trans-Atlantic convoys against surface raiders.

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CONSIDERATION OF BASES SUITABLE FOR DREADNAUGHTS AND THE NATURE OF THEIR OPERATIONS.

42. The probable locality of a major engagement is considered to be the vicinity of the German bases at Zeebrugge and Ostend. Action in this vicinity could be forced upon the British Grand Fleet by a naval raid in the Channel or by a military raid on the coast of England, in the vicinity of London.

43. In the following consideration of bases, Kentish Knock has been considered as the probable locality of such a major fleet action.

44. The distance from Kentish Knock to Rosyth is about 390 miles. To be strategically concentrated with the British Grand Fleet, the base of the United States superdreadnaughts must be within this distance of Kentish Knock.

45. Within 390 miles of Kentish Knock there are not suitable bases except the channel ports and Brest. The channel ports of both Great Britain and France are overcrowded now, and the basing of a squadron of dreadnaughts on any of these ports would probably seriously interfere with cross-channel traffic. The Brest roads are 360 miles from Kentish Knock and from all data at hand appear to offer a satisfactory base.

46. In case the British Grand Fleet is based at Scapa, the distance of our base from Kentish Knock can be increased without destroying the strategic concentration. This increase in distance furnishes no additional bases for consideration except Berehaven. Berehaven lacks many of the advantages of Brest as regards questions of communication, supply, and fuel, and in the event of operations against battle cruiser raiders in the channel is not so well situated as Brest.

47. In the further consideration of a plan for the accomplishment of the mission of the fleet it will be assumed that the superdreadnaughts are to base on Brest.

ENEMY RAIDING OPERATIONS.

48. Provisions adequate for the protection of our transports against operations by the battle cruisers should be sufficient to afford protection against surface raiders of other types.

ENEMY FORCES—DISPOSITION AND PROBABLE INTENTIONS.

49. The enemy may use any types of surface craft as raiders. If, however, battleships or battle cruisers are based, the number will probably not be large, whereas if merchant cruisers or light cruisers are used it is quite probable that the number of raiders out at once will be as large as they may deem advisable.

50. All enemy vessels of types suitable for use as raiders are based on the home coast of Germany.

51. There are two avenues of escape to the Atlantic Ocean from the North Sea:
(*a*) Round the north of Scotland.
(*b*) Through the English Channel.

52. (*a*) Has the advantages of—
(1) More sea room.
(2) Avoids British torpedo craft bases.
(3) Norwegian territorial waters can be used to assist in avoiding mines.
(4) Longer period of darkness in each day.
(5) More chance of evasion.
(*a*) Has the disadvantages of—
(1) Leading nearer to main bases of British Grand Fleet.
(2) Being farthest from the probable convoy routes.
(3) Being the obvious way.
(*b*) Has the advantages of—
(1) Surface craft of equal power will not be met unless the United States dreadnaughts are based on the vicinity of the English Channel.
(2) Nearest way to the transport routes.
(3) Least obvious way.
(*b*) Has the disadvantage of—
(1) Greater danger from mines.
(2) Greater danger from torpedo crafts.
(3) More likelihood of being sighted.
(4) Fewer hours of darkness.

54. There does not seem to be much choice between the two routes. The greater danger in the passage of the English Channel, is the danger from mines. Undoubtedly the German vessels are fitted with paravanes and in addition to those, high speed sweeps carried by destroyers would undoubtedly be used to sweep up the mines. The

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battle cruiser would no doubt be screened also by a strong screen of destroyers and light cruisers in sufficient strength to fight off any British forces of light vessels based in the vicinity of the channel.

55. In case of an attempt to pass north about, the battle cruisers will attempt to take full advantage of darkness and fog. It is quite possible that the German High Sea Fleet might make a demonstration in the vicinity of the British coast in order to draw the British battle cruisers and destroyers away from the northern area during the passage of the battle cruiser.

58. In view of the probability that the first attempt of this nature will be the most successful, it is quite within the probabilities that attempts to pass out by both routes may be made simultaneously.

57. The German High Sea Fleet may be expected to make demonstrations against the British coast during the period that the battle cruisers are out, in order to prevent the detachment of British battle cruisers to participate in antiraider operations.

58. As a force of at least six battle cruisers would be required to have a chance of success in running down the enemy battle cruiser, it is extremely doubtful if the British Grand Fleet would be willing to sacrifice that strength to hunting raiders.

59. The cruising radius of the latest German battle cruisers is sufficient to permit them to reach the West Indies at a speed of 20 knots after steaming 24 hours at 25 knots during their escape. They would still have about 15 per cent of their fuel capacity remaining.

60. The problem of legistics would be a most serious one with them and the logical course appears to be to fit out one or more of their larger merchant ships to act as tender and collier.

61. There are available for this:

(*a*) The *Imperator*, 52,000 tons, 25 knots speed.

(*b*) The *Columbus*, 40,000 tons, 21½ knots speed, and possibly—

(*c*) The *Hindenburg*, 40,000 tons, 21½ knots speed, which vessel was building in 1916.

OWN FORCES, DISPOSITION AND COURSE OF ACTION.

62. Our forces would consist of:

(*a*) Eight superdreadnoughts, based on Brest.

(*b*) *North Dakota* and *Delaware*.

(*c*) Two *Michigan* type, six *Minnesota* type.

(*d*) Five *Georgia* type.

(*e*) Seven armored cruisers.

(*f*) Squadron one battleship force, and division A assigned to training and coast defense.

63. There are two courses of action:

(*a*) Strictly defensive.

(*b*) Strictly offensive.

64. Course (*a*) is by far the simplest and would consist in supporting the ocean escorts by dreadnoughts whenever it is considered that an enemy battle cruiser may be out.

This course would lead eventually to a permanent escourt of dreadnoughts for all convoys of troop ships, but would not prevent the destruction of a perhaps vital amount of shipping not under such escort. It would permit the freedom of the sea to the enemy battle cruiser.

65. Course (*b*) would be to operate defensively with regard to the one or two troop convoys nearest Europe and offensively with the remaining dreadnaughts and such destroyers and other vessels as might be available, to run down this raider. It is quite true that battleships can not overtake a battle cruiser, but constant pursuit would prevent the battle cruiser stopping to fuel and consequently soon exhaust her fuel supply.

66. In case of a passage through the Channel, the dreadnaughts and such destroyers as might be available should be able to intercept and defeat or drive back the battle cruiser before she cleared the western end of the Channel.

67. A battle cruiser gaining the sea north about will be more difficult to locate and scouts and destroyers will be required to assist the dreadnaughts.

68. The vessels of our Navy most suitable for this are the armored cruisers. It is recognized that they are of inferior speed and power to a battle cruiser, but such a vessel on a raiding expedition would not desire to expend fuel in chasing down scouts. She would not know into what she was being led and would be wary about following a scout.

69. By substituting the *South Carolina* and *Michigan* and six *Minnesota* type for the armored cruisers as ocean escorts, these cruisers can be made available for scouting and, if necessary, relieving the ocean escorts on the eastern end of the voyage.

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70. The *North Dakota* and *Delaware* could be based on Halifax or Guantanamo or on the home coast. Their primary duty being to guard the western Atlantic against battle cruiser operations against the coast and to prevent such vessels from fueling in the western Atlantic if they are tracked to this vicinity.

71. The five *Georgia* type would assist the *North Dakota* and *Delaware* in defense of the coast. The radius of action of these vessels is probably insufficient to permit their efficient use as ocean escorts.

DECISIONS.

72. (1) To assign to the commander in chief Atlantic Fleet the mission of guarding all trans-Atlantic convoys against raiders.

(2) To base the superdreadnoughts *Pennsylvania*, *Arizona*, *Utah*, *Oklahoma*, *Nevada* (*Mississippi*, *New Mexico*, *and Idaho* when ready) at Brest.

(3) To base the seven armored cruisers at Berehaven as scouts and eastern ocean escorts.

(4) To base *North Dakota* and *Delaware* on home coast, Halifax or Guantanamo, as detail plans may indicate best.

(5) To use *South Carolina*, *Michigan*, and *Minnesota* type as ocean escorts and troop convoys.

(6) To base five *Georgia* type on home coast.

(7) The commander in chief to assume direct control over offensive antiraider operations.

(8) To base squadron one and division A on home coast and operate them as training units.

[Secret.]

UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET,
U. S. "PENNSYLVANIA," FLAGSHIP,
June 17, 1918.

From: Commander in chief, Atlantic Fleet.
To: Secretary of the Navy (Operations).
Subject: Visit of inspection and observation to Atlantic Fleet in European waters.
References:

(*a*) C-in-C letter file 1445, 13 June, 1917, to Sec. Navy (Op.) re "Status of naval forces operating in the Atlantic."
(*b*) CNO let. file 28754-20:46, 9 July, 1917, to C-in-C in reply to reference (*a*);
(*c*) CNO letter file 20392-648, 2 July, 1917, to commander United States naval forces operating in European waters re "Assignment of United States naval forces operating in European waters to Atlantic Fleet"—an inclosure with reference (*b*).
(*d*) CNO let. file 29392-649, 3 July, 1917, to commander convoy operations in the Atlantic re "Forces engaged in convoy operations in the Atlantic attached to the Atlantic Fleet"—an inclosure with reference (*b*).
(*e*) Art. 1652 Navy Regulations, Paris (*b*), (*c*), (*d*).
(*f*) Art. 901 Naval Instructions.
(*g*) C-in-C let. file 8010, 11 Oct., 1917, re "General report on visit to England and France in August-September, 1917."

Inclosures: 4—Copies of references (*a*), B (*b*), (*c*), and (*d*).

1. References (*a*), (*b*), (*c*), (*d*) define the status of all forces operating in the Atlantic generally as attached to the Atlantic Fleet, and specifically the forces operating in European waters and those engaged in convoy operations in the Atlantic.

2. references (*e*) and (*f*) deal with the duties of a commander in chief in regard to maintaining familiarity with the condition and employment and general readiness of his command.

3. The commander in chief, during his visit to England and France in the late summer of 1917, was able to comply in some measure with the requirements of references (*e*) and (*f*) in regard to those parts of the Atlantic Fleet which were then in European waters. Report to the department thereon was included in reference (*g*).

4. The report made in Reference (*g*) also includes notes and memoranda in regard to naval conditions in England and France, derived from observation and from personal contact with officers of the British Grand Fleet, of the British Admiralty, and of the French Ministry of Marine.

5. The information gained by the commander in chief in 1917 from direct contact with the allied naval administration and forces engaged in active operations furnished reliable data for the modification of the general operating conditions of the Atlantic Fleet to conform with the experience gained by the allied navies during three years of war, and notably assisted in the introduction of the new system of tactics for the handling of battleships, and also contributed largely to a comprehension of the con-

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ditions—all of which matters have rendered the Atlantic Fleet more nearly ready to cooperate with the allied navies in general and with the British Navy in particular.

6. About nine months have now elapsed since the commander in chief returned from Europe. During that time that part of the Atlantic Fleet operating in European waters has been greatly increased, notably in the case of battleships division 9 (60 battle squadron of the British Grand Fleet) and of the mine force.

7. It is believed that the benefits to be gained from a visit of inspection and observation by the commander in chief are even greater than from the trip in 1917, on account of the clearer understanding of allied aims and methods acquired from study of the information in hand and the consequent readiness to acquire further and more definite information along more advanced and more detailed lines. It is further believed that advantage should be taken of the opportunity to learn, under the most favorable conditions, and at first hand, from those who have the accumulated experience afforded by nearly four years of war—an opportunity which will probably never again be presented to us.

8. The commander in chief has therefore to recommend and to request that he and certain members of his staff be ordered to proceed to Europe for a visit of inspection and observation. In this connection, attention is invited to the following conditions:

(*a*) The *Arkansas* has been ordered to prepare for distant service; i. e., to join battleships division 9.

(*b*) The assignment of flag officers of the Atlantic Fleet in home waters to duty on the selection board, which is soon to meet, and the lack of destroyers to operate at sea with the fleet while enemy submarines are working on the Atlantic coast will largely restrict the battleship forces to ship and division work in inclosed waters for some weeks.

(*c*) The departure of the *Arkansas* deprives the commander battleship force 2 of a suitable flagship, as the *New Mexico* will not be ready for sea for some time.

(*d*) The *Pennsylvania* is due to go to the navy yard for several weeks' authorized work, and there is no relief fleet flagship.

9. The absence of the commander in chief in Europe during the months of July and August can readily be arranged for along the following lines:

(*a*) That the commander in chief and party take passage to Europe in the *Arkansas*.

(*b*) That commander battleship force 2 (second in command Atlantic Fleet) transfer to the *Pennsylvania* to handle the Atlantic Fleet during the absence of the commander in chief.

(*c*) That the *Pennsylvania* go for navy-yard work after similar work has been completed on the *Arizona*, by which time the *New Mexico* may be expected to be ready for sea.

H. T. MAYO.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, June 22, 1918.

Secret.
To: Commander in chief, United States Atlantic Fleet.
Subject: Visit of inspection and observation to Atlantic Fleet in European waters.
Reference: (*a*) Letter from commander in chief to Secretary of the Navy, dated June 17, 1918.

1. The department approves in general the recommendation of the commander in chief as contained in reference (*a*). The department, however, does not approve the departure of the commander in chief prior to the completion of the duties of the selection board. Your plans should contemplate departure as soon as possible after the work of this board has been completed.

W. S. BENSON.

MEMORANDUM RE INSPECTION AND OBSERVATION TRIP TO EUROPEAN WATERS.

1. The proposed inspection of the forces of the Atlantic Fleet now operating in European waters should cover the following:

Great Britain: Headquarters, United States naval forces, operating in European waters, London; mine force and mine-force bases; battleship division 9; destroyers based on Queenstown; air stations.

France: Force based on Brest; air stations; force based on St. Nazaire; force based on Bordeaux; force based on Gibraltar; force based on Azores.

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NOTE.—This is in no sense to be considered as an inspection of shore stations except in so far as the activities at these stations are intimately connected with the operations of the forces afloat: i. e., the fleet.

2. This trip of the commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet and a portion of his staff has for its aims:

(*a*) An inspection of the forces of the Atlantic Fleet now operating in European waters, with a view to familiarizing the commander in chief with the operations of these forces and with the conditions existing within these forces. This inspection will furnish the commander in chief with adequate information upon which to base such suggestions and recommendations regarding operations, personnel, and material, as may appear pertinent.

(*b*) To obtain first-hand information of the methods of operation of these forces, and of the methods of operation of the allied navies, in order that the training and preparation of the forces of the Atlantic Fleet now in home waters, which may soon be employed abroad, may be such as to insure early efficient cooperation with our forces now in Europe, or with any allied forces.

3. The principal points upon which information of our own forces should be obtained are:

(*a*) What type of operations are being conducted, and what efficiency has been attained by the force in the performance of these operations. If a high state of efficiency has not been attained, what is the reason for the lack of efficiency.

(*b*) What is the organization most suitable for the performance of the type of operations in progress, and how, if at all, can the organization be improved.

(*c*) In what manner can the material available be used to greater advantage, or in what manner can the material be improved.

(*d*) In what respects can the methods of communication or the material means of communication be improved.

(*e*) What changes in the methods of training and preparation of the forces in home waters will increase the efficiency of units upon their arrival in European waters.

4. With regard to the operations of the allied forces.

It is desirable to obtain as much knowledge of the methods of operation of the various types of vessels as possible. It is impossible for officers on active duty with vessels in European waters to give sufficient time to the study of this important matter except in so far as the type of vessel to which they are attached is concerned. Such officers are unfamiliar with the progress that has been made in the Atlantic Fleet in home waters during their absence. Especially valuable is the experience to be gained in the British Grand Fleet, and in the British forces operating from Harwick and Dover. Such an opportunity to learn the practices of forces which have been engaged in active operations of war for a period of four years may never again be presented and full advantage should be taken of this opportunity.

5. Vice Admiral Sims has pointed out in his weekly reports the desirability of enlarging the staff of Rear Admiral Rodman and of assigning officers to duty with the British forces operating from Harwich and Dover, in order to take advantage of this opportunity. It is considered that this request should be complied with, if practicable, in order that the United States Navy may profit to the greatest extent possible, from the opportunities presented. The greatest amount of information can be obtained in a short time and the most immediate good be derived from the information so obtained by permitting members of the staff of the commander in chief, who have been selected for their knowledge of various features of naval activities, and who are constantly in touch with the developments of these activities at home, to visit and observe the opperations of these British forces.

6. These officers, all of whom were abroad with the commander in chief last year, are sufficiently in touch with the British practices to be able to determine what changes have been made during the past year; how these changes affect the practices in our own forces in home waters; and to inquire intelligently into the details and procedures which were new to them last year. It is believed that the information that can be obtained by these officers, who are experts in their respective lines and who are familiar with the present practices at home and with previous British practices, will be most valuable to the forces of the Atlantic Fleet in home waters in preparing such forces for active cooperation with Allied naval forces.

7. Due to the fact that during the commander in chief's trip last year much of the time abroad was consumed in necessary conferences and observation trips to British and French bases, not much opportunity was offered to obtain the desired detailed knowledge of operations that was so much desired. As a result of this trip, however, many improvements were made in the tactics of the fleet, in signalling, in gunnery, and in communications. The trip was of great value to the commander in chief in familiarizing him with the actual conditions abroad, and in indicating the lines of

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activity which should be pursued by the forces in home waters in order to insure effective cooperation with the forces abroad.

8. As a result, direct or indirect, of the commander in chief's trip last year, the battleship forces have been trained with a view to joint operations with the British grand fleet, particularly along the following lines:

TACTICS.

Modifications of cruising formations. (Fleet S. O. No. 2.)
Modifications of battle instructions. (Fleet S. O. No. 2.)

GUNNERY.

Modification of rules for distribution of gunfire.
Adoption of conditions of readiness for action similar to British practices.
Increased importance of concentration emphasized.

COMMUNICATIONS.

Modifications of radio procedure.
Adoption of contact reports.
Improvement of radio and signalling material.
Organization code and signal section.

INSTRUCTION OF BATTLESHIP SIGNAL FORCES IN BRITISH SIGNALS.

9. In order that the commander in chief may profit by the knowledge and advice of his staff, it is necessary that these officers keep up to date in the developments which are constantly taking place, especially in the war zone. It is believed that, due to their familiarity with our present practices and with previous British practices, they can obtain information which will be invaluable to our forces in home waters and possibly, in some instances, convey information which will be useful to our forces and allies in Europe.

10. In view of the above, the commander in chief desires to have the following-named officers of his staff accompany him to Europe: Capt. O. P. Jackson, United States Navy, chief of staff; Commander W. S. Pye, United States Navy, war plans and fleet intelligence officer; Commander D. C. Bingham, United States Navy, training and fleet gunnery officer; Lieut. Commander A. B. Cook, United States Navy, flag lieutenant; Lieut. Commander Leigh Noyes, United States Navy, flag secretary and communication officer; Lieut. Commander H. W. McCormack, United States Navy, fleet radio officer. Only one of these officers, the flag lieutenant, will have duties of the nature of a personal staff.

(At 1 o'clock p. m. the subcommittee adjourned until to-morrow, Wednesday, March 31, 1920, at 10 o'clock a. m.)

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NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 31, 1920.

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON NAVAL AFFAIRS.
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 o'clock a. m., in room 235, Senate office Building, Senator Frederick Hale presiding.

Present: Senators Hale (chairman), Keyes, and Trammell.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. Admiral Mayo, will you continue?

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL H. T. MAYO—Resumed.

Admiral MAYO. Mr. Chairman, before any questions are asked me may I make a slight correction of my testimony?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral MAYO. I would like to insert on page 19, after line 7, the words "this subject was never again mentioned."

I want to insert on page 72, after line 4, "In December, 1917, I arranged with the department to have one officer of my staff on duty in Washington at all times in order that I might be kept better informed of conditions, plans, and operations."

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Trammell, have you any question?

Senator TRAMMELL. I have not any questions to ask the Admiral.

The CHAIRMAN. As I have stated several times in this hearing, the purposes of the committee are not to decide differences between officers of the Navy or between officers of the Navy and officials of the Navy Department, and if mistakes have been made in the course of the war, in the operation of the Navy, we want to see what we can do about rectifying those mistakes for the future.

In your final summary you stated:

> Until the Navy is provided with a definite ideal in the form of a definite statement of the foreign policies of the United States which it is to be prepared to enforce, the management of the Navy can not formulate building programs and war plans except on hypotheses as to the foreign policy of the United States.

Again you state:

> The laws and regulations under which the Navy was operating during the war and is operating today, are unsatisfactory.

On account of the great position that you occupied during the war, and on account of your great knowledge of naval matters in general, the committee would like to have you, at some future time, elaborate on this statement about the foreign policy of the country as applied to the Navy, and also to state in what particulars the

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organization of the Navy was faulty and to suggest some general plan for remedying the faults in the organization, and we shall call on you at some time in the near future to give us a statement about these matters.

Admiral MAYO. Can you give me an idea, Mr. Chairman, as to what length of time I will have in order to get that out? That is a thing that requires thought and consultation and coordination of ideas,

The CHAIRMAN. We will give you as much time as you want.

Admiral MAYO. Very well, sir; I will go at it.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is all, Admiral. We have no further matters, and you are excused.

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL BRADLEY A. FISKE.

(The witness was sworn by the chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Fiske, will you state to the committee what duties you performed from the opening of the World War in 1914 down to the date of the armistice?

Admiral FISKE. I was aid for Operations in 1914. I had been aid for Operations for about a year. I have a statement here which goes into the history of it, more or less.

The CHAIRMAN. You were aid for Operations in 1914?

Admiral FISKE. In 1914.

The CHAIRMAN. And for one year thereafter?

Admiral FISKE. I had been aid for Operations since February, 1913.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Now, Admiral, can you make a statement to the committee about matters connected with the operations of the Navy?

Admiral FISKE. I have a statement prepared, Mr. Senator, which goes back to the time when I was aid for Operations, a year or so before the war began in 1914.

The CHAIRMAN. On all matters pertinent to this investigation?

Admiral FISKE. Yes, sir. The first portion of this, the first three or four pages, may seem not pertinent, but they are. It is the groundwork on which what I say afterwards is based.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Admiral FISKE. While captain I was a member of the General Board from August, 1910, till August, 1911. During all except the first three or four months of that time I was in charge of the war plans section of the General Board, and responsible for the preparation and readiness of the war plans of the Navy under Admiral Dewey. On taking charge I was surprised to find that the war plans were extremely meager, and did not embody, it seemed to me, even 1 per cent of what war plans should embody. During the eight or nine months that I was in charge of them I did what I could to make them more full and complete; but as I had only two assistants, and we all had other work to do, and as I had had no experience or training in making war plans, I made no appreciable headway.

As there is some misunderstanding about what a war plan is, I beg leave to state that a war plan is a plan prepared in peace for the purpose of enabling a navy or army to start very quickly on any given line of conduct immediately after war is declared, by deciding on that line of conduct before war actually begins and by arranging all

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possible details in advance. If anyone will read history carefully, he will see that all the highly successful campaigns of the great commanders began so quickly after war had been declared that their opponents were taken by surprise, and that the plans had been so well thought out in advance that very few if any mistakes were made.

The first man to realize the necessity in modern times for the highly intricate and detailed war plans that the complexity of modern civilization demands was Moltke. Moltke set the pace that all other nations have had to follow since, under penalty of being defeated in war. The penalty is so great, the number of lines of action so many, and the amount of detail so enormous that a war plan at the present day, especially a naval war plan, would fill a bushel basket.

But 99 per cent of the bulk of the war plan would be not so much the plan itself as the details for carrying it out; just as the general plan of a house or building which one wishes to erect may be shown on one piece of paper, while the detail plans which a builder needs in order actually to build the house may cover many sheets.

The main plan which may be called the strategic plan, simply states, and usually briefly, the line of conduct decided on. For instance, if we were to send a naval force to attack Mozambique, it states one or more routes that are to be taken. and which route will be under certain conditions. It also prescribes the amount of force, the way in which it will be divided up, and the numbers and the kinds of units of which it will be composed. This general plan is usually decided upon after what we call chart maneuvers and war games have been carried out and decisions have been reached as to what are the best lines of action. The main features of the war plan having been decided on, the details of how to carry it out are worked out very thoroughly; such as the providing of fuel and food and ammunition. In all cases where sufficient time is allowed certain kinds of weapons, vessels, and equipments are constructed.

If sufficient time has been allowed after the coming of war had been realized, and if this time has been utilized to the best advantage, then all the various units of personnel and equipment will be waiting in absolute readiness for the instant of the declaration of war. When this declaration is finally made, and the news sent by radio telegraph to the fleet and other units, they can start to fulfill their mission immediately. I am told that the British fleet started in less than an hour after the declaration of war.

In order to prepare suitable plans of war, the Germans found out many years ago what a large body of officers experienced in making war plans was required. To this body of officers the name given in our Navy now is planning division. No planning division was started in our Navy until August 1, 1918. I beg leave to place in the record an official paper called "Organization of the Office of Naval Operations." The planning division in the office of naval operations then formed was, as will be noted on page 7 of this organization plan, not separated entirely from administrative work.

(The paper referred to is here printed in full in the record, as follows:)

ORGANIZATION OF THE OFFICE OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, AUGUST 1, 1918.

NOTE.—Every officer on duty in the Office of Naval Operations or who reports for duty in that office must familiatize himself with the details of this organization.

W. S. BENSON.

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ORGANIZATION OF OFFICE OF NAVAL OPERATIONS.

1. The duties of the Chief of Naval Operations as head of this office are defined by regulations as follows:

"There shall be a Chief of Naval Operations who shall be an officer on the active list of the Navy appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, from among the officers of the line of the Navy, not below the grade of captain, for a period of four years, who shall, under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy, be charged with the operations of the fleet and with the preparation and readiness of plans for its use in war." (Act Mar. 3, 1915; N. R. 103 (1).)

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS.

2. For administrative purposes an officer of suitable rank and experience will be designated as assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations, and he shall hold the same relation to the heads of the divisions as an executive officer of a ship holds to the heads of departments on board ship. The assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations shall not attempt to administer the details of any division.

All questions of policy and questions involving the formation of plans, or a change in plans, should first be taken up with the assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations by the head of the division concerned.

DIVISIONS OF THE OFFICE OF NAVAL OPERATIONS.

3. The primary functions of the Office of Naval Operations are:

(1) Preparation of plans and policies, and (2) operating the forces of the Navy.

The actual planning work will be carried on by the Plans Division, and the actual operations of forces will be administered under the supervision of the Chief of Naval Operations or of the assistant Chief of Naval Operations under the administrative caption "Operating forces." The other activities of the office are administered through the following divisions: Intelligence Division, Material Division, Naval Districts Division, Aviation Division, Communication Division, Gunnery Exercises and Engineering Performances Division, and Files and Records Division.

4. The heads of these divisions are authorized to administer the details of their respective divisions by direction of the Chief of Naval Operations. This delegated authority covers only the administration of approved policies and plans. The heads of divisions shall lay before the Chief of Naval Operations, in concise form, for his consideration and approval, all questions requiring his decision or involving a change in policy or plans, using their discretion as to which are of sufficient importance to first be referred to the Planning Division. The above divisions of the Office of Naval Operations exist to obtain effective administration, and the heads of the various divisions must not be allowed to overlook the fact that the final responsibility rests upon the Chief of Naval Operations, who desires and must have, at all times, a comprehensive knowledge of the activities of the several divisions.

5. Heads of divisions will submit, at regular intervals, or from time to time, as may be found most suitable, such condensed statements as will most readily enable the Chief of Naval Operations to keep intimately in touch with their activities, plans, and progress. Such information will be merely supplementary to frequent conferences with heads of divisions. In order to conserve time, conferences should be arranged through the aid to the Chief of Naval Operations or with one of his assistants.

6. The organization of the several divisions is and shall be in accordance with the approved diagrammatic plan. No additions or changes will be made in any part of this organization without the written approval of the Chief of Naval Operations. With any proposed changes, a diagram shall be submitted showing wherein the change will affect the present organization, or, if new work, where it will link with the present organization.

7. In addition to the divisions of the office, an officer of or above the rank of lieutenant commander will be designated as senior aid to the Chief of Naval Operations. Additional officers will be ordered as aids or as assistants to the aids to the Chief of Naval Operations as may be required. In addition to the duties prescribed by regulations for an aid, the senior aid to the Chief of Naval Operations will have general supervision of all rooms and office space assigned to the office; will handle all correspondence relative to officers' records and officers' orders, and other naval personnel correspondence, and will generally assist, under the assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations, in the organization of the office and the coordination of the work of the several divisions of the office with bureaus and with other departments, unless a special representative is designated.

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8. The complement of officers and clerical assistants shall be in accordance with the plan above mentioned. This shall be the "allowed complement" from which the "actual complement" may vary under the same conditions as hold in a ship's organization.

9. To explain the method of handling a subject involving the various divisions, the following may be taken as an illustration:

Certain conditions are known to exist, let us suppose, through information obtained from force commanders and detailed information obtained through Naval Intelligence. The information, with the objects to be obtained, is sent to the Planning Division. The Planning Division makes a study of the subject and calls a meeting of a certain plans committee. This committee deliberates on the information at hand and on the mission. It then prepares definite recommendations of what it proposes in order to insure the success of the mission. The matter is then taken up with the Chief of Naval Operations, and if approved by him (or the Secretary if required) is referred to Material Division, Aviation Division, and (or) Districts Division according to the requirements. These divisions proceed with the preparation of the material and personnel which may be necessary to make the approved plan effective.

Everything having been provided, and everything being in readiness for making the plan effective, the operating orders are issued (by the Division of Operating Forces) and the plan is put into effect so far as movements are concerned and forces are handled under the direction of the Chief of Naval Operations or the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations.

ORGANIZATION OF DIVISIONS.

10. *Intelligence Division (Office of Naval Intelligence).*—The Intelligence Division is charged with the collection of information for the department and for other naval activities which require it. It publishes and disseminates such information to the Navy and to Government officials requiring it. It cooperates with the other executive departments of the Government in discovering and bringing to justice persons engaged in activities against the United States. It directs all naval attaches abroad, and is the official channel of communication for all foreign naval attaches in the United States.

It is the duty of the Office of Naval Intelligence to keep in close touch with all naval activities, both in and out of the Navy Department. The office handles all classes of information excepting purely operating information, which is usually (and should always) be forwarded by the senior officer present direct to the Chief of Naval Operations. Such information is under the cognizance of the Division of Operating Forces.

11. *Planning Division.*—The organization of the Planning Division is, in general, as follows:

It will be composed of a body of selected men who shall have had special training, particularly in war staff work. It may not be practicable to separate entirely the Planning Division from certain administrative work, but the administrative work assigned to the personnel of this division must be as little as the allowance of commissioned personnel in the other divisions of the office will permit. The administrative heads of all divisions of the Office of Naval Operations are ex officio members of the Planning Division. It will not, however, be necessary for the heads of the divisions to sit on the various plans committees, except on matters in which they are interested. The plans committees shall be ordered for the considerations of various classes of papers There shall be a permanent committee consisting of the assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations, the heads of all divisions and the officers of the Planning Division.

The Chief of Naval Operations, or assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations, may name other committees for the consideration of various classes of papers and they may, at their discretion, call special plans committee meetings, the members of which may be selected by them. The personnel of special plans committees do not necessarily form a part of the Office of Naval Operations, but may be designated in addition to other duties which they are performing. The officer in the Office of Operations who is most vitally concerned an any plans under consideration by a plans committee should sit with the committee which is considering that particular plan, and he, in his administrative capacity, should be the follow-up man on the committee for that particular plan.

12. The Planning Division is organized for the purpose of deliberating upon all changes of policy and all proposed plans of operations which come before the department. Questions involving a change on policy, and those questions upon which a definite policy has not yet been determined, must be referred by the division concerned, with appropriate remarks and all necessary papers, to the Planning Division

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for consideration before being presented to the Chief of Naval Operations for decision. The action of the Planning Division or of any subcommittee thereof shall be clearly expressed in proper official form, as briefly as may be consistent with the subject in hand, and signed by all officers who have taken part in the deliberation. The Planning Division shall keep a careful record of all action taken by it as a body and by all plans committees.

13. The Planning Division and plans committees' decisions are in no sense final and shall never be considered as the basis for action until approved by the Chief of Naval Operations. The function of the Planning Division is purely deliberative and not executive or administrative, except as pointed out above.

14. *Material division.*—It will be noted from the diagram that the material division is organized so that the several sections thereof have cognizance of the several general divisions or classes of vessels. It is the duty of the officers of the various sections of the division to keep in close touch with those handling the planning and operating end of the work for their classes of vessels, and to attempt to shape their work to meet the approved plans and the operating orders for the vessels in question, subject, of course, to the approval of the head of the material division.

It is the duty of the head of the material division to coordinate the work of the navy yards and other industrial establishments of the Navy. He shall carefully study all projects which have for their purpose the expansion of any industrial establishment or base, or the building of any new base or plant for industrial activities. It is his duty to anticipate the material needs of the service, to advise the Chief of Naval Operations accordingly, and to initiate correspondence on such questions and prepare such papers as may be advisable for consideration by the planning division and by plans committees.

15. *Naval districts division.*—The function of the naval districts division is to form the connecting link between the Office of Naval Operations and the naval districts. It undertakes the routine central administrative work in connection with naval districts operations and advises the Chief of Naval Operations in regard to matters of policy affecting the naval districts. It undertakes the work of properly supplying the districts with facilities, so far as practicable for carrying out their work including the supply and assignment of district vessels and the locating and building of district bases.

The districts division has cognizance of the routine commandeering of vessels for the Navy, and of the correspondence which such commandeering occasions. It must work closely with all other divisions of the office, and with all bureaus, in order that it may assist in adjusting all matters between the districts and the department about which a clear understanding does not exist.

16. *Aviation division.*—The aviation division has cognizance of all aviation activities which are under the direction of the Chief of Naval Operations, except the actual operation of aircraft designated for offensive and defensive operations. Such aircraft are part of the operating forces of the Navy.

17. *Operating division.*—The movements of all naval craft, whether surface, submarine, or air, not especially designated for training and experimental purposes exclusively, shall be directed by the Chief of Naval Operations and the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, through the officers charged with the responsibility of supervising the movements of: (1) Fighting vessels of the Navy; (2) vessels of the naval overseas transportation service.

In the case of craft assigned to a naval district, a fleet, or a force, the orders issued by the Chief of Naval Operations to the commandant or force commander, as the case may be, will not specify individual craft unless the character of the mission or the existing circumstances so require. In order that the movements of all classes and types of craft may be coordinated and effectively and efficiently directed, it is essential that the supervising officers work in closest touch with the various divisions of the office, especially with material, naval districts, and aviation.

Complete and accurate records and analyses of the movements and operations of Naval craft shall be made and particularly care shall be taken to disseminate this information to the divisions, offices, and bureaus concerned. Only by the exercise of intelligent thought and constant attention can satisfactory results in this respect be attained. The success of much of the work of the bureaus and the development of the requisite spirit of cooperation between this office and the bureaus depends on the intelligence and skill with which this phase of the work is handled. Commandants of districts and commanding officers of fleets, forces, and stations shall be kept informed of the movements of all of our own and allied naval craft and of all known or probable movements of enemy craft which would make their work more comprehensive or assist them in carrying out the orders of the department. The Assistant Chief of Naval Operations will be responsible for the general coordination of the

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movements and operations of all naval craft, but the officers supervising the several classes and types of craft will be held strictly accountable for the efficient performance of the duties assigned to them.

18. *Communication division.*—The director of naval communications is charged with the administration, organization, and operation of the entire radio, telegraph, telephone, and cable systems of communications within the naval service, including the operation of the trans-Atlantic radio system and all communications between merchant ships and all shore stations in the United States and its possessions. The foregoing includes the preparation and distribution of all codes, cyphers, and secret calls and commercial accounting. The director of naval communications handles all matters pertaining to radio communication in any manner whatsoever, except those relating solely to purchase, supply, test, and installation of apparatus.

The director of naval communications is also chief cable censor, which involves the administration of the organization for censor in all cablegrams from or to the United States and its possessions, except the Philippine Islands.

19. *Gunnery exercises and engineering performances division.*—That branch of Naval Operations which is the office of gunnery exercises and engineering performances is charged with the issuing to the service of instructions for gunnery and engineering exercises and operations, for collection, analyzing, and review of data, in regard to gunnery and steaming performances of naval craft, and the review of battle inspections of ships for the Chief of Naval Operations, in connection with the preparation and maintenance of the fleet for war. To this end the director of gunnery exercises and engineering performances is expected to make timely and suitable recommendations to the Chief of Naval Operations to increase efficiency.

The functions of the office are divided into four parts: (*a*) Gunnery, (*b*) steaming, (*c*) small arms, and (*d*) inspections. Each of these functions has three distinct steps: (*e*) Preparation and training, including the issuance of necessary plans to the service for conducting exercises and tests; standard instructions; and general dissemination of information. (*f*) The conduct of exercises and inspections, including cooperation with the operating branches of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, in the movement of units to conduct exercises, cooperation with operations (Mat) and the bureaus to conduct special tests, improve installations, and increase efficiency in operation. (*g*) Analytical and historical, including the collection of data of gunnery inspections and engineering as regards actual performances of naval craft in service; and the dissemination of this information to those who would be benefited thereby.

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS.

20. Up to the time of the promulgation of this order heads of divisions have not taken up for consideration the problems of policy with other divisions as much as appears advisable. Careful consideration must, therefore, be given in the future to this question, and the views of the Planning Division and such plans committees as may be ordered must be obtained where doubt exists. It becomes the duty of the heads of all divisions to carefully consider such questions and to refer them to the Planning Division without awaiting the advice of the Chief of Naval Operations to follow this course. The fact that an officer refers questions to the Planning Division for consideration is no reflection upon his knowledge or ability, but rather an appreciation on his part of the value of deliberate professional discussion of weighty problems which are sure to arise from time to time.

21. The Assistant Chief of Naval Operations shall call a weekly conference, the committee consisting of the heads of divisions, the officers of the Planning Division, and such others as he may consider necessary for the purpose of discussing the current questions which are before the office, and for the further purpose of taking up for general discussion such questions as may relate to the activities of two or more divsions of the office. It is the duty of the heads of the divisions to prepare such matters for discussion upon the occasion of these meetings.

22. The head of each division should consider the advisability of holding a weekly conference of all officers of his division for the purpose of coordinating the work of his several sections and with a view to giving these attending to details a comprehensive idea of the general work of the division and of the office, imparting to them such information as may assist them in their work or may make more comprehensive the policies involved.

23. Formal correspondence between the different divisions of this office is not approved and shall not be indulged in. Matters in which two or more divisions are jointly concerned must be taken up informally in conference or, if this is not necessary, by memorandum.

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24. It is the duty of every officer to consider every piece of correspondence that comes to his desk with a view to its usefulness to others. Nothing helps so much in an organization as large as this office as a wise dissemination of proper information and this fact must be carefully borne in mind and must be a guiding principle. When action is taken in one division upon any matter regarding which other divisions or bureaus should be informed, the division initiating the action must, if necessary, prepare additional copies for the information of others who are concerned or whose work may be facilitated by a knowledge of the action taken. An officer taking any action on any paper or an officer receiving incoming information is responsible for the dissemination of the information to others whether they be in this office, in the bureaus, the districts, or the forces afloat, and he will be held accountable for the same by the Chief of Naval Operations.

25. Officers must bear constantly in mind the fact that the Office of Naval O0erations is the coordinating center of all the various naval activities of the service. The function of the office is, therefore, largely one of rendering decisions upon which the various bureaus and offices concerned may base their administrative work. In handling correspondence all officers should be governed by these conditions:

First. Does this paper come under my personel cognizance?

Second. If so, does it reflect upon, or would it make any more comprehensive the work of any other division of the office or bureau of the department?

Third. Shall it be referred by routing slip or by indorsement for information?

Fourth. Does my action on this paper affect, and, knowing same, would it assist any division or bureau other than that to whom it is addressed? If so, shall I send copy of my action or route via party concerned, or shall I consult with the interested parties before taking action?

Fifth. Am I acting in accordance with a well defined and approved policy?

Sixth. If not, shall I refer to the bureau or others concerned, for recommendation, and then to the Planning Division for its action, or is the general policy of the qusetion before me sufficiently well known for me to prepare a brief memorandum to accompany my action letter to the Chief of Naval Operations for his signature?

Admiral FISKE. A year later—that is, on August 1, 1919—this organization was revised, and a planning division organized in the Office of Naval Operations, in which the work of the Planning Division was divided into two parts, the first of which was concerned with war plans only. I beg to place in the record an official paper called "Revised organization orders of the Office of Naval Operations," and to call attention to the fact that it was not until August 1, 1919, that the Navy Department established an organization for the exclusive duty of making general and detail plans of war. I beg leave to place in the record an official diagram showing the work of planning division now.

(The revised organization orders above referred to are here printed in the record, as follows:)

REVISED ORGANIZATION ORDERS OF THE OFFICE OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, THIRD ISSUE, AUGUST 1, 1919.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C., August 1, 1919.

The revised organization orders of the Office of Naval Operations contained herein are approved.

These orders and the organization which they make effective are the result of war experience in handling the work which legally comes under the cognizance of this office. I earnestly hope that the officers attached to this office and the service at large will realize the tremendous value to the service and the country of the Office of Naval Operations, and will use their best efforts to increase its efficiency and its effectiveness.

W. S. BENSON,
Admiral, Chief of Naval Operations.

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THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS.

1. The duties of the Chief of Naval Operations as head of this office are defined by regulations as follows:

(1) There shall be a Chief of Naval Operations who shall be an officer on the active list of the Navy appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, from among the officers of the line of the Navy, not below the grade of captain, for a period of four years, who shall, under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy, be charged with the operations of the fleet, and with the preparation and readiness of plans for its use in war. (Act Mar. 3, 1915; N. R. 103 (1).)

(2) Hereafter the Chief of Naval Operations, while so serving as such Chief of Naval Operations, shall have the rank and title of "admiral," to take rank next after the Admiral of the Navy. All orders issued by the Chief of Naval Operations in performing the duties assigned to him shall be performed under the authority of the Secretary of the Navy, and his orders shall be considered as emanating from the Secretary, and shall have full force and effect as such. (Act Aug. 29, 1916; N. R. 103 (2).)

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS.

2. For administrative purposes, and next in authority to the Chief of Naval Operations, an officer of suitable rank and experience will be designated as Assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations. He shall hold the same relation to the heads of divisions as an executive officer of a ship holds to the heads of departments on board ships. The Assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations shall not administer the details of any division.

All questions of policy and questions involving the formation of plans, or a change in plans, should first be taken up with the Assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations by the head of the division concerned.

The Assistant Chief of Naval Operations has cognizance of Navy regulations, naval instructions, and general orders. When circumstances require it, an officer may be designated to handle details incident thereto.

DIVISIONS OF THE OFFICE OF NAVAL OPERATIONS.

3. The primary functions of the Office of Naval Operations are:

(1) Study and preparation of policies and plans, and (2) the operation of the forces of the Navy in accordance with approved plans and administrative work incident thereto.

The functions of (1) are not administrative, and all work in connection therewith shall be carried on by a body known as the Planning Division, none of whose members will be given administrative duties.

The forces of the Navy will be operated under the supervision of the Chief of Naval Operations or the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, the administrative details being handled by the Division of Operating Forces. The functions of (2) are purely administrative and for the purpose of making effective the approved work of the Planning Division. The administrative divisions are as follows: Operating Division, Intelligence Division, Communication Division, Matériel Division, Naval Districts Division, Inspections Division, Gunnery Exercise and Engineering Performances Division, Files and Records Division.

PLANNING DIVISION.

4. The Planning Division shall be composed, as nearly as personnel conditions will permit, of a body of selected officers who shall have had training in war staff work. The Planning Division has been organized for the purpose of deliberating upon all changes of policy which come before the department and the preparations of plans consistent with approved policies. It is important that the members of the Planning Division shall, by reason of their experience, rank, and reputation, command the confidence of the department and of the naval service. The work of this division is of two general classes, namely, (1) war plans, and (2) plans in connection with current administrative work. The work of the Planning Division shall be divided into the following sections:

Section A.—Policy section:

(*a*) Policies of foreign nations.
(*b*) Own national policies.
(*c*) Resultant naval policies.

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Section B.—Strategy section:
(1) Strategy of foreign powers—
(a) Peace-time strategy.
(b) War-time strategy.
(c) Building programs.
(2) Own grand strategy. This comprises—
(a) Naval strategy in peace and in war.
(b) Military strategy in peace and in war.
(c) Building program—types, numbers.
(d) Naval bases.
Section C.—Tactics section:
(1) Naval tactics of foreign navies.
(2) Own naval tactics of—
(a) Fleet as a whole.
(b) All elements of naval power.
(c) Building program—tactical requirements.
Section D.—Education Section:
(a) Doctrine.
(b) Tactical instructions.
(c) Leadership; cooperation.
(d) Manuals.
Section E.—Submarine section.
Section F.—Aviation section.

NOTE.—Sections E and F are considered necessary at this time on account of the fact that the naval activities they cover are still under development to such a degree that not only is our future policy in regard to them not yet determined, except in a very general way, but their strategical and tactical value, when properly developed, is considered so important that these special sections for the development of these and related problems are essential. In matters of policy, strategy, and tactics, therefore, the heads of these two sections bear the same relation to submarine activities and aviation activities, respectively, as the heads of the first three sections named bear to other naval craft and bases, the problems of which are more definitely known and are of a more general character.

Section G.—Logistics section:
(a) Bases.
(b) Reserve supplies.
(c) Personnel.
(d) Mobilization.
(e) Train.
(f) Materiel.
(g) Merchant marine.
Section H.—Secretary.
Section I.—Administrative plans.

WAR PLANS.

5. Every problem should be considered as a part solution of a general plan rather than as something that stands alone, detached, and solitary. For this reason the most general problems should be solved first, and subsequent problems should arise from the decisions of the more general problems. National policy, naval policy, national strategy, naval strategy, logistics, naval tactics, form a descending series from the general to the concrete which may be used as a partial guide in determining chronological sequence of effort in problem solving.

6. The Chief of Naval Operations will propose the problems, and the Director of Plans, in consultation with the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, will prepare the problems and assign them to committees for solution.

7. Every solution of a problem concerning war plans that may be submitted shall be examined by all sections. The committee responsible for the solution shall, if necessary, demonstrate in conference to the Planning Division as a whole the soundness of its conclusions.

ADMINISTRATIVE PLANS.

8. In addition to the war plans work carried on by the permanent personnel of the Planning Division, the officers of sections E, F, G, and I will be particularly concerned with administrative plans. For planning work of this character planning committtees may be named, when considered advisable, by the Chief of Naval Operations or the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for the consideration of various classes

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of problems. At least one officer from the Planning Division should be appointed on each planning committee. The number and composition of planning committees is optional with the Chief of Naval Operations or Assistant Chief of Naval Operations; but it may be stated as a general rule that such committees will be composed of those available officers most familiar with, and in most cases, those handling the administrative details, of the subject in hand. Officers composing planning committees are not necessarily attached to Operations.

JOINT ARMY AND NAVY PLANNING COMMITTEE.

9. The naval members of the Joint Army and Navy Planning Committee will be detailed by the Chief of Naval Operations from the members of the several sections of the Planning Division. Three or more members will be so designated.

The joint Army and Navy Planning Committee will investigate, study, and report upon questions relative to the national defense and involving joint action of the Army and Navy, referred to it by the Joint Army and Navy Board. It shall also have the duty of originating consideration of such subjects when in its judgment necessary. The members of this committee are authorized to consult and confer freely on all matters of defense and military policy in which the Army and Navy are jointly concerned, and will consider this joint work as their most important duty.

The procedure of the Joint Army and Navy Planning Committee will be informal. All reports and recommendations shall be confidential and will be made to the Joint Army and Navy Board.

GENERAL REGULATIONS AND PRINCIPLES.

10. Questions involving a change in policy, and those questions upon which a definite policy has not yet been determined, must be referred by the division concerned, with appropriate remarks and all necessary papers, to the Planning Division for consideration before being presented to the Chief of Naval Operations for decision. The action of the Planning Division or of any subcommittee thereof shall be clearly expressed in proper official form, as briefly as may be consistent with the subject in hand, and signed by all officers who have taken part in the deliberation. The committee report shall then be submitted to the Chief of Naval Operations, and if approved by him (and the Secretary if required) all divisions concerned shall be informed in order that the administrative details may proceed.

11. The Assistant Chief of Naval Operations and the administrative heads of all divisions of this office are ex officio members of the Planning Division.

12. The personnel of the Planning Division shall not be given administrative work except that they shall prepare and handle such correspondence with other departments of the Government as may be necessary for the study of policy and preparation of plans based thereon. On account, however, of the developments and large amount of experimental work necessary in connection with submarines and aviation, it is necessary for officers in charge of sections E and F to exercise coordinating supervision over the activities of the several sections of the different divisions which are concerned with administrative matters connected with their respective work, and to consult and advise with the bureau representatives. They shall have full authority to act in those matters, so far as relates to the personnel of the sections concerned in the several divisions of this office. Like other sections of the Planning Division they have cognizance of policies and plans for their particular work, and are advisory in matters of administration. All administrative work shall, however, be carried on under the administrative divisions concerned.

13. To render this supervision effective and to insure the cooperation of all divisions in these matters, the officers in charge of sections E and F shall frequently call conferences of their respective representatives in the several divisions of the office. The bureau representatives shall be informed of the time and place of these conferences, and invited and encouraged to attend. In like manner they shall from time to time inspect the submarine bases and aviation bases and stations, respectively, and shall bear the same relation to these as they do to the actual operating forces themselves.

LIAISON WITH OTHER GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS.

14. In order to keep in touch with the activities in all departments of the Government, and in the bureaus of the Navy Department and in the fleets, constant liaison will be maintained. The Chief of Naval Operations hopes that it will be the aim of the personal touch with officials of the Government in and out of the Navy Depart-

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ment from whom information can be obtained which would lend a broadening influence to the work of the office. A member of the policy section will be the liaison officer with State and other departments in routine matters.

LIAISON WITH WAR COLLEGE.

15. An officer of the Planning Division shall be designated for liaison with the Naval War College

DISCUSSION WITH OFFICERS OF THE SERVICE.

16. In order that subjects under discussion may have every viewpoint considered the Director of Plans is authorized to consult directly with officers of the service; and, when he considers advisable, he may request the Chief of Naval Operations to order such officers for temporary duty with the Planning Division.

LIAISON WITH OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE.

17. The Planning Division shall establish a close liaison with the Office of Naval Intelligence. The officers of the Planning Division shall call upon the Office of Naval Intelligence for information collated and arranged in the desired manner.

SEPARATE FILING SYSTEM.

18. The Planning Division shall, on account of the nature of its work, have a separate and carefully organized filing system with the necessary confidential stenographers and clerks. It shall keep a careful record of all action taken by it as a body and by all planning committees.

COMPLETED SOLUTIONS.

19. The completed solutions of all problems shall be submitted to the Chief of Naval Operations for his action.

20. The director of plans shall continue in close touch, in an advisory way, with the execution of plans.

RESPONSIBILITY OF COMMITTEES.

21. Each committee will be responsible for the completeness and soundness of the solutions of problems assigned to it, and will present finished solutions to the director of plans.

APPROVAL OF PLAN.

22. The Planning Division and plans committees' decisions are in no sense final and shall never be considered as the basis for action until approved.

DIVISION OF OPERATING FORCES.

23. The movements of all naval craft, whether surface, subsurface, or air, not specially designated for training and experimental purposes exclusively, shall be directed by the Chief of Naval Operations or the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, through the officers charged with the responsibility of supervising the movements of: (1) Fighting craft of the Navy; and (2) all other naval craft.

24. In the case of craft assigned to a naval district, a fleet, or a force, the orders issued by the Chief of Naval Operations to the commandant or force commander, as the case may be, will not specify individual craft unless the character of the mission or the existing circumstances so require. In order that the movements of all classes and types of craft may be coordinated and effectively and efficiently directed, it is essential that the supervising officers work in closest touch with the various divisions of the office, especially with Planning Division, material, and naval districts. Complete and accurate records and analyses of the movements and operations of naval craft shall be made and particular care shall be taken to disseminate this information to the divisions, officers, and bureaus concerned. The success of much of the work of the bureaus and the development of the requisite spirit of cooperation between this office and the bureaus depend on the intelligence and skill with which this phase of the work is handled. Commandants of districts and commanding officers of fleets, forces, and stations shall be kept informed of the movements of all of our own naval craft and of all known or probable movements of foreign craft which would make their work more comprehensive or assist them in carrying out the orders of the department. The

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Assistant Chief of Naval Operations will be responsible for the general coordination of the movements and operations of all naval craft, but the officers supervising the several classes and types of craft will be held responsible for the administrative work involved.

ASSIGNMENT OF DUTIES.

25. The duties of the sections of this division are as outlined on the diagram accompanying these regulations. The following explanations and regulations are added:

STATISTICAL SECTION.

26. Section G shall become the statistical section for all matters pertaining to the movements and operations of naval craft. Its general scope of work shall be as follows:

(1) Prepare an accurate index history of each fleet, unit, and subunit of that fleet, showing the composition of the various units, their movements, and, where possible, the duty performed in connection with these movements.

(2) Prepare an an accurate index history of each vessel in the Navy. This shall apply to aircraft as well as other naval craft. This data should show the dimensions, fuel consumption, cruising radius, tactical qualities, armament, and all movements of the craft from the date of commission, with duty performed, and the division or subdivision of the fleet or the stations to which attached, if any, at each time. In case of vessels not built by contract for the Navy, prepare a complete history of the vessel's activities previous to delivery to the Navy and method by which the vessel was obtained from the Navy. Also a résumé of any action against an enemy of the United States in which the vessel has been engaged.

(3) Continue the present general inspector's duties of naval overseas transportation service until this is abolished.

(4) Prepare movement reports of naval overseas transportation service vessels and troop transports as at present until this operation ceases.

(5) Prepare summaries of naval overseas transportation service activities as at present until this activity ceases.

AUXILIARY SERVICE—MERCHANT MARINE INTERESTS—TRANSPORTS.

27. Section H shall, with its subordinate sections I and K, carry on the work heretofore under the cognizance of the naval overseas transportation service. One of the most important duties in connection with this section is the liaison with the Shipping Board and the merchant marine. Stated generally, its functions may be defined as follows:

(1) The handling of all matters pertaining to the merchant marine.

(*a*) Above all is personal interest. Before the war there was no cordial relationship between the Navy and merchant marine. By the formation of the Naval Reserve, and as a result of the Navy handling merchant ships during the war, a closer sympathy between the two has been fostered. The policy in regard to the Reserve Force and its use in time of peace will foster or break the present cordial relations. Find out, if possible, what the Navy can do in time of peace to help the merchant marine.

(*b*) Keep in touch with the statistical section to build up a set of statistics on merchant ships with their availability and adaptability for naval use in time of war. Also the shore and port facilities of United States ports. This is a most important duty.

(*c*) If the Navy Department should take a similar relationship with the United States merchant marine as is maintained by England, this desk should be the beginning of such a supervision.

(2) Maintenance of a nucleus for a naval overseas transportation service organization, in case such an organization is again needed by the Navy.

(*a*) The idea in this is to be prepared for any emergency and in doing so to profit by the experience gained in naval overseas transportation service during war operations. The merchant marine could not handle the situation of carrying supplies in the presence of the enemy, and the Navy will have it to do again if the emergency arises.

(*b*) In connection with the plans committees, prepare general plans in regard to routing, coastwise and otherwise, for the preservation of our merchant vessels in case of war.

(3) The handling of all matters pertaining to the operation of naval auxiliaries, and cargo vessels operated by the Navy for other Government departments.

(4) The handling of all matters pertaining to the operation of troop transports by the Navy.

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NAVAL OVERSEAS TRANSPORTATION SERVICE PROBLEMS.

28. In carrying out the above for probably a year there will be a great many matters come up in regard to the naval overseas transportation service. These matters of course will be handled by this desk.

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION (OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE).

29. The Intelligence Division is charged with the collection of information for the department and for other naval activities which require it. It publishes and disseminates such information to the Navy and to Government officials requiring it. It cooperates with the other executive departments of the Government in discovering and bringing to justice persons engaged in activities against the United States. It directs all naval attachés abroad, and is the official channel of communication for all foreign naval attachés in the United States.

30. It is the duty of the Office of Naval Intelligence to keep in close touch with all naval activities, both in and out of the department. The office handles all classes of information excepting purely operating information, which is usually (and should always be) forwarded by the senior officer present direct to the Chief of Naval Operations. Such information is under the cognizance of the Division of Operating Forces

COMMUNICATION DIVISION.

31. The director of Naval Communications is charged with the administrations organization, and operation of the entire radio, telegraph, telephone, and cable systems of communications within the naval service, including the operation of the trans-Atlantic radio system and all communications between merchant ships and all shore stations in the United States and its possessions. The foregoing includes the preparation and distribution of all codes, ciphers, and secret calls and commercial accounting. The Director of Naval Communications handles all matters pertaining to radio communications in any manner whatsoever, except those relating solely to purchase, supply, test, and installation of apparatus. During war the Director of Naval Communications is also chief cable censor, which involves the administration of the organization for censoring all cablegrams from or to the United States and its possessions, except the Philippine Islands.

COMMUNICATION OFFICE OF NAVY DEPARTMENT.

32. The communication office of the Navy Department (a section of the Communication Division) is responsible for the handling of all telegraphic and radio communications to and from the Navy Department. In order that the Planning Division may be kept in constant touch with progress in the execution of plans, and all other information which would affect their work, the communication office will, from date of promulgation of these orders, furnish the Planning Division with copies of all dispatches sent or received by the Office of Naval Operations.

33. The duties of the sections of this division are as outlined on accompanying diagram.

MATÉRIEL DIVISION.

34. It will be noted from that diagram that the Matériel Division is organized so that the several sections thereof have cognizance of the several general divisions or classes of naval craft. It is the duty of the officers of the various sections of the division to keep in close touch with those handling the planning and operating end of the work under their cognizance and to attempt to shape their work to meet the approved plans and the operating orders for the vessels in question, subject, of course, to the approval of the head of the Matériel Division.

35. It is the duty of the head of the Matériel Division to coordinate the work of the navy yards and other industrial establishments of the Navy. He shall carefully study all projects which have for their purpose the expansion of any industrial establishment or base or the building of any new base or plant for industrial activities. It is his duty to anticipate the material needs of the service, to advise the Chief of Naval Operations accordingly and to initiate correspondence on such questions and prepare such papers as may be advisable for consideration by the Planning Division and by plans committees.

The duties of the sections of this division are as outlined on accompanying diagram.

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NAVAL DISTRICTS DIVISION.

36. The function of the Naval Districts Division is to form the connecting link between the Office of Naval Operations and the naval districts. It undertakes the routine central administrative work in connection with naval districts except such as logically comes under other divisions, and advises the Chief of Naval Operations in regard to matters of policy affecting the naval districts.

37. In war or national emergency the Districts Division has cognizance of the routine commandeering of vessels for the Navy and of the correspondence which such commandeering occasions. Upon demobilization it has corresponding duties with such vessels.

38. The Districts Division must work closely with all other divisions of the office and with all bureaus, in order that it may assist in adjusting all matters between the districts and the department about which a clear understanding does not exist.

INSPECTIONS DIVISION.

40. The activities at present under this division are:

(*a*) Board of inspection and survey, and (*b*) joint merchant vessels board.

41. The board of inspection and survey is charged with inspection and trials of newly constructed naval vessels and, at intervals specified by law, with the material inspections of all vessels of the Navy. It is in close coordination with the Matériel Division of the Chief of Naval Operations.

JOINT MERCHANT VESSELS BOARD.

42. The joint merchant vessels board is charged with the inspections of privately owned craft and the securing of such data relative to such craft as will determine their suitability for military purposes.

GUNNERY EXERCISES AND ENGINEERING PERFORMANCES DIVISION.

43. That division of the Office of Naval Operations which is the office of gunnery exercises and engineering performances is charged with the duty of issuing to the service instructions for gunnery and engineering exercises and operations, the collection, analysis, and review of data in regard to gunnery and steaming performances of naval craft, and the review of battle inspections of ships for the Chief of Naval Operations in connection with the preparation and maintenance of the fleet for war. To this end the director of gunnery exercises and engineering performances is expected to make timely and suitable recommendations to the Chief of Naval Operations to increase efficiency.

44. The functions of the office are divided into four parts: (*a*) Gunnery, (*b*) steaming, (*c*) small arms, and (*d*) inspections.

45. Each of these functions has three distinct steps:

(1) Preparation and training, including the issue of necessary plans to the service for conducting exercises and tests; the preparation of standard instructions and the general dissemination of information.

(2) Cooperation with the other divisions of the Office of Naval Operations in the movement of units to conduct exercises; cooperation with the Matériel Division and the bureaus to conduct special tests, improve installations, and increase efficiency in operation.

(3) Analytical and historical, including the collection of data pertaining to the actual performances in gunnery and engineering of naval craft in service, and the dissemination of this information to those who would be benefited thereby.

FILES AND RECORD DIVISION.

46. The head of this division is the chief clerk of the office.

This division shall have charge of the delivery, routing, handling, and mailing of all official mail of the office (both confidential and nonconfidential); of the records of all personnel, except officers, of the office and general supervision of the clerical force of all the divisions of the office; of the procuring and delivery of all supplies, printing, etc., issuance of passes, and such other administrative matters as ordinarily come within the province of the chief clerk's office of a bureau or office.

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AID TO CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS.

47. In addition to the divisions of the office, an officer of or above the rank of lieutenant commander will be designated as senior aid to the Chief of Naval Operations. Additional officers may be ordered as aids or as assistants to the aids to the Chief of Naval Operations as required. In addition to the duties prescribed by regulations for an aid, the senior aid to the Chief of Naval Operations will have general supervision of all rooms and office space assigned to the office; will handle all correspondence relative to officers' records and officers' orders, and other naval personnel correspondence, and will generally assist, under the assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations, in the organization of the office and the coordination of the work of the several divisions of the office with bureaus and with other departments, unless a special representative is designated.

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS—PERSONNEL COMPLEMENTS.

48. The complement of officers and clerical assistants shall be in accordance with the diagrammatic plan approved August 1, 1919. This shall be the "allowed complement," from which the "actual complement" may vary under the same conditions as hold in a ship's organization.

COOPERATIVE WORK OF DIVISIONS.

49. Up to the time of the promulgation of this order heads of divisions have not taken up for consideration the problems of policy with other divisions as much as appears advisable. Careful consideration must therefore be given in the future to this question, and the views of the Planning Division and such plans committees as may be ordered must be obtained where any doubt exists. It becomes the duty of the heads of all divisions to carefully consider such questions and to refer them to the Planning Division without awaiting the advice of the Chief of Naval Operations to follow this course. The fact that an officer refers questions to the Planning Division for consideration is no reflection upon his knowledge or ability, but rather an appreciation on his part of the value of deliberate professional discussion of weighty problems which are sure to arise from time to time.

WEEKLY CONFERENCE.

50. The Assistant Chief of Naval Operations shall call a weekly conference consisting of the heads of divisions, the officers of the Planning Division, and such others as he may consider necessary, for the purpose of discussing the current questions which are before the office and for the further purpose of taking up for general discussion such questions as may relate to the activities of two or more divisions of the office. It is the duty of the heads of divisions to prepare such matters for discussion upon the occasion of these meetings.

WEEKLY CONFERENCES IN DIVISIONS.

51. The head of each division should consider the advisability of holding a weekly conference of all officers of his division for the purpose of coordinating the work of his several sections, and with a view to giving those attending to details a comprehensive idea of the general work of the division and of the office, imparting to them such information as may assist them in their work or may make more comprehensive the policies involved.

NO CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN DIVISIONS.

52. Formal correspondence between the different divisions of this office is not approved and must not be indulged in. Matters in which two or more divisions are jointly concerned must be taken up informally in conference or, if this is not necessary, by informal memorandum.

REPORTS OF FITNESS.

53. Reports of fitness for officers on duty in the Office of Naval Operations will be prepared and signed by the officers in charge of divisions and will then be submitted to Chief of Naval Operations for approval. The Chief of Naval Operations will personally prepare reports of fitness for heads of divisions and for such other officers as may be required by regulations.

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METHOD OF HANDLING BUSINESS.

54. To explain the method of handling a subject involving the various divisions, the following may be taken as an illustration:

55. Certain conditions are known to exist, let us suppose, through information obtained from force commanders or through Naval Intelligence. The information, with the mission clearly stated, is sent to the Planning Division, or a planning committee is named to take up the problem. Those designated deliberate on the information at hand and on the mission. They then prepare definite recommendations stating what is proposed in order to insure the success of the mission. The matter is then taken up with the Chief of Naval Operations, and if approved by him (or the Secretary, if required), is referred to Material Division, Aviation Division, and (or) District Division, according to the requirements. These divisions proceed then to get the required information and authority to the bureau concerned so that they may proceed with the preparation of the material and personnel which may be necessary to make the approved plan effective.

56. Everything having been provided, and everything being in readiness for making the plan effective, the operating orders are issued (by the Division of Operating Forces) and the plan is put into effect so far as movements are concerned, the forces being handled under the direction of the Chief of Naval Operations or the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations.

DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION.

57. It is the duty of every officer to consider every piece of correspondence that comes to his desk with a view to its usefulness to others. Nothing helps so much in an organization as large as this office as a wise dissemination of proper information, and this fact must be a guiding principle. When action is taken in one division upon any matter regarding which other divisions or bureaus should be informed, the division initiating the action must, if necessary, prepare additional copies for the information of others who are concerned or whose work may be facilitated by a knowledge of the action taken. An officer taking any action on any paper, or an officer receiving incoming information, is responsible for the dissemination of the information to others whether they be in this office, in the bureaus, the districts, or the forces afloat.

58. Officers must bear constantly in mind the fact that the Office of Naval Operations is the coordinating center of all the various naval activities of the service. The function of the office is, therefore, largely one of rendering decisions upon which the various bureaus and offices concerned may base their administrative work. In handling correspondence, all officers should be governed by these considerations:

First. Does this paper come under my personal cognizance?

Second. If so, does it reflect upon, or would it make any more comprehensive the work of any other division of the office or bureau of the department?

Third. Shall it be referred by routing slip or by indorsement for information?

Fourth. Does my action on this paper affect, and knowing same, would it assist any division or bureau other than that to whom it is addressed? If so, shall I send copy of my action or route via party concerned, or shall I consult with the interested parties before taking action?

Fifth. Am I acting in accordance with a well-defined and approved policy?

Sixth. If not, shall I refer to the bureaus or others concerned for recommendation, and then to the Planning Division for its action, or is the general policy of the question before me sufficiently well known for me to prepare a brief memorandum to accompany my action letter to the Chief of Naval Operations for his signature?

(The official diagram presented by Admiral Fiske is not reproduced in this record.)

Admiral FISKE. According to modern principles, the planning division in any navy or army is the original source from which all work starts; because not only the actual operations of war, but all the previous measures of preparation of personnel and material are taken up, after the decisions of the planning division have been made, and approved. This shows that the first thing necesssary to do, in order to prepare a navy for war, is to prepare a plan of war.

At the conclusion of my duty on the general board, I went to sea as a rear admiral in command of the fifth division of the fleet. This was in August, 1911. I was afterwards in command of the third and

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then the first division, and second in command of the third and then the first division, and second in command in the fleet. I was detached on January 3, 1913, and made aid for inspections of the Navy. I was made aid for operations, the senior aid of the Secretary of the Navy, and his military adviser on February 11, 1913.

I took up my duties with a grave sense of my responsibilities, especially because the failure of the Declaration of London put the whole status of international law, as applied to maritime affairs, in a condition of approximate chaos; so that if any war should occur between any great Europen nations, the position of the United States, as neutral, would be almost impossible to maintain. Had the Navy been prepared for war, I should not have felt so much concerned, but I knew that the Navy was not only unprepared in personnel and material, but that it did not even have any plan for even entering an important war.

The present Secretary of the Navy came into office in less than a month after I became aid for operations. Naturally, I looked forward to my future relations with him with considerable interest. I was much relieved when I found him be be a delightful gentleman, companionable, sympathetic, and apparently open-minded. He announced his desire to make the Navy efficient, and he was kind enough on many occasions to say things to me and about me that were very pleasant.

The following August, 1913, I spent at the War College at Newport. By that time, I had come to realize that the Secretary's mental characteristics and his previous training were not such as to give him the capacity to regard the Navy as a whole. His tendency was to concentrate his attention on some one part of the Navy, usually connected with its personnel, and to exaggerate its importance with Navy as a whole. For this reason, I wrote him a letter from the War College, pointing out respectfully, but earnestly, the necessity for taking a broader and profounder view. I have a copy of this letter with me, and I will put it in the record if desired. Part of it was written by me personally; the other part was written by certain officers on the staff of the War College. That part is unsigned.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that matter had better be put in the record.

Admiral FISKE. Yes, sir. That was August, 1913.

(The letter and attached matter referred to are here printed in full in the record as follows:)

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
GENERAL BOARD,
Naval War College, Newport, R. I., August 26, 1913.

From: Rear Admiral B. A. Fiske, United States Navy, aid for Operations.
To: Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: Administration of the Navy Department.
Reference: Exodus, Chapter XVIII, paragraph 13 et seq.

1. In presenting this paper to the Secretary I wish to make it clear that the ideas expressed in it are not original with me, but have been gotten from study and from conference with other officers; that they agree with the ideas held by the great navies of the world, and that they are the ideas by which those great navies are directed.

2. The first point to which I ask the Secretary's attention is the fact that navies are members of a competing class. The measure of readiness of any navy is, and must be, her readiness as compared with that of other navies. In this respect, a navy is like any competitor in any competition. Therefore, it is not sufficient to say that any navy is of itself excellent or otherwise, any more than it is sufficient to say, regarding any

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tennis player that he is excellent. The only prize a tennis player can get is against some opponent; and, unless his excellence is greater than that of his opponent, he will not win the prize, no matter how excellent he may be.

3. If we hold this idea in mind we will then see clearly that the United States Navy must have a readiness for war which will compare favorably with that of her probable opponents; that is, with the navies of Great Britain, Germany, France, Japan, and Italy. At present we are forced to acknowledge our inferiority to the navies of Great Britain and Germany, not only in point of size, but in point of readiness for war.

4. How to get into readiness for war and keep in readiness, is not only the duty of the Navy in peace—it is its paramount duty. To get the Navy into readiness for war, and keep it in readiness, is not only the duty of the Secretary, it is his paramount duty, so far as his relations to the Navy per se are concerned. When war breaks out between two countries, the war will continue and will according to the numerical strength and the efficiency of the forces engaged, the spirit and courage with which the men have been imbued, the degree of excellence of the organizations in which they are directed, the knowledge and skill which their station and training have imparted to them, the speed and thoroughness of their mobilization. When war breaks out all the forces that will determine the result are already in existence. The result is already determined, though it is not known to mortals. Therefore, far above and beyond all minor responsibilities the direct and immediate responsibility of the Secretary of the Navy is the Navy's readiness for war.

5. We can not comprehend fully this question of readiness, unless we realize fully the change brought about in military and naval matters by the startling revelations of 1870. In 1870 the German and French armies met in a series of battles whose result astonished the world, even the military world. Germany and France were not unequal in population or resources, but whatever disproportion there was, was in favor of France. The armies were not unequal in size, but whatever disproportion there was, was in favor of France. The armies and the generals of France had had much more experience than had those of Germany; "even their generals of divisions and brigades had more actual experience than those who led the German Army corps;" the French were by nature a more military people; they were fully as brave as the Germans, and fully as intelligent. Yet the armies of France went down before the armies of Germany with a suddenness and completeness that had no parallel in history.

6. The reason was eagerly sought and speedily found. The reason was simply that the Germans, under the direction of Von Moltke, had organized a general staff which had made such perfect plans of mobilization and subsequent operations that, on the outbreak of war, the German Army was ready immediately. The whole German Army had been made into a vast machine. All its parts were fabricated, finished, and in place. Steam was up in the throttle; and as soon as war was declared, the throttle was opened, and the whole engine began to move with perfect precision, without friction and without noise.

7. The triumph of the German organization was so splendid and complete that all the military nations of the world took the lesson to heart at once, with the result that to-day every military nation in the world has its army and navy organized on German principles.

8. The last two countries to follow the lead of Germany were Great Britain and the United States. The reason for the inactivity of the United States is not hard to find; but in regard to Great Britain it must be stated that the British Admiralty and the British Navy had never lapsed into the state of unreadiness of the various armies of the world. The British Navy was even in 1870 in nearly the same state of readiness as at the present time. Little attention was called to this fact, however, or has since been called to the fact, because the British Navy has, for many centuries, been kept ready by the Admiralty and no great change was necessary, such as Von Moltke brought about in the German Army.

9. The British Army, however, remained unaffected or very little affected by the lesson of 1870; and as a result was practically disgraced by the Boer War. So startling was the evidence brought about by the Boer War of the unreadiness of the British Army and so directly was this unreadiness traced to the inefficiency of the system in the British War Office as its cause, that a commission was appointed to investigate the matter. This commission resulted in the famous "Esher report." This Esher report recommended that the British war office be entirely reorganized on the basis of the British Admiralty. This recommendation was at once put into effect, and the British war office is now organized almost exactly as is the British Admiralty.

10. In the United States little attention has been paid to the lessons of the Franco-German war by the Government. The United States, being a nonmilitary country, having engaged in no serious foreign war since the Revolution, military and naval

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questions have not been considered important, and the great minds of the country, with a few notable exceptions, have not been focussed on them.

11. The War Department, however, during the administration of Hon. Elihu Root, was reorganized on a basis very similar to the German, so far as direction of the Army was concerned; with the result that the administration of the Army has been very greatly improved and the Army's readiness for war very greatly increased.

12. The only organization belonging to the national defense of any great country which is not organized on the German plan, or on a plan similar to it, is the United States Navy. Why the United States Navy has lagged behind all other organizations of a similar kind is not difficult to understand, when one realizes that the United States is a nonmilitary country; and that, while a far-sighted statesman, with the aid of a Congress in political sympathy with him, was able to place our Army on a basis of military readiness, no similar combination has yet been found to do the same thing for our Navy.

13. During the past few years, by reason of our growing familiarity with the principles of war as taught by our War College, there has been an increasing agitation over the subject of giving the Navy a more efficient organization; but nothing was accomplished in a practical way until the administration of your predecessor, in which four "aids" were made advisors to the Secretary, each aid being advisor for a certain division of the duties of the department, the four aids together forming the "council."

14. This system has made a great improvement in the work of the department, especially in coordinating the work of the various bureaus, and in giving to the Secretary the advice of experienced officers, who know what should be done in order to put the Navy into readiness for war.

15. By adopting the "aide system" the Navy Department may be said to have taken a step half way from a previous unmanageable condition to the position occupied by the military organizations of the other great countries, including the British Admiralty.

16. But the step was only half way to efficiency, and the present method of administration can be improved. If the present method were like that of any other great organization, even industrial organizations in our own country; if all the people at the head of it were engaged in doing the most important work of which they were capable; if every one of them had time for the consideration of important matters; and was not perpetually interrupted by unimportant matters; if high officials did not have their time and attention diverted by the consideration of subordinate matters, then we might declare that, while our system is different from all others, it is different because it is better. But this is not the case.

17. As a matter of fact, under the present system much of the time of the Secretary of the Navy, a Cabinet officer intrusted with the direction of one of the most important departments of the Government, must be devoted to comparatively unimportant questions. His time is precious in the highest degree and yet much of it is spent on matters that a subordinate could handle, with the result that the amount of time that he can give to important questions is abbreviated. He is sometimes compelled to delay the consideration of matters on which some subordinate needs a decision.

In any other great organization, even an industrial organization in our own country, the time of the head of the organization is economized in the most scientific way. His time is comparatively free, and he occupies his mind with great questions and not with little ones. If the work of the Navy Department were properly systematized, the Secretary's time and attention would be properly and profitably employed in great public questions connected with the Navy and the country. He would have leisure for conference with statesmen and public men, for reading the writings of authorities on naval and military policies and foreign relations; and he would be, as he ought to be, the man next to the President, or possibly next to the Secretary of State, occupying the most commanding position in the United States with relation to her really important national and international affairs.

18. What has just been said about the work of the Secretary of the Navy may be reiterated with only a little less emphasis about the work of the Assistant Secretary.

19. In my opinion what has been said about the waste of the time of the Secretary and the Assistant Secretary must be reiterated with regard to the time of the four aids. These officers are supposed to be valuable men, otherwise, they would not be advisors to the Secretary; yet we find their time wasted also. But while much of the time of the Secretary is wasted by being employed with minor matters, their time is wasted largely by simply waiting to get opportunity for those full and frank conferences with the Secretary which are essential, if efficient teamwork is to be attained.

20. While these statements are true of all the four aids, they apply particularly to the aid for Operations. The handling of the fleet and individual ships, as well as various questions pertaining to the War College, the General Board, and the Office

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of Naval Intelligence, and (which is the most important of all), the preparation and readiness of the Navy for war, are in his division of labor: and yet he has no authority whatever in these matters, or any clearly defined responsibility, except that of giving advice.

21. The organization of our Navy Department is entirely different from that of any other of which the writer has knowledge. In every efficient organization, great or small, the head of the organization handles the organization as a unit, through the heads of the various divisions. He alone, at the top, handles no separate divisions. He has the right, for purposes of inspection or correction, to intervene between the head of a division and a subordinate. The heads of divisions have authority in their divisions and should be held responsible to the chief, not for details but for results. These principles, I believe, are common to every great organization of the world, great or small, that is efficiently conducted. In no other way does any successful organization conduct its business. This is the case, even in 99 per cent of the organizations of the world, in which the head of the organization is familiar with the details of the organization, having grown up with it. If such a system is necessary in these organizations; if in these organizations a system is necessary in which the heads of the organization does not manage directly each department, but simply manages the heads of the departments, how much more is it necessary in our Navy Department, of which the Secretary is a civilian, who can not be familiar with the details, and must therefore trust to his subordinates.

22. I therefore recommend that the Secretary and the Assistant Secretary meet the four aids in council every day; that at these meetings the questions before the department be discussed; that each day the Secretary give the various aids such instructions as he sees fit in regard to the work he wishes done in their various divisions, and that each aid then carries out these instructions he has received by means of oral and written orders; written orders being signed "By direction of the Secretary," as was authorized in the Regulations of 1909, but never carried out. I would also recommend that a clerk be present at the meetings of the Secretary and aids in council to keep the minutes of the meetings. No money or legislation would be needed to do this.

23. I respectfully request the attention of the Secretary to a memorandum on this subject, prepared by the War College, in which the ideas embodied in this letter are expressed in "War College language."

B. A. FISKE.

MEMORANDUM PREPARED BY THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, NEWPORT, AUGUST 26, 1913.

Subject: Administration of the Navy Department.
Reference: Exodus, Chapter XVIII, paragraph 13 et seq.

1. The accomplishment of any task requires, first of all, a clear conception of that task. The task to be considered here is the administration of the Navy Department. We are therefore led to inquire why the Navy Department exists. We find that it is a necessary part of the Navy. The mission of the Navy Department flows directly from the mission of the Navy.

2. The mission of the Navy is to maintain itself in the maximum possible degree of readiness for war in order that honorable peace may be maintained; or, if war comes, in order that honorable peace may be reestablished in the shortest possible time.

3. No mission for the Navy other than this will satisfy present-day conditions. Nations are competing organizations. In peace they compete by diplomacy, by legislation, and by commercial effort. In war this competition is intensified by the competition of armed forces, each seeking the annihilation of the other. The factors that govern the competition of armed forces are strength, efficiency, and readiness. Under modern conditions no one of these factors can be neglected. No matter what the condition of a navy may be when judged by a noncompeting standard, neither its strength nor its efficiency nor its readiness for war are what they should be unless it can compete successfully with navies of probable enemies. From these considerations the mission of the Navy Department is derived.

4. The mission of the Navy Department is to so administer the affairs of the Navy as to maintain the Navy in the maximum possible degree of readiness for war.

5. This mission should be clearly understood and constantly borne in mind by every individual of the Navy Department. Every decision as to naval administration should be derived from this general mission. It must be the guide to effort.

6. At the head of the Navy Department is the Secretary of the Navy, through whom the President exercises the authority of Commander in Chief. The Secretary of the Navy has a double mission. He is the head of a great department of the Government, and as such he is one of the chief counselors of the President. He is, over and above

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all, a statesman, assisting his chief in guiding the destinies of a great Nation, which destinies are in unavoidable conflict with the destinies of other nations. There is a unity in great governmental duties that requires a world-wide view by each individual on whom those duties devolve. Each question as it arises is a part of the whole. A clear grasp of the whole permits the true statesman a prophetic vision by which he is the more able to give a true direction to events. From these considerations we derive the Secretary's first and highest mission.

7. The first and highest mission of the Secretary is so to coordinate the efforts of the Navy as a whole with the efforts of other departments of the Government as best to further national aims.

8. The other mission of the Secretary is derived directly from the mission of the Navy Department, of which he is the head.

9. The second mission of the Secretary is so to administer the affairs of the Navy, through the Navy Department, as to maintain the Navy in the maximum possible degree of readiness for war.

10. This mission brings us directly to the question of administration and the foundational methods of its sound practice. Efficient administration requires that there be unity of action, coordination of effort. Centuries of experience since the days of Moses have served to demonstrate the wisdom of the advice which he received from his father-in-law, and on which he acted, that there must be leaders over thousands, and over hundreds, and over tens; a supreme authority flowing downward, through subordinates, in defined channels, to individuals. This arrangement permits to high authority time for the consideration of great questions and delegates to subordinates questions graded in importance to the station and abilities of those subordinates. It results in the faculties of high authority being brought, unfatigued by the consideration of subordinate matters, to the solution of the greater problems of the organization. It results, further, in the solution of all subordinate questions of harmony with great and governing policies.

11. The necessity for the kind of administrative ability here indicated flows from the natural limitations of the capabilities of any individual and from the supreme necessity for the smooth and unclogged working of the administrative machinery of a great organization.

12. Wherever high authority is so submerged in details that it can not give proper attention to great questions as they arise, there we find the sources of the inefficiency. A badly conceived intention of high authority rapidly spreads its influence through every ramification of the organization. The same is true of a well-conceived intention when suitable expression is given to it by action. These considerations lead to the subject of the proper mission of the aids to the Secretary. It is unnecessary to quote from the regulations the present division of administration work in the department or the duties of the aids in that work. The administrative work of the department is grouped with a view to efficient coordination of effort. At the head of each administrative group is an aid, whose duties are solely advisory. This restricted view of an aid's duties is a clog in administrative procedure. The aid is powerless, except for the signature of the Secretary; and too often the Secretary has not sufficient time to see the aids and sign those papers necessary to realize the efforts at coordination with which the aids are charged. Further, the aids can not relieve the Secretary of the administrative details of which he should be relieved.

13. The experience of many years with the bureau system in the department has shown the necessity for a coordinating link between the various bureaus. The aids should be this coordinating link.

14. From these considerations we derive the following as the true mission of the aids to the Secretary. Like the Secretary himself, each aid has a double mission.

15. The first mission of an aid is, under the general direction of the Secretary, so to coordinate the efforts of his group as a whole with the administrative groups of the department as best to execute the purpose of the Secretary in the accomplishment of his mission.

16. The second mission of an aid is under the general direction of the Secretary so to administer the affairs within his own group as best to accomplish the aims of the Secretary in the accomplishment of the Secretary's mission.

17. Coordination of effort requires first of all a clear understanding of what is to be done, and then a knowledge of all on the part of each of the share each cooperating colleague has in the general effort. So the aids need, as a first step in the accomplishment of their several missions, a systematic association with each other and with the Secretary. Such systematized association establishes a feeling of the fullest loyalty and mutual confidence, as all come to know the aims and motives of each. At stated hours each day the aids should assemble with a view to the accomplishment of their first mission. This preliminary conference should be followed by a confer-

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ence of all aids with the Secretary, together with the recommendations of the aids. The Secretary should then give general instructions to the aids, who would then disperse, to carry out his instructions, and thereby accomplish their several missions.

Admiral FISKE. By this time, I realized also that the Secretary was nettled at my insistence on certain measures of preparedness, and that it would be much better for me personally if I should moderate my insistence. This became especially apparent when I, with Admiral Dewey's approval, nominated Rear Admiral Knight to be president of the War College. The Secretary declared that I was the man to be president. I should have had to go if Admiral Dewey had not interfered and insisted that I should stay where I was.

During the following year, 1914, I did all that I could to bring the Secretary to realize the necessity of dealing with the Navy as a whole, and not with its separate parts, but with little if any success. In particular, I tried to make him see the necessity of approving a certain section of the General Board's general war plan, which we called for brevity "the administrative plan." This was not a war plan except in the sense that it supplied the base from which the Navy Department could start to prepare for war. It merely provided that the various bureaus and the department itself should cooperate toward preparedness by means of a system of reports which each bureau would make to the department once every three months in regard to the status of that bureau in preparedness. I was unable to get the Secretary to approve the administrative plan during my entire term of office with him, though it lasted for more than two years, until May 11, 1915. I frequently brought it to his attention and asked him to sign it, pointing out that until he had signed it, it was utterly impossible for the Navy even to start toward a state of preparedness; and that it was necessary for him to sign it as soon as possible, because, even after he had signed it, it would take several years before war plans could be made and developed and the Navy got ready in accordance with them. On every occasion the Secretary declined to sign the paper.

In July, 1914, I got permission again to go to the War College for the month of August. I arrived in Newport on July 31. The evening papers said that war between Germany and Austria on one side, and France and Russia on the other—and possibly Great Britain—would be declared the following day. I resolved immediately to request Admiral Knight to call a meeting of the General Board the following morning. The General Board was then at the War College, as it usually was in the summer months. I did so; and we spent the day of August 1, 1914, in preparing and sending a letter in which we pointed out the various dangers of the United States being drawn into the war, and the consequent necessity of making certain preparations.

When I returned to Washington in September, 1914, I found that nothing had been done toward preparedness, and that the Secretary's principal thought was the work that he was outlining for an aid for education, an office that he had just established. Naturally I was extremely concerned. The officers of the War College had been much exercised during August with the situation in Europe, and had concluded, after many conferences, that the chances were in favor of Germany; and that if Germany succeeded in Europe, she would then

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attack the United States as the one bar between her and world dominion.

During the following months of 1914, after many consultations with Navy officers, I concluded that it was my urgent duty to make the Secretary see the truth, no matter what effect it might have on my professional future. Of course my professional future was entirely in his hands. As aid for operations, I was most concerned with the impossibility of getting the Navy ready in time, in case we got into the war, because mainly of the lack of a sufficient personnel and the absence of any staff, or planning division for making general and detail plans of war.

As to the personnel situation, the remarks in my diary during the months of October and November, 1914, contain frequent statements about the endeavors of the General Board and myself to get the Secretary to ask Congress for 19,600 additional enlisted men. I should be glad to read any extracts that the committee may desire. The gist is that the General Board decided to recommend that the Secretary ask for 19,600 more enlisted men, that the Secretary asked the General Board not to put that recommendation in their written report; that the General Board did so nevertheless; that the Secretary directed me to request the General Board to omit that recommendation; that the General Board finally did so, and that the Secreatary's annual report, made in December, was generally interpreted as meaning that the General Board did not think that any more men were needed. In my later testimony before the House Naval Committee on March 24, 1916, I was cross-questioned on this matter. I told the whole truth about it; but, of course, it was too late. I have a copy of my testimony with me.

The CHAIRMAN. I suggest that you put that testimony in the record.

Admiral FISKE. Very well.

(Portions of the hearing above referred to by Admiral Fiske are here printed in the record, as follows:)

(No. 43.)

THE COMMITTEE ON NAVAL AFFAIRS,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Friday, March 24, 1916.

The committee this day met, Hon. Lemuel P. Padgett (chairman) presiding.

STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL BRADLEY A. FISKE.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen of the committee, we have with us this morning Rear Admiral Fiske.

Admiral Fiske, you were before the committee last year, and at some length gave your views in relation to certain matters in the Navy which were published. It is now a year later, and I want to ask if you have any additional or different suggestions to make to the committee other than those given to the committee last year.

Admiral FISKE. I have no suggestions or statements to make contrary to those; but naturally, that has been 15 months ago and my ideas have expanded a good deal, and I have, of course, a good many ideas which I did not have then.

The CHAIRMAN. My question was not if you had any contrary views, but if you had any additional views?

Admiral FISKE. Yes, sir; I think I have.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will be glad to have you express your views.

Admiral FISKE. I have prepared some notes, and if it will not take too long, I will just read them over.

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed in your own way, without interruption.

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Admiral FISKE. Fifteen months ago, on December 17, 1914, I had the honor to testify before this committee as aid for operation. In that capacity I had been brought into closer touch with the Navy and its efficiency compared with that of other navies than any other person; and the peril of the situation had been brought close home to me by the Vera Cruz and Tampico incidents, the disturbance in the public mind about Japan, the fact of the European war, and the danger of our being entangled in it.

American naval officers had been aware for many years that our Navy differed from the other great navies in the matter of preparedness; that the other great navies had followed the lead of Germany in the matter of preparedness and that we had not; that the other great navies had adopted in more or less modified forms the idea of the German general staff, but that we had continued to follow the method that we had been using for practically a hundred years without trying to adapt it to modern conditions. They realized, it is true, that we had established a Naval War College before other nations had; but they also realized that the War College remained a college pure and simple; that it was a thing apart from the Navy and that its teachings were almost ignored. They realized, for instance, that the War College had always insisted that the Navy must have a general staff, or else surrender any chance of being as efficient as other navies, and yet that we could get no general staff. They realized that, as a result, there was no continuity in the aims of either the department or the fleet; that each successive Secretary of the Navy and each commander in chief of the fleet went ahead according to his own ideas, with little reference to the ideas of his predecessor. Of course, in time of peace this state of things wrought no disadvantage; but officers all realize that if war should come with a real military power, it would come so suddenly that we could not get ready in time to fight the war successfully.

During the latter part of the last administration the department was administered under a system that was called sometimes the "aid system" and sometimes the "Meyer system," because Secretary Meyer put it into effect. The system, however, did not embody a new idea, but was the outcome of the report of a board of naval officers, called the Swift Board, which report was founded on the report of a board called the Moody Board, headed by ex-Secretary Moody, of which the other members were ex-Secretary Admiral Luce, Admiral Mahan, Judge Dayton, and others; and the report of the Moody Board was founded largely on the report of the so-called Esher Board in England, which investigated the cause of the unsatisfactory operations of the British Army in the Boer War. The Esher report itself was founded on the organization of the British Admiralty, which had continued in successful operation for nearly 300 years. In other words, the Swift Board recommended a sort of modification of the British Admiralty adapted to the needs and ideals of our country.

There were two Swift reports, however, signed the same day; one recommending the aid system and needing no legislation for its execution, and another report recommending a similar organization, except that there should be four chiefs of divisions instead of four aids, each chief having authority under the Secretary in his division.

Mr. OLIVER. What was the date of the Swift report?

Admiral FISKE. I think July, 1909; I think about that time.

This recommendation—that is, that the four men should be chiefs of division having authority under the secretary in their divisions—needed legislative authority for its execution, and it was not published. The secretary at that time desired to have the latter organization put into effect, but he did not think the time was ripe and therefore did not press it.

When the present administration came in the aid system was in operation. It worked well, but naturally, as it was a halfway or intermediate measure, it was not wholly satisfactory. If the Navy was to remain always at peace, it was unnecessary and complicated the organization of the department unduly; while if the Navy should get into war, it was not adequate to insure quick action and sure coordination. For this reason, it seemed the obvious duty of the aid for operations, as the military adviser of the secretary, and in fact his senior advisor, directly charged with the operations of the fleet, to bring the secretary gradually to the point of view that the unpublished recommendations of the Swift Board should be put into effect. The aid for operations, therefore, started at this task at once (see his letter to the secretary, dated Aug. 26, 1913) and he was still engaged on that task when he testified before this honorable committee on December 17, 1914.

The views which he expressed at that time, therefore, had not been hastily formed and they were not carelessly expressed. Neither were those views radical or peculiar; on the contrary, they were those held by all naval officers of experience and thoughtfulness, not in our Navy only, but in all navies. They represented not only the thought of the great military navies, but their actual practice; they did not advo-

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cate any extreme or original measures, intended to put our Navy far ahead of other navies, but only measures to get our Navy out of a rut and put it on a par with other navies.

During the giving of my testimony the chairman of this committee said to me:

"If I understand you, the crux of your criticism of what is lacking in organization is that there should be a general staff?"

To this I answered "Yes." The chairman then said:

"To prepare plans and to do the work of a general staff ashore, preparatory to sea?"

To this I answered:

"Yes, sir; preparatory and during the war."

Perhaps a little explanation may be desirable here, to the effect that the unpublished report of the Swift Board recommended what would be in effect a general staff, though not to be called by that name; the reason for not using the name being a desire not to offend a curious prejudice among some civilians against a general staff, due to misinformation as to its intent and character. In other words, when I used the words general staff, and when American officers now use that phrase, the phrase means only a body of specially trained officers to study and recommend and execute plans, headed by a chief of staff. A general staff is somewhat like any committee, and the chief of the general staff is somewhat like the chairman of the committee. In fact, this committee at this moment is doing general-staff work for the Navy.

Previous to December 17, 1914, however, the excitement about Japan, the Tampico, and Vera Cruz incidents, and the rapid spread of the war in Europe forced on my attention and the attention of the officers in the Operations Division of the department the fact that for sufficiently quick work in mobilization and in conducting a campaign the aid for operations would need a great many assistants that the Swift report did not contemplate. The wonderful speed and certainty with which the European armies and fleets started showed that if we were ever to have to contend against one of them, we would be beaten badly in getting ready; and so we would start with a handicap that it would probably be impossible to overcome. It became clear, not as a matter of academic interest, not as a fact to be mentally accepted and not acted on, but as a living menace that no matter how many fine ships we might have, we would go down as the French did in 1870, because we were not ready and our antagonist was. It was for this reason that I accented the need for a staff to make plans and also the need for 20,000 enlisted men who should be thoroughly trained and actually ready before the war began.

Your committee was evidently impressed with the need for a general staff, for you embodied in the following appropriation bill a provision for a chief of naval operations with at least 15 assistants to prepare war plans. Unfortunately, this provision went out on a point of order, but fortunately the main feature of the provision was restored later, and the bill as it went through established the Office of Chief of Naval Operations. In the opinion of most naval officers this was the most important step toward the modernization of the United States Navy that has been taken since 1880, when the steel ships *Dolphin*, *Atlanta*, *Boston*, and the *Chicago* were authorized. Most officers regret, however, the omission of the 15 assistants. Had they been prescribed they would have been able to lighten greatly the labors of this committee by working out, with the assistance of the game board, and presenting a number of alternate plans for your selection; each plan describing a program recommended as the best for a given sum of money.

Since my previous appearance here, the effect has been continuously shown of proper preparedness before plunging into war; and the fact that this has been appreciated for years by the strong nations of the world has also been shown. This war so far has shown no new thing to Army and Navy men, except in details. The underlying principles of strategy, as expounded by the strategists of the past, have been found to apply to modern times; and the present war simply falls into line with other wars and teaches the same harsh lessons. The history of mankind has not been finished, the direction of national progress has not been changed, and the unprepared and weak still go down before those who are prepared and strong. No nation in history has ever become great without the exercise of military power, or fallen from greatness without neglecting it. Only three great nations of the world have maintained their greatness for 800 years, and these are the three greatest nations now, France, Germany, and Great Britain; and each of these nations has always maintained a carefully balanced relation between the civil and the military, allowing neither to wax unduly great in comparison with the other.

All these nations lay great stress on the preparedness of their navies, and not only in the matter of plans, but also in the matter of men; that is, not only in plans, but also in the men to execute those plans. They realize that navies do not consist of

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ships, but rather of men who use the ships. All those nations have large bodies of reserves, those reserves existing not only on paper but in fact, existing not only as men but as organizations of men. Service in the reserve is obligatory in all those navies, and not only service but practice.

In our country we have no reserve worthy of the name, though we have been trying for more than 30 years to get one. If we should get into war in the near future, the only men the Navy could count on for service, or rather for effective service, would be the men already wearing the uniform. Modern wars come too quickly to warrant our relying on anybody else. We may not realize this unless we realize that the problem of war is not to fight, but to win; that the battle between the *Chesapeake* and the *Shannon*, gallant though it was, was as fruitless for the success of the American policy as Don Quixote's battle with the windmill.

Referring to my declaration of opinion that it would take at least five years to get our Navy into condition to fight effectively an effective navy, like the one then indicated, I have had more than a hundred conversations with officers since then, and not one has controverted my position; every officer with whom I have talked has agreed that it was correct. I wish to say now that I did not believe that it could be done in five years, but I did not think it wise to make a statement that might seem sensational. I also wish to say that my subsequent studies, discussions, and reflections have led me to the belief that, no matter how much money we may spend, we shall never be able to get our Navy into the condition of efficiency of certain other navies until we change the system which directs it to a system as good as theirs.

Mr. ROBERTS. As I understand, it is your opinion that had Congress enacted the provision for chief of operations that was reported from this committee we would have had a much more effective bureau than we have under the provision that was enacted?

Admiral FISKE. I think so; yes, sir.

Mr. ROBERTS. Is it your opinion that the provision reported from this committee was broad enough and complete enough to give us a real effective General Staff or Bureau of Operations, or whatever name we chose to call it? In other words, did we go far enough in the provision reported out from the House Naval Committee?

Admiral FISKE. I think there should have been more than 15 assistants. I do not think that 15 is enough. Speaking only as a naval officer, and not taking any broad view of policy, simply thinking of the Navy as a navy, having only in mind its ostensible purpose, I think that it would be well to have some provision—I do not quite see how it could be put in—whereby in strictly military work the recommendations of what I will call the staff should be carried out. I am speaking only as a naval officer.

The CHAIRMAN. Speaking as a naval officer, I understand you to mean that the military matters should be placed under the control of military men; in other words, that the military features and military work of the Navy should be placed under naval officers?

Admiral FISKE. Of course, it must all be under the President. The President is the Commander in Chief, and we might call him a naval officer in that capacity. It is all under the President.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand that.

Admiral FISKE. I only wish to guard against giving the idea that I want to put naval officers over civilians. Of course, none of us wants that. I want to guard against creating that impression.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you give that authority to the naval officers, over military matters, independent of the Secretary of the Navy?

Admiral FISKE. I would not recommend that extreme; no, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. There was one officer who recommended it. You do not?

Admiral FISKE. No, sir; but I should like to say, in trying to define my position, which is rather difficult——

The CHAIRMAN (interposing). In other words, while you do not recommend it, I infer from your answer that you would like to see it, as I understand.

Admiral FISKE. I think it would be safer from the standpoint of what might happen in a war.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, while you do not recommend it, you would like to see the military matters of the Navy put under naval officers, independent of the Secretary of the Navy?

Admiral FISKE. As a naval officer, I can hardly imagine such a condition as that. I, perhaps, might state it like this: This comes under what is called strategy. Now, strategy is a thing very hard to define. It is often compared to chess, and it is like chess in a good many ways, but it is a much more difficult game than chess, because there are more pieces; because in playing chess a man has plenty of time for his moves, and because in chess all the pieces are on the board before you play and they are regulated already by the rules of the game; but in strategy you change the pieces,

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battle cruisers instead of battleships, etc., and you bring in aeroplanes, etc. I am simply trying to show what a tremendous thing strategy is.

The CHAIRMAN. I was not speaking of management, but I was speaking of control.

Admiral FISKE. I will lead up to that in a moment.

The CHAIRMAN. Should all military matters be under the control of naval officers who could act on their own authority, independently of the Secretary?

Admiral FISKE. I will come to that in a moment, if you will permit me.

Abroad—that is, in the military countries—they recognize strategy as a specialty just as much as construction, or engineering, or electricity, or anything else; and they take young officers who seem to be capable and send them to the War College. Those who make good there, and seem to be of a certain standard, are put tentatively in the general staff; and if they make good there they are put into the general staff, just as an officer in our Navy is put into the Construction Corps. Under our system of Government, the Construction Corps, for instance, is under the Secretary, and the Secretary can give any orders to the constructor that he wants; but the Sectreary does not, as a matter of fact, tell the constructor that the ship ought to be so long instead of so long; and the same way in engineering, he does not say what kind of oil there shall be used on the bearings of an engine. Under our system, it would seem to me that if we recognized strategy in the way that we recognize construction, that we would get very excellent results. That would mean that the military authority would not be independent of the Secretary. We do not—in saying this I think I am in accord with most of the officers in the Navy—we do not wish to have a system whereby the staff could tell the Secretary to do so and so, or to do things without his knowledge and consent; but that it should be understood by everybody that this staff of trained men are there for a purpose, and that their recommendation should be carried out unless the Secretary, as a member of the Cabinet and the trusted adviser of the President, should rule otherwise.

The CHAIRMAN. Bearing in mind all you have stated, and your opinion on the subject, is it your idea, not your recommendation, but is it your idea that the military functions and duties should be put into execution by the naval officers constituting the general staff, or whatever name they may go by—sat is not essential—assuming that tthe members of the general staff or organization are the very best military and naval men in the Navy, should their orders be put into operation independently of the authority of the Secretary of the Navy?

Admiral FISKE. No.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, it is your opinion that there should not be a divided authority?

Admiral FISKE. Absolutely.

The CHAIRMAN. And that the Secretary of the Navy should be the ultimate authority not only on administrative matters, but on determining the military functions of the Navy?

Admiral FISKE. Yes.

Mr. KELLEY. Just what additional power would you give to the Chief of Operations as the law now stands?

Admiral FISKE. Those powers which are given by the provision which this committee put through last session.

Mr. KELLEY. Nothing further than that?

Mr. BRITTEN. I believe the admiral stated that he would enlarge the number.

Mr. KELLEY. That is a detail.

The CHAIRMAN. That is not limited now. He can have 100 or 200 if he desires.

While we reported that provision out of the House committee, during the time intervening I have been looking into that somewhat. Would not the draft that was submitted to the House and reported out by this committee give to the Chief of Operations supreme control not only of the preparation of plans for war, but would it not give him supreme control of military matters in time of peace for the preparation of plans and also in time of war in administering the plans?

Admiral FISKE. I think not. I think it said "under the Secretary" very clearly.

The CHAIRMAN. I think you will find that the provision which was reported out would give the Chief of Operations administration in war time as well as peace time.

Admiral FISKE. I think it said "under the Secretary."

The CHAIRMAN. It was under the Secretary. It was enlarging his powers into a much broader field of activity than the preparation of the Navy for war?

Admiral FISKE. I am quite sure, Mr. Chairman, that it distinctly provided that everything must be done under the Secretary.

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly, it said under the Secretary, but I am speaking of what, under the Secretary, he could do?

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Admiral FISKE. My recollection is——

The CHAIRMAN (interposing). It was not limited as the law finally put it to the discharge of duties in preparing the Navy for war in time of peace, but it was managing, if I recollect, the administration of military affairs, both in peace and in war.

Admiral FISKE. Yes, sir; but in the same way, unless my recollection is very wrong, that the commander in chief has over his fleet or the chief of bureau has over his bureau, that he was to have direction. To use a phrase in strategy, he had a certain area of discretion within which he could act, but his action in the large was to be determined by superior authority.

The CHAIRMAN. If I remember, under the first phraseology, it placed the commander in chief of the fleet under the control of the aid for operations in time of war?

Admiral FISKE. Yes, sir; but only in the sense, of course, that he is under the Secretary.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Admiral FISKE. The provision in the bill, as you reported it, simply delegated to the Chief of Naval Operations certain authority from the Secretary. The commander in chief was exactly the same as it was before; his status was not changed, except that the Chief of Naval Operations was recognized as having jurisdiction under the Secretary, which, by the way, is the method abroad. In practically all the other navies that is the method.

Mr. ROBERTS. The law provides that the Chief of Naval Operations shall "be charged with the operations of the fleet and with the preparation and readiness of plans for its use in war." Does not that language itself give the Chief of Operations the power, under the Secretary, to control the operations of the fleet in war? There is no limitation there as to what he shall do in the operations of the fleet in time of peace or war, but that he shall "be charged with the operations of the fleet, and with the preparation and readiness of plans for its use in war." I can not extract any other view from that than that the Chief of Operations is charged with the operations of the fleet at all times. That does not limit him to the operations of the fleet in times of peace?

Admiral FISKE. Oh, no.

Mr. ROBERTS. It does not say that he shall be charged with the operations of the fleet in time of war?

Admiral FISKE. No.

Mr. ROBERTS. But it does say that he shall be charged with the operations of the fleet.

Admiral FISKE. Naturally.

Mr. ROBERTS. Which must run all through?

Admiral FISKE. You can hardly imagine any other situation.

Mr. ROBERTS. Whatever language may have been used and however it may have differed from the provision we had originally, we finally enacted a provision giving the Chief of Operations that power?

Admiral FISKE. You realize that is says the "fleet"; it does not say "the Navy."

The CHAIRMAN. It was the Navy. This is limited to the fleet.

Admiral FISKE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The first provision that we reported gave him control of the Navy in time of peace and war?

Admiral FISKE. Yes, sir; under the Secretary.

The CHAIRMAN. It was a very different proposition from the one we finally agreed to?

Admiral FISKE. Very different; but this provision, as it finally passed, does——

The CHAIRMAN (interposing). Limits it to the fleet?

Admiral FISKE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And the other one extended it to the whole Navy?

Admiral FISKE. To the Navy; yes, sir.

Mr. ROBERTS. What is the difference?

The CHAIRMAN. There is a great deal of difference between Navy and the fleet.

Mr. ROBERTS. That depends on what you call the Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. The Navy means everything, while the fleet means the fleet that is at sea. We passed that provision limiting him to the operations and preparation of the fleet and not to the management and control of the Navy.

Mr. ROBERTS. Do you differentiate between the fleet actually in commission and at sea and the vessels that are laid up in reserve?

The CHAIRMAN. No; but there is the administration of affairs here in the department. The fleet means the Navy that is out on the water. That is why we limited it in its present form, so that he should not have control over the whole Navy.

Mr. ROBERTS. With the Chief of Operations limited in his authority to the control of the fleet, meaning by the fleet all the ships, whether in commission or out of com-

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mission, and some other function or bureau or department of the Navy responsible for the gun foundry, the powder factory, the navy yards, and the naval stations, where have you centered any responsibility for a failure to coordinate all the military features necessary for the successful operation of the fleet?

Admiral FISKE. You have not done it.

Mr. ROBERTS. We have a weakness in our present system?

Admiral FISKE. Yes, sir.

Mr. ROBERTS. Due to the fact that there is no centralization of responsibility?

Admiral FISKE. Yes, sir.

Mr. ROBERTS. And conferring authority to support that responsibility?

Admiral FISKE. Yes, sir.

Mr. ROBERTS. If, under existing conditions, we should be drawn into war and through failure of our navy yards or our gun factory or any other of the military features the fleet was not properly supplied we could not put our finger on any one officer and say, "You are the man to blame." The Chief of Operations would say, "If I had had my way the navy yards would have been ready, the ammunition would have been ready, and the guns would have been ready. My part was all done, but through the failure of somebody else to meet the emergency we met with failure."

Admiral FISKE. I think your idea is correct.

Mr. ROBERTS. If the Chief of Operations is given authority to control all military matters in connection with the Navy, then you have placed the responsibility on one man?

Admiral FISKE. Yes, sir.

Mr. ROBERTS. And it is his duty to see that the facilities of the Navy, relating to the military end, are provided, to the one end that the fleet shall be ready for war and efficient when war comes?

Admiral FISKE. Yes, sir.

Mr. ROBERTS. This, of course, all under the Secretary?

Admiral FISKE. Yes, sir.

Mr. ROBERTS. No independent authority, but everything done under his direction?

Admiral FISKE. I think the provision that passed this committee that the Chief of Operations should be responsible for its readiness for war means not only the fleet but the Navy.

Mr. ROBERTS. You recognize, and I presume all officers recognize, that there is a wide difference between having your fleet ready for war and having all the other departments of the Government which must work in harmony with that fleet ready for war?

Admiral FISKE. Yes, sir.

Mr. ROBERTS. We might get the fleet ready for war quite readily and within a comparatively short time, and there would be no means of supplying that fleet with the thousand and one things which you must have to maintain war?

Admiral FISKE. Yes, sir.

Mr. ROBERTS. It is your thought, as I gather, that whoever is responsible for the readiness of the fleet for war and for its operations during war should also be made responsible for everything that goes to make for efficiency, when the war comes.

The CHAIRMAN. That interpretation placed upon the provision that he should be responsible for the thousand and one things and everything that is necessary to make the Navy ready for war would make him the Secretary of the Navy?

Admiral FISKE. No; I do not think so.

The CHAIRMAN. What functions would the Secretary exercise, relating to the thousand and one things that are necessary and enter into the preparation of the Navy, that this Chief of Operations could not exercise under the interpretation which you gave? You said that he would have control of everything that went into the preparation of the Navy?

Mr. ROBERTS. The military features. My questions all related to the military side of it.

The CHAIRMAN. Provisions would relate to the military side, for they have to be fed, and clothing would relate to the military side, because they have to be clothed. Everything that is in the Navy relates to the one crucial point.

Admiral FISKE. This officer is responsible to the Secretary.

The CHAIRMAN. The Secretary would just simply have the authority of passing on such things as he saw fit to submit to him?

Mr. ROBERTS. That is the condition to-day in every bureau.

The CHAIRMAN. No; not one man; it is quite different.

Mr. ROBERTS. We can get around that in a minute if we can have the regulations concerning the Chief of Operations.

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Mr. KELLEY. Before Mr. Roberts goes into that, will you discuss briefly just what we are to understand by the military side of the Navy as distinguished from any other side? It seems to me, somehow, that the whole thing is military, that all and everything points to the one function of the Navy, and I can not quite distinguish in my own mind what powers would be purely military in their character?

Mr. OLIVER. Would not that be specially true in view of the defined purposes of the Navy as expressed this morning?

Admiral FISKE. Anybody who has had to map out an organization realizes the difficulty of drawing a line between any two parts and yet have them merge; and if they do not merge they do not work together, I think I see Mr. Kelley's point. The purpose of the Navy being actually military exclusively, the control of all the factors which would lead up to the battle or to war, would practically take in everything. That is true. So, naturally, there would have to be some more or less arbitrary line drawn; otherwise the power of the Chief of Naval Operations might spread over everything, more than any of us would want. There would have to be some arbitrary line drawn as to what constituted the military and what constituted the other.

Of course, if the Chief of Naval Operations were given the authority which this committee's provision seemed to contemplate last year, that would give him power over all the other factors in the Navy. For instance, he could send for a chief of bureau and ask him why he did not do so and so. If he did that and the chief of the bureau had the power of appeal, as he naturally would, to the Secretary, in case it did interfere with anybody under him in his own bureau, why, the Secretary of the Navy could very easily rectify it, I think. The idea of military and naval men is to recognize that in our country the underlying idea of our Government is not to put the military over the civil, but to prevent harm being done by a civilian official who did not quite have the proper conception of the weight of these factors; to have a competent man who is versed in all those matters to be the principal adviser to the Secretary, and also under him, just as an adjutant in a regiment. No Chief of Operations who had any sense at all—in fact I can not imagine any man at all who would want to go and interfere between the chief of a bureau and his subordinates, or the commandant of a navy yard and his subordinates.

The whole training of military men is just the reverse; and our whole training is to keep out of another man's area of discretion. A few years ago there was a regulation put in the regulation book, and it is still there, cautioning admirals not to interfere with the interior discipline of flagships. For instance, an admiral aboard ship could give orders not only to the captain of the ship but to the coxswain of the boat, to the sweeper on the deck, and to the chief engineer. Of course, he has the authority to do it and you can not stop him very well; but the regulations distinctly warn him against it. It would be a very bad thing to do, and we do not want him to do it.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, I should like to hand you these regulations with reference to the Chief of Operations and ask you to read them carefully and suggest what additional military power or duty you would give to the Chief of Operations.

Admiral FISKE. Yes, sir. [Reading:]

"(Extract from United States Navy Regulations covering the duties, etc., of the Chief of Operations. Those regulations have been in force since July 1, 1915.)

"SEC. 3. The Office of Naval Operations.

"126. (1) The Chief of Naval Operations shall, under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy, be charged with the operations of the fleet and with the preparation and readiness of plans for its use in war. (Act Mar. 3, 1915.)

"(2) This shall include the direction of the Naval War College, the Office of Naval Intelligence, the office of target practice and engineering competitions, the operation of the radio service and of other systems of communication, the operations of the aeronautic service, of mines and mining, of the naval defense districts, Naval Militia, and of the Coast Guard when operating with the Navy; the direction of all strategic and technical matters, organization, maneuvers, target practice, drills, and exercises, and of the training of the fleet for war; and the preparation, revision, and enforcement of all tactics, drill books, signal codes, and cipher codes. The orders issued by the Chief of Naval Operations in the performance of the duties enumerated in this paragraph shall be considered as emanating from the Secretary of the Navy and shall have full force and effect as such.

"(3) The Chief of Naval Operations shall be charged with the preparation, revision, and record of regulations for the government of the Navy, naval instructions, and general orders.

"(4) He shall advise the Secretary concerning the movements and operations of vessels of the Navy and prepare all orders issued by the Secretary in regard thereto, and shall keep the records of service of all fleets, squadrons, and ships.

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"(5) He shall advise the Secretary in regard to the military features of all new ships and as to any proposed extensive alterations of a ship which will affect her military value, and all features which affect the military value of dry docks, including their location; also as to matters pertaining to fuel reservations and depots, the location of radio stations, reserves of ordnance and ammunition, fuel, stores, and other supplies of whatsoever nature, with a view to meeting effectively the demands of the fleet.

"(6) In preparing and maintaining in readiness plans for the use of the fleet in war he shall freely consult with and have the advice and assistance of the various bureaus, boards, and offices of the department, including the Marine Corps headquarters, in matters coming under their cognizance. After the approval of any given war plans by the Secretary it shall be the duty of the Chief of Naval Operations to assign to the bureaus, boards, and offices such parts thereof as may be needed for the intelligent carrying out of their respective duties in regard to such plans.

"(7) The Chief of Naval Operations shall from time to time witness the operations of the fleet as an observer.

"(8) He shall have two principal senior assistants, officers not below the grade of captain, one as assistant for operations and the other as assistant for material.

"(9) He shall ex officio be a member of the General Board."

I would define his duties and powers as they were defined in the provision which this committee put into the last appropriation bill, as it was originally reported.

I said I did not believe that the Chief of Naval Operations should act independently of the Secretary. If he acted independently of the Secretary, he might go contrarywise, and, of course, I would not agree to that. I am very sure, in my opinion, that whatever law is passed in regard to the Navy should be so detailed that it would be impossible for a Secretary coming in to change everything without the consent of Congress. We have had that trouble always, as everybody knows.

The CHAIRMAN. Then, you would transfer the power by act of Congress from the Secretary to the officers under the Secretary?

Admiral FISKE. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. When you take away from the Secretary the power to control or to change the actions of the subordinates, why have you not transferred the power from the Secretary to the subordinates?

Admiral FISKE. I did not advocate that, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I understood you to say you would have it so specified that the Secretary could not change it without authority of Congress.

Admiral FISKE. Yes, certain matters. Whatever is decided on should be so.

The CHAIRMAN. In whom would you vest that authority by act of Congress?

Admiral FISKE. I do not think I understand you, Mr. Chairman. Perhaps I might say here and point out that the law, for instance, gives the bureaus certain authority, and gives the commander in chief of the fleet certain authority. The law does that. The idea of that law, of course, Mr. Chairman, and of a great many of these laws is to prevent the Secretary, or even a higher official, from certain acts which they thought might not be for the public good.

The CHAIRMAN. I will ask you to name one thing that a chief of bureau can do without the authority of the Secretary of the Navy?

Admiral FISKE. He can not do anything without authority from the Secretary of the Navy, and I do not want the Chief of Naval Operations to do anything without the authority of the Secretary of the Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you mean, Admiral, when you say that the law shall define certain things?

Admiral FISKE. To be specific, then, I should say—and I forgot to put it in my last recommendation—that it ought to be in the law that there should be under the Chief of Naval Operations at least 15 assistants——

The CHAIRMAN (interposing). That is a detail.

Admiral FISKE. Yes, sir; but that detail is exactly what I am insisting upon.

The CHAIRMAN. I am speaking about what authority you would give. Would you give any officer of the Navy, by law, authority which the Secretary of the Navy can not control?

Admiral FISKE. No, sir; I testified to that a short time ago.

The CHAIRMAN. That simplifies the matter very much.

Mr. ROBERTS. That has been the contention all along. There has been no point in anybody's mind on that. There has been only one officer appearing before us that had a contrary view.

Mr. OLIVER. I think your question, Mr. Chairman, is very indefinite, as is also the answer. To what extent should the Secretary be permitted to control?

The CHAIRMAN. He said he should have supreme control. I asked if the Secretary was to be the supreme control, and he said "absolutely."

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Mr. OLIVER. Is he in favor of any limitations of that control being fixed by Congress?

Admiral FISKE. Not as between the Secretary of the Navy and his officers.

Mr. KELLEY. But your idea is that there are some well-established policies which even the Secretary of the Navy ought not to change without the authority of Congress?

Admiral FISKE. That is exactly what I mean. For instance, this provision itself is a provision of law. Before that was made law, the Secretary could or could not, would or would not, appoint a man to do something like this. But by law now he is compelled to do it, and the succeeding Secretary can not come along and say, "I do not want a Chief of Naval Operations at all," and wipe him off the slate. He can not do that.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the creation of an office.

Admiral FISKE. Yes.

Mr. ROBERTS. But pardon me, the succeeding Secretary of the Navy can come along and take away from the Chief of Operations all these powers that are given him in this regulation, and make his office virtually nonexistent.

Mr. BRITTEN. Useless?

Mr. ROBERTS. Yes; and that has been done.

The CHAIRMAN. That applies to every bureau in the Navy Department. There are only three or four sections of the statutes that relate to the creation of all the bureaus, and they say that they shall have such power and perform such duties as the Secretary of the Navy may delegate to them. We have never had any case where the Secretary of the Navy has taken such action, except where we had, under the former administration, in the Bureau of Equipment, a situation where they did not appoint bureau chiefs to meet that provision of the bill.

Mr. ROBERTS. The history of that, if you will recall, is that the law provided for a Bureau of Equipment, with a chief, and his duties were such as were assigned him by the Secretary of the Navy from time to time. The then Secretary of the Navy took away all the duties of the Chief of the Bureau of Equipment and distributed them among other bureaus and left the office absolutely useless.

The CHAIRMAN. You are a little inaccurate about that. He did not take them away from him. When the office became vacant at the expiration of the time, he and the President declined to make another appointment.

Mr. ROBERTS. I think you are mistaken about that, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. No; I am right.

Mr. ROBERTS. I am quite certain they were distributed before the vacancy came.

The CHAIRMAN. No; they were not. There being no chief of the Bureau of Equipment, the Secretary distributed those duties among other officers and asked the approval of Congress, and we carried it by temporary enactment from year to year for several years, until we finally abolished it and permanently distributed them.

Mr. ROBERTS. Having read these regulations, I want to ask the admiral if paragraphs 5 and 6 do not give the Chief of Operations just the authority over the food and the ammunition and the supplies and the bureaus that he thinks a Chief of Operations should have. I refer you to section 6. When the Secretary of the Navy, on recommendation of the Chief of Staff, has decided on carrying out a certain program that requires action by the bureaus, hasn't he given it to the Chief of Operations to tell the bureaus what to do?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; he has.

Mr. ROBERTS. That is exactly what I want to get in the law as a permanent feature, because I believe the staff is of as much importance in the administration of the Navy as is the Secretary of the Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. Those details might much better be handled by the department under regulation than by a fixed, rigid law.

Mr. ROBERTS. It does not take away from the department the right to regulate, but it does give and define the scope of the staff. The objection I have to the present arrangement is not that it is not efficient. I am not criticizing its efficiency at all, and I am not seeking to take from the Secretary of the Navy any power he has or that he should rightly and properly have; but I do have in mind, and the chairman must have in mind, that the Secretary of the Navy in perfecting an organization by the exercise of his own authority had what was thought at that time to be a good organization. The next Secretary of the Navy came along and thought it was not good and dispensed with it, and he set something in its place which he thought was good, but he did not set it up in its place until Congress told him he should have a Chief of Operations and compelled him to have it.

The CHAIRMAN. That becomes now a fixed law, and the duties of it are discharged, in my opinion, under the regulations of the department, with a rigid law saying, "Just this, and nothing more."

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Mr. ROBERTS. I do not know who the next Secretary of the Navy will be. He may be a man who will understand the importance of this Chief of Operations and continue his power. He may not understand the scope of it and may strip him of all these powers and leave it where we were when this organization started.

Admiral FISKE. I would like to say, Mr. Chairman, that all over the world, especially since 1870, when we became aware of what had been done by Prussia, there has been in naval and military circles an increasing realization of the importance of continuity in strategy, and that the danger of not appreciating it is really tremendous. In other words, in my humble opinion, this particular question we are now on is actually the most important question before the country to-day. The national life has hinged on this particular thing in a great many countries all during history. The general staff of Prussia brought about entirely a new state of things before the war with Austria in 1866, and when the war came along they tried their method and defeated Austria practically in three weeks.

The CHAIRMAN. Just a moment ago you suggested as one of the things you insisted upon as material that there should be a limitation of not less than 15 officers at a time. I think the Secretary has assigned 14. How much materiality do you attribute to the difference between a reservation giving 14 unlimited and fixing a limitation of 15?

Admiral FISKE. The difference between 14 and 15 is simply of course that difference. That is all the difference there is in that. May I proceed to what I was leading up to?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral FISKE. The war with France of 1870 brought up the same thing. Since that time all the nations except our own have been adopting that plan, and adopting it with utmost rigidity and insisting on it and seeing that it is followed. They go to the extreme in the navy of Germany and in the navy of Japan, which are the most efficient for their size, of having the Secretary of the Navy by law a naval officer. Those nations are poor and their navy to them is a very vital thing. They have to get every single cent's worth of efficiency out of a cent that they can get. That is the system they have there. I am not going to the extreme. I am simply pointing out the tremendous importance of that factor. It is absolutely impossible to have a general staff, and have it good, without doing something like that. It is easy enough to have a staff; it is easy enough to have anything; it is easy enough to have a Navy, but to have a good one is a very different matter. It is a very different matter indeed, and you have to strain every nerve to do it, because they are doing it. That is exactly what they are doing. The whole national life is back of that general staff in those countries.

The further we fall short of it, the further we will fall short of the efficiency of the Navy for its ostensible use. If we have a plan whereby every four years a new secretary will come in and change, not in detail, not the fitting of a boat or the appointment of a clerk, but the whole strategy of the Navy, we can never get anywhere—that is, not in comparison with these other navies. We may get along but not efficiently; we can not compete with them.

Mr. BRITTEN. Has not that been done in the past? Is not that the very thing that has been done in the past—changing from one system to another?

Admiral FISKE. It has been, and I am sure I am speaking what all naval officers feel; that if it is kept up, we will carry out the policy—that is our business. It is not our business to prescribe the policy; but it is our business to say, that, looking at it from the standpoint of efficiency, looking at it from the standpoint of strategy, this plan will work or it will not, and that we do need continuity.

Mr. BRITTEN. Is not that what the general staff is for?

Admiral FISKE. That is what the general staff is for. One reason that our construction corps is so good is because they follow that idea. We have a splendid construction corps. We have a corps of highly educated men, who staterd at the beginning and have been naval constructors all their lives, who make a specialty of it, and make a success of it; but we do not have strategists along that line. But the foreign navies think the strategy specialty is much more important, and much more difficult than the construction.

Mr. BRITTEN. Actually, from the fighting standpoint, is not the strategy just as important or more important than the ship itself?

Admiral FISKE. That is like asking which is more important, a man's mind or his legs. The strategy of the Navy is its mind. The general staff you may call the brain by which this mind acts on the body.

The CHAIRMAN. Just at that point; you are speaking of the foreign navies. Are they not given simply the power in general terms, or is their power limited and described and defined by precise regulations? Are they not created and given broad power in general language, and the general duties are left for the admiralty to work out and prescribe in detail?

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Admiral FISKE. The Government, as I understand it, prescribes the policy and then they say, "Here is our policy; develop your strategy to fit our policy."

The CHAIRMAN. We have a policy and prescribe a general duty, but we have said said to the Navy Department, "Carry out this policy," which they are proposing to do, meeting exactly what you say they should do.

Mr. BRITTEN. Just at that point may I offer a suggestion? Suppose there is a change in administration and a new Secretary comes in next year, and he decides this Chief of Operations idea is all wrong, and he wants to go back to the aid plan. The law has been passed which provides the Chief of Operations. The new Secretary comes in and says, "This Chief of Operations idea is all wrong from my standpoint, and I will not assign any men to that duty." The result is that the Chief of Operations will sit there alone, with nothing to do. Is not that true?

The CHAIRMAN. No, sir. That will not ever happen with any Secretary of the Navy.

Mr. BRITTEN. We have had Secretaries of the Navy who have been more radical than that.

The CHAIRMAN. When the law prescribes the duty and responsibility, the Secretary of the Navy will not defy Congress.

Mr. ROBERTS. You say that will never be done, but it was done, and you just cited the instance indirectly where the Secretary of the Navy and the President refused, when the vacancy came, to appoint a bureau chief.

The CHAIRMAN. They submitted the matter to Congress.

Mr. ROBERTS. Years afterwards.

The CHAIRMAN. No; they submitted it right at that time.

Mr. ROBERTS. Years afterwards.

The CHAIRMAN. No; right at the next session of Congress.

Mr. ROBERTS. Yes; it was submitted.

The CHAIRMAN. We made temporary approval until we could work out a permanent system.

Mr. ROBERTS. Which was several years afterwards.

The CHAIRMAN. But we gave a permanent system, and we carried it by act in the appropriation bill.

Mr. BRITTEN. The chairman of the committee was evidently in favor of the provision inserted in the last appropriation bill, because it left the committee with its unanimous approval, if I am not mistaken. It prescribed that the minimum number of aids to the Chief of Operations should be 15. The chairman reported that particular measure to the House unanimously, and supported it on the floor. He evidently has changed his mind very materially in the last year.

The CHAIRMAN. If you will permit the chairman to make a statement, he will say this: There was very litt'e support on the floor, because it went out of the bill on a point of order. After the hearings were completed, and while the clerk of the committee was engaged in making up the bill, Mr. Hobson submitted it, just toward the close of our work, and we put it in. We had no hearings on it. I was in favor of the general principle, and I am now. I think it was a very valuable office to create. We put it in the bill, and had no opportunity to discuss it, and had no hearings upon it, but when it got on the floor it went out on a point of order.

Mr. OLIVER. What was the point of order?

The CHAIRMAN. That it was new legislation in an appropriation bill. When the Senate restored it in a modified form in conference, we worked out the clause that is in the bill now, by a conference discussion among the members of the Senate and House on the conference committee.

Mr. BRITTEN. I may be mistaken in this, and if I am I hope Admiral Fiske will correct me, but I am told by certain officers in the department, who are supposed to know, that the provision that was incorporated in the bill was bery largely your language, Admiral, and drawn by you. Is that ture?

Admiral FISKE. Yes.

Mr. BRITTEN. The Secretary of the Navy has taken complete credit for that section, and I am very glad to have an expression from you in that particular regard. I do not know who offered it. The officers say Admiral Fiske drew it up in his own handwriting.

The CHAIRMAN. The Secretary of the Navy has not, so far as I know, made any such claim.

Mr. BRITTEN. I would be glad to give you the press clippings that show that he did claim credit for that section.

Mr. KELLEY. Am I right in thinking the powers of bureau chiefs are provided in general language in much the same way that the power of this Chief of Operations is provided?

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The CHAIRMAN. Yes; only not so specifically. It says there shall be certain bureaus created, and they shall have such power and perform such duties as the Secretary of the Navy from time to time prescribes.

Mr. KELLEY. While this does in a way prescribe the duties, it only leaves them very broadly prescribed.

The CHAIRMAN. It prescribes the policy and the general duties.

Admiral FISKE. I feel it necessary to explain something that Mr. Britten said. I do not want to seem to give assent to a remark that he made, which was to the effect that the provision for the Chief of Naval Operations, as originally reported by this committee, was drawn up in my own handwriting. It was drawn up at my suggestion, and Mr. Hobson and I had several conferences while drawing it up; and finally, in framing the phraseology in which it was presented to you, Hobson and I had the assistance of six other officers.

Mr. KELLEY. Your objection to this language that is in the law now is merely that it limits the power of this officer to preparing the fleet, whereas you think it should be preparing the Navy for war?

Admiral FISKE. That is one objection; yes.

Mr. KELLEY. Is there some other specific thing you want to put in more in detail than that?

Admiral FISKE. Yes: I think for the same reason, that if Congress should decide to direct that this office be established it should also direct that he should have a certain number of assistants to prepare war plans and certain war-game apparatus for their use.

Mr. KELLEY. You think that at some time the Secretary might destroy the office by withholding a proper amount of help? Is that the thing that is in the back part of your head?

Admiral FISKE. Or, perhaps, the Chief of Naval Operations might get lazy.

Mr. ROBERTS. We have provided in the law that the Chief of Operations should be appointed not below the rank of captain, and that while holding his office he should have the rank, title, and emoluments of a rear admiral. In view of the fact that that same bill provided for three admirals to command fleets and in view of the fact that the legislation placed on the Chief of Operations the duty of operating the fleets, was it not a mistake to make the rank of the Chief of Operations as low as that of rear admiral? Should he not have been made an admiral?

Admiral FISKE. Are you referring to the rank which he holds after appointment or to the rank he had before?

Mr. ROBERTS. I am speaking of the rank which the Chief of Operations holds while he is Chief of Operations.

Admiral FISKE. Oh, undoubtedly.

Mr. ROBERTS. If he did not have that rank or did not reach it while serving. In the present instance the Chief of Operations, when he assumed his duties, was a captain, and he could be appointed under the law from that rank. Of course, when he came into office he immediately had the rank of rear admiral, which, had he not reached that rank lineally, he would have dropped when he left the bureau and he would have gone back to his rank of captain. But, in Admiral Benson's case, he reached the rank of rear admiral lineally, while holding the position of Chief of Operations, and what has appeared to me to be a little out of joint and out of harmony in a military organization is a rear admiral having charge of the operations of fleets that are commanded by admirals.

Admiral FISKE. Yes; there is an incongruity.

Mr. ROBERTS. To say the least, and, according to my understanding of a military force, it does not tend to the best efficiency?

Admiral FISKE. You are quite correct.

Mr. ROBERTS. And does not tend to the utmost harmony?

Admiral FISKE. That is quite correct.

Mr. ROBERTS. It appears to me that there should be another change in the law regarding the Chief of Operations in that respect.

Admiral FISKE. Yes, sir; I think so, too.

Mr. ROBERTS. That he should be given the rank of admiral while holding his position as Chief of Operations?

Admiral FISKE. Yes, sir.

Mr. ROBERTS. And then to go back to whatever his lineal rank might be when his term had expired?

Admiral FISKE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Just at that point, and not antagonizing your view at all, but to elucidate it, would you still continue the provision that a captain may be appointed to serve as Chief of Operations with the rank of rear admiral or admiral?

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Admiral FISKE. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. From what rank would you have the appointment made?

Admiral FISKE. Flag rank, sir. In my opinion, he should not be appointed to that position unless he had served successfully as a flag officer afloat.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean unless he had had sea service successfully as a rear admiral?

Admiral FISKE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And should not be appointed from the grade of captain?

Admiral FISKE. That is correct, sir.

Mr. ROBERTS. I was coming to that, Mr. Chairman; I was going to get the admiral's idea as to the lowest rank from which he should be appointed and his reasons for it.

Admiral FISKE. The duties of a rear admiral afloat are very different from those of a captain. A man may be a very good officer in a junior grade; he may be a very good captain even, and yet not at all good as a flag officer. The requirements, the mental attitude, and all of that, are quite different. A good many men have been good captains, but have not been good flag officers; and some men who have never been considered as amounting to very much have been intrusted with flag rank against, sometimes, the fears almost of their friends; and they have done beautifully; much better than men who had done better in the subordinate grades.

Mr. BRITTEN. Admiral, which is considered the most important position in the service below the Secretary, the commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet or the Chief of Operations?

Admiral FISKE. Well, the most desirable position is that of commander in chief of the fleet; but the most important, I should say, is that of Chief of Operations. You can do more good or harm in that capacity than you can in the other; but, of course, the position of commander in chief of the fleet carries with it a great many things that are desirable.

Mr. BRITTEN. So that is an additional reason why the Chief of Operations should have the rank of admiral?

Admiral FISKE. Yes, sir.

Mr. BRITTEN. While he is holding that most important position in the service?

Admiral FISKE. Precisely.

Mr. ROBERTS. Now, I do not know that I want to ask any more questions of you on this general staff of Chief of Operations matter, because I think we have your views fully, but perhaps I might ask you one general question, although it may be that you have covered it in various ways in your answers. What, in your opinion—and you have yourself been Chief of Operations or aid for operations and you had experience with the fleet——

Admiral FISKE. Yes, sir.

Mr. ROBERTS. I understand you have commanded a division?

Admiral FISKE. Yes; three different divisions of the fleet.

Mr. ROBERTS. What, in your opinion, is the most important function or agency in the Navy for the attainment of the highest efficiency of the fighting units in battle?

Admiral FISKE. Good strategy.

Mr. ROBERTS. And you mean by that a properly constituted general staff or bureau of operations, or by whatever name it may be designated?

Admiral FISKE. Yes; to carry it out.

Mr. ROBERTS. I understand your view to be that with the very best of material, ships, guns, and ammunition, and with the very best of men and officers, you could not hope to attain the very highest efficiency, when it comes to action, without a central guiding spirit.

Admiral FISKE. Precisely, yes; just as a man could not without a good mind.

Mr. ROBERTS. It would be a good deal like assembling all of the football stars of the country into one team and allowing each one to operate as he saw best without any central governing power and directing spirit.

Admiral FISKE. Something like that.

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Mr. BRITTEN. I believe you stated this morning that as aid for operations you were the intermediary between the Secretary and the General Board?

Admiral FISKE. Yes, sir.

Mr. BRITTEN. You were aid for operations in December, 1914?

Admiral FISKE. Yes, sir.

Mr. BRITTEN. The report of the Naval General Board in December, 1914, was the first report that was made public by any Secretary of the Navy, was it not?

Admiral FISKE. I am not clear whether they were made public the year before or not.

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Mr. BRITTEN. I have here a copy of a letter written by the Secretary of the Navy, which says that this was a brand new idea of his.

Admiral FISKE. If it had been in 1913 it would have been his, too. I am under the impression that the report in 1913 was also made public, but I am not sure about that.

Mr. BRITTEN. In December, 1914, the recommendation of the General Board carried with it an estimate or recommendation for some 19,500 additional men in the service. I questioned Admiral Badger, who was the representative of the board who came before the committee, about that, and it appears that that recommendation for 19,500 additional men was taken out of the report of estimate that was made public. Did you have anything to do between the Secretary and the General Board in reference to that matter?

Admiral FISKE. Yes, sir; naturally, I was the intermediary between the department and the General Board.

Mr. BRITTEN. Did the original recommendation of the General Board, as submitted to the Secretary, embody a recommendation for 19,500 or thereabouts, of additional men for the service that year?

Admiral FISKE. Yes, sir.

Mr. BRITTEN. You are positive about that?

Admiral FISKE. Yes, sir.

Mr. BRITTEN. How did it happen that the report when published did not include that recommendation for 19,500 additional men? In other words, what transpired to bring about its elimination from the report of the General Board?

Admiral FISKE. Well, the General Board concluded not to publish that part of it.

Mr. BRITTEN. Well, the General Board does not publish its reports. These reports go to the Secretary of the Navy, and is it not true that after the Secretary of the Navy received the report that he sent word to the General Board that unless they struck from the report that suggestion as to personnel he would not make it public?

Admiral FISKE. The Secretary never took the report of the General Board as it came in, and struck out something and published it with that omission.

Mr. BRITTEN. No; he didn't take it, that is true; but a recommendation did come from the General Board with a recommendation that the enlisted personnel be increased by 19,500 additional men.

Admiral FISKE. It was 19,600 additional men.

Mr. BRITTEN. It left the General Board in that condition, did it not?

The CHAIRMAN. Was that recommendation a separate one, or was it embraced in the report?

Admiral FISKE. It was in the report.

Mr. BRITTEN. You say it was not stricken out by the Secretary, but it is not a fact that the Secretary refused to make it public unless that was taken from it?

Admiral FISKE. Yes, sir.

Mr. BRITTEN. How did the Secretary bring about its elimination from the report? Now, it was in the original report—there is no question about that—and it was not in the report that was made public. How did the Secretary bring that about? He could not strike it out of his own accord, but it was left out of the subsequent report made by the General Board, as published. Now, what brought that about? Did the Secretary go to the General Board and state that he did not want it in, or did he write them a letter, or did he send for you and talk to you about it, or just what was the transaction that brought about its elimination from the report?

Admiral FISKE. The transaction altogether took over a month. Finally, the report was sent to the Secretary, and I was told to take the report to the board and request that that part be left out.

Mr. BRITTEN. The Secretary told you to take it to the General Board and request of them that that part be eliminated from their report?

Admiral FISKE. Yes, sir.

Mr. BRITTEN. Will you tell the committee whether or not the General Board immediately acted upon that, or did they discuss it first? You were ex officio a member of the General Board at that time, were you not?

Admiral FISKE. Yes, sir. The board debated upon it and finally concluded that it was very desirable to have the report published for the education of the people, and that even if that part was left out, the effect of the report in educating the people as to the necessities of the Navy would be very great, especially as there was a paragraph or two explaining the necessity for having enough men to man all the ships, without mentioning the number.

Mr. BRITTEN. So the board decided that, in the interest of the service generally, and especially as it would be establishing a precedent for publishing the reports of the General Board in the future, it would have a good effect on the service in that way, and

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that expert opinion would finally reach the general public, and that it would be beneficial in that way. For that reason they decided to accede to the Secretary's demand that their recommendation for 19,600 men be stricken from it?

Admiral FISKE. Yes, sir.

Mr. BRITTEN. They evidently did not succeed in their desire to bring about future publication of their recommendations, because in July of the following year, or a few months later, they made a recommendation that was not made public until Henry A. Wise Wood, Congressman Gardner, and four or five others got after the Secretary and forced its publication. Is not that true?

Admiral FISKE. I do not know.

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Mr. BRITTEN. The recommendation of the General Board for $5,000,000 for aviation was cut to $2,000,000 by the Secretary, or at least cut by the Secretary on the suggestion of the Chief of Operations, Admiral Benson, who practically took entire responsibility for the reduction before the committee the other day. Will you tell us, please, if $5,000,000, in your opinion, is too much, and why? I will say to you before you start to answer that Capt. Bristol's estimate was over $7,000,000.

Admiral FISKE. Yes; I remember that very well. His estimate was originally for $13,000,000, was it not?

Mr. BRITTEN. Yes.

Admiral FISKE. When I was aid for operations, I became convinced, and I am still convinced, that the thing in which we are more backward than in any other thing is aeronautics; and I think it is a matter of common sense that in any large thing which is composed of a great many factors, we should look out for the weak point. No matter how fine and strong you are, if you have a weak point you want to look out for that, and in aeronautics I think we are weaker than we are in anything else. We have not a general staff; that is true, but we are on the way toward it and now we have something like it; that is, the Chief of Naval Operations——

Mr. BROWNING. Are we weaker in aeronautics than we are in battle cruisers?

Admiral FISKE. No; you are quite right there. But we can do more in a year in aeronautics than we can in battle cruisers. We are just as weak in battle cruisers as we are in aeronautics, but in one year we could do a lot in aeronautics, and we could not do much in battle cruisers. Now, that may not be all the time we want, but we may get into trouble when this war ends, and battle cruisers are not going to help us unless they are constructed and in the fleet. That is the thing that is going to take us the longest time, and it will be necessary also to train an enlisted personnel, which is going to take us quite awhile. Even if we started to-day it would be a long time before you could get your personnel enlisted, trained, and earning their pay aboard ship. But the thing that is most exciting the public is, I think, the fear of invasion. Of course, that is the most horrible thing that can happen to any country—to have its soil invaded by an enemy; nothing is so bad as that.

Now, to help us in that event we need a competent aeronautical corps and we need it right off. To do that we could get, in emergency, a lot of people from the outside. The Aero Club of America is doing a great deal, and is very much interested.

If we got 1,000 aeroplanes together and got them well organized—some of them large—to meet an attacking force, we would have aircraft that could drop large bombs and launch torpedoes and it would help to a great extent. You see, we could get ready to do that probably in a year. Then when it came to their landing the men to make the invasion, actually getting ashore, getting on the beach, getting their guns ashore, getting their ammunition ashore, and getting their food, and all of those things ashore, they would have reached the very ticklish period of their operations. If you had 1,000 aeroplanes, and they dropped bombs on those fellows, especially those in the boats, you would present an attack that they have not yet learned to answer. So I think aeronautics is the thing on which we can get to work quicker, and by which we can accomplish more than by anything else.

Admiral FISKE. As a basis on which to show the Secretary the necessity of preparing war plans in such detail that the Navy could take immediate action in case of war, I requested the General Board to give me its opinion as to the maximum time which I should state to the Secretary as the time within which, after declaration of war, the United States Navy should be ready to meet the enemy in a battle at sea. The General Board deliberated on this question during the greater part of an entire forenoon, and answered that maximum time allowed should be two weeks. I so informed the Secretary.

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I was unable to make any impression on him. After many oral conversations, and the submitting of different written memoranda, I finally, on November 5, 1914, wrote him a long letter, declaring in the most unequivocal terms that the Navy was wholly unprepared for war and showing that its unpreparedness might be divided into three principal parts; that is, lack of any staff for making and carrying out war plans; inadequacy of personnel, both regular and reserve; and insufficiency of material. I handed this letter to the Secretary and he read it in my presence. This is the letter which he subsequently denied having seen or heard of, but which he admitted later that he might have seen, but forgotten. This letter could not be found in the department's files, when the Senate asked for it in April, 1916; but it was found in them later, bearing the receiving stamp date of September 13, 1916. Despite my earnest warning, the Secretary in his annual report of December 4 set forth the preparedness of the Navy in glowing terms. One headline in his report was "Proof of the preparedness of the Navy." He gave testimony of similar purport before the House Naval Committee.

Realizing that the safety of the country was at stake, I suggested to Representative Hobson that he get me called before the House Naval Committee, as the official expert of the Navy Department in strategy, which includes, of course, preparedness. Hobson did so.

In the course of my testimony I showed how wholly unprepared the Navy was, and, I believe, convinced the Naval Committee in a very great measure. In my testimony, I gave certain figures showing the composition and maneuvers of the German fleet in the autumn of 1913, in which dirigibles, aeroplanes, mine sweepers, and battle cruisers operated in the fleet, and the fleet maneuvered according to strategic plans drawn up by the general staff; and I declared that it would take "at least five years" to get our Navy ready to fight effectively against such a navy. Our Navy is not yet able to carry on maneuvers such as the German Navy carried on in 1913.

This is largely because of the absence in our fleet of battle cruisers, but mainly because of our amazing backwardness in aeronautics. All the time that I was aid for operations, I strove to make the Secretary see the necessity for grasping the power that aeronautics held out to us. After about a year I finally succeeded in getting a Director of Aeronautics established and Capt. Bristol put in the post. But scarcely had I left my position than the division of aeronautics was abolished. Before going, Capt. Bristol, in 1915, recommended an appropriation of $13,000,000. The Secretary cut it down to $2,000,000.

In my testimony before the House Naval Committee on March 24, 1916, I pointed out that aeronautics gave us better opportunity than any other one thing for overcoming our unpreparedness quickly. Congress then raised the appropriation to three and one-half millions. Even after war had been declared by us, no appropriation for aeronautics was asked for till July, 1917. As a result, the Navy did little effective work in aeronautics in the entire war. If my urgent recommendations had been carried out, we would have been able to send a large aeroplane force to Europe in April, 1917, to have increased this force rapidly, and to have carried out bombing attacks on the German submarines before they got away from their bases into deep water.

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During the following month of January, 1915, I induced Representative Hobson to get the House Naval Committee to incorporate in the appropriation bill a provision for a Chief of Naval Operations, who should be given the authority and the staff necessary for preparing war plans and for putting the Navy in a state of preparedness, and be held responsible that those things were done. I drew up the phraseology myself with Hobson's assistance. The committee adopted the provision exactly as I had drawn it up with two or three unimportant changes in words and incorporated it in the bill. I beg leave to incorporate the House Naval Committee's report in the record.

This provision was described as follows in the report of the Naval Committee to the House dated January 16, 1915:

CHIEF OF OPERATIONS.

The committee recommends a provision whereby a new office of Chief of Naval Operations is created. This office is to be filled by an officer of the Navy on the active list, not below the rank of rear admiral, and appointed for a term of four years by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. This officer, under the Secretary of the Navy, is to be held responsible for readiness of the Navy for War, and is charged with its general direction. He is to perform only such duties as shall be assigned him by the Secretary of the Navy, and such duties shall be performed under the authority of the Secretary of the Navy, and is given the same authority regarding orders issued by him as is now given under existing law to the chiefs of bureaus of the Navy Department.

To assist this officer in preparing general and detailed plans of war, 15 officers of and above the rank of lieutenant commander of the Navy or major of the Marine Corps are to be assigned for this exclusive duty. It is the opinion of this committee, after a most thorough investigation and mature deliberation, that the necessity for such an office exists in the Naval Establishment. At present there exists a General Board and the Naval War College, neither of which seem to be equipped for adequately performing this duty, nor have they sufficient officers under their jurisdiction to do this fundamental work of preparation of plans for war.

The demands upon the staff of the War College and the members of the General Board for other questions involving the efficiency of the personnel and the material of the Navy are such that they have not time and opportunity to fully prepare and perfect this work, and it is therefore recommended by the committee that the proposed provision be enacted into law.

It will be noted that the Secretary of the Navy retains absolute control over the office, and the Chief of Operations performs only such duties as are assigned by the Secretary, and all orders are issued under the authority of the Secretary of the Navy.

The principle of civilian control of the Navy Department is in no way affected by the provision recommended.

(The report of the committee above referred to is here printed in full in the record as follows:)

[House Report No. 1344, Sixty-third Congress, third session.]

CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS.

February 2, 1915.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed.

Mr. Hobson, from the Committee on Naval Affairs, submitted the following report (to accompany H. R. 21257):

The Committee on Naval Affairs, to whom was referred H. R. 21257, a bill to create the office of Chief of Naval Operations and for other purposes, report the same favorably, with the recommendation that the bill do pass.

The bill provides for the creation of a new office in the Navy Department, to be known as the Chief of Naval Operations. This office is to be filled by an officer of the Navy on the active list, not below the grade of rear admiral, and appointed for a term of four years by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. This officer, under the Secretary of the Navy, is to be held responsible for readiness

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of the Navy for war and in charge of its general direction. He is to perform only such duties as shall be assigned to him by the Secretary of the Navy, and such duties shall be performed under the authority of the Secretary of the Navy, and is given the same authority regarding orders issued by him as is now given under existing law to the chiefs of bureaus of the Navy Department.

To assist this officer in preparing general and detail plans of war, 15 officers, of and above the rank of lieutenant commander of the Navy or major of the Marine Corps, are to be assigned for this exclusive duty.

At present there exists a General Board and Naval War College, neither of which seems to be equipped for adequately performing this duty, nor have they sufficient officers under their jurisdiction to do this fundamental work for preparation of the plans of war. The demands upon the staff of the War College and the members of the General Board for other questions involving the efficiency of the personnel and material of the Navy are such that they have not had time and opportunity to fully prepare in detail and perfect this work. It is the opinion of the committee that the necessity for such an office exists in the Naval Establishment.

It will be noted that the Secretary of the Navy retains absolute control over the office, and the Chief of Naval Operations performs only such duties as are assigned by the Secretary, and the orders are issued under the authority of the Secretary of the Navy. The principle of civilian control of the Navy Department is in no way affected by the provision recommended. The tentative duties of the proposed Chief of Naval Operations and his assistants will be such that the work may be conveniently divided among nine committees or sections. The sections would probably be as follows:

The historical section, which covers the study and analysis of past campaigns.

The policy section, which studies the inherent interests of all nations and the policies which logically follow.

The strategic section studies the theaters of possible wars from every aspect and sources and means of supply for the military and naval forces.

The tactical section studies tactics, particularly in relation to strategy; determines and endeavors to insure that the tactics of the fleet are kept constantly up to date and conform to the character of the ships and weapons that will be used.

The logistic section studies the logistic aspects of the strategical and tactical plans involving the requirements as to supplies at the beginning of the war, during the war, and the organization of transportation, and many other things incident to the auxiliary service, including the inspection of merchant vessels.

The organization section studies and devises plans of organization for war in order to secure the most efficient flow of authority, the best administrative and tactical grouping of the forces, detail of personnel for command, and the orders necessary for the execution of the various plans.

The mobilization section prepares and keeps always up to date plans for mobilizing for each of the various stations arising from conflict with possible enemies.

The training section studies methods for the training of the naval forces and devises strategical problems and tactical exercises involving combined maneuvers of battleships, auxiliaries, submarines, aircraft, and mining vessels.

The executive section sees that the plans devised are executed.

The importance of this work may be judged from the fact that Great Britain has a separate organization called "the naval war staff," composed of 39 line officers, a few staff officers, and about 31 civilian assistants; in Germany, by the admiral staff, composed of 22 officers, with 13 officer assistants, and a librarian; in Japan, by a general staff, which is immediately under the Emperor.

Such an agency as is hereby established in the Department of the Navy to coordinate and harmonize all parts of that establishment, prepare plans in detail, and supervise their execution, the committee believes is necessary for the effective or efficient accomplishment of the object for which the Navy exists, to insure our country victory in war. The committee unanimously recommends that the bill do pass.

The subjoined statements of Rear Admiral A. M. Knight, United States Navy, in an address before the Efficiency Society of New York, sets forth the importance of this legislation:

"The War College considers that every effort of the fleet and every effort of the department in connection with the fleet, should have for its sole aim the war efficiency of the fleet.

"There is much about the Navy which is splendidly efficient, but as a whole it is far less efficient than it can and ought to be. Our ships are fine. Our officers are capable, industrious, and ambitious. Our enlisted men are the equals of those in other navies. But efficient ship and officers and men do not alone make an efficient Navy. They must be welded into an efficient whole by a unity of organization and administration and purpose which coordinates their capabilities and directs their

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efforts toward a common end, wisely selected, and very clearly seen. Here is the first point at which we are lacking.

"I come now to what is, perhaps, the most important part of my subject—the organization of the Navy Department, viewed from the standpoint of efficiency. There can be no question that the existing organization is inadequate and would break down under the strain of war. The administration starts from too many sources and flows through too many channels. It lacks the unity of purpose which would come from recognition of the fact that a navy have one excuse for existing, and only one—that it shall always be ready to strike on the minute and with every element of power concentrated behind its blow for the defense of the country.

"Do not misunderstand me. I am not telling you that our organization is wholly bad. I am telling you that it is inadequate. In many cases it works rather surprisingly well. But if you analyze these cases you will find that in so far as the results are good, they are so in spite of the system and because of some personal factor which has compelled efficiency. Moreover, and this is the crux of the whole matter, the cases with which we can deal at the present time are illustrations of peace efficiency, whereas the efficiency upon which our attention should be fixed unwaveringly is war efficiency; not because we are going to have war, but because we may have it, and because the one supreme duty of the Navy is to be ready for it if it comes.

"I suppose this relation of the Navy to war, whether possible war or actual war, has always been understood more or less clearly. But it a singular fact that the organization of the Navy Department takes no accoount of it. War is the one thing for which no arrangement is made. There are seven bureaus in the department, each with clearly defined duties; but in all the elaborate legislation creating these bureaus and defining their duties there is not a word about the duty of keeping the Navy in readiness for war or preparing plans for war or conducting war after it begins. There would be a certain element of comedy in this if there were not so many elements of possible tragedy.

"There is a bureau in the department charged with the construction and repair of ships, one with the design of machinery, one with the preparation of ordnance, one with the direction of personnel, and so on; but nowhere is it said this bureau shall be responsible for the readiness of the fleet for war, for the preparation of war plans, and for the conduct of war." This, then, is the last and great defect in the efficiency of the Navy. How shall it be remedied? The answer is, I think, by the creation in the Navy Department of a division of strategy and operations, preferably not coequal with the present bureaus, but superior to them and standing between them and the Secretary. This arrangement would be a recognition of the fact that all the activities of the present bureaus should lead up to the Secretary through a channel which coordinates them all and directs them toward war efficiency.

"I have explained that the defects in the organization of the Navy Department are a lack of coordination of authority, as a result of which the administration starts from too many sources and flows through too many channels, and a total lack of provision for planning and carrying forward the operations of war. It must not be supposed that these defects have escaped recognition or that no efforts have been made to correct them. The most successful of the efforts to secure coordination between the bureaus was the adoption during the last administration of a system of aids to the Secretary, who coordinated the work of the various bureaus, and who, when important questions were under consideration, formed a council upon which he could call for advice. The weak point about this system was, and is, that the aids have never been legalized by Congress, and therefore have no permanent status whatever. In spite of this, they are a position to do much toward improving the administration of the department.

"The General Board was called into existence in 1900, by an order of the Secretary of the Navy to provide a body for the consideration of war plans and allied subjects. It has performed and is performing work of the very highest importance, but it, like the council of aids, lacks legislative sanction, although Congress has for many years past shown great interest in its work and not a little deference to its views.

"Another and a very important agency to which the Navy Department looks for a contribution to its work in strategy and other matters connected with preparation for war and the conduct of war, is the Naval War College at Newport. The War College has been in existence since 1884 and has been an important factor in the education of officers from the very beginning. For some reason, however, it has failed until very recently to command the full recognition which it has deserved from the Navy Department or even from the officers of he Navy. The present Secretary of the Navy visited the college shortly after coming into office, and, with an insight of which many naval officers have shown themselves incapable, recognized its possibilities for usefulness and pronounced himself as its friend. Since that time he has done everything to forward its work which could be dictated by the most thorough comprehension of its mission and its needs, and as a result of this generous support, both moral and

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material, the college has taken its proper place as an institution for the training of officers for high command and for the development of the art of naval warfare. Thus the college is able to contribute something toward making good the lack of a strategic division in the Navy Department itself.

"You will see, therefore, that, although no law takes cognizance of the necessity for keeping the Navy ready for war, there are many agencies which cooperate toward that end—the council of aids, to which the Secretary would naturally turn in an emergency, the General Board, and the War College. These agencies are so closely in sympathy that they are able to cooperate harmoniously with each other and with the fleet, and this cooperation is having important and very valuable results. This does not change the fact that there should be—that indeed there must be—in the Navy Department itself and close to the Secretary a coordinating office to bring the efforts of these and other agencies to an administrative focus, bearing directly upon the efficiency for war. Such a coordinating office I have already sketched as a dividsion of strategy and operations immediately below the Secretary of the Navy in authiority.

"The creation of this office would provide a policy for the Navy, so far as the activities of the Navy itself are concerned, insuring unity of effort and shaping plans toward the end which we have recognized to-night as the proper end of all our efforts—preparedness for war."

Admiral FISKE. This provision was struck out on a point of order in the House. Subsequently, it was introduced into the appropriation bill again by the Senate, but with certain modifications suggested by the Secretary. As modified the provision read:

There shall be a Chief of Naval Operations who shall be an officer on the active list of the Navy appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, from among the officers of the line of the Navy, not below the grade of captain, for a period of four years, and who shall, under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy, be charged with the operations of the fleet and with the preparation and readiness of plans for its use in war.

It will be noted that although this provision as finally passed was a tremendous boon to the Navy, yet that it omitted to supply the Chief of Naval Operations with any staff for preparing war plans. It charged him with the preparation and readiness of plans, but provided no officers for making the plans. It is true that the Secretary of the Navy could, if he so desired, order officers to Washington for doing that work; but my intention in preparing the original draft was to make the ordering of these officers to Washington mandatory, because I realized that, if it were not done, officers would probably not be ordered.

It is absolutely necessary for me to declare here that, in bringing about the establishment of this new office, in which the Chief of Naval Operations would continue my work, but under very much better conditions, I was not working for myself, because I realized that it would give the Secretary the opportunity of superseding me by another officer; and I told a number of my friends that there was not the slightest chance that I should be made the Chief of Naval Operations.

During the time that had elapsed after the war had broken out in Europe the Secretary and I had had a number of unpleasant conferences with relation to preparedness, mainly in the matter of securing increased personnel and the signing of the administrative plan. The Secretary refused to do either, and a natural tension between us ensued. It is absolutely essential also, in the interests of the truth, for me to declare in the most positive terms that there was no unpleasant feeling on my part toward the Secretary personally, and that I have no reason to think that there was any unpleasant feeling on his part toward me personally. Our intercourse was always polite, and on the surface cordial.

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In the early part of 1915 my position became extremely difficult. I realized that I could not stand it indefinitely, but Admiral Dewey and others insisted that I must stand it as long as I could. Finally I resigned on April 1, 1915. A year later—that is on April 3, 1918—the Secretary testified before the House Naval Committee that I was not in harmony with the department and that I would have been asked to resign had I not resigned myself. The reason why I was not in harmony with the department was that I insisted on the signing of the administrative plan and the establishment of some system like that embodied later in the Office of Naval Operations. Yet both of these measures the Secretary approved of highly later, and it was by means of them that the Navy was handled with whatever of success it did attain in preparing for the war and afterwards in waging it. Attention is requested to the delay involved by the Secretary's opposition to a measure finally adopted.

In the report of the Secretary of the Navy for 1915—the summer of 1915—page 11, there is a large headline, "Better organization effected." Under that heading it read as follows:

OPERATIONS—BETTER ORGANIZATION EFFECTED.

Upon my recommendation the naval appropriation act of 1914 provided that "there shall be a Chief of Naval Operations * * * who shall, under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy, be charged with the operations of the fleet and with the preparation and readiness of plans for its use in war.

Then it details how that is being carried out, and then in the middle of page 12 it says:

A well thought-out plan, prepared by the General Board, for the preparation of the fleet for war in the Atlantic has been approved and each office and bureau under the department has been assigned its proper share in the general scheme of preparedness. By reference to periodic reports the department may at any time become informed of defects, of efforts made to overcome them, and of the progress made toward a complete state of readiness.

The Secretary appointed Capt. Benson as Chief of Naval Operations, and he relieved me on May 11, 1915. At this time the Navy was wholly unprepared for war, and I was sorry that the Secretary had not appointed as my successor an officer who had had experience on the General Board or on the staff at the War College.

I was ordered to duty at the War College; but during the following winter I secured leave, so that I spent the months of January, February, and March, and most of April, 1916, in Washington. I had kept in close touch with the Navy, and I knew that no officers had been ordered to the office of the Chief of Naval Operations for the exclusive duty of making general and detail plans of war, as the House Naval Committee had emphatically recommended; that no planning division had been established in that office, and that, therefore, the very first step toward preparation had been taken, except that the administrative plan had at last been signed.

As I was intensely anxious that a planning division should be established in the Office of Chief of Naval Operations, for making general and detail plans of war, I arranged that I should be called before the House Naval Committee, in order that I might urge upon the committee the necessity of directing that the 15 assistants which that committee had recommended in January, 1915, should be provided.

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I testified on March 24 and 36, 1916. The committee adopted my recommendation and incorporated it in the bill, but only in appearance and not in substance. In January, 1915, the House Naval Committee had recommended earnestly that to assist the Chief of Naval Operations in preparing general and detail plans of war, 15 officers of and above the rank of lieutenant commander of the Navy or major of the Marine Corps be assigned for this exclusive duty; but in their recommendation of 1916 the provision relating to this matter read:

To assist the Chief of Naval Operations in the performance of the duties of his office there shall be assigned for this exclusive duty not less than 15 officers of and above the rank of lieutenant commander of the Navy or major of the Marine Corps.

It will be noted that these 15 officers were simply for exclusive duty in the office of Naval Operations, but that it was not directed specifically that their duty should be exclusively in making war plans.

Of course, my whole endeavor had been to convince the committee that the exclusive duty of those 15 officers should be in making war plans, and it has always been my belief that that was the intention of the committee. I may be wrong about this, of course; but it is difficult to see why the committee should have gone to the trouble to direct that those 15 officers should be for the exclusive duty of assisting the Chief of Naval Operations in his duties, for the reason that it has always been the custom (with some possible exceptions) that the duties of an officer are exclusively in whatever office he may be assigned to. For instance, an officer ordered to duty in the Bureau of Ordnance is assigned for exclusive duty in that bureau, although the word "exclusive" is not used. Whether or not the change was intentional, or whether the change had been suggested to them by someone opposed to having a proper Planning Division, I do not know. But I do know that the change was most unfortunate.

The bill was signed and went into effect on August 29, 1916. Although the phraseology was ambiguous, the bill as passed made a new epoch possible for the Navy, because if the 15 assistants which the bill ordered had been assigned to the exclusive duty of making general and detail plans of war, as the House Naval Committee had urgently recommended in January, 1915, a fairly good war plan could have been developed by the time we declared war in April, 1917; provided, of course, that those 15 assistants had gone to work immediately and prosecuted their endeavors zealously. But 15 officers were not assigned to the exclusive duty of making general and detail plans of war.

In fact, as Capt. Laning testified to you, no Planning Division had been established even as late as March 3, 1917; for some days after March 3, 1917, the Chief of Naval Operations appointed a special committee to consider a paper prepared by Capt. Laning individually, that was, so far as he knew, the first attempt at a war plan that would meet the actual war situation. Up to that time, apparently, no Planning Division had been established. I understand, however, that one man, Commander Schofield, had been engaged in making some plans regarding the installation of armed guards on merchant ships, and other minor efforts.

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Less than six months elapsed after the bill went into effect assigning not less than 15 assistants to the Chief of Naval Operations, before our relations with Germany were broken off, and only seven months and a half before we were actually at war. As this interval had not been utilized in developing a war plan to meet the actual situation, it was unavoidable that the Navy should enter the war without such a war plan, and, therefore, that it was caught unprepared to carry such a war plan into execution.

Passing now from the unpreparedness of the Navy when it entered the war to the subject of the strategic handling of the Navy during the war, Admiral Sims charges that the Navy Department violated the immutable principles of war in not applying its major effort in the actual theater of war. If Admiral Sims is wrong, then the teachings of the War College are wrong, and the campaigns of Alexander, Cæsar, Napoleon, Washington, and the other great commanders were carried out according to principles that were wrong.

In order to see this matter from the correct point of view, it is necessary to realize that the history of war is a matter of careful record for more than 2,000 years, and that no other subject of man's activity has been gone into with such care or had such an amount of money, time, and mental effort spent upon it. The campaigns of the great commanders have been analyzed, and thousands of books have been written that show the causes of failure and success. From the study of these campaigns, certain principles and lessons have been evolved. These principles and lessons are taught to officers of mature age by the various war colleges in the various countries.

The first war college was the German war college, that was established by Moltke. It was because of the training which officers received from that war college that Prussia triumphed so easily over Austria in 1866, and over France in 1870. The Austrian Army and the French Army were not as armies distinctly inferior to the Prussian. In fact the French Army in 1870 was supposed by most people to be superior to the Prussian, and it was well known that the French generals had had more actual experience in war, than the Prussian. Nevertheless, the war plans of the Prussians were so much more virile than those of the Austrians or the French, that in each case Prussia advanced into the heart of the enemy country immediately and conquered it. In both cases Prussia left only a small force home to guard her there.

Similar strategy was exercised by the British admiralty in the days of Nelson and Napoleon; for the British Navy guarded the British coast, not by staying on the British coast, but by advancing to the coast of the enemy and preventing the squadrons and fleets of the enemy from uniting.

Similar strategy has marked the campaigns of every great commander from the days of the Egyptian Kings to the present time. On the opposite sides we see recorded a different kind of strategy, which I beg leave to call "safety-first" strategy. This safety-first strategy is the kind of strategy that one reads about in most of the wars of history, but it is not the kind that was exercised by Caesar or Napoleon or Frederick or Washington. Those great commanders always adopted a strategy that was very daring, and that usually began with an energetic attack against the enemy.

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It can not be too clearly emphasized, however, that, in order to start in war with proper energy and effectiveness, a high state of preparedness must previously have been achieved. History shows by countless incidents that it has always been dangerous in the highest degree even to enter a war when unprepared.

That our Navy was unprepared when we entered the war, I think nine officers in ten would be glad to testify. To what extent this lack of preparedness accounts for the fact that our full naval strength was exerted for many months, it would be difficult to determine with precision. It may be that had the Navy been fully prepared for war on April 6, 1917, the efforts put forth by the Chief of Operations and his assistants and the bureau chiefs would have resulted in the weight of our naval effort being exerted at a much earlier date in the actual theater of war. Certainly, unpreparedness was, in some part, the cause of our dilatoriness in getting into the war with full strength, and whoever was responsible for the unpreparedness must bear a large share of whatever blame may finally be adjudged.

As the war is over, some may think our unpreparedness a matter of little moment now, and may bewail the injury to the prestige of the Navy caused by the fact of its unpreparedness becoming known to the public.

We must all realize, however, that we can learn even more from past failures than from past successes; and that the more clearly the fact is recognized that we missed disaster by only a narrow margin in this war, by reason of our unpreparedness, the less danger there will be of unpreparedness happening again.

The American Navy has made a good record in past wars, but no American wishes that it shall make a bad record in the next war, or that the Navy shall go down before the enemy in disaster and disgrace.

It becomes the Navy's duty therefore to realize and to declare as clearly as we can what was the reason of our unpreparedness, and how similar unpreparedness can be prevented in the future.

By this standard it is my duty to give my professional opinion in this matter, to say that I think that my opinion is the same as that of 9 in 10 officers of the Navy, and that my opinion is based not only on my personal observation but on a careful study of war.

The result of my experience and studies has been to convince me that immeasurably the most important single element in any naval or military organization is the man at the head; and that whether any organization be efficient or inefficient, good or bad, the main reason in either case is to be found at the head.

In all the historical events that I have analyzed and studied, the paramount importance of the personality of the man directing them has impressed me more and more. No matter who else was concerned in any undertaking that was really great, the man at the head has stood out so clearly as to obscure every other person and every other thing. In all the campaigns of Cæsar, 99 per cent of everything was Cæsar; similarly, the most important single cause of Germany's ruin was the Kaiser.

This means, in this special case of the United States Navy, that the reason why it was unprepared lay in the mental and temperamental characteristics of the man at its head, and of the policy which he, as a consequence of those characteristics, had pursued.

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As to the means whereby unpreparedness can be prevented in the future, I am forced to the conclusion that by far the most important step is for the public to insist that the man at the head of the Navy shall always be a man imbued with the spirit of the Navy, highly educated, open-minded, and acquainted with the principles on which naval preparedness is based, and by following which naval preparedness can be secured.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, how could you make such a brilliant appointment, of such a man as you have described; how could you find a man who could be imbued with the spirit of the Navy, and who would have sufficient knowledge, who had not been connected with the Navy?

Admiral FISKE. I think the public men of the United States, Mr. Senator, are pretty well known, and their characteristics are pretty well known. The President, of course, in selecting his Cabinet, in selecting his men, would realize that certain men have certain characteristics.

The CHAIRMAN. I am simply asking for information.

Admiral FISKE. Yes. Of course, I might say——

The CHAIRMAN. You mean a public man who had had some experience of naval matters; any such practical experience?

Admiral FISKE. Senator, that is a tremenduously difficult question to answer, tremendously difficult. I think that it is a very important question, and very, very difficult to answer; very difficult indeed. I should leave that to wiser persons than I am.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you think the condition of the Navy would have been in 1917 if you had not succeeded in having the office of the Chief of Naval Operations established, and had not opposed the policy of the Secretary of the Navy in the way your statement has indicated?

Admiral FISKE. I have often thought about that, Senator, and I have wondered. I have come to the conclusion, after a great deal of thought, that the Navy would have been in a state of demoralization. During the little trouble with Mexico, when I was aide for Operations, the weakness of the department organization showed up very clearly. Some of us had to stay there all night. We could not have stood it very much longer, and that was a very small affair. I had two assistants only, two lieutenant commanders, and the whole organization of the Navy was absolutely unable to tackle any situation more serious than that, and that situation kept us going as it was.

The office of Chief of Naval Operations as established gave the Chief of Naval Operations a very considerable staff, and legalized him before the Nation by the action of Congress, and gave him much more power to have things done than I had.

Equally important or nearly equally important was the existence of the administrative plans; because before we actually went into the war in April, 1917, this administrative plan had been in action then for pretty nearly two years, so that the system had got to going, whereby the Navy Department was kept continually informed of what was the condition of preparedness of the bureaus, each bureau, and not only of the bureaus as far as they were individually concerned, but the way in which the work of the whole department was divided up among them.

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Now, if I had let things go in what would have been the easiest way for me, I suppose I would have stayed there until I retired in June, 1916, less than a year before the war was declared. By that time there would have been no organization in the department for doing much, and the very fact of my having yielded and not having tried to keep the Navy up would have been reflected among all the officers in the Navy, because I was at that time the principal officer of the Navy. I had the most responsible position of anybody.

The CHAIRMAN. As aide for Operations?

Admiral FISKE. Yes; as aide for Operations, which afterwards, as you know, became the Chief of Naval Operations; and of course you realize that the Navy is a very artificial product, and what we call its morale and spirit must be kept up. Otherwise they will not do what you want them to do in time of war. The morale of the Navy is its spirit.

Now, somewhat different from morale, and yet very close to it, is discipline. The question of discipline is as old as fighting. A great many people think discipline means a system of punishment, whereby if somebody does something wrong he is punished. That is one part of discipline, it is true; but that is a minor part of discipline. The major part of discipline is what the War College calls the indoctrination of the Navy, whereby the system of authority is almost venerated, so that a man instinctively salutes his superior officer, without hardly knowing him. He thinks his superior officer is much better than he is, and that spirit has always been found necessary. The subordination of the individual has always been found necessary.

Now, I do not think that the plan of the Secretary would help that out, but just the reverse. He insisted on a great many things being done against the advice of his aids; that is, to a degree; that is, incorporating a system of education among the enlisted men, an excellent idea, and an idea that had been carried out very carefully by us always; but it was carried out by the Secretary to a degree which I think almost every officer in the Navy thought was so great as to be very injurious indeed to the discipline.

The CHAIRMAN. In what way?

Admiral FISKE. By taking up the time of the enlisted wen with work that was not along the line of their professional duties, and by making them do these things when they knew and all the officers knew that their immediately superior officers; that is, the officers of the Navy themselves, were opposed to. So the Secretary of the Navy put all the officers of the Navy on the defensive in that way, by making them carry out before the enlisted men duties which the enlisted men knew the officers did not think were wise, to the degree to which they were carried. There was a great deal of time taken up on board the ships with that. That was one instance of it. The attempt to democratize the Navy was made by Camil Pellaquin in France, with results that were very deplorable there. Camil Pellaquin was the Minister of Marine of the French Navy, and I know it is the consensus of opinion of everybody that has ever written about it at all that the influence of Camil Pellaquin on the French Navy was awful, was ruinous, and that the French Navy has never recovered from it. I have never heard it denied that to democratize the Navy is not to improve its morale, but I believe officers of the Navy think it is just the wrong way to do,

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Now, the War College has been the central source from which we have been getting all our ideas about the Navy, as a whole, for many years, and that War College has imbued the Navy with what we call a certain indoctrination, which has been found to be a very fine thing for cooperation, whereby everybody knows what we ought to do, and he will do it even if he does not get orders to do it. It is the kind of spirit that was maintained among Nelson's captains. It is said they were a band of brothers, and that they would do a thing even if he did not tell them to do it. Any system which comes in between the operation of that principle and endeavors to decrease the feeling which enlisted men have for their officers, or the feeling which junior officers have for their superior officers, which is the result of attempted democratization, is bad. A Navy or an Army must be a very different organization from any commercial or other organization, and if it is going to be efficient it has got to be handled along lines which are not democratic.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you give the committee some specific cases of attempts to democratize the Navy that resulted in a breakdown of discipline?

Admiral FISKE. I think that attempt which I just spoke of, to insist that all this time should be taken up with the study of arithmetic, etc.—studies which are not professional—I think that the general feeling which existed in the Navy, on account of the attitude toward that and toward high officers had that effect. Of course there has been no mutiny, but the feeling all through the Navy is that the morale of the Navy, the loyalty, the regard which juniors had for their superiors, has not been increased, but the reverse.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, what was the effect on your own personal affairs of your pushing this campaign for preparedness and your attempt to inaugurate the system of the Bureau of Naval Operations?

Admiral FISKE. Well, of course I had to get out. That was the first thing.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean you had to get out of that position?

Admiral FISKE. Out of that position.

The CHAIRMAN. Out of that position.

Admiral FISKE. I had to resign. I was not told to resign, but I knew perfectly well that that was the idea, and the secretary so testified on April 3, 1916, that if I had not resigned myself I would have had to get out, that I would have been asked to resign. Of course, I had to give up the best position in the Navy, and I was not on duty except at the War College all the rest of my time on the active list.

The CHAIRMAN. You were never actually chief of the Bureau of Operations. You were aid for Operations, but had to resign from that when the other office was created?

Admiral FISKE. Yes. Of course the Secretary's remarks about me in his testimony of April 3, 1916, especially in regard to Admiral Dewey not wanting me on the General Board, and that I would have been asked to resign—of course that officially discredited me, put me in as bad a position officially as an officer could be put in, and I have heard in a number of ways that that impression got abroad. Possibly I can illustrate it by a story.

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A waitress in my family was asked by a young man in New York, a beau of hers, whom she was working for. She said she was working in the family of Admiral Fiske, and this man said "Admiral Fiske? Oh, that is the guy Secretary Daniels had to get rid of in order to get the Navy prepared?" Well, things like that, and I was officially discredited, that was all. I lost my position and was officially discredited. I was put in the position of a man who had gotten to the highest position in the Navy and did not make good and had to be fired.

The CHAIRMAN. You spoke of Secretary Daniels's statement about Admiral Dewey not desiring that you be put upon the General Board. In your book, From Midshipman to Rear Admiral, I think you stated that Admiral Dewey denied that he made any such statement as that attributed to him by Secretary Daniels.

Admiral FISKE. Absolutely, and Admiral Dewey said that to other people, too. That is all right. Everything in that book is correct. I am willing to stand by it.

The CHAIRMAN. But the statement was made by the Secretary of the Navy that Admiral Dewey had recommended that you be not put upon the board.

Admiral FISKE. Yes. The statement of the Secretary of the Navy before the Committee on Naval Affairs of the House of Representatives, April 3, 1916, is found on page 3824 of the hearings. Shall I read it?

The CHAIRMAN. If you will.

Admiral FISKE. I read from page 3824 of the hearings before the House Naval Affairs Committee:

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, When Admiral Fiske was before the committee, he was asked if Admiral Dewey had recommended him for appointment to the General Board, and he stated that he had; and he was then asked if he was appointed, and he said that he was not. I will ask you to give the committee your statement with reference to that, and, if he was recommended, if anything subsequently took place, and why he was not appointed on the General Board.

Secretary DANIELS. I do not recollect the date, Mr. Chairman, but some time after Congress had created the office of Chief of Operations Admiral Dewey said to me one day that he would like to have Admiral Fiske to go on the General Board when he was relieved from Operations. I told him I would consider it.

Mr. TALBOTT. What did you say, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary DANIELS. I told him I would think about it. Later Admiral Dewey requested me not to put Admiral Fiske on the General Board. He said he wanted a practical man; that Fiske was too theoretical; and I did not put him on.

The CHAIRMAN. But Admiral Dewey later denied that statement?

Admiral FISKE. In the most positive terms. As I state in my autobiography, Admiral Dewey, not at my solicitation at all and without my previous knowledge, asked the Secretary in my presence to have me retained on the General Board after I had been relieved, and the Secretary said he would do so. Very shortly after that—I think the next day, or at any rate before I left—I reminded the Secretary of that and said, "Shall I tell the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation to make out my orders to the General Board?" Secretary Daniels said, "Yes." Then I went and told the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation that the Secretary said to make out my orders to the General Board. The next day or so I got my orders, but instead of being to the General Board they were to the War College in Newport. Then I went to the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, and I said, "I told you that the Secretary told me to tell you to make

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out my orders to the General Board," and he said, "Well, that is the Secretary's order, Admiral." Of course, I was very much surprised, because I had been on the General Board with Admiral Dewey. He had always given me a "perfect" mark every time on my efficiency report. I had been with him at the Battle of Manila. He went out of his way very frequently to speak to me very kindly about the work I was doing as aid for Operations. So I was very much surprised when that statement was made, and I heard from various people that Admiral Dewey was denying it. So I telephoned down to the General Board one day, to Admiral Badger, and I asked him if that was true, and he said, "Well, you had better come down and see Admiral Dewey yourself."

So I went down to the General Board and went into Admiral Dewey's room and he was there with his aid, Lieut. Commander Le Breton. Admiral Dewey jumped out of his chair and came forward and said:

Fiske, I never said it, I never said it. No communication passed between me and the Secretary about your being on the General Board except when you were present, and you heard me ask him to keep you on the board.

That was all of that, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, I think you have stated in your testimony that it was unfortunate that in choosing a man for the chief of the Bureau of Operations a graduate of the War College was not chosen. Why did you make that statement?

Admiral FISKE. The War College was established for the purpose of educating officers in just that kind of thing, in the operations of the Navy as a whole. A man ordinarily in the Navy does not get that experience. As an officer below the rank of captain of a ship he is charged with various detail duties aboard the ship. As captain of the ship he has nothing to do except with the ship. His responsibility for the ship is not for any one man. The hardest job I ever had was as captain of a battleship. The War College, and to a somewhat similar degree, the General Board, bring a man into contact with the Navy as a whole as distinguished from a part of the Navy; and by going to the War College and studying there, a man gets an entirely new point of view. You do not see this ship or that ship, or this man or that man, or this corps or that corps, or this rank or that rank. You see a great, magnificent machine, the most magnificent machine that there is, a very complicated machine, all the parts working together and in exact adjustment under the control of the man at the head of it. Now, unless a man goes to the War College and gets that point of view, I do not know of any other way in the Navy in which he could get it. Now there were a number of men whom I suggested to the Secretary to be chief of Naval Operations, and all those men had had that training; and so, when Capt. Benson was appointed, who had not had that training—I think he was at one summer conference for a short time, what they call a conference—I did not think it possible that he could have gotten the view of the Navy that a man ought to have to occupy the position at the head of the Navy. For instance, the War College was under him.

The training of the General Board is very similar, and I do not see how it could be possible for a man to occupy that position and fill it well, with a thorough understanding, unless he had had that training.

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Capt. Benson was the captain of the *Utah* in my division, and he was a good captain. I gave him fine reports. He wanted at that time to be superintendent of the Naval Academy. He would have been a splendid man for superintendent of the Naval Academy. After he left the *Utah*, however, he went on duty as commandant of the Navy Yard at Philadelphia, and I think a better training for the position he occupied as the head of the entire naval operations would have been obtained in the War College and General Board.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you consider that he had any special qualifications for the office of chief of the Bureau of Operations?

Admiral FISKE. No, sir: he was a fine man, a fine gentleman, a fine character, industrious, straightforward, careful, very conscientious, but it had not occurred to me that he was to be appointed, and when the Secretary appointed him as my successor I was surprised, because it had never occurred to me that he would be the man who would be appointed.

The CHAIRMAN. When you devised the system of the Bureau of Operations, when you recommended it, what sort of a man did you suppose would be placed at the head of the bureau?

Admiral FISKE. The kind of man I was speaking of. For instance, the man I would have picked myself, if I had had the selection, would have been Rear Admiral H. S. Knapp, except at that time I believe he had not got the rank of rear admiral; but he was that kind of a man, a man who had had that experience. Rear Admiral Knight would have been a very good man. I suggested him. He was the actual president of the War College; but I did not really suggest Admiral Knight seriously, because I did not think the Secretary would appoint him—was quite sure he would not.

The CHAIRMAN. But one of the essential qualifications would be that the chief of the Bureau of Operations should be familiar with naval strategy?

Admiral FISKE. Oh, that would be the first thing.

The CHAIRMAN. That would be the first thing.

Admiral FISKE. I should think so. I should think that would be the first qualification.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Benson had no such knowledge as far as you know?

Admiral FISKE. I have never known of his taking any interest in that branch of the profession. I knew him quite well, and admired him very much in many ways, but that partuiclar thing was a thing that, so far as I knew, he had never devoted any thought to.

The CHAIRMAN. As aide for operations I assume you had a very close connection with the Secretary of the Navy?

Admiral FISKE. Oh, yes; very.

The CHAIRMAN. In matters other than this question of the Bureau of Operations did you find that the Secretary attended to all matters that you took up with him with promptness?

Admiral FISKE. Not as a rule. There were certain classes of questions or matters, matters of personnel, matters of individuals, this person or that or the other—he was always very much interested in the enlisted men, of which I was glad. Anything connected with that he was always ready to listen to and ready to act on.

The CHAIRMAN. Not the increase in the personnel?

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Admiral FISKE. Oh, no; not the increase of the personnel. The situation, as it seems to me, was that the Secretary was very much interested in the enlisted man himself, and in his well-being—I think sincerely and unselfishly interested—and I admired him for it, because the enlisted man needs somebody to help him, no doubt about that. The officers try continually to make the enlisted man think we are his friends and not his overlords to too great a degree. Any question along that line, any personal question, he was always very glad to talk about; but he seemed to me to have a curious characteristic of not looking at the Navy as a whole. That impressed me all the time. For instance, for a long while after he first came into the department the question of chaplains occupied him a great deal. But even that was not so much in regard to their connection with the Navy as the chaplains themselves and the effect of their teachings on the enlisted men, which, of course, was fine. But he never seemed to think about the Navy as a whole, and, as far as I could make it out, it has always seemed to me that he was always absolutely convinced in his own mind that there never would be any war.

I found after a while that it was not a good thing to say anything to him about war. He did not seem to be ready to start on any subject connected with war at all. He approached the subject from a different point of view. To bring up a subject in connection with the men or something like that, would secure his interest, but if you brought up anything in connection with the efficiency of the Navy and its part in the war, why that was not good. We must avoid that subject. I gave up using the word war as much as I could; but finally, of course, when things became, as I thought, rather dangerous, about the time when I got through this project of the Chief of Naval Operations, by that time I had to come out and inform him as clearly as I could that he had to do something, that we would be in trouble, and I wrote him a letter which was dated November 9, 1914, although originally written on November 5, which letter is quoted in my book, Senator, in which I thought I went into the subject very carefully and very clearly; but to answer your question, it was very difficult as a rule to get him to take any action whatever. He was always polite. He would listen to you with the most untiring patience. He was always courteous, and then he would usually wind up by saying, "Speak to me about this to-morrow, or next week."

The CHAIRMAN. Was that true of ordinary routine matters?

Admiral FISKE. No; not routine matters. About routine matters he was very good. He had a fine memory and was very good at all such things as that. He was very good at routine matters.

The CHAIRMAN. But that was not true of any suggestion of any new policy?

Admiral FISKE. No; nothing which suggested the use of the Navy for war or anything like that; but if you would bring up any routine matter, he would act on that at once, and he was very industrious, always receptive and never lost his temper, a very nice man to deal with, very pleasant.

The CHAIRMAN. After you retired from the position of aid for Operations, how long were you in the service before you were retired?

Admiral FISKE. A little over a year.

The CHAIRMAN. What were your duties during that time?

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Admiral FISKE. I was supposed to be on duty at the War College, but I just was there. I had been aid for Operations, and there was not really much I could do. The people at the War College were engaged on their own War College work.

The CHAIRMAN. After we entered the war, on April 6, 1917, were your services utilized in any way during the war?

Admiral FISKE. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Not in any way?

Admiral FISKE. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Was that true of most of the retired rear admirals?

Admiral FISKE. I do not know about most of them, sir. Of course there were a great many on duty. I do not know what proportion they bore to the entire number. There were a great many, of course, that were on duty.

The CHAIRMAN. In your book you refer to a letter on the unpreparedness of the Navy, which letter was submitted to the Secretary. Can you tell me anything about that letter?

Admiral FISKE. You mean my individual letter?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral FISKE. I submitted that letter to him and he read it and gave it back to me, and then I returned to my office; and the same officers were there who were there when I left to go into the Secretary's office, as I recollect—Lieut. Commanders Cronin and Capt. Smith. They were there when I returned, and I told them that the Secretary had read it and made no comment on it, and I said, "I will speak to him again about it," and I put it on my desk; but I thought about it later and then thought, "Well, there is no use in doing that. It will not do any good." So I simply filed it. The fact of that letter was known to a good many officers.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you a copy of that letter?

Admiral FISKE. I have no copy here. It is in my book. I am sorry I haven't it here. I did not think to bring it here.

The CHAIRMAN. That letter is included in your book?

Admiral FISKE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to have that letter inserted in the record.

Admiral FISKE. Yes.

(The letter is as follows:)

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, November 9, 1914.

From: Aid for Operations.
To: Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: The Navy's unpreparedness for war.

1. I beg leave, respectfully but urgently, to request the attention of the Secretary to the fact that the United States Navy is unprepared for war.

2. It is true that the United States does not expect to get into war in the near future and is not preparing for war. It is true that nothing could be more unwise than for the country or the Navy itself to become nervous about the condition of war into which most of the civilized world has been plunged. It is true that there is no cause for excitement, and it is also true that even the most timid person can give no specific reason for anticipating war with any given country at any given time.

3. It is also true, however, that the mere absence of actual certainty of coming war is no reason for neglecting preparation. Some persons assume that a disposition to make preparation evidences a state of alarm in the mind of the person who proposes to make preparation. Yet such an assumption is entirely illogical. Wise men and wise nations show their wisdom in no better way than by taking wise precautions against possible dangers. The prevalence of smallpox induces wise people to guard

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their families against it by vaccination. They do not expect to be attacked by smallpox, but nevertheless they think it wise to take precautions against it.

4. Because of the position which I have occupied for more than a year and a half as senior adviser to the Secretary of the Navy, it has been my duty to keep myself informed, so far as I have been able, of the condition of the various nations in relation to war, the effects of that condition upon us, the strength of our Navy compared with other navies, and the degree of probability of our being dragged into war.

5. The present condition all over the world is one of general upheaval. The state of unstable equilibrium which the great powers maintained for many years with great skill and care has been at last upset. A conflict is going on, very few results of which can be foretold. One thing probably can be foretold, however. I mean that it can be foretold that the conflict will be violent and also will be long, involving other countries than those now taking part, and followed, even after the war at present outlined has been ended, by a series of more or less violent readjustments of boundaries, insular possessions, treaties, and agreements of every kind.

6. Surely he would be an optimist who would expect that a state of general peace will come in less than five years. During the next five years we must expect a great number of causes of disagreement between this country and other countries, and periods of tension between this Government and others; periods like that preceding the Spanish War, needing only a casualty like the blowing up of the *Maine* to precipitate a conflict.

7. In my opinion, as your professional adviser, and in the opinion of every naval officer with whom I have talked, the United States is in danger of being drawn into war and will continue to be in danger for several years. And when I say war, I do not mean war of the kind that we had with Spain, but war with a great power, carried on in the same ruthless spirit and in the same wholesale manner as that which pervades the fighting in Europe now. It is true that I can not specify the country with which war is most probable, nor the time, nor the cause. But my studies of wars in the past, and my observations of conditions at the present time, convince me that if this country avoids war during the next five years, it will be accomplished only by a happy combination of high diplomatic skill and rare good fortune.

8. Would it be wise to base all our hopes of national safety on such a frail foundation? Would it be wise to close our eyes to the dangers that confront us? Would it not be wiser to look the dangers clearly in the face and take reasonable precaution to avert them?

9. Comparing our Navy with the navies which we may have to meet in war, I find that our Navy is unprepared in three ways:

10. First, it has an insufficient number of officers and enlisted men. The number of officers can not be increased—that is, the number of suitable officers—because it takes four years to get a midshipman through the academy and several years afterwards to train him. But the number of enlisted men can be increased, and very quickly. It has been said that in time of war we could add to our enlisted personnel from the Naval Reserve and the Naval Militia. To my mind, this is a visionary notion, with no basis of fact to rest upon. We have been working to get a Naval Reserve and a Naval Militia for more than 30 years; scores of expedients have been tried, and the only result has been no naval reserves at all and less than 7,000 incompletely trained militia. Possibly we may do better with the Naval Reserve in the future than in the past, but only possibly, not probably. All reasonable expectation for the future is based, and must be based, on the experience of the past, and the experience of the past shows us that to place dependence on the Naval Militia and the Naval Reserve is to place dependence on hope, not reasonable expectation. The only men we can depend upon for naval work on board our ships are men who are enlisted regularly, who have been trained on board our ships, and wear the naval uniform. But even if we would expect reasonably to get a Naval Reserve in the future, the fact remains that we want enlisted men right now. To man the ships which should be used in war we need 19,600 more men.

11. The second way in which I find our Navy unprepared is in departmental organization. Our ships are well organized and pretty well drilled; the fleets are well organized, though not very well drilled; but the department itself is neither organized nor drilled in a military way. Perhaps this is nobody's fault, and may be attributed to the fact that our Navy has never had to fight a serious enemy—certainly not in 100 years. The people of the country have naturally devoted their energy along the paths of most obvious profit, and have not been confronted with any obvious military dangers. But in my opinion there is an obvious military danger at present, and the Navy Department should be organized to meet it. The organization which other navies and all armies of great powers employ to meet this danger is known, in English, by the phrase "general staff." In different languages, of course, the words are dif-

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ferent, but the meaning is the same. In Great Britain it is called the "Board of Admiralty." This general staff has as its first duty preparation for war, and as its second duty the conduct of war when war comes. In making preparation for war, the general staff makes war plans. These war plans are of two kinds—general and specific. The general plans are simply analyses of what should be the general conduct of the Navy in case of war; and the specific plans are plans in which the general plans are worked out in detail. Besides these general and specific plans, however, the general staff devises means whereby information regarding these general and specific plans shall be given to the various executive bureaus and divisions, corrected up to date, and whereby the various executive bureaus and divisions shall always be compelled to be ready to carry the various parts of those plans into immediate effect.

12. In directing the conduct of a war, the general staff, under the direction of the minister, sees to it that all information is kept up to date and supplied to the various commanders, and that all machinery for carrying out their decisions is kept in working order.

13. Our Navy Department has no machinery for doing what a general staff does. The closest approach to it is the General Board, which, as part of its numerous duties, "shall devise measures and plans for the effective preparation and maintenance of the fleet for war," and "shall prepare and submit to the Secretary of the Navy plans of campaign," etc. The General Board does carry out these duties but the plans that it makes are general and elementary. It exists entirely as an advisory board to the Secretary of the Navy. It is highly valuable; but, as its name indicates, it is only a "general board." It does hardly 1 per cent of the duties that a general staff would do. Having no executive authority and no responsibility, and being called upon to do a great variety of work, it has not the time to prepare specific plans, and has no means to see that even its general plans are ever carried out. If we compare our General Board with the general staff of any other country or with the Admiralty of Great Britain and when we see what those general staffs have been accomplishing during the past three months, we must become convinced that unless we go on the theory that we shall always have peace we shall be whipped if we ever are brought into war with any one of the great naval powers of Europe or Asia. We shall be like the lawyer who has not prepared his case when pitted against the lawyer who has prepared his case. We shall be as the French were before the Germans in 1870.

14. The performance of the Germany Army during the last three months is the greatest triumph of the human mind and the human will that has ever been accomplished. It is not the triumph of one mind or one will but the triumph of several million minds and several million wills, coordinated by a general staff with a degree of perfection that the world has never before seen. This pace being set, any navy not provided with a general staff is a navy not provided with "the most modern improvements."

15. The third way in which I find our Navy deficient is in training. This deficiency in training is due not to lack of spirit or ability but to a combination of the two preceding causes; that is, to insufficient personnel and lack of departmental organization to which must be added lack of small ships. I mean that because we have had not enough small ships to do work on the coasts of Haiti, San Domingo, and Mexico, because our ships have been insufficiently manned and because the Navy Department has had no general staff which would devise and carry out a progressive system of training, lack of progressive training has resulted. When I say lack of progressive training I mean lack of training such as the Germans and other nations have. I mean lack of training that secures a high degree of skill. If we are forced into war with a navy like Germany's or England's or Japan's, our training should be at least as good as theirs, or, rather, our skill should be. It is impossible for me or for anybody to compare exactly the skill of our Navy with the skill of other navies; but, on the theory that cause produces effect, we must admit that we have not had nearly so good a system to produce skill as other navies have. The developing of skill in the navies and armies of the other great powers is carried out with a vigor and persistency that we can not approach, and has been directed by an organized intelligence that certainly has no superior and probably no equal in any other branch of human effort.

16. The subject of the improper organization of our Navy Department was exhaustively analyzed by the Moody Board and afterwards by the Swift Board in 1909. Certain recommendations were made to remedy the evils that they found. These recommendations have not been carried out. They were, in effect, to establish a general staff, though the words "general staff" were not used. In my opinion, the failure to adopt those recommendations was serious and will invite disaster if a great war comes.

B. A. FISKE.

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The CHAIRMAN. Were you afterward informed that that letter was not filed with the department?

Admiral FISKE. Some time in April, 1916, the Senate asked for a copy of that letter and also asked for a copy of a letter which the General Board was supposed to have written on the outbreak of the European war, August 1, 1914.

In regard to this letter that you are speaking of I received a telephone message from the Secretary's aide asking if I had a copy of it as a copy could not be found in the files. I said yes. They asked me to send a copy, which I did. The Secretary had that letter copied and transmitted to the Senate, with a letter which is also in my book, saying that he had not seen it and expressing surprise that I should have had a letter put in the department files without his knowledge and without his having seen it.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to have that letter put in the record also.

Admiral FISKE. Yes.

(The letter is as follows:)

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE,
NEWPORT, R. I., *August 1, 1914.*

From: Senior member present.
To: Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: Withdrawal of battleships to home yards.

In view of the immediate danger of a great war in Europe, and in pursuance of its duties as laid down in paragraph R 167 (1) of the Navy Regulations, the General Board earnestly urges that the battleships be brought home, docked and put in perfect readiness, with the exception of the ships actually necessary in Caribbean and Mexican waters.

(2) The present situation in Europe is absolutely without precedent; not only in the vast extent and variety of the interests involved, but in the suddenness with which it has developed.

(3) It is not clear at this moment that any interests of the United States are threatened. Yet it would be rash to assume that there may not emerge from the extraordinary situation in which so large a part of the world has become unexpectedly involved some incident or combination of incidents fraught with danger to our interests.

(4) Our commercial interests are closely interwoven with those of every one of the great powers which are apparently on the verge of war. Our trade routes pass through the waters of those powers and terminate in their ports. Our privileges and duties as neutrals may easily become matters of misunderstanding and controversy.

(5) There are said to be 300,000 United States citizens now in Europe. Many thousands of them are claimed by European powers as liable to military service, and those who find themselves abroad may at any moment be arrested and imprisoned. As bearing upon this point, the following quotation from a press dispatch of July 31, is pertinent:

"Other Americans whose safety promises to be a serious matter are now naturalized citizens passing between Europe and the United States. Efforts may be made by European belligerents to arrest such people because of their nativity, regardless of their naturalization."

Should incidents occur as are here forecast, they could hardly be ignored, and this is only one of the many difficulties that may arise in connection with the interests, personal and commercial, of American citizens residing or traveling abroad.

(6) Another press report from Copenhagen of the same date suggests another source of complications if the report is authentic. The report is as follows:

"A German squadron, cruising off Langeland in the Great Belt, is stopping all vessels to investigate their nationality and the destination of their cargoes."

There is so little American shipping engaged in foreign trade that such procedure in the locality mentioned is hardly likely to affect American vessels; but what has happened in one place may happen in another. The United States would hardly permit its merchant ships to be overhauled by foreign men-of-war when no actual state of war exists, and the spirit thus manifested by the German squadron might cause acts in violation of neutrality after war has supervened.

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(7) In the event of a general European war, it is probable that foreign shipping will endeavor to register under the United States flag. The shipping then needed adequately to supply the war requirements of European nations will be enormous. Many questions of neutrality, or alleged breaches of neutrality, may, in the irritable condition of public opinion at home and abroad, result in strained relations; and notwithstanding all efforts to the contrary, may further result in the embroilment of this country with some country or countries of Europe.

(8) Again, the merchants of the United States will certainly endeavor to supply immense quantities of munitions of war, arms, ammunition, fuel, food, and other warlike supplies, with the resulting accusation that the country has become a base from which war is supported against friendly nations in violation of its proclamation of neutrality.

(9) There are other possible complications: Belligerents always tend to overstep their powers in executing the right of search: disputes will arise over the definition of contraband; and accusations of unneutral service will be brought against the United States traders and foreigners doing business under the United States flag.

(10) A serious possibility for the United States connected with a great European war lies in the changes of sovereignty in possessions on or adjacent to the American Continent that may result from corresponding changes in sovereignty on the Continent of Europe. We can not forecast the eventualities of such a war. Many indications exist that Germany desires a foothold in American waters, and it is well known that she does not concur in the Monroe doctrine. If Great Britain is drawn into war the German fleet will be neutralized as far as any danger from it to our interests in the immediate future is concerned. If she is not, and if the end of the war should find Germany stronger than ever in her European position and with her fleet practically unimpaired, the temptation will be great to seize the opportunity for obtaining the position she covets on this side of the ocean. We should prepare now for the situation which would thus be created.

AUSTIN M. KNIGHT.

Admiral FISKE. Then I wrote to the Senate pointing out the position in which this put me; and then the American Defense Society in New York wrote the President and brought this matter up, and the President wrote the American Defense Society and said that Mr. Daniels had said that he might have seen the letter but had forgotten it. This is also in my book.

The CHAIRMAN. That is also in your book?

Admiral FISKE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Then have that put in the record, and all matters connected with that.

Admiral FISKE. Yes.

(The extracts from Admiral Fiske's book are as follows:)

My diary says:

"December 16, 1914: I suggested to Hobson over phone this a. m. that if he wanted to get straight news about the Army, he would get committee to call for Chief of General Staff. Hobson answered, 'A word to the wise is sufficient,' so I got word to-night to appear before committee to-morrow."

I spent that evening in my office with Lieut. Commander Madison, who was the officer on duty there that evening. We discussed the subject of my testimony and collected some papers which I could use to refresh my memory. Madison and I agreed that the Navy could not be got into the same state of efficiency as the German Navy for many years. I told Madison that I wanted to bring out that point very strongly, and we discussed what number of years I should state as the time required, knowing, as we both did, that it was a matter of doubt whether the political influences in the United States would ever permit the Navy to be as efficient as the German, and realizing that even if the politicians should all stand aside and permit a general staff to be established, it would probably take that general staff at least 10 years to train itself and train the Navy. We finally decided that I should say that it would take at least five years to get the Navy ready to fight a navy like the German effectively.

My diary says:

"December 17, 1914: * * * I was before the committee at Hobson's request nearly all day to-day, and never received more courteous treatment and more attention in my life—much to my surprise. I certainly startled committee when I told them it would take five years to get ready. Congressman Roberts took me to lunch

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in Capitol restaurant and I asked him to ask me how long it would take to get Navy ready for war, and I told him I would answer five years. Roberts took the hint."

The Washington evening papers published most of my testimony, and I got several congratulatory messages over the telephone that evening. The first message I received was from my old classmate and roommate Dorn, who said that my action was the most splendid thing that had been done by any naval officer since the Civil War.

On my walk down to the department the following morning numbers of Navy officers, and Army officers as well, came up to shake hands with me and thank me. I got to my office at 9 o'clock and found several officers waiting for me. All were most enthusiastic, and each one thanked me as if I had done him a personal favor. About a quarter after 9 the Secretary's messenger came in and said the Secretary wanted to see me. All the officers became grave at once, and some of them said, "He is going to fire you." They all seemed to think this, and I know I did. I expected to be sent to some distant place like Olongapo in the Philippines.

* * * * * * *

The entries in my diary during the remainder of December refer mainly to the congratulatory letters and messages that I continued to receive regarding my testimony, and also to my efforts to establish a general staff.

"December 27, 1914, Sunday: Called on Hobson in afternoon and explained why a general staff is absolutely essential, if one is to have a Navy of maximum effectiveness; though it is not necessary if one is to have merely a Navy.

"January 3, 1915, Sunday: Had long interview in afternoon with Hobson at his residence, in regard to general staff. etc. I took many documents with me, and Hobson became thoroughly interested. We concluded that it might be better not to attempt to get through legislation for any modification of aid system, because Secretary would say present aid system is adequate and that it might be better to propose a new scheme, whereby an addition would be made to present system and additional means be provided to accomplish preparation for war. So I asked Capts. Knapp, Hood, and Oliver, and Lieut. Commanders Cronan, Madison and Knox to be at Hobson's at 8.30 p. m. We all met there in Hobson's study, and sat till after 11 p. m., when we adjourned. We agreed on program whereby Chief of Naval Operations is to be legislated for and to have 15 assistants."

The entries under head of December 27 and January 3 give the outlines of a good deal of work that Hobson and I did on those days and in the intervening week. The plan which we drew up was drawn up in the light of my knowledge of strategical requirements and Hobson's knowledge of congressional requirements. When the six officers arrived that evening, they came secretly because they were engaged on an exceedingly dangerous mission. I had expected more or less objection on the part of some of them to certain features of the bill as drawn, but I found that every one of them was enthusiastically in favor of it. We eight men went over the whole subject very carefully, and when we finally came to an agreement, the original memorandum that Hobson and I had planned had been changed but little.

During the discussion that evening it happened occasionally that some one would speak of the power and authority which I would have if the bill should pass. Whenever anybody made such a remark as that, I told him that, if Congress should authorize a chief of naval operations, I was absolutely certain that I would not be the chief of naval operations. I told them that I was positive that the Secretary wanted to get rid of me, but could see no opportunity or give any reason for it, because he knew that I was performing my duties to the satisfaction of the Navy, including Admiral Dewey; but that if a new office was established by Congress, the Secretary then would be perfectly free to appoint any one whom he wished. I told the company that I was like the well-known gentleman who sawed off a branch of a tree at a point between himself and the branch, except that that man did not realize what he was doing, and I did.

"January 4, 1915: The six officers who met at Hobson's last night met in my office at 8.30 a. m. and we drew up on neat typewritten page the proposition agreed on. Hobson came to my office at 10.15 and took up the matter with Secretary. Hobson told me later that Secretary declared that if the bill went through he would "go home." How foolish. Now he has the chance to back it up and get back into good opinion of the country. Hobson came to our apartment at 2.20 and told me subcommittee—of which Padgett is chairman—passed the proposition unanimously. Hobson asked me to get him a brief with which to argue matter before full committee January 5. So Madison, Cronan, Dudley, Knox, and I met in my office from 9 p. m. till 11.15 p. m. and drew up brief, which Knox will leave at Hobson's house at 9 a. m. to-morrow.

"January 5, 1915: Papers give large space and headlines to action of subcommittee. Dewey is delighted, and told me I might tell Hobson, which I did at 10.30 a. m. by telephone.

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"January 6, 1915: Hobson telephoned me at 1 p. m. that full House Naval Committee agreed unanimously on incorporating in naval appropriation bill the provisions for a 'Chief of Naval Operations.'"

With the exception of Admiral Dewey, Hobson, and the six other officers, nobody knew that I or any other naval officer had any connection with this measure.

"January 7, 1915: Evening papers last night and morning papers to-day confirm news that House Naval Committee unanimously agreed to incorporate in naval appropriation bill the provision, 'There shall be a Chief of Naval Operations.' * * * The New York papers give great space and comment (sympathetic) to establishment—Bureau of Operation. New York Tribune is especially favorable, and the World, the leading Democratic newspaper, gives the project its first column of first page, headed 'Fixed Naval Policy Assured.' It must hurt Mr. Daniels very much indeed to see the World taking a stand so antagonistic to him."

When the naval appropriation bill came up before the House, the provision for a chief of naval operations was stricken out on a point of order, on the motion by Mr. Mann. This did not surprise us because Hobson had said at the start that it was liable to this fate, being new legislation added to an appropriation bill. Hobson said that he thought he could get the Senate Naval Committee to put it back in the bill; he added, however, that this would give an opportunity for the Secretary to modify the provision by recommending certain changes in it, though he thought that the Secretary would not oppose a provision that had been agreed to by the full House committee.

Hobson's prediction was verified in toto. The provision, as finally incorporated in the bill by the Senate Naval Committee, was made to conform to the suggestions of the Secretary. In its amended form it was passed by both Houses. It established the office of Chief of Naval Operations in a form which, though it omitted the 15 assistants for making war plans which Hobson and I had suggested, accomplished, nevertheless, a greater advance than any other naval legislation had accomplished in many years. Most officers said that it was as great a boon to the Navy as the act of Congress in 1880, which authorized the "new Navy" in the shape of the steel ships *Chicago*, *Atlanta*, *Boston*, and *Dolphin*.

On March 24 and 26, 1916, I testified again before the House Naval Committee, and made the strongest argument I could in favor of putting back into the appropriation bill the provision for 15 assistants, for making war plans, which had been left out in 1914. The subcommittee of the Naval Committee agreed to do this. When the matter came up before the full Naval Committee, the committee divided half in half, most of the Republicans voting yes, and most of the Democrats no. As the subcommittee had recommended it, and the full committee had not rejected it, the full committee had to pass it, though half of them opposed it.

This is the organization by which the Navy Department handled the Navy throughout the war. The excellence of the system is now admitted by everybody, including the Secretary.

The appropriation bill, as finally passed, contained the provision for the 15 assistants to the Chief of Naval Operations that had been omitted from the previous bill, after having been included in the original draft of the House Naval Committee in the session previous.

The language of the bill is:

"Hereafter the Chief of Naval Operations, while so serving as such Chief of Naval Operations, shall have the rank and title of admiral, to take rank next after the Admiral of the Navy, and shall, while so serving as Chief of Operations, receive the pay of $10,000 per annum and no allowances. All orders issued by the Chief of Naval Operations in performing the duties assigned him shall be performed under the authority of the Secretary of the Navy, and his orders shall be considered as emanating from the Secretary, and shall have full force and effect as such. To assist the Chief of Naval Operations in performing the duties of his office there shall be assigned for this exclusive duty no less than 15 officers of and above the rank of lieutenant commander of the Navy or major of the Marine Corps."

The office of Naval Operations with the 15 assistants "assigned for this exclusive duty" constitutes a general staff.

Before I gave my first testimony, the personal relations between the Secretary and me had been friendly and pleasant, though we disagreed entirely as to the desirability of getting the Navy ready for war. Our disagreement on this point was extremely trying to me, for the reason that I liked the Secretary so much as a man. I appreciated his kindness of heart and his delicate refinement. I admired his steadfast adherence to the principles of Christian conduct which he professed, and I was continually tempted to cease from urging him to undertake a course of conduct against which he was resolved. But I often told him that I was the only man in 90,000,000

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people to hold before him the military side of the Navy, and that I felt it my duty to persist. He always told me that I was right in so doing, and for a long while I thought that I was gradually impressing him with our dangers.

But his report of December 1, 1914, dispelled all my illusions on that point. I saw that I had not impressed him at all, and that the disagreeable and dangerous duty devolved on me of endeavoring to impress Congress and the people. Hence my testimony.

Beginning with the morning after my testimony the Secretary's manner toward me changed entirely. He was always polite, but a cold formality took the place of a warm cordiality; disapproval was intimated in every way, though never expressed in words. But my period of misery had passed. I knew that I had done right, and that my testimony as the official expert of the Navy Department had roused a powerful minority to a realization of the peril of the Nation.

* * * * * * *

As I walked out of the shady corridors of the department building into the bright sunshine of the town, I said to myself that I thought I had been able to prevent any very great lowering of the efficiency of the Navy, and that I had had the great privilege of being able to do five things which would be of permanent benefit to it. These were:

(1) Establishing the Division of Aeronautics.

(2) Instituting strategic war problems for the fleet.

(3) Proving that the country trusts Army and Navy officers more than it trusts any one else.

(4) Making Congress realize the needs of the Navy more clearly than it had ever done before.

(5) Establishing the office of Chief of Naval Operations.

Besides these, there were three other undertakings which I had not yet brought to a successful issue, but which I felt sure were in such a state that it was only a matter of a short time before they, also, would be accomplished facts. These were:

(1) The establishment of some agency under the department for recognizing and developing new inventions. This was accomplished in the following summer by the establishment of the Naval Consulting Board, with Mr. Edison at the head. This differed from my plan mainly in being composed of civilians exclusively. My idea had been to have a naval officer with inventive ability to be the head, in order to steer the efforts of the civilians along the most advantageous lines.

(2) The recognition of the possibilities of the diving-shell.

(3) The putting into effect of the administrative section of the general war plan. Much more than any other one thing the refusal of the Secretary to sign this plan was the cause of the differences between him and me. Let anyone imagine himself in my position, and realize how I must have felt in knowing that the department possessed no means of knowing its degree of readiness for war, and that it could not know it until a certain paper had been signed, and until the methods which that paper provided for had been in operation for a considerable time.

The administrative plan was signed shortly after I gave up my position to my successor. That plan and the office of Chief of Naval Operations are the means by which the Navy Department got ready for war, and by means of which it operated during the war and has operated since.

The virtue of these two schemes were realized immediately after they were put into operation. This is proved by the following extracts taken from page 7 of the official report of the Secretary, made in the following December, 1915:

"OPERATIONS—BETTER ORGANIZATION EFFECTED.

"Upon my recommendation the naval appropriation act of 1914 provided that 'there shall be a Chief of Naval Operations * * * who shall, under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy, be charged with the operations of the fleet and with the preparation and readiness of plans for its use in war.' * * * A well thought-out plan, prepared by the General Board, for the preparation of the fleet for war in the Atlantic has been approved, and each office and bureau under the department has been assigned its proper share in the general scheme of preparedness. By reference to periodic reports the department may at any time become informed of defects, of efforts made to overcome them, and of the progress made toward a complete state of readiness."

It was mainly (almost wholly) because I urged the two measures which the Secretary described and praises that I had to resign my position as aid for operations.

I was surprised that the Secretary should state that the provision for a Chief of Naval Operations was made upon his recommendation.

* * * * * * *

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My diary says:

"April 3 (1916): Secretary testified to-day. Roasted me in the afternoon; said I was not in harmony with department, and that he would have asked me to resign, if I had not done so.

"April 4 (1916): The morning papers give considerable space to the Secretary's attack on me. I held conference in forenoon and evening with Admirals Schroeder, Wainwright, and Osterhaus at Schroeder's house. We agreed best thing is for me to write to Naval Committee, requesting permission to appear and refute Secretary's testimony."

It had always been the custom for the Secretary of the Navy to be the first to testify before the House Committee, but on this occasion the Secretary was the last.

The following account of the Secretary's testimony is taken from the New York Herald, on April 4:

"Just before the hearings on the naval bill came to a close before the House Committee on Naval Affairs to-day Josephus Daniels, Secretary of the Navy, took occasion to bring about a final airing of his personal differences with Rear Admiral Bradley A. Fiske, United States Navy, one-time aid for operations. Mr. Daniels, in answer to questions propounded by Representative Lemuel P. Padgett, of Tennessee, chairman of the committee, tried to impress the committee with the fact that Rear Admiral Fiske, in criticising the situation in the Navy and its lack of preparedness, was moved by personal grievances rather than by higher motives.

"One of the causes of differences, the Secretary said, was his issuance of the order barring wine from the officers' mess. Rear Admiral Fiske, he stated, had protested against this. Then, to cap the climax, he said:

"'Rear Admiral Fiske told me that if the officers were deprived of their wine they could take to cocaine.'

"The Secretary then went on to give further details of his relations with the rear admiral.

"RAISES ISSUE OF VERACITY.

"In one instance a direct issue of veracity was raised. Rear Admiral Fiske told the committee that he acted as the personal messenger of the Secretary when he sent word that he desired the General Board to suppress its recommendations with respect to increased personnel of the Navy.

"To-day, Mr. Daniels said:

" 'I never told the General Board to do anything in my life.'

"The Secretary's broadside at the officer all occurred in the last few minutes of the hearing.

"Mr. Daniels also contradicted in some degree the statement of Rear Admiral Fiske with regard to his failure to be appointed to the General Board. The Secretary said it was true that Admiral George Dewey had recommended the appointment of the officer to the board, but he had afterwards changed his mind, saying he thought Rear Admiral Fiske too 'theoretical' for this post and that a more practical man should be appointed to it.

"The thing the Secretary wanted to emphasize most, it appeared, was his contention that the rear admiral's troubles with the civilian head of the department arose long before the question of preparedness became acute; that when Rear Admiral Charles J. Badger was about to retire Rear Admiral Fiske importuned the Secretary 'a dozen times' that he be made commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet; that when it was suggested that Rear Admiral Fletcher, now Admiral, might be available for the appointment of commander of the fleet, Rear Admiral Fiske stated that he would not desire the place and would refuse it if it was offered to him; whereupon, according to Mr. Daniels, the Secretary wrote and offered the place to Rear Admiral Fletcher and he was glad to accept the appointment.

"Also, the Secretary explained that the real issue between himself and Rear Admiral Fiske was whether the Navy should be operated under the ideals of the Old World or of America.

" 'He told me, not once, but five times,' said the Secretary, 'that if we did not follow the principle of militarism and put men at the head of the Navy whose fathers and grandfathers had been naval officers, we would never attain any degree of preparedness.'"

"April 5, 1916: New York Sun and World say editorially I must reply to Secretary. Herald has editorial taking my side against Secretary of Navy. I must defend myself. Fortunately, that is easy."

After my meeting with Schroeder, Wainwright, and Osterhaus I prepared a letter to House Naval Committee. We had a meeting the following morning, April 5, at which

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I read my letter to them. They suggested a few minor changes in it, which I made. At their suggestion I handed this personally to the secretary of the House Naval Committee.

My letter read as follows:

WASHINGTON, D. C., *April 5, 1916.*

To the NAVAL COMMITTEE,
House of Representatives,
Hon. Lemuel P. Padgett, Chairman.

GENTLEMEN: Referring to my testimony given before the Naval Committee on March 24 and 26, to the testimony given on April 3 by the honorable Secretary of the Navy and the editorials in this morning's issue of the New York World, Sun, and Herald, I beg leave to request your attention to the fact that the testimony of the Secretary has cast a serious cloud on mine.

For this reason I respectfully request permission to appear before the committee to explain certain occurrences concerning which I fear that the Secretary's memory had led him to do me great injustice.

According to all the papers that I have seen, the Secretary said that I told him that if naval officers were deprived of their wine they would take cocaine. It is true that I tried to persuade the Secretary not to prohibit wine and beer; spirituous liquors had been forbidden by law for 50 years. My arguments were expressed in a closely typewritten letter to him, four pages long, dated May 27, 1914, and covered many points. It would be necessary to read this entire letter to get a correct idea of what I told the Secretary. I should like to show a copy of the letter to the committee.

I did not know that my letter caused any unpleasantness between the Secretary and me. It caused no unpleasant feeling on my part toward the Secretary, because I felt that he was acting according to his convictions.

In the matter of desiring to be commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet, I did make application for the command. Such an application was perfectly proper, as I had served successfully in command of three divisions at different times and was then aid for operations, which many officers thought a more important position.

I wish an opportunity, however, to convince the committee that I did not tell the Secretary that Fletcher did not want the command; the Secretary's memory leads him into error there. What I did tell the Secretary was that Fletcher had told me some time before that he thought the natural thing to do when Admiral Badger gave up the command was to give it to me, make Fletcher aid for operations, and then make Fletcher commander in chief when I retired, Fletcher being 18 months younger than I and my junior in rank.

I find the following entry in my diary on the date of April 30, 1914:

"Secretary of the Navy, in accordance with my request, telegraphed Fletcher asking him if he would like to change places with me."

Fletcher was then in Mexico in command of the first division, which I had commanded a year and a half before; and Admiral Winslow, my junior, also a candidate for the position of commander in chief, was also in Mexico, in command of the special service squadron. It will be seen that at my request I was to leave Washington, give up altogether my position as aid for operations and take a much lower place—a subordinate position in the fleet in Mexico as commander of the first division. Surely this was not pressing my claims unduly, but rather the reverse.

I find an entry in my diary of May 1:

"Fletcher answered above dispatch, saying that he would not like to become aid for operations, as he wished to succeed the present commander in chief."

I was greatly surprised but Fletcher has explained to me since why he changed his mind. It is needless to state that Fletcher's reasons were perfectly satisfactory to me.

I find in my diary under date of June 15, 1914:

"Secretary of the Navy told me the accounts published in the morning papers were correct; that he is going to make Fletcher commander in chief. I told him I could make no objection, that I had continually praised Fletcher as a fine admiral and that he could make no mistake in making Fletcher commander in chief."

I have never had the slightest ill-feeling about this episode, and I have told everyone to whom I have talked about it that if I had been in the Secretary's place I would have appointed Fletcher because he had made good in important practical work in Mexico. For many years Fletcher and I have been close friends, and we are so still.

As to my telling the Secretary, not once but many times, that "if we did not put men at the head of the Navy whose fathers and grandfathers had been in the service, we would never be able to obtain any degree of preparedness," I have never entertained such ideas; my father was a clergyman, and not one of my paternal ancestors for more than 400 years had been in the Army or Navy. My maternal uncle was in

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the Navy, but he was killed at athe age of 18; and my maternal grandfather was an Army officer in his early days, but resigned and went into the lumber business.

I do not remember any other Army or Navy relatives, and I am not a militarist or a believer in caste. What I did tell the Secretary was that countries like Germany and Japan have aims and ideals different from ours; that in those countries every man is in a measure military, as his father and grandfather were before him, and that such nations naturally have a greater military spirit and a greater military ability than nations like ours.

Referring to that part of the Secretary's testimony that bears on my testimony that the Secretary directed the omission of a recommendation of 19,600 men from the General Board's report of December, 1914, I should like an opportunity to convince the committee of the correctness of my recollections by showing the entries made in my diary at the time.

Very respectfully,

B. A. FISKE,
Rear Admiral, United States Navy.

"April 6, 1916: Navy League has ordered 2,500 copies of my 'Naval Strategy' and asked me to read it before the convention next month, and has put my name on program to read it. Of course, I am forbidden to speak at all on preparedness. So some one else will have to read it.

"April 7 (1916): New York Herald, Times, Sun, Tribune, and American, also Washington Post (doubtless practically all big papers) have long scare-head accounts of my letter to House Naval Committee, quoting it almost in full. * * * Lots of letters from friends about it.

"April 8 (1916): I received Mr. Padgett's letter, saying Naval Committee would not call me, but I may send copy of my letter of May 27, 1914, expostulating about the Secretary's wine mess order and he will print it in the hearings. So I wrote to Secretary, asking for a copy of it and wrote Padgett, telling him I had done so. Lots of congratulatory letters from friends.

"April 11 (1916): Representative Gardner in his Navy League speech ended, 'Bradley Fiske, I salute you as our Arnold von Winkelreid.'

"April 12 (1916): At meeting of Navy League this a. m., Col. Thompson, the president of league read a letter from Secretary of the Navy declining to permit me to read my paper on 'Naval Strategy,' published in March–April Naval Institute. Col. Thompson made eloquent speech denouncing Secretary's act, and was followed by W. S. Stayton on same lines, but bitter. Stayton was followed by Henry Reuterdahl, the artist, in really an oratorical outburst—at the conclusion of which all the audience rose and cheered me. Mayor Lewis of Forest City, Ill., read my paper. When he started, Stayton asked audience to act as if he were Admiral Fiske, and they got all up and cheered again. Very nerve-racking to me.

"April 13 (1916): Morning papers devote considerable space and headlines to demonstration of cheers and hisses at Navy League yesterday. Senate yesterday p. m. adopted unanimously a resolution proposed by Senator Lodge 'directing' Secretary of the Navy to send to Senate General Board's letter of August 3, 1914, urging getting Navy ready and my letter to Secretary of November 9, 1914, reporting Navy unprepared for war. Papers mention it.

"April 15 (1916): Received from department a letter inclosing a photo copy of my letter expostulating against using the wine mess order. Took it down to Naval Committee with a letter of transmittal from me, and handed it to the secretary of the committee."

This letter was very long, and analyzed the whole sobriety question as related to the Navy. It dealt also with the letter from the Surgeon General, which seemed to me an insult to Navy officers, because it represented them as being much less sober than the enlisted men. My letter pointed out also that whatever lapses from sobriety occurred, occurred in almost every case when on shore leave, away from the restrictions of naval life, so that the Secretary's order would not affect the real trouble. It also predicted that the issuing of the order would not decrease drunkenness. My information is that this prediction has been fulfilled. In the middle of paragraph 10 was the sentence, "Another effect would be an increased temptation to use cocaine and other drugs."

"April 17 (1916): Called on Admiral Dewey, and he stated in the most emphatic terms that the statement to House Naval Committee made by Secretary of the Navy in his recent testimony to the effect that Dewey had asked Secretary not to keep me on General Board, as he wanted a practical man and not a theoretical man, was utterly in error. Dewey also told me that he was telling this broadcast. Several officers had told me of this."

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The statement of the Secretary as printed in the official report of his testimony was as follows:

"Later, Admiral Dewey requested me not to put Admiral Fiske on the General Board. He said he wanted a practical man; that Fiske was too theoretical; and I did not put him on."

This statement surprised me for the reason that I had served twice on the General Board and Admiral Dewey had given me the mark 4 (the perfect mark) on every semiannual efficiency report; and his request that I be retained on the board after being relieved as aid for operations, had been made without any suggestion from me. Furthermore, he had put my name in a short list of officers whom he had mentioned for "heroic conduct" at the Battle of Manila and had taken occasion many times while I was on the board to compliment me on my abilities and conduct. So I was not surprised when I heard that Admiral Dewey was denying the statement attributed to him.

Finally, after several officers had told me that Dewey was denying it, I went to his office to ask him face to face if he had done so. When he saw me coming in at the door he rose from his chair (in the presence of his aid, Lieut. Commander Le Breton) and advanced toward me with both hands outstretched, saying, "Fiske, I never said it; I never said it. No communication passed between the Secretary and me about your staying on the board except when you were present, and you heard me tell the Secretary that I wanted you to stay."

[Chapter XL.—Unpreparedness letter, letter of President, and retirement.]

"April 19 (1916): * * * Telephone message from Secretary's aid said my preparedness letter can not be found. I sent a copy, which was copied and returned.

"April 23: All the papers (I believe) print my unpreparedness letter practically in full. Secretary transmitted it to the Senate yesterday with a letter, etc."

The Secretary's letter read as follows:

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
Washington, D. C., April 21, 1916.

To the SENATE:

I am in receipt of the resolution adopted by the Senate on April 12, 1916, calling for—

(1) A communication, dated August 3, 1914, from the General Board of the Navy warning the Navy Department of the necessity of bringing the Navy to a state of preparedness.

(2) A communication, dated November 9, 1914, from Rear Admiral Bradley A. Fiske, senior advisor to the Secretary, warning the Navy Department of the unprepared state of the Navy.

Upon receipt of this resolution, diligent search was made in the files of the department for the communications desired. That dated November 9, 1914, from Rear Admiral Fiske, is appended hereto. The chief clerk was unable to find it in his files, it having been withdrawn by an officer who "looked it up several times but could not find it." However, the copy herewith transmitted was furnished the department by Admiral Fiske at my request.

This communication was not furnished me, and I did not know of its existence until long after it was written. I find upon inquiry that it was filed with the chief clerk, without my knowledge that it had been written. Although Rear Admiral Fiske was in my office daily, he did not tell me he had placed the communication on file. His article was written after the estimates for the Navy, as required by law, had been submitted, and I was left in ignorance of its existence, while Congress was considering legislation for the increase of the Navy and actually enacting legislation which has secured the best organization the Navy Department has enjoyed in its history. I was greatly surprised when I learned that a communication deemed important enough now to be the subject of a Senate resolution was not considered by its author of sufficient importance for him to present in person to me, instead of depositing it, without acquainting me of his action, in the files of the Navy Department.

We are unable to find any communication such as that described in the resolution, from the General Board under date of August 3, 1914, though our files contained a letter of two days previous not bearing upon the subject mentioned in your resolution. I therefore addressed the following letter to Admiral Dewey, president of the General Board:

[Secretary's letter to Dewey.]

"APRIL 17, 1916.

"MY DEAR ADMIRAL DEWEY: I am in receipt of a resolution from the Senate requesting me to send a communication dated August 3, 1914, from the General

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Board of the Navy, warning the Navy Department of the necessity of bringing the Navy to a state of preparedness.

"I have made a careful examination of the files of the Navy Department and have not been able to find any such communication. If the General Board has such a communication of that date, won't you please send me a copy?

"Sincerely yours,

"JOSEPHUS DANIELS.

"Admiral GEORGE DEWEY,
"*President of the General Board,*
"*Washington.*"

In response to this inquiry I received the following letter from Admiral Dewey:

"OFFICE OF THE ADMIRAL OF THE NAVY,
"*Washington, April 18, 1916.*

"MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I am in receipt of your letter of the 17th instant, asking me to send you a communication from the General Board, dated August 3, 1914, 'Warning the Navy Department of the necessity of bringing the Navy to a state of preparedness.'

"There is no letter or recommendation from the General Board bearing the date of August 3, 1914. I find, however, that on August 1, 1914, a special meeting was called at the request of Rear Admiral Fiske, aid for operations, to consider the withdrawal of battleships from Mexican waters to their home yards. A letter adopted at this meeting and bearing its date was signed by Rear Admiral Knight, senior member present, a copy of which is forwarded herewith.

"You will note that this is a confidential communication, and as it bears intimately upon our policy with regard to certain foreign powers I do not think it advisable that it should be given to the public.

"Sincerely, yours,

"GEORGE DEWEY.

"Hon. JOSEPHUS DANIELS,
"*Secretary of the Navy.*"

It will be noted that Admiral Dewey states the communication of August 1, 1914, "bears intimately upon our policy with regard to certain foreign powers," and that he does "not think it advisable that it should be given to the public." In view of this statement of Admiral Dewey and of the fact that the letter of August 1, 1914, does not refer to "the necessity of bringing the Navy to a state of preparedness," as stated in the resolutiou adopted by your body, it does not appear to be in the public interest to transmit the confidential communication of the General Board of August 1, 1914. No other report from the General Board touching preparedness has been received, except those published as appendices to my reports and in my hearing before the House Committee on Naval Affairs.

Respectfully,

JOSEPHUS DANIELS.

The SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,
Washington, D. C.

"April 29 (1916): * * * Army and Navy Journal has editorial, 'Admiral Fiske and the Secretary,' saying a naval correspondent says so and so—recounting facts stated by him, showing I did show Secretary the unpreparedness letter."

From Washington, I returned to the War College. Then I wrote the following letter:

UNITED STATES NAVY WAR COLLEGE.
Newport, R. I., April 29, 1916.

To the PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE:

1. In a communication to the Senate, dated April 21, 1916, transmitting a copy of a letter dated November 9, 1914, to the Navy Department from me as aid for operations, the Secretary of the Navy makes the following statement:

"This communication was not furnished me, and I did not know of its existence until long after it was written. I find upon inquiry that it was filed with the chief clerk, without my knowledge that it had been written. Although Rear Admiral Fiske was in my office daily, he did not tell me he had placed the communication on file. His article was written after the estimates for the Navy, as required by law, had been submitted; and I was left in ignorance of its existence, while Congress was considering egislation for the increase of the Navy, and actually enacting legislation which has secured the best organization the Navy Department has enjoyed in its history. I was greatly surprised when I learned that a communication deemed important enough

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now to be the subject of a Senate resolution was not considered by its author of sufficient importance for him to present in person to me, instead of depositing it, without acquainting me of his action, in the files of the Navy Department."

2. This statement constituted an accusation against me of a grave breach of official propriety—in fact, of actual underhandedness—of an attempt to conceal an important letter from the Secretary; while as a matter of fact, I was always scrupulously careful never to permit him to receive, or to remain under, any mistaken impression, or to be in ignorance of any important matter, if I could prevent it.

3. The statement appeared in the New York Herald and in many other papers on April 23, 1916, and injured my reputation for fair dealing.

4. For this reason I respectfully request permission to appear before such persons as you may designate, and state facts which I and other officers remember very clearly, and which are noted in my diary, showing that there has been a lapse of memory on the part of the Secretary. In particular, I wish to show the two following entries that appear in my diary:

"November 5: I showed Secretary paper I had written to him, stating Navy is unprepared and needs more men, more training, and a general staff. He made almost no comment on my paper, though he read it carefully. During conversation, Secretary referred to time in early April, 1913, etc.

"November 10: I showed Assistant Secretary a copy of my letter to Secretary on unpreparedness of the Navy, lack of training, lack of general staff, etc. He said, it was bully and he would keep it, etc."

5. Attention is invited to the fact that, although the copy of the letter sent to the Senate was dated November 9, while the entry in my diary was November 5, yet, nevertheless, my diary shows that the contents of that letter were the same as the contents of the letter of November 9. My recollection is that I kept the letter on my desk a few days, intending to take up the matter again with the Secretary, but finally decided not to do so, but merely to file it; and that a fresh copy was made. The date was probably changed by inadvertence, but no changes were made in the letter beyond possibly some verbal alterations. Certainly no change was made in the character or purport of the letter.

6. I should also like to prove by my diary that this letter was merely the concentrated essence of a great many oral conversations carried on frequently after the war began, in which I repeatedly urged on the Secretary the peril of the country and the need for more men, a general staff, and more progressive training.

7. In case you do not deem it wise to grant this request, I then ask you, as a matter of justice, to give this letter as much publicity as was given to the letter of the Secretary.

Very respectfully,

BRADLEY A. FISKE,
Rear Admiral, United States Navy.

I was much surprised that the Secretary should state that "the letter of August 1, 1914, does not refer to the necessity of bringing the Navy to a state of preparedness." It was my intention that the letter should urge it, and it was my recollection that it did. A reference to the entry in my diary under date of August 1, 1914, confirmed me in this recollection. I did not think it proper to state this in my letter, however, as it might be interpreted as questioning the veracity of the Secretary.

"May 3 (1916): The newspapers say that Vice President Marshall gave my letter to Naval Committee to decide what to do with it; that Lodge defended my action, and Tillman said I was 'in a mud hole.'

"May 4: Newspapers state that Senator Tillman read my letter in the Senate and then declared it was due to wounded vanity, disappointed ambition, etc., and Senator Lodge defended me. New York Sun and New York World have strong editorials saying the case must be investigated. World is particularly strong.

"May 8: Received characteristic note from T. R.—'I am very glad to get your piece on naval strategy and to sit at the feet of Gamaliel.'

"May 15: The newspapers print with appropriate headlines an open letter written by the American Defense Society to the President, urging him to investigate the 'question of veracity' between the Secretary of Navy and me."

The letter of the society was as follows:

NEW YORK, *May 12, 1916.*

The PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,
White House, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The American Defense Society desired to call your attention to an unfortunate situation.

As the result of a request from the United States Senate, the Secretary of the Navy recently made public a letter written on November 9, 1914, by Rear Admiral Bradley A. Fiske, who was then aid for Operations.

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Secretary of the Navy has stated that his aid for Operations filed this letter with the chief clerk of the Navy Department and did not show it to the Secretary. Admiral Fiske states that he handed the letter to the Secretary of the Navy as the latter was standing at his desk in the Navy Department, and he read it carefully.

An issue of veracity has thus arisen between Rear Admiral Bradley A. Fiske and the Secretary of the Navy. Mr. President, we respectfully petition you, in fairness to your Secretary of the Navy and fairness to a gallant naval officer, not to allow this matter to remain uninvestigated.

Admiral Fiske graduated from the Naval Academy in 1874; he has given 40 years of service to his country. When he served as navigating officer of the *Petrel* at the Battle of Manila, he was cited by his captain for "eminent and conspicuous conduct in battle," and by Admiral Dewey for "heroic conduct." His series of inventions have done more than those of any other man to place the United States Navy in a preeminent position. His telescope sight has been adopted by every navy in the world and is chiefly responsible for the improvement that has taken place in the naval gunnery since 1898.

Admiral Fiske is recognized throughout the service as the logical successor to Admiral Mahan. His writings on naval strategy mark him as the leading strategist in the United States Navy. His record, therefore, is one of gallantry in battle, coupled with faithful attention to the less spectacular duties of a naval officer in time of peace. Never before has there been a blot on his record. To-day he stands accused by your Secretary of the Navy of negligence and untruthfulness, for if he filed his letter on the unpreparedness of the Navy with the chief clerk without showing it to the Secretary he was culpably negligent of duty. This, he says, he did not do. We earnestly request that, without delay, you will order an investigation.

Very respectfully, yours,

C. S. THOMPSON,
Chairman Executive Committee.

"May 16 (1916): New York Times and World have editorials insisting that 'question of veriacty' between Secretary of Navy and me be investigated."

"May 24: The newspapers publish a letter from President Wilson to the American Defense Society in reply to their letter of May 14, in which President quotes a letter from Secretary of Navy, saying he accepted my statement that I had shown my unpreparedness letter to him and he had read it."

The letter of the President read as follows:

"THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, D. C., May 22, 1916.

MY DEAR SIR: I am in receipt of your letter of the 12th of May. I referred it to the Secretary of the Navy, and he has furnished me the following memorandum:

"Some days ago, in response to a resolution of the Seuate, I transmitted to that honorable body a copy of a communication written by Rear Admiral Fiske in November, 1914. In transmitting the letter I stated that I had not seen it and did not know that it had been filed until long after it was filed with the chief clerk.

"In a recent letter to the Senate Rear Admiral Fiske stated that my statement showed a 'lapse of memory,' because he had presented the letter to me and I had read it. I have no recollection that this paper was ever presented to me or of reading it.

"Inasmuch, however, as Admiral Fiske states that he did show it to me before it was filed I of course accept his statement. It was his custom while aid for operations to present to me scores of papers bearing upon all naval matters. It is utterly impossible for any Cabinet officer in the multiplicity of papers presented to him to recall all of them.

"I had talked with Rear Admiral Fiske several times about the subject matter of the communication, upon which I had rather fixed views. But I did not, when my letter was written to the Senate, and do not now, recall that he had at any time committed his views to paper, presented them to me, or placed them on file."

Inasmuch as the difference referred to in your letter between the Secretary of the Navy and Rear Admiral Fiske is merely one of recollection of an incident which occurred in November, 1914, and inasmuch as the Secretary says that, while he has no recollection of having read the communication by Rear Admiral Fiske, he is willing to accept the Admiral's statement, the matter does not seem to me to call for any comment.

Very truly, yours,

WOODROW WILSON.

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"May 25 (1916): Letter from Dr. Graeme Hammond says no need for apprehension about Jo."

During the preceding two years my wife's health had caused me great anxiety. The physicians did not seem to be able to locate the cause of her distress; but finally they declared that her system indicated a nervous malady.

"June 2 (1916): Admiral Benson made adulatory speech at United States Naval Academy dinner Annapolis last night about Secretary of Navy and telling the fine things he and Secretary had been doing during past year. Unprofessional.

"June 11, Sunday: * * * Leave Newport for New York to-night and bid farewell to my naval life.

"June 13: Retired to-day, 62 years old. Had a wonderful ovation from American Defense Society in big room of Great Northern Hotel, hung with flags, etc., during which I was presented with a book by the society, my name on outside in gold letters, etc., letter read to me, etc. I made a speech in answer, and then several photographers and 'movie men' took pictures of us."

The letter from the American Defense Society read as follows:

AMERICAN DEFENSE SOCIETY,
303 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK,
Office of the Trustees.

DEAR ADMIRAL FISKE: With sincere pleasure we hand you this album containing extracts from the leading papers of the country which should be of particular interest to yourself.

To have been instrumental in having justice done in this public way to a gallant and distinguished officer of the United States Navy is a source of satisfaction to the American Defense Society.

And may we say in conclusion that your dignified and courteous bearing in the trying circumstances of an extremely unpleasant experience has won universal admiration, and has increased, if that is possible, the high regard and esteem in which you are held not only by the members of the American Defense Society, but by millions of your fellow countrymen.

Very respectfully, yours,

J. H. CORT,
Chairman of the Board of Trustees.

JUNE 13, 1916.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Trammell, do you desire to ask any questions?

Senator TRAMMELL. Yes, I have some questions.

On March 25, 1917, did you address a communication to the Secretary of War in which you made the following statement: "I beg leave to express the hope that I shall be permitted to proceed with this work, as I believe that I can do more good in this way than in any other way"—in connection with some convention?

Admiral FISKE. Yes.

Senator TRAMMELL. You did then, on March 25, ask to be allowed to remain on the work that you were doing?

Admiral FISKE. Yes.

Senator TRAMMELL. March 25, 1917?

Admiral FISKE. Yes.

Senator TRAMMELL. Now, you seem to have disagreed with the Secretary of the Navy in regard to his efforts to democratize the Navy, and you refer only to one particular matter, that of trying to give the enlisted man some opportunity to get an education. You objected to that, did you?

Admiral FISKE. No, sir; only to the degree to which he carried it.

Senator TRAMMELL. You spoke of it in a critical way.

Admiral FISKE. To the degree to which it was carried.

The CHAIRMAN. To what degree was it carried then?

Admiral FISKE. There were orders issued prescribing the amount of time in the forenoon and afternoon to be devoted to this instruc-

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tion, and a system was put into operation which most of the officers of the Navy thought was out of proportion to the good to be obtained, considering all the other duties which the officers and men had to carry out.

Senator TRAMMELL. Do you remember how much time they were allowed for study during each day or during the period of a week?

Admiral FISKE. No; I do not remember the details, Senator.

Senator TRAMMELL. You do not know?

Admiral FISKE. I do not remember the details. I did at one time.

Senator TRAMMELL. Do you remember any other efforts on his part to democratize the Navy?

Admiral FISKE. I have not at hand any distinct policies, but in general the feeling that I had and that I think others had was that this attitude was not incorrect but that it was carried to an undue extreme. It is very hard now for officers of the Navy to maintain discipline, as it is. It is very difficult, the most difficult thing possible, and I think the feeling was throughout the service, Senator, that the looking out for the enlisted men was carried to a degree further than was consonant with our idea of discipline.

Senator TRAMMELL. If you can recall any particulars of his abuse of the principle of looking out for the enlisted personnel, I should like to have you recite it.

Admiral FISKE. I would not call it abuse in any case, Senator.

Senator TRAMMELL. You said he carried it to an extreme.

Admiral FISKE. Yes, to an extreme.

Senator TRAMMELL. I would call that an abuse if he carried it to an extreme.

Admiral FISKE. Of course, it is a matter of definition. My idea of "abuse" would almost carry with it the idea of intention. I certainly do not think there was any intention on his part to do anything wrong, but the feeling was, I think, that that part of the work of the Navy was given a prominence out of proportion to the rest, and that for that reason other things had to be overlooked.

Senator TRAMMELL. Can you give us some more facts as to his carrying it to an extreme—something definite?

Admiral FISKE. I can not give any facts that I know of my own knowledge, no; I can not state any absolute facts along that line, except the one I am speaking of now in regard to what we thought was undue importance attached to the comfort and education of the enlisted men.

Senator TRAMMELL. And you think that that interfered with the discipline?

Admiral FISKE. Yes; I think so.

Senator TRAMMELL. I am sorry you can not remember something about the educational opportunities that he wanted to give these men.

Admiral FISKE. For instance, he appointed an aid for education. Now, that officer had an office next to mine. The idea of the aids had been to coordinate the work of all the various different activities, which were quite different, one from another. The Bureau of Steam Engineering, for instance, had very different work from the Bureau of Ordnance, and very different from the Bureau of Navigation, and very different from the Bureau of Yards and Docks.

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The idea of the aids was to coordinate these, so as to let the secretary have four men to deal with, instead of a great number. For instance, the aid for material had to coordinate what we call the material bureau. That was along the idea which has been in every Army and Navy, especially since they have got up to date. Now, the aid for education had duties which were along a specific line, just as specific as that of the Bureau of Construction, or the Marine Corps, or any other. It was not at all the work of an aid as we had been accustomed to consider an aid, and as a matter of fact the aid for education did not as a rule take part in the councils of the aids. His work was otherwise; but nevertheless, he gave to this captain, who had this position of aid for education, the same title and the same rank in the Navy Department as that for instance of aid for material or the aid for personnel. I think that gives an idea of the exaggerated form that we thought his ideas of the education of the enlisted man took. I think that is an illustration of what I mean.

Senator TRAMMEL. Along back during those times did you not have some difficulty in getting enlistments to fill up your authorized enlisted personnel?

Admiral FISKE. I will have to answer that question, Senator, by saying that we were having no more difficulty than navies always have had in getting men. We always would eventually get them, but after any new excess has been appropriated for it has always taken a certain length of time to get the men enlisted. Of course, I was not the aid for personnel, but my recollection is that there was no very great trouble. It took a little time to get them. I would not call it trouble.

Senator TRAMMELL. Don't you think that the fact that the men who were considering entering the Navy knew that the enlisted personnel were given a good deal of consideration would encourage that man in going into the Navy?

Admiral FISKE. I do, absolutely. I think that was a good thing to do, to have that idea. I think that part of it was good.

Senator TRAMMELL. The idea of doing something for the enlisted personnel would not do any particular harm in keeping the Navy up to its full strength, would it?

Admiral FISKE. No; that was a fine idea, only carried too far, that is all. One of the members of the Council of Aides, the Aide for Personnel, will testify to-morrow, I think, and he had more experience in training the personnel than anybody else in the Navy. He was always in favor of it, but we all thought it was carried too far, carried to an extreme.

Senator TRAMMELL. Since you have entered into a discussion of the democratizing of the Navy, I just want to get a little information. Are there any regulations of the Navy that forbid an enlisted man in the Navy from sitting at the same table with an officer in a public eating place?

Admiral FISKE. I trust not. I do not know of any. There was a captain in the Army who was court-martialed, you may remember, Senator, a few years ago, up in Connecticut, for making an enlisted man who happened to sit alongside of him in the theater get out. That officer was court-martialed and came very near being dismissed from the service.

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Senator TRAMMELL. I am glad that is not the custom, then, in the Navy. No such conditions exist in the Navy?

Admiral FISKE. Not that I know of. Would you mind repeating your question, Senator?

Senator TRAMMELL. My first question was, is there any regulation or custom that forbids an enlisted man in the Navy from sitting at the same table with an officer in a public eating place?

Admiral FISKE. Not that I know of, and I should be very sorry if there were any.

Senator TRAMMELL. Our views, then, on that are in harmony. Now, this plan that was adopted for the operations, was that along the lines that were recommended by you? I mean as finally adopted by Congress.

Admiral FISKE. Yes; with the change which I specified.

Senator TRAMMELL. You stated in your testimony, I think, that it was adopted in appearance, but not in substance.

Admiral FISKE. The recommendation as regards the exclusive duty, yes. In my testimony of March 24, 1916, I pointed out the advisability and the great value of having at least 15 officers put back, and I went into that at great length. It was finally put into the bill, and I thought for a long while that it was put in as I had suggested; but, as a matter of fact, instead of being for the exclusive duty ofmaking war plans, it said for the exclusive duty of assisting the Chief of Naval Operations in his duties. His duties, of course, were multifarious, so they were not ordered for the exclusive duty of making war plans.

Senator TRAMMEL. The plan you originally suggested was that something on the order of the British Admiralty?

Admiral FISKE. Somewhat, but yet quite different.

Senator TRAMMEL. Along that line?

Admiral FISKE. The idea, Senator, was that war plans were very important things. Now, I had known Mr. Hobson for years, knew him when he was a young man. He is a graduate of the Naval Academy, graduated at the head of his class, a very brilliant man. I convinced Mr. Hobson of the desirability of having some legislation whereby no matter who was Secretary of the Navy, leaving out his personality altogether, there should be a machine made whereby a naval officer should be made responsible, just as the captain of a ship is responsible. The captain of the ship is held responsible for results. And the way this was framed was that the Chief of Naval Operations should be responsible for the readiness of the Navy.

Admiral Mayo testified yesterday, as I see in the papers to-day, that the Chief of Naval Operations did not now have, under the law, the responsibility and power which he ought to have in order to be sure that the Navy would not, from any accident of any kind whatever lapse into unpreparedness, and that was explained to the House committee by me, and the House Committee on Naval Affairs made a very positive recommendation after long and mature deliberation.

Senator TRAMMEL. You are referring to Hobson, of *Merrimac* fame, and later a Member of Congress, are you?

Admiral FISKE. Yes, sir.

Senator TRAMMEL. At the time that you recommended additional enlisted men, do you know whether or not along about the same time the Secretary made a recommendation of some 14,000 or 15,000 additional enlisted men?

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Admiral FISKE. I do not remember that. What date was that?

Senator TRAMMEL. I think it was probably in 1916.

Admiral FISKE. I am, of course, referring to the fall of 1914.

Senator TRAMMEL. This was within a few months, I think, after you stated that you had recommended 20,000 men.

Admiral FISKE. Of course, this recommendation was for adoption by the House. It was a recommendation to the Congress that met in December, 1914.

Senator TRAMMEL. You do not know what recommendation, if any, the Secretary made in regard to increasing the enlisted personnel at that time, and along about the same time that you were making that recommendation?

Admiral FISKE. The Secretary did not incorporate any general recommendation in his report. I do not remember the statement.

Senator TRAMMELL. You do not remember what number he recommended, if any at all, about the same time you were asking for 20,000 men?

Admiral FISKE. Nineteen thousand six hundred.

Senator TRAMMELL. Yes.

Admiral FISKE. Yes, sir; I do not think, Senator, that he recommended any. I do not think he did. That would be in December, 1914.

Senator TRAMMELL. Did Admiral Benson, as chief of operations, call to his assistance officers who had been in the War College, or not? Do you know whether any of them were men who had been in the War College?

Admiral FISKE. Oh, yes.

Senator TRAMMELL. Some of his assistants had been in the War College?

Admiral FISKE. Oh, yes; very good men.

Senator TRAMMELL. On page 530 of your book I find the following quotation:

> We did not have even a general staff, and the only man in the United States Navy who could remotely pretend to occupy the position of a naval strategist was myself. I occupied that position simply because I occupied the position of military adviser to the Secretary. I knew I was not fitted by training or experience for such a position, but I had had as much training and experience as anybody else in the Navy.

According to that statement you did not consider that yourself or anybody else was particularly qualified for the position of naval strategist at that time?

Admiral FISKE. No, sir; I did not. In fact I was sure of it.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the date of that?

Admiral FISKE. When I became aid for operations, in February, 1913.

Senator TRAMMELL. Prior to the time you went into the Navy Department in 1913. they had no chief of operations, or anything of the kind?

Admiral FISKE. They had the aid for operations.

Senator TRAMMELL. They just had the aid for operations?

Admiral FISKE. Yes, sir.

Senator TRAMMELL. That had been the former plan?

Admiral FISKE. Yes.

Senator TRAMMELL. And your idea was that the plan which had been in effect all along prior to 1913 should be changed, in accordance

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with the testimony you have given here to-day? That is, I mean you thought it should be changed according to your suggestions?

Admiral FISKE. Yes. The aid submitted was put into operations after many years of trial to have something of that kind brought about by many of the officers of the Navy, at the head of whom was Admiral Luce, and Admiral Mahan; and many others, but Luce and Mahan were the principal ones; and two boards had been appointed to consider what should be done.

As a matter of fact, nothing was done for a long time. The situation was that these various bureaus were established by law as advisers to the Secretary. Now, that system had worked pretty well when the Navy was small, when there were only a few ships, and when the mechanism of the ships was simple, and the whole machine was of a simple character; but as time went on, and armies and navies became more complex, and especially after the German victory in 1870, and they saw what a machine the military people of Germany had been about, then everybody else had to do something about it or keep out of war, or get licked; so that Admiral Luce, and afterwards Admiral Mahan and others, tried to have something brought about by which the difficulty could be overcome in a measure.

We realized we could not get any general staff, for the reason that the words "general staff" were entirely misunderstood. The idea had gotten abroad, and was in Congress, that a general staff was—well, they had different ideas. None of them knew what it was, but they thought that it was something awful; that it was something whereby the Navy or the Army could go off by itself, and they could raise cain with the country, and so forth. But all that the general staff was, it was the same thing you have in every newspaper or any other commercial organization, everywhere; you have a man who does the same thing for you, who acts as your secretary, who finds out about different things and collects information for you so as to present the question to you in a simple form. Of course, we had to have a large staff, and to have it highly trained. We were afraid to call it a ganeral staff, because we knew we could not get it and could not get anything through Congress for anything like it, so that Mr. Myer got up this scheme, which is almost identical with the scheme proposed by those boards, whereby four men, officers, for instance, would coordinate the various bureaus. For instance, one bureau would coordinate for the material bureaus.

Now, Mr. Myer did not think—I talked about it several times with him—and nobody thought, that that was final. All he wanted to do was to take that step.

The next step Mr. Myer wanted to take was to get that legalized by Congress, and he tried to do it, and he went out and could not do it. They would not legalize it.

Now, when I came into the job—excuse me, I should say the position—here, of aid for operations, especially after the experienc in the Mexican War, I thought that the machinery was wholly inadequate to handle the situation even in that Mexican trouble; that we needed more men, needed more clerks and more everything, and especially we needed something to start on; we needed war plans and needed men to get war plans started. That was the main thing, to get war plans; to get some line of action lined out in advance, so that when you are up against war, you have something to go on.

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I suppose you may have heard the story—I do not know whether it is true or not—but when France declared war against Germany in 1870 the news came to Berlin where Moltke was asleep, and they awakened him with the news, and he said, "You will find the plan in the top drawer," and then turned over and went to sleep. That is what we wanted—something like that—because it was just as in the early days out West, the man who got his gun out first was the man that had the drop on the other. That was all we wanted; so that that was the reason I wanted it, not so much changed, but amplified.

Senator TRAMMELL. You found this condition when you entered the department in the early part of 1913, prior to the induction into office of Secretary Daniels, such that you thought there ought to be a good many changes made in the Navy Department; and that was prior to his induction into office?

Admiral FISKE. Yes, in the sense that I felt that the system of aids should be extended and more of a machine there to handle the work. But of course I thought that the aid system was very much better than anything that had gone before.

Senator TRAMMELL. You thought that the plan suggested by you would be an improvement over that?

Admiral FISKE. Yes.

Senator TRAMMELL. Of course if you had not, you would not have suggested it. I do not think I have any further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. You stated in your book on page 530, that the fact was that, fit or unfit, you were the official strategist of the Navy, and that you were not fitted by training or experience for that position. Does that mean that you were not in any way familiar with naval strategy?

Admiral FISKE. It means that I was not sufficiently familiar with it. My training had been inadequate for such a position as that.

The CHAIRMAN. And also the training of every other officer in the Navy had been inadequate?

Admiral FISKE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. How long were you acting as aid for operations before Admiral Benson was made Chief of Operations?

Admiral FISKE. Two years and three months.

The CHAIRMAN. During that two years and three months you spent a good deal of time studying naval strategy?

Admiral FISKE. I certainly did.

The CHAIRMAN. So that by the time the bureau was created and the chief was appointed, you probably were better up on naval strategy than any other officer in the Navy? You had had some experience?

Admiral FISKE. Well, I ought to have been, Senator, by that time.

The CHAIRMAN. Whose duty was it to prepare a war plan? Was it entirely the duty of the bureau of operations or did the general board have any duty in it?

Admiral FISKE. You mean when I was in operations?

The CHAIRMAN. No, later on.

Admiral FISKE. The General Board is really under the office of Naval Operations, in fact, and in a sense the General Board was under me as aid for operations. Of course Admiral Dewey was at

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that time the head of that board, but Admiral Dewey at that time did not do very much work in connection with the board. Of course he was the head of the board and we all almost idolized him, and anything he wanted, if possible, we would do; but he did not take part actively in the deliberations of the board and the making of war plans was a part of the General Board, but I considered myself responsible for it the same as if I had been on the General Board in charge of war plans. Admiral Wainwright held me responsible the same way, when I was aide for operations, I was sent for; but the General Board was responsible for war plans.

The CHAIRMAN. So that the responsibility under the plan that is now in existence in the Navy lies with the Bureau of Operations for the war plan?

Admiral FISKE. Yes; but as I pointed out, the word "responsible" is not in the law. It says it is charged with the preparation of plans. Now, you may think that is a fine point. I suppose it is; but I wish to call attention to the phraseology, nevertheless. The word "Responsible" is not there.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is all, Admiral, and you may be excused.

Admiral FISKE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will adjourn until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

Admiral FISKE. May I tell the Chief of Naval Operations that I may go home?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

(Thereupon, the subcommittee, at 12.20 p. m. adjourned until tomorrow, Thursday, April 1, 1920.)

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NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

THURSDAY, APRIL 1, 1920.

UNITED STATES SENATE.
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON NAVAL AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 o'clock a. m., in room 235, Senate Office Building. Senator Frederick Hale presiding.

Present: Senators Hale (chairman), Keyes, and Trammell.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Fullam, will you take the stand and be sworn?

STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL W. F. FULLAM (RETIRED).

The witness was sworn by the chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, will you state to the committee what positions you occupied in the Navy from the time of the beginning of the World War up to the present time, and will you also give the committee any information that you have about the preparation and conduct of naval activities during the war and before the war?

Admiral FULLAM. In 1915 I was ordered to command the Pacific Reserve Fleet, and I remained in command of the Pacific reserve forces from that time until the beginning of the war.

When the war began, the commander in chief of the Pacific was sent to the Atlantic with a part of the ships, and I remained in the Pacific as commander of the forces that were held there, and I retained that command throughout the war and until the 1st of August, 1919, coordinating with the Japanese and the British forces in patroling the whole Pacific from Alaska to the Cape, my part particularly being the patrol from Alaska to the canal, but the Japanese and English commanders reporting to me their movements, as I was the senior officer in the Pacific, and I informing them constantly of the disposition and movements of my ships in order that we might all check German activities and rascalities over the whole Pacific.

Those were my duties, sir, from 1915 until I retired, practically, in 1919; and previous to that from 1913 to 1914—in February—I was one of the aids of the Secretary of the Navy at the Navy Department. In that way I was brought in touch with the administrative function of the Navy Department and with the trend of its policy, and kept in touch constantly until almost the present time.

The CHAIRMAN. That was what the committee wanted to know.

Admiral FULLAM. I prepared a file to cover this subject, sir, and they are mostly personal letters, because I found from a year's experience at the Navy Department that official letters sometimes

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were less effective than personal letters, particularly when the personal letters were written to officers with whom I was intimately acquainted, and whom I hoped I might support and encourage to help me in the work we all felt it was my duty to perform; and this file I submit, if the committee wishes it. Many of these letters are not in——

The CHAIRMAN. Are they letters to which you are about to refer in your statement?

Admiral FULLAM. Some of them I will refer to indirectly, but some of them I have in the file that I will read. Others, in addition to those, are filed here, if the committee wishes to have them.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that where you refer to a letter in the file and do not give the letter in full in your statement, the letter had best go into the record. Of course letters that you give in full in your statement will not have to go in a second time.

Senator TRAMMELL. Those to which you make no reference, there is no necessity of filing, is there?

The CHAIRMAN. No.

Admiral FULLAM. I think we can decide that as we go on, sir.

Referring to this discussion as to the naval preparedness in the Pacific from 1915 to 1918, this file shows that immediately upon taking command of the Pacific Reserve Fleet on the 15th of October, 1918, I began to recommend, and to work with the idea of getting the Reserve Fleet ready for war.

The correspondence will show that I had a constant struggle to get anything really done by the Navy Department as regards a definite policy, and as regards the personnel needed to man these vessels. The letters tell the story and indicate the reasons for the vessels not being manned when war was declared.

My caustic letter of September 14, 1916, summed up the condition as to material and showed that if something was not done to coordinate all the bureaus and make them all get busy, the ships never would be ready.

This letter of mine awakened the department and brought about the order dated September 30, which made it possible to get a start on the repairs needed to put the material of these ships in a condition for war.

No legislation concerning personnel was advocated or pushed by the Navy Department except by Admiral Palmer who did his utmost, but whose hands were tied.

It will be noted that on October 19, 1917, about 6 months after war was declared the Chief of Naval Operations recognized the work done in getting these ships ready for war and testified as to the thoroughness of the work. I will read that letter now. (Reading):

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, D. C., October 19, 1917.

From: Chief of Naval Operations.
To: Commander, Division 2, Pacific Fleet.
Subject: Report of commander, Reserve Force, Pacific Fleet, upon detachment.
Reference (*a*): Report of commander, Reserve Force, Pacific Fleet, RLW/M, June 1, 1917.

1. Reference (*a*) has just reached the department, having been delayed in transmission to the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet.

2. The department notes the energetic measures taken by the Pacific Reserve force prior to 1 June to make the vessels of the then Reserve force ready for war conditions.

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3. The excellent performance of these vessels since the mobilization of naval forces has proved the thoroughness of the preparatory work done by the Reserve force and the department desires to extend its commendation to all concerned.

W. S. BENSON.

I sent copies of that letter to all the officers who had been under my command, and who had most zealously and faithfully assisted me in the effort to get these ships ready for battle from October, 1915, until the war began.

Had the battle fleet been required to act as a fleet in actual war operations, these armored cruisers and other vessels originally in the Pacific Reserve Fleet would have been vitally necessary as scouts and screening vessels in any naval engagement. They were about the only ships we had to act as eyes for the fleet. Without them our battle fleet would have been practically blind, inasmuch as we had no battle cruisers, no modern scout cruisers, and too few destroyers.

Nearly all the letters in this file are personal. Admiral Benson was my classmate, and Blue, Palmer, Chase, Pratt, McKean, Laning, Senn, Watt, Taylor, Strauss, Earle, all of them chiefs or assistants in various bureaus had been instructed by me when they were midshipmen at the Naval Academy. I was personally fond of all of these officers, and for this reason I could write to them forcefully and with freedom of expression.

I wish to testify to the high character, zeal, and ability of all of these officers and to the belief that every one of them wished to prepare the Navy for war and did their best to that end. But their hands were tied. They were helpless, for the simple reason that it was not the policy of the Navy Department to actively prepare, or even encourage preparations for war during the years between 1913 and March, 1917. As a result of this policy of indifference the Navy was not ready for war in any respect—organization, material, or personnel. This was not the fault of naval officers or chiefs of bureaus. They all did their duty.

The United States escaped disaster, as usual, in spite of its unpreparedness, simply because the German and Austrian fleets were both bottled up, with the exception of submarines, before we entered the war and because all maritime nations joined the Allies instead of aligning themselves with the Central Powers.

On May 12, 1915, I officially requested orders to sea duty in the Pacific, and on October 15, 1915, in obedience to orders, I took command of the Pacific Reserve Fleet, which at this time comprises six armored cruisers, five of the largest and fastest protected cruisers in the Navy, and a few smaller vessels.

With the exception of the *South Dakota* (flagship), *Milwaukee*, and *Oregon*, which were anchored in San Francisco Bay in connection with the exposition, these vessels were all at Bremerton and other stations with complements of officers and men so small that they could not move.

There being no modern battle cruisers or scout cruisers and few modern destroyers in our Navy in 1915, the Pacific Reserve Fleet comprised nearly two-thirds of the vessels which were available in the event of war for scouting and screening duty in connection with the fleet. The importance of scouts, screening vessels, and fast light

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cruisers was manifest to anybody who had an intelligent conception of the most fundamental principles of naval warfare. It was plain that without such vessels, properly manned and in condition to make their maximum speed, the fleet would be practically blind and would for this reason be imperiled, or at a great disadvantage in meeting a hostile fleet properly manned and organized. This weakness was most serious, and the condition was aggravated by the fact that the Navy had a very small and wholly inadequate air service available for scouting duty, owing to the failure of the Navy Department to supply such a force even after the vital importance of the subject had been brought to the attention of the Secretary and earnestly emphasized by Admiral Fisk in my presence in 1913, when I was on duty as one of the aids to the Secretary of the Navy.

In view of this situation, it was manifestly my paramount duty to get the reserve ships away from the docks and make them ready for the important work that would inevitably be forced upon them. I had no orders or instructions to do this, but I did it of my own accord.

In further explanation of my policy and action, and to make plain my reasons for persistence as shown by me in the remarkable series of letters hereto attached, it is proper for me to emphasize the following points:

(*a*) I was convinced that we would be forced into the war for the reasons well stated in Admiral Fiske's prophetic letter to the Secretary of November, 1914.

(*b*) I knew that the Navy was fatally short of men. The General Board, in 1914, had recommended 19,000 additional men, and Assistant Secretary Roosevelt had received a statement from the Bureau of Navigation that 18,000 men were actually needed to man the Navy.

(*c*) Notwithstanding this condition, the Navy Department failed to advocate an adequate elnisted force in 1915. It advocated a certain number of men, as I recall, but not more than half, if half, of the number recommended by the General Board and Assistant Secretary Roosevelt. The constant addition of new ships increased the shortage. In this connection it is proper to state that, subsequently, in 1916, Admiral Fletcher stated that he needed 5,000 additional men in the Atlantic Fleet, and Admiral Knight, president of the War College, urged the House Naval Committee to increase the Navy by 25,000 men. That was in 1916.

(*d*) Furthermore, the necessity for the maximum effort by naval officers to secure preparedness was made perfectly plain to me by one year's experience in the Navy Department, February, 1913, to February, 1914, during which time the preparation of efficiency of the Navy for war appeared to be the last thing considered, notwithstanding the constant but vain attempts of Admiral Fiske to secure attention to vitally important measures as regards organization, personnel, material, guns, torpedoes, mines, and particularly aviation.

To my knowledge, he forgot nothing, sir.

With the exception of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy and the General Board nobody gave a willing ear to the seriousness of the situation and the Navy Department proper was exclusively busied with a routine of peace, totally indifferent to the possibility of a state of war being forced upon us.

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(*e*) The gravity of the situation was increased in the summer of 1915, possibly before that, by the practical wrecking of the aid system of organization which was designed, intelligently, to coordinate the bureaus without in any manner interfering with their interior organization. This system had been adopted as a result of the report of the Mahan-Moody Commission as confirmed by the Swift Board. I happened to be the secretary of that commission, sir, and to know all about its work. The following were the members of that commission:

Mr. Justice Moody, of the Supreme Court, formerly Secretary of the Navy.

Mr. Paul Morton, formerly Secretary of the Navy.

Judge Dayton, of West Virginia, who had served many years on the Naval Committee of the House.

Rear Admiral Evans, commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet.

Rear Admiral Luce, founder of and first president of the War College, and recognized authority on naval organization, strategy, and tactics.

Rear Admiral Folger, formerly Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance.

Rear Admiral Cowles, Chief of the Bureau of Equipment; and last but first in knowledge of the subject.

Rear Admiral A. T. Mahan, the greatest authority on naval organization and strategy in this or any other country.

It is doubtful if a commission of more competent men was ever convened to consider and report upon an important administrative question. It so happened that I had served as secretary of the Mahan Commission in 1908 and was thoroughly familiar with its proceedings and with the opinions of Admiral Mahan, whose ideas dominated the commission in its work. The admiral was at the head of the subcommittee that formulated the aid system; he believed in it absolutely as the only solution of the problem; he sought simply to coordinate and group the bureaus, the general board, and other agencies in such a manner as to secure proper control and intelligent concerted action without wrecking any existing element and without in the slightest degree diminishing the power or authority of the Secretary of the Navy.

On the contrary, the ultimate and constant authority of the Secretary was loyally and clearly recognized, and the Admiral stated in one sentence the invulnerable principle that: "The Navy Department should be so organized that it could pass from a state of peace to a state of war without a jar in the machinery." This principle, so absolutely necessary to naval efficiency and preparedness, was violated by the wrecking of the aid system advocated by Admiral Mahan. The present Office of Naval Operations, the one and only modern and effective feature of our naval organization—and let me say right here that it is a splendid feature, recognized by all naval officers as being a splendid feature—resulted from a bill formulated by Admiral Fiske and the Hon. Richmond Pearson Hobson. Their scheme was, however, somewhat modified and injured thereby, in that the Chief of Operations is not given sufficient authority, or does not use sufficient authority to properly control and coordinate the bureaus, leaving the latter to work more or less independently, with no head and no well-defined policy. This fault was clearly

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demonstrated in my vain attempt to get the Pacific Reserve Fleet ready for war, and this fact will be made plain in the correspondence hereto attached. It will be seen that Mahan's principle, "The Navy Department should be so organized that it can pass from a state of peace to a state of war without a jar in the machinery," was ignored, and that it was necessary to continuously jar every cog of the departmental machinery in order to get results in preparing our Navy for war or in operating it for several months after war was declared.

Five days after taking command at San Francisco I took the first step toward getting the reserve fleet away from the docks and preparing them for active service by writing the two letters following. I will read only a few parapraphs of each [reading]:

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF,
UNITED STATES RESERVE FLEET,
U. S. S. "SOUTH DAKOTA," FLAGSHIP,

San Francisco, Calif., October 20, 1915.

MY DEAR BENSON: I am sending you a copy of a letter just written to the Navy Department concerning the detail of apprentice seamen from the training station to the ships of the reserve fleet. This letter explains itself.

I am most anxious to keep these ships in good condition so that they may be ready when needed in the active fleet. The apprentices may be utilized for many duties that will relieve other man whose services are needed on board these ships, which are so shorthanded that the task of keeping them in all respects ready is no mean endeavor.

Sincerely, yours,

W. F. FULLAM.

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF., *October 20, 1915.*

To: Navy Department (Navigation), Washington, D. C.
Subject: Detail of apprentice seamen companies from naval training station, to ships of reserve fleet at San Francisco.

1. The commandant of the training station at San Francisco has from time to time detailed companies of apprentice seamen for special duty on board ships of the reserve fleet in emergencies. The commander in chief believes this practice to be beneficial in every possible respect, not only to the apprentice seamen themselves, but to the ships also.

2. It is therefore respectfully recommended that this practice be continued and encouraged to the utmost. Should the department view it favorably, care will be taken that the routine instruction of apprentices will be continued on board with attention to every detail, not only as regards the academic part, but the professional part of their regular course of instruction. This plan will serve to somewhat broaden the training of the apprentices and make them more efficient for general service in the fleet.

3. Having commanded two training stations and being thoroughly interested in the subject of training men for the Navy, the commander in chief will give his personal attention to this matter and assures the department that the apprentices will benefit by this plan and at the same time the ships being very shorthanded, will receive much needed assistance in the work of keeping them in readiness for active commission on short notice.

W. F. FULLAM.

This was the beginning of a veritable fight that continued daily and unceasingly until war was declared in April, 1917. The story is told in the complete file of letters hereto attached and numbered serially. If the truth concerning the unpreparedness of the Navy in every detail is desired it can be found in these letters, inasmuch as

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the conditions in the Pacific were practically duplicated in the Atlantic in every respect.

This scheme of utilizing apprentices from the training station was suggested as the only device that appeared to be possible in view of the shortage of navy personnel in the absence of sufficient personnel in the Navy. Strange as it may seem, however, this plan was at first disapproved by the Bureau of Navigation presumably because it might interfere with the educational and academic principle of making the Navy a "great university" instead of a primary fighting service.

In a letter dated November 20 (letter No. 3) I requested a reconsideration, and on November 29, 1915, the bureau with some reluctance granted my request with certain reservations by the Secretary (letters No. 4 and 5).

With the aid of the apprentices I moved my three ships to San Diego and immediately wrote to the department suggesting that all ships of the reserve fleet should be supplied with sufficient officers and men to enable them to move and join the commander in chief, thus testing them out and enabling me to prepare them for active service; and I requested information as to the department's policy.

In a letter dated February 10 (see letter No. 6) the department encouraged me very much by approving my suggestions and asking me for a "schedule of movements" to carry out the scheme.

On February 18 I addressed the following letter to all commanding officers as the most important step in preparing these ships for war [reading]:

SAN DIEGO, CALIF., *February 18, 1916.*

To: Commanding officers, all vessels, Pacific Reserve Fleet.
Subject: Increasing fighting efficiency of ships.

1. As it is desired to bring the ships of the fleet up to the highest possible standard of efficiency for service, commanding officers are directed to make a careful study of the present condition of the following installations on board their respective ships: (*a*) Guns and mounts; (*b*) gun sights; (*c*) fire control; (*d*) torpedoes, tubes, etc.; (*e*) searchlight and searchlight control; (*f*) radio; and to make such recommendations to the commander in chief as they see fit toward the improvement of the installations and their appurtenances, having in mind the fighting value of the ships.

2. Information is specially desired as to any recent improvements that have been made or authorized, such as the installation of new and up-to-date equipment, and as to the present state of efficiency of that now installed.

3. As much expedition as consistent with the subject is desired.

W. F. FULLAM.

That was to start my commanding officers to work with me; and start they did. Every officer out there worked his heart out, night and day, under very discouraging circumstances, to get those ships ready for war.

On February 19, 1916, the reserve fleet was short 600 men of reserve complement, as shown by the attached memorandum; shortage, with few officers on board, made it impossible for many of these ships to move. This memorandum is incorporated here showing the reserve complement of each ship, and the shortage.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be put in the record? Is it right here in the record?

Admiral FULLAM. It is in my file.

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(Memorandum referred to is here printed in the record as follows:)

Enlisted men in the Pacific Reserve Fleet, on Saturday, Feb. 19, 1916.

Ship.	Complement.	On board.	Vacancies.	Excess.
Colorado	313	231	82	
Maryland	313	376		63
Pittsburgh	313	128	185	
South Dakota	313	257	56	
West Virginia	313	216	97	
Charleston	260	191	69	
Milwaukee	260	221	39	
Saratoga				
St. Louis	260	191	69	
Albany	120	101	19	
Oregon	296	255	41	
Total	2,761	2,167	657	63

Total number of men short	594
Average per ship	59.4

Admiral FULLAM. On February 23, 1916, in reply to the department's letter of February 10, 1916, asking for suggestions, I forwarded a letter (see letter No. 7) giving at length a complete statement of the measures necessary to carry out my plans as well as the department's declared policy. Special attention is called to this letter, which is too long to quote in full. It will be noted that it covered every possible detail as follows: (*a*) Need of a permanent policy; (*b*) maneuvers and drills of all kinds at sea; (*c*) importance of supplying personnel; (*d*) absolute necessity for providing more officers in the Navy by increasing flag officers, captains, and commanders; promoting lieutenant commanders and lieutenants; graduating two classes from the Naval Academy; establishing a three years' course at the academy; largely increasing officers; employing retired officers; promoting chief petty officers, etc.

In paragraphs 11, 18, 22, and 26 the commander in chief specially sought to awaken the department as follows. Remember that this was in reply to the department's request that I submit suggestions in reference to the carrying out of their own policy [reading]:

In the above connection, however, the commander in chief is constrained to submit that the success of the whole plan depends absolutely upon the assignment of a sufficient complement of officers and men to the reserve ships. If a sufficient complement is not provided the plan will assuredly fail. There is no alternative.

The question of personnel is so important and the effect of leaving ships shorthanded is so discouraging and depressing, despite every effort of a commander in chief to inspire zeal and interest, that it would be a neglect of duty not to invite serious attention to the matter—it is the one and only key to enthusiasm and efficiency in any fleet.

The commander in chief has done everything in his power in urging officers and men to a high standard of duty even with short complements and other discouraging conditions, there having been no tendency to encourage complaints or grievances as to existing conditions as to personnel.

The above letter was followed up the next day, February 24, 1916, by a letter to Admiral Blue (see letter No. 8) in an endeavor to impress him with the situation and the importance of really doing something. Paragraph 6 of this letter should be noted, as follows:

If Congress would do something and do it right away, we could get busy and do something. I am convinced that the suggestions made in my letter, if approved,

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would secure several hundred junior officers within the next few months and give us enough captains and commanders to do naval work in a proper and dignified manner. This is the key to the whole situation, and if the Navy Department does nothing in this line all plans and schemes to improve the efficiency of reserve ships—not to say other ships—will simply remain on paper.

It is, perhaps, needless to say that no action whatever was taken by the Navy Department. Not one of the suggestions made in my letter was favorably considered. The Navy Department did practically nothing. It did not lift a finger nor initiate any measure to carry out its own policy as outlined in its letter of February 10. In other words, that letter remained a mere "scrap of paper"—nothing more. The department continued to shuffle the same old cards and accomplish nothing.

On March 6, 1916, the Bureau of Navigation addressed to me the attached letter [reading]:

NAVY DEPARTMENT, BUREAU OF NAVIGATION,
Washington, D. C., March 6, 1916.

DEAR ADMIRAL: Your letter of February 24 has been received. Rear Admiral Blue is on leave, therefore, I am answering it.

I regret we can not give you the officers and men necessary to put your excellent scheme into effect. There are no officers of the rank of commander available, and the only way to get officers below the rank of commander would be to take them from the battleships of the Atlantic Fleet, which, of course, would not be practicable. In regard to the men, we have got to provide crews for the *Nevada*, *Oklahoma*, *Pennsylvania*, *Wainwright*, 12 submarines within the next six months: and in addition to that the Naval Academy practice squadron will have to be filled up, so the situation is rather hopeless from our point of view. However, we will do the best we can.

With kind regards, I am, very sincerely, yours,

J. H. DAYTON.

Admiral W. F. FULLAM, United States Navy.
United States Pacific Reserve Fleet,
U. S. S. "Milwaukee," San Francisco.

Special attention is called to this letter inasmuch as it declares that the Bureau of Personnel could not assist in carrying out the scheme of the commander in chief, which had been approved by the Secretary of the Navy in his letter of February 10. In other words, Operations and Personnel did not or could not cooperate. There was no policy at the Navy Department which made it practicable for them to cooperate in manning ships in preparation for war. This letter admitted that there were not enough men or officers in the Navy to man the ships then in commission, and none forthcoming to man 3 new dreadnoughts, 7 new destroyers, and 12 new submarines. As stated in this letter the situation was in truth "rather hopeless." This condition confirmed the soundness of the opinion of the General Board, Admiral Fletcher, Admiral Knight, and others, that 25,000 more men were needed to supply the Navy.

On March 8 I addressed the attached letter to Admiral Benson [reading]:

UNITED STATES PACIFIC RESERVE FLEET,
U. S. S. "MARYLAND," FLAGSHIP,
San Diego, Calif., March 8, 1916.

MY DEAR BENSON: I inclose for your eye a copy of a letter just written to Blue. I have been impressed during the past year or two with the fact that letters like this are not very much encourage and are often ignored or unanswered. Of course I do not want to nag people with letters and suggestions, but it is very easy to say nothing and do nothing in cases of this kind.

I am impressed with the need of a grand rally to create some real interest and enthusiasm all along the line. We need a surplus of officers and men just as quickly as

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we can get them. If we could man all our ships and keep them moving, we will, at least, do some training of the personnel that will prepare us for an emergency.

Sincerely, yours,

W. F. FULLAM.

Rear Admiral W. S. BENSON, United States Navy,
Chief of Naval Operations,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

On March 10 I addressed the attached letter to Admirals Blue and Benson [reading]:

UNITED STATES PACIFIC RRSERVE FLEET,
U. S. S. "MARYLAND," FLAGSHIP,
San Diego, Calif., March 10, 1916.

MY DEAR BLUE (and BENSON): I am sending herewith a copy of a letter received from Tozer, who commands the *South Dakota*. It has several commends and some information which I think you may wish to know.

It is a pity that we can not get officers and men right now to put these ships in commission and begin moving them about for training purposes. Is it not possible to get immediate legislation now along the lines of the personnel bill which will authorize immediately the employment of retired officers, double the number of gunners and boatswains, and authorize the immediate enlistment of men. These things would all put new life into the service afloat; everybody is anxious to do something, but many of them are inclined to throw up their hands and say, "What's the use?" We are powerless.

I shall try to do everything possible with the material at hand, and with the assistance of Andrews we can utilize apprentice seamen in a manner that will help tremendously in putting hope into these ships.

Sincerely, yours,

W. F. FULLAM.

Rear Admiral VICTOR BLUE, United States Navy,
Chief of Bureau of Navigation,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

The CHAIRMAN. These letters were in 1916?

Admiral FULLAM. In 1916; yes. These last were dated March 10, 1916, one year—13 months—before we entered the war.

On March 20 I addressed a letter to Admiral Benson (see letter No. 9) repeating the suggestion to graduate midshipmen after three years. Special attention is invited to the last paragraphs of this letter, as follows:

The general feeling of satisfaction and hope inspired by the proposition to move these reserve ships indicates the great good that will result if you adopt a new scheme—use reserve ships to train men and young officers for the active fleet and by so doing keep the reserve ships moving. It is a knife that cuts both ways.

Why should we not get busy and adopt emergency measures in an emergency?

It is easy to sit still and do nothing—altogether too easy; and this is my reason for making these suggestions to you. Reserve ships alongside a dock deteriorate and all officers and men employed on board such ships deteriorate also. The whole thing is bad and it is time to stop it.

It is submitted that this letter to Admiral Benson outlined a scheme which could have been and should have been immediately adopted by the Navy Department as a practical means of preparing the Navy for war at no expense to the Government. And it is ventured that Admiral Benson would gladly have adopted the scheme, I am sure he would, had it been approved by the Navy Department which resisted all plans to shorten the course at the Navy Academy or to take any steps whatever to increase the officers of the Navy until war was actually upon us. In this connection attention is invited to Admiral Benson's significant letter of March 28 (read) in reply to mine (see letter No. 10), which concluded with the words "the effort

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you are making to build up the readiness of the Pacific Fleet is appreciated."

I knew Admiral Benson appreciated those efforts.

No further evidence is needed to prove that the Navy Department took no steps whatever up to April, 1916, to provide officers necessary to place the ships of the Navy in condition for active service.

In the meantime, confronted with, and anticipating, the trying situation as regards men the commander in chief conceived the scheme and suggested to the Navy Department that apprentice seamen at training stations be sent to reserve ships after two instead of six months' training, their instruction to be continued on board ship. After being twice disapproved by the department, this suggestion was finally approved by the Bureau of Navigation, as stated by Admiral Blue in his letter of April 1. (See letter No. 11.) It will be noted that Admiral Blue stated that he was considering other suggestions of mine looking to an increase of officers, that a few more Warrant officers had been appointed, and asking me for further suggestions along these lines. It will also be noted that this scheme of assigning apprecntices to ship after two months' training was only approved by the Secretary of the Navy with the understanding that the academic instruction would be continued on board ship.

On April 8 I addressed a letter to Admiral Blue concluding with the following paragraph:

I can not too earnestly impress you with the fact that a very bad condition exists as regards personnel, and the sooner you get the ships in full commission with complete complements of officers and men, the better it will be." (See letter No. 12.)

On April 10, 1916, I addressed to Admiral Benson a letter (letter No. 13) calling attention to the need for skilled men, torpedo personnel, and additional officers. Not a day passed, sir, that I did not write a letter to somebody.

Paragraph 4 of this letter merits attention:

I can not too earnestly impress you, my dear Benson, with the immediate necessity for training our personnel with all kinds of weapons. When I inspect the crews and note the youth of most of the apprentices, I can not but wonder how long it will take to develop them into material that will answer the requirements of war.

After emphasizing the need of an immediate increase of officers, the letter concluded as follows:

The effect upon the Navy would be electrical, and it would do nothing more than provide for emergencies of the next few years. Really, Benson, we must look ahead to do things quick. I inclose a copy of my last letter to Blue. I hope I am not nagging you. It would be easy for me to say and do nothing.

I am sure that Admiral Benson agreed with these suggestions, but he was powerless to overcome the inertia of the Navy Department, which gave little thought to preparing the Navy for war.

On April 12, 1916, I addressed to Admiral Blue a letter (see letter No. 14), from which the following is quoted:

I am at sea with the *Maryland*, training for target practice. A tour of the decks and turrets, with few men and hardly an officer in sight is impressive. For heaven's sake get officers and men as quick as you can and by every means in your power. We must train them for the future and do it now. * * * We should take a tremendous brace along all military lines and get every officer, every man, and every ship on the move and sheer up generally.

Admiral Blue wanted to do things, but he was as powerless as Admiral Benson to move the Navy Department to action.

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On April 14, 1916, I addressed the attached letter to Assistant Secretary Roosevelt concerning the "hearing" before the naval committee. Mr. Roosevelt was always anxious to forward measures for the fighting efficiency of the Navy.

Like his namesake of glorious memory, he seemed to regard the Navy as the first line of the Nation's defense, and he wanted to see it ready. [Reading:]

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET,
U. S. S. "MARYLAND," FLAGSHIP,
Drill Grounds Off San Diego, Calif., April 14, 1916.

MY DEAR MR. ROOSEVELT: I was delighted to read your "hearing," and to note what you said about personnel.

I inclose for your eye some correspondence with Blue and Benson on the subject of personnel, and the means of increasing officers and men just at present.

My suggestions about shortening the training of apprentices ashore, and getting them on board ship was turned down at first, but I am glad to say that Blue finally changed his mind, and we will now get these lads afloat and hustle them on practical work.

In my letter to Blue of March 16, I referred to suggestions made to Blue about getting more officers, and I am pleased to note that Blue is considering these questions also.

The sooner we get busy training additional officers and men the better it will be, and I hope there will be a steady improvement and no more backward steps in this respect.

Please believe me, faithfully yours,

W. F. FULLAM.

Hon. FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT,
Assistant Secretary of the Navy,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

The CHAIRMAN. What was Admiral Blue's position at that time?

Admiral FULLAM. He was chief of the Bureau of Navigation. I should have stated that.

I wrote to Mr. Roosevelt instead of writing to the Secretary of the Navy, although I had been the Secretary's aid for a year, and I did it because the Secretary himself, though he was most agreeable and kindly to me, and I was very fond of the Secretary of the Navy in the early days, and I hoped he would take the proper view of the Navy, yet I could not write to him about this subject, because I felt that he was not interested in it, and so I wrote to Mr. Roosevelt.

In May, 1916, I addressed to Admiral Blue a letter (No. 15) asking for more officers and concluding with these words:

I wish you would consider this plan promptly and let me know whether I am to bother myself with such matters as these any more. It is very easy to go along in the Navy and carry on a routine. It seems to me that now is the time to encourage everybody to think and try to do something.

It is pertinent to state right here that, to my personal knowledge, the Navy Department did nothing but carry on a routine—and a peace routine at that—at a time during 1916 and the first months of 1917, when war was practically inevitable. Not a move of any consequence was made to prepare the Navy for war. It is plain that naval officers who followed the same supine policy would have been guilty of criminal neglect of duty to the Navy and to the country.

On June 10, 1916, I addressed to Admiral Blue the letter No. 16, from which the following is quoted:

There is only one solution—get every ship filled up as soon as possible with officers and men and begin a thorough military system of administration and discipline with every attempt to infuse enthusiasm and spirit into everybody.

I have been in the department a year and I know the difference between plans on paper and the actual doings of officers and men in the fleet itself. The last counts most and tells the whole story. If we fail to recognize this fact we will neglect our first duty.

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It is pertinent to remark at this point that if the department had any plans at all they must have remained on paper.

There was no evidence in the Pacific of any intent to prepare the Navy for war.

On June 17, 1916, I addressed the attached letter to Admiral Benson.

I will say here, sir, that I have 12 flagships in the Pacific. I took one at a time, with my impedimenta and my staff, and went abroad and tried to key it up; and then I moved the whole outfit to another one and made a frantic struggle to get that keyed up. [Reading:]

UNITED STATES PACIFIC RESERVE FLEET,
U. S. S. "PITTSBURGH," FLAGSHIP,
San Diego, Calif., June 12, 1916.

MY DEAR BENSON: I received your letter of the 29th and am delighted that the latest cruising schedule has been approved. Of course it has been my idea to get these ships and crews ready for active service—which is, I suppose, the first duty of the commander in chief of the reserve fleet. I have no complaints to make when ships are taken away from active duty.

I inclose for your eye copy of a letter to Blue. Of course the personnel and ships are very much tangled up, but we can not have efficient ships without a personnel—even reserve ships. That is why I am sending this letter to you.

I will not repeat what I have said about conditions on this coast.

I note that you have not answered or even mentioned my letter of May 13. Of course I regret this somewhat, and do not exactly understand your attitude or reason. It is not my desire to annoy you with letters or to take up your time unnecessarily and as soon as I know your attitude, both personal and official, I will know what to do in the future.

Personally, I believe in writing frankly and fully to the department concerning conditions as they are, and I never hesitate to call a spade a spade. It seems to me of late years there has been too much secrecy, too little frankness, and too little enthusiasm or cooperation, and things have run too much on a personal basis instead of with the idea of rallying everybody and utilizing everybody's brains and good will.

I have written letters to the department which I deemed and knew were very important, but they have sometimes been ignored completely. I think this has been the tendency of late years, and I think it is very unfortunate.

I wish to repeat that, in my opinion, unless there is a tremendous revival as far as the Navy is concerned, in the Pacific coast, a condition of war would find things in a state of absolute pandemonium and inefficiency—unreadiness instead of preparedness in every essential that counts in actual warfare.

Sincerely, yours, W. F. FULLAM.

This letter was not intended as a criticism of Admiral Benson. It was a criticism of our departmental policy. Benson was my friend and classmate and I could speak to him with perfect frankness. It was for this reason that I wrote many personal rather than official letters. The latter were too often ignored, pigeonholed, and forgotten. It is pertinent to state at this point that the condition mentioned in the last paragraph of this letter, namely, "a condition of war would find things in a state of absolute pandemonium and inefficiency—unreadiness instead of preparedness in every essential that counts in actual warfare"—was fully realized when war was finally declared in 1917.

On June 15, 1916, I addressed the following official letter to the Navy Department [reading]:

FULL POWER RUN OFF,
San Diego, Calif., June 15, 1916.

To: The Secretary of the Navy (Operations).
Subject: Condition of reserve ships as to personnel.

1. The department is informed that on June 3 the five armored cruisers of the reserve fleet were short of their reserve complements by 286 men, an average of 57 men for each ship. The total shortage in the reserve fleet was 403.

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That was the reserve complement. That brought the actual complement on board down below 30 per cent, I think, or about 30 per cent. [Continuing reading:]

2. There were about 400 apprentice seamen under training in reserve ships, but these men are inexperienced, and although they help with deck work, they can not fill the places of trained men, and they can not be rated until after the passage of the appropriation bill.

3. Every effort will be made to keep reserve ships in proper condition if possible with reduced complements, but these vacancies should be filled as soon as practicable.

4. This report is sent to Operations, inasmuch as the shortage of personnel affects the cruising efficiency of reserve ships.

W. F. FULLAM.

On July 5, 1916, the Bureau of Navigation addressed the attached letter to me. This was after efforts for nine months [reading]:

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
BUREAU OF NAVIGATION,
Washington, D. C., July 5, 1916.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL: Replying to your letter of June 20, I regret that it is impracticable to send any additional officers to the reserve ships unless mobilization takes place and retired officers are ordered to duty and officers from shore are ordered to sea.

Sincerely, yours,

VICTOR BLUE.

Rear Admiral WILLIAM F. FULLAM,
United States Navy, Commander Reserve Force, Pacific Force.

This letter appeared to blast the last hope that officers would be be supplied sufficient to keep reserve ships away from the docks. But the force commander determined to continue to fight with the officers available and with the assistance of 10 ensigns assigned to his ships at his request from the graduating class of 1916. Accordingly the force order of July 13, 1916, was issued to the commanding officers of all ships, demanding of them renewed exertions and a high standard of training and discipline with the existing personnel. (See letter No. 17; read.)

In the meantime the scheme suggested by me, of having apprentices in my ships, was being carried out and it was by this means, and by this means alone, that I was enabled to fairly drag four armored cruisers away from the docks at Bremerton and join Admiral Winslow and afterwards cruise on the Mexican coast with Admiral Caperton when war with Mexico was threatened in the summer of 1916. Both Admiral Winslow and Admiral Caperton gave me and my officers full credit for this accomplishment which, as shown by previous paragraphs in this letter, would never have been possible had the Navy Department been left to itself. It was accomplished in spite of every obstacle and every possible discouragement. I will not read that letter, but it told them to work all the harder and not to expect additional men or additional officers, because they would not reasonably expect it; we did not have them: and they must not get discouraged but must continue to work. That is the gist of it.

In the meantime the question of repairs and material readiness of these ships, as well as question of personnel, had been pushed with the bureaus and with Capt. Coontz at Bremerton and Capt. Bennett at Mare Island. Both of these officers and their assistants gave me every possible support, but I discovered that their hands were tied for lack of material or funds and because there was no policy at the

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Navy Department concerning these ships, thus leaving the bureaus to act not at all or with no concert. On this connection attention is invited to Capt. Coontz's letter of July 24, 1916 [reading]:

COMMANDANT'S OFFICE,
Navy Yard, Puget Sound, Wash., July 24, 1916.

Rear Admiral W. F. FULLAM, United States Navy,
Commanding Reserve Force, United States Pacific Fleet,
U. S. S. "Colorado." Care Postmaster, San Francisco, Calif.

DEAR ADMIRAL FULLAM: 1. I am just in receipt of your letter of July 10, 1916. I regret to state that owing to the shortage in machinists and shipfitters and the fact that we are very much cramped for funds, I found it necessary to request the department that the date of completion of the U. S. S. *West Virginia* be made August 26. The department has granted this request and so set the date. While we were about it, however, we found that we could complete all of her repairs by that date, including the directorscope, so that all that will be necessary to have her in final condition will be the installation of the catapult, which is due about October 15, 1916.

The *Saratoga* is suffering from the same conditions—lack of machinists and lack of funds, and these will continue until the appropriation bill passes. To-morrow we expect to lift the turrets of the *Saratoga* and determine the conditions as to her tracks, and will then be able to settle on a definite completion date.

The *St. Louis* got away the 21st for Honolulu. The *New Orleans* is at Sitka with the Naval Reserves, and the *Vicksburg* is ready to take the second batch out on August 10. From what the press states it looks as if the *Colorado*, *Pittsburgh*, and other vessels would shortly be available for taking out the civilians on August 15.

Starting up of new shipbuilding plants and scarcity of material have caused our recent troubles here, but we hope that they will soon end.

Sincerely,

R. E. COONTZ.

Capt. Coontz did his very best.

A vigorous correspondence had taken place between me and the commandants with their most cordial cooperation, and this continued up to the declaration of war, the only trouble being to get funds, labor, material, etc., all of which should have been provided in 1914 and 1915, before the stress of approaching war came upon the country. In other words, the delays in the fall of 1916 were the natural consequence of previous inaction by the Navy Department and its failure to act upon my repeated suggestions as to the value of these ships.

In the meantime, Admiral Blue had gone to sea and Admiral Palmer became Chief of Bureau of Navigation. He found the Navy short of officers and men with no adequate provision and no determined attempt by the Navy Department to supply the defficiency. On August 4, 1916, Admiral Palmer addressed the attached letter to me [reading]:

NAVY DEPARTMENT, BUREAU OF NAVIGATION,
Washington, D. C., August 24.

To: Commander, Reserve Force, Pacific Fleet.
Subject: Completion of *West Virginia's* repair period; preparations of that ship for joining the Reserve Force in crusing exercises.

1. The Bureau has, at present, the following commissioned officers on the ships of the Reserve Force:

Maryland	7	South Dakota	7
New Orleans	1	West Virginia	4
Pittsburgh	8		
Saratoga	1	Total	28

2. This gives an average of about five per ship. This is the maximum that can be allowed until the department releases sufficient personnel by placing ships out of commission.

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In other words, I could only have, as a maximum, five officers on a 14,000-ton ship; and the only scout cruisers we had in the Navy, unless ships were placed out of commission. [Continuing reading:]

3. In the meantime recommendation is requested of the commander, Reserve Force, for nominations of officers from those ships of his command having more than five commissioned officers for their further transfer to the *West Virginia* and *Saratoga*.

4. There is no additional enlisted personnel available for fitting of the *West Virginia* and the *Saratoga*. It is requested that such men as are necessary be requested from the commander in chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

L. C. PALMER.

The hopelessness of the situation that confronted Admiral Palmer is shown by the fact that he could allow only four officers for each of my ships "until the department releases sufficient personnel by placing ships out of commission"; and he declared that no enlisted personnel could be made "available for fitting out the *West Virginia* and *Saratoga* at the Bremerton yard.

It is proper to state at this point that Admiral Palmer attempted to assist me, and he apparently made powerful efforts to get an increase of officers and men for the Navy, and to secure the graduation of midshipmen after three years at the Academy. But he, too, found his hands tied by the department's policy of inaction along these lines.

The instruction of apprentice seamen on board my ships, after two months at the training station, having enabled me to get the ships away from the docks I now requested the department to curtail the courses at the training stations to one month in order to expedite the preparation of my ships for war. But it was only with reluctance that the Secretary had curtailed the course to two months, and I was not surprised therefore to receive the attached letter from Admiral Palmer under date of August 28, 1916 [reading]:

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
BUREAU OF NAVIGATION,
Washington, D. C., August 28, 1916.

To: Commander, Reserve Force, Pacific Fleet.
Subject: Training of apprentice seamen in reserve ships.
References: Your letter No. 486, WGG–S, of August 18, 1916.

1. The present course of two months' instruction at training stations can not be reduced unless congestion occurs at the stations, in which case your recommendations will be given careful consideration. The schedules of training of apprentice seamen in effect in your force meets the approval of the bureau, and your reports of the efficient aid this personnel has rendered the Pacific Reserve Force are gratifying.

L. C. PALMER.

In this letter it will be noted that Admiral Palmer appreciated the service rendered by training afloat.

The need of engineering officers in the work of preparing the armored cruisers for their maximum speed, which would be demanded under war conditions was urgent, and I accordingly addressed the following letter to the Chief of Bureau of Steam Engineering to enlist his assistance:

SAN DIEGO, CALIF., *September 4, 1916.*

MY DEAR GRIFFIN: I wish you would personally glance over the attached correspondence, which explains itself.

I am sure you will not misinterpret my action, for I know that we are short of officers in the Navy; but there must be a few qualified officers in these armored cruisers or they can never be made ready for service.

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It was only by persistence (after being turned down twice) that I got enough apprentice seamen on board to get these ships away from the dock. Having done so, I am now anxious to keep them in proper condition. This can not be done if they compel me to cruise too much and give me no engineer officers. I never cry for help if I am given reasonable support and authority.

It has been my ambition to get these six armored cruisers (including the *West Virginia* and *Saratoga*) into shape while training and developing their crews at the same time. I only ask for apprentices and a few engineer officers—that is all.

Bowen is now doing the work of about three men. If he can be relieved as engineer of this ship and can concentrate on his staff duty, we may accomplish something. It is an important matter.

Sincerely, yours,

W. P. FULLAM.

ROBERT S. GRIFFIN,
Engineer in Chief, Chief of Bureau of Steam Engineering,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

Special attention is invited to the declaration: "There must be a few qualified officers in these armored cruisers or they can never be made ready for service." When it is remembered that six months before war was declared the only cruisers in the Navy that could make 20 knots sea speed were unmanned, unofficered, and unready for full-speed trials, the situation could only be considered most amazing in the annals of naval unpreparedness.

On September 7, 1916, I addressed the letter No. 18 to Admiral Palmer. Special attention is called to the following:

If these armored cruisers are to be ready when called upon—and they are the only cruisers we have—there are three things that must be kept in good condition: (1) Boilers and engines; (2) guns; (3) torpedoes. I assure you that I have struggled hard with this problem with the minimum of assistance as regards officers and men, and I shall continue to do so and to avoid bothering you all I can.

The failure of the Navy Department to supply personnel up to September, 1916, to man the fleet has been fully treated in the foregoing pages. It is now important to emphasize the neglect as to material and the failure to adopt any policy that would insure the material readiness of the armored cruisers for battle.

In September, 1916, all of the armored cruisers except the *West Virginia* and *Saratoga* had been fairly dragged from the docks at Bremerton, and with scant personnel these ships had been tried out and inspected by me to detect their defects.

Right here, to illustrate, sir, I prodded the captains of these ships so constantly that they were kept on the jump, and my letters to them, I was told, were called "ginger letters"; and it seemed to me that the injection of ginger was an excellent tonic at that time; and it is the only thing in the world that ever got those ships away from those docks. Sargent took the *West Virginia* out of that channel at Bremerton steering from the steering-engine room, and with no engine-room telegraph—a thing that I do not believe any captain in the Navy ever did before, and he ought to have a medal for it. But he got that ship out of there, and then together we found out what was the matter with her, and we sent her to another navy yard and fixed her up, and she was convoying during the war.

These defects were found to be serious. The boilers were in poor condition, the fire control, director firing, and other important features were incomplete, and constant correspondence with the bureaus and commandants had proved that there was no well-defined policy, no head whatever, no control of the work of getting these ships ready for war.

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In desperation, after 11 months of unremitting work and daily correspondence, I wrote the attached letter to the department under date of September 14, 1916 [reading]:

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET RESERVE FORCE.
U. S. S. "COLORADO," FLAGSHIP.
San Diego, Calif., September 14, 1916.

To: The Secretary of the Navy (Operations).
Subject: Movement and employment of ships of Reserve Force, Pacific Fleet.
References: (*a*) Operation's letter 27772-138 Op-11 of 5 September, 1916. (*b*) Sheet 2, Mobilization Plan, "comments and suggestions useful in perfecting this sheet as requested." (*c*) Force commander's letter 505 WFF-M of 28 August, 1916.

1. Referring to the above, the following suggestions are submitted with a view to the preparation of all armored cruisers for action and dependable service, at the earliest practicable date.

2. The *West Virginia* has been at the Bremerton yard off and on for years, and other armored cruisers have been in reserve for extended periods during recent years. Notwithstanding this fact, the *West Virginia* developed troubles during her recent post-repair trial; the *South Dakota* and *Maryland* may need to have their boilers overhauled in the near future, and the fire control, radio installations, and director firing systems are not yet installed in these ships—

And those things are absolutely necessary to meet an enemy, or you will go down to the depths of the sea in the early part of the fight [continuing reading]—

the material for some of this work not being at hand.

3. It is not believed that the personnel of the navy yard or of the ships are to be blamed for this condition—it would appear that the system or policy is alone at fault. The force commander had been impressed with the zeal and energy of the personnel of the yard and the ships, but the personnel has been inadequate. At one time Lieut. Atkins, engineer officer on the staff of the commander in chief, commanded the *West Virginia* and one other armored cruiser—he was the only commissioned officer assigned to and responsible for two 14,000-ton ships. This illustrates the system which has controlled in the past. The result is logical. A decided change is necessary.

4. In suggesting a change, it is clear that correspondence must be free from circumlocution and consequent delay and inaction. The commander in chief, force commander, commandant of the navy yard, operations, navigation, engineering, and other bureaus may be involved in voluminous writing at cross purposes as regards material and personnel, and the date when these ships will be ready will be indefinitely postponed.

5. The following procedure is suggested:

(1) Decide on a policy regarding the armored cruisers.

(2) Consider and decide on the repairs of each individual ship.

(3) Assemble at once all material, boiler tubes, etc., necessary to complete each ship.

(4) Provide personnel to insure this work being properly done.

(5) Send ships to navy yard in turn as soon as the work can be pushed to completion.

6. In this connection with this subject, attention is invited to the correspondence hereto attached, especially to the letter and telegram from the commandant to the Bureau of Steam Engineering and to Operations.

7. If some definite plan is not adopted and pushed; unless there is some coordination; some one directing head, the armored cruisers will never be made ready for effective service—certainly not by August, 1917.

8. The force commander, supposing that these ships might be of some possible use pending the building of more modern cruisers has done his utmost to get them into cruising condition, and has made the necessary recommendations to this end. After being twice disapproved by the department, the suggestion to train apprentice seamen in these ships has been approved, and this plan alone made it possible for these ships to do duty on the Mexican coast. Crews of these ships have been almost exclusively self-developed in this manner, and will continue to be without asking for rated men except when absolutely necessary. Few commissioned officers have been supplied; nearly all the officers being junior in rank or newly graduated ensigns. In this respect the limit of endurance has been demanded and the chances of possible disaster have not been forgotten.

9. This letter is not a complaint. It is intended as a statement of facts, or of opinions based upon experience with the reserve force, and it is submitted for such consideration as it merits.

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10. Before considering the general policy recommended above, the following schedule of movements is submitted for immediate adoption or consideration in the absence of the commander in chief and with no opportunity to confer with him:

(1) Dock the *Colorado* at once.

(2) Send the *West Virginia* and *New Orleans* to Mexican waters to relieve the *Pittsburgh* and *Maryland*, if necessary.

(3) Send the *South Dakota* to navy yard later on, at discretion of force commander in consultation with commandant, to have her boilers thoroughly overhauled and other work completed.

(4) Following *South Dakota* send other ships as may be decided by the department.

(5) In the meantime, rendezvous at San Diego when not in Mexico, for target practice, inspection, etc.

11. This letter concludes the recommendations which the force commander has to submit regarding the preparation of these ships for war.

W. F. FULLAM.

Copies to: Navigation; Commandant navy yard, Puget Sound.

I was junior commandant then to the commander of the fleet. My status as commander of the reserve fleet had been changed to that of "force commander," which placed me under the commander of the fleet.

The CHAIRMAN. Who was commander of the fleet?

Admiral FULLAM. At that time it was Admiral Caperton. As you see, that letter continues to pound on things just like that.

I said, you see, that this letter was not a complaint. This was official, and it told the Navy Department that they had no policy, and that they had no head getting these ships ready for war.

As a result of this caustic letter, which plainly condemned the department and its policy, the following order was signed by Admiral Palmer while acting as Secretary of the Navy, directing all bureaus to get busy and do something [reading]:

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, September 30, 1916.

To: All bureaus; commander in chief, Pacific Fleet; commander Reserve Force, Pacific Fleet; commandant, navy yard, Puget Sound, Wash.; commanding officers of vessels listed:

Subject: Reserve Force, Pacific Fleet—repairs.

1. Instructions have been issued directing all authorized and necessary work be proceeded with at once on the *Colorado*, now at Puget Sound Navy Yard, and it is estimated that this work will require about two months, although no date of completion has as yet been set.

2. As soon as the *Pittsburgh* has completed target practice in the near future at San Diego she will be directed to proceed to the navy yard, Puget Sound, and upon arrival will be available for the performance of all authorized and necessary work, estimated to require about 50 days.

3. The *South Dakota* will arrive at the navy yard, Puget Sound, about November 30, when she will be available for survey and the performance of all authorized and necessary work.

4. The *Maryland*, upon the completion of target practice, will arrive at navy yard, Puget Sound, about November 30, when she will be available for the performance of all authorized and necessary work.

5. The *Colorado* and *Pittsburgh* should have all work completed by the time of arrival of the *South Dakota* and *Maryland*, and every effort will be made to accomplish the same.

6. Upon the arrival of each vessel and as soon as information is obtainable the commandant will recommend a date of completion.

7. The bureaus will take the necessary action to insure the prompt delivery of all necessary material at the navy yard, Puget Sound.

8. It is the department's desire that all work heretofore authorized or found necessary during the progress of present authorized jobs be completed as early as practicable on these ships, and when so completed that they will be in all respects ready for service at sea, with their director control, fire control, battery boilers, and engines complete in all respects and ready for active service with the fleet away from navy yards.

L. C. PALMER, *Acting.*

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This letter was prepared in the office of operations in the department of material, which showed the efficiency of that office of material in the office of naval operations. It was the one agent and the only agent that could coordinate all these bureaus and get anything done. This letter was prepared there in the office of operations in the division of material. It was directed that all these offices and bureaus should get busy.

Under a proper organization this order should have been and doubtless would have been issued a year sooner. This letter conclusively proves that a directing and ever present controlling and coordinating military head is at all times essential to the efficiency and preparedness of a military service for war. If the Secretary will not or can not coordinate all agencies nothing may be done unless he leaves the department temporarily in charge of an officer vested with the Secretary's power over the bureaus—an officer who knows what should be done and who has the energy to do things.

On October 10, 1916, I addressed the attached letter to Admiral Palmer [reading]:

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET RESERVE FORCE,
U. S. S. "COLORADO," FLAGSHIP,
NAVY YARD, PUGET SOUND,
Bremerton, Wash., October 10, 1916.

MY DEAR PALMER: I was delighted with the order, which you signed which was dated September 30, directing all bureaus to get busy and put these armored cruisers in condition.

It was the first real military control of a hopeless situation in which all bureaus were working independently with no head.

I am doing my best to get these armored cruisers ready. All the officers are working overtime, and it is the saying now, "that if an officer wants a rest, he would ask transfer from the Reserve Force to the active fleet."

I hope you were not annoyed by my request for a few more officers. It was my duty to put the case before you. If I could get two junior lieutenants and one ensign for the *New Orleans* right away, she could relieve the *Maryland* in Mexican waters in about two weeks.

The *Maryland* has measles on board and they have been four months at Salina Cruz and Manzanillo, and I know from experience that this is too long to keep them there. Both the ship and the crew will deteriorate if they are not soon relieved and I have told Benson the same thing.

Sincerely, yours,

W. F. FULLAM.

Rear ADMIRAL L. C. PALMER,
Chief of Bureau of Navigation, Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

With the signing by Admiral Palmer of the department's letter of September 30, 1916, we had the first glimmer of a departmental policy concerning the preparation of the armored cruisers for the war into which we entered six months later. And it is only the truth to state that the department would not have taken this action had it been left to its own initiative. It took this action only after 11 months of constant prodding and unceasing effort by the commander and officers of the Pacific Reserve Fleet. That was September 30, 1916, six months before we entered the war. I wish to bear testimony to the very important action and to the efficiency of the Division of Material.

Palmer did everything in his power to help. His hands were tied through no fault of his, as I believe the hands of every one of the officers in the Navy Department were tied, because the Navy Department had no policy and was not imbued with the absolute necessity of getting ready for war.

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The department's final and tardy action gave some impetus and and direction to the work of preparing ships in the Pacific. Nevertheless the work proceeded slowly, because of lack of material and funds due to previous neglect to anticipate such work.

The force commander continued to press matters and to emphasize once more the importance of personnel. In this connection attention is invited to my letter (see No. 19) of September 28, addressed to Admiral Palmer, and my letter (see No. 20) of October 11, addressed to Capt. Chase, in which the folly of employing young officers at training station teaching arithmetic was emphasized, when these officers were needed afloat.

On October 23, 1916, I addressed the attached letter to Admiral Benson [reading]:

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET RESERVE FORCE,
U. S. S. "COLORADO," FLAGSHIP,
Navy Yard, Puget Sound, Wash., October 23, 1916.

MY DEAR BENSON: Lieut. Commander Theleen, of the *Maryland*, has been sent to the hospital, and it is doubtful if he may return to the ship for a long time, if at all.

A lieutenant is now in command and doing executive duty also. They had had 48 cases of malaria within 2 weeks and have a large sick list now. As you know, I have felt that the *Maryland* ought to be relieved, and I still think it would be a very great mistake to keep her down there any longer than is absolutely necessary, and for this reason I hoped that the department could get two young officers to the *New Orleans* and let me send her south. She is a sheathed ship, and as you know she ought to be in those waters if possible.

It is a very pathetic state of affairs when we can not do the things in the Navy that ought to be done, especially when so little is needed to accomplish it.

I inspected the *New Orleans*, and she is in good condition in all the essentials.

The circular letter of September 30 encouraged me that I might succeed in getting these armored cruisers in shape. Of course you realize ships would never have gotten to Mexico at all had it not been for my insistence for manning them with apprentices. This is not a boast. It is a mere fact to say that this was accomplished after having twice been disapproved by Navigation; that is, those four ships were available in an emergency, but the Navy Department would not have made them so had it been left to itself.

After working the ships and personnel up to a state of some efficiency and enthusiasm, I should have now to have the personnel feel that they are not treated with consideration; that they are doing double duty with little reward.

I thought you would want me to let you know the actual conditions on the *Maryland;* hence this letter.

I am getting the *Colorado's* torpedoes into shape now, and when the *Pittsburgh*, *Maryland*, and *South Dakota* come here they will finish the work with theirs.

I shall peg away at this business until I find that it is hopeless or until I am told to take it easy, and let the department take all the responsibility, as it did previously.

I confess I am amazed that young officers should be kept at training stations teaching arithmetic when a ship like the *New Orleans* is helpless for the lack of two of them. Now, Navy will never amount to anything, Benson, when such absurd things are possible. I have several times made suggestions as to graduating midshipmen a little earlier, and doing something to relieve the present situation, but I have not even received the courtesy of an acknowledgement of such letters. As you know, classes were graduated ahead of time upon several occasions in the past, and as some of the officers tell me they seem to have done quite as well as those who stayed the full four years.

The last academic year is entirely practical anyway, and would be perfectly possible to employ midshipmen who were graduated in February that they would learn even more on practical lines than at the Naval Academy during these four months; and they could be required to pass a good stiff examination and have a course of study outlined for them should they leave the Naval Academy in February.

With the Naval Academy packed and jammed full, the graduating of the senior class in February would, it seems to me, relieve the situation somewhat.

Sincerely, yours,

W. F. FULLAM.

Admiral WM. S. BENSON, U. S. Navy,
Chief of Naval Operations, Washington, D. C.

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On November 21, I addressed the attached letter to the department, reporting that all ships of my force (except the *Saratoga*) had been forced away from the docks at the navy yards. [Reading:]

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET RESERVE FORCE.
U. S. S. "COLORADO," FLAGSHIP.
Navy Yard, Puget Sound, Wash., November 21, 1916.

To: The Secretary of the Navy (Navigation).
Subject: Personnel and employment of ships of the reserve force, Pacific Fleet.

1. With the departure of the *New Orleans* from the navy yard, Puget Sound, it is proper to state that all ships that were in the reserve force when the present commander took command about one year ago are either in active service or have done cruising duty in Mexican waters.

2. The activity of the reserve force in the Pacific has been made possible by the training of about 1,200 apprentice seamen, who have been distributed among these ships or assigned to active ships after completion of their training.

3. It is proper to state that the four armored cruisers could not have been sent to Mexico during the difficulties on that coast last summer, and the *West Virginia* and *New Orleans* could not have been made available for their present duties in Mexican waters, had it not been for the system of training apprentices in the reserve ships on this coast.

4. Strict orders have been given concerning the uniform and the military training of men; and preparations will be made to supply a full desk complement to the *Saratoga* as soon as repairs to that ship are so far completed that men can be properly berthed and employed on board.

W. F. FULLAM.

Copy to commander in chief.

On November 30, 1916, I addressed the attached official letter to the department concerning the vital importance of thoroughness in repairing the boilers and machinery of the armored cruisers. [Reading:]

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET RESERVE FORCE,
U. S. S. "COLORADO," FLAGSHIP,
Navy Yard, Puget Sound, Wash., November 30, 1916.

To: The Secretary of the Navy (Operations):
Subject: Boilers and machinery of *Maryland*, *South Dakota*, and *San Diego*.

1. In view of the fact that the armored cruisers will be the only scouts available for the fleet for several years to come, it is the duty of the force commander to earnestly recommend that the boilers and machinery of the above-named ships be placed in absolutely dependable condition during their next overhaul, in order that they may be ready to make their maximum speed whenever occasion demands.

2. It is submitted that false economy as regards retubing boilers and overhauling machinery might be fatal to the efficiency of these ships in an emergency, and subject the crews to possible and unnecessary danger.

3. It is believed that the *Colorado*, *Pittsburgh*, *Saratoga*, and *West Virginia* will be dependable as far as their boilers and motive power are concerned, and it therefore remains to place the *San Diego*, *Maryland*, and *South Dakota* in similar condition in this vitally important respect.

4. This matter is brought to the attention of the department at this time in order that there may be no failure to have all these cruisers in perfect condition should mobilization be required next summer.

W. F. FULLAM.

Attention is invited to letters No. 21 to No. 26 to and from the department, concerning personnel and material matters between December 12, 1916, and January 24, 1917. It will be noted that the two letters from the Secretary's office indicated more activity and that the Secretary's letter of January 24, 1917, gave to the force commander the first real proof that his efforts had been appreciated and that the department was "doing all that it can do toward the end you seek."

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As proof of the continued and zealous work by the officers of the Reserve Force to expedite the preparations for War, attention is invited to the attached circular order issued by the force commander, February 15, 1917, only two months before war was declared. [Reading:]

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.,
February 15, 1917.

To: Commandering officers all ships Reserve force, Pacific Fleet.
Subject: Concentration on important work.

1. The force commander assumes that all commanding officers are attending to the following points, but it is desired to emphasize them:

(*a*) Concentrate upon work directly affecting cruising efficiency, sea endurance, and man-of-war duty.

(*b*) Do not ask for, and if possible stop, all alterations and other work not essential to the above.

(*c*) Avoid the employment of a single navy-yard workman except upon jobs that are absolutely necessary; and cooperate with navy-yard authorities in this respect.

(*d*) Perfect as far as possible the organization for and conduct with all possible thoroughness the military instruction of the crew.

(*e*) Anticipate demands for a sudden call for the distant cruising for which these ships were intended.

2. Everybody must be made to realize that full complements of officers and men may not be available.

Officers were not excused for crying for help. [Continuing reading:]

Now is the time for everybody to hustle and do double duty without complaining.

4. This letter will be read in confidence by the commanding officer to all officers on board, and they will be required to quietly instill these ideas into their men, and inspire them to show what they are made of, and to exhibit a proper spirit—a thing that our men always do when appealed to in emergencies.

W. F. FULLAM.

I did not know what minute war might be declared, and I did not want to write a public letter, but I asked them quietly to give this to the officers and men.

On March 24, 1917, believing that war was imminent, I sent the attached radio concerning the importance of immediately recruiting the reserve force, and received the next day the department's authority to begin recruiting. My letter and the authority of the department are as follows. [Reading:]

MARCH 24, 1917.

From flag *Pueblo* to Secretary of the Navy, via N. P. G.

In view of the need of men in the Reserve Force, will the department authorize me to stimulate recruiting on this coast by stating to the press over my signature the number needed to fully man ships? I am advised that the result may be excellent. Request telegraphic reply. 14224.

MARCH 25, 1917.

From: Bu. Nav. to commander Reserve Force, via N. P. G.

14424: You are authorized to publish the fact that the President has signed an Executive order calling for an emergency increase to 87,000 enlisted men. Give widest publicity. You are authorized to state number of men needed in your force and to enlist and retain on board men to fill vacancies. 12525.

When war was declared in April, 1917, the force commander then cruising in Mexican waters, addressed the attached letter to the commander in chief, Admiral Caperton. [Reading:]

To: Commander in chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
Subject: Preparation of armored cruisers for battle.

1. After experience of a year and a half, with the aid of a zealous staff in getting the armored cruisers in a condition for war, the force commander, from a feeling of interest in this matter, submits the following suggestions from a sense of duty.

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2. The regular target and torpedo practice as planned by the force commander for these ships for the fall of 1916 and the spring of 1917 was interfered with by conditions beyond control, and the inability of the Keyport station to render proper assistance prevented proving the torpedoes of the *South Dakota* and *Frederick*.

3. Many men have been transferred or discharged from these ships since the last target practice, and a very large percentage of the man recently added to the ships' companies have therefore never seen a gun fired.

4. The complements of officers as provided for war conditions will doubtless be somewhat short, and many of them will be inexperienced and by no means up to a desirable standard.

5. It follows from the above that it may require at least six months' strenuous training to prepare the armored cruisers for battle against ships that have been properly trained.

6. To do this, it is of the utmost importance that each of these ships should have target practice with great guns, even if it may be necessary to simulate this practice at sea and fire all the guns in the daytime, simply for the purpose of giving the crews some experience and opportunity to observe. It is also of the utmost importance that they should all have an opportunity to fire their torpedoes and overhaul the plants.

7. For this reason it is suggested that these ships, as they become available, should each be based on San Diego for a short time until they can have all this practice, and at the same time place their crews on the rifle range for instruction with the rifle and revolver.

8. It is for these reasons, as well as in consideration of efficient service on the Mexican coast, that the force commander has emphasized the importance of a patrol of yachts and small cruisers in Mexican waters in order that armored cruisers may be made and kept at all times ready for the serious emergencies of war and be prepared as regards their batteries, engines, and boilers for extreme speed and battery efficiency to meet a serious emergency at short notice.

9. It is assumed that any German cruiser that might gain the sea would be manned and officered by highly trained personnel. If the only fast armored cruisers in the Navy are to be prepared to chase and attack such a ship, they should have officers of ability and skill and crews that are trained to successfully land the first salvo. This is a very serious matter. Such an engagement is more probable than an engagement between battleships at the present time. Such a contingency should be the one to anticipate first of all, and such ships should be prepared for it, even at the expense of ships that may not have a chance to fight at all as long as the British fleet exists.

10. Armored cruisers in Mexican waters deteriorate rapidly, and, standing by constantly night and day in a warm climate, their crew soon becomes more or less enervated and listless. It is no place to train a fighting ship for battle, nor to keep its material in condition for a supreme test. In the event of a submarine menace, such a ship may be needlessly sacrificed.

11. If war with Mexico is not anticipated nor contemplated, therefore, it is my duty to emphasize the fact that armed yachts are of more use than armored cruisers on the Mexican coast to-day.

12. I am sending a small power boat, the *Paxinosa*, by courtesy of the owners, to investigate the report of a radio station at Angeles Bay. This is an object lesson.

13. It is assumed that these comments will be considered to be as respectful as they are intended to be and as practical as they are believed to be by an officer now on the Mexican coast.

W. F. FULLAM.

Serious attention is invited to this letter, especially to paragraph 9, in which it is stated that if one of these ships met a German ship which was fully manned it would have been in a very embarrassing position. In this connection it is pertinent to state with all emphasis that whereas all the armored cruisers except the *Saratoga* were not at sea, only one of the six—the flagship of Admiral Caperton—could be said to be ready for battle or for the strenuous conditions of war. With the exception of Caperton's flagship, these six vessels were underofficered and undermanned, with largely untrained crews. When it is remembered that the war had been in progress nearly three years it was to be expected that all enemy vessels were fully officered and manned and thoroughly trained. The battle of Jutland had

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demonstrated the high degree of fighting efficiency of the German fleet.

In view of these facts and conditions no who man has the faintest glimmer of intelligence concerning modern naval warfare and the vital importance of quick and accurate hitting in the initial stages of a naval battle can resist the conclusion that the armored cruisers of our Navy, officered and manned though they were with a personnel unequalled, we will say, in intelligence, patriotism and bravery by the men of any navy in the world would nevertheless have been at such a fatal disadvantage due to their lack of training that a battle at this time with enemy vessels manned with trained and seasoned crews could only have resulted in inevitable defeat for our ships. To claim the contrary would be to exhibit a degree of ignorance and bombast of which any American citizen or naval officer should be ashamed. It was a condition of complete naval unpreparedness for war as far as the scouts and screening vessels of the Navy were concerned.

I then wrote to the department about the completion of the *Saratoga*. On May 2, 1917, while at sea in the U. S. S. *Pueblo*, and knowing that the *Pueblo* would soon be required in the war zone, I wrote the attached letter concerning the completion of the armored cruiser *Saratoga* still under repair at Bremerton. [Reading:]

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET, RESERVE FORCE,
U. S. S. "PUEBLO" FLAGSHIP,
PASSAGE, CERROS ISLAND TO SAN DIEGO,
May 2, 1917.

To: The Secretary of the Navy (Operations) (Material).
Subject: Completion of *Saratoga*.

1. I am informed by the commandant of the Bremerton yard, under date of April 3, that he has been embarrassed for lack of funds to provide for the completion of the *Saratoga*.

2. In view of the department's confidential message "10028," and assuming that this ship may be ultimately under my command, I earnestly suggest that every possible effort be made to put her in readiness for efficient service at the earliest possible date.

3. As soon as she comes under my control an attempt will be made to drill and train her personnel to the highest state of military efficiency.

W. F. FULLAM.

The *Saratoga* was completed and became my eighth flagship in the fall of 1917. It is proper to state at this point that I at all times assisted the department by gladly sending every ship I could possibly spare into the Atlantic. Upon the receipt of a letter from Admiral Benson, October 1, 1917, that he regretted taking the *Saratoga* from me, I promptly answered his letter which is herewith attached. [Reading:]

October 8, 1917.

MY DEAR BENSON: Your letter of October 1 at hand.

Of course, I personally regret leaving the *Saratoga*, my eighth flagship—but "War is hell," and we must recognize it.

I understand the situation perfectly. If the Japanese Navy, Australian Navy, and the few English cruisers on the coast of South America are active, they should practically prevent the possibility of raiders or submarines getting around either cape into the Pacific. And, therefore, there is no reason why ships like the *Saratoga* should not go to the Atlantic, where the demands are clearly paramount.

In the meantime, I will keep the few ships here in the best possible condition, by sending them to the navy yard frequently; and with the patrol scheme in Mexico, I can hold the situation down.

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I can use colliers and even the oil barge, if necessary, to guard our interests in those ports.

I can see that if all the South American Republic stampede over to our side, as they may do, the Germans can find no bases for their operations in South America; and we will only have to circumvent them in Mexico and Central America.

With good consuls and a well-organized secret service in Mexico we can checkmate them here, with the aid of these small ships.

I have ordered the *Oregon* to San Diego and will make this my headquarters, as it is the only place under the circumstances.

I shall remain on board the *Saratoga* until after her target practice and will inspect the submarine and training station at San Pedro next Thursday; and will shift to the *Oregon* on Friday, October 12.

I do hope our Government will consider the Mexican situation and put the screws on all German rascality, and make German merchants in Mexico squeal. They are making money at our expense and using it to help Germany.

Sincerely, yours,

W. F. FULLAM.

Admiral W. S. BENSON, United States Navy,
Chief of Naval Operations,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

I was anxious to send troops to the war.

On October 19, six months after we entered the war, Admiral Benson addressed to me the attached letter of appreciation of my work on getting the armored cruisers ready for war.

This ends the story of the preparation for war in the Pacific during the two-year period from October, 1915, to October, 1917.

It is proper to state in this connection that while I had served as second in command under Admiral Winslow and Admiral Caperton, from June, 1916, to May, 1917, part of the time the work of preparing the armored cruisers and other large vessels in the Pacific devolved entirely upon me inasmuch as all these vessels except the one flagship of the commander in chief were directly under my command. Admiral Winslow and Admiral Caperton received from me the most loyal support at all times and they both gave me credit for the work our officers did.

In conclusion, it may be claimed that the following facts are established by the evidence in this correspondence:

(*a*) The Navy Department did not take the initiative in preparing the armored cruisers for war either as regards personnel or material.

(*b*) It was only after the lapse of 11 months constant effort, and after my caustic letter of September 14, 1916, that the bureaus of the Navy Department were coordinated and a policy adopted.

(*c*) The few armored and fast cruisers in our Navy would have been of great value if our battle fleet had been called upon to meet a hostile fleet in war. Every one of these ships should, therefore, have been in instant readiness with a full crew trained when war was declared. Otherwise the fleet could not act offensively and it was at a grave disadvantage on the defensive in having no scouts or screening vessels. Unpreparedness in this respect was inexcusable.

The following subjects are briefly handled in separate files to demonstrate the complete unreadiness of the Pacific forces for war. I present first the following memorandum. [Reading]:

1. Aviation in the Pacific before and during the World War.
2. Neglect of the Navy Department to prepare and develop an adequate aviation service for war in 1917, after Admiral Fiske had urged the Secretary of the Navy to establish a bureau of aeronautics in 1913.
3. Inadequate air service during the World War.

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4. Importance of aviation for a scouting duty with the fleet, especially in the absence of battle cruisers, scout cruisers, and because of the unpreparedness of the armored cruisers of our Navy.

1. In the first part of my statement concerning the unpreparedness of the armored cruisers for war it was emphasized that the battle fleet of the United States was blind for the lack of battle cruisers and scout cruisers, and for this reason the preparation of all armored and fast cruisers for scouting service was of vital importance, especially in view of the fact that our aviation service was totally inadequate to furnish seaplanes as an adjunct in scouting work in war operations. It is important, therefore, to take up the subject of aviation in connection with the conduct of the war.

2. In 1913, while I was serving as one of the aids to the Secretary of the Navy, Admiral Fiske, in my presence, called the attention of the Secretary to the immediate necessity for a bureau of aeronautics. The admiral advocated this step as the best and most economical means for the defense of the Philippines against invasion, as well as an auxiliary measure for the protection of our own coasts. In his effort to impress the Secretary with the importance of this subject, Admiral Fiske laid before the Secretary the illustrations and sketches of organization and material in the aviation bureaus of European nations.

3. Notwithstanding Admiral Fiske's efforts, which continued unremittingly until his retirement from the Navy Department in 1915, comparatively little had been accomplished in aviation before the declaration of war, and, as a result of this failure to act during a period of four years, we had only 45 trained aviators and a pitifully inadequate service in July, 1917, three months after we entered the war.

Three months after we entered the war we had only 45 trained aviators.

The CHAIRMAN. In the whole Navy?

Admiral FULLAM. In the whole Navy. That is the official statement from the Navy Department, in which it demonstrates its wonderful—and they were wonderful—efforts to expand that service after the war was on top of us. Then they did hustle, and our aviators, a few of them in Europe, did wonderful work. They could not help it. Naval officers do not know how to neglect their duty. [Continuing reading:]

4. Capt. Bristol, who had been appointed director of aeronautics, exerted himself to the utmost, but his hands were tied. His estimates in 1916 were cut down by the Navy Department from $13,000,000 to $2,000,000, Congress ultimately increasing the appropriation to $3,500,000, a sum, however, which was sadly insufficient.

5. There was no Navy aviation service whatever on the Pacific coast previous to the declaration of war, and no preparation for the prompt organization of such an important element in offensive and defensive warfare in the Pacific or elsewhere.

6. Several months after we entered the war, a young lieutenant reported to me at San Diego, Calif., and informed me that he was directed to organize a school for the elementary instruction of officers in the mechanical and other details of aviation, and that an aviation field was to be developed on North Island in San Diego harbor.

This young officer, Lieut. Spender, United States Navy, with few qualified assistants, pushed his work with all possible zeal and energy. But progress was very slow for lack of funds and want of careful plans. In the spring of 1918, nearly a year after we had been in the war, despite Lieut. Spender's efforts and through no fault of his, so little had been accomplished in the building of the aviation station that I had called the attention of the Navy Department to the situation, and Capt. Laning, Assistant in the Bureau of Navigation, who came to the Pacific on an inspection tour, sent a telegram to the department stating that conditions were not satisfactory and that unless immediate steps were taken there would be no means nor facilities for training officers and men at San Diego for months to come.

7. Ultimately a beginning was made, a few seaplanes were supplied, and training was pushed in 1918 with the limited material at hand. Very few of the aviators from San Diego got to the war zone, and very few seaplanes were available for use with our naval forces in Europe. I was personally informed by one of our aviators, and I think he was one of those who went on a cruise across the Atlantic—he was one of the best ones—that he flew the first American-built seaplane in Europe July 13, 1918, four months before the armistice was signed, and five years after Admiral Fiske had urged the Secretary of the Navy to establish an aviation bureau to develop this important service.

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Now, I know that he made that statement—that he personally flew the first American-built seaplane in Europe in July, 1918. We flew planes that we got over there, before that, of course. I would not like to make any statement here that could not be substantiated I only want to make the statement that that statement was made personally to me by the man who said that he did it. [Continuing reading:]

8. The record made by our aviators in the war zone was worthy of the highest praise. But the failure of the Navy Department to act promptly upon the recommendations of Admiral Fiske during the years from 1913 to 1917, resulted in a pathetically inadequate naval air service in the first year of the war. Had the Admiral's plans been approved by the Secretary, and had Capt. Bristol's estimates and suggestions been accepted, the Navy might have sent an air force to the war zone sufficiently strong at the beginning of the war to have attacked the enemy's aviation bases and interfered seriously with their submarine campaign.

9. The officers and bureaus of the Navy Department were in no sense responsible for our unpreparedness in aviation. The responsibility rested with the Secretary of the Navy, who cut the estimates and prevented the full development of this important element of naval warfare during the years preceding the declaration of war.

10. The naval air station at San Diego is still in process of building, nearly 18 months after the armistice was signed. Its present equipment and the number of planes now available are totally inadequate for effective cooperation with the fleet in war operations or for the defense of the Pacific.

11. When war was threatened with Mexico in 1916, Admiral Winslow was ordered with his whole force to the west coast. I accompanied him as second in command.

I had orders to prepare for possible hostilities with Mexico. I had three ports that I was required to stand by to take. [Reading:]

An aviation squadron would have been of the utmost importance at that time, but there was not a single seaplane on the Pacific coast for service with Admiral Winslow's forces; three years after, the importance of this adjunct had been brought to the attention of the Secretary of the Navy by Admiral Fiske.

Those seaplanes might have saved a great many lives if we had been forced ashore.

I present next this memorandum with regard to unpreparedness of ships from the Asiatic station and from Honolulu passing through the Pacific for the war zone. [Reading:]

UNPREPAREDNESS OF SHIPS FROM THE ASIATIC STATION AND FROM HONOLULU PASSING THROUGH THE PACIFIC FOR THE WAR ZONE.

1. It was my duty as the senior officer in the Pacific not only to fit out my own vessels for war, but to provide as far as possible for the needs of all vessels passing through the Pacific for duty in the war zone.

2. There were a number of such vessels—the *Cincinnati* and *Galveston* from the Asiatic station, the *Schurz* and *Gulfport* from Honolulu, and the *Alert* and *Albatross*, which had not been under my command.

3. I inspected these vessels and found them unready for war in every respect. They were woefully short of officers and men, and many of these ships had not had target practice or opportunity to train their crews for battle.

4. I stripped my own ships to supply officers, petty officers and men, as it was my manifest duty to do in order to contribute to the readiness of ships bound to the war zone. I did these things without orders or authority from the Navy Department; but both Admiral Palmer and Capt. Laning of the Bureau of Navigation heartily approved my action.

5. Fully recognizing the ability and zeal of the officers and men on board these vessels, it is the simple truth to declare that they were so short of personnel and so untrained for battle that had any one of them met an enemy vessel of the same class properly manned and trained its defeat would have been inevitable. It was a pitiful condition of unpreparedness. It was another proof of the great good fortune of this country that the German Fleet was bottled up, without a cruiser upon the sea. It is to be devoutly hoped that the United States will not again owe its safety to the fact

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that its enemy is completely blockaded by the fleet of Great Britain or any other friendly power. It is time to recognize the truth—even as regards naval matters.

6. Attention is invited to the letters hereto attached concerning the unpreparedness of the vessels mentioned above.

I desire also to read the following letters [reading]:

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET, DIVISION 2,
U. S. S. "Oregon," Flagship, December 3, 1917.

MY DEAR GEORGE:—Thank you for your letter of the 30th. The K boats and the flotilla—*Gulfport, Schurz, Alert* and *Nanshan*—got away. The *Nanshan* will return from Acuapico and the *Alert* will return from Balboa, unless her orders are changed.

Thank you very much for hustling things.

We will now concentrate on the *Savannah* and N boats, and I realize that you are doing everything possible to expedite their departure.

I have directed the division commander of the N boats to make all preparations necessary for their cruise. I am surprised at the small amount of Diesel engine oil and lubricating oil required by the N boats at Acapulco. The K boats required a great deal more.

I have granted the request for the N boats to proceed to San Diego, without convoy, but will stand by to help them with the *Yorktown* in case anything happens.

I can well understand your difficulties with all active officers detached. We will have similar conditions in the ships of my force. We are training reserve officers for cruising duty.

I shall write a letter to the department to-day concerning the project to make improvements and alterations in the *Brutus* and *Nanshan* and will send you a copy of the letter.

After departure of the *Savannah* and N boats there will be a small force remaining for us to keep in cruising trim.

Thanking you again,
Sincerely, yours,

W. F. FULLAM.

Capt. HARRY GEORGE, United States Navy, Retired,
Commandant, Navy Yard, Mare Island, Vallejo, Calif.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the name of that officer?

Admiral FULLAM. Capt. George, a very efficient and able officer; and the work that he did out there was wonderful.

Then I wrote a letter to Capt. Pratt, one of my officers and a very dear friend of mine [reading]:

DECEMBER 16, 1917.

MY DEAR PRATT: I inclose copy of a letter to Palmer, concerning the *Cincinnati*. It explains itself.

While I intended always to hustle ships on their way to the east coast, I consider it most important to put them in as good shape as possible as regards material and personnel before leaving here.

I am stripping my ships of petty officers and commissioned officers of the regular Navy whenever they are needed for ships going to the Atlantic.

When the *Galveston* arrives I will try to put her in good shape also.

Sincerely, yours,

W. F. FULLAM.

Capt. WM. V. PRATT, United States Navy,
Office of Naval Operations, Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

I wrote that letter to Capt. Pratt and addressed it to the Office of Naval Operations because I wanted them to realize that I was helping. They were helping me at that time, in December, 1917, and everything was going with speed. I wrote the following letter to Admiral Palmer [reading]:

DECEMBER 16, 1917.

MY DEAR PALMER: The *Cincinnati* has arrived. She is short of officers and of men too.

I have made tentative arrangements to detach two or three regular line officers from the *Yorktown* and three of the best reserve officers from the *Oregon* and send them to the *Cincinnati*.

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I will also fill the *Cincinnati's* complement of petty officers and men from my ships, so that she may start from here with a good crew.

I assume that you wish me to do this and I am proceeding with the plan to send regular officers, in excess of those absolutely necessary in my ships, to duty where they are absolutely needed.

The *Cincinnati* has been underway constantly for a month and her engines and boilers need careful attention.

The engineer force has had no rest or liberty, and I deem it absolutely necessary that she shall stay here about a week before proceeding. It will save time in the end.

Sincerely, yours,

W. F. FULLAM.

Rear Admiral L. C. PALMER, United States Navy,
Chief of Bureau of Navigation,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

P. S.—I assume that the *Galveston* may need officers and men also and I will do my best to supply her needs.

The *Yorktown*, having an excess of regulars, will be called upon to supply officers for the *Galveston* as well as the *Cincinnati*.

I wrote the following letter also to Capt. Laning [reading]:

DECEMBER 23, 1917.

MY DEAR LANING: When the *Cincinnati* arrived I found she needed assistance as regards personnel.

Brumby had made a quick trip, only stopping for coal, and he needed officers at once.

I transferred two regulars from the *Yorktown* and three reserve officers from the *Oregon*, which cheered him up.

I advised Brumby to discharge or transfer all short-time men who enlisted on this coast.

I gave him 14 petty officers, 8 signalmen and radio men, and 40 seamen, second-class, which filled his complement.

He was greatly encouraged, and said that he was better off than ever before.

The engines needed overhauling before leaving San Diego, and the crew, especially the engineer department, deserved liberty.

She has several propeller blades and about 20 tons of spare boiler parts stowed on her deck. While this does not interfere with the guns, it would be desirable to ship it from Colon to the States by collier or merchant vessel, if there is any chance of the *Cincinnati* being required to meet an enemy.

Brumby informed me that the ship had not had target practice recently and that a long interval had elapsed between the last two practices.

I would suggest that the ship be thoroughly inspected upon her arrival at Hampton Roads before she is assigned to the war zone.

Upon the arrival of the *Galveston*, will take account of her needs also.

There are two more regulars on the *Yorktown* who can be sent to the *Galveston*, if she needs them. I think that will bring all my vessels down to their authorized allowance of regular officers, and we will immediately train the personnel to obtain the best standard possible.

Orders have just come to detach the *Alert*, instead of her coming back here from Balboa. She has two officers—a gunner and a reserve officer—on board whom I sent to her to help out during her cruise to Balboa. We strive to please.

I send this to you because I suppose Palmer is overloaded and I thought you would bring the matter to his attention.

Very sincerely, yours,

W. F. FULLAM.

Commander HARRIS LANING, United States Navy,
Bureau of Navigation, Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

I have here another letter that I wrote to Capt. Laning. [Reading:]

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET, DIVISION 2,
U. S. S. "Oregon," Flagship, January 12, 1918.

MY DEAR LANING: Thank you for your letter of January 4.

Your previous letter to me concerning the *Nanshan* and *Brutus* was perfectly well justified, and I appreciated it.

I was perhaps more disgusted than discouraged. If the department does not let me handle things out here it will get into a mess sooner or later.

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The *Galveston* came in yesterday, and we are giving her everything she needs. I dd not hesitate to strip the ships of rated men to supply the *Galveston's* needs, and I required the submarine base at San Pedro to send two machinist's mates and a coppersmith, because we can fill our vacancies out here much easier than *Galveston* can.

I have taken all the *Galveston's* short timers on board the *Oregon* and *Vicksburg*. I hope most of them will reenlist.

Chadwick needed two watch officers badly, and he was below the complement assigned him by the bureau.

With these transfers of two regulars from my ships we will be about down to our final complement as fixed by the bureau.

It has been my policy to do my utmost for every ship leaving this side for the Atlantic, both as regards material and personnel.

Always sincerely,

W. F. FULLAM.

I present another memorandum, on the following heads:

1. Unpreparedness as regards torpedoes in the Pacific.
2. Difficulty of testing torpedoes of armored cruisers due to lack of personnel.
3. Lack of facilities at Keyport, the only torpedo station in the Pacific.
4. Submarines leave the Pacific for the war zone with no torpedoes or guns for offensive or defensive use.

The memorandum is as follows:

1. Early in 1916 the force commander took up the work of putting the torpedoes of the armored cruisers into condition for effective use as fast as personnel and facilities could be obtained.
2. It was found that this work was greatly hampered by the lack of personnel, and the department was asked to supply both officers and men.
3. It was discovered that the torpedo station at Keyport was lacking in facilities despite the zealous action of the commanding officers, Lieut. Commander Jenson and Lieut. Canaga who succeeded him.
4. There was no air pump at Keyport, and in testing the torpedoes the station was dependent upon the presence of an old torpedo boat to supply air. When this boat went to Bremerton for repairs all torpedo work was stopped. This was a great handicap.
5. The armored cruisers were undergunned in comparison with the battle cruisers and other vessels of the German Navy. Under some conditions, therefore, the skillful use of their torpedoes might have somewhat lessened the handicap of our ships in battle with the scouts of the enemy. At all events it was a duty to put their torpedoes in proper condition if they were to remain on board these ships.
6. There was shortage of torpedoes in the Pacific for the supply of new destroyers and submarines, and for this reason these vessels sailed for the Atlantic in many cases without any torpedoes or guns on board. It was fortunate for them that the German Navy was bottled up by the Grand Fleet of Great Britain, unless it can be demonstrated that an American ship with no weapons and with an untrained personnel can defeat an enemy properly armed and trained.
7. Owing to the insurmountable difficulties in the Pacific not more than one-half of the torpedoes of the armored cruisers had been properly proved and tested when war was declared. This was wrong, no matter whether these torpedoes were kept on board these ships or were sent to submarines or destroyers.
8. Attention is invited to the letters hereto attached, which suffice to explain the situation in the Pacific.

I wrote a number of letters concerning this. I do not think I will read them all. Here is one to Admiral Benson, dated May 25, 1916 [reading]:

UNITED STATES PACIFIC RESERVE FLEET,
U. S. S. "PITTSBURGH," FLAGSHIP,
San Diego, Calif., May 25, 1916.

MY DEAR BENSON: I have ordered the *South Dakota* and *Oregon* to proceed to Portland for the rose festival in accordance with the department's wishes.

You will realize that these ships are very short-handed, both as regards men and officers. Williams on the *Oregon* is a commander, and Tozer is the only other commander I have in the reserve fleet.

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I suggested that Tozer be ordered to take the *South Dakota* to Portland and from there to San Francisco, and that he then return by rail to Bremerton.

I consider it very wrong to order young lieutenants, who have never commanded any kind of a ship, however small, to take command of a 14,000-ton armored cruiser—some of them with inturning screws—and expect them to take the full responsibility of a captain in the Navy and to navigate their ships on the Pacific coast with short-handed complements.

Of course, they have done it thus far and they deserve great credit. I hope, however, that this condition may not be long forced upon them.

We should all be ready and willing to tackle any job in an emergency, but the time has about come, it seems to me, to stop requiring things that are practically impossible without providing the means. We have about reached the limit in attempting to do things without the facilities for doing them.

I shall send you very soon a report on the torpedoes of the armored cruisers. This report will show that many of the torpedoes have not been fired in years and others have not been fired at all. This is a serious matter.

Of course, torpedoes can not be handled by people who don't know anything about torpedoes.

There are reasons, therefore, for supplying these armored cruisers with enough officers and men to keep them in cruising condition and keep their guns and torpedoes ready for war. The climate and conditions at Bremerton and the custom of lying alongside the dock will prevent success. The plan outlined will, I think, make success possible.

I will continue to keep things going until the department can furnish the officers and men that are needed.

Sincerely, yours,

W. F. FULLAM.

Rear Admiral WILLIAM S. BENSON, United States Navy,
Chief of Naval Operations,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you wish some of these other letters which you have not read, to be put in the record?

Admiral FULLAM. It might be well to have them there as a matter of future reference.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well; we will put them all in.

Admiral FULLAM. They are of no use to me.

Here is another letter on this matter of torpedoes of May 27, 1916 [reading]:

UNITED STATES PACIFIC RESERVE FLEET,
U. S. S. "PITTSBURGH," FLAGSHIP,
San Diego, Calif., May 27, 1916.

MY DEAR BENSON: I am inclosing for your eye copies of two letters received from Bradshaw.

These letters will give you some information which I think you should have concerning affairs of the reserve fleet. I especially call your attention to the lack of facilities at the Keyport Station for handling torpedoes. This is a matter of prime importance. We should have a station out there that is perfectly equipped to do this work expeditiously and thoroughly. All our ships that are so deficient in speed and gun power should have their torpedoes in perfect condition because these might help them out in an emergency.

I hope you and Blue, therefore, can eventually assign skilled torpedo officers and men to every ship that carries torpedoes. I shall emphasize this matter as much as possible with the personnel I have.

I will send copies of these letters to Blue for his consideration. I assume that you and Blue want to be in touch occasionally with actual conditions out here, and trust that I am not nagging you.

I wish to commend in the highest terms the manner in which Bradshaw has acted as senior officer present at Bremerton. He deserves great credit, and I shall give it to him on his report of fitness.

I truly hope that you may approve my last cruising schedule so that I may get the armored cruisers in proper condition. To be sure, they are not powerful ships,

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but they are the best cruisers we have, and we will have no others for sometime to come, and in time of need they would be of some use.

Sincerely, yours,

W. F. FULLAM.

Rear Admiral W. S. BENSON, United States Navy,
Chief of Naval Operations,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

Here is another letter to Admiral Blue [reading]:

UNITED STATES PACIFIC RESERVE FLEET,
U. S. S. "PITTSBURGH," FLAGSHIP,
San Diego, Calif., May 27, 1916.

MY DEAR BLUE: I am sending you copies of two letters from Bradshaw, because they contain information which I think you should have.

I am very anxious to do my duty in getting these ships in condition for active service. They are not very powerful, to be sure, but they are the best cruisers we now have or will have for some time to come, and we should put them in perfect condition.

I consider that the torpedoes of these ships should be absolutely reliable and that the personnel should be such as to give confidence in the torpedoes. In time of need these ships, with such inadequate gun power and speed, might find their torpedoes of great use, if they were skillfully handled. For this reason, I hope the bureau will ultimately see to it that every ship carrying torpedoes has a skilled personnel to handle them.

Sincerely, yours,

W. F. FULLAM.

Rear Admiral VICTOR BLUE, United States Navy.
Chief of Bureau of Navigation,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

The Battle of Jutland shows that the ships that had torpedoes used them; they fired torpedoes, often, when they were suddenly confronted by an enemy's ship at short range, in the fog and mist that they had in the North Sea; and the torpedo was a very useful weapon.

I made a report to the Navy Department on May 31, 1916, upon the subject of torpedo work, which is as follows [reading]:

UNITED STATES PACIFIC RESERVE FLEET,
U. S. S. "PITTSBURGH," FLAGSHIP,
San Diego, Calif., May 31, 1916.

To: The Secretary of the Navy (Operations, target practice and engineering competitions).
Subject: Torpedo work of ships of the Pacific Reserve Fleet.

1. There are 40 Whitehead Mark V, Mod. 4, torpedoes in the armored cruisers attached to the Pacific Reserve Fleet—8 on each of five ships: The *Colorado*, *Maryland*, *Pittsburgh*, *South Dakota*, and *West Virginia*.

2. Attention is invited to the attached table showing the last date on which each torpedo was fired, reason for firing, result of shot and number of shots to date.

3. The *Colorado* received her torpedoes July 8, 1913, practically three years ago, and none of them have ever been fired except to test fit in tube, April 21, 1915, almost two years after receipt.

4. The *South Dakota* received her present outfit of torpedoes July 17, 1913. Four of them have never been fired; the other four once each, for test, and one of them functioned.

5. It is considered absolutely essential for the sake of the efficiency of these ships that they be given suitable personnel, and afforded opportunity to test and prove, at least, all torpedoes on board, and to keep them in an efficient condition.

W. F. FULLAM.

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I wrote another letter to Admiral Blue on the same subject, which is as follows [reading]:

UNITED STATES PACIFIC RESERVE FLEET,
U. S. S. "PITTSBURGH," FLAGSHIP,
San Diego, Calif., June 5, 1916.

MY DEAR BLUE: I am very glad we are to get some midshipmen for the armored cruisers in the reserve fleet. "Small favors thankfully received," and I will try to prescribe a routine which will be of benefit to these young men.

I shall be greatly encouraged if commanding officers and a few officers of junior rank are supplied later on in order that the work of training apprentices, and the projected civilian practice cruise, may be properly done.

The junior officers have handled these ships extraordinarily well, but I am sure you realize that it is a heavy responsibility to put upon them, and if anything should happen there would be severe criticisms.

I am trying hard to insure that important elements of man-of-war efficiency—machinery, battery, and torpedoes—are made ready in these armored cruisers.

The battery and the machinery may be satisfactorily attended to, but the torpedo question is more difficult. We are doing all we can with the personnel available, and I will continue to utilize the services of the officers and gunners' mates who are qualified to handle torpedoes. I hope, however, that special effort may be made to at least put one officer and one or two expert gunners' mates on ships that have torpedoes; also that we may be sure of getting them in fighting trim.

The *South Dakota* and *Maryland* are working with torpedoes now at the Keyport station, and I shall direct the *Colorado* to overhaul hers and be ready to fire them as soon as she reaches Keyport. The *Pittsburgh*, in the meantime, will make preparations to test her torpedoes also.

Sincerely, yours,

W. F. FULLAM.

Rear Admiral VICTOR BLUE, United States Navy,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

Also I wrote a letter to Admiral Caperton dated March 7, 1917, just as he was about to leave [reading]:

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF., *March 7, 1917.*

MY DEAR CAPERTON: While the *Perry* is undergoing repairs at Bremerton there is no air compressor at the torpedo station and it is impossible for the *Frederick* and the *South Dakota* to prove their torpedoes.

It has been my policy to have ships employ their time to advantage while at Bremerton, particularly as regards testing and proving their torpedoes. It is amazing that the Navy Department has not equipped that station in such an important respect. It would have been a very simple matter to install an air compressor there.

I have represented the matter to the Navy Department and hope you will also give it a push. I assume that you have no destroyer available at present to send there while the *Perry* is being repaired. Meanwhile the *Frederick* and *South Dakota* are helpless with their torpedo work.

I will not read the rest of that letter, it is in my file.

Then there is a memorandum on the shortage of small-arm and machine-gun ammunition in the Navy from September, 1917, to March, 1918 [reading]:

1. Attention is invited to the attached letter from Admiral Benson dated September 20, 1917, forbidding all target practice with machine guns, rifles, and revolvers in the Navy owing to the shortage of ammunition.

Attention is invited to the attached letter from Admiral Plunkett dated March 14, 1918, removing the restriction upon the expenditure of machine-gun and rifle ammunition, but continuing the restriction as regards revolver ammunition.

3. From this it will be seen that for six months during the war, from September, 1917, to March, 1918, tens of thousands of enlisted recruits must have entered the Navy and served afloat and ashore without even having pulled the trigger of a revolver, rifle, or machine gun. The assertion is ventured with confidence that many thousand enlisted men of the Navy never fired a single shot, even at target practice, with any weapon, large or small, during the World War.

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4. The shortage of small-arm ammunition was admittedly of less importance than a shortage of shells for big guns in the Navy. It is understood, however, that there was a perilous shortage of 14-inch shells for our first-line dreadnaughts, and that the contracts for these shells were held up for some time at the Navy Department. Such a condition, if it existed, crippled the battle fleet and imperiled the country.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, September 20, 1917.

To: Commander in chief, Force Commander, Division Commanders, Commandants of Naval Districts, and Bureau of Ordnance:
Subject: Expenditures of small-arms ammunition for target-practice purposes.

1. Expenditure of small-arms ammunition for target-practice purposes, for pistols, rifles, and machine guns, will be suspended until further orders.

2. A small amount of unserviceable ammunition has been issued to small-arms ranges for the purpose of training recruits. This firing may continue until ammunition supplied is exhausted, when firing will be suspended until such time as the department is able to allot ammunition for target-practice purposes.

W. S. BENSON.

Then there is the letter from Admiral Plunkett, dated March 14, 1918, which is as follows [reading]:

MARCH 14, 1918.

From: Chief of Naval Operations.
To: Commander in chief, United States Atlantic Fleet; commander in chief, United States Pacific Fleet; commander, Division 2, United States Pacific Fleet; Commandants, naval districts:
Subject: Expenditure of ammunition for small-arms target practice.

1. The following letter from the Bureau of Ordnance is quoted for the information of the service, and the recommendations contained therein are approved:

MARCH 9, 1918.

To: Chief of Naval Operations:
Subject: Expenditure of small-arms ammunition for target-practice purposes.
Reference: (a) Office of N. L. Letter OP-P-W (1-157) 27832-340 of September 30, 1917.

1. Reference (a) suspended the use of small-arms ammunition for target-practice purposes, for pistols, rifles, and machine guns until further orders.

2. Recent large deliveries of .30-caliber ball cartridges, model 1906 (Springfield rifle ammunition) relieved the shortage of this type of ammunition and the bureau is now in a position to fill out ships' and shore-stations' allowances. It is recommended therefore, that the order suspending the use of small-arms ammunition for target-practice purposes be rescinded in so far as it applies to rifle and machine-gun ammunition.

3. As the shortage of pistol and revolver ammunition is still acute, it is recommended that the use of this ammunition for target-practice purposes continue to be suspended until larger supplies are received.

RALPH EARLE.

2. Ammunition for small-arms practice is furnished directly to the following ranges:
Navy rifle range, Camp Logan, Ill.
Navy rifle range, Great Lakes, Ill.
Navy rifle range, Wakefield, Mass.
Navy rifle range, Peekskill, N. Y.
Navy rifle range, navy yard, Philadelphia, Pa.
Navy rifle range, Cape May, N. J.
Navy rifle range, Glen Burnie, Md.
Naval Academy Rifle Range, Annapolis, Md.
Navy rifle range, Virginia Beach, Va.
Navy rifle range, Mount Pleasant, S. C.
And for men sent to these ranges for practice, no supply of ammunition need be furnished from their ship or station.

C. P. PLUNKETT,
By direction.

So that for six months we could not have any target practice with small arms. Here is another memorandum on shortage of guns in the Pacific and in the Navy [reading]:

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MEMORANDUM.

1. Shortage of guns in the Pacific and in the Navy.
2. Removal of 3-inch guns from the armored cruisers.
3. Removal of intermediate battery from battleships in the Atlantic Fleet.
4. Shortage of guns even as late as September, 1918.
5. Inability of the Navy Department to supply guns of 4 inches and above to ships in the Pacific to safeguard them against a possible German raider.

First. Immediately upon the declaration of war about two-thirds of the 3-inch guns were removed from all the armored cruisers in the Pacific, and it is believed that the same was done in the Atlantic, and that many of the intermediate battery guns were removed from the second-line battleships to be utilized in merchant vessels.

Second. The removal of these guns from fighting ships somewhat diminished their offensive gun-fire in meeting submarine and destroyer attacks. As a war measure it was most unfortunate. Had our fleet been called upon to fight at sea, it would have somewhat lessened the chances of victory. A study of the Battle of Jutland will suffice to demonstrate this fact.

Third. It is only fair to say, however, that the removal of some of the intermediate battery and 3-inch guns, especially those on the lower decks which would, for this reason, have been of little use in a heavy sea, was justified and doubtless recommended. But the fact remains that in fair weather the volume of fire of these ships was quite materially reduced.

Fourth. After sending every available vessel from the Pacific to the Atlantic, the turret guns of the brave old *Oregon* were the sole defense against a possible well-armed raider in the Pacific. For this reason it was my duty to ask that a few guns of 4-inch and heavier calibre be supplied to certain vessels under my command to meet possible emergencies; particularly at a time when Germany was reported to be trying to fit out some special raiders with special endurance, who might get into the Pacific.

These guns could not be supplied in September, 1918, for reasons set forth in the attached letters from Capt. Laning and Admiral Earle.

These facts confirm the recent statements of Assistant Secretary Roosevelt, that he was compelled to spend many millions without authority of Congress to supply guns imperatively needed by the Navy.

Fifth. The responsibility for shortage of guns could not be laid to Admiral Earle, Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance. It was not the policy of this country to prepare for war.

I have the following letter:

BUREAU OF ORDNANCE,
Washington, D. C., September 11, 1918.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL: Please do not consider that any letters from you ever bother me; I have been the loser by not hearing from you.

The bureau will do its best to provide heavy batteries for the *Brutus* and *Nanshan* when funds for the same become available. At the present writing there are such a large number of vessels in the overseas trade that are not armed that I do not expect to be able to send any guns of 4 inches and above to the Pacific coast until next spring at the earliest.

Spring of 1919. Six months after the armistice, before any guns would be available for the Pacific.

The bureau would certainly assist in the matter of building a magazine at San Diego should the Chief of Naval Operations so authorize.

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As for rifles and machine guns, the production is not anywhere near up to the demand. In other words, we are training men for the Navy and Army faster than we can turn out rifles for them.

I will speak to Leahy, Director of Target Practice, about the rifle range on the Pacific coast and see what he has to offer.

I regret that I can not answer your letter in a more satisfactory manner, but I am unable to do so. Really, there seems less and less hope of immediate betterment because of the labor conditions throughout the country.

With kindest regards, I remain,

Most sincerely, yours,

RALPH EARLE.

Rear Admiral W. F. FULLAM, UNITED STATES NAVY,
U. S. S. "Oregon," Municipal Dock, San Diego, Calif.

I have a letter from Laning dated the same day. He said that he had been in conference that day with Admiral Earle. [Reading]:

BUREAU OF NAVIGATION,
Washington, D. C., September 11, 1918.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL: I received your letter dated September 4 bringing with it an inclosure, a copy of your letter to Admiral Earle. I have been in on a number of conferences with regard to the gun situation and I am very much afraid that it will be impossible for Ordnance to change the batteries of those ships at the present time. As a matter of fact the demand for guns is so heavy that Ordnance is not yet able to equip more than a few of the vessels going to the war zone, so no matter how advisable it may be it is still less possible to send guns elsewhere.

The gun problem is the most serious thing confronting us. I am sure that everybody would only be too pleased to fix those ships up the way you recommend but I am sure no one would think it the best thing to do at this time when all the available guns are needed for use against submarines.

Sincerely, yours,

HARRIS LANING.

Rear Admiral W. F. FULLAM, *United States Navy,*
Municipal Docks, San Diego, Calif.

There is another file of letters which are confidential because they refer to matters in regard to coast defense, that ought not to be made public, but I suppose that if you wish them——

The CHAIRMAN. You do not want them to be included in the record?

Admiral FULLAM. If they could be considered confidential——

The CHAIRMAN. It would be better to leave them out of the record.

Admiral FULLAM. Yes. I will abbreviate the reading of this letter [reading]:

1. This file shows the effort made by the commander of the reserve forces on the Pacific to get proper coordination between the Army and the Navy on the Pacific.

2. It will be noted that the first letter was written on the 17th of February, 1917, nearly two months before the war was declared, but that the correspondence was not concluded until 19th of October, 1917, about six months after the war was declared.

In other words, I corresponded for eight months trying to get coordination.

3. During this time things were in a more or less unsettled and chaotic state despite the efforts of the division commander.

4. There appeared to be hesitation at the Navy Department to adopting any real thorough system by which responsibility would be fixed and definite action demanded.

5. The objection by the Navy Department to permanent and properly organized "joint boards" in each port appeared to be the main stumblingblock.

6. There seemed to be fear that these boards of Army and Navy commanders would assume too much authority; but assumption of authority and definite plans to use authority and use it quickly was the secret of the whole matter, and the letter to Capt. Marvell of September 27, 1917, gave the division commander's ideas on this subject in no uncertain words.

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7. It was not deemed sufficient by the division commander that boards and conferences should be "informal" or by "mutual consent" but that such boards and such conferences should be decidedly authoritative in order that they might be held responsible in their cooperation and in their defensive measures.

8. This subject is one of interest for the present and the future if we are to be at all times properly prepared for war.

9. The art of going to war "informally" has not been studied at our Naval War College and has not been justified as a sound national policy by Admiral Mahan or other well qualified authorities.

10. War must be considered as a decidedly "formal" and serious business. Our next enemy may so consider it, in which case the United States will be at a very serious disadvantage if we adhere to the "informal" attitude in organization and preparation for war.

11. The Army and Navy must work in harmony, and with perfect coordination, offensively and defensively, if we are to be victorious.

12. Organization costs nothing. It demands no appropriation by Congress. It is economical and prevents chaos when war comes. It conserves Mahan's principle "The organization of the Navy Department should be such that it may pass from a state of peace to a state of war without a jar in its machinery."

13. The maintenance of an Army and Navy involves the appropriation of hundreds of millions annually. This taxation is not justified unless both the Army and Navy are at all times ready for war, and prepared by perfect organization to instantly cooperate. The thoughts of officers should be fixed constantly upon this subject. This is the best way to occupy their minds in time of peace. They should be compelled, not forbidden, to study and advocate this policy of organization. It is their first duty. The Secretary of the Navy should reward and encourage officers who work on this line rather than those who simply carry on a peace routine with no anticipation of war. The people of this country should demand perfection of organization in the Navy and at the Navy Department.

14. The United States can not wisely pursue the gentle policy of "informality" leaving our enemy to strike with "formal" and well-organized force. We must not be so wonderfully kind and chivalrous as to leave our coasts with an "informal" defensive plan, thus giving the initial advantage to an unchivalrous enemy who is ready to take advantage of us.

15. On the 5th of February, 1917, being then in San Francisco with my flagship, believing that war was inevitable and that I might possibly be left in command in the Pacific I wrote to Capt. Chase, Assistant of the Chief of Naval Operations informing him of the need of immediate defensive plans in the Pacific; that the Army and Navy were not as yet prepared to coordinate; that "I am conferring with the military authorities and with Capt. Gilmer"; that "I send this information because there must be cooperation; and similar conditions may exist at other seaports."

16. This began a correspondence which continued for eight months—from two months before the war until October, 1917. The letters in the attached file tell the story. They should not be published. They are numbered serially. (See letter No. 1.)

17. The next day, February 6, I wrote an official letter to the department on the subject of cooperation at San Francisco. (See letter No. 2.)

18. On February 17 I wrote an official letter concerning a conference with Gen. Sibert, commanding the coast defense of the Pacific, and Capt. Gilmer, the comunandant of the twelfth naval district. At this conference the subject of cooperation of the Army and Navy was thoroughly discussed, the need of immediate organization was manifest, and we unanimously recommended the formation of permanent, local "joint boards" of Army and Navy officers at each seaport to prepare and perfect defensive plans concluding with the words: "A procedure of this kind would serve to meet the emergency of sudden war without confusion or delay at any time." It is submitted that this plan merited immediate consideration and adoption by the Navy Department. (See letter No. 3.)

19. On February 20 I wrote to the department giving an account of another conference with Gen. Sibert, Capt. Gilmer, and the master of pilots of San Francisco. At this meeting, held on board my flagship, we got under way and steamed out to sea and back again to observe and discuss the existing defensive measures.

As a result of this experiment our previous opinions were confirmed and it was demonstrated, beyond question, that a radical change was demanded. (See letter No. 4.)

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20. Under date of February 14 the Secretary of the Navy wrote to the force commander in answer to his letter of February 6. (See letter No. 5.)

21. Under date of February 27 Admiral Benson replied to my letters expressing satisfaction with our conferences at San Francisco. In this letter, however, there was no answer to my suggestions regarding joint boards. The department seemed to be satisfied that the existing regulations which directed commandants "to confer with Army officers" would suffice. (See letter No. 6.) I was greatly disappointed that the recommendations made by me and Gen. Sibert were not approved. In our estimation—and we were in the spot—existing regulations were not sufficient and a definitely carefully organized board at each seaport was a necessity.

22. In the meantime, while awaiting definite action by the Navy Department, upon my recommendation for thoroughness of organization, the soundness of my recommendations was conclusively demonstrated. On May 19 a sergeant at Fort Rosencrans reported three submarines off San Diego. This report caused great alarm. I did not for an instant believe that German submarines were in the Pacific, but nevertheless I sent two small vessels down to the coast to investigate, and warned all vessels, including the two Japanese cruisers at San Pedro. I had no authority to do more.

23. Confusion reigned at San Diego. The defensive measures were inadequate and there was poor cooperation of Army and Navy agencies. On May 20 the Navy Department sent a radio message to the force commander asking for an explanation of the lack of coordination at San Diego. To this radio the force commander, in reply sent the attached letter to the Navy Department.

Confidential.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET, DIVISION 2,
U. S. S. "OREGON," FLAGSHIP,
May 22, 1917.

To: The Secretary of the Navy (Operations).

Subject: Functions of commander, patrol force, and cooperation between Army and Navy on Pacific coast.

References: (*a*) Operations' radio 11020, May.

Inclosures: (1) Orders of patrol force commander; (2) correspondence concerning cooperation and local joint boards; (3) letters of May 2, May 9, and May 12.

1. Concerning the above subject and references, attention is invited to the following statements, and to the copies of letters, which are attached hereto for convenience of reference:

AUTHORITY COMMANDER PATROL FORCE.

2. The force commander wished to assume all responsibility that properly belonged to him on this coast, without overstepping or interferring with other commanders afloat or ashore.

3. It will be noted, from the copies of "orders" hereto attached, that the force commander is under the command of the commander in chief and that his authority is strictly limited to the ships of the patrol force. The coast torpedo force, the ships of the coast and the naval districts are independent of the Pacific patrol force.

NAVAL DISTRICTS.

4. A skeleton organization of the twelfth naval district, under mobilization orders, and dated March 23 was furnished the commander, reserve force, by Capt. Gilmer at my request, but this organization has been greatly modified by the detachment of the *Oregon*, *Annapolis*, *Yorktown*, *Hull*, *Hopkins*, and *Bear*.

5. No report of changes in the organization, no information concerning the ships or patrol boats now available or concerning the duties of the twelfth, thirteenth and fourteenth naval districts, or as to the question of cooperation with the Army and the Pacific patrol force have been made known to me.

TWELFTH DISTRIAT PATROL AT SAN DIEGO.

6. The *Yorktown* was originally designated for the twelfth district patrol service at San Diego. Upon her assignment to the Pacific patrol force on May 2, I did not detach her immediately, but sent the following radio in order that she might remain and turn over her duties in the twelfth district before leaving San Diego:

"SAN DIEGO.

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"From: Commander, patrol force.
"To: *Yorktown*.

"Continue present duty until further orders 13108."

7. Under these orders the *Yorktown* remained at San Diego until May 12 before sailing for Honolulu to carry out orders of Navy department. Thus the *Yorktown* was per mitted by me to remain at San Diego from May 2 to May 12—10 days—during which time the naval district duties were performed and transferred.

COOPERATION WITH ARMY.

8. Attention is respectfully invited to the attached letters which show that the commander, reserve force (now commander patrol force) initiated the consideration of "cooperation" in his letter of the 7th of February and emphasized its importance in other letters to March 24, inclusive.

DANGER FROM RAIDERS AND SUBMARINES.

9. These dangers are and have been discounted by the force commander, but the message from the commander at Fort Rosecrans on May 19 was so worded that immediate action was imperative on account of the presence of Japanese cruisers at San Pedro and the tows en route from Honolulu. There was no alternative but to send the *Shaw* and the *Iroquois* on the patrol to the southward.

POSSIBLE OFFENSIVE OF SUBMARINES IN PACIFIC.

10. The presence of German submarines in the Pacific now, or in the future, is believed to be extremely improbable.

11. However, in the absence of mines and nets, considering the composition of our naval forces to-day, and noting the record of performances of modern submarines, it is believed that a bold submarine commander, choosing his time, could enter the harbors of San Diego, San Pedro, or San Francisco, at night, sink any vessels at anchor there and escape to sea with little chance of being sunk.

FUTURE DUTIES OF PACIFIC PATROL FORCE.

12. Referring to my radio, and to letters of May 2, May 9, and May 12, and to Operations' letter of May 12 and radio of May 21, hereto attached for convenience of reference, the following points have not been settled:

(1) Officers for *Oregon* (letter May 9).

(2) Are Perry and Lawrence to be permanently attached to patrol force under my command (letter May 9)?

(3) New name for *Angel* (May 9).

(4) "Policy" of department as to "Mission" patrol force (May 9).

(5) Recognition signals (Radio May 11 and 17).

13. It is assumed that none of the vessels of coast guard and Fish Commission will be assigned to the Pacific patrol force.

14. This letter is written in order to bring the following questions up to date:

(1) Cooperation with Army.

(2) Cooperation with coast defense districts.

(3) Defense and patrol against submarines.

(4) Recognition signals between United States, Japanese, and English cruisers ot avoid possible danger.

15. The force commander in flagship, San Diego, will leave San Francisco about June 1 to take part in and direct patrol to Honolulu and to inaugurate itinerary of patrol force approved by Operations.

16. The question of possible changes in organization to secure better or more complete cooperation between the various commandants and commanders, Army and Navy, on the Pacific coast is left to the consideration of the department, pending which the force commander will confine himself to the limits defined by his present orders.

17. The radio—Operations' 11020—carried the possible construction that the commander, patrol force, was informed of, or in some measure responsible for, cooperation or action at San Diego in connection with the submarine incident May 19. It is hoped that he will be freed from responsibility concerning that matter.

W. F. FULLAM.

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This letter showed the need of better cooperation between the Army and Navy. It proved that the recommendation of "Local Joint Boards" was practical and necessary, and that there should be one directing head in the naval defense of the Pacific.

The Navy Department ultimately approved, in part, the suggestions of the commander, patrol force, and placed him in general charge of all naval districts.

There is a clipping from one of the newspapers attached to this letter. I will just leave it there.

Meantime, I had been at sea, cruising, and I could not coordinate defensive measures in the different seaports when I was at sea. I told the department that the organization must be independent of me, because I must go to sea sometimes. I wrote this letter explaining it, and that brought a letter under date of May 26 from the department, putting me in general charge of the naval district. I did not receive that letter for a month or so, because I was at sea [reading]:

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, May 26, 1917.

To: Commander, Patrol Force, Pacific Fleet.
Commandant Twelfth naval district,
Commandant Thirteenth naval district,
Commandant Fourteenth naval district.

Subject: General supervision of the twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth naval districts by commander, patrol force, Pacific Fleet.

1. Due to the long extended coast to be patrolled, the varied conditions that exist in the different districts, and the great distance from Washington; and in order to insure a uniformity of action in the various districts, the commander, Patrol force Pacific Fleet, will assume general supervision of the twelfth, thirteenth and fourteenth naval districts.

2. This supervision must not be construed to displace the organization of the naval districts within their districts. It is hoped that as a result of this action more coordinate work between forces ashore and afloat will be effected.

3. Acknowledge receipt of this letter.

JOSEPHUS DANIELS.

Thus, three months after my letter on the subject of coordination, and six weeks after the declaration of war the Navy Department took the first real step toward a proper organization in the Pacific, and stated "It is hoped as a result of this action that more coordinate work between forces ashore and afloat will be effected."

The force commander discovered that this order, placing him in general charge of the naval districts in the Pacific with certain limitations of authority, was by no means sufficient to secure effectiveness in the organization, and he accordingly wrote the following letter to the department under date of June 16th. [Reading:]

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET, DIVISION TWO,
U. S. S. "OREGON," FLAGSHIP,
U. S. S. "SAN DIEGO," FLAGSHIP.
June 16, 1917.

To: The Secretary of the Navy (Operations.)

Subject: Policy as to coordination of defensive forces in the Pacific.

References: (*a*) Commandant Twelfth naval district, radiogram 13015 and my reply thereto (letter No. 109 W. F. F.-S. (101) of June 16.

(*b*) Commander Reserve Force, Pacific Fleet, letter No. 825 W. F. F.-M. of February 17, 1917.

(*c*) Commander Reserve force, Pacific Fleet, letter No. 846 W. F. F.-F. of March 1, 1917.

(*d*) Radiograms 11020, 16020 and 21220 (May).

Inclosures: (5) Copies of above references.

1. The attention of the department is respectively invited to reference (*a*) and to the force commander's reply to the same. Attention is also invited to references (*b*), (*c*) and (*d*).

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2. In view of the fact that previous recommendations as contained in the above references have either not been acknowledged or favorably considered by the department, the force commander hesitated to intrude with further suggestions concerning this subject, and had no intention of doing so until, the receipt of reference (*a*), which constrains him to once more invite the attention of the Department to the importance of complete cooperation and coordination of defensive forces—Army and Navy—on the Pacific coast.

PRESENT CONDITIONS.

3. The following is a statement of existing conditions as far as they are known to the force commander:

(*a*) The commander in chief is absent in the Atlantic and can not therefore, control or promptly or effectively coordinate with naval forces now in the Pacific.

(*b*) The commander, patrol force, by the terms of his orders, is under the command of the commander in chief, and his authority is strictly limited to the few ships of his own force.

(*c*) Commandants of naval districts make occasional reports to the force commander as senior officer present, but the latter is not informed as to the details of conditions and activities in the several districts.

The commander, submarine force, Pacific Fleet, is independent of the commander, patrol force, as regards the movements and disposition of his vessels. He merely reports their movements as they are made.

(*e*) The commander, patrol force, is not informed as to the intention of the War and Navy Departments concerning the placing of mines, if they are to be placed in an emergency for the defense of harbors on this coast, nor as to the condition of defense nets, if such are to be provided at any time.

4. The patrol force available at present consists of four ships—the *San Diego*, *Yorktown*, *Marblehead*, and *Vicksburg*. The destroyer *Perry* will be available June 20, the *Patrol* about July 16, and the *Saratoga* and *Lawrence* in the latter part of July.

5. There have been various reports of raiders in the South Pacific, near the Central American coast, and in the vicinity of Honolulu. These reports have neither been credited nor ignored by the force commander.

6. As far as known at present there is no imperative need of vessels on the Mexican coast, nor in Central America, but past experience indicates that the patrol force must anticipate the necessity for cruising in these waters from time to time.

7. The force commander is not definitely informed as to the future permanent stationing of the submarine force on the Pacific coast, but he has been led to believe that it is contemplated to mobilize all these vessels at San Pedro. The 12-inch guns of the *Cheyenne* were last fired in November, 1915.

8. There appears to be no reason, at present, to expect any hostile act of Germany in the Pacific.

COORDINATION.

9. It appears from the above that there is not at present any thoroughly organized coordination or cooperation of the naval forces in the Pacific, nor between the naval and military forces and naval districts, as far as is known to the force commander.

10. It is manifest that with no offensive operation by Germany there is no present cause for anxiety and therefore no immediate demand for a coordination of defensive forces in the Pacific.

11. It is proper, however, to remark that a complete organization of defensive forces that would insure perfect coordination of effort in the event of actual hostilities in the Pacific would cost nothing and would perhaps serve the excellent purpose of a practical and interesting lesson or drill in preparedness to meet any situation that might arise at any time in the future.

EMERGENCY MEASURES.

12. In the event of any emergency, or to prepare for one, the following are a few suggestions that might be considered:

(*a*) Place all naval forces and districts on the Pacific under one coordinating head.

(*b*) Instead of concentrating all submarines at San Pedro, distribute them for defense as follows:

Send the H boats to Puget Sound.

Retain the F boats at San Francisco.

Detail the new L boats for the defense of San Pedro and Santa Barbara, the commander of the submarine force to visit each station in turn, and each small division

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of his force being provided with local barracks, or with a suitable mother ship merely for the living quarters of the crew.

(*c*) Purchase and arm a sufficient number of tugs, small vessels, etc. (that may be of permanent use to the Navy) for harbor patrol and for Mexican patrol service.

(*d*) Provide nets and give practice in placing them in channels, if they are not to be permanently placed.

(*e*) Plant mines and accustom commerce to the rules that would govern in an emergency.

(*f*) Arrange for the defense of Greys Harbor and Willapa Bay.

(*g*) If practicable send three or four of the older reserve battleships to the Pacific to be used with the Oregon as floating batteries at Puget Sound, Willapa Bay, San Francisco, San Pedro, and San Diego.

12. It is assumed that the few seagoing cruisers of the Pacific patrol force must be employed in the sea patrol of the coast, the Gulf, and the outlying islands of the Pacific. They can not well be depended upon exclusively for harbor patrol.

13. In the event that the department should reconsider the project for local joint boards as suggested in reference (*b*), and (*c*)—or at least for such a board in the special case of the Pacific coast—it is suggested that Capt. T. M. Potts, of the inspection board, who visits various ports on this coast, and who formerly served on the general board and on the Army and Navy Joint Board, at the Navy Department, might, in addition to his present duties, serve as member of a coordinating joint board for the Pacific, to be composed of three members, as follows:

(1) Army officer commanding coast defenses (representing department commander and War Department).

(2) The senior naval officer afloat in the Pacific.

(3) Capt. T. M. Potts, representing the twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth naval districts and the Navy Department's policies as to harbor and local defense.

14. It is believed that a board constituted as above might serve a very useful purpose on the Pacific coast, where the conditions, at such a distance from Washington, are very different from those on the Atlantic coast.

15. In view of the possible need of additional cruising and patrol, or barrack, vessels in the Pacific, it is suggested that no more ships suitable for such purposes be transferred to the Shipping Board. From observation of the *Loongmoon*, recently towed from Honolulu to Seattle, she appeared to be available as an excellent auxiliary cruiser.

W. F. FULLAM.

Special attention is called to this letter which once more emphasized the importance of local "joint boards" as the key to the defense of each seaport.

The necessity for board has been conclusively demonstrated at San Diego by the appearance of the whales. Under the department decision a lieutenant on the retired list was in charge of all naval activities at San Diego. He was engaged in many other duties—recruiting, inspecting, in charge of coaling station, etc. He was young and inexperienced and although zealous and energetic he could not reasonably be expected to handle such a situation in cooperation with colonels and generals of the Army.

The force commander, therefore, suggested that Capt. Brotherton, commanding the naval training station who had been on duty on the general board should be made senior officer present at San Diego and should confer with the military commandants. This was approved by the department.

In the meantime, in the absence of more definite instructions from the Navy Department, and without waiting longer for action concerning the principle of joint boards I gave instructions to commandants of districts to proceed, and attention is invited to letters No. 7 to 15 inclusive in the attached file which show the action taken by the boards thus organized.

On August 17, 1917, I addressed the following letter to the commandant of districts to emphasize the importance of cooperation between the Army and Navy. [Reading:]

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U. S. S. "SARATOGA," FLAGSHIP.

August 17, 1917.

To: Commandants, twelfth, thirteenth and fourteenth naval districts.
Subject: Cooperation between the Army and Navy in the twelfth, thirteenth and fourteenth naval districts. General supervision of the naval districts by the commander division two, United States Pacific Fleet.
Reference: (*a*) Secretary of the Navy's letter No. Op.-9-B, 24514 of 26 May, 1917.
(*b*) Chief of Naval Operations' letter No. Op.-11, 28754 of June 12, 1917.
(*c*) Chief of Naval Operations' letter No. Op.-11, 27838 of July 28, 1917.
Inclosures (four):

1. The attention of the commandants of the twelfth, thirteenth and fourteenth naval districts is called to the above references hereto attached, from which it will be seen that the commander division two, United States Pacific Fleet is directed to exercise "general supervision" over the naval districts with the view to "coordinate work between forces ashore and afloat."

2. It is not necessary to emphasize the importance of this matter. An organization mutually agreed upon to secure proper corodination and cooperation between the Army and Navy costs nothing and will enable both military and naval forces to render the most effective service possible in case of any emergency in the Pacific.

3. The fact that there are no enemy forces in the Pacific at present and that hostile operations appear to be remote would not excuse a failure on our part to prepare for and anticipate every probable war condition that might be forced upon us at short notice at any time in the future.

4. With a view to the complete review and understanding of this subject your attention is invited to the following letters included in the attached file:
Letter from commandant thirteenth naval district No. 2943—N. D. of June 28, 1917.
Letter from commanding officer North Pacific coast, artillery district, to commandant thirteenth naval district No. 267-D3 of July 1, 1917.
Letter from commandant, twelfth naval district No. 6308-7-(14-LG) and its inclosures.

5. The key to the whole problem of coordination will be found in the local joint boards in each district. In this connection the action of the commandants of the twelfth and thirteenth naval districts as detailed in the above correspondence is in all respects approved, and the general plan therein outlined will be adhered to by the naval districts on the Pacific, the commandants by mutual agreements with Army commanders making such changes and adopting such measures as may be required to meet conditions from time to time.

W. F. FULLAM.

I deemed this letter of great importance.

Not long after issuing the above instructions to the commandants in the Pacific I was amazed to receive the following letter from office of Naval Operations, addressed to the commandant, twelfth naval district, August 20, disapproving of the formation of local "joint boards." [Reading:]

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, D. C., August 20, 1917.

Op-14-S 8-17.
From: Chief of Naval Operations.
To: Commandant twelfth naval district.
Via: Commander division two, Pacific Fleet.
Subject: Cooperation between Army and Navy.
Reference: Commandant's letter 6309-1-(14) of August 9, 1917, with inclosures.

1. The receipt is acknowledged of the above references.

2. The regulations for the naval districts require that the Army and Navy authorities on duty in the naval districts shall cooperate with one another to obtain the best results in the defense of the district. Article 77 of the Regulations authorizes this cooperation.

3. The department, however, does not desire that any board by the name of "joint board" be established for this purpose. It is considered that the regulations are sufficiently elastic and mandatory to permit of and require the closest cooperation between the Army and the Navy, and it is considered that this cooperation should take place without the necessity of having any formal board to carry on the work.

W. S. BENSON.

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After eight months correspondence this letter appeared to indicate disapproval of the one most important of all suggestions that I had made to secure real coordination in the Pacific. Being in a quandry concerning the department's real attitude I wrote the attached letter of August 25 asking the department if it approved or disapproved my instructions to the commandants of Naval Districts. [Reading:]

U. S. S. "SARATOGA," FLAGSHIP,
August 25, 1918.

To: Secretary of the Navy (Operations).
Subject: Cooperation between Army and Navy.
References: (*a*) Operations letter, Op-14-a 8-17 24514J-22 of August 20, 1917.
(*b*) Commander division two, letters No. 375 W. F. F.-S of August 17, 1917.
(*c*) Operations letter, Op-9-B 24514 of May 26, 1917.

1. Referring to reference (a), forwarded through the Commander, second division, to the commandant of the twelfth naval district, it is proper to state that the term "joint board" as used by the commandant of the twelfth district, and by the commander of the second division in his letter of 17 August (reference b) is only a term of convenience. It was not intended that these so-called "local joint boards" should be "formal," but it was especially provided that they were to be informal in character and that the Army and naval officers, commanding in each district, should occasionly meet by mutual consent to consider all matters requiring cooperation between them.

2. In other words, it was the intention simply to emphasize the importance of the provisions already authorized by regulations. It was not expected that these so-called "joint boards" should exercise any independent authority, but should merely be the medium through which the commander of the second division could exercise general control over the naval districts and bring to their attention matters that might be of importance, both to the Army and Navy in an emergency

3. It is not clear to the commander of the second division how there can be cooperation between the Army and Navy, or how "more coordinate work between forces ashore and afloat will be effected" (as stated in paragraph 2 of Operations' letter of May 26, 1917, reference (c) in which letter the commander of the patrol force was given general supervision of the naval districts) unless Army and naval commandants occasionally meet and discuss matters of offense and defense.

4. It is therefore requested that the commander of the second division be informed without delay if the instructions given by him to the commandants of the twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth naval districts in his letter of August 17, 1917, reference (b) are approved or disapproved by the department. If these instructions are disapproved by the department, they will be immediately canceled.

5. It is hoped, however, that these instructions will be approved, as it is believed that they are designed to secure cooperation in the only manner that is possible, and in a manner that does not in any way violate the letter or spirit of the regulations, as referred to in reference (a); it being remembered that the term "joint board" was a mere term of convenience, that these boards had no independent authority and that the officers were to meet by mutual agreement, whenever occasion appeared to require discussion of any subject.

W. F. FULLAM.

Copy: Commandant twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth Naval District.

On the same day, not wishing to take any chances concerning the department's approval of my previous instructions to the commandants, I wrote the following letter, August 25, directing the commandants to conform to the department's letter as regards "joint boards." [Reading:]

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET, DIVISION 2,
U. S. S. Saratoga, Flagship, August 25, 1917.

To: Commandants, twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth naval districts.
Subject: Cooperation between Army and Navy.
References: (*a*) Operations' letter Op-14-a 8-17 24514J-22 of August 20, 1917, to Commandant twelfth naval district (copy inclosed). (*b*) Commander Division 2, letter No. 412 WFF-F of August 25, 1917 to Operations (copy inclosed). (*c*) Commander Division 2, letter No. 375, WFF-S of August 17, 1917, to commandants, twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth naval districts.
Inclosures: 2.

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1. Your attention is invited to Operations' letter reference (*a*) and to my reply thereto, reference (*b*), copies herewith inclosed.

2. You will be, in all respects, governed by reference (*a*) and will so construe my letter of August 17, reference (*c*) that there may be no conflict between its requirements and those of Operations' letter.

W. F. FULLAM.

On August 27 the department addressed a letter to me confirming its letter of August 20, in which it disapproved of "formal joint boards," and expressing its desire that instead of these boards, naval commandants should keep in very close touch with officers of the Army. [Reading:]

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, D. C., August 27, 1917.

Op–14–s:25
28754–8–27
From: Chief of Naval Operations.
To: Commander, Division 2, Pacific Fleet.
Subject: General supervision of naval districts by the commander, Division 2, Pacific Fleet.
References: (*a*) C. N. O. letter 278383–127 of July 28, 1917. (*b*) Commander Division 2, letter 279–1120 of August 17, 1917. (*c*) C. N. O. letter to commandant twelfth Naval District 24514 J–22 of August 20, 1917.

1. The department does not consider that it is necessary to have formal joint boards for the purpose of cooperation between the Army and Navy officers, but it does consider that it is necessary for the commandant and his subordinates to be in very close touch with the officers of the Army and the various coast defenses.

W. S. BENSON.

On September 5 in obedience to the department's orders I again addressed to the commandants a letter telling them that the department did not deem "formal joint boards" to be necessary but that the department preferred the commandants to keep in "very close touch with Army officers." [Reading:]

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET, DIVISION 2,
U. S. S. Oregon, Flagship, September 5, 1917.

To: Commandants, twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth naval districts.
Subject: General supervision of naval districts by the commander, Division 2, Pacific Fleet.
References: (*a*) Operations letter Op–14–s–8–25 28754–827 of August 27, 1917 (copy inclosed). (*b*) Operations letter 278383–127 of July 28, 1917. (*c*) My letter No. 279–112 of August 17, 1917. (*d*) Operations' letter to commandant twelfth naval district, No. 24514J–22 of August 20, 1917.
Inclosure:

1. Your attention is invited to reference (*a*), copy inclosed, to which you will strictly conform, taking particular note that while "formal joint boards" are not considered necessary by the department, "it is necessary for the commandant and his subordinates to be in very close touch with the officers of the Army at the various coast defenses.

W. F. FULLAM.

Thus, in September 1917, after eight months correspondence the division commander in his earnest attempt to secure an effective working organization to insure coordination of the Army and Navy in the Pacific found himself practically where he started on February 18, 1917. The Navy Department disapproved of formal boards that might really accomplish something, and preferred a "close touch" between officers of the Army and Navy whatever that may mean. But it did not satisfy me. I wanted to get closer than a "close touch."

In desperation, therefore, on September 27, 1917, the division commander addressed the following letter to the Navy Department,

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inclosing a complete file of the eight months' correspondence. [Reading']:

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET, DIVISION 2,
September 27, 1917.

To: The Secretary of the Navy (Operations).
Subject: Letter of commander Division 2, No. 375 of August 17, 1917; cooperation between Army and Navy on the Pacific coast.
References: (*a*) Operations' letter Op–14–2 9–18, 27383 of September 19, 1917. (*b*) File of letters beginning February 17, 1917 to August 25, 1917.
Inclosures: 16 (reference b).

1. Referring to reference (*a*), letter No. 375 of August 17 should read, "No. 378 of August 17," copy of which has been previously forwarded to the depertment, and which is also contained in the attached file.

2. For convenience of reference and in order to properly review the whole subject, a file of letters, that have passed between Operations and commander Reserve Force, commander patrol force, commander Second Division and commandants of districts, is hereto attached.

3. The correspondence explains itself. It will be noted that the present commander of the Second Division began to consider the question of cooperation between the Army and Navy of this coast in February, 1917.

4. The use of the term "joint board" appears to have been unfortunate, and to have created a mistaken impression at the Navy Department. It might better have been called "Joint Conference between Army and Navy commandants."

5. In the correspondence with the commandants of naval districts, suggesting these "conferences" or "informal joint boards," it was recognized by all that they were informal; that they had no independent authority; that the commandants were subject to higher authority and to the War and Navy Departments.

6. These meetings, or conferences, of Army and Navy officers, by mutual consent, are considered the only possible means of discussing conditions in each port or district. Without such meetings or conferences, and in the absence of any plans agreed upon between Army and Naval commandants, cooperation and coordination would not, and could not, be possible.

7. Another important point to remember in this connection is the changing of commandants, which has, in some cases, been quite frequent. These changes in personnel manifestly require occasional meetings to secure continuity in the mutually agreed upon procedure, to be adopted at any port in an emergency.

8. The commander of the Second Division has made every possible effort to rightly interpret and conform to the wishes of the department, especially as outlined in letter Op–9–B, 24514 of May 26, 1917, signed by the Secretary of the Navy.

9. A consideration of the correspondence will make plain to the department the existing conditions. The commander of the Second Division considers it his duty, not only to himself but to the department, to state that he is by no means satisfied with the present organization, or with the means that have been taken or authorized to secure effective coordination of Army and Navy forces on this coast in the event of actual hostilities or any serious emergency. It is believed that this organization is not sufficiently definite; that it is not closely knit; that responsibility is not placed; and that the whole subject deserves careful review and serious consideratiou.

10. Attention is invited to my letter of July 11, 1917, concerning conditions at San Diego, and to Chief of Naval Operations' letter Op–14 s 7–20 27772–197 of July 21, in which the section commander at San Diego is placed in charge of all naval activities afloat and ashore, etc. This officer is a lieutenant on the retired list, whereas officers of the rank of captain in the Navy and colonel in the Army and other grades higher than that of lieutenant in the Navy, are commanding various posts in this vicinity.

11. In conversation with these various heads, it has been clearly demonstrated that there is no well understood plan of cooperation, no agreement as to the part each should play—aviation for instance—in the event of an emergency, requiring coordination. On the contrary, it would appear that there is decided bewilderment, concerning the whole matter.

12. The division commander realizes that he, himself, would doubtless be cruising at sea, and that an emergency affecting the different ports must be met by the coordinated action of Army and Navy authorities on shore at each port. The division commander furthermore realizes that the War and Navy Departments may have made plans unknown to him, and that they may be perfectly satisfied and have confidence in the arrangements already made and outlined in existing regulations, concerning naval districts and Army coast defenses.

13. In conclusion, the division commander once more regrets if the term "joint boards," as used, has been misconstrued at the department and invites attention to

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his letter No. 413 of August 25, in which commandants are cautioned to rightly interpret all directions given by the division commander in pursuance of his orders to assume general control of naval districts.

W. F. FULLAM.

Special attention is called to this letter, which emphasized the following points:

(*a*) That the organization in the Pacific was ineffective.

(*b*) That the condition at San Diego was chaotic, bewildering, and absurd.

(*c*) That the division commander might be called upon to cruise at sea at any time, in which case the boards or conferences of the Army and Navy officers at seaports would be vitally important.

On the same day, September 27, I addressed the attached letter to Capt. Marvell, who I understood had charge of naval district matters in the Office of Operations. [Reading:]

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET, DIVISION TWO,
U. S. S. "Oregon," Flagship, September 27, 1918.

MY DEAR MARVELL: I received your letter of September 19, asking that a copy of my letter No. 375 be sent to you. It appears, that this letter should have been No. 378, and that you already have a copy of it.

In order to clear up the whole subject, I sent to Operations to-day a complete file of the correspondence. I must confess to you that I am completely mystified as to the real attitude of the Navy Department in this matter, and I wish that Operations would take me more into its confidence.

It must be plain that we can not coordinate or cooperate without occasionally meeting, discussing, and planning; and it seems to me that the more cordial the relations between Army and Navy commanders in any district, and the more often they confer and plan together, like officers of a single service for instance, the more complete our cooperation will be.

I am greatly disappointed that my efforts since February have apparently resulted in so little good. If organization is not thorough and complete it fails inevitably. From personal observation out here and from my conversation with all the different officers, it is my opinion that the organization here on this coast is painfully incomplete, and that real war conditions would result in more or less confusion and chaos.

I realize that there is practically no war in the Pacific and no need of serious alarm, but I consider this an excellent opportunity for a good practical drill in organization and preparedness for war on this coast.

I believe that my letter of August 25 to the commandants will make clear to them that the department objects to "formal joint boards," and they will put such a construction upon my letter of August 17 that it will not conflict with the wishes of the department.

W. F. FULLAM.

Capt. GEO. R. MARVELL,
United States Navy, Office of Naval Operations.

These two letters appeared to at least partially awaken the Office of Naval Operations to the true conditions, and it accordingly addressed to the division commander a letter dated October 9 expressing qualified approval of his views [reading]:

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, October 9, 1917.

From: Chief of Naval Operations.
To: Commander, Division 2.
Subject: Cooperation between Army and Navy.
References: (*a*) Op–9–B 24514, of May 26, 1917; (*b*) commander, Division 2, letter 524 of September 27, 1917.

1. Referring to paragraph 9 of reference (*b*) the commander of Division 2 states that he is by no means satisfied with the present organization, etc. Previous orders relative to the organization of naval districts contained in the regulations for naval districts and in correspondence between the two departments provide for joint action and cooperation of the Army and Navy authorities in each district.

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2. Reference (*a*) places the commander of the Patrol Force, Pacific Fleet, in general supervision of the twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth naval districts in order that a more satisfactory development of the organization of these naval districts might be insured and satisfactory cooperation obtained between the forces afloat and the forces ashore.

3. The commander of Division 2, therefore, has the power vested in him by reference (*a*) to insure the satisfactory working of the present organization of the west coast.

4. Referring to remarks on the use of the term "joint board," the department desires that this term be not used, as it is already utilized to designate a definite board now established.

5. The department concurs with the opinions of the commander of Division 2 expressed in paragraph 6 of reference (*b*).

W. S. BENSON.

On October 19 the division commander addressed the following letters to the department and to the commandants of districts outlining a plan of action which would tend to secure coordination by the Army and Navy in each district [reading]:

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET, DIVISION 2,
October 19, 1917.

To: The Secretary of the Navy (Operations).
Subject: Cooperation between the Army and the Navy.
References: (*a*) Operations' letter No. Op-14-Sm-D 10-6, 27383-139 of October 9, 1917.

1. Receipt is acknowledged of Operations' letter, reference (*a*), concerning the above subject.

2. The instructions contained in this letter will be most carefully observed and the division commander believes that he will now be able to bring about a hearty and effective cooperation between the Army and Navy commandants in the naval districts and at different ports on the Pacific coast.

3. It will be thoroughly understood that the conferences between Army and Navy officers will be informal and the officers of both services must very carefully conform to the instructions from the War and Navy Departments, respectively, in the formulation of any plans to meet possible emergencies.

4. Although there is no present cause for concern these conferences will be mutually instructive to the officers concerned and each service will realize the better how to cooperate with the other. It will be an excellent practical study and drill.

W. F. FULLAM.

OCTOBER 19, 1917.

To: Commandants, twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth naval districts.
Subject: Cooperation between Army and Navy.
References: (*a*) My letter No. 524 WFF-F of September 27, 1917.
Operations: (*b*) Operations' letter Op-14-Sm-D 10-6 27383-139, of October 9, 1917, to commander Division 2; (*c*) My letter No. 615-WFF-S of October 19, 1917, to Operations.
Inclosures: Three (copies of above references).

1. The attention of commandants of districts is called to the above references, and they will give to this subject renewed and immediate attention, with a view of securing, or perfecting plans for, complete and hearty cooperation with the Army officers commanding coast defenses or other units within the various naval districts.

2. Commandants will immediately invite conferences with Army commandants and acquaint them with the contents of the attached letters, and invite their cooperation in the formulations of plans that will best utilize whatever facilities now existing on this coast to meet any possible emergency.

3. It is important that each commandant of the Army or Navy shall most carefully consider and conform to whatever instructions he may have received from the War or Navy Department, concerning the subject of coast defense, in order that any plan agreed upon may not conflict in any manner with the wishes or instructions of superior authority. The questions to be discussed have been referred to in previous communications on this subject from the commander of the second division, and need not be repeated in this letter.

4. It is suggested that two plans be discussed: First, the means to be taken to utilize present facilities and recognizing actual conditions in the Pacific and the improbability

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of any serious enemy operations on this coast: second, a plan that would be necessary and the facilities and means that would be demanded in the event of enemy forces appearing on the Pacific coast.

5. The study of this subject will manifestly be of mutual benefit to officers of the Army and Navy in each district, and officers of each branch will the better realize the functions of the other and be the better prepared to cooperate.

6. It is suggested that these meetings by mutual consent be designated as "Army and Navy conferences," such and such a district or port; that these conferences should be informal; that they be held from time to time, whenever there is a change in the personnel or when conditions require a modification of the plans agreed upon; and that minutes of these conferences be kept, in order that there may be some continuity in the study and treatment of the subject.

7. In order that there may be no conflict with the War and Navy Departments, it is suggested that copies of the plans agreed upon be forwarded to the War and Navy Departments, through the department commander, and the commander, Second Division, Pacific Fleet, respectively.

8. It is not deemed necessary to refer to details in this letter, as it is believed that commandants and commanding officers in the different districts are thoroughly prepared to handle this matter successfully and with attention to every practical demand that would be forced by a state of war. It is the intention of the division commander to forward to each district copies of the plans outlined in all other districts, in order that each commandant may profit by the study and special features emphasized in all other districts.

9. It is requested that the proceedings of the conference first held, after the receipt of this letter, and the plans formulated thereby be forwarded to the division commander at the earliest practicable date.

W. F. FULLAM.

In concluding this remarkable account of eight months' vain effort by the senior naval officer in the Pacific to secure an effective organization and proper coordination of Army and Navy forces, it is proper to summarize as follows:

(1) The important recommendations made by the senior Army and naval officers on the Pacific coast were not approved by the Navy Department and were practically ignored for weeks.

(2) The appearance of three whales, mistaken for submarines off San Diego May 19, 1917, demonstrated the inadequacy of the Navy Department's organization, proved the lack of coordination of Army and Navy forces, and had more influence in bringing the Navy Department to act than the official report and recommendation of a rear admiral backed by the opinion of a brigadier general, made three months previously.

(3) Army commandants in the Pacific at all times showed a desire to cooperate with the Navy and entered into the plan of joint boards with enthusiasm, as shown by the correspondence in the attached confidential file. The Navy Department objected to a closely knit organization in the Pacific, and insisted that conferences should be "informal" rather than mandatory. This action practically forced the division commander to revoke or modify his orders and it decidedly lessened his authority or threw doubt upon it. The effect was most unfortunate.

(4) The reliance of the Navy Department upon its regulations proved to be ill-considered. Regulations alone never have and never will secure efficiency in the administration of war afloat or ashore. There must be personal action and thoroughness of organization with definite orders as to the exact part that each unit is to play. Without such explicit orders, and without a carefully prepared plan the Army and Navy can never coordinate effectively and the safety of the United States in war will be jeopardized. An

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"informal" organization, with the mere direction that Army and naval officers shall "keep in close touch," will not suffice. As well might we rely upon Navy Regulations alone to secure efficiency in our battle fleet.

(5) The objection of the Navy Department to local joint boards of Army and naval officers was inexplicable. I have been informed, however, that the Navy Department did not favor any real joint organization with the Army for offensive and defensive purposes, and that the Navy Department discouraged, if it did not forbid, meetings of the joint board in Washington during the one or two years before the war. I am not personally cognizant of this fact, but it came to me from a reliable source, and if true, it would explain the department's action toward joint boards in the Pacific in 1917. It would appear, therefore, that the Navy Department, and not the War Department, objected to this means of securing proper coordination. That is a matter I wish to leave for somebody else to investigate. But I am informed that the importance of the joint Army and Navy board is now recognized, and it is to be hoped that it will play a very important rôle hereafter in providing a proper system of coast and harbor defense for this country.

I was told that the Navy Department apparently was afraid that the Army and Navy joint board in Washington might meddle with questions of preparation for war, and therefore they did not want it to meet; and that the officers on it were afraid to push the matter, because they were afraid that the board would be abolished if they did meet. That, I say, is my information. I believe it, but I can not swear to it.

The invulnerable principle must be recognized that there shall be organization—definite, authoritative, and complete—or there will be chaos. There is no alternative. The Navy Department did not itself perfect, nor permit anybody else to perfect, a thorough organization on the Pacific coast between February, 1917, and October, 1917. The appearance of three whales off San Diego made the need of a new organization very plain. The existing machinery did not work. There was no head, no board of Army and Navy officers to control the situation, and there was no plan. Confusion was inevitable.

In conclusion, it is manifest that perfection of organization with due recognition of local authority in offensive and defensive measures, is peculiarly important on the Pacific coast, 3,000 miles from Washington.

In concluding this statement regarding the preparedness of the Navy for war as regards both personnel and material, it is only proper to state that the officers and men of the Navy were and always have been individually ready for war; that the unpreparedness of the Navy for war in 1917 was not primarily the fault of any officer or officers, but that it was due to the fact that the Navy Department as a whole declined or failed to adopt policies which demanded, or even permitted officers to prepare the Navy for its duty as a fighting machine.

That the officers and men of the Navy, both regular and reserve, did their whole duty with great gallantry and devotion is admitted by everybody, and that they contributed loyally to the winning of

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the war is also beyond question. That the bureau chiefs were in no sense responsible for the lack of preparedness of the Navy Department, and that they accomplished wonders as soon as their hands were free, can not be denied.

That we escaped disaster was plainly due to the fact that the enemy's fleet, with the exception of submarines, had been driven from the seas before we declared war against Germany. Furthermore, it is important to recognize that we had no naval war in the full sense of the word. No admiral led an American fleet into battle. Not one American ship fired a single gun at a German ship, and not a German ship fired a single gun at an American ship, with the exception of a few engagements between German submarines and our destroyers, armed merchant ships, and small craft, and noting the gallant little fight made by our subchasers at Durazzo. It was a war without naval battles.

In other words, there was, strictly speaking, less sea fighting than in the war with Spain, and the Navy of the United States was not fully tested as to its readiness for battle nor as to the adequacy of all its units to meet the emergency of war had Germany's fleet been free to take the sea against us.

Escaping as we did by our great good fortune, in that the German fleet never appeared after the Battle of Jutland in June, 1916, it is the duty of every naval officer who realizes the actual condition of our unpreparedness to tell the truth upon the occasion of the investigation of the conduct of the war by a coordinate branch of the United States Government, in order that the people of this country may no longer be deceived and that the United States may not again be threatened by the inexcusable failure of the Navy Department to prepare the fleet in all respects for sudden war at any time in the future.

The time has come to face the facts and to ask this question: Was the fleet of the United States, with all its units and auxiliaries; with its available supply of ammunition, torpedoes, mines, and submarines; with no battle cruisers, no scout cruisers, and with a pitifully inadequate force of scouts and destroyers; with an air service composed of only 45 trained aviators; with its ships largely manned with green, untrained men and reserve officers of little naval experience; was this fleet so constituted even though its officers and personnel were unexcelled in the world for bravery and devotion to duty, was this fleet in all respects in readiness in the spring of 1917, or at any time during the World War, to line up for battle against the German fleet with a fair chance of victory, taking into account the cold facts as shown when the British fleet met the Germans at the battle of Jutland? The commanders in chief of our fleets must gravely consider the facts and answer this question with solemn regard for the consequences. If we were in all respects ready to defeat the German fleet as it existed at Jutland in June, 1916, the Navy Department may claim the credit for our preparedness; if we were not in condition to beat the German fleet in April, 1917, the Navy Department alone is responsible for neglect to prepare for that battle during the four preceding years.

The articles for the government of the United States Navy, found in the Revised Statutes—laws passed by Congress to fix the duties

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and responsibilities of officers of the Navy—contain the following provision:

That a commissioned officer of the Navy, being in command of a fleet, squadron, or vessel acting singly, who neglects when an engagement is probable, or when an armed vessel of an enemy or rebel is in sight, to prepare his ship for action; or does not afford all practicable relief and assistance to vessels of the United States or their allies when engaged in battle, shall suffer death or such other punishment as a court-martial may adjudge.

But a naval officer's duty does not, or should not, begin and end in battle, nor in time of war. He has duties and responsibilities before the war and before the battles begin. And it should be clearly understood that any officer of the Navy who sits supinely or subserviently idle and indifferent when an armed enemy nation with an efficient fighting navy is in plain sight (and has been for years), and fails with energy to prepare and to urge others to prepare his country's navy for war, when he knows or should know that it is unprepared in every respect, is unworthy of his cloth; that he is neglecting his first duty, fails to measure up to the standards of the American Navy, and is deserving of a more severe punishment than a captain who fails to prepare a ship for battle. The neglect in time of peace to prepare the great Navy of a great nation for battle imperils the whole country, and for this reason the offense is the more reprehensible.

The experience of the past demonstrates clearly, if we probe for the facts, that in throttling and ignoring officers of high rank who are seeking zealously and patriotically to prepare the Navy for war, the real truth concerning the Navy may be suppressed, the public may be deceived, and as an inevitable result the Navy may be placed in a condition of unreadiness involving danger of humiliating and disastrous defeat, or that it may fail to put forth its best efforts in affording "all practicable relief and assistance to our allies" when engaged in war.

The Navy of the United States was not properly prepared for war in April, 1917. The question is, Shall such a condition be permitted to exist again in the future?

The CHAIRMAN. You said that you were one of the Secretary's aids at one time. Will you state how long you served in that capacity?

Admiral FULLAM. I was ordered to Washington in February, 1913, as aid to Mr. Meyer. I was aid for inspections under Secretary Meyer, and I was his aid for about a month, and I observed his general policies. In fact, I had known Mr. Meyer personally and he knew that I had been on the Mahan Commission for the Navy Department organization, and that I was familiar with it, and he had consulted me and written to me to get all information about the work of Admiral Mahan and of that commission.

The CHAIRMAN. You say you were his aid for about a month?

Admiral FULLAM. Yes; about a month.

The CHAIRMAN. Did he not go out of office on March 4?

Admiral FULLAM. When that change took place I became one of the aids for Mr. Daniels, and I remained his aid from the 4th of March until about the middle of February of the next year; first, as aid for inspection, and then afterwards Mr. Daniels sent me over as aid for personnel.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you tell me anything about Mr. Meyer's general policy as regards the administration of the department?

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Admiral FULLAM. As I say, Mr. Meyer took a very serious view of the utilization of the Navy Department to prepare the Navy for actual war. He always encouraged all naval officers to study that subject specially, and that is why, I think, he had me ordered down there, because he knew that I had been associated with Admiral Mahan, and his first idea seemed to be to recognize that the Navy was the first line of the Nation's defense.

The CHAIRMAN. What was Secretary Daniels's general policy?

Admiral FULLAM. Well, I regret very much to say that Secretary Daniels did not take the same interest in the preparation of the Navy for war. He regarded it—he was greatly interested in many things that were good, but, generally they did not affect the preparation of the Navy for war, or stimulate officers to exert themselves. The question of fighting efficiency, getting down to the awful conditions of fighting, were not pleasant, and he gave no encouragement to it at all—none at all. As an instance of that, when war was threatened in 1913 with a certain foreign power, I got very much wrought up about it. I was aid for inspections or personnel then, and I drew up a memorandum of things that I thought ought to be immediately done; oh, anybody would say that they should be done. But I did not take that to Mr. Daniels at all. I did not want him to know that I drew it up. I was one of his official family, but I did not feel encouraged to take it to him, because I had seen Admiral Fiske take papers like that to him, and he would not pay any attention to it.

The CHAIRMAN. What did you do with it?

Admiral FULLAM. I did not tell the aids that I did it. I did not want anybody to know that I had written it. I took it to Mr. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, who usually—always—took a lively interest in the Navy and in the cooperation of the Navy with the Army; and I was encouraged to go to him frankly, as I wanted to do with the Secretary. We all wanted to gather around the Secretary as a man and a brother, and we would have been only too happy to do it, for the glory of the Navy and to help him, and he would have had all the credit—every bit of it. But I could not. I took it to Mr. Roosevelt.

I remember that memorandum; I can repeat the items of it. I said, "Mr. Roosevelt, do you approve this?" He read it over, and he said, "Yes; every bit of it." I said, "Will you take that as yours, and do not mention my name as ever having written it, and do not let anybody know that I wrote it, and will you present it to the Secretary of the Navy this afternoon?" He said he would, and he took it in there, and I remember so well that he sat down in his chair, and he put this paper on the desk of the office between his feet, and he read off from time to time the items; and, coming from him as a civilian to the Secretary of the Navy, it had some effect, and some of those things were done. Among them was a very important suggestion to get the few submarines we had across the Isthmus by building a cradle and getting them across by rail, because the canal was not finished.

Another item was to get all the naval officers on the retired list and on inactive duty assigned to shore duty, so that the active, physically perfect men could go to sea; and it seemed that from this a rather amusing situation took place. The Bureau of Navigation was so rattled at getting a suggestion to really do something—I do

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not hesitate to say so—that they assigned this duty of assigning retired officers to duty to a picked-up board of three comparatively young officers. I was told this afterwards by Capt. French, who in the Pacific was one of my flag captains.

They picked up a board of young officers, and they tackled this job. They were unfamiliar with the personnel of the Navy; they did not know the names of these retired officers; they did not know the names of the officers, even on the active list, who were practically incapacitated; and their recommendations were very amusing. They had a one-legged captain, who was on the retired list, ordered to command a battleship. They had officers who were out here in St. Elizabeth Insane Asylum and at Las Animas and at other places assigned to important duties, and the thing was impossible. It had to be completely revoked. I knew Admiral Luce intimately. I loved that old man, because he never dreamed or thought of anything but the Navy and its preparation for the emergency for which it exists; and when I would tell him about these things he would say, "Oh, Fullam, you can not help it. The United States always goes to war in a very casual sort of way." This reminded me of it. This was just an instance.

The CHAIRMAN. You say that coming from a civilian this recommendation had some effect. Do you mean by that that the Secretary resented suggestions made by officers of the Navy?

Admiral FULLAM. I would not say that Mr. Daniels resented them. He was one of the most agreeable men personally that I ever had anything to do with.

The CHAIRMAN. But he did not pay any attention to it?

Admiral FULLAM. He did not think the naval officers—he did not want to give admirals much authority, and I can not tell you how it hurt us. He did not trust us. He did not take our advice, and realize that we were citizens of the United States just as he was, and that it was our life to do that thing and to help him to do it. It was a very trying situation, and I never would have stayed there and suffered if I had known that he was going to continue in that attitude. And that uncovers a very trying situation that naval officers were subjected to. We would support the view of Mr. Meyer's policies with great enthusiasm, because they were directed toward the preparation of the Navy for war. It was not, to him, a political matter at all, or anything else; it was to prepare the Navy for war. How could I, the next day after Mr. Meyer left office and I became Mr. Daniel's aid, view with equal enthusiasm and zeal policies that destroyed and smashed everything that Mr. Meyer had attempted to do or did do? It is impossible, unless a naval officer can turn his coat in 24 hours and say one thing to-day and another thing to-morrow; say yes when the Secretary says yes and say no when the Secretary says no. It is impossible. And as soon as I found out that that position was going to be permanent, I got out of the Navy Department as quick as I could. I applied for duty at sea. I would not have stayed there for a thousand dollars a month in addition to my pay. It was impossible.

The CHAIRMAN. You say that Secretary Meyer's policies were not based on politics, at all. Were Secretary Daniel's based at all on politics?

Admiral FULLAM. I ask you please to withdraw that question.

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The CHAIRMAN. Very well. Now, Admiral, you stated that you were the secretary of the Mahan-Moody commission.

Admiral FULLAM. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you give the committee, briefly, the facts in regard to that commission?

Admiral FULLAM. I know all about it; and to me it was the most wonderfully illuminating experience of my whole life, and I look back to it with more joy and satisfaction than anything else I have had to do since I have been in the Navy. Explaining that, I will just say that before the Spanish War, when Mr. Theodore Roosevelt was Assistant Secretary of the Navy I became intimately acquainted with him, and one day he asked me—he was usually curious, and asking people—what I thought was the one thing of all others that was most necessary to secure an efficient Navy. Well, that was a pretty terrific question to ask a lieutenant; but I was 43 years old, older than many Senators, and I had been at sea a good while, and had been around the world; and I said to him that I thought that the most trouble was that the Navy was handled too much from the beach and not enough from the sea, and it greatly amused him, and he gave one of those characteristic grins; and two weeks later, after he got back to Washington, he told me to write him—he reminded me of this conversation and asked me to write him—and I wrote him 20 pages. I never wrote anything that delighted me so much, in my life; and he never forgot it. And so, in 1908, about 10 years after this remark, although we met frequently, and he never forgot to mention it, he made me secretary of this board on reorganization of the Navy Department, and I knew that I was going to be secretary a month before, and I took there from the office of Naval Intelligence sketches of all the organizations of the great navies of the world, Great Britain, France, Germany, Japan, and ours, arranged in blue prints, with a file for each member of this commission, and I took there the report of the Essher commission, appointed to reorganize the British War Office after the Boer War. This Essher commission report is a classic. Everybody who wants to know anything about War or Navy Department organization, in fact every citizen of the United States who is interested in the Army or the Navy, ought to read that report. That report, strangely enough, recommended for the oganization of the British Army practically the same organization that they had in the British Admiralty, because they said that that organization was wonderful; that it had carried Great Britain through every war, and that it, to their minds, was the best guide for the organization of their Army. I had that ready for the members of the commission and I gave to Admiral Mahan all those things.

Then Admiral Mahan, Mr. Paul Morton, and Admiral Folger were made a subcommittee to draw up an organization, and I was with them; they made me an assistant of that subcommittee, though I really was secretary of the whole committee. So they drew that up; and then they asked Admiral Mahan to write a little monologue on the subject, and he used that expression, that the Department of the Navy should be so organized that it can pass from a state of peace to a state of war without a jar of its machinery; and the admiral did not wreck anything in the Navy. He kept every agency in our Navy just as it is to-day, but he only grouped them under this aid

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so that they could work together like a band of brothers—material, personnel, and other agencies; and he said to us that that was the answer, in our country; and he said to us, the whole thing recognized, almost sentimentally, the supremacy of the civil power and the necessity for providing that nobody should ever for one instant doubt that officers of the Navy must recognize that fundamental principle of our Constitution; and he recommended one more aid than the four that had been used by Secretary Meyer; he recommended the fifth aid, who, he said, should be the final and the confidential adviser of the Secretary of the Navy in all technical matters and in the preparation for war. This officer, he said, should stand by the Secretary, to keep him informed of everything, keep nothing from him, give him everything from the other aids, see that he knew the whole thing; and that this aid, being in touch with the Secretary and knowing the policies of the United States Government and the Secretary's policies and wishes, would in time of war, if the Secretary so desired, stand ready to go to sea and take command of the whole fleet, just as Admiral Jellicoe did just before the World War in connection with the British fleet. I remember that so well.

This report, sir, was brief, but it was an outline and splendid; and I stayed there with Admiral Luce after the other members went away, and drew it up, and they all signed it before they left except Justice Moody, and when I had finished it I took it to Justice Moody at the Supreme Court and he signed it and told me to take it to the President. I took it to the White House. Mr. Roosevelt glanced at it—it was short—and he was delighted. And he remembered his previous conversations and conferences with me, and he said, "Well, Captain, possibly we have driven in an entering wedge that may result in the principle that the Navy may be controlled in some measure from the sea instead of entirely from the beach"; and he gave me one of those characteristic smiles that I think all Americans love to think about.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you a copy of that report?

Admiral FULLAM. No, sir. I have it, but not here. I have it filed away.

The CHAIRMAN. Could you furnish that to the committee to put in the record?

Admiral FULLAM. It is buried deep under boxes of my impedimenta at Annapolis. It ought to be obtainable at the Navy Department.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you tell us where we can get it at the Navy Department?

Admiral FULLAM. I am sorry to say I can not. I think I can get it, though. It is a very brief thing. Mr. Meyer made me tell him all about that, and then he took this report—he did not want to be hasty—and he brought up the subject and he gave that to a board of officers presided over by Admiral Swift, and they considered the subject in great detail, and then practically approved of Admiral Mahan's and Mr. Moody's commission report, and that is why Mr. Meyer put it in force and effect; but he had no authority of Congress, and therefore the aid system was never legally authorized, and it was not forceful for that reason.

The CHAIRMAN. Are the navies of any other countries controlled or administered by civilian heads?

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Admiral FULLAM. Yes, sir; and, to my knowledge, the French Navy and the British Navy have civilians at the head. I do not know so very much about the French Navy, though I had studied it at that time; but they have had their troubles, worse than we have at times. I remember one case of a statesman, Camille Pelletan, who had charge of the French Ministry of Marine. I have here some very brief accounts of the results of his administration, which I think should be known. [Reading:]

Camille Pelletan's administration was disastrous to the navy. And yet he was a patriot, animated by the best intentions. Unfortunately, almost all his ideas were contrary to a good organization of the navy department, where so many out-of-date and incomprehensible traditions survive. He left his department in chaotic disorder.

This letter then goes on—it is in the archives of the Office of Naval Intelligence that you can find this thing. He says here:

The navy is succumbing to a double anarchy—anarchy at the top, due to an out-of-date organization of the central services of the ministry, which has permitted politics to reduce in a few years all the services to a state of complete impotency and irresponsibility; anarchy from below, due equally to the intrusion of the political element into our dockyards, thanks to which intrusion the dockyards have cased to be able to build and maintain the fleet.

Speaking of Camille Pellatan as Minister of Marine of France in Les Marines Francaise et Allemande, 1904, the author states that the distinguishing characteristic of M. Pelletan's régime is "an increased tendency to lessen the combatant corps, to lower its prestige, to belittle it in the minds of the enlisted men and the public."

* * * * * * *

The name of democracy has been invoked to explain this merciless war on the spirit of discipline and duty; it was pretended that it was desired to make the navy democratic. It is one of the most daring jokes that a minister has ever permitted himself to play. Between demoralization and democratization there is an abyss.

Those things can be found in the Office of Naval Intelligence, and that is why the French Navy was wrecked. And it never recovered. An official examination into its history since that time—it is sad. I say this with regret, but perhaps I ought not to fully say that. They have tried hard. But when you wreck an organization and get wrong principles insidiously into it, it takes a long, long time for that organization to recover.

And another explanation for the reason the French Navy went to pieces was the lack of recognition of the fact that naval officers have a right to say something about the navy.

American naval officers are citizens of the United States. Now, this writer is a captain in the French Navy, and he writes this article. He says:

It seems to me to be a propitious time to make at least one seaman's voice heard in the passionate debate now going on about the principles of naval warfare. It is curious, indeed, to note the officers are vainly to be sought among the many spokesmen of the two opposing parties, which are daily strenghtened by new recruits and sit in judgment on a technical question of vital concern to the Nation.

Unless it can be shown that naval men are incompetent to discuss their own profession, we can not admit that they alone should remain silent in regard to the principles which ought to govern the constitution of the fleet.

There is much to be done in France in the way of freeing the voices and pens of naval officers from the strict rules which limit them in the great field of discussion of naval affairs. The English Government sets us a very good example in this respect, as it always does where naval matters are concerned.

This is a French officer writing this [continuing reading]:

At the very moment when a few years ago we gave to certain officers, with extreme parsimony and under many restrictions, authority to hold conferences in the name of

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the Naval League, Admiral Charles Beresford was uttering loud protests and complaints on professional subjects in the journals and at public meetings without any attempt on the part of the Admiralty to interfere in the slightest degree with his freedom of speech.

Such an attitude is justified by the importance which the British Admiralty has always attached to the education of public opinion in regard to all maritime questions and also by the very clear perception that the ideas expressed by an officer, however eminent, commit no one but himself and have only the exact value which people are willing to give to them.

There is no doubt that we must attribute to the fixed rule of silence, imposed even now upon our experts, the unfortunate fact that in our country first principles are constantly being questioned and the same sterile discussions are periodically renewed.

Now, that is the opinion of a French captain about the bad effects of smothering and throttling naval officers, and it is my duty to say right here that when a system like that takes place in a republic it is not consistent. If an admiral in the navy is told that he can not say that 2 and 2 make 4, it is a decree. It is not democracy; it is autocracy. And if the president of a war college is reprimanded severely for writing a paper and reading it at a dinner—I heard it read; it is a classic; it is a paper that Admiral Mahan would have subscribed to instantly, and he was reprimanded with great severity. I deplore that such things can be possible, because those officers ought to be called by the Secretary of the Navy to surround him, and he ought to discuss matters with them.

The CHAIRMAN. What letter are you referring to now—from the president of the War College?

Admiral FULLAM. Oh, in 1915, in the early months of 1915, Mr. Daniels wrote to me and to Admiral Knight and asked us to attend as representatives of the Navy a society dinner in New York City and to address that society, as they wished. I did not want to go there. I had my own job, and speechmaking, to me—I do not like it. I do it when I am compelled to. But I went, and when they called on me I spoke extemporaneously. Admiral Knight prepared a paper, but I did not. I knew he would cover the serious subjects of the Navy, as he always did everything with wonderful language, and he is a man of quick intelligence, and I knew he was going to have a paper; so that I spoke extemporaneously. I spoke first and then he read this letter, and it was one of the finest things I have ever heard. It was just on a line with Admiral Mahan's work and with all his writings, about the organization of the Navy Department and the control of the Navy that would make it ready for battle, and it was dignified, it was classical.

I was amazed a few days later when Admiral Knight came to see me at Annapolis and told me that he had been raked over the coals, and he felt so badly—he was afraid that he was going to be court-martialed for reading that letter.

Then I had to send my notes on to the Secretary. Fortunately, my remarks were more or less jocular, and more or less on the human side, and the Secretary returned them to me without comment.

But I felt that when admirals of high rank, who have been 40 years in the Navy are not permitted to speak at all about the service in which their whole life has been spent, and where their energies are concentrated, it is not democracy, sir; it is autocracy. It is bad.

The CHAIRMAN. We are not on the subject, Admiral, of a civilian head of the Navy, but you have cited the question of Admiral Pelle-

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tan. In general, do you think that having a civilian head of the Navy in France and England has worked out badly for those countries?

Admiral FULLAM. It has entirely worked badly in France, but not because of having a civilian there. Look at England. The First Lord of the Admiralty is a civilian. They never have had any trouble there, because that civilian recognizes that the British Navy is the first line of defense of the empire, and that the empire will go to smash and ruin if the Navy is not administered properly. And he has a serious realization of the terrible responsibility that rests upon him; and furthermore, he can not, under the laws that control the constitution and the direction of the Navy, give direct military commands, or control very important matters, without consulting with his connections, the sea lords of the Admiralty, who go to sea. He must consult with them; and as a practice, they work together.

The CHAIRMAN. You are referring now, to the Secretary of State for the Navy?

Admiral FULLAM. No, the First Lord of the British Admiralty. Now, there is an amusing case in point. An Englishman recently told me this. This is his statement that I quote, and I think he is right; that it was accurate. He said one time Mr. Goschen, whom you will all remember, who has had a very important rôle—I think he was ambassador to Germany, was he not, before this war—he was one of the ambassadors just before this war to one of the great powers, a distinguished statesman of Great Britain, was temporarily free from political or from governmental duty or assignment, and they made him First Lord of the Admiralty in recognition of his abilities and his statesmanship; and he had, as it happened, never taken the slightest interest in the Navy, or never been associated with the Navy. It was not a matter that was particularly congenial to him. He had been a statesman in a broad sense. So it caused some merriment in the British press that Mr. Goschen should be made First Lord of the Admiralty, they remembering Pinafore, and they said funny things; and among other things—this Englishman told me this only recently—Punch said,

"Mr. Goschen
Has no notion
Of the motion
Of the ocean."

But it did not matter whether he did or not, because he called to his assistance, and to coordinate with him, officers who had made British naval history for 50 years; and they knew about "the motion of the ocean," and they knew how to make the British navy—to bring it to such a condition that it would defend the British empire, and therefore no harm resulted, and that is all there is about it.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you think it is a question of the character of the civilian head more than anything else?

Admiral FULLAM. Well, men differ. All men do differ in their ideas.

I want to emphasize one thing, that not one naval officer in a hundred in our Navy would wish to have a military man—a naval man—as Secretary of the Navy. We want a civilian. We want him, why? Because we are citizens of the United States, and we are loyal to the fundamental principles. Nobody in this Nation is more loyal to our principles of government than the Army and Navy offi-

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cers, of the regulars, because that is bred in their bones; and I would not for an instant see an officer there. But we do want a man who will utilize our brains, and rally us around him, and say, "Come on, now; let us all get together and work for the Navy."

Admiral Fiske said one or two things here yesterday I want to speak of. He did not know about that educational scheme. I would like to say one or two words about that.

The CHAIRMAN. I was about to ask you about that.

Admiral FULLAM. Because Admiral Fiske was pretty busy with a good many other things, and that was my job.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you prefer to finish to-day, Admiral, or come back again? We would like to finish to-day if we can.

Admiral FULLAM. I can finish in 5 or 10 minutes. I do not wish to prolong my remarks.

The CHAIRMAN. I have one or two other questions to ask you, and probably Senator Trammell has some questions; so that if you will go ahead, very well.

Admiral FULLAM. Yes, sir. I was aide for personnel, and I knew that Mr. Daniels wanted this educational scheme put in force, and I thought it was useless to oppose him. I did not think it wise to do so. And, furthermore, there was a great deal of good in it; so that I outlined a scheme to carry out his general plan, and particularly emphasizing the professional spirit, in order that all men in the Navy might make themselves eligible for promotion, and go along up the list; and in my draft I made the academic instruction optional with each man after he left the training station, except for men who were illiterate. But when I presented this draft the Secretary insisted that they should all be forced to go to school, whether they wanted to go or not. Now, this did not induce men to go into the Navy. It would tend to drive them out; because there were many men between 17 and 25 who did not want to go to school, who had been to school; so that I think it did harm. But I insisted that the general scheme, particularly when you took into account the professional part of it, might do no harm, and we had better let it go through, and I pushed it along and helped Mr. Daniels to. But if he had not been extreme about it, it would have worked. But it was so emphasized that the officers of the Navy had to look upon that as the principal duty of the Navy; and therefore, it hurt the Navy, it hurt the morale of the Navy, in the minds of men and officers, in that the minds of men and officers, instead of being directed towards getting ready to fight—it was a university. And it was harmful. And where is it now? The aide for education has folded his tent and gone, and the whole system is a dead letter in the Navy. It was extreme; that is all.

I went to Scranton, Pa., and investigated the correspondence schools, and that, I thought, was a good thing because it encouraged men aboard ship to study. That did not require men to attend school; but they could study. The commanding officer was asked to give them a place where they could study. That was an excellent plan. In other words, I tried to make the Secretary see that education was nothing new in the Navy. Admiral Luce 40 years before started education in the Navy. There were three admirals in the Navy who graduated from the apprentice system. But when the men became older, from 17 to 25 years of age, it was not so necessary. We had all these vocational schools. Why, we had education to

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burn in the Navy. There was no discovery of something new there, at all; nothing. It was nothing new.

And about the democratizing of the Navy, I talked to the Secretary about that. I told him he was mistaken, that there was no aristocracy in the Navy; that there was nothing of that sort; that officers loved their men, and were ten times more solicitous of their men than any employer in civil life is of his; that I had seen officers put under suspension because they did not have a boat's crew put in rain clothes before they left the ship when rain was probable, or because they did not save dinner for the gig's crew when they were away from the ship. And the men of the Navy, why, we stood together all our lives. Admiral Huse jumped overboard not long ago and saved the life of an enlisted man—an admiral of the Navy. They are doing it all the time. Why, sir, I would rather be in a street car or in any public place with enlisted men of the Navy than with nine-tenths of the civilians in this country.

Those charges of caste and aristocracy hurt the Navy. The officers felt hurt. There is no sense in it. And when you hurt the feelings, and cut down deeply into the feelings of officers, it causes what? Resentment, enmity, permanent resentment, and permanent enmity; and that does hurt. It hurts the morale. It does something that ought never to be done. No, sir; there is no caste, sir, or aristocracy. There are traditions that were established by John Paul Jones and Decatur, perpetuated by Farragut and Porter and Sampson and Dewey and Mahan and Evans and Brownson and Schroeder and Wainwright, and men like that. And if you call that caste or aristocracy, the more you have of it the better for the Navy and for this country; and when you wreck it, you will wreck the Navy, just as sure as there is a God in heaven.

The CHAIRMAN. In your testimony you have said several times that you could not get anywhere on account of the inertia of the Navy Department. Do I understand that that refers to the Secretary or to the officers of the Navy or to the bureaus of the Navy?

Admiral FULLAM. Now, sir, I do not want to be too personal.

The CHAIRMAN. No; but it is necessary for the committee to know this.

Admiral FULLAM. But I do think it is my duty now to tell the truth, because it is a national question; it is not a personal question; nor have I any personal feeling—please, I want to emphasize that.

The CHAIRMAN. This is not to bring out any personal feeling, but to find out where the hold-up was.

Admiral FULLAM. I do not believe that an officer of the Navy on duty at the Navy Department at any time has intentionally failed in or neglected his duty. Duty is a passion with him. It is the life of every man in the Navy. I know it, because it so happens that I have instructed, myself personally, and been in contact with, every officer in the Navy from the lower numbers on the admirals' list nearly down to the bottom. Thirty-one different graduating classes of the naval academy have come under my inspection and instruction, and I have bothered them, somehow or other, during one year or two years at the naval academy; and I know what they are made of, and I know that they all do their duty and are obedient. Obedience is instinctive, and they would never think of violating it. I do not think that our failure to prepare for war—I know it—was due to

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one thing with the Navy Department; our Government did not weigh—did not consider the subject of preparation for war, and they discouraged its consideration by everybody at the Navy Department. I saw Admiral Fiske go there day after day and try to get the Secretary to do something; and how he could have stood it I do not see, month after month. No attention was paid. It could not be done. It was impossible; until that office of Chief of Operations was forced upon the Secretary. Mr. Holson told me just the other day that he took that to Mr. Daniels, and when Mr. Daniels looked at it he said, "I will fight that. If that is adopted, I will go home." And for that reason the Naval Committee of the House was moved, I think, to change it in one or two very important matters, unfortunately, and that was war plans. If it had not been for Mr. Holson and Admiral Fiske that office of Operations would never have been organized. I can not conceive of the department taking any initiative it did not take for the organization of that office of Operations after Mr. Holson presented the plans. Holson told me that they had to meet in his house in secret, and to call officers, like Admiral Knapp, up there to meet them, so as not to let the Secretary know about it.

That is a pathetic state of affairs, and it was done by an officer who was about to be dismissed from the Navy Department. In his determined and zealous desire to see that the Navy was safeguarded he went up there with Holson, and they got their heads together and made that organization, and that organization of that office of Naval Operations is the only thing that saved the day for the Navy in this war. It was a splendid thing, and those officers did splendid work, all of them. Every one of them did splendid work. I can not make it clearer than that.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you have no complaint to make about inertia or lack of cooperation on the part of any officer of the Navy or any department of the Navy in any plans for the government of the Navy that you came across during the war?

Admiral FULLAM. No, sir. On the contrary I believe those officers all wanted to do it; but, sir, they have gotten down to this point. There is a dangerous idea getting around that you have got to efface yourself; that you have got to agree absolutely with somebody else; and that is going to ruin the Navy if you keep it up. If you establish the principle that a man has got to be subservient, almost servile, almost to efface himself, and say yes, and not dare to express himself the inevitable result of that is that you will put mediocrity itself upon a pedestal, and you will throw ability and zeal into the discard, and you will hurt the Navy if that system becomes embedded in the Navy Department. Officers must be assigned to duty not by reason of their subservience, but by reason of their ability, and they must be ready to leave any job and go to sea, to leave any important job on shore where they may have a palace, and take two rooms and a bath, if necessary, to go away, when they find that it is planned to do something that will injure the Navy and not prepare the Navy for war.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Keyes, have you any questions?

Senator KEYES. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Trammell?

Senator TRAMMELL. Admiral, I have a great deal of respect for naval officers, and I want that understood. I think taking them as

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a whole, they are very capable, and they are a very patriotic and very efficient set of men; but I gather from your testimony that the naval officers are practically infallible, and that the civilian officials are responsible entirely for any neglect that occurred in the operation of the Navy in the carrying on of the war; is that correct?

Admiral FULLAM. No, sir.

Senator TRAMMELL. You said every naval officer did his duty.

Admiral FULLAM. Well, no, sir; I hardly——

Senator TRAMMELL. I understood you to say that. At least, your statement would carry that inference with it.

Admiral FULLAM. Well, I am sorry if it did. I am speaking now under the pressure of feeling, because it is a very serious situation; but I will emphasize it, that I do not believe that men in civil life in any profession take duty and obedience as seriously as naval officers do, and I do not believe they do their duty as well.

Senator TRAMMELL. Well, of course that is a matter of opinion. I have found that the people connected with the Navy—and I have a great deal of respect for them—were human, just like anybody else.

Admiral FULLAM. That is right.

Senator TRAMMELL. And I have occasionally run up against some fellows of a bad character filling pretty important positions in the Navy, and I think you find them there as well as you find them all through life. You do find them all through life; nd ou can not pick out and throw the cloak of infallibility around naval officials and say that everybody else is all wrong. The Navy officials themselves have clashes, and have differences of opinion, and I think you are entitled to your opinion; but I do not think that a civilian is to be reflected upon merely because he might maintain an opinion different from that that a naval officer might have. I have a great deal of respect for the Navy, and no doubt you have a fine lot of men and officers; but I have not found them all absolutely infallible, nor have I found them all absolutely tiptop when it comes to business or official duties. I have had some experience and observed some of them.

Admiral FULLAM. I agree with you.

Senator TRAMMELL. If that was not true, you would not have to court-martial some of them now and then.

Admiral FULLAM. No, sir.

Senator TRAMMELL. I have a great deal of respect for them; but I am just trying to——

Admiral FULLAM. Please do not let me seem to carry the point that far, to assert that all naval officers are better than all civilians, at all. We are appointed to the Navy by Congressmen. We can not get there without a Congressman appoints us; and if there are any incompetents they were appointed by some member of Congress, or a Senator, or the President. We can not get into the Navy in any other way.

Senator TRAMMELL. A Congressman or a Senator is liable to make a mistake, and somebody that was a great deal wiser than a Congressman or a Senator made a mistake once, and got a Judas mixed up with his organization; but because they make a mistake is not any reason——

Admiral FULLAM. I tried to make it very clear that I respect the civil power absolutely. I do not think anybody in the world respects

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the coordinate branches of our Government so much and has such a sentimental feeling of loyalty for them and respect for them as naval officers have.

Senator TRAMMELL. I know, you stated that before in response to a question of the chairman; you said that none of the naval officers were responsible for anything that had gone wrong at all. That was the substance of it.

Admiral FULLAM. They could not be responsible because they can not control policies, and they can not get money, and they can not get men, and they can not get guns, and they can not get torpedoes, and they can not get small arms, and they can not get anything to do anything with themselves. They carry on the routine of their duty, and the most that I wanted to do, sir, was to say that their functions should be recognized, and that an admiral 40 years of age should be regarded as having probably a better idea of the Navy than any man in civil life, however distinguished he might be—some admirals. That is all; because they concentrate on that. That is all, sir.

Senator TRAMMELL. I do not question that at all, and I think you have done a splendid work; from your recital of your work here I think you have done a splendid work; I am impressed that way; but if you have a Secretary of the Navy, and our Constitution and system of government so provides, now he might make mistakes by exercising some judgment himself, but he has either got to do one of two things; he has either got to be a rubber stamp and carry out the will of the naval officers, or else he has got to be a man who stands four corners to the wind and exercises some judgment himself. He has got to be one or the other.

Admiral FULLAM. We want a strong man. We love to serve under strong men. I do not want to have anything else.

Senator TRAMMELL. The fact that a Secretary might disagree with a naval officer——

Admiral FULLAM. A naval officer, yes, sir.

Senator TRAMMELL. Is no particular reflection upon the Secretary or no particular reflection upon the naval officer. Each one of them has his province and duties to perform. Now, the naval officer might have made a mistake in that instance, or the Secretary, I do not know which. It is testified here in some cases, that a naval officer has made some mistakes, probably, in some instances, and probably the Secretary has made some mistakes. So that we are all more or less subject to fallibility.

Admiral FULLAM. Yes, sir.

Senator TRAMMELL. We are all, I suppose, striving for the proper end, from our viewpoints.

Now, in the question of recommendations and suggestions, you were very energetic and made quite a number of recommendations in regard to the Pacific Fleet; but while it seems that they were not always approved of, I did not hear you read any letter rebuking you or reprimanding you for making suggestions.

Admiral FULLAM. Oh, no.

Senator TRAMMELL. You had that right, did you, to make suggestions and recommendations?

Admiral FULLAM. Oh, yes, sir.

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Senator TRAMMELL. Just as you did?

Admiral FULLAM. Yes, sir.

Senator TRAMMELL. The Secretary did not object to that, even if he did not happen to agree with you?

Admiral FULLAM. Oh, no; no.

Senator TRAMMELL. The men under you, I suppose, were authorized to make recommendations to you, were they?

Admiral FULLAM. Yes, sir; they were invited to do so.

Senator TRAMMELL. You did not always approve of them, though, did you?

Admiral FULLAM. Well, I do not remember of anybody making any recommendation to me that I did not approve, because they were all working on one job, with innate intelligence.

Senator TRAMMELL. That is your policy, then, as a rule to approve recommendations made to you by subordinate officers?

Admiral FULLAM. There is nothing in the world that gives me so much joy as to approve and encourage my subordinates and to make them feel that I am using every ounce of brains they have got in their heads.

Senator TRAMMELL. I think that is very proper, but if you approve of everything they do, do they think that you are exercising every ounce of brains in your own head?

Admiral FULLAM. Well, Senator, I will leave them to say.

Senator TRAMMELL. If you accept what they say every time?

Admiral FULLAM. I will leave them to answer that question for me. If they think I have not got the brains, all right. I will not speak of my own brains.

Senator TRAMMELL. You said you were utilizing and accepting every ounce of brains they had; and you also said you always approved of their recommendations. You take those two statements and it would indicate that you were letting them govern and control so far as their recommendations were concerned, and you were not exercising your own brains.

Admiral FULLAM. Well, Senator, I have made a mistake in bringing that up. I think my brains have been pretty thoroughly occupied.

Senator TRAMMELL. I know they have, but I am just taking what you say. I do not question but what you are a very intelligent man and a very efficient officer. I am confident of that. But I am just taking your statements. I do not know a thing about the Navy, but I have observed a good many naval officers that when they had recommendations made to them by subordinate officers they did not always approve of them. They disapproved of more or less of them, and I thought they were exercising a proper prerogative in disapproving of them.

Admiral FULLAM. Quite right. I think I have disapproved of some recommendations. That is a very general statement, you know. But young men, who have not had much experience, you have got to be a little careful about them. If you take a man who has been to sea for 20 years or longer, and possibly been all over the world, and has had opportunities for observations, his opinions as a rule are pretty nearly right.

Senator TRAMMELL. Then another thing you said in regard to Secretary Meyer. Do you remember what all he did in regard to

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building up the Navy and building up the personnel and officers, and so on, of the Navy, during his administration? What great progress was made during his administration toward preparing the Navy for war?

Admiral FULLAM. Well, I was with him only a month, Senator.

Senator TRAMMEL. You were pretty familiar with the Navy. Did he make great preparations for war and lay plans throughout his administration for putting the Navy in a state of preparedness for war?

Admiral FULLAM. He initiated the most important thing in his organization. You can not do anything without an organization. He started that. He could not appropriate money.

Senator TRAMMEL. If the present Secretary had found the Navy in a high state of efficiency and in a thoroughly prepared condition for emergency, in accordance with what you advocate, we would probably have been a good deal better prepared than we were, would we not?

Admiral FULLAM. Yes. As I say, Mr. Meyer could not get everything he wanted. I do not want to talk about Congress, but really, personally, I think Congress has been a little derelict.

Senator TRAMMEL. I think Congress has had a great deal to do with it.

Admiral FULLAM. I am sorry there was one thing, Senator, that I did not bring out, that the Council of National Defense was suggested by officers of the Navy—I think Capt. Hill of the Navy and others very strongly suggested it, to bring all the civil departments of the Government together on policies—national policies and national defense—and that would have been a wonderful thing if it had been carried out. There was only one representative of the Navy and one representative of the Army, I think, on that suggested Council of National Defense, so that the supremacy of the civil power was maintained. The vast majority of the council were civilians, and the naval officers were perfectly willing to have it that way; and that would have coordinated all Government agencies to prepare the Navy for war.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that will be all, Admiral.

(Thereupon the subcommittee adjourned until Tuesday, April 6, 1920, at 10 o'clock a. m.)

LETTER NO. 1.

OFFICE OF COMMANDER IN CHIEF,
UNITED STATES PACIFIC RESERVE FLEET,
U. S. S. "SOUTH DAKOTA," FLAGSHIP,
San Francisco, Calif., November 15, 1915.

MY DEAR ANDREWS: I am greatly obliged to you for having written to the department on October 26 concerning the assignment of apprentices to this fleet, and I regret that Brittain did not approve their going to San Diego. I will write to him and see if he will not modify the orders.

Would it be possible to send to the ships going to San Diego apprentices who had practically or nearly completed their course and let us graduate them there; that is, let us take apprentices who might not be compelled to return again to the station. If some such arrangement could be made, I should be delighted, but of course I do not wish to nag you with propositions of any kind.

The scheme generally has so many advantages that I should think the department would appreciate them.

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I hope you have noted no ill effects as far as the apprentices are concerned. Hoping to see you before many days, I am,

Sincerely, yours,

W. F. FULLAM,
Rear Admiral, United States Navy.

Capt. PHILIP ANDREWS, United States Navy,
United States Naval Training Station,
San Francisco, Calif.

LETTER NO. 2.

UNITED STATES NAVAL TRAINING STATION,
San Francisco, Calif., November 19, 1915.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL: Referring to your letter November 15, in regard to apprentices for the reserve fleet ships, I will see if it is possible to send apprentices who have nearly completed their course of instruction and let you transfer them later, but I am very much afraid that the refusal of the bureau to allow them to go from the station on account of your uncertain itinerary will prevent my doing it. I should be very glad to do it for we have too many men here to berth and handle. I have succeeded in getting the bureau to let me rate men after five months who are found qualified and I got rid of about 200 men to the *Maryland* and *San Diego*, but I must take back the three companies which you have before you sail, probably about December 1, and that will crowd us up.

The service on the ships that the apprentice seamen have had, and most of it has been on reserve ships, has been of the greatest benefit to them, and I think all of the ships have taken a great deal of interest in completing their instruction, as I have always found them much improved by these experiences on shipboard. I notice particularly the very excellent routine of instruction which the *Oregon* has prepared, of which Capt. Reeves sent me a copy. By keeping a record of the individual men and marking them constantly it is possible to determine, even without an examination here, whether the men are qualified for advancement and whether they can be considered as having completed their instruction.

I shall try to drop on board to see you Saturday morning when I go to call on Admiral Winslow.

With kind regards,

Sincerely, yours,

PHILIP P. ANDREWS,

Rear Admiral W. F. FULLAM, United States Navy,
U. S. S. "South Dakota," San Francisco, Calif.

LETTER NO. 3.

OFFICE OF COMMANDER IN CHIEF,
UNITED STATES PACIFIC RESERVE FLEET,
U. S. S. "SOUTH DAKOTA," FLAGSHIP,
San Francisco, Calif., November 20, 1915.

To: Secretary of Navy, Navy Department (Navigation), Washington, D. C.
Subject: Detail of apprentice seamen to ships of the Pacific Reserve Fleet.
Reference: (*a*) Bureau of Navigation's letter No. 5549–618–N6th, of November 4, 1915, to commandant United States Naval Training Station, San Francisco, Calif.

1. Referring to the question of utilizing apprentice seamen from the training station on board the ships of the Pacific Reserve Fleet and to the acting chief of bureau's letter of November 4, 1915, I beg to invite the attention of the bureau to the inclosed letter from the commandant of the training station and the comments concerning the benefit to the apprentices from this employment.

2. While I do not wish to importune the bureau, nor to question its decision in this matter, I request its reconsideration for the following reasons:

(1) If apprentices who have nearly finished their course are sent to the reserve ships before they go to San Diego these men may be transferred to ships of the Pacific Fleet any time when they call in at San Diego, or they may also be transferred back to San Francisco by ships of the Pacific Fleet, which visit this port from time to time.

(2) The *South Dakota* is ordered to return to Mare Island some time after the 1st of January to have her 8-inch guns replaced, which will offer an opportunity for bringing back to San Francisco any apprentice seamen who may have been assigned to the ships at San Diego.

(3) The apprentice seamen are not only benefited by this arrangement, but the ships of the reserve fleet are, by this means, kept in better condition in every respect.

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It is my opinion that with the cooperation of the commandant and of the bureau this plan will result in very great good, and the bureau is assured that the commander in chief will take especial measures and conform to such general instructions as to prevent embarrassment or trouble to the bureau in case the commandant of the training station is authorized to continue the present assignment as outlined in his letter, herewith inclosed.

W. F. FULLAM.

LETTER NO. 4.

[Bureau of Navigation—First indorsement.]

NOVEMBER 29, 1915.

To: Commander in Chief, Pacific Reserve Fleet.
Subject: Detail of apprentice seamen to ships of Pacific Reserve Fleet.
Reference: C-in-C's letter 97-WFF-V 11-20-15.

The detail of apprentice seamen to ships on the Pacific coast prior to their completion of the full course at the training station has been taken up with the Secretary and such detail has had his approval in cases of short and definite cruises; and, in addition, the course at the training stations has been shortened to five months in the cases of especially apt and recommended men; a further extension of these details and shortening of the course does not receive the approval of the bureau.

Please return all papers.

VICTOR BLUE.

LETTER NO. 5.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
BUREAU OF NAVIGATION,
Washington, D. C., November 30, 1915.

To: Commanding officers *Maryland*, *South Dakota*, and *Oregon* (via Commander in chief Pacific Reserve Fleet.)
Subject: Apprentice seamen.
Reference: (*a*) C. O. *Maryland*, letter 11-21-15; (*b*) C.O. *South Dakota*, letter 11-23-15; (*c*) *Oregon*, letter 11-23-15.

The bureau notes with satisfaction the uniformly good reports of the apprentice seamen detailed temporarily on board the vessel under your command, and has already authorized a continuance of this policy in short and definite cruises.

VICTOR BLUE.

Copy to commandant training station, San Francisco, Calif.

[First indorsement.]

U. S. S. "SOUTH DAKOTA," FLAGSHIP,
NAVY YARD,
Mare Island, Calif., December 9, 1915.

From: Commander in chief Pacific Reserve Fleet.
To: Commanding officers *Maryland*, *Oregon*, and *South Dakota*.

1. Forwarded.
2. Commanding officer *South Dakota* please return papers.

W. F. FULLAM.

LETTER NO. 6.

28365-29

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C., February 10, 1916.

Subject: Schedule of movements of Pacific Reserve Fleet during the present year.

COMMANDER IN CHIEF,
Pacific Reserve Fleet.

1. It is the department's policy to have two vessels (never less than one) of the Pacific Reserve Fleet at San Diego during the continuance of the exposition.
2. The department assumes that the commander in chief would wish to have his flag on one of the vessels at the exposition.
3. In order that the vessel of the fleet may surely be kept in readiness and that the department may at all times be assured of this readiness by actual tests of their cruising ability, it is directed that a schedule of the movements necessary to carry out the policy laid down in paragraph 1 be submitted, the schedule to arrange that each of the vessels of the Pacific Reserve Fleet in turn shall proceed to San Diego and remain for such period as the commander in chief may desire and then be relieved by her successor.

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4. Conformity with the above paragraph will assure the vessels being put in the best condition, that their officers, crews, and organizations will be adapted for actual service and will permit the commander in chief to inspect them and will give their officers and crews a trip to the exposition.

5. The above plan will provide for the annual cruising called for in the department's policy letter in reference to reserve ships and will enable the commander in chief and the department to ascertain how fully and completely that policy is being carried out.

6. A new docking schedule, which will conform with the above-requested schedule of ship movement, will be submitted.

JOSEPHUS DANIELS.

LETTER NO. 7.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC RESERVE FLEET,
U. S. S. "MILWAUKEE," FLAGSHIP,
San Diego, Calif., February 23, 1916.

To: The Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: Schedule of movements of Pacific Reserve Fleet during the present year.
References: (*a*) Department's letter No. 28365–29, dated February 10, 1916; (*b*) department's circular letter No. 10265–13, dated December 3, 1915.
Inclosures:

1. The department's letter of February 10, concerning a schedule of movements of ships of the Pacific Reserve Fleet, is carefully noted.

2. The plan outlined in this letter, together with the requirements of the department's circular letter of December 3, 1915, will, if properly carried out, put new life into the Pacific Reserve Fleet and insure the readiness and efficiency of all ships for any duty that may be demanded.

3. In conformity with the letter, reference (*a*), the following tentative schedule is submitted for the consideration of the department:

NOTE.—The department failed to provide the officers and men necessary to carry out its own program or to comply with the Navy Regulations concerning the readiness of reserve ships. This letter recommended a permanent instead of a temporary policy.

It will be noted that this schedule gives the ships, in turn, a two months' cruise from Bremerton to San Diego.

RESULTS TO BE ACCOMPLISHED.

4. Each ship spends four days at San Francisco going south and four days going north, to give liberty, make necessary transfers of officers and men, take on board or send to training station apprentice seamen, or to transport any Naval Militiamen or civilians who may be assigned to naval training by the Navy Department.

5. Each ship will remain about six weeks at San Diego for "military drills;" gunnery training; "some form of elementary target practice;" "annual fleet maneuvers" as may be prescribed; "exercises under way in a group" under the commander in chief; a four-hour (or longer) full-speed trial of engines under forced or natural draft, as may be necessary; thorough inspection by the commander in chief.

6. It is not believed that the requirements of the department's letter can be met by a shorter cruise than two months. The schedule provides that from two to four ships (usually three) shall be at San Diego during the year, and this number is necessary for "maneuvers in groups" by the commander in chief, and to supply the officers necessary to secure proper and thorough inspection by the commander in chief. It is hoped therefore that this schedule will be approved, as it will conduce to the success of the whole plan.

ADVANTAGE OF A PERMANENT POLICY.

7. The presence of these ships at San Diego, and the constant cruising from Bremerton to San Diego with stops at San Francisco, will prepare all ships to join the active Pacific Fleet at any time, and to transport officers and drafts of men to and from San Francisco for all ships.

8. It is submitted that a schedule of this kind providing for a cruise along the coast to the three important seaports of the Pacific should be made permanent—not simply during the exposition—in that it will conduce to the lasting efficiency of the fleet for reasons that are manifest; in other words, there should be a permanent, not a temporary, policy in this respect. The climatic conditions of southern California will conduce to sucess in training and fleet work.

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FULL REQUIREMENTS OF DEPARTMENT'S LETTER.

9. It is noted that the following are the most important requirements of the department in the letters referred to above: (1) "Complete readiness" of each ship to perform "all assigned duties in war"; (2) "sufficient trained petty officers and men" to "maintain organization" and to be "ready for efficient service after a short shakedown"; (3) exercise at "military drills"; (4) "exercise underway, singly or in group," to demonstrate preparedness of all machinery; (5) "readiness for annual fleet maneuvers"; (6) "some form of target practice annually"; (7) readiness "for active service in the fleet" at any time.

(NOTE.—The department required much and withheld everything necessary to carry out its plans. This was all on paper. Nothing was done to help the commander in chief get results.)

10. It is manifest that the above requirements of the department's letters are very important and are absolutely necessary to secure readiness of reserve ships for war.

NECESSITY FOR SUPPLYING PERSONNEL.

11. In the above connection, however, the commander in chief is constrained to submit that the seccess of the whole plan depends absolutely upon the assignment of a sufficient complement of officers and men to the reserve ships—if a sufficient complement is provided the policy will be a success; if officers and men are not provided, the plan will assuredly fail. There is no alternative.

12. The following table shows the number of officers and men at present on board ships of the Pacific Reserve Fleet and, in red ink, the minimum number of officers (and of the lowest rank) that could possibly meet the importamt demands noted above:

ADDITIONAL OFFICERS AND MEN REQUIRED.

13. It will be noted that, not counting the *Saratoga*, 7 additional commanding officers, 15 additional junior officers, and 26 additional warrant officers are needed, with 594 enlisted men, to fill the reserve complements and to give each ship 4 commissioned line officers, exclusive of the commanding officer, 4 boatswains and gunners, to stand watches, etc., and 3 machinists for engineering and mechanical duty.

14. It is not considered practicable or safe to attempt to carry out the proposed plan with fewer officers or men.

RANK OF COMMANDING OFFICERS.

15. As regards the rank of the commanding officers, it is submitted that each important ship in reserve should have the commanding officer who would be needed in time of war. Officers of lesser rank should not be assigned as a matter of policy. The demands of sudden war would throw upon the commanding officer of a reserve ship a greater responsibility and confront a commanding officer of a ship in full commission, in that the reserve ship must quickly attain efficiency with a crew made up largely of recruits or men untrained for the duties of that particular ship.

16. An officer of proper rank is required for other reasons. It is demonstrated by actual experience in the reserve fleet that captains and commanders are not only needed for war duty and war efficiency on board ship, but they are needed every day in time of peace to administer discipline and to carry on routine work, courts, boards, etc., in a dignified and proper manner. The commander in chief has been constantly hampered, and unfortunate conditions in discipline and routine have been precipitated by having junior officers in command of big ships. At one time Lieut. Arthur K. Atkins, on the staff of the commander in chief, did additional duty in command of two of the biggest ships of the fleet—the *Pittsburgh* and *West Virginia*—and was the only commissioned officer on board these two ships.

17. It will be noted from the above that the number of junior commissioned officers and men required to fill the reserve complements of 10 ships is only 15 junior officers and 600 men—not more than the complement of one armored cruiser in full commission. This would not appear to be an extravagant demand if it will secure the readiness of 10 cruising ships.

IMPORTANCE OF PERSONNEL.

18. The question of personnel is so important and the effect of leaving ships shorthanded is so discouraging and depressing, despite every effort of a commander in chief

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to inspire zeal and interest, that it would be a neglect of duty not to invite serious attention to the matter—it is the one and only key to enthusiasm and efficiency in any fleet.

INCREASE OF COMMISSIONED AND WARRANT OFFICERS.

19. In connection with this general subject of providing necessary officers, and having in mind that a new personnel bill is to be formulated, it is most respectfully submitted that an increase of flag officers is needed, inasmuch as many captains are now doing rear admiral's duty; that a large increase would provide commanding officers and promote and reward lieutenant commanders and lieutenants of long service; that a large increase of boatswains and gunners would promote worthy chief petty officers now in service and thus provide junior watch officers for ships in reserve; that the graduation of the two senior classes at Annapolis in June would further add available junior officers.

20. The project of graduating midshipmen after three years has been previously suggested to the department, and it is to be noted that the curtailment of the course at Annapolis at this time, to meet an emergency, could be compensated for at some future time by giving to all midshipmen who may be graduated prematurely a suitable post-graduate course in the future when practicable.

21. As a further means of supplying officers in the emergency that now confronts the Navy, it is most respectfully urged that the law which forbids the employment of retired officers except at their will and at a lieutenant's pay, should be repealed at once, and that all retired officers who are available should be assigned to active duty on shore or elsewhere in order that a large number of officers now on the active list may be ordered to service with the fleets.

22. The above suggestions are submitted as a means of putting new life and hope into the personnel of the Navy while increasing the efficiency of the naval service in every respect.

LETTER NO. 8.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC RESERVE FLEET,
U. S. S. "MILWAUKEE," FLAGSHIP,
San Diego, Calif., February 24, 1916.

MY DEAR BLUE: I am forwarding herewith copies of correspondence concerning the future policy and movements of the reserve ships. This correspondence explains itself, but I wanted to send a copy to you because of the paragraph concerning the employment and training of apprentice seamen, Naval Militia and civilians who are to be given instruction, etc.

I hope you will give my suggestions consideration. If the scheme as outlined is carried out, we can cheer things up out here and get all ships and the personnel in proper condition and secure enthusiasm in place of a condition of depression and discouragement.

I hope the law forbidding the employment of retired officers except on a lieutenant's pay may be repealed at once. It should never have been passed, and at the present time we need every retired officer who is fit for duty, and all such officers assigned to active duty should have active-duty pay.

Please note that the whole scheme depends on the assignment of a few more officers and men in this fleet. They need not be all assigned now but month by month during the next six months in order that the ships may move in turn.

If the department will give me a chance, I can cheer things up out here and the whole effect along the coast will be very good. It seems to me that the number of officers and men needed to secure this object is so small that it is well worth the effort and trouble necessary to get them.

If Congress would do something and do it right away, we could get busy and do something. I am convinced that the suggestions made in my letter if approved would secure several hundred junior officers within the next few months and give us enough captains and commanders to do naval work in a proper and dignified manner. This is the key to the whole situation and if the Navy Department does nothing on this line, all plans and schemes to improve the efficiency of reserve ships—not to say other ships—will simply remain on paper.

If this plan is approved, I can get the ships of the reserve fleet into splendid condition, taking them out for some form of elementary target practice, tactical maneuvers, etc., and thus keep them tuned up. For this reason I have made the plan so that there may be not less than two ships in addition to the flagship at San Diego. This

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number is necessary to supply officers for target-practice work and inspection, and if the department will approve the plan as it stands, I will agree to deliver the goods.

Sincerely, yours,

W. F. FULLAM.

Rear Admiral VICTOR BLUE,
United States Navy, Chief of Bureau of Navigation,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

LETTER NO. 9.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC RESERVE FLEET,
U. S. S. "MARYLAND," FLAGSHIP,
San Diego, Calif., March 20, 1916.

MY DEAR BENSON: After writing to you of my disappointment in getting some news from Dayton that he could not supply officers sufficient to move my ships, I was delighted to get a copy of his letter of March 11 in which he promised to arrange for enough officers to bring the *Pittsburgh*, *Colorado*, and *Charleston* south on the dates proposed in the schedule; and that he will later on provide personnel to carry out the entire scheme.

I hope you will approve the schedule, and I assure you that we will make no complaint about little things, for I realize that Navigation is doing the best it can.

In the meantime we will be as self-reliant as possible as regards enlisted men, and with the aid of apprentice seamen, our troubles will be greatly lessened. Andrews is helping me very much and we are working in complete harmony. The scheme of instruction I have adopted will soon whip the apprentices into shape.

I realize the main difficulty is with officers; and we should do something to solve that problem.

In connection with the suggestion to graduate two classes from the Naval Academy in June, please give your earnest consideration to the following:

The subjects covered in the first class year are as follows: Seamanship, ordnance, navigation, steam, electricity, languages, physiology and hygiene. All practical.

If you will give me 100 midshipmen who have been three years at the Naval Academy, I will guarantee to put them through a practical course in all these subjects on board reserve ships, and at the same time they would help us to keep these ships away from the dock; I am sure that with the cooperation of the academic board a plan could be easily outlined by which all midshipmen after three years at Annapolis could receive practical instruction which would bring them up to a standard practically as good for work afloat as that given during the first class year.

Should this scheme be considered, you will note that the number of officers on duty at Annapolis can be considerably reduced, which will be another gain for the fleet.

This plan would increase the output of the Naval Academy 25 per cent and would greatly help us during the next few years, after which we could return to the four-year course at Annapolis.

I can see no difficulty in carrying this out, for we might consider the last as a practice cruise, and the midshipmen need not be commissioned until the end of this cruise; in other words, they would be required to qualify in all these subjects before receiving a commission.

The post-graduate course could in time supply any deficiency caused by the adoption of this plan with certain classes during the next few years.

The general feeling of satisfaction and hope inspired by the great proposition to move these reserve ships indicates the great good that will result if you adopt a new scheme—use reserve ships to train men and young officers for the active fleet, and by so doing keep the reserve ships moving. It is a knife that cuts both ways.

Why should not we get busy and adopt emergency measures in an emergency?

It is easy to sit still and say and do nothing—altogether too easy—and this is my reason for making these suggestions to you. Reserve ships alongside a dock deteriorate, and all officers and men employed on board such ships also deteriorate. The whole thing is bad, and it is time to stop it.

Sincerely, yours,

W. F. FULLAM.

Rear Admiral W. S. BENSON,
United States Navy, Chief of Naval Operations,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

P. S.—I inclose herewith a letter from Tozer. Please glance at the concluding paragraphs.

W. F. FULLAM.

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LETTER NO. 10.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, March 28, 1916.

MY DEAR FULLAM: I have received your various letters in regard to the conditions in the Reserve Fleet, and particularly with reference to the personnel, and every effort is being made to carry out the schedule outlined.

It was with considerable reluctance that we decided to take the *Milwaukee* as the relief of the *Iris* and the *Charleston* as the relief of the *Annapolis*. The shortage of personnel is such, however, that it seems a waste of good material to keep officers and men in such vessels as the *Iris* and the *Severn*. By utilizing them for the purposes that we have, and keeping the personnel fairly well up to the number allowed, these vessels which are really fighting units, can be kept in much better readiness for service, and it gives us more men and officers toward keeping the other vessels of the reserve fleet in better shape. It seemed to me to be the very best arrangement that could be made to help the present situation.

I note what you say in regard to the detail of additional warrant officers. In regard to the graduating of the two classes from the Naval Academy, for obvious reasons the Naval Academy is a topic that I do not take up with the Secretary unless I am called upon by him for an expression of my opinion. Whatever my feelings and ideas may be on the subject, I shall certainly try to avoid any suggestion for action that could in any way give anyone grounds for suspecting any personal interest or motive in so doing.

Hoping that the whole matter will work out satisfactorily and assuring you that the effort you are making to build up the readiness of the reserve fleet is appreciated, I am,

Very sincerely, yours,

W. S. BENSON.

Rear Admiral W. F. FULLAM,
United States Navy, Commander in Chief Pacific Reserve Fleet,
U. S. S. "Maryland," Flagship, San Francisco.

LETTER NO. 10.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
BUREAU OF NAVIGATION,
Washington, D. C., April 1, 1916.

MY DEAR FULLAM: Last week I returned from a two week's leave, and since then have been doing some business along the lines of your correspondence with me.

You will be gratified to know that your fleet will get all apprentice seamen from the San Francisco station who have completed two months of training, that they will not have to return to the training station.

The same thing will be done with apprentice seamen at the other training stations. They will be sent to the Atlantic Fleet.

The Secretary permitted me to do this with the understanding that the instruction would be continued afloat.

Again, the Secretary approved my recommendation to appoint an additional number of boatswains and gunners. In consequence, all who passed the examinations last year have been appointed; this gives us 17 gunners, 7 boatswains, and 2 machinists additional. You have several of them and can make use of them.

I will put you on a better basis in regard to officers as soon as we can get the new class of ensigns. How would you like to have a number of them for watch duty on your cruising ships? That would be valuable experience for them.

During this period of shortage of officers, what would you think of so changing the curriculum at the Naval Academy as would permit of sending the second class to sea on regular cruising ships and returning them to the Academy for examination at the end of a year to complete the first-class year there—the academic board to prescribe the course of studies to be followed during the year at sea, and in which they would be examined upon their return? This, I believe, can be done under present laws.

That part of the course could be confined to navigation, ordnance and gunnery, seamanship, and engineering, and be entirely practical in its nature and systematically laid out. These young men, of course, would perform regular duties as junior officers while on board ship.

I would be glad to receive from you suggestions along these lines.

Very sincerely, yours,

VICTOR BLUE.

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LETTER NO. 12.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC RESERVE FLEET,
"U. S. S. MARYLAND", FLAGSHIP,
San Diego, Calif., April 8, 1916.

MY DEAR BLUE: Referring to your letter of April 1, I hope I did not misunderstand your meaning in the last two paragraphs. I understood that the curriculum would not be changed for the first three years of the course, but at the end of the second class year, but after three years at the academy each class should go to sea and spend its first class year in the fleet, returning to Annapolis for its final examinations and graduation. In other words the Naval Academy course proper would be three years, the last year being devoted to a cruise and to strictly practical work.

I hope you will push this through before you leave the bureau.

I can not too earnestly impress you with the fact that a very bad condition exists as regards the personnel, and the sooner you get the ships in full commission, with complete complements of officers and men, the better it will be.

Sincerely, yours,

W. F. FULLAM.

Rear Admiral VICTOR BLUE,
United States Navy, Chief of the Bureau of Navigation,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

LETTER NO. 13.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC RESERVE FLEET,
U. S. S. "MARYLAND," FLAGSHIP,
San Diego, Calif.

MY DEAR BENSON: Winslow conferred with me concerning a relief vessel for the *McCulloch*. I advised that the *Charleston* remain at San Francisco until May 12, at which time, you will note, the *Albany* should arrive there according to the cruising schedule. If you approve this plan, the *Albany* may remain indefinitely at San Francisco for neutrality duty, and the *New Orleans* may relieve the *Albany* with the Naval Militia. The *Charleston* can leave San Francisco May 12 for any other duty. It seemed to me that this was the best solution of the problem. I am more than anxious to have the ships of the reserve fleet ready for any duty at any time.

We hope to have target practice for the *Maryland* this week. And I shall make every endeavor to have the torpedoes of all ships tested in turn at the Keyport station.

We are unfortunately short of skilled personnel in connection with torpedoes. This is a serious matter because in time of a war the torpedoes of these vessels, if properly used, might do some execution which their light batteries could not do.

I can not too earnestly impress you, my dear Benson, with the immediate necessity for training our personnel with all kinds of weapons. When I inspect the crews and note the youth of most of the apprentices, I can not but wonder how long it will take to develop them into material that will answer the requirements of war.

I wish I could see you personally and talk to you freely on this subject. I am sure the Navy Department realizes that we have hard work to do and should begin at once.

I was encouraged by Blue's last letter concerning the practical scheme for midshipmen to spend the last year of their course in the fleet. The increase of warrant officers is also welcome, but we do need proper captains and commanders right away. I would like to see the whole list of lieutenant commanders promoted to-morrow, with a good increase in admirals, captains, and commanders. The effect upon the Navy would be electrical and it would do nothing more than provide for the emergencies of the next few years. Really, Benson, we must look ahead and do things quick.

I inclose a copy of my last letter to Blue. I hope I am not nagging you. It would be easy for me to say and do nothing.

Sincerely, yours,

W. F. FULLAM.

Rear Admiral WILLIAM S. BENSON,
United States Navy, Chief of Naval Operations,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

P. S.—I have talked with Winslow about the coal situation here, and I understand this station will be supplied at once. We ought to have a good surplus of coal here at once. I have instructed all my ships to fill up at Bremerton and San Francisco because of the shortage at San Diego. This might hamper our movements seriously.

W. F. FULLAM.

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LETTER NO. 14.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC RESERVE FLEET,
U. S. S. "MARYLAND," FLAGSHIP,
San Diego, Calif., April 12, 1916.

MY DEAR BLUE: I was glad to get the two circular letters regarding (1) the training of apprentices in this fleet, and (2) the advancement in rating of enlisted men. These are timely and cheering and will help things.

I am at sea with the *Maryland* training for target practice. A tour of the decks and turrets, with few men and hardly an officer in sight, is impressive! For Heaven's sake get officers and men as quick as you can and by every means in our power. We must train them for the future, and do it now.

I answered your last letter promptly and fully. The Navy Department should correspond with officers afloat and welcome their suggestions. The department should wish to know the worst. Perhaps it does—I certainly hope so.

I have heard rumors of your going to sea before long. If you do, I truly hope your successor will be one to whom we can write and confide. He should be carefully selected. If not, the Navy will go to the devil in double time.

I am never pessimistic by nature, but I am convinced that the situation as regards lack of personnel, etc., is critical; that laxity, discouragement, and demoralization are too prevalent; that discipline is not good, and that we should take a tremendous brace along all military lines and get every officer, every man, and every ship on the move, and cheer up generally.

Sincerely, yours,

W. F. FULLAM.

Rear Admiral VICTOR BLUE,
United States Navy Chief of Bureau of Navigation,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

LETTER NO. 15.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC RESERVE FLEET,
U. S. S. "PITTSBURGH," FLAGSHIP,
San Diego, Calif., May 8, 1916.

MY DEAR BLUE: I inclose herewith copy of a letter and plan just forwarded to Benson.

All ships will be provided with sufficient apprentices to fill their complements and enable them to move by August 19 if you will give us only a few more officers.

I hope the department will carefully consider all the suggestions I have made in this plan.

You will note the parts that deal with personnel. If adopted, this scheme would ease up on the Naval Academy and enable the department to educate midshipmen in a practical manner and at the same time get all our ships tuned up.

I wish you would consider this plan promptly, and let me know whether I am to bother myself with such matters as these any more. It is very easy to go along in the Navy and carry on a routine. It seems to me now is the time to encourage everybody to think and to try to do something.

Respectfully, yours,

W. F. FULLAM.

Rear Admiral VICTOR BLUE,
United States Navy, Chief of Bureau of Navigation,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

LETTER NO. 16.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC RESERVE FLEET,
U. S. S. "PITTSBURGH," FLAGSHIP,
San Diego, Calif., June 10, 1916.

MY DEAR BLUE: Thank you for your note of June 3 concerning torpedo officers. Of course, I knew that Mr. McMorris and Mr. Hibbs were well qualified, but you see I have five armored cruisers that carry torpedoes and I naturally feel that it is a duty to bring the torpedo element up to the proper standard, and this, of course, can not be done without a good personnel.

I suppose the torpedo boats and submarines will have the first call, but when officers are available for this work I hope to get them.

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I am trying to emphasize all "military" elements in these ships by giving as much time as possible to target practice, etc.

I can not too earnestly impress you with the fact that we need a tremendous military revival as regards the personnel of the Navy. From my observation out here I do not believe the standard has ever been so low as it is to-day. There are not officers enough to administer discipline properly and to secure a proper mental attitude on the part of the enlisted men. I consider that there is laxity and slackness everywhere and that a large percentage of our personnel is absolutely unprepared to meet the emergencies of war. Many of the apprentices are very young and we can not expect them to reach a high standard in a few weeks or months, particularly if ships are not kept cruising and drilling constantly.

The few officers in this fleet appear to be working very hard, but I will not hide my head in the sand like an ostrich and refuse to see things or to realize the truth as regards the conditions out here, for I consider them precarious in the extreme.

There is only one solution—get every ship filled up as soon as possible with officers and men and begin a thoroughly military system of administration and discipline with every attempt to infuse enthusiasm and spirit into everybody.

I am glad to know that there is some chance of getting an increase of the upper grades in the appropriation bill, and I deplore the fact that the law which discourages the employment of retired officers has not been repealed so that we could get additional active officers in the fleet at once. It is also very unfortunate that another class can not be graduated in September to supply immediate needs. They could be given a postgraduate course a few years later, but we need them right now.

I have been in the department a year and I know the difference between plans on paper and the actual doings and conditions of officers and men in the fleet itself. The last counts most and tells the true story. If we fail to realize this fact, we will neglect our first duty.

Sincerely, yours,

W. F. FULLAM.

Rear Admiral VICTOR BLUE,
United States Navy, Chief of Bureau of Navigation,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

LETTER NO. 17.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET RESERVE FORCE,
U. S. S. "COLORADO," FLAGSHIP,
Salina Cruz, Mexico, July 13, 1916.

To: Commanding officers, all vessels, Reserve Force, United States Pacific Fleet.
Subject: General instructions concerning personnel, etc.
Reference: Force Order No. 10.

1. The attention of commanding officers is called to the requirements of Force Order No. 10 concerning the training of apprentice seamen, and to Circular Letter No. 410 of July 5, concerning personnel, care of machinery, boilers, etc.

2. Every effort will be made to strictly conform to all the requirements of these orders in order that the efficiency of ships, and particularly the personnel, may be improved as much as possible.

3. It is desirable that all seamen, ordinary seamen, and apprentices shall be taught to pull a good oar, and in order to accomplish this result pulling boats will be used daily whenever the weather and other conditions permit.

4. The officers of the deck and the petty officers of the watch on the forecastle will be required to stand a very strict heel and toe watch and a sharp lookout night and day.

5. All midshipmen who join reserve ships will be assigned watch duty on deck, and commanding officers will require of the midshipmen the strictest attention to every duty, and will prescribe a routine for the industrious employment of their time that will secure progress in practical naval subjects. It is important that these young men shall be started right.

6. A thoroughly military system will be enforced with attention to every principle and tradition of naval discipline. Smartness will be demanded at all times, and laxity, carelessness, inattention to little things, etc., will not be tolerated.

7. Commanding officers will see that all officers under their command are impressed with the importance of the subjects covered by this order.

W. F. FULLAM.

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LETTER NO. 18.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET RESERVE FORCE,
U. S. S. "COLORADO," FLAGSHIP,
San Diego, Calif., September 7, 1916.

MY DEAR PALMER: I am glad you sent a few officers to the *Oregon*. All ships in reserve here have cruised a good deal, and Operations evidently intends to keep them cruising. I am glad of this because they will be kept in better condition, and they serve as excellent training schools for the large number of recruits you will soon have.

The shortage of competent officers in the armored cruisers has been precarious at times, and I have feared that some disaster might take place. I have cautioned them to navigate with great care and to give strict attention to boilers and machinery.

If these armored cruisers are to be ready when called upon—and they are the only cruisers we have—there are three things that must be kept in good condition: (1) Boilers and engines; (2) guns, and (3) torpedoes. I assure that I have struggled hard with this problem with the minimum of assistance as regards officers and men, and I shall continue to do so and to avoid bothering you all I can. However, I earnestly advise you to turn your attention to the Pacific. The Mexican trouble may not be settled for some time, permanently, to come, and the war plan distinctly states that the Navy's rôle on this coast will be more important than on the Atlantic, because there are more ports here, and a longer coast line to blockade or seize.

I have advised Operations to complete the *West Virginia* and *Saratoga* as soon as possible and put the *New Orleans* on a cruising basis. All these ships are important and may be made very efficient for future emergencies. Lieut. Bowen, my staff engineer, who is also engineer of this ship, is now overworked. He is a hustler, and the efficiency of these armored cruisers will develop largely upon his being free to inspect their engineer departments frequently and searchingly.

Sincerely, yours,

W. F. FULLAM.

Rear Admiral L. C. PALMER,
United States Navy, Chief of Bureau of Navigation,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

LETTER NO. 19.

PASSAGE SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF., TO BREMERTON, WASH.,
September 28, 1916.

MY DEAR PALMER: Referring to the telegram I sent you to-day concerning officers for the *New Orleans*, you must bear and forbear with me for the following reasons, as I have been and still am trying to do something for the good of the fleet:

(1) The armored cruisers are now and have been cruising. Each one has covered about 6,000 miles and has been on active duty in Mexico.

(2) We are required to have target practice, torpedo practice, and steaming trials. These tests require officers to prevent accidents and disaster.

(3) These are the only scout cruisers we will have for three or four years to come. Unless they are made ready the fleet will remain blind.

(4) These ships are now training apprentices for the fleet in addition to their work. We have trained 1,100 apprentices for the fleet in the past few months.

(5) As commandant in Newport in 1909 with from 800 to 2,000 apprentices and with the *Mercedes*, *Constellation*, *Cumberland*, and *Boxer* I had three commissioned officers—no more—for three years. To-day Johnson has nine commissioned officers and the two biggest ships, the *Mercedes* and *Cumberland*, have been sent away.

(6) In 1913 at Chicago, I had three commissioned officers. To-day Moffett has six. It was my experience at both of these stations that warrant and chief petty officers handle apprentices and train them better than commissioned officers.

(7) I see that Dayton has seven commissioned officers at Norfolk—more than twice as many as I had at Newport, although the *Mercedes* at Newport was "receiving ship" also.

I am sure you will pardon these comparisons and forgive me for saying that if you will give me on-half the excess of officers at these three training stations over what they had a few years ago, I will keep these six ships going, make them ready for business next spring, and train apprentices as well or better than at the training stations.

I need four more officers now—three for the *New Orleans*. and an engineer officer for this ship, so that Bowen, the force engineer, can do his proper duties—duties which

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are very important. I will not ask for any more officers for the present, but the *Saratoga* will need six or seven more in the spring, and each armored cruiser should have one more when available.

If the department will help me, I will guarantee to have six armored cruisers in prime condition for mobilization next summer.

I note the number of officers in ships of the battleship fleet, and I believe that each one of them could spare two or three junior officers for ships that are so short handed. In fact, I believe young officers are falling over themselves in the battleships, standing no watches, and not learning very much. Chief petty officers on the battleships could take many of the stations and do many of the duties now assigned to junior officers in fire control, etc., until we get more officers for such work.

In conclusion, Palmer, please consider the necessity and wisdom of graduating the present first class in February. Make preparations to do so now—at once. The first-class year is entirely practical, and if you will send these young men to the fleet—each one of them with a sextant of his own—and put them on watch and make them hump themselves, they will learn more than by remaining four months at the academy, and will help out the fleet in this emergency. I will guarantee to put some of these young men through a course on these ships that would make officers and men of them. This is no idle boast.

Excuse me for saying so, but this is the time to break away from cut-and-dried systems and do something. The Naval Academy is overcrowded and the course there should be cut down to three or three and one-half years for a few years to come, training graduates at sea and giving them a postgraduate course several years later when opportunity permits. This plan, if adopted, will give you 200 young officers in February which will help the fleet tremendously. I earnestly advise you to do it. It will cheer things up.

I could have had a soft snap out here had I accepted the situation and said and done nothing.

Sincerely, yours,

W. F. FULLAM.

Rear Admiral PALMER,
United States Navy, Chief of Bureau of Navigation,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

LETTER NO. 20.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET, RESERVE FORCE,
U. S. S. "COLORADO," FLAGSHIP,
Navy Yard, Puget Sound, Wash., October 11, 1916.

MY DEAR CHASE: Thank you for your letter of the 5th.

I am glad you understand me, and I hope that you and Benson will not be annoyed by my persistence. If you do not trust me and help me when I need help, my task will be hopeless.

Getting the armored cruisers to Mexican waters was a good thing, but they must not stay there too long. The *Maryland* should come north at once, and it is my duty to impress you with this fact.

One junior lieutenant and one ensign for the *New Orleans* is all I ask. I can send a boatswain from the *Colorado* and a gunner from the *Maryland*, and with them *Canaga* can relieve the *Maryland*, leaving here about October 18. In other words, two young officers will give the *Maryland* a relief and prevent harm to the ship and to the morale of the crew.

I deplore the fact that young officers must be kept at training stations for academic work in such emergencies as this. Can not the Secretary be induced to drop the academic instruction temporarily? Has the condition been made known to him? It was only by persistence that I got the course at training stations cut down to two months. Had it not been for this no armored cruiser could have gone to Mexico. And now they are practically being punished instead of rewarded for good work.

It is not alone my idea that there are more officers or young officers in the active ships than are needed at present. Many officers agree with me that some of these young officers could be spared to supply needs like these in the Pacific. It is my experience that chief petty officers and warrant officers are not fully utilized nowadays in the battle fleet. If they were, some of the young commissioned officers could be spared to meet other demands, at least temporarily.

I have made a casual inspection of the *Saratoga;* and shall inspect the *New Orleans* this week.

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Gilmer tells me he will have about a hundred apprentices for transfer next week. He is anxious to get rid of them promptly to prevent congestion. The *New Orleans* is the only ship to go to San Francisco at present. I consider, therefore, that the demands for the *New Orleans'* services are imperative.

I am sure, my dear Chase, that you and Benson will prefer to have me put things plainly. The conditions in the Pacific are not what they should be.

Sincerely yours,

W. F. FULLAM.

Capt. VOLNEY O. CHASE,
United States Navy, Office of Operations,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

LETTER NO. 21.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, December 12, 1916.

To: All bureaus, all navy yards, commanders in chief, division, force and flotilla commanders, commanding officers of vessels listed.

Subject: Tentative schedule for overhaul of ships not with the fleet.

1. The department desires that all authorized and necessary work on vessels of the Navy be undertaken when the vessels become available as listed below and completed as expeditiously as possible, so that when completed each vessel will be ready for prolonged active service with the fleet away from navy yards, with director control, fire control, battery, boilers, engines, and all other material in the best possible condition.

2. All work will be completed by July 31, 1917, but this date must be anticipated whenever possible, especially in those cases where a vessel's services are noted below as being required at an earlier date.

3. To this end a tentative schedule for overhauls is given below for each ship not operating with the fleets and the schedules will be followed as nearly as possible. The bureaus, yards, and fleet officers will use every effort to have the work completed as desired by the department.

4. The work now being done on vessels of the Atlantic Fleet will be carried out as already planned, the work on the other ships listed below being taken up as the ships become available, but not to interfere with the work on ships of the active fleet.

5. It is expected that the ships in full commission and operating with the fleet will arrive at the yards for docking and repairs about April 15 and all work is to be completed by May 15 if possible. Yards will take this into consideration in planning work.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, *Acting.*

LETTER D. 22.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET RESERVE FORCE,
U. S. S. "PUEBLO," FLAGSHIP,
December 17, 1916.

To: The Secretary of the Navy (operations).

Subject: Inspection of *South Dakota* and probable action concerning that ship and the *Frederick*.

References: (*a*) Operations let. 22397–138 Mat–4–ML of September 28, 1916; (*b*) Operations let. 18788–365 Mat–4–ML of September 30, 1916; (*c*) operations let. 10265–15 Mat–1–ML of November 18, 1916.

1. Referring to the department's letter, reference (*a*), and especially to the requirement that the *South Dakota* shall be placed in "efficient condition for service," it is earnestly suggested that careful attention be given to the report of the board of inspection in order to determine the repairs that shall be made to the boilers of the *South Dakota*.

2. The force commander is informed that this inspection was very thorough, but that the board did not recommend the retubing of many of the boilers of the *South Dakota*, but that defective tubes should be replaced.

3. Without questioning the judgment of the board, it is the duty of the force commander to urge that there be no false economy in the overhaul of the *South Dakota*, inasmuch as the armored cruisers must be the main reliance for cruising and scouting service until more modern ships are built.

4. The same comments may be made concerning the policy regarding the *Frederick*, which ship will reach Bremerton January 1 for overhaul. The *Frederick* and *South*

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Dakota are the weakest of the cruisers as regards boilers, all the others, including the *Saratoga*, being in far better condition in this respect.

5. This letter is written with the assumption that it is the department's desire that all armored cruisers shall be in dependable condition for war service and ready to make their maximum speed on or before June, 1917. If there is failure to thoroughly prepare them at this time, the fleet will be crippled for lack of dependable scouts for the next three years.

6. It is therefore recommended that no efforts be spared to place the *Frederick* and *South Dakota* in absolutely reliable condition.

W. F. FULLAM.

LETTER NO. 23.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET RESERVE FORCE,
U. S. S. "PUEBLO," FLAGSHIP,
San Diego, Calif., December 22, 1916.

MY DEAR PALMER: I noted with delight that in your "hearing" you advocated the graduation of a class in February and another in June, and the three years' course for some time to come.

This is the only solution of the problem to get more officers in this emergency, and I regretted most keenly the report that the Secretary opposed this plan.

The situation out here is perilous, in my estimation.

I noted the change in the course at the training station from two to four months. This may cripple my force again. I wrote to Senn about it and will not bother you with a repetition. Please be assured that suggestions of mine are made with the desire to be of some assistance and that I do not wish to annoy or bother you.

You may have good reasons for changing back to the four months' course, and if recruiting is greatly expedited we may not suffer so much out here after all. You will know before long.

With the season's greetings and best wishes, I am,

Sincerely, yours,

W. F. FULLAM.

Rear Admiral L. C. PALMER,
United States Navy, Chief of Bureau of Navigation,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

LETTER NO. 24.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET RESERVE FORCE,
U. S. S. "PUEBLO," FLAGSHIP,
San Diego, Calif., January 7, 1917.

MY DEAR PALMER: I have read your annual report and your hearing, and I congratulate you.

If Blue had asked for officers and men in the beginning as you have done, and insisted that we needed them, he would have saved his reputation, and also saved the Navy from a very precarious condition of affairs.

It will be deplorable if your plan to graduate midshipmen in February and in three years hereafter is not approved.

If midshipmen were graduated after three years, with certain rules regarding their employment and studies during the next two years to come, each one taking a sextant with him, and all being compelled to stand watch on the forecastle or quarterdeck night and day, at sea as in port, their shore liberty regulated within reasonable limits, they would soon become of great service to us on board ship, and their ultimate professional standard would not be lowered—in fact, I believe it would be improved.

If we could get a lot of young officers right away, officers of senior grades could be employed in higher duties, where their services are sadly needed.

I wish we could employ certain retired officers ashore, for there are many who could be used to advantage, and relieve active officers of lieutenant's rank and above.

We are suffering on this coast for officers of rank. There are not enough for the proper administration of discipline, and for courts and boards, etc. Retired officers could be utilized for permanent courts at various places.

I am sure you realize that the condition regarding officers out here is precarious. I know you are doing the best you can, and I note that you have recently ordered officers to the reserve force.

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I am trying hard to get six armored cruisers ready for war service by June 1—the only cruisers and scouts we have for the fleet. It is an up-hill job, but I can do it with little encouragement.

Sincerely, yours,

W. F. FULLAM.

Rear Admiral L. C. PALMER,
United States Navy, Chief of Bureau of Navigation,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

LETTER NO. 25.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET RESERVE FORCE,
U. S. S. "PUEBLO," FLAGSHIP,
San Diego, Calif., January 11, 1917.

To: The Secretary of the Navy (Operations).
Subject: Length of time to repair *South Dakota*, *Frederick*, and *Huntington*.
Reference: Commandant, Navy Yard, Puget Sound, let. 35611–C, RMG–Ly, dated January 6, 1917.

1. Referring to the letter above referenced, the force commander regrets that the time of completion of the *South Dakota* has been extended from March 10 to May 10, that the *Frederick* may not be completed until June 15, and that the *Huntington* can not be handled at the navy yard, Puget Sound, prior to May 15.

2. It will be noted that the *South Dakota* reached Bremerton November 29, 1916, and she will have been there 5 months and 11 days if not completed until May 10; that the *Frederick* reached Bremerton December 30, 1916, and will have been there 5 months and 15 days if she is not completed until June 15.

3. The force commander does not wish to importune the department nor to officiously interfere with its policies or with the details of navy-yard work; but in the attempt to get the armored cruisers on the Pacific into cruising condition at the earliest practicable date the force commander, after months of effort, finds the present situation extremely discouraging.

4. It is submitted that there must be a decided lack of facilities, labor, or money available at the navy yard, Puget Sound, if an armored cruiser can not be properly overhauled in less than six months.

5. From observation it is not believed that the difficulty rests with the personnel of the yard.

6. If it is the desire of the department, therefore, that the armored cruisers be prepared for war service at an early date, it is respectfully suggested that the navy yard, Puget Sound, be immediately supplied with the necessary funds, material, and laborers, and that special efforts be made to complete the *Frederick* and *South Dakota* not later than March or April, respectively, in order that they may be available for Mexican service, and that the *Huntington* may reach the yard at an earlier date than that set by the commandant.

7. In the same line it is suggested that every effort be made to anticipate the early completion of the *San Diego* as soon as that ship reaches the navy yard, Mare Island.

8. In conclusion it is respectfully submitted that the inability of the navy yards on the Pacific coast to handle expeditiously the repairs to the few ships of the Pacific Fleet demonstrates the need of serious attention to a condition which is, to say the least, precarious.

W. F. FULLAM.

Copies to D–in–C, Comdt., Puget Sound; Comdt., Mare Island.

LETTER NO. 26.

In reply address the Secretary of the Navy and refer to No. 28365–49.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, January 24, 1917.

To: Commander, Reserve Force, Pacific Fleet.
Subject: Length of time to repair *South Dakota*, *Frederick*, and *Huntington*.
Reference: (*a*) Commander reserve force letter No. 751–WFF/M, January 11, 1917.

1. Receipt of the above reference is acknowledged.

2. The department notes the desire of the commander, reserve force, to have the repairs to the ships of his force completed at the earliest possible date, which desire

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is in accord with the policies of the department. It is noted, however, that the commander of the reserve force seems under the impression that there is a policy as to repairs at yards that delays the completion of the *South Dakota*, *Frederick*, and *Huntington*, and that he suggests that the navy yard, Puget Sound, be "immediately supplied with the necessary funds, material, and laborers, and that special efforts be made to complete the *Frederick* and *South Dakota* not later than March or April, respectively, in order that they may be made available for Mexican service and that the *Huntington* may reach the yard at an earlier date than that set by the commandant."

3. The department's policy has been, and now is, to get all the vessels of the Navy in condition for war service at the earliest possible time. Every request of the commandant for funds to carry on the work at Puget Sound has been granted and the department is using every means in its power to secure the early delivery of materials. The great difficulty at present is a lack of labor, though in that respect Puget Sound is perhaps better off than most yards. Funds are available to employ labor if it can be found, but it appears the rolls have been exhausted and the department has no means under the existing laws of obtaining labor when it does not voluntarily answer the calls.

4. The above is written in order that you may understand that the department is doing all that it can do toward the end you seek. Your letter has, however, been forwarded to the commandant, navy yard, Puget Sound, with a request for information as to any steps that either the yard or the department can take to expedite the work. If the commandant's reply indicates that there are steps that can be taken to expedite the work without adding materially to the cost, such steps will probably be taken.

JOSEPHUS DANIELS.

LETTER NO. 27.

No. 843–101
WFF/S

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET RESERVE FORCE,
U. S. S. "PUEBLO," FLAGSHIP,
San Francisco, Calif., February 26, 1917.

To: The Secretary of the Navy (Operations).
Subject: Officers and men for armored cruisers.
References: (*a*) Commanding officer, *South Dakota*, letter No. 1253–20a of February 23, 1917, (*b*) Bureau of Navigation letter No. 7771–115 N6S, of February 3, 1917, to commanding officer, receiving ship, Puget Sound, Wash.
Inclosures: 2.

1. The force commander invites attention to the attached letter from the commanding officer of the *South Dakota* and in connection therewith, deems it his duty to make the following statements concerning the question of peronnel for these ships.

2. Shortly before the present crisis apprentice seamen were graduated to the reserve ships after being two months at the training station and men available at receiving ships, particularly at Puget Sound, were promptly distributed among the armored cruisers.

3. This policy alone made it possible to get the armored cruisers to Mexican waters last summer.

4. Recent orders have extended the course of training at Yerba Buena Station to four months, and receiving ships have been directed not to send men to the armored cruisers unless vacancies exist in their reserve complements.

5. The force commander does not wish to criticise in any manner, still less to complain concerning this change of policy in as much as he does not know the reason therefor.

6. But it must be manifest that these changes inevitably delay the building up of crews and the proper preparation of their personnel for important service—if important service is seen to be demanded of them.

7. Furthermore, it must be noted that the armored cruisers now undergoing repairs may be somewhat delayed by the fact that their limited personnel does not enable them to assist the yard workmen in completing certain necessary work on board these ships.

8. In the present emergency it is also to be noted that many men have been assigned to guard duty required on board these ships, which materially reduced the number available for other ship duties.

9. During the duty in Mexican waters, when ships of the Reserve Force were called upon at times, to make high speeds with reserve crews, large numbers of men were prostrated, although they stuck to their work with the greatest possible faithfulness. The temperature of the firerooms of these ships when in tropical waters is very high.

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10. The above conditions should be considered in case it is anticipated that the armored cruisers may be required to "keep the sea" and to maintain their speed in emergencies. If they are to be relied upon for constant and efficient scout duty, it would seem that their engine-room personnel should not be only completely filled, but that there should be at least a few surplus men in certain ratings.

11. The force commander realized that the Bureau of Navigation may have reasons and for retaining men on board receiving ships to provide drafts for the Asiatic station for other reasons, and, similarly, there may be reason for returning to the four months' course at the training station.

12. The armored cruisers at present have a few men in excess of the old reserve complements, but if the new complement of 50 per cent is to be authorized, there will be vacancies in the Reserve Force.

13. The department has doubtless decided upon the duty to be performed by the armored cruisers in an emergency and also upon the policy to be followed in providing them with officers and men.

14. The force commander is merely bringing this subject to the attention of the department in order that actual conditions and necessities may be made known in time to prevent these ships going into active service with insufficient officers and men and with untrained crews that may be found unequal to the demands made upon them, if they are confronted with serious responsibilities.

W. F. FULLAM.

LETTER NO. 28.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET RESERVE FORCE,
U. S. S. "PUEBLO," FLAGSHIP,
San Francisco, Calif., March 4, 1917.

MY DEAR PALMER: I have just read your "hearing" before the Navy Committee on the need of officers and men and the necessity for graduating midshipmen after three years at Annapolis.

This is just a line to congratulate you on your splendid presentation of the whole matter. It is a pity that it was not done long ago, before you came to the bureau. I can not see how your argument can be resisted, and I should think that the Navy Department and every officer in the Navy would stand firmly behind you in your splendid efforts.

Unless we get officers and men and get them quickly, we can not properly prepare our ships for serious work and still less can we expect to have crews and officers ready for the new ones that are coming on.

I will not take more of your time.

Sincerely, yours,

W. F. FULLAM.

Rear Admiral L. C. PALMER, UNITED STATES NAVY,
United States Navy, Chief of Bureau of Navigation,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

LETTER NO. 29.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET RESERVE FORCE,
U. S. S. "PUEBLO," FLAGSHIP,
San Francisco, Calif., March 9, 1917.

MY DEAR CHASE: I suppose Benson is overwhelmed with manifold duties, and although you are being kept out of mischief, too, I want to suggest that a permanent policy should be decided upon concerning the armored cruisers pending the building of better ships to take their place.

In my struggle to get these ships into condition for effective service (and it has been an unceasing struggle for a year and a half) the following facts have been made plain:

(*a*) The armored cruisers will not be sufficient unless arbitrary orders are given by somebody to provide them with what they need, as soon as practicable.

(*b*) They will never be dependable unless they are kept cruising away from the yard, so that their defects can be noted.

(*c*) The case of the *West Virginia* proves the above.

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(*d*) The personnel of these ships must slightly exceed fifty (50 per cent) per cent, and especially in certain ratings, to keep machinery in condition for maximum speed.

(*e*) The loss of the *Milwaukee* was due to inexperienced and bad seamanship of officers of the junior grade.

Three armored cruisers will be ready by April 7—*Pueblo*, *South Dakota*, and *Frederick;* three others will be ready June 1—*Saratoga*, *Huntington*, and *San Diego*.

When these six ships are all ready for service, I earnestly recommend that not less than four of them be kept together at all times under the personal eye of the force commander, for constant inspection, limited cruising, target practice, drills, and routine administrative work to keep them tuned up and to keep their personnel properly disciplined.

The remaining two ships may be assigned to assist the active fleet in Mexico when needed.

I hope, Chase, that Operations will consider the above. I don't want to bag the department, but I do want to help keep these armored cruisers ready for the important work that might be demanded of them, and I am convinced that it can be done if the plan outlined above is approved.

It is of prime importance that four of them be kept together as a division at all times. That will keep material and personnel in the best possible condition. When the ships separate from each other and from the force commander's control, deterioration begins.

Sincerely, yours,

W. F. FULLAM.

Capt. VOLNEY O. CHASE,
United States Navy, Office of Chief of Naval Operations,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

LETTER NO. 30.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET RESERVE FORCE.
U. S. S. "PUEBLO," FLAGSHIP,
San Francisco, Calif., March 25, 1917.

MY DEAR PALMER: I inclose for your eye copy of a circular letter just issued to my ships.

I am trying hard to arouse some military enthusiasm, and heaven knows we need it. We are doing all we can to stimulate recruiting with baseball teams and the assistance of the enlisted men. The apathy of the people on this coast, however, is amazing.

I fear you may have been irritated by my taking up the personnel with operations. But, My dear Palmer, ships can't operate without men, and I thought under the present organization of the Navy Department, and particularly at a time like this, that operations would coordinate with bureaus. For this reason I have sent nearly all of my official letters through operations.

I have worked very hard in my attempts to get these ships ready for war. My correspondence with the department for a year and a half has shown one constant, never-ending struggle. Reviewing it now, I feel that I have deserved some credit, but I have received very little evidence that my work has been properly appreciated. Of course, I haven't worked simply to win the department's approval, but rather from a sense of duty, and because I like to do things; and when I know I'm right I will insist on doing things in the face of every discouragement.

I am well supported by the officers of the reseve force.

Of course, we will have to work mighty hard to train our crews when mobilization takes place. We all welcome the job.

Sincerely, yours,

W. F. FULLAM.

Rear Admiral L. C. PALMER,
United States Navy, Chief of Bureau of Navigation,
Navy Department, Washington.

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NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 7, 1920.

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON NAVAL AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 o'clock a. m., in room 235, Senate Office Building, Senator Frederick Hale presiding.

Present: Senators Hale (chairman), Ball, Keyes, Pittman, and Trammell.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. Admiral Rodman, will you take the stand?

TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL HUGH RODMAN, UNITED STATES NAVY.

(The witness was sworn by the chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, have you any statement to make about matters that are pertinent to this investigation?

Admiral RODMAN. I have, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And in that statement will you give an account of the official positions held by you prior to the war and during the war?

Admiral RODMAN. I am not quite sure whether I have that in my statement, sir. I can very easily do that.

The CHAIRMAN. I wish you would add that in making your statement.

Admiral RODMAN. I prepared this statement, gentlemen, that I might read it, that I might get the sequence in the order in which I would like to lay my evidence before you, and prior to reading my written statement I wish to assure this committee that I am here solely at my own request and on my own initiative, I am here purely from a sense of duty, to defend the good name of the Navy. I shall make my statement for this purpose alone, without malice, with no ulterior motive, and only for the reasons which I have mentioned.

The CHAIRMAN. Before you go further, I want to state that it does not seem to me that the good name of the Navy is at issue.

Admiral RODMAN. I hope not.

The CHAIRMAN. All of us want to defend it.

Admiral RODMAN. I hope so.

The CHAIRMAN. No one could have more interest than this committee, all of whom are members of the Committee on Naval Affairs of the Senate, in the Navy; but as I have repeatedly sated, we are not here to settle differences between officers of the Navy, or between

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officials of the Navy Department and officers of the Navy. We are here because we believe that in a war of this magnitude certain mistakes probably have been made, certain mistakes have been made in the organization, certain faults have been developed in the organization of the Navy, and what we want to do is to develop something that will be constructive, and something that will be for the good of the Navy, and that is the basis of this investigation.

Admiral RODMAN. I have recommendations right along those lines.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I want. You can not make too many recommendations. We want all the recommendations and all the information that we can get to help us in making up our report later on.

Admiral RODMAN. Yes, sir. Shall I proceed, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral RODMAN. I very earnestly desire to emphasize the fact that statements which I may make are intended to refer in general to the subject now before this committee, and that my desire is to lay before you the general impression which this investigation has made upon my mind. My statement is made without any reference to documentary evidence of any kind. I have kept no file-records the war, nor consulted any in the preparation of this statement; and if, therefore, there may appear to be slight differences or inconsistencies, or my statements be at variance with sworn testimony already submitted, it is with no intention on my part to deliberately do so, but is a natural consequence from the principle which I have followed in preparing it, this in order that I may be unbiased as possible and express my own views based on experience.

I have studiously avoided attending the hearing before this committee, or of reading in detail the testimony which Admiral Sims or any one else has presented, even though printed copies of its proceedings have been sent me; yet it is inevitable that I should see some of it in the public press, and receive information concerning it from the discussions and opinions which are so freely expressed by almost everyone in and out of the naval service, both in Washington and elsewhere. But I will try to give you my own impressions, and not those of others. There is no question whatever in my mind, and I believe in the minds of all right-thinking Americans, but that our Navy did its full share most efficiently and splendidly in helping to bring the war against the Huns to a successful and victorious conclusion, and I am here solely, as far as I know, to defend its deservedly good name.

I would naturally like to be impersonal and deal only with generalities, but from the course which this investigation has followed Admiral Sims has been thrown directly into the limelight and occupies the middle of the stage. Around him, his actions, and opinions revolve most of the publicity and discussion which has arisen, hence my references to his personality.

Though doubtless my subsequent statements concerning Admiral Sims may appear to be too personal, and that I shall have beggared and failed to controvert many of the salient statements which he has made, this will not be my primary motive. I will try to show my conception of his position in reference to the general organization of the Navy Department and his duties in connection with the conduct of the war, more particularly to express my own opinion and what

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I believe to be the general sentiment of the Navy to the indiscreet and injudicious methods which he has employed in setting forth his views.

Admiral Sims's letter was very indiscreet—this, I believe, is the general opinion—it was that which, no doubt, brought about this investigation. Naturally, in defending his actions he has tried to make good by attempting to make it appear that his remarks were pertinent only to the first months of the war. To my mind it covers a wider field; his indiscretions lay primarily in the tone, wording, and phraseology of his letter, and very particularly in his breach of confidnece by making public an intimate and confidential conversation which should have been held sacred. Had his letter been less indiscreet, had he omitted reference to conversations which, as I have said, he should have held sacred and confidential, had it been couched in moderate terms, such as are usually used in official correspondence, had it been less antagonistic, it would no doubt have followed the usual course of such communications, received due consideration by the proper authorities, and doubtless some good would have come from it. His mention and the subsequent publication of a certain admonition which he states he received prior to his departure for London no doubt has had its effect upon the cordial relations which heretofore existed between us and one of our closest allies. In every expression of opinion which I have heard concerning it, both in and out of the Navy, it has received the deepest censure.

His status in London, as I understand it, was that of a liaison officer, which later was combined with the duties of naval attaché there. His title as "Commanding United States naval forces in European waters" is particularly misleading. He was in reality a subordinate part of Naval Operations, with his office in London; he was its advanced agent; his was the relay office for all communications between Washington and the forces in the field. He did not personally direct the movements of our fighting ships in the war zone, as the public so generally believes. For example, every operation of the battleship force under my command was ordered and directed by Admiral Beatty, of the Grand Fleet, of which my command was a part. I served under Admiral Beatty's command throughout the war. I understand that the destroyers based on Queenstown were operated under Admiral Bayly, of the British Navy; that Admiral Wilson directed the movements of ships in and out of the French ports; that the ships of Admiral Strauss's command that laid the North Sea mine barrage were routed and protected by the Grand Fleet, and that the fighting ships in general operating in the war zone had their movements directed by some one other than Admiral Sims.

I would like to explain briefly a little more to the committee as to the operation of our convoys. Without going into the details, I have an idea that when our convoys were organized—I mean the transports—there was assigned to them their fighting force for protection; that a convoy would be routed from New York or Hampton Roads by Operations. They would be directed to proceed, we will say, to a point "A" in mid-Atlantic. Now, this information concerning the convoys would naturally be cabled to Admiral Sims in London, who would immediately inform the British Admiralty, and

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also inform the officer, we will say, if it were going to a port in France, who was there, Admiral Wilson. It was then the duty of those officers who controlled the destroyers to meet them at a designated point, to afford them protection against the submarines, and on their arrival close to the coast of France Admiral Wilson would direct the naval vessels that would go out to meet them and bring them safely into port. I say this because I believe that Admiral Sims did not direct our convoys.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have anything to do with the convoy system?

Admiral RODMAN. Nothing at all, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. This is simply your idea of it?

Admiral RODMAN. Just my opinion, sir.

My conception of his duties was that he was in London as a central office, or advanced base of operations, to help coordinate our combined interests, to collect and forward information, to make recommendations, to look out for our correspondence, supplies, stores, personnel in European waters, and to approve or disapprove his subordinates' requests or recommendations in a limited degree, referring to Washington the major ones, in his discretion; but all under the immediate supervision of the Chief of Operations in the department in Washington.

Reasoning from a standpoint of experience I would naturally infer that when Admiral Sims sent his communications to the Navy Department bearing upon policy or any other subject, that they would have received due consideration the same as from any other officer, and that the most important would have been submitted to the General Board of the Navy for its opinion. This board consists of the older and most experienced officers. It has neither administrative nor executive duties, but acts solely in an advisory capacity. And so, it seems to me, that unquestionably his communications would have received proper consideration, and that action would have been taken in accordance with the best advice offered and that which was considered best by operations. There is no doubt that when those officers who were intrusted with the policy of the Navy, had formulated an opinion, it was laid before the Chief of Operations, who was not only influenced but very largely governed by the advice of technical experts, i. e., officers of the Navy Department.

The policy of the department is largely influenced by the advice of this board, which amongst other duties assists in preparing all general war plans. These plans are formulated but modified from time to time, as new conditions arise to warrant it. To imply anything to the contrary shoots wide of the mark. I know, from experience, from having been a member of this board just prior to the declaration of the war, that my statement is correct; that there were plans and policies in existence anticipating the possible advent of our entering the war, and that they were no doubt modified as I have stated. There was probably not one single nation engaged in this great World War but which had to revise every plan that it had previously made. Admiral Sims's recommendations to the department looked to just these same ends.

One might infer that he considered himself the sole source of information, and that in consequence his every recommendation should have been instantly approved. He admits that all of the maritime

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allied countries were constantly communicating direct with the department through their embassies in Washington. It is a fact that foreign allied naval attachés were in daily direct communication with our Navy Department, setting forth their desires, interests, and policies of their home countries; therefore Admiral Sims could not, by any manner of means, have had a thorough knowledge of the varied requests and propositions set forth. It was unqualifiedly the mission of our department to consider all such questions and act accordingly; as there were multitudinous recommendations and interests to be considered, many of which were interdependent with our own or pertained solely to their individual needs, all of which had to be combined, and decisions be rendered accordingly.

There is also no question but that Admiral Sims was in a most advantageous position for making recommendations and that they should have had great weight—and no doubt they did—particularly after the Allied Council was formed and he became a member; but I refer more particularly to the period prior to this and to which he himself refers in his letter. Possibly, in his earnest endeavors he has arrogated to his office more importance than was actually the case; and implies that his recommendations to the department should have received immediate and unqualified approval. I do not agree with him in the principle laid down that all recommendations from juniors to their seniors should follow this course. For example, I once made the request to him as my senior, that the British destroyers that were assigned by the Grand Fleet to my division of battleships as our screen—I mean that every time battleships went to sea on both sides, there were a number of destroyers to act as a screen against submarines—be replaced by the newest type of American destroyers that were being sent for work in British waters, giving my reasons therefore. He disapproved it. I never for a minute resented it, recognizing that he being my senior that this was his privilege; yet he implies that just the contrary should have obtained when he made recommendations to his senior, the Chief of Naval Operations.

I have an idea that the war was not fought and won in London alone. In spite of what Admiral Sims may think, unqualifiedly the only place for the direction and administration of the Navy's policy was in Washington, delegating to others abroad, and commanders in the field, such authority as should properly belong to them. My experience was that this was the case.

I do not for one minute wish to detract one iota of my opinion that Admiral Sims rendered most conspicuous and valuable service to the Navy during the war.

I can say that I know of no officer who was more conspicuous in this war, and who rendered better service, than Admiral Sims.

In this he is held in the very highest esteem; but I do wish to impress upon this committee that the only logical place in which our Navy could possibly be directed was in Washington, and that officers who were there, and legally responsible, were the logical ones to do so. To have moved our whole administration to London, even though 3,000 miles separated it from the scene of hostilities, would have been a serious blunder. The whole responsibility of winning this war was not placed upon the shoulders of Admiral Sims in his London office; the Navy Department could not surrender to him all of its power and responsibilities.

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The motive which prompted this public investigation is veiled to me under a smoke-screen of words, and I can not for the life of me see but that it will discredit the work of the Navy in this war, which I know has been most creditable. It has already had its effect upon Congress, to say nothing of the public.

The CHAIRMAN. To what motive do you refer, Admiral?

Admiral RODMAN. It would be very hard for me to explain, Senator. I think that I have tried to show that beforehand. What I am trying to show is that it would have seemed to me the logical thing for an officer to have kept his letter in the hands of the department. The fact that it has been given publicity, I know from talking to a great many people in civil life, has brought about this question, "Well, what is the matter with the Navy?"

The CHAIRMAN. My question was meant to develop the question of whether you meant to accuse this committee of having any motive.

Admiral RODMAN. Not in the slightest degree, sir; not in the slightest. I would not do such a thing, sir. Even though Admiral Sims states that he did not desire this publicity, I am still of the opinion that if he himself did not desire it and had used his best endeavor to have prevented it, it might have been avoided. But the impression left on my mind, by giving his letter all this publicity, and the evident effort throughout to discredit the Navy is that it may have been the intention to give the impression that he had most of the responsibility for running this war, and that the department fell down upon its job because it did not follow his advice. This at the expense of the good name which the Navy so justly deserves. This whole affair to my mind savors of ill-advised criticism against the Navy. I refer to his criticisms before, and since the investigation has been under way. But still, since the investigation is under way, let us hope that some good may result from it, and I think that it will.

Another deep impression that is made upon my mind is, that, though praise is bestowed upon its officers and men, that there has been laid bare before this committee by some of the witnesses every possible point which is derogatory to the Navy—I refer to that more particularly in preparedness, which I will come to later—without stating the thousand and one good ones which should redound to its credit, and that they have attempted to sustain their argument by documentary evidence.

Throughout this war, and during my entire naval service, I have never found it necessary to refer to documentary evidence to establish and convince anyone of acts on my part. For example, I believe he has stated that the division of battleships which I commanded for a year or so in the war zone was not prepared when we entered the war. That it was not homogeneous. I wish to state from having been in the Atlantic Fleet from the time the United States declared war, that never in my forty odd years of service, most of which I have spent at sea, and in the latter part in the North Atlantic Fleet, never have I seen such preparedness and efficiency as obtained in our battleship fleet as at the beginning of, and during, the war. No ship has ever, in my experience, been absolutely efficient; nor will there ever be one whose commanding officer will conscientiously state that it is 100 per cent so. For this reason every officer who has pride and interest in his command will always strive for greater efficiency. No ship will ever be in absolutely perfect condition for no other reason

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than that from its complicated design, from the multiplicity and complexity of its machinery and constructive features, it will always require certain repairs, alterations, and improvements to keep pace with new and important inventions and improvements, and for its maintenance and upkeep.

The personnel of our ships must of necessity from time to time be changed, and since the operation and efficiency of our ships depends upon team work, it requires constant drills and exercises to promote and insure maximum efficiency. One of his references to my division was that it was not homogeneous in reference to its guns; that different ships had different calibers. True, yet he knows full well that this has not the slightest bearing upon the reason for the selection of those individual ships which constituted my division to go on foreign service with the British Grand Fleet; that it was based solely upon the fact that they were coal burners and that coal as fuel for these ships, instead of oil, could best be supplied while actively engaged in British waters, and that he himself so stated to the department. This statement of his, to my mind, therefore, beggars the main point at issue. He further states that prior to their departure from the United States that they were unprepared and had of necessity to be docked before leaving. Also true in part, and for this reason. He well knows that in general all of our ships are docked periodically at about nine months' intervals; that it would be absolutely impracticable to dock every ship in our fleet for cleaning their bottoms and thus increasing their speed at much shorter intervals. He further must know that there is never a time on any ship when some minor, and sometimes major, repairs, alterations, or installations are not necessary, and that it is absolutely impossible to keep every ship in our Navy absolutely perfect at all times. I have not the slightest hesitancy in saying that the ships of this division at the time mentioned, in particular, were in a very high state of efficiency, and, while they were sent to our navy yards for a few days prior to sailing, it was only to put on the finishing touches while in dry dock and clean their bottoms so there would be nothing left undone to reach the maximum state of efficiency for the work in which they were about to engage.

The first knowledge to reach me that I was to command this division, composed of ships none of them under my command at the time—that was because the number of coal burners had to be selected—was while I was on board Admiral Mayo's flagship on a certain afternoon. Realizing that it necessitated shifting several flag officers and other details before leaving his flagship, by his permission I immediately sent signals giving information and orders for movements, so that they might proceed to their home yards for docking, cleaning bottom, and a final grooming before their departure for the war zone.

Three weeks later we joined the British Grand Fleet, which had been in the war for three long years, at Scapa Flow, in the Orkney Islands, to the north of Scotland. It was a matter of pride that we were at once able to coordinate and cooperate with them intelligently, without the slightest hesitancy, friction, or misunderstanding. We adopted and could use their signals, radio, secret codes, and other communications—and, gentlemen, that is one of the hardest problems we have in the Navy—and could efficiently execute their tactics

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and maneuvers and conform to their war plans. This was put to the test when within three days of our arrival a signal was made for all ships to be ready to proceed to sea in two hours for active service in the North Sea, and we reported ready when the time came that we were ready.

From that day to the end of the war we took part in every major operation in the North Sea and some independent smaller ones. There was never a time but that we were ready when called upon; we could always steam full speed, maintain our position, and received nothing but the highest praise, not only from the British admirals, officers, and men, but from those of our own Navy who visited us.

I might further say, gentlemen, I hate to speak of the division that I command, for it seems to me that I might seem to be trying to laud myself, which I am not, in the slightest degree, but our ships were maintained in such a high degree of efficiency that the British Admiralty made inquiries of us as to our methods, with the possible view of adopting them in the British Navy, for their ships.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is a very good point to bring out.

Admiral RODMAN. Let me truthfully add that without taking the slightest credit to myself as the commanding officer, but giving it to the officers and men, where it belongs, and to the years of preparedness in the American Navy, that, put it as modestly as I can, the American squadron was fully equal to any of the Grand Fleet.

Assuming that these ships were unprepared when we received the order to go, as some have testified, and that in the short period of three weeks when we joined the Grand Fleet, that we were prepared (and we unqualifiedly were), it must be ascribed to divine interference, for it could not possibly have been accomplished by human hands alone in that short time.

While our ships were in active service in the war zone they were visited by Messrs. Butler, Padgett, Kelley, and others of the House Naval Committee. They are personally familiar with our condition, and it would be most interesting for you gentlemen to have any one or all of them give you their personal views which were obtained at such close range.

Congress gives us our ships, personnel, and the money for the maintenance of the Navy. No matter what the Navy may need, nor the department recommend, we are bounded by this limitation. Nor does it follow that the minute an appropriation is made that the Navy instantly receives the full benefit. If Congress should see fit to maintain our fleet at its full war strength in times of peace, there would never be any question of its preparedness and readiness when war is declared. I mean that it takes time to build ships, it takes months and years to do so. It takes time to increase and train the commissioned and enlisted personnel. Yet, at the beginning of this war, the Navy had so far profited by previous appropriations that I have no hesitancy in saying from having been in the fleet, and having been in it for some years, that never have I seen such efficiency and preparedness as obtained at that time.

I might diverge for a moment and say that I refer particularly to the ships that I know more about—that is, the battleships—and do you realize that around this nucleus of the old Navy, we were immediately able to expand to fully 10 times its then strength—not in capital ships, but in hundreds of others, and in the personnel, and that we

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were still able to do our work so that it has met with nothing but admiration and commendation. Again I say, if this be not preparedness, I do not know the meaning of the word.

Efficiency and preparedness in the Navy is never a matter of days. It is a matter of months and years. I might liken it to an athlete or to a pugilist who after months of training must strip for action and, if the latter, put on his gloves before the coming battle, but whose preparedness has attained by weeks and months of training. Or to a race horse who is not prepared for the race, by simply putting on his bridle, saddle, and final grooming before running, but whose training has extended over weeks and months. And just so with our ships, which require months and years to reach a proper standard of efficiency.

There is another point that I wish to emphasize and use an old expression that Admiral Sims has used that "Hind sight is better than foresight." Even so, I have already previously stated in public that so far as my command was concerned in this late war, that had I to live it over again I would not change it in one iota. Let me further state in reference to our actions in this war, that there can never be any great commercial enterprise, whether it be a manufacturing concern, a great railroad system, bank, or anything else, but that if those who are most intimately connected with its managements could look back over the passed years of experience, would say that if they had it to do over again they could do to better advantage. Gen. Goethals, with whom I was intimately associated at Panama for two years as marine superintendent of the canal, has stated that had he to build the canal again he could not only do it in a better manner, but that he could better have carried into execution many of the plans that were submitted during its construction. And possibly this same principle pertains to the Navy and its administration, particularly in war time. Unqualifiedly mistakes were made as there are in every great and highly technical enterprise which combines such a multitudinous number of interests which have to be coordinated, and there always will be mistakes under like circumstances.

There will always be difference of opinion in any body of men who are intrusted with the execution of great enterprises and who have the responsibilities pertaining thereto, particularly when there are so many and such varied requests, interests, and recommendations, all of which are more or less interdependent, and which have to be combined into a homogeneous whole, as there are in the Navy. For example, the very highest tribunal of our land or any other country, our own Supreme Court, has just rendered a decision of 5 to 4 in a most important case. Is it any wonder, then, that our Navy Department, and those intrusted with its policies and plans and their execution, may have found good and sufficient reasons for not following blindly the recommendations of just one single officer?

In looking back at the Navy's part in this war, and prior to the time that Admiral Sims made this charge, I had heard nothing but the very greatest praise and approbation on the part of the public, and those of us who served in the war, and were familiar with its workings, for the part which the Navy had taken. Having devoted my whole life to it, I was proud indeed to feel that this organization to which I belong had met with general approval from everyone,

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and that its operations had been so highly satisfactory and meritorious.

I would refrain from mentioning personalities, but let me say with the deepest sincerity, that no one could have had more cordial relations in every sense of the word than those which existed between Admiral Sims and myself in the war zone. As a classmate of mine and a life-long friend, at the conclusion of this war he was preeminently conspicuous among the officers who had rendered the most valuable service. I regret exceedingly for the Navy's reputation sake, that it was through his instrumentality, directly or indirectly, that this investigation was instituted with its resultant publicity, but I hope and believe that some ultimate good may be obtained.

The Navy doubtless made mistakes during the war, but the methods and means which have been employed in attacking it will of necessity leave prejudice in the minds of those who are not familiar with the Navy and its organization. There is many a charge that is made against an innocent man; but the very fact that such a charge has been preferred, even though the accused may be proved to be perfectly innocent, leaves a bad taste in the mouth, and what may have been a spotless reputation is often besmirched by the fact that the accused was brought to trial. This, in my opinion, is exactly what this investigation spells to me. In Admiral Beatty's speech to my division when we were leaving for home, he remarked: "Now that the fighting is over, the talking will begin." Surely no truer prophecy was ever made, and I might add, of writing, too.

After the Spanish War, no matter how well Admiral Dewey may have done his work at Manila Bay, nor what the Atlantic Fleet accomplished at Santiago, both of which combined to eliminate the Spanish fleet, we had the Sampson-Schley controversy, which directly or indirectly detracted from the well-deserved reputation of the Navy. And now we have the so-called Sims controversy or investigation, which does the same thing, regardless of what the Navy accomplished.

I repeat that the Allies won the war. This was their mission; nor can anyone deny, who is fair-minded, but that the American Navy did its full share in helping to attain this end. I wish to reiterate that I have not one single document nor record of any kind, class, or description to substantiate my statement, nor have I ever felt it necessary in my service of 45 years to keep any files or records to do so. I am simply trying to lay before this committee my views in general of what the Navy accomplished, and its preparedness, and can not, for the life of me, see how any unprejudiced person in or out of the service can take any other view than that which I have tried to lay before you.

It is easy for anyone to sit on the side lines and criticize; it is a far more difficult proposition for those who are intrusted with the execution of plans and policies to carry them out with the means at their disposal, when they have an active command in time of war. When a war is ended, even though victoriously, the critics and historians have no hesitancy whatever in pointing out how much better it could have been done, not infrequently stating just how, in their opinion, it could best have been accomplished, and to back their

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opinion and air before the public what they had recommended or would have done themselves and produce documentary evidence in substantiation.

No doubt the great leaders in this war in the field—Marshal Foch, Sir Douglas Haig, Gen. Pershing, Admiral Beatty, Lejeune of the Marines, and others—will come in for their fair share of adverse criticism from the literary critics. No doubt the same class of writers will attempt to show how the French, British, and American forces, afloat and ashore, were in a chaotic condition, unprepared, and made a mess of it. But those of us who were fortunate enough to hold active commands in the field of hostilities, no matter how humble or small a part we may have taken, have a different view, and are more apt to feel that even if we were not like Ivory soap, $99\frac{44}{100}$ per cent pure, that we still did our fair share toward winning this war.

Now, gentlemen, in looking back over the various testimony and the investigation which has been held, I have a recommendation to make. I believe that it would be for the best interests of the Navy that we might avoid mistakes in future, to intrust the Chief of Naval Operations with the responsibility of preparing plans for any future work, and to keep the Navy in a State of preparedness; and, more important still, to give him the authority to carry them into execution when war is declared, following the policy that is laid down by the Federal Government. That is all, gentlemen.

The CHAIRMAN. You think that the Chief of Naval Operations should be responsible, do you?

Admiral RODMAN. Yes, sir; and have the authority——

The CHAIRMAN. The law does not provide that he is responsible for all——

Admiral RODMAN. I believe not, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It was the original intention of Congress, I believe, to provide that the Chief of Naval Operations should be responsible, but at the instigation of the Secretary that word "responsibility" was taken out.

Admiral RODMAN. I think he should have the responsibility and the authority, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I will ask you some further questions a little later about that question, about the Chief of Naval Operations.

Admiral RODMAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, Admiral Rodman, you are a very high officer in the Navy. You are in command of the Pacific Fleet, I understand.

Admiral RODMAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And you are on oath before this committee.

Admiral RODMAN. I beg your pardon.

The CHAIRMAN. You are on oath before this committee.

Admiral RODMAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you want it to be understood from your statement that you consider that the United States Navy was in a thorough state of preparedness at the beginning of the World War, or at the beginning of our entrance into the war, at the time of our entrance into the war?

Admiral RODMAN. No, sir; not by any manner of means. No navy will be absolutely prepared. The British Navy was not

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thoroughly prepared. It never will be thoroughly prepared. But, I say, sir, that so far as the limitations that were placed upon us by the appropriations and Congress, and what it gave us, we were in a very high state of preparedness. There were certain of our ships that were lacking. We lacked types of vessels that we should have had, and some of our ships were not, possibly, as well prepared as they might have been; but, in general, the battleship fleet was in a high state of efficiency.

The CHAIRMAN. And you think that even considering the fact that the World War began in 1914, and had been going on——

Admiral RODMAN. Three years.

The CHAIRMAN. Nearly four years.

Admiral RODMAN. Three years.

The CHAIRMAN. Practically three years, when we went into the war; you think they were in a reasonable state of preparedness when we went in, all things considered?

Admiral RODMAN. My statement shows conclusively that the battleship fleet was, so far as my force was concerned.

The CHAIRMAN. I have some further questions to ask you about that force later on.

Admiral RODMAN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Your relations with Admiral Sims you have stated were entirely satisfactory during the war?

Admiral RODMAN. Most cordial; as cordial with Admiral Sims as with any man in the world.

The CHAIRMAN. You never had any controversy with him?

Admiral RODMAN. Not the slightest with him, or with any other man that I know of.

The CHAIRMAN. You were under his command?

Admiral RODMAN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You were?

Admiral RODMAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And yet you say that he was not really the commander in chief on the other side, or that that idea is misleading.

Admiral RODMAN. I said that the title, commanding United States Naval forces in European waters, might be misleading; meaning by that, that the public might think that—I am referring a great deal of my testimony to the public, I am free to admit—they might think that Admiral Sims directed the movements of our warships. It was to emphasize that fact that I stated this title might be misleading.

The CHAIRMAN. But he was your superior officer on the other side.

Admiral RODMAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. How were you assigned to the British fleet?

Admiral RODMAN. By the direction of the Secretary of the Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. Before you went over?

Admiral RODMAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did Admiral Sims interfere in your operations?

Admiral RODMAN. Not in the slightest.

The CHAIRMAN. Or limit your initiative in any way?

Admiral RODMAN. Not in the slightest, sir. No one could have been better in every way, shape, and form than Admiral Sims.

The CHAIRMAN. Was your position in the war such that you can testify at first hand to the questions brought up in Admiral Sims's testimony?

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Admiral RODMAN. I have never read it, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know anything, from personal observation, about the convoy system, and about the question of sending destroyers to the other side?

Admiral RODMAN. Very little.

The CHAIRMAN. Or about the question of sending tugs?

Admiral RODMAN. Very little.

The CHAIRMAN. Or about the state of affairs there on anything else?

Admiral RODMAN. No; I do not. I was not in the position to, except what I read in the public press, I know very little about it.

The CHAIRMAN. So that your statement is made up from observation, from what you knew yourself and what you saw over there, and what you have read and gathered in general during the war?

Admiral RODMAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. When were you assigned by the department to take a division of battleships to the North Sea?

Admiral RODMAN. I think it was in the latter part of November, 1917.

The CHAIRMAN. In November, 1917?

Admiral RODMAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And you sailed immediately?

Admiral RODMAN. I do not remember the time. I should say it was about 10 days or 2 weeks.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you do anything during those 10 days or 2 weeks——

Admiral RODMAN. I do not get that.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have to do anything in those 10 days or 2 weeks toward getting your ships in condition to go over?

Admiral RODMAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What?

Admiral RODMAN. There were a number of minor repairs, docking and cleaning bottoms. Then we naturally filled up with stores and coal and everything to the utmost capacity that we could carry—what all ships do just prior to leaving port for any extended voyage.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you given any plans or policy, by the department, before you went over?

Admiral RODMAN. None whatever. I was simply directed to follow a designated route, and I followed that route and found myself amongst the British Grand Fleet.

The CHAIRMAN. No policy or plan for the conduct of the war?

Admiral RODMAN. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you know of any such plan?

Admiral RODMAN. No, sir; I did not need any. I was to go over to splice out the British Grand Fleet.

The CHAIRMAN. Whom were you to report to over there?

Admiral RODMAN. I do not remember. I will tell you the incident. When I arrived, I reported in the usual naval fashion, my arrival, to the department. That is a cut and dried affair.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you report to Admiral Sims?

Admiral RODMAN. No, sir. And then I got a telegram from the department "In future send all your reports and communications direct to Admiral Sims;" so that I was placed under Admiral Sims's command by a telegram from the department.

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The CHAIRMAN. After you had gotten over there?

Admiral RODMAN. Yes, sir. It was explained to me before I left the department, by Operations, that I was going over to splice out the British Grand Fleet. A verbal order is as good to me as any other kind, you know. I knew what I was going for.

The CHAIRMAN. Did the department give you any instructions to govern your actions after you were on the other side?

Admiral RODMAN. None whatever.

The CHAIRMAN. Was not that rather embarrassing to you?

Admiral RODMAN. Not to me. I knew what I went for. Never the slightest embarrassment.

The CHAIRMAN. Just what did the department tell you to do when you went over there?

Admiral RODMAN. I could not repeat the words. I had an intimate conversation with the Acting Chief of Operations. The chief, I think, was abroad. He simply said, "You are designated to take this command, to go over and splice out—and strengthen the Grand Fleet in their operations against the German main force. Why, Senator, I did not have to have any more instructions than that.

The CHAIRMAN. And you were told to report to the head of the British Grand Fleet?

Admiral RODMAN. No, sir. I did report to the head of the Grand Fleet, and reported my arrival to the department. I had my orders.

The CHAIRMAN. What?

Admiral RODMAN. They left it to me to report to the Grand Fleet. That was my object in going. They supposed they could trust my judgment, or they would not have sent me.

The CHAIRMAN. You were simply told to go over and report to the Grand Fleet?

Admiral RODMAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Was your position in the Grand Fleet satisfactory?

Admiral RODMAN. Very highly so, sir. I was in command of what they called, under that designation, the six battleship squadron. It was one of the two important squadrons of the Grand Fleet. Technically, I think, they called them the fast wings. I was put in command of the left end of the line, and the fifth battle squadron had the other end of the line when we went into action.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the rank of the other commanders of battleships?

Admiral RODMAN. There were three of them. The commanders of all the other squadrons were admirals or vice admirals. I was a rear admiral.

The CHAIRMAN. Did Admiral Sims recommend you for the position of vice admiral?

Admiral RODMAN. Yes, I think that was——

The CHAIRMAN. Did the department approve that recommendation?

Admiral RODMAN. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know why not?

Admiral RODMAN. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Was it not rather embarrassing to you to hold a lower rank than the others?

Admiral RODMAN. Not in the slightest. Sometimes I commanded the British admirals and sometimes they commanded me. It de-

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pended upon the nature of the work which we were doing. We strengthened the force. I took my rank in accordance with theirs.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it usual for an admiral to serve under a rear admiral?

Admiral RODMAN. I have never seen it, in my life.

The CHAIRMAN. I thought you said some of these others served under you, when they were admirals?

Admiral RODMAN. I should have stated that they were rear admirals. I used "admiral" in the sense in which we use it. I was then commanding British rear admirals who were some of them junior to me and one senior. Admiral Alexander Sinclair had some light cruisers when we were sent out on certain service, but that difference in rank he waived. The officer in command of the battleship force was originally the one to command the other ships. There was no embarrassment there.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have under you officers ranking higher than rear admirals at one time or another?

Admiral RODMAN. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. If you had been higher than a rear admiral would you have had higher command, probably?

Admiral RODMAN. No, sir. When they sent out small detachments we were sent in rotation. For example, sometimes it was our duty to carry convoys from the British ports to the Norwegian ports and back, and then we would have to have sufficient strength to prevent the Germans from getting in their work. They do these things in rotation. When my turn came I would not be at all surprised, although I do not remember, if there were possibly little changes made in the British officers to make the squadron commanders juniors to me, so that I might command when I went out.

The CHAIRMAN. In the testimony before the committee on the question of naval awards, Secretary Daniels intimated that he would have preferred to have had the American battleships not under British orders, but as a separate and independent unit. In your opinion would it have been better to have established a separate divisional command of these battleships?

Admiral RODMAN. You mean the battleships I commanded over there?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral RODMAN. No, sir; I could only have operated intelligently and efficiently under the Grand Commander-in-Chief, regardless of his nationality.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you ever have any trouble with the Commander of the Grand Fleet?

Admiral RODMAN. Never in the slightest. Our relations were the most cordial on earth. They were brotherly, almost.

The CHAIRMAN. If you had had any trouble, what would you have done? Would you have gone to Admiral Sims?

Admiral RODMAN. That is a hypothetical case. I never had it.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to know what the procedure there would have been, and where you would have gone.

Admiral RODMAN. I should have sent my communication to the Department through Admiral Sims, unqualifiedly.

The CHAIRMAN. To the department through Admiral Sims?

Admiral RODMAN. Yes, sir.

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The CHAIRMAN. Could he have changed you over, ordered you to another duty, if he had wanted to?

Admiral RODMAN. I do not know, sir. That is not an evasive answer, in the slightest. That just reaches the point that I do not know whether his authority would have extended that far, or whether the department would have stood for it. I do not know. I rather imagine he would have had the authority. If I had misbehaved or done anything wrong he would have had the authority.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, you are not entirely familiar with how much authority he had as Commander-in-Chief of the Forces in European Waters? If you are, I would be very glad to have you tell me what the limit of authority was?

Admiral RODMAN. I am afraid, if you are trying to get me down to exact limitations, you will get me over my depth. I would rather he would tell you that himself. He knows.

The CHAIRMAN. You have stated that his position was entirely misunderstood; that he had practically no authority over there.

Admiral RODMAN. I do not think so. I would be very glad to read you what I said.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you not?

Admiral RODMAN. I do not think I said so. I think I said that he did not direct the movements of the fighting ships. I would be very glad to read you what I said, or let you read it yourself. I will say this, sir, that there was never a time when there was the slightest difficulty of any character, class or description raised between Admiral Sims and me, if that will cover it.

The CHAIRMAN. I can not locate the place in your statement, but I refer to your statement that his position as commander in chief over there was generally misunderstood.

Admiral RODMAN. No, sir; I said that it might be misleading to the public. At least, that was my intent.

The CHAIRMAN. Here is your statement. [Reading:]

His title as "Commanding United States naval forces in European waters" is partially misleading. He was in reality a subordinate part of Naval Operations with his office in London;

Admiral RODMAN. Yes; my idea was this. The public—now, just notice that I refer to the public, and this is intended for the public. The public think——

The CHAIRMAN. Your testimony, Admiral, is for this committee.

Admiral RODMAN. Yes, sir; but I am trying to explain to the public at the same time, sir, if I may, and what I was saying there was for the public.

The CHAIRMAN. Does the public have different opinions from this committee?

Admiral RODMAN. I do not know, sir. They get some mighty curious ones, sometimes.

The CHAIRMAN. Apparently.

Admiral RODMAN. And they form very queer conclusions.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you consider that your division of battleships during the war was an integral part of the British Navy, as Secretary Daniels has stated?

Admiral RODMAN. He has used that statement himself. My statement was, on another occasion, that it was an integral part of the Grand Fleet. It was just as I imagine that General Pershing's

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army was an intregral part of the allied forces on the west front, under Marshal Foch.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you not keep up, always, its independent character as American?

Admiral RODMAN. Absolutely; and we were praised for it by the British themselves. The commander in chief or some other admiral admired the fact that we never lost our Americanism in the slightest degree.

The CHAIRMAN. So that they were practically "brigaded" with the British, to use a military term?

Admiral RODMAN. Yes, if you can use that term. We were a squadron of the Grand Fleet.

The CHAIRMAN. But you kept up their Americanism all the time?

Admiral RODMAN. Yes. And every bit of our work, and everything about our ships down to the smallest part, from the ground floor up, was American.

The CHAIRMAN. And there never was any question in your mind or in anybody's mind, that you were an independent American unit?

Admiral RODMAN. No, sir, never in the world, not in the slightest degree in the mind of anybody.

The CHAIRMAN. And you were only under the operational direction of the British commander in chief?

Admiral RODMAN. Oh, certainly, sir. He had nothing to do with our interior management or upkeep, or anything of that kind—nothing.

The CHAIRMAN. What is your general view about the advisability of the unity of command in a situation such as that you were in the North Sea?

Admiral RODMAN. I think it is the only way to work, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It is the only way to work?

Admiral RODMAN. Yes, sir. I think that was shown, sir, by all of our allied forces, so far as I know, being united under the general command of Marshal Foch on the French front.

The CHAIRMAN. You have stated that the condition of the battleships assigned to your command, when you took them over, was excellent?

Admiral RODMAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In every way?

Admiral RODMAN. Well, you could find fault, if I were to say yes, but I would rather put it in general. Yes, sir, they were. They were ready to go into action.

The CHAIRMAN. How about their proficiency in gunnery?

Admiral RODMAN. The gunnery reports will give you a very good contrast. I do not remember the scores, but it was excellent from what it had been. You must remember that our gunnery is like anything else. It started in the very simplest forms, has built up through the number of years; and let me give Admiral Sims the very greatest credit of anybody in our Navy for giving us our form of gunnery; and I think everybody is deserving of the very greatest credit for building up our gunnery. That was progressive. I could not give you the scores, but I think it was excellent. I hate to speak of the ships I commanded because people may think that I am egotistical, but I can say furthermore, I can give you one instance in which the commanding officer of the *King*, which was the ship that towed the targets when we went out to target practice, told some of our officers afterwards that our target

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practice there was the best that he had ever seen. I think that is going some on efficiency.

The CHAIRMAN. What report did you make to the commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet as to gunnery proficiency?

Admiral RODMAN. I did not get that.

The CHAIRMAN. What report did you make to the commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet as to gunnery proficiency of the ships under your command?

Admiral RODMAN. Are you speaking of the Texas, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. I am asking generally.

Admiral RODMAN. Are you leading up to where the Texas come over? I am rather anticipating that, am I not?

The CHAIRMAN. I should prefer to speak of that later.

Admiral RODMAN. The rest of the ships were excellent, but the *Texas* was rotten when she arrived, and for this reason—compared with the others. I asked for the *Texas* to come over as a replacement ship, the idea being that if any of the four that I had should break down, I should want an old ship to replace, and I asked for the *Texas* because she was a sister ship to the *New York* and was a coal burner. Now, the *Texas* unfortunately had been grounded in the previous summer or autumn, and when she was hauled off at Brooklyn she was carried to the navy yard at New York, and there she staid, and that does not spell efficiency when a ship has to stay in the navy yard some three or four months. They had had no chance whatever.

There is another thing—this is of no interest, I think, to the committee, but it will explain why her training was poor—the *Texas* had been the most efficient ship in the Navy, and flew the pennant at her masthead both in seamanship and gunnery, but when she came over there she had much deteriorated. When we went out to target practice over there we had to have all the mines swept out and we had to have a screen on both sides in order to go out, and I found that on the *Texas* at that time they were still thinking too much of competition; they were still competing. I said to the captain, "You must forget that competition idea and go in for war purposes"; and I explained to them what I meant; and I can say almost unqualifiedly that when the *Texas* recognized that she was not there competing, but for war purpose, she went ahead; and so much so that I gave the captain special commendation. The operation was excellent when she realized and had an opportunity to pick up.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you make any report to Admiral Mayo before you went abroad about the gunnery condition of the fleet?

Admiral RODMAN. Before I went?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral RODMAN. I think probably you refer to a report I made after I went.

The CHAIRMAN. You made none before?

Admiral RODMAN. We all made reports, but I do not recall any report. I mean, each commanding officer or flag officer makes a report on target practice. I remember no special report I made to Admiral Mayo, but I did make one after I arrived, making certain recommendations, and I got a pretty sharp letter from him. I do not think it was written by him, but by the gunnery officer, and it was a pretty sharp letter, and I placed it under the Rodman filing system; I put it in the waste basket, where I thought it belonged.

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The CHAIRMAN. A communication from the admiral?

Admiral RODMAN. Yes, sir; and I think he was glad of it. I have not a closer friend in this world than Admiral Mayo.

The CHAIRMAN. What were your recommendations that you made at that time?

Admiral RODMAN. I have no idea. I can give you a very brief description of what the thing was about. I made certain recommendations about target practice, as they appealed to me from the experience which I had gained in the war zone. I recited these conditions and made certain recommendations that the Atlantic Fleet immediately do thus and so. I have forgotten what they were. I think it gave offense, and it offended the gunnery officer; and it did not amount to that [witness snapping his fingers].

The CHAIRMAN. What was the basis of it?

Admiral RODMAN. That was such a little thing I would not bother with it if I were you, Senator. It is really trifling. That has no bearing on this question.

The CHAIRMAN. It has nothing to do with the efficiency of gunnery or the ships?

Admiral RODMAN. If I said no it would not be true. Everything had a bearing. But it did not amount to that (witness snapping his fingers), that letter. I have not thought of it since.

The CHAIRMAN. You have stated that the ships in your division were efficient in every way.

Admiral RODMAN. The *Texas* was not when she arrived, for the reasons I have stated. She was immediately afterwards, when they realized conditions, just as good as any of the rest of them; and I have told you the reason, because she was left up in the navy yard about six months and did not have an opportunity to go out and practice.

The CHAIRMAN. Your recommendations had nothing to do with any ship except the *Texas*?

Admiral RODMAN. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. There was no fault found with any of the other ships at all?

Admiral RODMAN. I think not, sir. We write those reports and state the conditions that arise. No—I do not know what you have got up your sleeve. It is something that I do not know anything about.

The CHAIRMAN. It is not a question of my having anything up my sleeve. I want you to give me information, Admiral Rodman.

Admiral RODMAN. The ships were excellent. Of course they were not perfect.

The CHAIRMAN. You said you made a certain report yourself.

Admiral RODMAN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Which excited a call-down from Admiral Mayo; and yet you are not willing to give me those recommendations that you made in that report.

Admiral RODMAN. I will answer you just as willingly and as truthfully as I possibly can, but I say that matter was trifling. It is one of those things that go and come, from time to time and does not amount to a hill of beans.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you get a copy of those recommendations and submit them to the committee, and then they can see whether they were trifling or not?

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Admiral RODMAN. Senator, I stated that I have never kept any files in my life. I have no more idea where that letter is than the man in the moon, except that I put one of them in the wastebasket. I will explain it to you. I have no hesitancy in doing it.

We have target practice at stated intervals. Each officer, captains and admirals, makes a report. Sometimes they give praise, and sometimes they make recommendations. Sometimes they find fault. It is a mere routine affair.

When the *Texas* arrived I saluted her. I called her captain over and her gunnery officer, and gave them the mischief for firing as they did, in the methods that we generally use in target practice. The exact conditions were that I gave them on this particular occasion, if I remember, each five rounds per gun per turret. I naturally supposed that they would fire under war conditions, and let off all the salvos instantly; but they did not. Their salvos were poor—very poor. If I remember, she took maybe—I supposed she might have fired all these salvos in three minutes—I do not remember the time. She may have been six or seven minutes. The salvos were ragged, I saw that their minds were focused still on making a score and making everything hit. There may have been a little trouble with the personnel. They were still focused on the target practice and winning the pennant; and then I told those officers to get over that competition business, and shoot trying to fire all their guns at all times, and fire them instantly. That was the gist of it, so far as I remember. That letter made no impression on me.

The CHAIRMAN. And it simply referred to that one ship and not to the others?

Admiral RODMAN. Yes, sir. I think I mentioned that thing to my officer, to my aid, this morning—I mentioned that very letter, saying that after considering it awhile, I wrote an answer. It was based on my recommendation as to target practice, and calling my attention to the fact that I had violated some of the rules on it, and my answer was a reference to the fifteenth chapter, first verse, of Proverbs. That was, "A soft answer turneth away wrath." That was my indorsement on it.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the effect on the fleet or removing large numbers of the personnel for merchant ships gun crews?

Admiral RODMAN. That was bad. It decreased for the time being the efficiency of the battleships, but as I remember the conditions, in the days of neutrality the State Department made a decision that would warrant armed gun crews going on what had been merchant ships, now turned into transports. There was an immediate necessity of getting these ships to sea. They did not at that time anticipate that the American battleship fleet would immediately go into action. It was a part of the policy, therefore, to take those gun crews and put them where they could do the most good, to man the guns on the transports. At the same time we took the other ships and took in recruits as fast as we could, and trained them up in their places. That is where I said the Navy expanded to about 10 times its original size, and that was a part of the expansion.

The CHAIRMAN. That would naturally hurt the efficiency while the training was going on.

Admiral RODMAN. Yes, it would; but it would increase the efficiency of the ships we put them on.

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The CHAIRMAN. Later on?

Admiral RODMAN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. What were the names of the ships that went over with you?

Admiral RODMAN. The *New York*, the *Wyoming*, the *Florida*, and the *Delaware*.

The CHAIRMAN. And later the *Texas*?

Admiral RODMAN. And later the *Texas;* and then I think, still later, the *Arkansas* came.

The CHAIRMAN. Had you been in command of these ships before?

Admiral RODMAN. Not immediately. I had once commanded the *New York* as captain.

The CHAIRMAN. She was your flagship?

Admiral RODMAN. I say I had commanded her as captain.

The CHAIRMAN. You had commanded her?

Admiral RODMAN. Yes; and then when I went over I again took the *New York* as flagship.

The CHAIRMAN. Had these ships operated before as a division?

Admiral RODMAN. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Or as a squadron?

Admiral RODMAN. No, sir; but we never had the slightest difficulty in operating them, as soon as I took command. They had operated in other divisions. It is not hard to go from one division to another. That does not amount to a hill of beans.

The CHAIRMAN. Had they operated together?

Admiral RODMAN. No, sir; but they operated as perfectly as ships can operate together, when they came together.

The CHAIRMAN. That answers the question.

Admiral RODMAN. I wanted to qualify it so you could understand.

The CHAIRMAN. Were they of uniform type?

Admiral RODMAN. Do you mean were they exactly sister ships?

The CHAIRMAN. I mean, were they the same type of ships?

Admiral RODMAN. They were near enough in type to operate together.

The CHAIRMAN. Practically at the same speed?

Admiral RODMAN. No, sir; they were approximately so. They would all average 21½ knots. There may have been a knot and a half or a knot difference, but that is nothing.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not think that the fact that they came from different divisions and were of different types would injure their efficiency at all?

Admiral RODMAN. I said positively that it did not.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Sims stated in his testimony that for four months previous to your departure to Europe the question of sending a battleship division to reinforce the Grand Fleet had been under discussion. Had you received any information of this during this time?

Admiral RODMAN. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You had never heard it discussed?

Admiral RODMAN. No, sir. I never heard, as I told you, until one afternoon I was called up and told that I was to have command. That is the first I heard of it.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you know of any general plan, war plan, prepared by the department, at all? Were you shown any war plans in any way?

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Admiral RODMAN. With reference to me going over?

The CHAIRMAN. With reference to the general conduct of the Navy.

Admiral RODMAN. Nothing whatever, sir; except as a member of the General Board. They were discussed before the board at times.

The CHAIRMAN. When did you leave the General Board?

Admiral RODMAN. About the time war was declared.

The CHAIRMAN. And at that time had the General Board prepared a war plan?

Admiral RODMAN. We had a number of them. I could not tell you in detail what they were. There are other members of the board who can tell you better than I. Admiral Badger, for instance, can tell you about that better than I. I was a junior member of the board. My work on the board, although I was cognizant of all the work, was not in connection with the war plans, and I paid no attention to that. My work there was of a different character.

The CHAIRMAN. But there were some war plans that were actually prepared?

Admiral RODMAN. Oh, yes, sir. Mr. Senator, there is no nation in the world, bar none, that does not make plans. I do not care how good or how bad they were, they were there.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you ever see any of them?

Admiral RODMAN. I do not know. They kept them locked up, as I understood.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you ever hear of them later in the war, or were they put into practice?

Admiral RODMAN. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You never heard of their being used?

Admiral RODMAN. No, sir; I do not know a thing about them.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you ever have any trouble in your service in the Navy in getting approval of your recommendations to the department while you were in the North Sea?

Admiral RODMAN. In general, none.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you make any recommendations to the department?

Admiral RODMAN. I would not be surprised if I did, sir, but I do not recall. I am not trying to evade answering your question, Mr. Senator, but I do not remember anything. I recall once that I recommended that we have some American destroyers as our screen. I wanted to educate up our destroyer force to their work that they would have to do with our battleships, and I thought that our American destroyers were larger and better able to stand the weather, which was frightful in the North Sea.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you make some other recommendations that you know of?

Admiral RODMAN. Oh, I suppose I made hundreds of them. I do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. How did you make them?

Admiral RODMAN. In the usual form.

The CHAIRMAN. Through Admiral Sims?

Admiral RODMAN. Through Admital Sims, and he could approve or disapprove of them as he saw fit.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you recall any one—where he disapproved of any of your plans?

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Admiral RODMAN. Nothing to amount to anything. We were working in accord on all measures and plans. There was nothing to amount to anything.

The CHAIRMAN. You recall no plans or recommendations that you put up to the department that were disapproved?

Admiral RODMAN. None that I remember, but if you have any there I can tell you about them.

The CHAIRMAN. If you had made recommendations, and you do not remember about them, and they were not followed out, would it have been up to Admiral Sims and up to the Navy Department?

Admiral RODMAN. Admiral Sims would first have put his indorsement upon them and sent them on to the department—he always did. If I had disagreed—and I did not—with Admiral Sims in any way, I would have exercised a privilege that belongs to all officers. You have the right, if a senior officer disapproves, to still have your recommendations forwarded to a higher authority, and if I had found any fault—and I did not—with any recommendations I had made to Admiral Sims, in the way they were treated, I would have requested the courtesy—the privilege which was due me—to send it up.

The CHAIRMAN. But if you had made your recommendations and Admiral Sims had approved of them and the Navy Department was against them, the Navy Department would have been responsible and not Admiral Sims, of course?

Admiral RODMAN. Certainly. They were the highest authority. They were the supreme court.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you put up to the department any plan for docking facilities for your battleships, based on the assumption that your battleships were to be sent to the United States to be docked?

Admiral RODMAN. At first, yes; and then I found out they could be docked abroad, and I made arrangements with the British to have them docked in British waters, so that they would not have to be sent back to the United States. I made plans when I first went there, contemplating sending them to the United States; but when I found out I could do it abroad, we followed that plan and did dock them abroad.

The CHAIRMAN. Did the department turn you down before you took up the proposition of docking them abroad?

Admiral RODMAN. I say honestly, sir—and I am not evading—I have no idea. I remember the circumstance, the fact, that we did dock abroad.

The CHAIRMAN. But you do not remember the department turning down your plan of docking them in this country?

Admiral RODMAN. No, sir; I do not remember the action that the department took in that case. I mean I do not remember the sequence of events. I only know that we did dock them abroad, which was the logical thing to do.

The CHAIRMAN. You have stated that the fleet was in a high state of efficiency—the battle fleet was in a high state of efficiency—when you were an officer of the fleet, before you went abroad?

Admiral RODMAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. At the beginning of the war—at the time of the beginning of the war?

Admiral RODMAN. Yes, sir.

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The CHAIRMAN. Do you mean that it was in a high state of efficiency as a fleet?

Admiral RODMAN. No, sir; I would confine myself to saying that the battleship fleet was. I stated previously, sir, I think, that some of our types, other types, of vessels were not efficient. For instance, now, you must know that I am generalizing as any naval officer would who had been in the Navy all his life, without, as I say, having documentary evidence. I do not believe our submarines were up to the standard. I can tell you why. When we first started building submarines—and we must revert back to a number of years ago—we built small ones. We did not know any better. We have built many a vessel not worth the powder it would take to blow it up, as we started. But as we learned more about submarines and what they might accomplish, we began building larger types. I remember quite a discussion once in the General Board as to the minimum size. And then Congress took it in hand, if I remember right, and—of course it was on my side—made a provision that they should not be less than 800 tons. Now, I think that is why our earlier submarines were not efficient. It was because we did not know their value, and the ones we built were too small, and they were not a proper type, and there was a misconception in the views of naval officers as to just what they might accomplish; and what led to the larger types was that we soon learned that the Germans were building submarines that could keep the seas. I do not think we had contemplated their keeping the seas, but as long as the German submarines could keep the seas, it was, like everything else, progressive, and when we learned these lessons, then I think toward the latter part of the war we devoted our attention to the larger and better type.

Now, as to their efficiency and their state of preparedness, whoever was in command of them can tell you about that better than I can.

The CHAIRMAN. How many battleships were there in the Atlantic Fleet when you were serving there, and before you were ordered abroad?

Admiral RODMAN. Just before the war?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; that is, in Force No. 2.

Admiral RODMAN. You mean the dreadnought type?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes—well, the fleet with which you were——

Admiral RODMAN. I think there were eight. I can get you the data on that. I think there were possibly eight dreadnoughts and eight or nine of the older type, like the *Connecticut* and the *New Jersey* type; and then there were the old, old type, the crab fleet, as we called them, like the *Kentucky*, that did not amount to anything.

The CHAIRMAN. I mean of the actual battle fleet as distinguished from the reserve?

Admiral RODMAN. I think approximately 16.

The CHAIRMAN. Sixteen?

Admiral RODMAN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And for a fleet, a properly prepared battle fleet, how many destroyers would we need?

Admiral RODMAN. Oh, I do not know, sir. I think that the General Board has laid down some rule, that for each battleship we should have so many destroyers.

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The CHAIRMAN. It should be at least four?

Admiral RODMAN. It should be at least that.

The CHAIRMAN. How many did you have when you were serving in European waters?

Admiral RODMAN. Eight, for four battleships. But, Mr. Senator, let us not get into that, because that will depend upon the nature of the work you are going to do. It will vary from time to time.

The CHAIRMAN. I am talking about for a fully equipped battle fleet. I want to find out whether this battle fleet which you say was so efficient as a battle fleet was——

Admiral RODMAN. I would like to confine myself to the battle ships. There was nowhere near the number of destroyers they should have had.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know how many you should have had?

Admiral RODMAN. I do not remember; no, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You say you had nowhere near as many as you should have had?

Admiral RODMAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have half what you should have had?

Admiral RODMAN. I would rather not try to say. I do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to know how well prepared the battle fleet was.

Admiral RODMAN. I can give you more than that. We were very much in need of destroyers.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to ask you several questions, if you do not mind answering. The fleet was deficient in vessels, to a great degree; in battle cruisers, in light cruisers—how many light cruisers did you have?

Admiral RODMAN. I could get you a list, and you could get that in two minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. I wanted to know about the battle fleet. You are an old fighter——

Admiral RODMAN. I am not so much of a fighter.

The CHAIRMAN. You had a fleet of light cruisers and submarines, and——

Admiral RODMAN. Why do you not get that from the General Board? They will give you the exact data right off the reel, of what we ought to have had and what we did have. I can not recall those things right in my mind's eye. I can only say in general that we ought to have had a greater number of destroyers. We had nowhere near enough. We ought to have had 20 or 30 light cruisers and 6 battle cruisers, and we did not have them. So that the fleet was short of all these kinds of vessels.

The CHAIRMAN. And you did not have enough of those types of vessels?

Admiral RODMAN. Not near enough.

The CHAIRMAN. So that the fleet was not complete?

Admiral RODMAN. No fleet is ever complete.

The CHAIRMAN. No fleet is ever complete?

Admiral RODMAN. Never.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you regard any fleet as of any value as a fleet without them?

Admiral RODMAN. Certainly. The fleet would be more efficient if it had all the types.

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The CHAIRMAN. It would be practically as efficient as a fighting unit without those vessels?

Admiral RODMAN. I think it would put up a pretty good scrap, if it ever had a start.

The CHAIRMAN. And your opinion would be that while these other things are useful and helpful, they are not useful in a battle fleet?

Admiral RODMAN. I did not say.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I gathered.

Admiral RODMAN. Well, you gathered it wrong. You would have to have all the types.

The CHAIRMAN. But you think it could still have performed its duty as a battle fleet without——

Admiral RODMAN. If you are driving at the fact——

The CHAIRMAN. I want to know the facts. I am asking for information.

Admiral RODMAN. I will have to give it to you from my side, too, you know. If you are driving at this, if you think that the German fleet, if it had got mixed up with the British Grand Fleet and had any success, could still have licked the Atlantic Fleet, you were never more mistaken in your life. It would never have done anything with them. They would have wiped it off the face of the earth. I will tell you why. If those two fleets had come together, even presuming that it had not been a complete victory for the Grand Fleet, they would have done a great deal of damage to the German fleet, and the Huns would never have stood up against the Atlantic Fleet.

The CHAIRMAN. We have now before the full Naval Committee the question brought up of building ships of all kinds.

Admiral RODMAN. Yes; that is the building program. That is why I was referring to the general board.

The CHAIRMAN. Then these ships are not necessary?

Admiral RODMAN. I did not say so; never, in the world. I say unqualifiedly we should have all these types, battle cruisers and light cruisers, etc. I am so glad, Mr. Chairman, to find that you know that we need them, and I hope you are going to give them to us.

The CHAIRMAN. I think you do need both, but I think that the battle fleet needs them also.

Admiral RODMAN. Yes, certainly; but just because we did not have them, we were not going to crawl in our hole and pull the hole in after us.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; but would you have been very much of a fleet? You do not answer that very clearly, Admiral.

Admiral RODMAN. I am afraid that I do not. I am trying to, but you have got me muddled, all right.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you given these ships when you were on the other side? Were you given destroyers?

Admiral RODMAN. Yes; I was given eight destroyers.

The CHAIRMAN. And light cruisers?

Admiral RODMAN. I was given eight British destroyers to screen the American battleship force, and every time I went into the North Sea, and each time we went north, the whole British fleet, including every type of vessel, not only the battle cruisers and light cruisers, but we had sea-going submarines and air ships, and I do not know what all—we had the whole thing go out.

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The CHAIRMAN. Are you familiar, generally speaking, with the composition of the British and German fleets as they met at the battle of Jutland?

Admiral RODMAN. No, sir: only from general reading. I could not give you the exact data.

The CHAIRMAN. But you are fairly familiar with the battle of Jutland—the details?

Admiral RODMAN. Fairly so, from what I have heard from the Britishers, themselves, and from what I have read.

The CHAIRMAN. Then what would your definition be of a fleet that is in all respects ready for battle, against a fleet like the Germans' in 1916?

Admiral RODMAN. We should have all the types of vessels that were necessary, and have time to train them and the men to man them.

The CHAIRMAN. In addition to battleships, what units would be necessary?

Admiral RODMAN. Exactly those I have mentioned; the battle cruisers, light cruisers, sufficient destroyers, that we now have, and possibly in an increased number, battleships planes, and their number of auxiliaries, together with the fleet, and there should be one or two ships for carrying airplanes. That, in general, is about what we need. We have got fine ships, Mr. Senator, there is no question about it. The battleships we have got are a fine type of ships. Why do you not ask me about their state of efficiency now, and I will tell you that it is very poor.

The CHAIRMAN. I will come to that later on. Would it be proper to state that a fleet composed only of battleships and destroyers, no matter how efficient and ready for war, would be a proper fleet for a battle like the battle of Jutland?

Admiral RODMAN. Certainly not. Our fleet had nothing but the battleships and a few destroyers. Still, what was left of the German Battle Fleet, it would have put it out of commission if it had ever started to come across.

The CHAIRMAN. If it had already disposed of the British Fleet?

Admiral RODMAN. It could not. That is a hypothetical case. Never in the world. The British Fleet was double their strength.

The CHAIRMAN. You are stating your opinion.

Admiral RODMAN. No, sir; I know it. The British Fleet would have cleaned them off the face of the earth.

The CHAIRMAN. No; but I say, if they had disposed of the British Fleet and come over here after a certain length of time, would we have been prepared to meet them?

Admiral RODMAN. No, sir; not fully.

The CHAIRMAN. Then a fleet is not ready for battle if it has not got scouts and screening vessels and seagoing submarines and air service and destroyers?

Admiral RODMAN. You should say it is not prepared for its maximum efficiency, but it still has right considerable fight in it.

The CHAIRMAN. It is not properly prepared as a battle fleet?

Admiral RODMAN. No, sir; it is not.

The CHAIRMAN. Nor is it in all respects fully prepared if these ships are not fully officered and manned?

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Admiral RODMAN. No, sir; the more trained officers and men you have, the better the ships, everyday in the week.

The CHAIRMAN. How about our Navy when war was declared; was it fully officered and manned?

Admiral RODMAN. I believe not; not as well as it should have been. I believe we were a little shy of men about that time.

The CHAIRMAN. A little shy?

Admiral RODMAN. Yes, sir. I do not know how much; possibly 10 to 20 per cent; something of that kind. That was very clearly demonstrated, because I remember before I went abroad, just at the time we increased the complements of ships; I might explain by saying that the old complements of ships contemplated having at all times a certain number of men for certain purposes in the engine room. We always had a full turret's crew; but just prior to that time we only had half enough men to man our secondary batteries, thinking that if we were engaged on the starboard side, we had enough men, and then we could shift them over to the port side. Later that was changed, and the department decided to give us full complements for all our secondary guns. When they went abroad realizing that I might need more men than usual, I asked for an increase on that, and I think I had 10 or 15 per cent more men than were used in our other ships.

The CHAIRMAN. I suppose the department put itself out to give you the best possible complement of officers and men that it could for foreign service?

Admiral RODMAN. No, sir; not a bit of it. There was not a change made in any of the officers or men on board of the ships; not one. They gave us a lot of recruits that were not trained. They had sent numbers of our men around to the merchant ships for manning the guns, and what men I had with me were not trained when I started, by any manner of means. Some of them were raw recruits.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know anything yourself about the reserve ships, whether they were thoroughly manned when you went abroad?

Admiral RODMAN. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know, or they were not?

Admiral RODMAN. I do not know, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know whether there were enough men to man them and officer them?

Admiral RODMAN. I imagine there was a great scarcity of officers and men. I imagine that if you took the men out of the Navy at that time to man anything else than the naval ships, there was a great scarcity.

The CHAIRMAN. I think Admiral Palmer testified there were over 2,300 officers in the Navy, and the need was for 6,000.

Admiral RODMAN. His information is infinitely more accurate than mine. Whatever he said was perfectly true, no doubt.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know what vessels in the Navy were available for scouts and screening vessels with the battle fleet in January, 1915?

Admiral RODMAN. No, sir; I can not recall those things. Please do not think that I am evasive, Mr. Senator, but I have not thought of those things.

The CHAIRMAN. No; you have said that you have no documents, and of course nobody can remember all these things.

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Admiral RODMAN. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It was notorious that there were too few, at that time.

Admiral RODMAN. I do not know about the word "notorious." It might be a fact that they had too few, but I do not know whether there was anything notorious about it.

The CHAIRMAN. It was well known?

Admiral RODMAN. Oh, yes; it might have been well known, and it might not have been notorious.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not get the distinction, but I am glad you do. Were these scouts and screening ships fully manned and officered in April, 1917, when we declared war?

Admiral RODMAN. I imagine they did not have anything like the men and officers on them, but I do not know. I imagine not.

The CHAIRMAN. There were some of these vessels with the fleet, of course, at that time?

Admiral RODMAN. You are still asking me something about things I do not know anything about.

The CHAIRMAN. It was your fleet.

Admiral RODMAN. Oh, I thought that you were asking about the reserve fleet, now.

The CHAIRMAN. No; I am asking you about the scouts and screening vessels. I want to know whether there were some of those vessels with the fleet, or whether it was purely a fleet of battleships and destroyers?

Admiral RODMAN. I think I can say, unqualifiedly, so far as I know, it was, almost. There were very few of those other ships. It was almost altogether battleships and destroyers. But Admiral Wilson can tell you about that, better than I can, because I think he was in command of a squadron of scouts and cruisers. He knows and I do not.

The CHAIRMAN. If the Secretary stated in his 1918 report that the Navy was ready from stem to stern when the war was declared, in April, 1917, would you say that that was so?

Admiral RODMAN. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. How was it not ready?

Admiral RODMAN. It did not have sufficient types and numbers of vessels and trained personnel to make a complete fleet along the line you were just asking me just now. The fleet was not complete.

The CHAIRMAN. And it was not in an efficient state for battle?

Admiral RODMAN. Yes, sir; what we had could put up a pretty good scrap. But if you were to go into an engagement, if you waited until everything was complete and you had absolutely everything, you could make mighty little headway. I suppose there is a necessity in every engagement and every battle ashore or afloat, there are many things that are not complete; but that does not keep a man from very frequently winning a victory.

The CHAIRMAN. Then it was not ready to run up against a fleet such as came out from Germany to fight the battle of Jutland?

Admiral RODMAN. I would not say that until I saw the figures on both sides. I always had an idea that we would give the Germans a pretty good scrap. The principal fighting force of a fleet is the battleships, Mr. Senator.

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The CHAIRMAN. As I remember, in the battle of Jutland Admiral Jellicoe stayed behind with the battleships, and Admiral Beatty was in front with the battle cruisers and light cruisers?

Admiral RODMAN. Very briefly, so far as I remember from my information, without going into the harrowing details, if that would represent the German fleet in column [indicating on table], which is the fighting formation, Admiral Beatty in his battle cruisers sighted the German fleet coming in that direction [indicating], just as I bring my hand, and when he had gotten contact, he had to turn, and make a turn here [indicating], and it was in that turn that some of his ships were sunk. He then took position off the leaders of the German fleet and picked up the battle, leading them up to here, where the British fleet was in command of Admiral Jellicoe.

The CHAIRMAN. But in front of Admiral Jellicoe's command were all of these screening vessels, were they not?

Admiral RODMAN. There must have been destroyers and light cruisers, I should think.

The CHAIRMAN. We had no battle cruisers?

Admiral RODMAN. No; no battle cruisers and no light cruisers; and our scouting vessels, which is our source of information among other things, would have been very scanty indeed.

The CHAIRMAN. So that we would have had to do away with all Admiral Beatty's part of it, and it would simply have meant that the battleships would have been attacked by the German fleet, and we would have had an insufficient number of destroyers to screen them?

Admiral RODMAN. Under that condition which you have mentioned there, we would have been shy of the information. It was Admiral Beatty's duty to report what he saw to the battleship fleet, which we are always trying to get into action. Not only was Admiral Beatty scraping to beat four of a kind, but he was sending information back; and without information we would be very much behind in picking up the movements.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not think that our fleet was as well prepared as the British Grand Fleet in 1917?

Admiral RODMAN. I imagine that just at the beginning of the war they were in very much better position than we and better prepared from the fact that they did have the types of vessels that we should have had but did not have; but from what I was told when I was abroad they were far from being in a thorough state of preparedness when the war started.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not asking you that. I am asking, in 1916, when they met the German Fleet at Jutland?

Admiral RODMAN. Would you please ask that question again? Were they prepared then— —

The CHAIRMAN. I asked you whether you thought our fleet in 1917 was as fully prepared and provided as was the British Fleet to meet the German Fleet at any time in 1917?

Admiral RODMAN. Not by any manner of means, for the reason that the British Fleet had the types of vessels that we did not have, and they had a war experience.

The CHAIRMAN. Then their personnel was in good shape at that time?

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Admiral RODMAN. Yes; I think their personnel was in fine shape. You must remember that there was not a day but that all ships in the war zone were profiting by the experience of the war and making changes right straight along.

The CHAIRMAN. And was our Navy profiting at the same time by the experiences of the war?

Admiral RODMAN. Yes; unqualifiedly. They may not have gotten the maximum benefit, but I have never seen more energy and more preparation. We were acting to the best of our ability.

The CHAIRMAN. They were studying on the other side, as the Army was, studying up naval conditions?

Admiral RODMAN. I imagine so.

The CHAIRMAN. That is, prior to our entrance into the war?

Admiral RODMAN. Certainly they did. We had officers in the British Fleet, since I come to think about it.

The CHAIRMAN. In the British Fleet?

Admiral RODMAN. Yes; Capt. Symington. I do not know how many more. He was in one of the British battle cruisers.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you recall whether those officers, before the war commenced, some time before the war commenced, were arriving back home?

Admiral RODMAN. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know about that?

Admiral RODMAN. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. But you think that we had men studying the submarine situation and the various battle situations that might come up on the other side; but you do not know?

Admiral RODMAN. Oh, I imagine that we had; but I can not give you that information.

The CHAIRMAN. You have no information?

Admiral RODMAN. No, sir; I do not recall: but I imagine we did.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, Admiral, do you consider the organization of the Navy Department as now existing satisfactory?

Admiral RODMAN. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What changes would you suggest other than the ones you spoke of?

Admiral RODMAN. None other, sir. I am not very familiar, Mr. Senator, with the intimate organization of the Navy Department, because I never had anything to do with it. There are other officers who probably know more about it than I, lots of them, in fact, who have been in the department. I think, very generally speaking, sir, that with the recommendation I made in regard to the Chief of Operations being given more responsibility and the authority, repeating that recommendation, that the continuation of the General Board as it exists is most important. Beyond that I have no recommendations to make.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think that a civilian Secretary of the Navy who has never studied or had experience of naval warfare could reasonably be expected, without expert advice and assistance, to prepare a navy or a fleet for battle?

Admiral RODMAN. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. He would have to depend almost altogether on expert advice?

Admiral RODMAN. I should think so, sir.

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The CHAIRMAN. And would probably have to follow that advice in order to get good results?

Admiral RODMAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think that the Chief of Naval Operations should be authorized to exercise throughout the bureaus and offices of the Navy Department, through naval commanders, such supervision over all activities of the Navy as is required to secure coordinate action?

Admiral RODMAN. Will you repeat that question, please?

The CHAIRMAN. Do you consider that the Chief of Naval Operations should be authorized to exercise through the bureaus and offices of the Navy Department and the naval commanders, such supervision over all activities of the Navy as is required to secure coordinated action?

Admiral RODMAN. Yes; there will be times, possibly, when the State Department might require the services of a vessel, and the Secretary of the Navy might be more in touch with the national policy, and he might direct the Chief of Naval Operations in that respect. But so far as carrying out war plans is concerned, and in the matter of preparedness and in the execution of the plans, I think it should be intrusted to the Chief of Naval Operations, as I have said.

The CHAIRMAN. You believe in a centralized control over the policies and plans?

Admiral RODMAN. Certainly I do.

The CHAIRMAN. And decentralization of authority and responsibility over the execution?

Admiral RODMAN. I do, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That is, give the authority to execute to the subordinates as much as possible?

Admiral RODMAN. Yes, sir. What would be the use, if he had responsibility, of making preparations, what would be the use if he could not execute them?

The CHAIRMAN. What should be the general authority of the Chief of Naval Operations in time of peace?

Admiral RODMAN. I would not avoid that question, but I am not very good at that sort of thing. I would rather make my general statement, if you would allow me, and let those who are more familiar with the technicalities of the department, and who are gifted in writing regulations and that sort of thing, answer on that.

The CHAIRMAN. You state, in general, that the Chief of Naval Operations should have responsibility for the plans?

Admiral RODMAN. Yes, sir; I do.

The CHAIRMAN. And that would also apply to time of war?

Admiral RODMAN. I think he should be also given authority.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is the point; if he has responsibility he ought to have the authority.

Admiral RODMAN. He ought to have it. He has not got it. In other words, they should be hand in glove.

The CHAIRMAN. And the same thing would apply to time of war?

Admiral RODMAN. Yes, sir. Now, I would not for a moment imply that the Chief of Naval Operations would be so independent that he could do just what he wants. You must remember that our Government would have to be run throughout as it was in this war,

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through all the industries and the whole country following the Federal policy, and this policy would be told to the Chief of Naval Operations, and he then would execute that part of it which relates to the Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Mayo brought out that question of the general policy which the Navy should be kept thoroughly familiar with in order to know what steps to take.

Admiral RODMAN. He is a very level-headed man.

The CHAIRMAN. You agree with that?

Admiral RODMAN. Yes, sir; anything that Admiral Mayo would recommend. I think he is one of the most level-headed men I know.

The CHAIRMAN. You would give him a general indorsement?

Admiral RODMAN. Yes, I would. He is a very level-headed man. He is a fine man.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you believe in a planning division under the direction of the Chief of Naval Operations?

Admiral RODMAN. I think it is necessary.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think it needs 15 men?

Admiral RODMAN. I do not know whether it takes 15 or 50. That is a detail I do not know. I imagine that I would not put any limit on that. I would let the Chief of Operations say as to that. He would not take any more than are necessary or take any less. He would take the officers who have ability in that line and take the number required. I would not limit him to any number. That is not like saying that there is going to be a great general staff. It is like where a man is assigned to one trick of duty. A man would be planning and after a certain number of years he would be assigned to other duty. I would not put a limitation there.

The CHAIRMAN. You would not put a limitation?

Admiral RODMAN. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You would not provide for the number of men?

Admiral RODMAN. I would simply say that he be authorized to have detailed sufficient officers to properly constitute a planning section. In other words, that he is so——

The CHAIRMAN. Would you provide that those officers who are serving in the planning section should do that and nothing else while so serving?

Admiral RODMAN. I do not think so. That would be the principal duty. When an officer is assigned to duty there is a multiplicity of duties that come in, and my experience has been that when an officer, to use a slang expression, has been given a job, he is expected to devote a maximum amount of his time to that work, and that is what would happen if a man was detailed to the planning section.

The CHAIRMAN. If the Chief of Naval Operations was given the responsibility and authority, which you say you approve of, would he not have to have men who would spend most of their time on that in the planning section?

Admiral RODMAN. No, sir; if he was a regular naval officer I would say if he spent as much as three years there he then ought to go to sea. That is our general policy throughout. We have a number of specialists in the Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. That is quite true, but I mean while he is serving with Operations he should do that in the planning section, and nothing else?

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Admiral RODMAN. Yes, sir; he should devote his attention to this.

The CHAIRMAN. And nothing else?

Admiral RODMAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. After your experience and observation in the war, preparing for it, do you think it would be advisable to retain intact and without change the present organization of the Navy Department or to repeat the policies and methods of handling the Navy that prevailed in 1914 and 1917?

Admiral RODMAN. I would recommend the change that I have already recommended, that we have a Chief of Naval Operations with the responsibility and the authority that I have already stated. That, I think, would make the remedy all right.

The CHAIRMAN. You think that would take care of the personnel?

Admiral RODMAN. You are getting me over my depth again. I honestly do not know very much about the organization as to the relations of the chiefs of bureaus to the Chief of Operations, but I rather imagine that if there were a Chief of Operations he would be responsible for the personnel, just the same as he is for material and preparedness and everything else. He does now have something to say in those matters.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any further suggestions to make, Admiral?

Admiral RODMAN. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN (continuing). That would be of help to the committee in formulating any plans?

Admiral RODMAN. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN (continuing). That may come up later on?

Admiral RODMAN. I would be very glad if I could be of any assistance, to come again before the committee, but I have no recommendations to make now.

The CHAIRMAN. If you have any recommendations at any time to make, I would be very glad if you will write me a letter and give any suggestio s that you migh have to make.

Admiral RODMAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any questions, Senator Ball?

Senator BALL. I have not any. You have covered the ground very well.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Trammell?

Senator TRAMMELL. The chairman of the committee asked you a hypothetical question in regard to a Secretary of the Navy who had no assistance in the way of naval officers and no advice from naval officers, and so on; as to whether or not he would be capable of preparing plans, and I think you probably properly said that he would not. Is that the condition we have in connection with our Navy?

Admiral RODMAN. No; not as I understand it. The plans for the conduct of war, as I understand it now, are in the hands of the Chief of Operations. Also the General Board, in my time there, would prepare plans. These would be approved or di approved by the Chief of Operations who would refer these plans to the Secretary, and the Secretary could approve or disapprove them.

Senator TRAMMELL. He could approve or disapprove; but as a matter of fact, this hypothetical question that the chairman asked you did not reflect the conditions that exist in our Navy, because

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as I understand in our Navy the Secretary has a great army of naval officers around him making these plans, making suggestions and recommendations, and they very largely furnish the details—the naval officers themselves. Of course he might disapprove some of the suggestions, but he has the advantage of their advice and suggestions?

Admiral RODMAN. Unqualifiedly.

Senator TRAMMELL. And they are given liberty, and have the right, to make recommendations?

Admiral RODMAN. I will even go further and say that all plans and recommendations are formulated by technical officers, and are submitted to the Secretary.

Senator TRAMMELL. The question was asked you about the preparedness of our fleet in 1917 and that of the British fleet. Would it be presumed that the American Fleet would be quite in the prepared condition that the British fleet would, when they had been in war three years and we had not been in war for three years?

Admiral RODMAN. No; our fleet would not be quite so well prepared, for the reason that during that three years of war they had learned by experience that they could make a great many changes and improvements on what they thought was best prior to the war; and be benefited by the same experience when we went into the war, to the best of our knowledge. We were still prepared, but we made a number of changes.

Senator TRAMMELL. Is not that the story of war over and over?

Admiral RODMAN. I think so, absolutely.

Senator TRAMMELL. That there are emergencies, and the experiences of the war made necessary new preparations?

Admiral RODMAN. Absolutely.

Senator TRAMMELL. If the war went on for 15 years, during the fifteenth year there very likely would have to be something done that was not necessary the first year, to meet the same conditions of war?

Admiral RODMAN. You profit by experience, and in no place could you profit by it more than by being in contact with those who had been serving for three years.

Senator TRAMMELL. Do you have sufficient general knowledge of the Navy and its operations to know whether or not, beginning some two or three years before the entrance of the United States into the war, the Navy Department was active in trying to build up the efficiency of the Navy?

Admiral RODMAN. In general, I assume that it was. I have never seen them yet when they were not. I think the officers who are stationed in the department, who have made a life work of it, so far as I know they are very conscientious, and they would work up, doing all that they could to build it up. When it comes to an opinion about what should be had and what should not be had, we are largely dependent upon Congress, as you know. As I have stated in my statement, we are bounded by that limitation.

Senator TRAMMELL. Is it not a fact that the building program was largely increased, and an effort for increasing the personnel of the Navy was in progress a year or two before we actually entered into the war?

Admiral RODMAN. I think so. As I remember, at that time—gracious, it comes and goes! I can not remember those things in

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detail. I know just of late—well, I will say in the last 8 or 10 years—there has been a tremendous increase in the Navy; and in the war, as I stated, the Navy was expanded eight or ten times, more or less.

Senator TRAMMELL. You have been questioned more or less on expert matters. Admiral Sims in his testimony before the committee stated that through the failure of the Navy Department to give adequate support with the means at our disposal during the first six months of the war, and previous unpreparedness, the war was prolonged for four months, causing the loss of 2,500,000 tons of shipping and of 500,000 lives, and the needless expenditure of fifteen billions of dollars. Have you any views upon that statement?

Admiral RODMAN. That is statistical, is it not?

Senator TRAMMELL. As to whether it is correct or not?

Admiral RODMAN. It is no reflection on Admiral Sims, but there is an old saw to the effect that there are three kinds of lies, "Lies, damn lies, and statistics." I think that is hypothetical entirely. No, sir; I do not think that any fair-minded man could ever say that the American Navy was ever responsible for any loss of tonnage or loss of lives. Now, if I understand the conditions to which that question there pertains, it possibly refers to the submarine attacks on allied shipping.

Senator TRAMMELL. That seems to have been his principal point, that on account of failure in supporting them——

Admiral RODMAN. I have no conception of those figures whatever, nor could I possibly, before any jury or before a committee and under sworn testimony, give positive evidence as to facts and as to figures; but I do not believe there is a particle of truth in that statement; not that Admiral Sims was not perfectly conscientious and may not have thought so. It may have been his interpretation. I will tell you why. Let us assume that there were a certain number of vessels of the Allies engaged in trying to get the submarines. Our percentage of that number, if we had sent every ship that was available for submarine combat, to the infested area, would have been only a small percentage. I do not know what, but it is small. Ten per cent of that amount of shipping, and that amount of lives that were lost by the submarine menace—give us 10 per cent of it, if you like, maybe; but let us make it out proportional to the number of ships that you have sent there, and that statement ought to be knocked into a cocked hat. That is my opinion. I have no figures.

Senator TRAMMELL. I do not think this represents any statistics. It just represents the Admiral's views.

Admiral RODMAN. I do not know anything about the number of ships or the tons, but on the face of it I do not think that statement will hold water, a bit. I had seen that statement, before I came here, and I thought it was a hypothetical case, and a good deal of imagination.

Senator TRAMMELL. How long have you been in the Navy, Admiral?

Admiral RODMAN. Nearly 45 years.

Senator TRAMMELL. Have you been at sea during most of the time during the 45 years of your service?

Admiral RODMAN. I left the Naval Academy in 1880, and I have been about 30 years at sea.

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Senator TRAMMELL. I believe you stated, in regard to the question of plans, that what knowledge you had was gained while you were connected with the General Board; that you had no general war plans furnished you when you assumed command and went abroad. Were your duties such and was your service such at the time that it was necessary for you to carry along in your pocket a copy of the general war plans in regard to other activities, other than those you were commanding yourself?

Admiral RODMAN. No; there was no occasion to furnish me with any war plans, or any other. I had a verbal order, or rather an intimate conversation. When information is to be conveyed, it is immaterial to me whether it be written or verbal or any other way. I was told what I was to do, and I did it the best I could. I did not need any plans.

Senator TRAMMELL. In your long experience and knowledge of naval affairs you do not consider it any particular neglect of duty that you were not furnished with other plans other than those connected with your particular operations, do you?

Admiral RODMAN. No, sir; it was a matter of no importance to me, sir.

Senator TRAMMELL. You were advised, so far as matters of importance to you were concerned, in connection with your command?

Admiral RODMAN. Yes, sir; I had the same instructions and orders—whatever you may call them—that anybody else would have had under like circumstances, I suppose, in any army or any navy in the world. I had instructions to go over and join the British Fleet. I can not see that there was anything more necessary.

Senator TRAMMELL. Your instructions were sufficiently explicit and intelligent, with your intelligence, to carry them out, so that you went ahead and fulfilled the mission required of you?

Admiral RODMAN. I would not say that I fulfilled it; I had a try at it.

Senator TRAMMELL. So far as you know, you fulfilled it?

Admiral RODMAN. Yes; the ships went across according to the verbal order.

Senator TRAMMELL. Were your instructions written or verbal instructions?

Admiral RODMAN. Both. The method of doing it was that I was called up to the Chief of Operations, and, naturally, there were a thousand and one things to be talked over. These we talked over, as is always the case, just as any gentleman might go to his subordinates and talk after giving his instructions, and when I was ready I was given my written instructions to leave on a certain date and go across.

The CHAIRMAN. And you were not even told whom you would be under when you got on the other side?

Admiral RODMAN. No, sir; I think the idea was, there was a little question about detaching us from the Atlantic Fleet for this reason. There are always a number of returns in relation to a number of subjects that would naturally go to the commander of the battleship fleet, and that was purely technical. It had no bearing on the conduct of the war; not a particle.

The CHAIRMAN. You stated that you did not agree with Admiral Sims's testimony that the failure to send ships over, and assistance, prolonged the war a certain length of time?

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Admiral RODMAN. I did not say that, sir, I think. I said that I think his statement is incorrect. I do not think that we should have laid at our doors the responsibility for the loss of a number of men and that tonnage. That is what I said.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean you disagree with the figures of Admiral Sims?

Admiral RODMAN. Yes, sir; I disagree with the fact that we as Americans and in the American Navy were responsible for the loss of whatever amount——

Senator TRAMMELL. Five hundred thousand lives and 2,500,000 tons of shipping.

Admiral RODMAN. Most decidedly; positively not.

The CHAIRMAN. You think he was stating it too high?

Admiral RODMAN. Let us assume that that number of men and that amount of tonnage were lost. That is a fair assumption. I assume they were. There were others in the war besides us, and there were others combating the submarine menace, and I think that refers to that. Now, we could not possibly, under any conditions, have sent more than 5 or 10 per cent of the vessels that were then or were to be engaged in combating the submarine. Give us 10 per cent of that number, and you will give us our fair allowance in any conditions.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have any particular knowledge about the submarine situation, or about the convoy situation?

Admiral RODMAN. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Or any about the matters in Admiral Sims's testimony?

Admiral RODMAN. No, sir. Any officer in the service has a good general idea of what was going on; but, while I was in the North Sea, I dare say I knew less about what was going on than you gentlemen here at home, who had the papers. I knew very little. And as to the other branches of the work, I had very little knowledge, except in a general way, as to what our destroyers were doing about submarines, etc. I knew only in a general way. I had no particular knowledge. I was not in a position to have.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Trammell spoke about the building program which was started in 1916.

Admiral RODMAN. That was——

The CHAIRMAN. That building program has not been carried out yet.

Admiral RODMAN. I think I recall in that case that there was such a pressure brought to bear upon dockyards and shipyards—I mean our navy yards as well—that it was considered inexpedient to continue building capital ships, and it was thought best to devote that space to the smaller types. I think that gives the idea.

The CHAIRMAN. When, in your opinion, did war with Germany seem probable, so far as the United States was concerned?

Admiral RODMAN. I thought, right from the very beginning of the war, we would be getting into it.

The CHAIRMAN. And you certainly thought so after we had given the German ambassador his passports, in February, 1917?

Admiral RODMAN. Certainly, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And during all that time, with war imminent, it was up to us and to the Navy Department to do everything in its power to get ready and prepare for it?

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Admiral RODMAN. Yes, sir, unqualifiedly. That is what they were there for.

The CHAIRMAN. In regard to this statement of Admiral Sims's, if the Navy Department had complied with his request and had sent the ships over he asked for and the personnel and other things he asked for, do you think it would have been helpful in stopping the submarine menace?

Admiral RODMAN. Certainly, sir; I think that all the assistance that we could have given, and the sooner it would have been given, all the better; but I doubt those figures, adding four months to the war; and I will tell you why. I have talked that over, naturally; we talk everything over. You can not put your nose outside of a building that somebody does not talk with you about something. I have talked that over with other officers and that statement seemed to me so preposterous that I went to some of the older officers and to all that seems ridiculous. Really, it seems ridiculous. That is the opinion I have heard from older officers.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you anything more, Senator Trammell?

Senator TRAMMELL. The chairman has asked you if you had advice in regard to convoys and other lines of activity?

Admiral RODMAN. None whatever. I knew nothing about that. It was not within my province.

Senator TRAMMELL. Was there any necessity or reason for you to know anything about that, so far as your efficiency in command was concerned?

Admiral RODMAN. Not the slightest.

Senator TRAMMEL. In carrying out the duties required of you?

Admiral RODMAN. No, sir; it was a different field of operations entirely. I had nothing in the world to do with it, no more than you had. You are speaking, of course, of the Atlantic operations?

Senator TRAMMELL. Yes.

Admiral RODMAN. No, sir.

Senator TRAMMELL. As a matter of fact, would it not have been the greatest piece of mere folly for them to have been advising you every time they were going to make some new change in regard to convoys; a waste of your time entirely?

Admiral RODMAN. I would have gone crazy if they had done so.

Senator TRAMMELL. When you had nothing to do with it?

Admiral RODMAN. There was no occasion to remind me what the convoys were doing. It was no business of mine.

The CHAIRMAN. I think the Senator has mistaken the purport of my question. I simply wanted to find out if the Admiral had any special expert knowledge of the facts.

Admiral RODMAN. No, sir; I had nothing to do with convoys or with the operations down off the south of England. Instead, Mr. Senator, of making war on submarines, I will tell you very frankly I had to get out of the way of them; and whenever we saw one we got out of the way as fast as we could.

The CHAIRMAN. On this question of prolongation of the war, as a matter of fact did not the question of when we got our ships there have a great deal to do with the question of whether the war was ended, and when it would be ended?

Admiral RODMAN. I have heard a good deal of hearsay evidence on that subject, and also in talking with the people here in Washington,

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and there will be better testimony than mine on this score. There will be positive testimony, and mine is only a poor opinion.

Senator TRAMMELL. Do you know whether or not, as far as the question of transporting troops and transporting supplies, the Navy, so far as its connection with that, met all the requirements when they were ready to transport troops?

Admiral RODMAN. I have heard that they did. I have heard a great deal of praise showered on the Navy, and I am very much prejudiced in favor of it. I suppose my statement might be considered prejudiced. I thought they did pretty well, and the Army said so, too.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all, Admiral, and you may be excused.

(Thereupon, at 12.30 o'clock p. m., the subcommittee adjourned until to-morrow, Thursday, Apr. 8, 1920, at 10 o'clock a. m.)

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NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

THURSDAY, APRIL 8, 1920.

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON NAVAL AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 o'clock a. m., in room 235, Senate Office Building, Senator Frederick Hale presiding.

Present: Senators Hale (chairman), Ball, Keyes, and Pittman.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. Admiral Wilson, will you be sworn?

TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL HENRY B. WILSON, UNITED STATES NAVY.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Wilson, have you a statement to make about matters pertaining to this investigation?

Admiral WILSON. If the committee pleases, I have a brief paper that I would like to read. It has principally to do with my work, and what the Navy did during the war of which I am personally cognizant.

The CHAIRMAN. Before going ahead with that statement will you tell us about the positions that you held in the Navy during the war or immediately before the war?

Admiral WILSON. Yes, sir; that is covered in my statement.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well, proceed.

Admiral WILSON. Because of the nature of my services prior to and during the war, I believe I am able to give first-hand information to the committee on the subject under consideration, especially on the following:

(1) The condition of the fleet just prior to the outbreak of war.

(2) The organization of the patrol force; its object, organization, and the plans adopted prior to and immediately after the declaration of war.

(3) The routing and escorting of convoys carrying a great part of our troops to France, together with their stores and supplies.

(4) The work of a successful and important part of our naval forces overseas—the United States naval forces in France.

SERVICE PRIOR TO THE WAR.

In order that the committee may be informed of the prior service spoken of, I give it briefly:

In 1904, after the completion of a cruise of over three years, during which, in turn, I was the executive officer of a gunboat;

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navigator and then executive officer of a battleship, I was ordered in charge of the enlisted men's division, Bureau of Navigation, one of the important positions in the Navy Department. The future needs of the service as to enlisted personnel were continually studied by me. It was in the latter part of this tour of duty that the battleships were fitted out and sailed on their cruise around the world. I then commanded a scout cruiser, and upon the completion of this tour of sea duty, returned to the Bureau of Navigation in charge of officer personnel and, later, assistant to the bureau. There I had the duty of studying the needs of the service as to officers. In 1911, I was ordered to command the battleship *North Dakota*, one of the Atlantic Fleet. After a two years' cruise, I was made president of the board of inspection and survey, which put me in close personal contact with almost every ship in the Navy—both the new and the old. June 12, 1916, I assumed command of the U. S. S. *Pennsylvania*, on her commissioning.

THE CONDITION OF THE FLEET.

I have no hesitation in saying that no nation upon the approach of war has had a force of battleships more nearly prepared for battle than was the force to which I was attached and which spent the winter of 1916–17 in southern waters; and I feel sure that if this force had engaged an enemy on its cruise north in the spring of 1917 the victory would have been ours.

The *Pennsylvania*, being the flagship of the commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet, I was in a good position to form an opinion as to the efficiency of the fleet. Our work (and the results obtained) clearly indicated that the commander in chief was proceeding in accordance with a well-defined policy; the ships present with the flag were well organized and efficient with the morale high, and the active fleet prepared for any emergency.

THE PATROL FORCE.

On March 28, 1917, I was detached from command of the *Pennsylvania* and ordered to Washington to organize a patrol force. This force had been created by the Navy Department for the purpose of protecting commerce to the seaward of areas guarded by naval district forces against enemy submarines and raiders. I believed at this time that the policy of establishing this force to combat enemy activity on the Atlantic coast of the United States was well conceived in view of the information then available, and I can state that it was well organized and its efficiency developed as rapidly as could be expected. Having such a well-established force it could be easily transferred to another zone of operations if it were found that the enemy did not come to our coast. This force, as planned, consisted of 13 cruisers, 34 destroyers, 5 Coast Guard cutters, and 3 gunboats.

Immediately upon the declaration of war I assumed command of the patrol force with the U. S. S. *Olympia* as flagship, and the following campaign order was issued:

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PATROL FORCE UNITED STATES FLEET,
U. S. S. "Olympia," Flagship, Fleet Base 3, April 9, 1917.

Campaign Order, No. 1.

FORCES.

(*a*) Northern detachment. Capt. Jones. Squadron 1.
(*b*) Nantucket detachment. Capt. Twining. Squadrons 2, 3.
(*c*) Delaware detachment. Capt. Oman. Squadron 5.
(*d*) Chesapeake detachment. Capt. Morgan. Squadron 6.
(*e*) Gulf detachment. Capt. Johnson. Squadron 4.

1. No news regarding enemy forces.

2. This force will give maximum possible protection to trans-Atlantic commerce of the United States and to friendly powers in areas to seaward of and contiguous to areas guarded by naval district forces. Vessels shall on every occasion use all means within their power to capture or destroy every enemy submarine sighted.

3. (*a*) Northern detachment. Guard area between lines bearing 135 through Cape Sable and Nantucket Shoal Lightship. Base, Boston and Portsmouth.
(*b*) Nantucket detachment. Guard area between lines bearing 135 from Nantucket Shoal Lightship and Barnegat. Base, New York and Newport.
(*c*) Delaware detachment. Guard area between lines bearing 135 from Barnegat and Assateague Light. Base, Hampton Roads.
(*d*) Chesapeake detachment. Guard area between lines bearing 135 from Assateague Light and Cape Hatteras. Base, Hampton Roads.
(*d*) Gulf detachment. Guard area Florida Straits and Gulf of Mexico. Base, Key West, and New Orleans.
(*x*) Proceed when ordered. Use 75 time.

4. Tenders: *Dixie*, base, Key West; *Panther*, base, Newport.

5. Cipher ROT

Flag in *Olympia* based in vicinity of New York.

H. B. WILSON.

On April 11, 1917, I was present at a conference at the Navy Department, Washington, between the Secretary of the Navy, a number of flag officers of our Navy, a British vice admiral, representing the British Admiralty, and a French rear admiral, representing the French Admiralty. The subject under consideration was the cooperation of the naval forces of the three countries. Both the British admiral and the French admiral read communications from their respective admiralties, and also took up the question of vessels going abroad and cooperating with naval forces on the other side; also the cooperation of the forces of the three services for operating against enemy submarines and raiders in the Atlantic Ocean and the Caribbean Sea. During the conference a number of our officers expressed their views—I among them. I advocated that a portion of our forces be sent overseas as early as practicable if nothing more than to get into game that our Navy might profit by the lessons to be learned. Before the conference ended, the Secretary of the Navy turned to the visiting flag officers and told them that he had noted the facts and suggestions given in the communications from their admiralties which they had read; that they could inform their admiralties that our Navy Department "accepted them in principle," and agreed that vessels of our Navy would be sent overseas to cooperate with the naval forces of our associates.

These communications, as I recollect them, while suggesting the manner in which our Navy could best help the Allies, and stating their needs as to types of ships, did not express any dire need for help or great urgency for it. I further recollect that, after reading his paper at the conference on April 11, 1917, one of the representatives in the course of his remarks said: "If nothing more, send one destroyer in order that the flag may be shown. Let it become know that the United States Navy has actually joined the naval forces of the Allies."

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I fully believed that both representatives felt they had successfully accomplished their mission; that they were more than pleased with their reception by the Secretary of the Navy, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, and the flag officers concerned; and were especially impressed with the hearty manner in which the responsible officers of the Navy Department had showed their desire to cooperate and thus further the cause against the common enemy.

At a further conference the next morning in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations, plans were drawn up for the cooperation of the forces of the three countries in the Atlantic Ocean and Caribbean Sea, and steps taken for the immediate detachment of certain vessels from the fleet with a view to sending them overseas and for some of the Navy colliers to transport certain supplies and stores badly needed by the French Government.

In consequence of the agreement arrived at in the conference, a modification of the organization of the patrol force was made, in which our area was extended, it now being from the headlands of the Atlantic coast of the United States to the fiftieth meridian and from Nova Scotia to and including the West Indies, the Gulf of Mexico, and the Caribbean Sea, as set forth in the campaign order as follows:

PATROL FORCE, UNITED STATES FLEET,
U. S. S. "Olympia," Flagship, April 17, 1917.

Campaign Order No. 2.

FORCES.

(*a*) Northern patrol. Capt. Jones. Squadron 1.
(*b*) Nantucket patrol. Capt. Twining. Squadron 2.
(*c*) Chesapeake patrol. Capt. Morgan. Squadron 6.
(*d*) Southern patrol. Capt. Oman. Squadron 5.
(*e*) Gulf patrol. Capt. Johnston. Squadron 4.
(*f*) Caribbean patrol. Capt. Anderson. Squadron 3.
(*g*) Supports. *Olympia, Columbia, Charleston.*

1. The area assigned to this force has been extended to include a portion of the Caribbean heretofore supervised by the French.

2. This force will furnish maximum possible protection to trans-Atlantic commerce of the United States and friendly powers in areas to seaward of and contiguous to areas guarded by naval district forces.

3. (*a*) Northern patrol: Guard area between lines bearing 90 from Cape Sable and 100 from Sankaty Head. Base, Boston and Portsmouth.

(*b*) Nantucket patrol: Guard area south of northern patrol to line bearing 110 from Absecon Light. Base, New York and Newport.

(*c*) Chesapeake patrol: Guard area south of Nantucket patrol to line bearing 110 from Cape Hatteras. Base, Hampton Roads.

(*d*) Southern patrol: Guard area south of Chesapeake patrol to line bearing 107 from Cape Canaveral. Base, Charleston.

(*e*) Gulf patrol: Guard area of the Bahamas south of Southern patrol north of latitude 23 and west of meridian 75, and the Gulf of Mexico. Base, Key West and New Orleans.

(*f*) Caribbean patrol: Guard area south of Gulf and Southern patrols, and the Caribbean west and north of a line from the Panama-Colombian boundary to the west point of Jamaica; thence along north coast of Jamaica, south coast of Haiti, Porto Rico, and Santa Cruz, through Anegada passage, and thence 84 degrees. Base, Guantanamo, Canal Zone, and St. Thomas.

(*g*) Supports: *Columbia* at Hampton Roads; *Charlesten* at St. Thomas. Be prepared to operate at high speed on short notice as far as meridian 50. Keep full of fuel.

(*h*) Use every means to capture or destroy enemy submarines sighted. Cooperate closely and constantly with the commandants of naval districts in adjustment of areas of operations, in exchange of information, and in routing outgoing and incoming merchant vessels. Tenders are available for repairs within their capacity. Effective noon, April 25. Proceed then. Use 75 time.

4. Tenders: *Dixie* at Key West; *Panther* at Newport.

5. Flag on *Olympia*, vicinity New York. Cipher as indicated.

H. B. WILSON.

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Of the 55 vessels definitely assigned to the patrol force, 24 were on station by April 16. Thirteen more joined by April 20. On this latter date 18 had not reported; 5 of these were Coast Guard vessels being fitted out for service in the Navy; others were still on foreign stations and some were undergoing extensive repairs.

Within a month of the organization of the patrol force, vessels began to be detached by order of the Navy Department for service in European waters.

I would like to add right there that the first two batches of destroyers that left the coast to go abroad had not yet been assigned to patrol forces. They were still with the fleet.

The CHAIRMAN. They went from the fleet and not from the patrol force?

Admiral WILSON. They had not been assigned to the patrol force yet. They were with the fleet.

On April 26, 1917, four destroyers (*Cassin, Cummings, Benham,* and *Aylwin*) were detached.

On May 1, 1917, 24 destroyers were detached: *Roe, Perkins, Terry, Sterrett, Walke, Monaghan, Warrington, Patterson, McCall, Jarvis, Fanning, Ammen, Paulding, Drayton, Trippe, Beale, Jenkins, Duncan, Allen, Wilkes, Shaw, Burrows, Parker,* and *Balch.*

On May 16 all destroyers remaining with the patrol force were detached.

On May 30 the *Birmingham, Charleston,* and *St. Louis* were detached for convoy escort.

Yachts purchased were fitted out and assigned to the patrol force. At this time—May 30, 1917—the force consisted of 22 active vessels and 8 other ships undergoing repairs and being fitted out.

On July 4, 1917, the *Albany, Cleveland* and *Raleigh* were ordered to fit out for convoy escort.

On July 7, 1917, *Chester, Yankton, Des Moines, Sacramento, Marietta, Birmingham, Machias, Paducah, Castine, Wheeling* and *Nashville* were ordered to fit out for foreign service.

These latter vessels were to comprise a force which was to be based on Gibraltar under my immediate command.

UNITED STATES NAVAL FORCES AT GIBRALTER.

On August 18, 1917, I arrived at Gibraltar on the U. S. S. *Birmingham* and for about two months commanded our forces based on that port, where, under the senior allied commander—a British rear admiral—our vessels protected commerce in the Western Mediterranean; in the approaches to the Straits of Gibraltar and escorted convoys between the Mediterranean and Great Britain.

There were in October, 1917, 21 United States vessels attached to the Gibraltar detachment. These vessels performed valuable and important service to the allied cause as so expressed by the senior allied commander.

UNITED STATES NAVAL FORCES ON FRENCH COAST.

On November 1, 1917, I assumed command of the United States patrol squadrons based on the French coast. On January 14 all the activities of the Navy in France were placed under my command

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with the title commander United States naval forces in France, in which capacity I continued until January 30, 1919.

Our mission in France was—

(1) To safeguard United States troop and store ships.

(2) To cooperate with the French naval forces.

The general nature of the United States Navy's work in France is shown in a memorandum dated August 29, 1918, prepared for the House Naval Committee upon the occasion of their visit to Brest, which is as follows:

I took this memorandum because I recognized it as partly an official paper, which I had already presented before the official committee.

Memorandum:
For: Chairman House Naval Committee.
Subject: United States Naval forces in France.

MISSION.

Our mission is (*a*) to get American troops and supplies for these troops safely into France, protecting them from mine and torpedo; (*b*) to turn the transports and storeships around as quickly as possible, and to escort them through the submarine zone on their return trip; (*c*) to cooperate with the French in the antisubmarine war.

We have taken as our most important duty that of assuring that American troops intrusted to the care of the Navy shall be landed in France safely.

The success of the United States Navy in this war will be measured by the success with which it fulfills this trust.

FORCES.

The first vessels of the United States Navy arrived in France on July 4, 1917, and consisted of eight yachts. Since then the force has progressively increased, and we now have 28 destroyers, 5 torpedo boats, 15 yachts, 9 mine sweepers, 3 repair ships, plus a considerable number of United States naval vessels carrying coal for the Army between Cardiff and ports on the west coast of France, 5 tugs and 2 steam lighters.

There are 736 officers and 7,970 men attached to these forces, exclusive of aviation.

ORGANIZATION.

For the purposes of administration, the coast of France is divided into districts corresponding with the French naval districts, with headquarters at Cherbourg, Brest, Lorient, and Rochefort; there being a United States naval officer with rank of captain or rear admiral in command of each district. He is charged with the maintenance of such vessels as may be be based in his district and with the safeguarding of shipping in coastal waters. He will direct the operation of the air stations in his district.

At Brest, Lorient, and Rochefort naval bases have been established with facilities for repairing, supplying, and refueling our vessels and for maintaining personnel. All of the vessels of the force are based at Brest, with the exception of nine mine sweepers which are based at Lorient, and five yachts and a tug at Rochefort. The mine sweepers have been very successful in safeguarding shipping in the approaches to St. Nazaire and the yachts in the Rochefort district escort convoys in and out of the Gironde River through the submarine zone.

The actual operation of the vessels performing escort duty is controlled from the Flag Office in Brest.

COOPERATION WITH THE FRENCH.

There has developed splendid cooperation between the American and French navies. The French have shown every disposition to assist us to the extent of their ability, and there is no disposition on their part to hamper our work in any way. They have permitted us to take complete charge of the handling of the American troopships convoys and of most of the storeship convoys.

Ten of our smaller yachts and the five torpedo boats operate under the French in the coastal convoy escort. This protects convoys running daily along the coast North and South, including a large number of vessels in the coal trade between Cardiff and the French ports.

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I would like to inject there that that large number of vessels in the trade between Cardiff and the French ports refers largely to the vessels supplying our Army. It took a great quantity of coal.

There are eight groups of escort vessels handling this convoy, of which we furnish three and the French five. In appendix (a) it will be noted that of the organized convoys this has been the most successful as regards protection from submarines.

I have not the appendix available now to insert here.

The facilities of the French navy yards are at our disposal but, unfortunately, these facilities are inadequate even for the French Navy after four years of war. This is because, in 1914, the workmen from the arsenals were sent to the front, and the arsenals themselves were largely converted into munition plants. As a result, they lack mechanics, and their machine tools are worked out. We found it necessary, therefore, to provide our own facilities for repair and maintenance of our vessels.

COMMUNICATIONS.

A communication system of American telegraph and telephone lines is about completed, by means of which all our bases, port officers, and air stations are tied together. These lines have been built for us by the United States Army Signal Corps. All the exchanges in this system are manned by American personnel.

By means of radio we are in constant touch with conditions afloat and with our vessels. In the flag headquarters at Brest and in each district headquarters a constant radio watch is kept, which gives us complete and instant information of all calls from vessels in the areas in which we operated.

By means of distant control apparatus we operate the French high power radio stations under an arrangement by which the air is cleared for our purposes on demand. As a result, the time of getting messages through to our ships at sea has been reduced from one hour to two minutes.

The development of our telegraph communication has included a direct wire to London, by means of a cable laid across the English Channel by the Army, and a cable across the mouth of the Gironde River laid by the Navy to permit communication with Verdon, at which place our westbound convoys from the Gironde are assembled.

PORT FACILITIES.

We found, upon arrival, that there was no fuel oil storage on the west coast of France except at Brest, where there was a capacity of only 7,000 tons. In order to provide for our oil-burning destroyers and for the oil-burning troop and store ships, we have increased the tankage at Brest to 28,000 tons, and will, within a few months, have 10,000 tons tankage each at Lorient, La Pallice, and Furt (in the Gironde). A further extension of the oil storage at Brest to a total of 50,000 tons is planned. All of these tanks have been erected by enlisted men of the Navy from material sent from the United States.

The French have turned over to us storehouses at Brest, Lorient, and Rochefort, in which are maintained stocks of supplies for our vessels. At Brest we have at the present moment a supply of provisions for 7,000 men for four months. We have increased the cold storage at Brest from 350 tons to a capacity of 750 tons.

In the beginning, the operations of our vessels were handicapped by lack of fresh water in nearly all of the French ports. This condition has been corrected at practically all the ports, either by the United States Army or United States Navy by the construction of water works. At Brest, for example, the Navy, by means of a pipe line 4¾ miles long to Trinite Valley, has tapped an ample supply which will be available by September 15 and the United States Army have established a water supply from the head of the Penfield River to the Port du Commerce.

United States naval hospitals have been established at Brest and Lorient, and an emergency hospital is to be constructed at Bassens near Bordeaux. At Pauillac, a hospital has been fitted out by the Red Cross and turned over to the Navy. The hospital at Brest is a 250-bed unit which has, however, accommodated 600 men. It is a building formerly occupied by a Carmelite monastery. The hospital at Lorient, recently completed, has 50 beds.

During the recent advances of American troops at the front, operating teams from the hospital at Brest have been sent to assist the Army at the front, where they have done splendid work.

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ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE.

There are appended charts showing the improvement in the submarine conditions as between the month of July, 1917, and the corresponding month of this year. It will be noted that there has been a marked reduction in sinkings in all areas in which American vessels have been operating; that is, west of Ireland, west of France, and in the Mediterranean. This is due in large part to the protection that is now given to convoys. There are, however, two significant conditions. Enemy submarines are being destroyed more rapidly than they are being constructed, and shipping is being launched at a greater rate than it is being destroyed. (The charts are not now available.)

There is no doubt but that the submarine situation no longer can affect the outcome of the war, and there is no doubt but that the answer to the submarine has been found in the depth charge. It is only within the present year that depth charges have been used extensively. Hitherto, our destroyers carried but few of them, and they were used sparingly. Now, whenever there is an indication of the presence of a submarine, a barrage of from 20 to 40 depth charges is laid, and the tactics of this barrage have been worked out so successfully that a destroyer which sights a periscope within a distance of a mile has a fair chance of either destroying or disabling the submarine.

SHIPPING.

The troop and cargo movements into French ports during the present year is shown in the following table:

Month.	Cargo.	Troops.
1918.		
January	240,000	44,400
February	250,000	31,500
March	288,998	62,348
April	397,969	84,948
May	487,197	162,885
June	884,471	249,088
July	971,981	316,187

During the month of July, 1918, the distribution of this work between the ports of France was as follows:

Port.	Tons.	Troops.
Bayonne	10,130	.....
Bordeaux	218,909	1,965
Brest	53,270	135,987
Cherbourg	2,771	49,077
Havre	88,102	117,295
La Pallice	121,283	672
Marseilles	42,436	136
Nantes	82,885	.....
Rochefort	47,996	.....
Royan	21,361	.....
St. Nazaire	282,778	.....
Total	971,981	316,187

From the first table it will be noted that there has been a very continuous and rapid increase. It is believed that there will be no further considerable increase in the number of troops to be handled, but there must continue to be an increase in the number of storeships. The amount of stores to be carried must vary as the number of troops to be maintained in France.

This means that there must be continued development of means for handling shipping; docks, tugs, lighters, etc.

In general, the Navy escorts ships through the submarine zone, brings them into port, and turns them over to the Army for discharge. The Army maintains large gangs of stevedores, and it has been considered unnecessary that the Navy should duplicate their organization. In this connection it should be mentioned that splendid cooperation exists between the Army and Navy. Once a vessel is discharged she is turned over to the Navy, and we endeavor to get her safely through the zone again on her westbound voyage with a minimum loss of time.

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It is frequently the case that transports are taken to sea again on the day following, or on the second day following their arrival. The *Leviathan* is a case in point. This vessel was, on her first few voyages, routed to Liverpool; it being considered that she could not be handled in any port in France. Due to her great draft it was necessary that she arrive and sail within a period of five days at the time of the lunar tides, which occur once a month. Missing this date it was necessary for her to remain for the next full moon with the corresponding tides. Her value as a troop transport was greatly reduced by this loss of time in port. She now comes to France, lands between ten and eleven thousand troops with their equipment, takes 4,500 tons of coal, 2,000 tons of water, and sails again the second or third day after her arrival.

It requires constant supervision to assure that vessels lose no time in port. A loss of a few hours may cause a vessel to miss a convoy, and thereby lose days before the next convoy. Due to the urgent demand for shipping, it has been necessary in many cases to send vessels to France with machinery in bad condition and with inexperienced personnel. There has been in the case of cargo ships a great amount of repair work necessary to prepare these vessels for their return trip across the Atlantic. This is accomplished by United States Navy repair ships and repair bases which do work on all American ships, regardless of classification, whether they be Shipping Board ships, chartered Army transports, or Navy vessels. Inasmuch as the United States Army and United States Navy have acquired control of practically all port facilities for repairing, ballasting, fueling, and supplying shipping, it has been necessary for us in the interest of the common good to take charge of all American shipping in these respects.

United States naval port officers have been established at practically all the ports reached by American vessels, namely, Cherbourg, La Pallice, Royan, Pauillac, Bordeaux, St. Jean de Luz, and Marseilles. It is our endeavor as soon as an American vessel first drops anchor in French waters to have her boarded by a United States naval officer who gives the master all the necessary information as to his future movements, charts, hydrographic notices, and necessary assistance as regards repairs, care of sick, fuel, and supplies. The port officer has the ship under constant supervision throughout the time she remains in port, and is charged with the responsibility of getting the ship out of port at the earliest possible moment. Inasmuch as the charter of a vessel may cost $4,000 a day, it is evident that an efficient port officer will save the Government his year's pay several times a month.

SALVAGE.

One of the lessons of the war has been that many vessels, though seriously damaged by mine, torpedo, or collision, may be brought to port if prompt and proper effort is made toward their salvage. For this purpose, two American tugs are maintained at Brest on two hour's notice, ready to proceed to the assistance of ships in distress, and British tugs are similarly sent out from the Scilly Islands, as well as French tugs from Brest and Lorient.

The wrecking steamer U. S. S. *Favorite*, with a complement of skilled wreckers, is maintained at Brest for salvage work. There are now at Brest under repair two vessels, the salvage of which was very creditably performed. The *Westward Ho*, torpedoed 315 miles from port, was abandoned by her crew and in an apparently sinking condition. Men from the U. S. S. *Noma* and U. S. S. *May* boarded her, raised steam in her boilers, started her pumps, and backed her into port, assisted by tugs; her forecastle nearly awash.

That ship had on board one of the most valuable cargoes that came to France. It was just at the time of the drive, and she was loaded in part with Lewis machine guns; and we saved every bit of the cargo of that ship except a little in the fore hold, and the repairs were made by the Navy and we sent her to sea.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the language of your report that you made to Congress?

Admiral WILSON. That is the language of the report I gave to the naval committee. Of course, I have a great deal more information, but this was a part of this report which was dated August 29, 1918. [Continuing reading:]

The *West Bridge*, struck by two torpedoes and with her well decks awash, was towed a distance of 400 miles into Brest by two American, two British, and one French tug. When she reached port there remained about 1 per cent of her original buoyancy.

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WORK OF THE VESSELS OF THE FORCE.

Too much credit can not be given the officers and men of this force for their cheerful and efficient performance of difficult and dangerous duty, under conditions which have frequently been most trying. They have their equals in no other Navy. Due to lack of a sufficient number of destroyers for the work in hand, it has been necessary to drive these vessels to a much greater extent than we had believed possible, and they are at sea two-third of the time.

The following table shows the distances steamed during the past two months by the vessels from which records are available:

Destroyers.	Miles steamed.	
	June.	July.
Conner	5,902	6,631
Cushing	6,043	4,479
Drayton	4,750	3,723
Ericsson	6,468	5,801
Fanning	6,232	5,985
Flusser	4,457	5,148
Lamson	5,320	4,351
Little	5,698	6,207
Monaghan	860	6,751
McDougal	.....	3,300
Nicholson	6,853	4,959
O'Brien	5,206	4,712
Preston	5,102	5,250
Reid	.....	5,220
Roe	5,260	2,194
Sigourney	7,118	4,427
Tucker	5,474	7,224
Wadsworth	5,617	3,660
Wainwright	5,198	5,288
Warrington	5,804	6,740
Winslow	6,398	5,516

In the storms of winter they frequently have returned to port with masts and boats gone, but with the officers and crew cheerful and asking to go out again after a night's sleep.

The vessels engaged in coastal convoy escort have handled their convoy, which frequently contain from 20 to 30 ships, through the dangerous coastal channels with frequent fogs and treacherous currents, with remarkably small losses.

AVIATION.

United States naval aviation stations have been constructed by naval personnel at points on the coast of France as follows:

Name of station.	Number of planes.	Number of officers.	Number of men.
Seaplanes.			
Dunkerque	32	40	440
Treguier	18	34	380
L'Aber Vrach	24	34	380
Brest	24	58	498
Ile Tudy	24	34	380
Le Croisic	24	34	380
Fromentine	24	58	498
St. Trojan	24	34	380
Arcachon	24	58	498
Dirigibles.			
Guipavas	2	16	237
Palmboeuf	6	16	237
Rochefort	2	16	237
Gujan	2	16	237
Kite balloons.			
La Trinite	6	14	198
Brest	6	14	198
La Pallice	6	14	198

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The function of these stations is the protection of ships on the coast of France within their radius of action, and their locations have been chosen with particular reference to covering the approaches to the important ports.

These stations are now practically completed, some of them are actually operating, and aeroplanes are arriving in large numbers.

In addition to these a station for training aviators is maintained in Moutchic and an assembling and repair base has been established at Pauillac.

H. B. WILSON.

ROUTING AND ESCORTING CONVOYS THROUGH WAR ZONE.

In the beginning the escort for United States troopship convoys was provided by vessels based on Queenstown. As the number of destroyers assigned to our forces in France was increased we gradually took over the escort of these convoys. The number of troops handled under the different conditions is shown in the following table:

United States troops transported direct to west coast of France.

Prior to Nov. 1, 1917 (the date I took command)	47,931
Nov. 1, 1917–Dec. 1, 1918 (of the latter number)	1,004,826
Queenstown forces furnished escort through submarine zone, assisted through pilot waters by naval forces in France, for	175,211
Queenstown forces, assisted by naval forces in France, furnished escort through submarine zone and further assisted through pilot waters for	122,914
Naval forces in France furnished escort through submarine zone and through pilot waters for	667,932

The naval forces in France in addition routed and escorted through the dangerous area the greater part of the storeships coming to the west coast of France with supplies.

In the case of convoys escorted by the naval forces in France, the routing was accomplished in the following manner:

Through the London office we received information as to the time that convoys would pass through certain positions well to the westward of the zone of normal submarine activity. After the receipt of this information all routing and protecting, including the preparation and issuing of operation orders to insure destroyers meeting up with the convoys on the high seas to escort them clear of all other convoys, were handled directly and entirely by the forces under my command.

Practically all homeward bound troopships from the west coast of France (many of them carrying sick and wounded), and empty storeships, were routed and escorted through the dangerous area directly and entirely by the forces under my command.

From the date I assumed command, November 1, 1917, to the end of the war, the United States Navy in France, while it completely and in the most friendly way cooperated with the French Navy was, by full agreement with the senior allied naval commander, organized, operated, and handled as a distinct American naval force under the direct and immediate command of an American rear admiral who, most ably and loyally assisted by his staff and the personnel of the entire force, was responsible for the successful carrying out of the mission of the force, viz:

(*a*) To safeguard United States troop and store ships.

(*b*) To cooperate with the French naval forces.

PRESENT DUTY.

Since the war I have been closely and actively engaged in constructive work as commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet. I have had no time or desire to bring up things of the past. I well know that the lesseons to be learned from the war will be studied by most competent officers in the Division of Operations and the general board, whose duties are to study these lessons and to apply them to the future plans of the Navy.

I have studied the summary of Admiral Mayo at the conclusion of his statement before this committee, and with his general observations on policy and organization I am in hearty accord.

CONCLUSIONS.

(1) The active vessels of the fleet were better prepared for war than they had ever been before.

(2) Full and complete plans had been drawn up to meet the enemy in case he made our coast.

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(3) That from the moment war was declared the entire Navy—the department as well as the fleet—entered into the prosecution of the war with the greatest energy, and its accomplishments deserve the commendation of the Nation.

(4) As soon after the declaration of war as practicable—in fact within four days—we were in conference with the accredited representatives of the British and French Admiralties, and as soon as we learned from the naval representatives of our associates the manner in which we could best cooperate, immediate and efficient steps were taken to send our available ships overseas.

(5) A great part of our Army was safely transported 3,000 miles across the sea by the Navy, and no soldier or passenger embarked on a Navy transport during the war was lost through the efforts of the enemy.

(6) Naturally "hindsight" may discover many things that might have been done better, but when we consider that the Navy expanded six times its former size in ships, and eight times in officers and men; when it accomplished so many big things that seemed almost impossible; when we consider what it did do; the things it did not do, the mistakes it made are so relatively unimportant that they are hardly worth considering in comparison. Results are what count.

(7) That our naval forces from the start cooperated in a most successful manner with the naval forces of our associates in many portions of the seas; and by their splendid and efficient work materially aided in shortening the war and in this manner saving untold life and property.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all of your statement, is it?

Admiral WILSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, you say in your statement that you have no hesitation in saying that no nation on the approach of war has had a force of battleships more nearly prepared for battle than the battle fleet to which you were attached.

Admiral WILSON. I did.

The CHAIRMAN. When you say that do you mean that the fleet as a battle fleet was more nearly prepared?

Admiral WILSON. No; I referred to the battleships.

The CHAIRMAN. You referred to the battleships as having been prepared?

Admiral WILSON. Having been the captain of a battleship, that is what I know about, and all I can speak of is what I know.

The CHAIRMAN. But you are also in a position to speak about the organization of the fleet, and whether as a fleet it was prepared or not.

Admiral WILSON. What we had given to us was in good condition.

The CHAIRMAN. And that consisted of what?

Admiral WILSON. Battleships and destroyers.

The CHAIRMAN. Were there an adequate number of destroyers to make up a well-prepared battle fleet?

Admiral WILSON. Not from our present knowledge. We thought we had quite a number at the time.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you think you had sufficient at the time?

Admiral WILSON. Never; never had sufficient.

The CHAIRMAN. Was the personnel of the battleships and of the destroyers sufficient?

Admiral WILSON. Yes; and excellent.

The CHAIRMAN. And well trained?

Admiral WILSON. Splendid.

The CHAIRMAN. Were there any other ships attached to the fleet, such as would ordinarily be attached to a battle fleet? I refer to light cruisers and antisubmarine vessels and scouting vessels of all types?

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Admiral WILSON. No, sir; because we did not have them in the service.

The CHAIRMAN. You are referring now to force No. 2?

Admiral WILSON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Which was our main defense?

Admiral WILSON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And which was naturally in better condition than any other force would be.

Admiral WILSON. That is the only force I know about, and I can say that was in excellent condition.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know anything about Force No. 1?

Admiral WILSON. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. From what you have heard about it, was that in good fighting condition?

Admiral WILSON. I can not remember what I heard, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You have no recollection of hearing anything about that?

Admiral WILSON. Well, I suppose I did, but I did not pay much attention to it. My time was taken up on my own ship. The captain of a battleship does not have much time to give to other things, if he attends to his work properly.

The CHAIRMAN. When were you assigned to the command of the patrol force of this country?

Admiral WILSON. I was detached from the *Pennsylvania* on the 28th of March, and immediately took up the duty of preparing the force. That was the 28th of March, 1917.

The CHAIRMAN. The boats that were given you, they were taken from the fleet?

Admiral WILSON. Most of the ships that were given to me had been under the command of Admiral Mayo, the commander in chief of the fleet. One was on a foreign station, one cruiser, I remember that was assigned to me was doing duty at the time in the Mediterranean. A large number of the destroyers came from the fleet. The coast guard vessels came from the Coast Guard. That is all I want to say.

The CHAIRMAN. After the destroyers were taken from the fleet, it left the fleet with very little screening protection, I presume.

Admiral WILSON. The number of destroyers asked for by Admiral Mayo remained in the fleet. I do not remember the number.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you say that the fleet, after these forces of yours had been taken away from it, was in condition in case the German fleet should break through and should come over in an effective condition—would you say that the battle fleet was in condition to meet them?

Admiral WILSON. We did not worry about the German fleet coming over.

The CHAIRMAN. I know——

Admiral WILSON. We were thinking about submarines coming over.

The CHAIRMAN. I know, but I want to know whether the fleet was, in your judgment, sufficient to meet a German fleet that was thoroughly equipped?

Admiral WILSON. I guarantee that after the German fleet came across 3,000 miles and appeared on our coast, we would have given them a good drubbing.

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The CHAIRMAN. But I want to know whether, according to the rules of naval warfare, the fleet was in a condition to meet the German fleet?

Admiral WILSON. Theoretically; no, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And it was not in the condition that the English fleet was in when it met the Germans at the battle of Jutland?

Admiral WILSON. The English fleet was in better condition when it met the Germans at the battle of Jutland than it was in when war was declared.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think our fleet, when war was declared in April, 1917, was in as good condition as the English fleet in August, 1917?

Admiral WILSON. What we had was.

The CHAIRMAN. Precisely; what we had.

Admiral WILSON. I have no comment to make on anything we did not have, because that is not my job.

The CHAIRMAN. And in spite of the fact that the whole world had been at war for nearly three years, and there was a probability of our being dragged into the war; in spite of that fact you would not say that we were as adequately prepared in April, 1917, as the English fleet was when they met the Germans in the battle of Jutland?

Admiral WILSON. You know we were not able to prepare anything to speak of, because a few months before we entered the war the majority of our people voted on the question that they approved that we had not gone to war, and we could not take any steps looking to war under such circumstances.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you say that that was the verdict of the people in the November election?

Admiral WILSON. I take it, from my reading, and as a citizen, that it was. I am not speaking as a naval officer; I am speaking as a citizen in regard to that.

The CHAIRMAN. You think that the Navy Department——

Admiral WILSON. I do not know the Navy Department, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think that officers of the Navy, I will say, thought that we were not going into the war?

Admiral WILSON. I personally thought we would surely get into the war; but I saw, at the same time, that a great many of our people, and the majority of them, had spoken in November, and it was doubtful when that time would arrive, if ever.

The CHAIRMAN. And do you think, after the German ambassador was given his passports, that there was any doubt about our going into the war?

Admiral WILSON. Mr. Senator, the night that the German ambassador was given his passports our fleet was on that night and from that night, on a war basis.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you mean by on a war basis?

Admiral WILSON. We acted just the same as if we had been at war.

The CHAIRMAN. You did everything you could to speed up preparedness?

Admiral WILSON. Ah! No, we were prepared at that time. All the ships that were with us were prepared for war.

The CHAIRMAN. The individual ships?

Admiral WILSON. Yes, sir.

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The CHAIRMAN. Now, these ships that you took over when you were put in charge of the patrol in American waters, were they all in good condition and adequately prepared for war?

Admiral WILSON. They were serviceable for war, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Were they in as good condition as you would expect them to be in in ordinary times?

Admiral WILSON. Taking into consideration their age, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Were they as well manned, as to personnel?

Admiral WILSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Trained personnel?

Admiral WILSON. They were efficient.

The CHAIRMAN. They were efficient.

Admiral WILSON. And did their job, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. There is no question about their doing their job. What was their job?

Admiral WILSON. I read you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; but briefly, their job was to guard against submarines on the coast?

Admiral WILSON. And patrol areas to protect commerce, and to be prepared to meet the enemy's submarines and destroy them.

The CHAIRMAN. And while you were on this side did any submarines come over to this side?

Admiral WILSON. No, sir; and that is the reason we went to the other side. The force was organized with that idea. I will say that the force was so organized that if submarines did not come to our coast it could be moved to the war zone.

The CHAIRMAN. And the plan of patrolling our coast was given out later?

Admiral WILSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Those vessels went abroad?

Admiral WILSON. Yes, sir; the decision to send them having been rendered five days after we went to war.

The CHAIRMAN. Five days after the 6th of April?

Admiral WILSON. Yes, sir; on the 11th of April, 1917.

The CHAIRMAN. The decision was made then to send them abroad?

Admiral WILSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And when were they sent abroad?

Admiral WILSON. I do not remember that, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, when were the first ones sent abroad?

Admiral WILSON. The order was given at once—the order was given the next day to send the first division abroad.

The CHAIRMAN. The first division consists of destroyers?

Admiral WILSON. I think there were six.

The CHAIRMAN. And when did they sail, do you know?

Admiral WILSON. They sailed as soon as prepared, after they received their orders to prepare to sail.

The CHAIRMAN. You stated that the force was in a good state of preparation?

Admiral WILSON. Oh, Mr. Senator, you can not take a ship that is going 3,000 miles across the ocean, like a destroyer, and start her off like a railroad train, just like that.

The CHAIRMAN. What was necessary to be done to prepare her?

Admiral WILSON. You have got to clean her bottom; you have got to overhaul certain little conditions and things about her ma-

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chinery; you have got to fuel her and fill her with stores, and such things. Those ships that were going over had to go in as good condition as possible; as good as we could make them on this side. It is no easy trip for a destroyer to make a 3,000-mile cruise across the ocean and to come onto the other side prepared for work, as they did. It showed in the end the advantage of it, because when they arrived they were ready for business.

The CHAIRMAN. Could not that all have been done between the 2d of February and the 1st of April?

Admiral WILSON. No, sir; you can not clean a ship's bottom on the 2d of February and sail on the 1st of June.

The CHAIRMAN. You can not clean a ship's bottom on the 2d of February and sail on the 1st of June?

Admiral WILSON. You can not clean the bottom of a ship on the 2d of February and have her in the best condition to sail on the 1st of June.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, but you stated, did you not, that these vessels were sent over very soon after the 11th of April, and that they needed to have their bottoms cleaned?

Admiral WILSON. They what?

The CHAIRMAN. You stated that they were sent over very soon after the 11th of April, and that they needed to have their bottoms cleaned.

Admiral WILSON. Mr. Senator, if you were acquainted with the details of the requirements of a ship——

The CHAIRMAN. I am just taking your own testimony, Admiral.

Admiral WILSON. If you were acquainted with the details of a ship, you would recollect that when you start out on a cruise you put them in as good condition for that cruise as possible by doing such things as cleaning the bottom, filling them with stores, looking over odds and ends of machinery, and otherwise putting them in spick and span order, so that they will stand the wear and tear of the trip. I will say that the ships were in good condition, except for finishing touches, and you always put finishing touches on before you start.

The CHAIRMAN. You filled them with stores when you started out?

Admiral WILSON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you clean the bottoms?

Admiral WILSON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You got orders on the 11th of April?

Admiral WILSON. On the 11th of April.

The CHAIRMAN. And they started when, within a month from that time?

Admiral WILSON. I do not know when they started, but very shortly.

The CHAIRMAN. Very shortly after that?

Admiral WILSON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You cleaned their bottoms in that short time?

Admiral WILSON. Yes. That does not take long.

The CHAIRMAN. And yet you say if you had started to clean their bottoms on the 2d of February, they would not have been ready on the 1st of June?

Admiral WILSON. I say if you cleaned a ship's bottom on the 2nd of February and you wanted to start on the 1st of June, you would

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have to do it all over again, and you could not start because you would have to do it all over again on the 1st of June.

The CHAIRMAN. That was not your testimony. I understand you now.

Admiral WILSON. That was my intention.

The CHAIRMAN. How often do you have to clean the ship's bottom?

Admiral WILSON. We try to do it, for the protection of the material, not less than once in nine months. We try to do it once in six months. The cost of cleaning the ship's bottom is more than paid for by the fuel saved. The saving in the expenditure of fuel more than pays for the frequent cleaning of the bottom.

The CHAIRMAN. So that if these ships had been cleaned on the 2nd of February, or in March, they would have been in good condition to go over until August or September?

Admiral WILSON. Yes; they could have gone at once. They would not have had to have anything done when we arrived on the other side. They would have taken only time to fix up, then. Mr. Senator, I can assure you as a naval officer who was in close communication and conference with all that was going on, that there was no time lost in cooperating with the forces on the other side, when we learned that that was something that would be advantageous to the Government.

The CHAIRMAN. But the testimony of other witnesses——

Admiral WILSON. I can not help what other witnesses have testified. I know what I am saying, sir, and I also say this, that when the information was presented to the Navy Department by the accredited representatives of the two principal admiralties of the world there was no urgency stated, no dire need was stated. I remember the officer himself saying "If you only could send, to show the flag;" and at that time, within two hours of the time, it was stated what we would do, and the Secretary of the Navy said "We accept that in principle," and immediately, at the next conference, the order was issued, what we should send; the order was given in detail; and from that moment there was a regular procession going over. Now, it was not anybody on the other side that put the tip here that that was what was wanted. The tip was here in Washington long before that officer ever communicated, or in fact got onto his job.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, you say you were in position to know.

Admiral WILSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And you knew all about the matter?

Admiral WILSON. I was at the conference in which the decision was made.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you informed when Admiral Sims made his recommendations about sending ships over?

Admiral WILSON. I know the day that Admiral Sims arrived in London.

The CHAIRMAN. I asked you if you were informed of all of the messages that Admiral Sims sent over?

Admiral WILSON. No, sir; I was informed on no message of Admiral Sims; but I take it for granted that Admiral Sims did not send any message before he arrived in London and communicated with the people whom he was sent to communicate with.

The CHAIRMAN. And he did communicate with them?

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Admiral WILSON. I imagine he did.

The CHAIRMAN. After he communicated with them, were you informed of his communications?

Admiral WILSON. Oh, no.

The CHAIRMAN. And did you act on them in any way?

Admiral WILSON. No, sir; I know nothing about that.

The CHAIRMAN. You have no knowledge of Admiral Sims's communications?

Admiral WILSON. All I know was that the decision was made before he communicated, because he could not have communicated until after he had arrived there, and that decision was made prior to his arrival.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, you say that there was a meeting—a conference—in Washington between the Secretary of the Navy and a number of the flag officers of our Navy, and a British Vice Admiral representing the British Admiralty, and a French Rear Admiral representing the French Admiralty?

Admiral WILSON. Yes, sir; that is the conference I referred to.

The CHAIRMAN. And you say that at that conference the subject under consideration was the coordination of the naval forces of the three countries?

Admiral WILSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And you state that one of the representatives—I take it that is one of the foreign representatives?

Admiral WILSON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN (continuing). Stated in the course of his remarks that we should send one destroyer over there, if nothing more, that the flag might be shown.

Admiral WILSON. Yes, sir; I stated that. That is true.

The CHAIRMAN. That was about the middle of April, 1917?

Admiral WILSON. The 11th of April, 1917, exactly.

The CHAIRMAN. The 11th of April, 1917?

Admiral WILSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know how many tons of shipping were sunk by the submarines during that month?

Admiral WILSON. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, the testimony has shown that there were about 800,000 tons sunk during the month of April, 1917, the greatest amount of shipping that was sunk during any one month of the war. Does it not seem to you that this representative of the British Navy, or the representative of the French Navy, whichever he was, that came over and said practically that if we sent a destroyer over for moral effect, that would be sufficient——

Admiral WILSON. He did not say that, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. He did not say that?

Admiral WILSON. No, sir; he did not say if we sent one over it would be sufficient; but he said, "If nothing more, send one in order that the flag may be shown."

The CHAIRMAN. Well, you stated before that they did not express any dire need for help or state that there was any urgency about it.

Admiral WILSON. That is what I said.

The CHAIRMAN. Does it not strike you——

Admiral WILSON. I can not help what was going on on the other side. I only know what was going on at the conference.

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The CHAIRMAN. Does it not seem remarkable, in view of the great need for ships to take care of the submarine situation and the great menace of the submarine, that that statement should have been made there?

Admiral WILSON. I do not know, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And in addition to that——

Admiral WILSON. Mr. Senator, have you any doubt in your mind that the statement was made?

The CHAIRMAN. No; I do not question your veracity in any way, Admiral.

Admiral WILSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. But I am asking you if it was not a remarkable fact that such a statement should have been made, and if it was made do you think that we should have taken that as a basis for not sending our ships over, rather than a statement of our accredited agents who were over there?

Admiral WILSON. We did not take that as any statement that we should not send them. On the contrary, it was from that moment decided we should send everything we could; and we did.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you did not give much credit to the statement of the foreign representatives?

Admiral WILSON. We gave lots of credit to them; but it showed very apparently that there was not such dire need and great urgency. The reason I put that in my paper here is to counteract anything—any feeling that the department, or those who were directing affairs in the department, were derelict in their duty.

The CHAIRMAN. And do you feel yourself that there was not dire need at that time?

Admiral WILSON. Oh. Hindsight we have now; that is all. We knew nothing about that then. Instead of finding fault with anybody in our country on what was done on the 11th of April, they ought to be very thankful——

The CHAIRMAN. What we are trying to do is to find out the mistakes made in the war so that those mistakes can be corrected in the future.

Admiral WILSON. You can rest assured, sir, that there was no mistake made on the 11th of April, 1917.

The CHAIRMAN. We have simply your testimony for that, and it is contradicted by other witnesses.

Admiral WILSON. I was present at the conference.

The CHAIRMAN. And you are giving your testimony about a general question of general policy.

Admiral WILSON. No; I am only giving testimony about what I know took place on the 11th of April.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you not think now that if we had sent antisubmarine vessels over at an earlier date than we did send them, it would have had a great effect?

Admiral WILSON. We could not have sent antisubmarine vessels over any faster than we did, unless we had done things prior to a declaration of war, which the policy of our country did not justify the Navy in doing.

The CHAIRMAN. You feel very sure of it?

Admiral WILSON. I feel sure about it. I feel very sure about it. Instead of finding any fault for any mistakes made by the United

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States Navy on the breaking out of war, I feel proud, and I feel sure it was onto its job.

The CHAIRMAN. Everybody feels proud of the Navy. There is no question about that.

Admiral WILSON. I feel sure that it was onto the job at the start.

The CHAIRMAN. If we can find mistakes that have been made and can find ways of preventing those mistakes in the future, is it not a good thing for the country and for the Navy?

Admiral WILSON. Absolutely; but you do not need to worry, and there is no need for any citizen of our country to worry; and to-day those questions are being studied and those mistakes are being studied by the brightest minds in our Navy, and the lessons will be fully learned from them. It does not need anybody who wants to make a little stir to come down and bring things to a focus. It will all be done in a calm, quiet way, by the brightest minds we have got in the country.

The CHAIRMAN. The Congress of the United States has a perfect right to go into these questions and get all the information, and it can and will do so.

Admiral WILSON. I am not questioning that at all.

The CHAIRMAN. There must be no question about that.

Admiral WILSON. I am not here for any pleasure of my own.

The CHAIRMAN. You are here because you were summoned by the committee.

Admiral WILSON. Yes; and it is my duty.

The CHAIRMAN. Precisely.

Admiral WILSON. My conscience is absolutely clear in everything that the Navy has done and what I did.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, when you assumed command of the patrol forces on the United States coast did you receive from the department any policy or any general plan of operations?

Admiral WILSON. Oh, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. To govern the conduct of your forces during the war?

Admiral WILSON. Yes. I have laid before you the two orders—the campaign orders which covered our whole mission and plan and everything.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you consider those general plans or special war plans?

Admiral WILSON. Why, Mr. Senator, there could not have been any more plans than what we drew up and what we made and what had already been prepared when I got into the Navy Department to take up my duties; and these were the result, all made out, ready, and the day war was declared I went to the job, and as soon as the printing machine could print them they were printed in numbers and sent out to the individual ships, and they got on their way.

The CHAIRMAN. That was the plan of patrolling our coast?

Admiral WILSON. Yes, sir; that is, what I speak of as the plan to meet the enemy on our coast was planned well ahead and organized and handled accordingly.

The CHAIRMAN. Was there a comprehensive war plan, so far as you know, to cover the whole field of operations?

Admiral WILSON. I know nothing about that, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You were never shown any such plan?

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Admiral WILSON. I have never been attached to the organization that had charge of such work.

The CHAIRMAN. Your force was organized before war was declared, or immediately afterwards?

Admiral WILSON. It was organized, sub rosa, before war was declared.

The CHAIRMAN. And what time before the war was declared?

Admiral WILSON. As soon as I could get there. We arrived in port from the West Indies, I think, on the late afternoon of the 27th. My orders came by wire on the 28th. I immediately made an order and nominated the commanders of the different squadrons, organized our forces; each one of the commanders went back to his station ready for the call. I arrived in Washington, and the moment war was declared off I went. Orders went to these commanding officers as soon as the printing press could print the orders, and out they went, and in a short time the number of ships I mentioned were on stations. I think it is a remarkably good piece of work, Mr. Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. After you went abroad were you in sufficiently intimate touch with the relations between Admiral Sims and the department to give first-hand information——

Admiral WILSON. Not a word do I know about it.

The CHAIRMAN. About his testimony?

Admiral WILSON. Not a word do I know about it.

The CHAIRMAN. And his relations with the department?

Admiral WILSON. Not a word?

The CHAIRMAN. Not a word?

Admiral WILSON. My time was fully occupied in other ways.

The CHAIRMAN. What were your orders when you were sent abroad? To whom were you to report?

Admiral WILSON. I was ordered to report upon my arrival to Vice Admiral Sims in London, which I did by wire.

The CHAIRMAN. And were you under his authority when you went over there?

Admiral WILSON. Yes, sir; from the time I arrived until I left I was under his command.

The CHAIRMAN. Under his command?

Admiral WILSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You stated that at Brest you had coaling capacity of 750 to 900 tons, I think.

Admiral WILSON. Tankage for 7,000 tons of oil.

The CHAIRMAN. You also referred to coaling capacity.

Admiral WILSON. No, sir; I never touched upon that.

The CHAIRMAN. You said that you increased the coal storage at Brest from 350 to a capacity of 750 tons?

Admiral WILSON. Oh, we never had any trouble with coal, sir. The reason that the amount on hand was no larger was due to the small space in the French arsenal, but the Navy had no trouble about supplying vessels with coal.

The CHAIRMAN. How could the *Leviathan* take on 13,000 tons of coal there?

Admiral WILSON. She never took on 13,000 tons. She took on 4,500 tons of coal, sir. This coal that I speak of there, that 350 to 750 tons of coal, was our own coal. When we needed more we had the unlimited capacity of the French, and I imagine that most of

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that 4,500 tons of coal sometimes might have come out of their coal pile, and then we would just chalk it up, and next time take it out of ours.

The CHAIRMAN. Practically you had no coal supplies?

Admiral WILSON. What?

The CHAIRMAN. Practically you had no coal storage?

Admiral WILSON. The allied corps had coal storage.

The CHAIRMAN. There simply seemed to be a discrepancy in the testimony that I wanted to straighten out.

Admiral WILSON. You understand that now; that is only our own little pile of coal there.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. When did you receive orders to proceed to Gibraltar, Admiral?

Admiral WILSON. I left, sir, on the 8th of August, 1917, on the U. S. S. *Birmingham*, and if I remember correctly I arrived at Gibraltar on the 18th of August, 1917.

The CHAIRMAN. What plans were given you to follow after you got to Gibraltar?

Admiral WILSON. The plans consisted of directing me to report to Admiral Sims. He then furnished me with a mission and a campaign order which directed me to cooperate with the senior allied commander, who was a British rear admiral, which I did; and thus our work was performed.

The CHAIRMAN. A British admiral was in command of the allied forces?

Admiral WILSON. He was senior to me.

The CHAIRMAN. And you kept up your independence as an American organization—as an American unit, there?

Admiral WILSON. In everything else except operations.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral WILSON. And of course the admiral consulted me frequently, even with regard to the operations. But—well, I will not say what I was going to say.

The CHAIRMAN. Was the arrangement satisfactory?

Admiral WILSON. Officially; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Officially?

Admiral WILSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That is, you do not think it is necessary to go into any personal matters?

Admiral WILSON. No, sir; I would not want to say what I would have to say, and have it taken down on paper.

The CHAIRMAN. What reports did you make concerning the situation at Gibraltar to this commander of the forces?

Admiral WILSON. What is that, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. What report did you make?

Admiral WILSON. I made weekly reports to the force commander in London.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, objecting to the way things were going?

Admiral WILSON. Oh, there was nothing to object to, sir. You misunderstand me. There was nothing to object to. As I have said in my statement, when we left, the British rear admiral, the senior allied commander, spoke most highly of the work of the forces that had been under my command, when I left.

The CHAIRMAN. The British had a larger force there?

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Admiral WILSON. I doubt it, sir. I know that when we arrived we certainly were welcome, especially when the four old-type torpedo boats came around from China, boats that we thought were played out years and years ago. They were very welcome when they arrived there. Anything that could make any headway at all and drop a depth charge was of value in the war. Some vessels were of more value than others.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you do not know which country had a majority of the naval forces?

Admiral WILSON. No, sir. It did not make any difference. They all worked together.

The CHAIRMAN. And the system that was adopted was as good as it could have been, or do you think it would have been better to have acted under a separate operational command?

Admiral WILSON. It would have been impracticable to have had any other organization in Gibraltar.

The CHAIRMAN. And you never considered that your vessels became an integral part of the British Navy in any way?

Admiral WILSON. Not in Gibraltar; no, sir; although you understand, Mr. Senator, that the vessels that I commanded were operated by the senior allied commander. Just the same——

The CHAIRMAN. But that was the general course with the allied fleets?

Admiral WILSON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And if we had had a senior commander he would have been the operating head?

Admiral WILSON. Yes, sir. When you get to France, when you get to the next duty of mine, I will go into that further with you.

The CHAIRMAN. Who assigned you to duty on the French coast?

Admiral WILSON. My orders came from the force commander in London.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Sims?

Admiral WILSON. Yes, sir; to whom I reported in Paris, and then went afterwards to London to study the situation from that end, and then to Brest; arriving on the 1st of November, 1917, when I took command.

The CHAIRMAN. What was your relation to the French admiral commanding there?

Admiral WILSON. Splendid.

The CHAIRMAN. You were under him in operations?

Admiral WILSON. He was the senior allied commander; and I invite your attention, Mr. Senator, to page 26 of my statement here, and to this statement therein. [Reading:]

The force is organized and operated as a distinct American unit. From the date I assumed command, November 1, 1917, to the end of the war, the United States Navy in France, while it completely and in the most friendly way cooperated with the French Navy, was, by full agreement with the senior allied naval commander, organized, operated, and handled as a distinct American naval force under the direct and immediate command of an American rear admiral.

This situation was quite different in Brest, because the American effort consisted in bringing troop ships east and sending empty troop ships west, and in bringing cargo ships east and sending empty cargo ships west; so that after my arrival in France I took that up with the French naval officer corresponding to me, Vice Admiral

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Sereur, and we came to an agreement which was drawn up—that, of course, all under the senior allied commander, technically—that I should handle all east and west bound American ships, both troop and cargo.

The CHAIRMAN. That is, you should provide cargoes for them?

Admiral WILSON. I should handle them, sir—do the work.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you tell me what the work was?

Admiral WILSON. The work consisted in doing everything in bringing them into the zone and taking them out again. I always furnished the senior allied commander, Vice Admiral Moreau, a copy of the orders, as a matter of courtesy; and of course, any time at all he could have stepped in and stopped or changed my plans: but it was never done. I never could imagine any more cordial or friendly relations than there were the whole time I was in France between the French Navy and our Navy. It in every way cooperated, and always to the best interests of both and of the allied cause.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, these transports and supply ships that came over were started from this side; and who had charge of the starting of them? Admiral Gleaves, was it not?

Admiral WILSON. I do not know, sir. I imagine Admiral Gleaves had charge of the transport force. Whether he had anything to do with the cargo vessels I do not know. I think that when Capt. Pratt comes before you he will be able to give you all that information.

The CHAIRMAN. You yourself had cargo vessels as well as transports?

Admiral WILSON. Yes, sir; but I only got them when they got a little westward of the submarine zone, what was called the destroyer rendezvous.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. These vessels were sent over there, were they coaled for the round trip in this country?

Admiral WILSON. In some cases. In other cases they neglected to do it on this side, probably in the hurry, and we often had to furnish coal and oil from Brest for cargo ships, and some of them could not carry sufficient to make the round trip, and we had to supply those.

The CHAIRMAN. Were they provisioned for the round trip when they started?

Admiral WILSON. Often we gave them provisions, too.

The CHAIRMAN. And then you were notified from American when they started?

Admiral WILSON. No, sir; America sent the message to the London office, and it was there relayed through there to me, when there was a convoy coming to the coast of France.

The CHAIRMAN. And they told you when the convoys came so that you could be on the lookout for them?

Admiral WILSON. Yes; the message would be made up about a convoy, and the message would be sent to us, the time that the vessels would cross the standard meridian. That standard meridian, I do not mind telling you now—it was kept very quiet then—was 30° west longitude. The message gave the time, date, number of ships, speed, and latitude crossing that standard meridian. That was sent to us, and after crossing the standard meridian where they should head for Ushant, the north coast of France, Bailleul, or the mouth of the Garonne, and we would know by radio communication

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through the Azores Islands whether they were on schedule time or not, whether they were going to cross this meridian on time. We would make our allowance on account of bad weather, and they even had to turn around so that they would not be ahead. We had to estimate to send destroyers to meet those ships, so that they would be clear of submarines. We would send our destroyers out under Operation's orders, timing the sailing of a convoy from the coast of empty ships, in order that they might take them safely to sea, and then meet troop ships; and they always met the troops ships early in the morning, and then during the daylight they would all spread out in a scouting line and sweep down.

It is no easy job to pick up a convoy of ships on the high seas. It looks large in a river, but they are a small dot in the ocean. We picked them up and immediately took charge—that is, I can not say we took charge, because the senior officer present is always in charge, but they would notify the senior officer of the course to steer, which he would be told to take, and then they would generally make a radical change, sometimes to the southward, and sometimes not so much to the southward, and sail in under orders we would give them. All the time we were in communication with them if we wished by radio, and they were ordered not to communicate unless necesssary, except to inform us that they had made contact, and then we would just say, "Contact," broadcast. If during the time we were coming in, it was necessary, we would catch a certain destroyer by radio, and tell him to take a course A or course B, an arbitrary course that we had laid out, and bring them on the coast where we had ships laid out as light ships, and bring them into harbor.

The great advantage of having our destroyers handle them was that our men knew the ports, and we could come right into port when they were handled by destroyers from their ports. They knew nothing about France, and otherwise we would have to send ships out to convoy them in. We have had as many as 3 convoys come in on one day with over 40,000 men, one convoy consisting of 13 ships, one right after the other coming through the war zone.

The CHAIRMAN. Coming in different convoys.

Admiral WILSON. Leaving at different times at home and at different speeds, coming in. I tell you, it was a relief when we would get them in. Our office never closed, night or day. It was always open from Sunday night to Sunday night, with continuous communication, continually receiving reports referring to submarines, where they were operating, and utilizing the information for diverting the convoys against submarines. There was never a question of taking anybody through a safe place. It was always just knowing where they were by information, when they would report themselves, and dodging them.

The CHAIRMAN. That is very interesting, Admiral, and it is giving the committee a good account of it.

Admiral WILSON. I could talk to you for an hour on that subject, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You had entire charge of the vessels that performed convoy duty?

Admiral WILSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You said, however, that you were under the admiral in command of the forces in European waters.

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Admiral WILSON. He was the force commander.

The CHAIRMAN. But he did not interfere with you in any way?

Admiral WILSON. He did not operate them. He gave me instructions and held me responsible for the execution.

The CHAIRMAN. There was no friction about the execution?

Admiral WILSON. Not a particle. I just obeyed orders. Mr. Senator, there is a Senator from Kansas who came over one time and came through the war zone, who knows about what was going on. If you are much more interested, ask him. He was very much——

The CHAIRMAN. Who was that?

Admiral WILSON. I do not remember his name. I know that he came in, and I never saw anybody more pleased, in my life, when he got in. I think he is from Kansas

The CHAIRMAN. Now, Admiral, in establishing the general organization of the forces in Europe, did Admiral Sims consult you?

Admiral WILSON. How is that?

The CHAIRMAN. In establishing the general organization of the forces in Europe, did Admiral Sims consult you?

Admiral WILSON. Admiral Sims never consulted me on anything except to tell me what I should have, and what the mission was I was to carry out.

The CHAIRMAN. Did he not order you to London for a conference on the organization of the forces?

Admiral WILSON. Of the forces in France; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In France?

Admiral WILSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And not in Europe?

Admiral WILSON. In France.

The CHAIRMAN. And the organization that you agreed upon was satisfactory?

Admiral WILSON. Oh, perfectly. It had to be.

The CHAIRMAN. That was the organization you operated on?

Admiral WILSON. Yes; the organization we agreed upon was one he set down. The senior officer gives you your orders.

The CHAIRMAN. Were the fuel and repair facilities at Brest adequate? You have stated, I think, that they were not, in France.

Admiral WILSON. Would you like me to go into that in detail?

The CHAIRMAN. No; I do not think that it is necessary; in a general way.

Admiral WILSON. I could only explain it in detail, sir. That is one of the questions that I had been hoping you might ask me.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well; if you have any information I would be glad to have it.

Admiral WILSON. I will say at the start that the facilities on the French coast of course never became adequate, but with good management we had no trouble in carrying out our work. Our chief trouble in France was a lack of forces with which to do the work, and I recommended a number of times that our forces be increased in order that we might be able to perform better work, the better work which would consist in giving more protection to troop ships, cargo ships, to turn them around more quickly; because the turnaround of a ship meant just so much more tonnage available from the United States.

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In these recommendations I always held that Brest was the place at which our naval forces should have been based to handle the American effort, and on that subject, since you have asked me a question, I have a little memorandum that I would like to give you.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Admiral WILSON. Of the ports in France, Brest is the one nearest to the United States. In the outside harbor there is an unlimited anchorage space for large vessels. There are a number of channels leading into Brest from the Bay of Biscay, all of which could be easily closed to enemy vessels by mines. On the other hand, channels for vessels are so numerous that in case of the enemy mining some of them, there were invariably others which were open to both large and small ships.

Queenstown is about 250 miles north and west of Brest. Vessels based on Queenstown on going to sea to meet an incoming convoy had about the same distance to go until they met the convoy and left it in a French port, as did the ships based on Brest, but after leaving the convoy they had to steam some 250 miles to return to their base, and while there was always some possibility of meeting enemy submarines during this passage, as compared with the duty of escorting convoys, the time was not usefully employed. Furthermore, due to the extreme degree to which all escort vessels were worked, it was necessary to keep them usefully employed as much of the time as possible, and to give them all the remainder of the time to upkeep of material. Therefore, the time taken in going from Brest to Queenstown was time wasted.

Almost without exception, destroyers which went west from Brest to meet incoming convoys, and to escort them to the coast of France, escorted to the westward empty ships. Destroyers which left Queenstown to meet troop convoys sailed to the westward without escorting empty ships on this passage. This method, I am sure, prevailed during the war. Whether or not it prevailed during its entirety I do not know. It is obvious, however, that a ship operating by this method was performing far from a maximum amount of useful work.

It is true that development of the port facilities of Brest was necessary, and this development was carried on. As an example, there was a fuel-oil storage capacity at Brest when we arrived of about 7,000 tons. By the end of September, 1918, there was capacity for 28,000 tons. Even without this increased capacity, we were able to keep such destroyers as we had filled with fuel, and, in addition, at times supplied fuel to destroyers based on Queenstown when they arrived in Brest from escort duty short of fuel, and also many troop ships and cargo vessels.

The question of shortage of fuel oil could always have been met by bringing an additional tanker, as necessary, into Brest in one of the frequent convoys which came to that port.

In the testimony of Rear Admiral Sims on March 23, referring to United States destroyers in European waters, he stated:

* * * so that on our advices from the other side we concentrated our destroyers as far west as possible so that they would be handy to their own bases. We put them at Queenstown first because the facilities for repairs and refueling with oil were better there. Brest was better strategically, and as fast as we could increase the storage facilities there for oil we took them there, until finally we had 28,000 tons of oil there, and we sent them there and our destroyers were almost exclusively used for that purpose.

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I had much correspondence with the London office on the subject of the insufficiency of the force under my command in France to carry out the mission assigned; and, also, many conversations with members of that office staff—in all of it I can not recall that the question of the storage facilities in Brest for oil ever entered into it except on the one occasion in June, 1918, when a number of destroyers were ordered to Brest after the sinking of the *President Lincoln*, and which I shall refer to later.

Brest oil destroyers based on Queenstown on many occasions, and at times whole Queenstown destroyer escorts would lay over in Brest fueling and taking on board necessary stores, from the time of bringing in one convoy to the time of starting for another. The oil question was only one of diverting a tanker to Brest, a much safer port to make as far as enemy activity was concerned than Queenstown.

But after keeping most of our destroyers based on Queenstown for over one year—and for the first six months after we declared war all of them were based on Queenstown—Admiral Sims at last recognized what all of us who had anything to do with the work in France had realized all along; that is, that Brest, in addition to being the most important port in Europe from an American standpoint, where most of our troops and supplies landed: that Brest was also, from a purely naval standpoint, much better than Queenstown as a base for our destroyers.

At that time, the last of May, 1918, he had memorandums made out concerning the relative advantages of Brest and Queenstown as a base for destroyers escorting troop convoys, which showed that it would be far more advantageous to base the escorting destroyers for our troop transports on Brest.

I haven't a copy of these memorandums, but in transmitting them to the British admiral at Queenstown, Admiral Sims wrote:

From an examination of these memorandums, it now seems that it would be really advantageous to base the escorting destroyers from our troop transports on Brest.

You will note from the inclosed memorandums that a troop escort based on Queenstown steams approximately three legs of a triangle, as follows: 480 miles to the rendezvous, not escorting; 600 miles to the French port, escorting; 380 miles back to Queenstown, not escorting; in all 860 miles not escorting and 600 miles escorting, 1,460 miles in all.

With the destroyers based on Brest, the legs of the triangle are as follows: 510 out to the rendezvous escorting empty transports off the coast, 600 miles escorting troops in to the coast, 150 miles returning to Brest from St. Nazaire in case the latter port is the port of destination. In all, this is 1,110 miles escorting and 150 miles not escorting, a total of 1,260 miles.

From this it is evident that destroyers based on Brest can be used with much greater economy of both destroyers and oil.

The result was that on June 1, 1918, a message was received from Vice Admiral Sims stating that it was proposed to assign 9 to 12 additional destroyers to the French coast as soon as we were ready to maintain them and were ready to take over the escort of all groups of troopships making the coast of France. We were asked how soon we would be prepared. Having from the first urged that more destroyers be based on France, and that the duty of escorting troopships to and from the coast be undertaken in France; a reply was immediately made that I was ready to maintain these vessels at once and was ready to take over the escorting of all troop convoys.

As a result of these communications, three destroyers arrived from Queenstown June 8, three June 9, four June 11, one June 12, one

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June 15, and troop convoys turned over to me. The first of our convoys reached the coast of France on June 18.

The practice had been to bring regular troop convoys to France about every 10 days (escorted by Queenstown destroyers) with a fast group in between (generally handled by vessels based on Brest) but the flow of troop convoys was speeded up, and after the whole charge of such convoys had been transferred from Queenstown to us, five separate troop convoys, in addition to merchant convoys arriving in the same period, were met and escorted to France in safety in a period of nine days. And what is also important to note is that by this increase to our force we were able to speed up turning ships around for home—and tonnage at this time was in great demand for transporting troops and stores. Each day saved counted for much. Then again we were able to give much better protection to our convoys.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, that is very interesting, Admiral. Now, will you tell me about the fuel and repair facilities at Brest—whether they were adequate?

Admiral WILSON. Mr. Senator, I just read that, sir. They were never adequate, the whole time I was there, but they were sufficient with good management to do anything that the American Navy wanted to do on the coast of France.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you make any recommendations about increasing those?

Admiral WILSON. Oh, yes; I went ahead and did them. I increased them four times. The oil tanks came from the United States and were erected by the American blue jackets.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you make any recommendations through Admiral Sims?

Admiral Wilson. Every communication I ever made to the Navy Department went to and through Admiral Sims. I never wrote an official letter nor a personal letter all the time I was abroad to anybody connected with the Navy Department that did not go through the force commander's office, except once I wrote to Admiral Benson, the Chief of Naval Operations, something about his boy, who was a lieutenant under my command.

The CHAIRMAN. What action did Admiral Sims take on your recommendations?

Admiral WILSON. He approved the recommendation, and sent it on to Washington, and in consequence we got the material to erect the tanks.

The CHAIRMAN. The department followed your recommendation?

Admiral WILSON. Absolutely, sir. I do not know of any recommendations that I ever made that were turned down, except the recommendation to try to get more ships.

The CHAIRMAN. That is, the repair and fuel facilities were supplied as they were needed, were they?

Admiral WILSON. Just as fast, I guess, as they could send them to us, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Then there was no trouble about fuel and supplies at Brest?

Admiral WILSON. No, sir; we never had an adequate amount. I was worried at times. For instance, if a tanker was coming to Brest and outside of Brest she was torpedoed, we might have been counting

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on that much oil, and we might have been worried about it. It never happened. I used to worry about it; but I learned then that this worrying business does not do much good.

The CHAIRMAN. Were the repair facilities at your disposition sufficient to take care of the repair of transports?

Admiral WILSON. Mr. Senator, we repaired ships that were so badly damaged by torpedoes that you could drive a truck through the side. We repaired ships that had only 1 per cent flotation when they arrived in port. We repaired ships that had the whole bow knocked off of them, that had the whole bottom out of them, that were brought in by our salvage vessels. I always went on the theory, with regard to our force over there, that there was no limit; the sky was the limit, and we would do everything that was put up to us, and make our best effort; and fortunately we always succeeded.

The CHAIRMAN. Were those repairs made by the Navy?

Admiral WILSON. Yes; by the American Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. And not by foreigners, at all?

Admiral WILSON. No, sir. The French had turned their arsenal there practically into a munitions plant. Of course we had the benefit of their shops and everything they could do in that way, and the drydock.

The CHAIRMAN. What did you do about the docking and the repairing of destroyers?

Admiral WILSON. We had several good docks in the French arsenal that we used for the purpose. All major repairs for destroyers, what we called overhaul, were made in England, as also to the Queenstown destroyers.

The CHAIRMAN. They were docked in England, you say?

Admiral WILSON. The overhaul; at what we called the overhaul period—general overhaul.

The CHAIRMAN. Were there any adequate docking facilities in France for that?

Admiral WILSON. As to the *Mount Vernon*, when she was torpedoed we brought her into the French dock and put her in the dock, heeled her over to the side, and repaired her and went over her bottom, in cooperation with the French.

The CHAIRMAN. But, as a general rule, they were docked in England?

Admiral WILSON. Not docked, but they were sent there for overhaul. Repairs we did ourselves.

The CHAIRMAN. The docking was done in France?

Admiral WILSON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, in the general carrying out of your duties in France, were you given the necessary initiative in the discharge of your duties by Admiral Sims?

Admiral WILSON. A free hand. I was only told to make good.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you at any time embarrassed by the activities of officers sent abroad by the department without your knowledge?

Admiral WILSON. What is that?

The CHAIRMAN. Were you at any time embarrassed by the activities of officers sent abroad by the department without your knowledge?

Admiral WILSON. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Who did not report to you?

Admiral WILSON No, sir. I often had people come in, but they never bothered me.

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The CHAIRMAN. The department did send officers over to investigate?

Admiral WILSON. Not to investigate me.

The CHAIRMAN. To investigate naval conditions, I say; who were not to report to you, did they?

Admiral WILSON. I do not remember anybody except the Chief of Operations, sir. He came over there and looked around. Admiral Mayo came and looked around—my commander in chief.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not recall any officers sent abroad under orders by the department, who were not ordered to report to you?

Admiral WILSON. No, sir; nobody embarrassed me.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you recall that anybody was sent over who was not ordered to report to you?

Admiral WILSON. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Sims in his testimony referred to the tendency of the department to demand full and detailed explanation of all recommendations before approval. Were you required by the department to explain in such detail any of your recommendations?

Admiral WILSON. I was not required by the department, because I made no recommendation to the department; but I was required by Admiral Sims, to whom I made my recommendations, to do the same thing. That, I think, is general, that when you make a recommendation, if you are putting it up to a person to make a decision, you ought to give him full data. I never felt that that was anything wrong.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have any difficulty in getting authorization to establish barracks on shore for the housing of personnel?

Admiral WILSON. No, sir; we did that ourselves. We took some old French barracks, with permission from the French admiral, and we took any old material we could get around the place to do that and did it ourselves. We had a fine outfit there in an old chateau.

The CHAIRMAN. You made recommendations to Admiral Sims about that?

Admiral WILSON. No, sir; we did not make any recommendations. We did it ourselves.

The CHAIRMAN. You did that without any recommendations?

Admiral WILSON. Oh, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You think that the American naval forces contributed materially, do you not, to winning the war?

Admiral WILSON. I know they did.

The CHAIRMAN. There is no question about that?

Admiral WILSON. No question about it; and I have had many, many prominent French people tell me the same thing.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee has asked a number of questions of officers about the question of reorganizing certain plans in the Navy, and we would like to ask you a few questions in that regard.

Admiral WILSON. May I say something before you start, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral WILSON. I said in my statement that I had read the summary of recommendations by Admiral Mayo on the subject of the policy of reorganization, and that I was heartily in accord with that and if I made any further answers, if I made any further replies to any of your questions, I could not go any further.

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The CHAIRMAN. Yes; but Admiral Mayo at the request of the committee is coming back later to present a plan of reorganization.

Admiral WILSON. I would like to wait for that plan, and I would probably be just as much in accord with him in that as I am already, because Admiral Mayo is a man in whose judgment I have the greatest confidence, and if he is going to present any plan, I would like to see it before I took it upon myself to present any plan.

The CHAIRMAN. But the committee would like to get the ideas of a number of officers in the Navy in order that they might have definite plans to go ahead on.

Admiral WILSON. I always felt that the answer was right there, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And we have confidence enough in you, Admiral, to ask you to give us some of your ideas.

Admiral WILSON. All right, sir; go ahead.

The CHAIRMAN. In the first place, do you consider that the organization of the Navy Department as at present existing is entirely satisfactory?

Admiral WILSON. No, sir. May I say how I think it is wrong?

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I want you to give.

Admiral WILSON. I think that the Secretary of the Navy should have a naval advisor, now called the Chief of Naval Operations; that he should be the adviser to the Secretary on all matters of preparation of the Navy for war and be held responsible for the execution of the plans. I do not for one instant mean that this officer who is Chief of Naval Operations shall in any way take the place of the Secretary of the Navy. I realize that the Navy would be not properly administered if a naval officer were Secretary of the Navy. Such a person, if he were Secretary of the Navy, would naturally be a political naval officer, and I do not think he would be near as successful as Secretary of the Navy as a civilian. But the civilian who is Secretary of the Navy having selected by his own selection the naval adviser, should place responsibility upon him, and naturally give him the authority that goes with the responsibility. I do not, again, mean for one instant that this naval adviser shall in any way mix in and try to do the job of every chief of bureau. I am informed, I think correctly, that on the breaking out of the war, I think by mutual consent, the Chief of Naval Operations and the bureau got together and cooperated in a very efficient manner during the war. Now, if in war time they got together by mutual consent and cooperated for efficiency in war, I say that the law should be such that in peace times they will have the same cooperation, in order that they can be prepared for war. Now, as to details, I know no more about it.

The CHAIRMAN. You say that the Chief of Naval Operations should have the responsibility of executing the plans. Should he have the responsibility of drawing the plans?

Admiral WILSON. Yes. He has now the authority for the preparation of plans.

The CHAIRMAN. He should have the responsibility?

Admiral WILSON. Yes; he should have the responsibility of drawing the plans and getting the Navy ready for war, and the responsibility of the execution of the plans; and the man who has responsibility for a thing should have the authority that goes with it. I do not mean for a moment that this man should take the place of the Secretary of

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the Navy. I recognize that it is the salvation of the Navy to have a civilian at its head, and if the Secretary of the Navy is not satisfied with his naval adviser, he can get another naval adviser. He is not held down to that one; because this man would be his own confidential man, charged with responsibility, and the law should be made such that the work that was done during the war by cooperation will be made the practice during peace times.

The CHAIRMAN. And, in general, you do not think that a civilian Secretary who has never studied or had experience of naval warfare could be reasonably expected, without the advice of some such man who has had experience, to prepare a navy or a fleet for war?

Admiral WILSON. Are you referring to the present Secretary of the Navy, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, no; I am just speaking in general. In general, a civilian Secretary of the Navy needs the advice and assistance of an expert naval officer?

Admiral WILSON. Yes; certainly.

The CHAIRMAN. To draw up plans?

Admiral WILSON. Yes, sir. The man appointed Secretary of the Navy has not got to have any naval knowledge to be an administrator. That is what you want, an administrator, there as Secretary of the Navy; a man who handles policies, on good terms with Congress, and such things as that. I do not think it was ever expected, and I do not think any Secretary ever expected to go down and do the details and say how war should be carried out.

The CHAIRMAN. Plans for military operations should be drawn, of course, by military experts?

Admiral WILSON. I think every one recognizes that, sir; even the Secretary of the Navy. The trouble with this business is that it is not the system, it is the individual, and if he gets in there and tries to make his job too big at the expense of anybody else, and not to the best interests of the service and everybody concerned, they ought to get somebody else who can keep within his limits, and keep happiness there, and not discord.

The CHAIRMAN. You believe in a centralized control of responsibility and a decentralized authority over the execution of plans?

Admiral WILSON. I do not understand that.

The CHAIRMAN. You believe in a centralized control of general policy?

Admiral WILSON. I believe in a centralized control of getting ready for war and carrying on war. I do not think this man ought to be meddling with——

The CHAIRMAN. Then, after the plan is made you believe in the department having authority to carry out their particular plans?

Admiral WILSON. Exactly; not meddling with navy yards and trivial things of that sort. He ought to be on big things. He never ought to get down to the level.

The CHAIRMAN. What would you say, in general, about the preparedness of the Navy at the beginning of the war? Would you say that it was adequately prepared from stem to stern?

Admiral WILSON. Senator, I never saw it any better prepared. Of course, as Admiral Rodman told you yesterday, you could never get 100 per cent efficiency; but I have been going along from a boy until my age, now, and I think I can say with great certainty that every year I have seen better results and more preparedness.

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The CHAIRMAN. Then you are prepared to state that you think that the Navy was prepared from stem to stern at the outbreak of the war?

Admiral WILSON. Oh, well, that is just an expression.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I am asking you.

Admiral WILSON. Well, now, you know even Admiral Wilson, from the position he occupied, is not in a position to answer that question; and no one officer is able to answer that question.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you decline to answer the question.

Admiral WILSON. I say I am unable to answer the question, sir. I decline nothing. But I want to say, Mr. Senator, that the force I was attached to was in a fine condition.

The CHAIRMAN. That was not the question, Admiral.

Admiral WILSON. I know it was not. I am not able to answer.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any questions to ask, Senator Keyes?

Senator KEYES. Yes; I would like to ask Admiral Wilson this question: You made the statement, as I got it, that the Navy was on the job from the start.

Admiral WILSON. Yes, sir.

Senator KEYES. Now, would you mind telling us what time you had in mind as the time of the start?

Admiral WILSON. Well, the force I was attached to, sir, received the order and went south after Christmas. We were carrying on our evolutions and maneuvers and target practice and everything the same as we always did, and we continually have maneuvers on the war basis, and from the time that the German ambassador was given his passports the fleet was handled as if on a war basis, and when we came north the force I was attached to was in excellent condition. I went to the Navy Department and took the patrol force, and the force I had there were on their toes from the start. I went to Gibraltar, and I went to Brest, and I have been fortunate, probably, in seeing nothing but successful performances of the work assigned to different people. I knew nothing about, and know nothing about, the administration of the Navy Department at that time, if you refer to that. I was at sea.

Senator KEYES. When you referred to the Navy being on the job, you had no reference to the Navy Department?

Admiral WILSON. When I say the "Navy," I mean the fighting force.

Senator KEYES. You did not refer to the Navy Department at all in making that statement, did you?

Admiral WILSON. I referred to the fleet.

Senator KEYES. That is what I wanted to find out.

Admiral WILSON. Well, I will change it and say that the fleet was on its toes from the start, or, say, in 1916, and has been so ever since, and I know about what was going on here. May I say this: You asked Admiral Rodman something about the fleet at the present time. May I read a little memorandum that I prepared when I called the admirals and captains together in conference to get their views of conditions at the present time, in order that I might have such a memorandum in case I came up here and was asked the question? It is my point of view, but it is a point of view that meets with favor by all my senior officers down below.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Rodman took the ground that information about the fleet at the present time should be given confiden-

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tially, and yesterday afternoon he appeared before the full Committee on Naval Affairs of the Senate and gave us a talk on that.

Admiral WILSON. Anything that I have to say here is nothing but what everybody can hear.

The CHAIRMAN. It, of course, has nothing to do with the purposes of this investigation?

Admiral WILSON. But you asked me what the condition of the fleet was to-day.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral WILSON. Now, I have another fleet, and I would like to tell you.

The CHAIRMAN. I said at the time it has nothing to do with that. I should be very glad to hear it if it has nothing in it that should be kept private.

Senator PITTMAN. I am perfectly sure that the admiral knows what is important, and he knows more than we do.

The CHAIRMAN. I have no objection. Have you any objection, Senator?

Senator BALL. I would be glad to hear it. I think it has a bearing on the future.

Admiral WILSON. It is not to be expected that following the demobilization which took place between the signing of the armistice and the 1st of January, 1920, the fleet would be in the condition it was during the war and during the period immediately preceding the war.

At the present time the material condition of the battleships is, as a whole, good. Judging by the previous high standard insisted upon in the Navy, the material condition of the battleships has somewhat deteriorated and is even, perhaps, still slowly deteriorating; but if the fleet can hold our present enlisted personnel as a nucleus around which to develop, we will soon reach our low ebb and begin to improve. To do so, however, it is essential that we hold what we now have.

When the fleet sailed for southern waters—and I would like to say that I have down there 8 dreadnaughts and something over 30 destroyers and an aviation force and submarine force—when the fleet sailed for southern waters, 10 knots was considered the maximum sustained speed which the battleships could maintain, and as a result of the two months' work subsequent to that time it mounted considerably. The oil burners can of course sustain more, but further training, development, and hardening of the newly recruited firemen is necessary before coal-burning battleships can increase this speed. This process is, however, continuously going on.

The morale of the fleet has steadily improved since leaving home. The reason that I wanted to give you this, Mr. Senator, is that we hear so much about the Navy being all shot to pieces, and everything going to pot, and everybody lying down on his job. This naval personnel that I have in the force down below do not know what it is to lie down on a job. They do not know any argument that is going on. They are only attending to their business.

The cruise has been beneficial. A schedule is being followed which will accomplish much and yet takes into consideration the large number of untrained men. This schedule is such that it is believed

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that more can probably be accomplished than was originally contemplated, and that nothing planned will be left undone.

As an example of the recent development, the eight battleships held a 4½ power trial on March 4, which resulted in their averaging over 17 knots, the highest speed of about 17.8 knots being made by the *Delaware*. During this trial conditions improved continuously and the speed during the last hour was the highest of the entire run.

Many of the officers, particularly the watch officers, are young and inexperienced. The watch officers themselves are almost without exception of the classes of 1916 and subsequent.

The same is true of the men. As an example, 52 per cent of the crew of one of the battleships are less than 19 years old. These men make splendid material for ultimate development, but by reason of their age and inexperience, require more supervision and training than did the men we had prior to and during the war.

As it is essential that we retain the older men still remaining in the Navy, it is absolutely necessary that a pay bill be definitely passed in the near future in order to hold them.

The morale of the fleet is surprisingly good. The Navy will, as it has always done, endeavor to make the best of things. The country has, due to an unbroken record of success and victory, throughout its entire history, come to expect that no matter what happens the Navy—its first line of defense (and the Navy is proud of its title)—will find a way to accomplish its mission. While the spirit and determination of the older officers and men is as firm as ever, the country must realize that they have nearly reached their limit. They feel that they are in the position so often portrayed by a newspaper cartoonist, "When a fellow needs a friend."

We had a big reserve of efficiency, with a fine personnel, but we have drawn heavily upon it of late.

My only object in bringing that to your attention is to counteract the statement that the morale of the Navy has gone to pieces; that the Navy is all shot to pieces, and so on. In fact, the only vital thing now is to increase the pay of the men. They are doing splendidly, but the married ones have their troubles. With the demand outside for enlisted men with the experience our men have, they can get three times the pay outside. You do not realize, sir, the great value of these men that we are losing. Millions of dollars are invested there. Take the electric plant of the *Pennsylvania*, a $1,000,000 plant, and because they do not increase the pay of the enlisted men, on the 1st day of July she will have 14 per cent of her electricians to look out for.

The CHAIRMAN. I am glad you brought this matter up.

Admiral WILSON. I do not think the people realize how the spirit and morale is affected by that; and at the present time we have just got to the place where a fellow needs a friend.

The CHAIRMAN. With the consent of the committee, after we have heard Admiral Fletcher to-morrow, I am going to call Admiral Washington, the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation——

Admiral WILSON (interposing). Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. To come before this committee and to give us some information about the present personnel conditions of the Navy and the question of pay in the Navy.

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Admiral WILSON. That is the one question. That is the only question.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is a very important matter for us to hear something on.

Admiral WILSON. That is the only question that exists to-day, on the pay of the men. Of course everybody wants more pay, but that is vital with us.

The CHAIRMAN. I agree with you fully about the importance of settling that matter.

Have you any questions, Senator Pittman?

Senator PITTMAN. I would like to ask one or two questions.

Admiral Sims has charged before this committee that the Navy Department, through unpreparedness and delay in sending to Europe forces that were available, prolonged the war four months, thereby causing the loss of 2,500,000 tons of shipping, 500,000 lives, and needless expenditure of $15,000,000,000. I ask you, in your opinion, based upon your experience and knowledge of this war, is that charge true?

Admiral WILSON. I do not believe this to be true. On the contrary, I believe that our naval forces from the start cooperated in a most successful manner with the naval forces of our associates in many portions of the seas, and by their splendid and efficient work materially aided in shortening the war, and in this manner saving untold life and property, as stated in my conclusions.

To futher show the faulty reasoning of Rear Admiral Sims, I ask attention to that part of the testimony before the committee contained in a memorandum prepared in the London office on August 3, 1918, for the information of the House Naval Committee. At this time we had about 300 vessels of all kinds in European waters. The memorandum states in part that "of all the total craft operating against enemy submarines in British and eastern Atlantic waters, the American patrol force constitute less than 5 per cent of the total number."

If, after 16 months of effort, we had less than 5 per cent of the total forces operating against the enemy (as the Naval Committee was informed), it is not probable that during the first six months we could have aided with more than 2 per cent of the total allied forces, and I fail to see how such a small percentage of the total number of vessels operating against the enemy's submarines could have had so serious influence upon the duration of the war or upon the loss of life and shipping.

The CHAIRMAN. You think, however, that it had a certain effect, do you not, Admiral?

Admiral WILSON. No, sir. I say the opposite. I say, sir, that I believe that our naval forces from the start—and I say this here, duly recognizing that I am under oath, and from my experience and everything—I believe absolutely that our naval forces from the start cooperated in a most successful manner with the naval forces of our associates in many portions of the seas, and by their splendid and efficient work materially aided in shortening the war, and in this manner saving untold life and property.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, Admiral, if we had been able to get ships over there sooner than we did, it would have been a good thing? Whether we could have done it or not, it would have helped, would it not?

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Admiral WILSON. Oh, if we could have had all that we had at the end of the war over there then, all our destroyers, and so on, certainly the thing would have been happy. But you can not take over what you have not got.

The CHAIRMAN. I know, but there is a conflict of testimony as to whether you could have gotten them over sooner.

Admiral WILSON. Mr. Senator, I testified to that, and I was right on the job here. I testified that five days after we went into war, as soon as we could get into touch with the accredited representatives of the foreign admiralties, we did so. You certainly could not get into touch with them and observe neutrality before the war. As soon as we could do that we had a meeting and a decision was made by the Secretary of the Navy, "We accept this in principle," and off we went.

The CHAIRMAN. A great many people think, whether you agree with them or not, that as soon as the war was declared we should have had destroyers and other ships ready to go over there.

Admiral WILSON. Mr. Senator, those people who think that do not know the circumstances. I have been endeavoring to tell you that. I was present. Five days after it started, as soon as they could get in touch with the representatives of these foreign powers, they considered the best way they could perform that duty, observing strict neutrality up to that time, and as soon as we started, then things went with a "biz."

The CHAIRMAN. I know, but that is not the question asked you. The question I ask you is, if we could have had ships over there so much earlier, would it not have materially shortened the war?

Admiral WILSON. Why ask me such a question as that?

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I do ask you that question.

Admiral WILSON. If we had had 100 destroyers over there, and we had had them fly across with aeroplanes immediately on the 6th of April, it would have had a wonderful effect.

The CHAIRMAN. But as there is considerable conflict as to whether they got them there as soon as possible, then if you disproved that assertion that they did not, it would assist us to decide, and I have asked you if they could have gotten them there sooner whether it would not have had a material effect in shortening the war?

Admiral WILSON. The evidence on that is clear. If they could have flown them right across, of course it would have had its effect. I have read this testimony here, and with all due modesty, I think I am in position to know whether we cooperated from the start, and I have told you all the circumstances, and have told you that we did so cooperate.

The CHAIRMAN. You have already testified that you had nothing to do with and had no knowledge of Admiral Sims's recommendations when they came over here, and that you were not consulted on them at all.

Admiral WILSON. I know nothing about his recommendations.

The CHAIRMAN. Nothing at all?

Admiral WILSON. Nothing at all.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you not think if we had adopted the convoy system sooner, it would have had a great effect in shortening the war?

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Admiral WILSON. We adopted the convoy plan in ample time. I was in Gibraltar when the convoy plan first started, and at the time that the convoy plan started from Gibraltar, do you know what the convoy from Gibraltar was? They went out and took sometimes 20 and 30 ships to England. One little coast guard cutter was the escort for the convoy. When you have such little things as that, all that that escort did was to navigate convoy up the coast, and take it into port.

The CHAIRMAN. But the testimony of others is that the convoy system was a very important system.

Admiral WILSON. Absolutely.

The CHAIRMAN. And that it had a great deal to do with the winning of the war?

Admiral WILSON. Absolutely.

The CHAIRMAN. And the testimony is that it was not adopted as soon as it might have been.

Admiral WILSON. How about England? She did not adopt it until long after the war started?

The CHAIRMAN. I think the testimony showed on that that if we had been able to cooperate with our vessels she could have adopted it sooner.

Admiral WILSON. I do not think that you have heard all the testimony on that yet.

The CHAIRMAN. That may be.

Admiral WILSON. When you have heard all the testimony you may change your opinion.

The CHAIRMAN. But no one man decides that fact.

Admiral WILSON. Oh, that is what I think. There has been an effort to make an impression that one man decided it, and I do not think that is fair.

The CHAIRMAN. We have had testimony from other officers, and we are asking you for yours.

Admiral WILSON. I am giving it to you pretty straight.

The CHAIRMAN. Yours is one part of the general testimony.

Admiral WILSON. I am giving it to you pretty straight.

The CHAIRMAN. Yours is only the opinion of one officer.

Admiral WILSON. I have given you first-hand information, too, Mr. Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. We are getting information from all sides, and of course when we have all this information we shall weigh these things.

Admiral WILSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Giving due weight to every part of it.

Admiral WILSON. O, Mr. Senator, I hope you will give due weight to everything that is told you here.

The CHAIRMAN. That is exactly what we shall do.

Admiral WILSON. I hope so, sir. I hope it will be given.

The CHAIRMAN. What we are working for is the good of the Navy.

Admiral WILSON. Well, Mr. Senator, I believe that it would have been good for the Navy if you had shut up shop after the first few days. It would have been better.

The CHAIRMAN. Unfortunately, that is not within your province to decide.

Admiral WILSON. I know, but I just said that was my opinion, that is all.

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Senator PITTMAN. Admiral, this war was decided upon the land, was it not?

Admiral WILSON. Yes, sir.

Senator PITTMAN. It was decided by the massing of forces on the west front?

Admiral WILSON. Yes; no doubt.

Senator PITTMAN. And the province of the Navy was to protect and get these forces there?

Admiral WILSON. Yes; and to protect and get the supplies there.

Senator PITTMAN. And it did that, did it not?

Admiral WILSON. I think it did it splendidly, sir.

Senator PITTMAN. Do you know of any troops that were prepared in this country and ready to go, that the Navy did not take over?

Admiral WILSON. I do not know that. I was not on this side and can not answer that. But I know that we put them over there, to the wonder and admiration and surprise of people that I was associated with officially in France.

Senator PITTMAN. How many men did you put in France through Brest?

Admiral WILSON. From the west coast of France, 1,352,000.

Senator PITTMAN. Now, how many of those men that you put in there, or rather, how many men that were taken over—how many convoys of men going to Brest sustained any losses through the enemy?

Admiral WILSON. There was not a man, or a passenger, or a sick or wounded man, or anybody attached to the Army, that lost his life going east or west, through the enemy effort.

Senator PITTMAN. That is all.

Admiral WILSON. The *President Lincoln* was sunk. We had wounded men on board that ship who were totally paralyzed. We lost some of our own men and our officers. We lost our doctor, getting the sick and wounded into boats. The sick and paralyzed men were all saved. The only people lost on the *President Lincoln* were men of the Navy who were devoting themselves to looking out for the people who were placed in their charge.

Senator KEYES. Admiral, you have given us various opinions. I would like one more.

Admiral WILSON. I have tried to confine it all on my own observation.

Senator KEYES. In your opinion, was everything done that could have been reasonably done by the Navy and the Navy Department to prepare for war for the two years prior to the time at which we entered the war?

Admiral WILSON. Senator, I think that the portion of the fleet to which I was assigned made every preparation for war. I know nothing about the administration of the Navy Department, except I do know one thing, if I may answer your question by this little note that I made.

Senator KEYES. That is an opinion, is it?

Admiral WILSON. It is a fact that dates back about to 1915.

Senator KEYES. Very well.

Admiral WILSON. I was president of the board of inspection and survey from the latter part of 1913 to the time of my going to sea in early 1916. This board, composed of four captains (one a qualified

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engineer and one a naval constructor), with a commander as member and recorder, conducted all acceptance and final trials of our new vessels, and in addition made periodical inspections of our vessels in service. As representatives of the Navy Department in connection with contract work, our recommendations were made only after the most careful consideration, and always met with the approval of the Navy Department. This work often brought me in personal contact with the Secretary of the Navy. I soon learned that he had confidence in the board's professional judgment and that it would have his staunch support, which it always did have during my tour of duty.

In 1915—I think it was in 1915—two members of the board and myself, together with the aid for material, were called in conference with the Secretary of the Navy to discuss trials of submarines with a view to the improvement of the boats and the early delivery of those for which contracts had already been let. The members of the board made several suggestions which were approved. The board had been having differences with contractors at time of trials of submarines. The results of the conference indicated to us that the board could count on the full and active support of the Secretary in such matters, and conditions improved greatly—all to the gain and advantage of the Government, and especially the Navy.

Senator KEYES. You do not think that answers my question, do you?

Admiral WILSON. I think that answers the question in this way; that I believe that that part of the Navy I was attached to at sea was well prepared; that the only thing I know about the Navy Department was the work that came under my cognizance on the board of inspection, which was submarines, and that was the result, that we made suggestions on the improvement of them, which were carried into the future types. We made suggestions as to the speeding up trials, and getting the boats into service, which did some good, for the Navy.

Senator KEYES. I hoped to get your opinion, but I have not got it.

Admiral WILSON. Mr. Senator, I am placed in no position to give an opinion.

Senator KEYES. You have been giving us opinions, and said that you were very glad to, and I hoped that you would give us one more.

Admiral WILSON. I have based every opinion I have given on my information and things that I was cognizant of. You are going to have officers come before you who handled those matters in the Navy and who can tell you more about it than I can.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, you have told us about the condition of the fleet at the beginning of the war, that is of force No. 2. Do you know how many battleships there were in that fleet?

Admiral WILSON. Sixteen.

The CHAIRMAN. How many destroyers were there?

Admiral WILSON. When we came north in the latter part of March——

Senator PITTMAN. That was in 1917?

Admiral WILSON. In 1917; we came north in formation, and with plans laid in case we should meet the enemy. I remember the formation well. I remember we had quite a screen of destroyers around us. The number I can not tell you.

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The CHAIRMAN. Do you know, approximately, how many?

Admiral WILSON. I should say somewhere between 20 and 30.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you consider that an adequate screen of destroyers for 16 battleships?

Admiral WILSON. Not to-day. I think it looked pretty good then, as I was coming up in 1917 as captain of the *Pennsylvania*.

The CHAIRMAN. When you came up, as you described, did you have any light cruisers?

Admiral WILSON. We never had a light cruiser in the Navy, so far as I know.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have any battle cruisers?

Admiral WILSON. We never had any battle cruisers in the Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. Any submarines?

Admiral WILSON. Submarines would not have gone along with us then. We were making pretty good speed at sea.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have any other screening boats of any kind?

Admiral WILSON. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you say that that was an adequately prepared fleet for battle?

Admiral WILSON. No, sir; that was not the fleet coming up. That was the battleship force coming up.

The CHAIRMAN. Then where was the fleet?

Admiral WILSON. When you speak of "the fleet," by the number of vessels I guess that was our fleet.

The CHAIRMAN. That was all the fleet we had, was it not?

Admiral WILSON. No, sir; we had some submarines. I do not know where they were then.

The CHAIRMAN. Was the fleet, so constituted, in condition to meet the German Fleet as it went out to the battle of Jutland?

Admiral WILSON. No, sir; but that was all the fleet we had; that Congress had given us. I do not know who decided what Congress had given us, but that was all Congress had given us, and what Congress had given us we had certainly looked after and taken care of pretty well, and tried to do our part with.

The CHAIRMAN. So that, aside from being a fleet that was well prepared as to the individual ships, it was not a well prepared fleet?

Admiral WILSON. I have not said, sir, that anything was prepared except the force of battleships, because I was not cognizant of anything else.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think a force of battleships so prepared could meet an enemy fleet that was prepared as the German Fleet probably was at the time or the English Fleet was?

Admiral WILSON. I think it would have been in pretty good shape to meet the German Fleet after it had come across the ocean 3,000 miles.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you do not think that these screening vessels are really necessary in a fleet?

Admiral WILSON. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not see how that tallies.

Admiral WILSON. I do not know that you have got to have everything perfect to do something.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course they would do the best they could.

Admiral WILSON. That is what we always do.

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The CHAIRMAN. What do you think would have been the result if the German Fleet had gotten over here with all of these additional ships?

Admiral WILSON. I said right there I thought the victory would be ours.

The CHAIRMAN. In spite of our not having these other ships?

Admiral WILSON. In spite of the fact of our not having these other ships; because, just recollect, they had to come 3,000 miles across the ocean, and they had to have some place to base. You can not take light cruisers and destroyers and take then 3,000 miles and have them in the same condition as they were in on the other side before you started with them.

The CHAIRMAN. But a fleet to go into battle should have all these ships, should it not?

Admiral WILSON. Oh, yes. But, my gracious, if an enemy is going meet you, just because you have not got those things you do not want to run away from him, but you have got to fight and do the best you can; and we were all prepared, coming up the coast at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. A thoroughly prepared Navy would have had those ships, would it not?

Admiral WILSON. Oh, yes; but I say, Mr. Senator, that we had everything that Congress had given us.

Senator PITTMAN. The Navy Department has always asked for more than Congress has given, has it not?

Admiral WILSON. I guess that is true. I know that it is.

Senator PITTMAN. Yes, I know it is. You spoke awhile ago of the election of November, 1916, as indicating to your mind that the people of this country did not expect to engage in that war.

Admiral WILSON. I said, sir, that it appeared to me from the slogan that went around, and all the things that happened, as a citizen of the United States, my own view was, that our President was elected on the score "He kept us out of war."

Senator PITTMAN. May I inject in there, for the benefit of the Committee on Naval Affairs of the Senate——

Admiral WILSON (interposing). Yes, sir.

Senator PITTMAN (continuing). That when we started to prepare the Navy in 1914, I think it was, the naval program, the House granted less than half of what was recommended by the Navy Department, and the Senate doubled that program.

Admiral WILSON. Yes, sir.

Senator PITTMAN. And had great difficulty, as I recollect it, in conference with the House, in maintaining the enlargement provided by the Senate Committee.

Admiral WILSON. Yes, sir.

Senator PITTMAN. I simply call attention to the fact, so that the Senate may not bear the responsibility for not having a larger fleet.

Admiral WILSON. If the buck is going to be passed, I do not think that it ought to land on the Navy.

Senator PITTMAN. I do not think that it ought to land on the Senate committee.

Admiral WILSON. I do not think it ought to, either.

Senator PITTMAN. I am not passing it to anybody, anyhow.

Our Navy was ample to protect our country against any attack by any other Navy fleet, except possibly the British fleet?

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Admiral WILSON. I do not think that the Navy is ever satisfied with the word "ample." They would always like to have a little up their sleeves.

Senator PITTMAN. It was sufficient?

Admiral WILSON. But I think we would have had no fear of any other Navy besides the British Navy.

Senator PITTMAN. That is very wise, in regard to the use of that word "ample," because we have other appropriation bills coming.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think that would have been true in April, 1917, if the British Navy had not cooped up the German fleet?

Admiral WILSON. Mr. Senator, we never gave that one thought because I knew that after that German fleet had made an attempt to get through the British fleet it would not have taken much to fix it.

The CHAIRMAN. So that you depended on the English fleet as the real safeguard.

Admiral WILSON. Of course, I guess everybody did.

The CHAIRMAN. And our fleet was not prepared to meet the German fleet at that time if it had had a free exit and could have gotten over here?

Admiral WILSON. I never stopped to think about that, because I knew that was never going to happen.

Senator PITTMAN. But you have already stated that if the German fleet had come 3,000 miles over here, the victory would have been ours.

Admiral WILSON. I was not worried about their fleet coming 3,000 miles across the ocean.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think that would have been true with the English fleet over there, if the German fleet had met the English fleet, at that time?

Admiral WILSON. Yes, or any other time. After you have traveled 3,000 miles across the ocean with those vessels, and have a fellow there ready to snap you as soon as you get there, you are not in very good shape.

The CHAIRMAN. Then for purposes of defense—and I presume that would be the only way we would go to war—why do we need these lighter vessels?

Admiral WILSON. Mr. Chairman, you must never ask a naval officer what he is going to do on the defensive. He only does that when he is up against it. We always have our studies on offense.

The CHAIRMAN. But I assume that the war will not be a war of aggression on our part.

Admiral WILSON. No; but after you decide on war, we are not going to sit around and wait for the other fellow to come to us. We are going to hit him.

The CHAIRMAN. For purposes of defense you do not think that we need any of these adjuncts of the fleet?

Admiral WILSON. I never looked into the subject of defense. That is only a last resort.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course these are matters that are of great importance to the committee on the question of appropriations for the future.

Admiral WILSON. Mr. Senator, may I make a suggestion?

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly.

Admiral WILSON. If Congress wants to have a Navy, and if they will always approve the recommendations of the Navy Department,

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which has the recommendations drawn up by the best minds we have in the Navy, then I think they will do no wrong; but when Congress—without trying to be in any way offensive—made up of nontechnical men—endeavor to say what we shall have except on the question of policy, then I think they get mixed up.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, as we are going to have Admiral Washington here to-morrow to talk to us about personnel, if it is convenient to you I would like to have you postpone leaving Washington until after he has testified.

Senator PITTMAN. I would ask that the Admiral also be invited to be here to-morrow to hear Admiral Washington's testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral WILSON. All right, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is all, Admiral.

The committee will now adjourn.

(Thereupon, at 12.30 p. m., the subcommittee adjourned until to-morrow, Friday, April 9, 1920, at 10 o'clock a. m.)

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NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

FRIDAY, APRIL 9, 1920.

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON NAVAL AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 o'clock a. m., in room 235, Senate Office Building, Senator Frederick Hale presiding.

Present, Senators Hale (chairman), Ball, Keyes, Pittman, and Trammell.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. Admiral Fletcher, will you take the stand?

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL F. F. FLETCHER, UNITED STATES NAVY.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, have you a statement to make about matters pertaining to this investigation?

Admiral FLETCHER. I have prepared a statement, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, and Senators of the committee, immediately preceding our entry into the war and during the war I was a member of the General Board of the Navy and of the Joint Army and Navy Board, but my principal duty was as a member of the War Industries Board and the priority board of the Council of National Defense.

(2) I was not, therefore, very closely associated with the executive officers of the Navy Department charged with the duty of conducting the operations of the war. My views upon the questions involved will therefore be confined to that obtained from the viewpoints of a member of the General Board, but more particularly from the viewpoint of a member of the War Industries Board, which dealt with the mobilization of the industries of the country in supplying the equipment and war material necessary for the naval and military forces.

(3) Before proceeding with specific statements from these viewpoints, I will express an opinion based upon my long experience in the Navy upon two questions that have arisen. First, as to the preparedness of the Navy for war. No one will maintain that our Navy was 100 per cent prepared for war. No navy ever has been or ever will be fully prepared for war in the minds of all. But, from my knowledge of the condition of other navies, there is no question in my mind but that the Navy of the United States, notwithstanding its shortcomings when it entered the war, was just as well prepared as any other navy in the world when the Great War burst forth. In this connection I would call your attention to the scathing criticism by Sir Percy Scott as to the defects and unpreparedness of the British Navy.

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(4) Second, as to the accusation that we should have immediately sent all available small craft to the war zone to combat the submarine. The reasons for this course of action at first sight appear plausible and attractive. They strongly appeal to the impulse for the initiative and the offensive and are in accordance with sound military principle to strike quickly and overcome the enemy. I will not enter into a discussion of the merits of this phase of the controversy, but content myself with the following observation: In the summer of 1916—the summer previous to our entry into the war—a German submarine demonstrated its ability to pass through the war zone, cross the Atlantic Ocean, enter a port of the United States, return to Germany without refuelling on this side, and, incidentally, to sink a number of valuable merchant ships in plain sight of our own coast line.

(5) Let us assume for a minute that immediately upon the commencement of war the United States had sent to Europe all available small craft capable of fighting the submarine menace, leaving wholly unprotected our long stretch of coast line and the adjoining ocean covered with thousands of unarmed ships with their valuable cargoes. Let us further assume that under these conditions several German submarines had appeared in this rich field of operations, as they did subsequently appear, but too late.

(6) As to the alarm that would have been caused in this country had such a situation occurred and the influence it would have had in again sending our small craft across to fight the submarine menace in the war zone, you gentlemen can form as accurate an opinion as any military or naval expert.

(7) In reference to the accusation that "if all of our antisubmarine forces had been immediately sent to the war zone it would have resulted in the saving of 2,500,000 tons of shipping." The calculations upon which this statement is made are founded upon a hypothetical condition, and, like all such methods of reaching a conclusion, the results are unsatisfactory, not being susceptible of proof. Equally so, if you attempt to expose the fallacy of the calculations in this method of reaching a conclusion, it is unsatisfactory to the opposing view, not being susceptible of proof on a basis of facts. Without entering into an academic discussion and challenging the various assumptions that must necessarily have been made, I may assist the committee in arriving at an estimate of the value and credibility of the statement through a shorter route by placing the problem in this form:

It has been stated that the maximum American forces that could have been sent or were sent to the war zone to combat the submarine were about 5 or 6 per cent of the combined total force.

If the American forces consisting of, say, 5 per cent of the total force combating the submarines could have saved 2,500,000 tons of shipping, as claimed, then how many million tons should have been saved by the allied forces consisting of 95 per cent of the total force?

(8) I will now make some comment from a viewpoint as a member of the General Board of the Navy upon the statement that "We entered the war with no well-considered policy or plans." The criticism that we have no adequate war plans has often appeared. There is no doubt but that, in the minds of many officers well qualified to know, our plans for conducting foreign wars are far from being

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as complete as they should be, and we have given much less attention to this subject than is believed to be the case in foreign countries. Nevertheless, we have collected a great deal of data upon this subject and many plans have been made and are on file, and to show you that we are not so badly off as has been made to appear, it may be of interest for the committee to know that nearly two years before our entry into the war the General Board prepared a comprehensive war plan for conducting war against a central power of Europe. This plan covered every phase of naval operations under the assumed conditions of war. It deals with the mobilization, organization, and composition of the fleet, its disposition and employment, maps and strategic positions, employment of auxiliaries and submarines, protection of the coast, bases of supplies on our coast and the West Indies, routes across the Atlantic, enemy's forces and probable course of action, etc. This war plan with its statistical data and modifications of details from time to time to bring it up to date comprises nearly 300 pages of typewriting. Rear Admiral Badger of the General Board, who, I understand, will appear before you, can give you more detailed information upon this subject if desired.

(9) I will now continue my testimony as seen from the viewpoint of a member of the War Industries Board, and what I am now going to say from this viewpoint leads up to an estimate of the value and credibility of the accusation in reference to the Navy's responsibility for the prolongation of the war and consequent sacrifice of so many lives.

(10) When this war came upon us it was soon found that the government machinery for conducting the affairs of peace was entirely too small and inadequate for conducting a great war. As you know, it was through legislation enacted by Congress that various so-called "war boards" were created to meet the emergency. Of these boards the War Industries Board was entrusted with the task of producing through the resources and industries of the country the necessary supplies and manufactured material required for carrying on the war. The total productive and manufacturing capacity of this country was astonishingly inadequate to meet requirements. It became necessary for the Government to take charge of or exercise control over all raw materials in the country, such as coal, fuel, oil, iron, steel, copper, zinc, nickel, and other materials entering into manufactured products. It became necessary to mobilize and control practically the entire industrial capacity of the country in order to meet the requirements of the war. The facilities and capacity of every manufacturing plant were known and the location of every machine tool in the country was tabulated. Many manufacturing plants were required to curtail their output of civil use and devote their energies to the manufacture of guns and shells and ammunition. When a plant in Detroit or Buffalo or Providence was unable to complete a rapid-fire gun or shaft for a marine chaser on contract time through inability to obtain a certain size of lathe, a telegram would go to Knoxville or Springfield or Chicago that machine tool (blank) in the Standard Iron Works is commandeered; express immediately to blank manufacturing company, Providence, R. I.; signed, Priority Board. I mention these details to inform this committee how this country had to meet the wants of a great civil population and to strain every

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nerve to equip our Army to get to the battle front at the earliest possible date. After our industries were completely mobilized they would not have been able to reach their maximum productive output until the spring of 1919—two years after the commencement of the war. It was not until this date, the spring of 1919, that we would have been able to have fully equipped and supplied the Army that was contemplated to be placed in France. You will thus see how completely the creation of an army was dominated by the output of our factories at home, and I will refer to this subject later.

(11) With your permission I would like to digress here a little from the continuity of my statement and refer to the work of the Navy in connection with the War Industries Board. In the creation of this board there was called to Washington some of the ablest men in this country and experts from practically every line of industry. Commencing with such men as Judge Robert M. Lovett, Mr. Robert Brookings, Mr. Daniel C. Willard, and others, and culminating in a completed organization under the directing genius of Mr. Bernard M. Baruch, I regard the task of these men and the industrial experts associated with them in mobilizing and directing the industries of this country to obtain the maximum output for military and naval requirements in the minimum amount of time as one of the greatest achievements of the war.

(12) In my association with these men of affairs and of business I heard from all sides the most complimentary references to the efficiency with which the officers of the Navy Department carried on their work from the business point of view. It was frequently remarked that the able officers at the head of the material bureaus of the Navy Department, Admirals Griffin, Taylor, Earle, McGowan, Braisted, Gen. Barnett, and others, always knew what they wanted, how much they wanted, when they wanted it, and, still more, how to get it. These bureau chiefs had their representatives on practically every industrial committee of the board and their assistants never lost a point in furthering the ends of their bureaus.

(13) In this connection I would like this Senate Committee to know that one of the first acts of the Council of National Defense decreed that all material entering into the construction of destroyers, submarine chasers, auxiliaries, and other craft intended for operations against submarines and everything required by the Navy to combat the submarine menance should take precedence over every other military or naval requirement of the war. There was never any wavering from strict compliance with the policy throughout the war.

(14) I will now revert to the question of war supplies, with the view of emphasizing the fact that in the conduct and progress of the war the action of our military and naval authorities was determined by and practically dominated by the output of war material from our factories. You will understand that my ideas upon what follows are given from a point of view overlooking the general progress of the war rather than from the necessarily more limited military or naval point of view.

(15) Two years or more before the termination of the war more than one military expert of Europe expressed the conviction that the war would be decided on the western battle front in France. This opinion was given in the face of activities of apparently great and determining importance covering the whole theater of the war, from

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the submarine menace in the Atlantic to military operations on the confines of India. No one challenged the truth of these opinions. The war would be settled on the western battle front—and so it was.

(16) The war mission of this country was made perfectly clear. Our sole main objective was to put a trained and equipped army on the fighting line in France strong enough to overcome the enemy in the final test of battle. Every other activity of the war must be subordinate and auxiliary to the accomplishment of this end. We must not for one minute lose sight of this fact. Every activity of the enemy which did not seriously menace the carrying out of this plan was of comparatively insignificant importance. Even the submarine menace, with all the fears and terrors its unknown possibilities inspired, could have no influence on the final outcome of the war unless it could succeed in starving England out of the war and in blocking our Army and its supplies across the Atlantic Ocean. The submarine menace accomplished neither of these objects.

(17) I have previously shown how the creation of an American Army in France depended upon the output of our factories at home, and mentioned the length of time it required to get our factories up to quantity production. As the war progressed supplies came on in gradually increasing quantity, and, through an economical use of shipping, were being continually accumulated on the other side. The size of the American Army that we could place in France at any given date after our entry in the war depended upon the quantity of war material—shells, powder, high explosives, rifles, artillery, and all the varied equipment that could be produced. The size of the Army depended upon these things and not upon the number of men that could have been transported across the sea by any given date. We could have placed a million men in France four months or even five months sooner that we did, but we would not have had an army there.

Even for the first army of 1,000,000 men that we had, only a very small percentage of this could be made by our factories in this country. Standing in the great crowd at the great Eddystone manufacturing plant, where they were celebrating the completion of the first 1,000,000 rifles made in this country, I remember at that time we had about 1,000,000 men in France.

(18) However, when sufficient war material had been created and we were ready for transportation all necessary world shipping engaged in less essential work was summoned to our shores from many quarters, and our men were sent across the Atlantic as fast as they could march aboard ship on this side and disembark on the other side, and the first army of 1,000,000 men was assembled in France at the earliest possible date.

(19) Neither the loss of shipping nor the imaginary loss of shipping that might have been saved, delayed, through lack of transportation, the execution of the plan of creating an army in France for one hour, nor did it prolong the war for a single day.

(20) Mr. Chairman, I think your committee will now understand how it is that from my point of view I can reach but one conclusion with reference to the accusation "that the Navy Department is responsible for the loss of 2,500,000 tons of shipping, the prolongation of the war for four months, $15,000,000,000 of debts, and the loss of 500,000 lives." The accusation is based upon assumptions and has

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no foundation on facts. The whole conclusion reached in the accusation is built upon the flimsy foundation of a hypothetical condition and is wholly without value.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Fletcher, what action was taken by you after the outbreak of the European war in 1914, in recommending the preparation of the United States Navy for war?

Admiral FLETCHER. At that time I was serving with the fleet afloat, and I do not remember that I made any specific recommendations to the department.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you in command of the fleet at that time?

Admiral FLETCHER. No; I was not in command of the fleet at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. When did you assume command of the fleet?

Admiral FLETCHER. I think it was in the fall or winter of 1914.

The CHAIRMAN. And how long did you keep command of the fleet?

Admiral FLETCHER. A little short of two years.

The CHAIRMAN. And you made no recommendations about the preparation of the Navy for war in 1914?

Admiral FLETCHER. No, sir; not that I remember. Not recommendations that would specifically pertain to our entering the war.

The CHAIRMAN. What recommendations did you make that would affect our going into the war?

Admiral FLETCHER. I do not remember that I made any recommendations at that time. I made my usual reports in regard to the operations, and the policy of the fleet; and I pointed out the usual shortcomings, and in my annual report I entered into that more specifically, showing all the shortcomings of the fleet in regard to our lack of armored cruisers, fast scouts, antiaircraft guns, and many other things—defects that were of long standing. That was a general report.

The CHAIRMAN. And personnel defects?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes, sir; with reference to defects of personnel at that time; shortage in the complements of ships. But all these recommendations had no specific reference to the war. They were of a general character and of long standing.

The CHAIRMAN. And they had nothing to do with the fact that the world war was on at the time?

Admiral FLETCHER. They bore directly on the world war, but they were not made with reference to the world war. They would always be made anyhow. We go on the basis that we must always be prepared for war—that is, the fleet afloat.

The CHAIRMAN. What action was taken upon these recommendations, if any; do you recall that?

Admiral FLETCHER. I do not know what active steps were taken, except that I believe Congress appropriated money for armored cruisers and fast scouts, and other money to make up the shortage.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you consider at that time the possibility that the United States would be drawn into the world war?

Admiral FLETCHER. Naturally, amongst the officers of the fleet that question was often discussed personally; but it was never taken up officially with the Navy Department.

The CHAIRMAN. But from the outbreak of the World War did you consider it was very probable that the United States would get into the war before it was finished?

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Admiral FLETCHER. No, sir; I did not consider it probable; but I did consider, of course, that it was possible.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you consider that it was so very possible that it was advisable to take steps to have our Navy thoroughly prepared?

Admiral FLETCHER. That is a question of policy, Mr. Chairman, that the department and the administration deal with, and I, of course, am always an advocate of taking steps to be prepared for war, at any time.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to find out the feeling of the officers of the Navy after the outbreak of the World War, whether it was probable or not that we would get into the war, and I have asked you what your opinion was at that time.

Admiral FLETCHER. I did not think at that time that it was probable, although I fully recognized that it was possible that we might be drawn into it.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you think that it was so very possible that we should prepare in every way for it?

Admiral FLETCHER. Well, Mr. Chairman, in regard to preparation for war, that requires years. The preparation for war consists in building battleships and battle cruisers and building up a fleet, and it covers years of time. Now, after you have got your fleet, with the fleet that you have got the question of preparing for war is only a question of a few months, the time required to dock the ships and mobilize them and get them together and see that the repairs are up to date; that is, to utilize and assemble all material that you already possess in the fleet, and in addition, seeing that the complements of ships are up to date. All of that is a question of a very short time.

The CHAIRMAN. I find that the record is of no value, Admiral, unless the questions which I ask are answered.

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And I want to know whether or not at the time you thought that war was so imminent that we should prepare the Navy for it. You can answer that by yes or no.

Admiral FLETCHER. I do not think——

Senator TRAMMELL. I think the Admiral ought to be allowed to answer the question in his own way.

Admiral FLETCHER. The question hinges on what you mean.

The CHAIRMAN. Whether extra precautions should have been taken at that time to prepare the Navy for war on account of the war being on.

Admiral FLETCHER. Not at the time, no, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. When did you first look upon the war, as far as we were concerned, as imminent?

Admiral FLETCHER. I did not think that it was imminent until, I should say, around about 1916.

The CHAIRMAN. What part of 1916?

Admiral FLETCHER. It was the latter part.

The CHAIRMAN. Towards the latter part?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And after that you did think that it was imminent, and that we should do everything to get ready.

Admiral FLETCHER. I think that is correct; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you make any report to the department or to the Secretary with regard to the steps which should be taken to prepare for such an eventuality?

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Admiral FLETCHER. As I remember, I was a member of the General Board at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. That was after you had left the fleet?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes, sir; and they sent several communications to the Navy Department pointing out and recommending steps that should be taken in anticipation of war. I do not know exactly what action was taken by the Navy Department, except that I remember a return indorsement on one of them, that these recommendations of the General Board were approved, and would be carried out as far as possible. These recommendations were in accordance with the general war plan that I have referred to in my testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. But that was a report of the board. Did you, personally, make any report to the department or to the Secretary?

Admiral FLETCHER. No; I was a member of the General Board and I personally made no report to the Secretary.

The CHAIRMAN. You personally made no report.

Admiral FLETCHER. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What were the recommendations made to the General Board to assure greater preparedness?

Admiral FLETCHER. There were no recommendations made to the General Board by anybody that I can remember.

The CHAIRMAN. Was the General Board called on to draw up a plan?

Admiral FLETCHER. I can not state that accurately, but my recollection is that they were asked for recommendations. I think Admiral Badger will be able to give you full information on that.

The CHAIRMAN. These recommendations that were made by the General Board, were they approved by the department?

Admiral FLETCHER. I do not know what action was taken by the department, except, as I say, on one indorsement, on one of our recommendations that came back from the department, in which it stated that all these recommendations of the general board were approved by the department, and steps would be taken to carry them out as far as possible.

The CHAIRMAN. What were those recommendations?

Admiral FLETCHER. Well, I am sorry, Mr. Chairman, but I can not specifically state them. But they are on record.

The CHAIRMAN. Could you get a report of those recommendations so that we can put them in the record?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes; they are on file in the department.

The CHAIRMAN. Could you furnish us a copy?

Admiral FLETCHER. Admiral Badger will be prepared to give you all those recommendations.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to get a copy to put in the record here.

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You state they were approved by the department?

Admiral FLETCHER. This one that I know of. The others, I do not know what action was taken.

The CHAIRMAN. I mean this one you speak of. I would like to have that go into the record here, if possible.

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes, sir; I will see that that is——

The CHAIRMAN. You will see that that is furnished to the stenographer?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes, sir.

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The CHAIRMAN. Capt. Taussig in his testimony referred to your report of the spring target practice in the spring of 1915, when you were in command of the fleet, and in that you called attention to the deplorable personnel conditions of the fleet. Do you recall such a report?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes, sir; I recall the report in which I pointed out that the complements of ships were not up to modern requirements, and we were quite short in personnel.

The CHAIRMAN. What action was taken on your report?

Admiral FLETCHER. That I do not know, Mr. Chairman. I know that the thing was thoroughly discussed here in Congress and taken up and investigated by committees of the House, and what action was subsequently taken by Congress I could not state, exactly.

The CHAIRMAN. Was the matter remedied while you were in command of the fleet?

Admiral FLETCHER. I left so soon after that, that it was impracticable to have remedied it in that short time. We did not have the personnel.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you a copy of that report?

Admiral FLETCHER. I have not a copy myself, but it is on file in the Navy Department, and I think it has been printed in public documents here in the Senate.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you recall what the substance of it was, and how far the personnel was lacking?

Admiral FLETCHER. I can only make a rough estimate. As I remember, the battleship fleet, as it was composed at that time, was about 5,000 men short of what would be required for an efficient modern complement.

The CHAIRMAN. That is, 5,000 officers and men?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes, sir. I am not sure that the officers would be included in that, but that would be a very small item.

The CHAIRMAN. What did the battleship at that time comprise?

Admiral FLETCHER. It comprised—I am speaking from memory only—16 battleships and about 20 destroyers, and a number of auxiliaries in the shape of supply vessels, colliers, tugs, and so forth.

The CHAIRMAN. Any submarines?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes; we had about 12 submarines.

The CHAIRMAN. Any light cruisers?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes; we had a cruiser squadron.

The CHAIRMAN. As part of the fleet?

Admiral FLETCHER. As part of the fleet.

The CHAIRMAN. Any other screening vessels?

Admiral FLETCHER. No; those represented the general types. We did not have any fast scout cruisers or general scout cruisers or vessels of that type at that time. The fast battle cruisers which would more nearly approach to the class of battleships were not in commission with the fleet at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. We did have some fast armored cruisers at that time?

Admiral FLETCHER. I think we had some in commission in the Pacific, but not actually employed with the fleet.

The CHAIRMAN. You say that you did make a report about the personnel, and that you do not know what action was taken in regard to it, because you left the fleet?

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Admiral FLETCHER. I do not know what was the final action taken by the department or by Congress.

The CHAIRMAN. In your hearings before the House Naval Committee, on March 2 and 3, 1916, you called attention to the great shortage of personnel, and pointed out that there was little or no reserve available for the manning of ships not in commission with the fleet, did you not?

Admiral FLETCHER. I did.

The CHAIRMAN. What action was taken by the department to meet the conditions which you outlined?

Admiral FLETCHER. That I do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. The fact that you made that report would indicate that no action was taken in regard to your report of the year before, 1915, would it not?

Admiral FLETCHER. Oh, if my testimony referred to conditions at that date; but as I remember it referred back to the date upon which I made my report. The record will show on that.

The CHAIRMAN. What recommendations for increases in the personnel were made by the General Board?

Admiral FLETCHER. I think that about that time the provisions to that time—I am not sure, but I think that the General Board made some recommendations relative to the total personnel that would be required to properly man the fleet, and the necessary reserves that would be required.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you repeat that, Admiral? I did not get it.

Admiral FLETCHER. We had made recommendations in regard to the shortage of personnel, and had recommended an increase which would cover this shortage and supply sufficient reserves. I do not remember just what number they recommended, but it was something like 15,000 men. Of course, that included the 5,000 which I had pointed out as short in the fleet.

The CHAIRMAN. Were these recommendations approved by the department?

Admiral FLETCHER. I do not know what action was taken on that, Mr. Chairman. I was not in the department at that time, nor had I any duty in connection with it, as I remember.

The CHAIRMAN. And you do not recollect the action that was taken?

Admiral FLETCHER. I do not recollect. I know the matter was discussed in Congress and in the committees of the House; but the final outcome of it I do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you recall whether the Secretary of the Navy approved the recommendation of the board in making his recommendation to Congress?

Admiral FLETCHER. That I do not know. I was not a member of the board at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. If it was not done, you do not recollect why it was not done, whether it was because of the Secretary not recommending it, or because Congress turned down the Secretary's recommendation?

Admiral FLETCHER. No; I am not familiar with that phase of it. I was not here at that time. But I assume all of that is on record, some place, because the thing was thoroughly discussed, as I saw by reading the press reports.

The CHAIRMAN. What plans, other than the old mobilization plan, had been prepared by the Navy Department before April, 1917, to govern the action of the Navy in the event of a war?

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Admiral FLETCHER. The plans for making war are in the hands of the Chief of Operations, under his direction. I do not know what plans were made in Operations. I have nothing to do with them. But as a part of the General Board we made a number of specific recommendations to the department which practically consisted on supplementary war plans as relating to this particular phase of war, and were in pursuance to the general war plan.

The CHAIRMAN. That is, you made a war plan which was drawn up to meet the situation which actually developed in 1917?

Admiral FLETCHER. We made recommendations to them that covered—that practically amounted to a plan of operations.

The CHAIRMAN. And your recommendations had to do with the question of submarines?

Admiral FLETCHER. I do not remember just what specific recommendations we made in regard to submarines; but, as I say, those papers can be placed before you.

The CHAIRMAN. You were on the General Board at that time?

Admiral FLETCHER. I was on the General Board at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it a fact that the question of submarines was one of principal importance in making any such plans, as far as our naval forces were concerned?

Admiral FLETCHER. I would not say that the question of submarines was one of principal importance, one of the principal forces that would be brought into play at that particular phase of the war.

The CHAIRMAN. That is, at the outbreak of the war?

Admiral FLETCHER. At the outbreak of the war. The condition that we were confronted with, more than anything else, was the submarine menace, and of course our submarines—it was not clearly seen at that time just what part they could play; so that I do not think that we necessarily made any specific recommendations with regard to submarines.

The CHAIRMAN. Although it was the critical menace at that particular time in the whole situation?

Admiral FLETCHER. In regard to recommendations against enemy submarines?

The CHAIRMAN. I referred to the use of our Navy against the enemy's submarines.

Admiral FLETCHER. Oh, yes; we made recommendations. I remember there were some 18 or 20 specific steps that we should take, and it referred to the patrol of our coast, protection against submarrines, utilization of small craft, employment of yachts for that purpose, and the outfitting and equipment to send against submarines, and various other steps.

The CHAIRMAN. Did the General Board consider it probable that our naval forces would be restricted to warfare of this kind in general?

Admiral FLETCHER. They did not consider that our main fleet at that time would probably be called to fight a battle at sea with the German fleet, but that the special employment would be directed against the submarine menace with our small craft.

The CHAIRMAN. Upon what information were the recommendations of the General Board based?

Admiral FLETCHER. Based upon their general knowledge of conditions and the progress of war and the form that hostilities were taking.

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The CHAIRMAN. Simply on general knowledge?

Admiral FLETCHER. On general lines; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have any reports from officers who had been over to investigate the matter on the other side?

Admiral FLETCHER. The General Board recommended that officers be sent over there to get in thorough touch with the situation and give all necessary information. This was in addition to the regular machinery for doing that through the naval attaché.

The CHAIRMAN. You had previously made the recommendation—the General Board—or, that was in your plans?

Admiral FLETCHER. It was made just previous to or at just about the time that hostilities were threatened.

The CHAIRMAN. That was in 1916?

Admiral FLETCHER. No, sir; in the spring of 1917; in February, to be more exact. Two or three months before the commencement of hostilities.

The CHAIRMAN. And were such officers sent abroad to study the situation?

Admiral FLETCHER. Such officers were sent abroad.

The CHAIRMAN. At that time?

Admiral FLETCHER. About that time; yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And they brought back reports that you acted on when you made your plans?

Admiral FLETCHER. No, sir; the plans were not made on their special reports. The plans were made on information much broader than their special reports; but I do not doubt, if there is anything in their reports that bore upon these subjects, it would naturally——

The CHAIRMAN. That is, they had made reports before you issued your plan?

Admiral FLETCHER. Well, I do not think, Mr. Chairman, that those reports were of such a character as to affect the plans.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you recall what officers were sent over to study the submarine situation, as you say, about February 10?

Admiral FLETCHER. I do not. I remember that we recommended that Admiral Sims and Admiral T. S. Rogers be sent abroad, with assistants.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Sims went over after the outbreak of the war?

Admiral FLETCHER. My impression is that he was sent over there before hostilities commenced, before the outbreak of war.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, before the outbreak of war?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I think you are correct.

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Did Admiral Rogers go over?

Admiral FLETCHER. I do not think he went over. He had an important command in the fleet at that time, and he was not sent.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you recall any other officers who were recommended for this duty?

Admiral FLETCHER. We did not recommend any other officers specifically by name, but by rank.

The CHAIRMAN. And you do not know whether any such were sent or not?

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Admiral FLETCHER. I know that Admiral Sims was sent, and I do not know what other officers were sent. That could be obtained from officers in Operations or Navigation.

The CHAIRMAN. You have referred in your statement to the war plan that was drawn up by the board. When was that submitted to the department?

Admiral FLETCHER. That plan was commenced nearly two years before we entered this war. I think the first part of it was about February, 1915; and then subsequently there were some operations depending upon the different phases that war might assume; but of course the great value of any general war plan of that kind consists upon the enormous amount of data collected, the number of types of ships of the enemy, and their probable use and employment, our supplies and our bases and the employment and disposition of all our various forces and the distances you have to steam and the amount of coal and fuel that is required to accomplish all the different movements. That is the data which is valuable. Now, you can take this general war plan, and with all these data available it is but a comparatively short time to alter that to meet the conditions that any phase of the war may take.

The CHAIRMAN. That plan was submitted in 1915, and was it kept up to date with additional recommendations?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes, sir. These recommendations from the General Board had the effect of keeping that up to date to meet the particular phases that this war may have taken.

Now, subsequent to that date, through legislation of Congress, the function of preparing war plans was placed under Operations, and I do not know what may have been done in that, you see, but this action of the General Board was simply supplementary to what may have been done in Operations.

The CHAIRMAN. What became of that plan? Was that in general use?

Admiral FLETCHER. That is on general file in the Navy Department.

The CHAIRMAN. Was it in general use in the Navy Department?

Admiral FLETCHER. Well, that I do not know, Mr. Chairman. I assume that it was; that Operations availed themselves of all the information contained in this plan.

The CHAIRMAN. What I want to know is, was that drawn especially for this war?

Admiral FLETCHER. No; because it was made two years before the war, and it was a general plan of war with the Central European Powers.

The CHAIRMAN. And it was kept up to date, as you say, by additional reports?

Admiral FLETCHER. I think that is correct; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Up to when?

Admiral FLETCHER. Up to the time we entered the war and even after.

The CHAIRMAN. And was that the general plan that was used throughout the Navy?

Admiral FLETCHER. No; because, of course, that general plan had to make general assumptions, such as the fact that the German fleet had gotten out and gotten into the Atlantic and was on this side or might have made its base in the West Indies. Of course you have to make various assumptions.

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The CHAIRMAN. Of course, modifications would have to be made?

Admiral FLETCHER. Modifications would have to be made, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. As conditions came up. But what I wanted to know was, was that the plan in the Navy, and was it communicated to the different bureau chiefs, and to the various fleet officers, so that the Navy could act as a homogeneous whole?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes; that plan made provision for that, so that we could use our forces at any time, or to suit the different phases that war might assume.

The CHAIRMAN. And the bureau chiefs, and the high ranking officers of the Navy were aware of this plan, and were made familiar with it so that they could act under it, were they?

Admiral FLETCHER. That I could not say. That was a matter of execution which I had nothing to do with. I assume that of course they all had it, if it was necessary.

The CHAIRMAN. But you do not know whether they did or not?

Admiral FLETCHER. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And you never came across any instances where you found that plan especially in operation?

Admiral FLETCHER. We have a rule in the department—I am speaking from memory now—that the chiefs of bureaus have to make frequent reports as to the condition of their bureaus for war, pointing out all the shortages.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, yesterday we suggested that we would like to have Admiral Washington come up here to give us some information about the personnel of the Navy, and with your permission, we will let him take the stand now, and then put you on as soon as he has finished; and of course we will put your statement in consecutive form.

Admiral FLETCHER. I will be very pleased to, Mr. Chairman; but before leaving the stand, I would like to make a statement: That I am aware that my answers in regard to many of your questions as to what conditions were around the department, are not satisfactory. As stated in my testimony, my duties during this war were principally concerned with the War Industries Board which took practically all my time, so that I am not as familiar with all those details upon which you questioned me as you will find Admiral McKean or other officers whom you will call before you.

Senator PITTMAN. Just one question before you go. Did not the Navy Department and the naval officers do everything in their power with the money that Congress furnished them to do with?

The CHAIRMAN. Excuse me, Senator; I want to finish my own line of questions before you take up yours, if you have no objections. That was the order we agreed upon. We are simply putting Admiral Washington in here in an emergency case.

Senator PITTMAN. As a matter of fact, when we had our agreement, it was agreed that each one of the committee should finish his cross-examination before interruption. We started and proceeded upon that line, when, at your instance, the committee thought we should finish one subject at a time.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; and you refused to adopt that plan.

Senator PITTMAN. No; I was compelled to adopt it.

The CHAIRMAN. I beg your pardon, you refused to adopt it. We did not adopt that plan. In every case we finished with the whole examination before the other side went on.

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Senator PITTMAN. The record will disclose the fact that whenever nished any subject and another Senator said that he would like to some questions on that before going to another, I desisted at .

he CHAIRMAN. I beg your pardon; I think you will find that ing of that sort happened. The original plan was carried out.
nator PITTMAN. Does the Chairman object to my questioning witness?
ie CHAIRMAN. I would like to have that put off until later.
nator PITTMAN. It is apparent why you object to it.
t this point Admiral Fletcher temporarily left the stand. At onclusion of the testimony of Admiral Washington, Admiral ner resumed the stand.)

'ESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL F. F. FLETCHER—Resumed.

CHAIRMAN. Admiral, had any plan been discussed before our ig into the war for sending antisubmarine craft to the war

iral FLETCHER. I did not know just what were sent.
CHAIRMAN. I say, had any plans been discussed as to sending marine craft?
iral FLETCHER. We discussed it in the General Board and made iendations pertaining to that subject in regard to sending the raft over.
CHAIRMAN. When did you make those recommendations, do all?
al FLETCHER. I think it was just previous to and subsequent ntry into the war.
HAIRMAN. That is, you kept on making recommendations at times?
al FLETCHER. We made a number of different recommenda- taining to that subject.
AIRMAN. To whom did you make those recommendations?
l FLETCHER. To the Navy Department.
AIRMAN. To the Secretary or to the Chief of Operations?
l FLETCHER. Those communications are addressed officially vy Department.
AIRMAN. To the Navy Department?
FLETCHER. Yes, sir.
AIRMAN. Do you recall when the first one was made in ubmarines?
FLETCHER. No, I can not tell you accurately, but I think made in February. Another one was made in March—cing only from memory—and I remember that one was e early part of April, shortly before war was declared.
RMAN. And that was the final plan that was made by the ard about the submarine situation?
LETCHER. I do not remember how many were made sub- hat. As I said before, I can not answer these questions ause my duties about that time were transferred over to lustries Board, and I only had general connection with the General Board.

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The CHAIRMAN. Was a general plan to govern antisubmarine operations ever drawn up in the Navy Department so far as you know—a general plan which the department was to use?

Admiral FLETCHER. I do not know that there was any general plan prepared in Operations. I do not know that any general plan would be required under those conditions.

The CHAIRMAN. You simply made general recommendations from the General Board?

Admiral FLETCHER. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And you do not know whether those recommendations were adopted or not, and whether there was any general plan based on those recommendations?

Admiral FLETCHER. No, I can not tell you in detail what steps were actually taken. My knowledge is confined to that indorsement which said that the department had approved these plans and they would be carried out.

The CHAIRMAN. And up to the time that war was declared such a plan was based simply on general information and not on the special reports of any officers who had been sent over to examine the European situation in regard to submarines?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes. Well, those recommendations were all based upon our knowledge of the situation of the war at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. Your general knowledge of the situation?

Admiral FLETCHER. Based upon all knowledge and all information that we could collect.

The CHAIRMAN. I asked you if you had any special reports from any special officers that you sent over to find out about the situation, and you stated that you recommended that Admiral Sims and Admiral Rogers be sent over to look into the situation.

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, Admiral Rogers was not sent over. Admiral Sims was sent over immediately before the commencement of the war, and as far as you know, he made no recommendations to the General Board which were used in making up plans, did he?

Admiral FLETCHER. No; he made no recommendations to the General Board directly. All his recommendations would be made to the department, naturally.

The CHAIRMAN. To the department?

Admiral FLETCHER. And referred to the General Board for use. But these plans and these recommendations or these communications to the department were based upon all knowledge that could be obtained up to that time from reports of naval operations.

The CHAIRMAN. That could be obtained from the available information that you had on hand?

Admiral FLETCHER. All available information.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it not essential in warfare that all operational plans be based upon full information and a full consideration of the situation by the responsible person?

Admiral FLETCHER. Certainly; as full information as it is possible to obtain.

The CHAIRMAN. And you feel that such information and such discussion with the heads of the allied navies was possible in Washington?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Without having anyone in the field?

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Admiral FLETCHER. No; I think the more sources of information that you have, of course the more valuable it is; and the more accurate your information is apt to be.

The CHAIRMAN. And the most accurate information would come from the field, would it not?

Admiral FLETCHER. Very probably. It depends somewhat upon conditions. Our sources of information are through the different departments of the governments abroad, and particularly through our naval and military attachés, or through the foreign embassies.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you feel that that information and the discussion that you had with the heads of allied navies here in Washington and what you got from your naval attachés, was of more importance than what you got from Admiral Sims?

Admiral FLETCHER. Undoubtedly. At the same time, Admiral Sims's information was very important, and a great deal of dependence was placed upon it. But that was not the only source of information.

The CHAIRMAN. And you feel that these other sources were of more importance than his information?

Admiral FLETCHER. Well, I will not say that they were more important. They are all equally important, according to the character of the information and the details and the accuracy of it. They have all got to be taken into consideration.

The CHAIRMAN. And yet the General Board had recommended that Admiral Sims go abroad to investigate the submarine and anti-submarine conditions?

Admiral FLETCHER. Their recommendations included more than that. Their recommendations included that an officer be sent—I am speaking only from memory—to get in touch with the Allies—the military or naval forces of the Allies—and to get any information that was of value, and to see what steps we should be prepared to take in case we entered the war. That is my recollection of the general tenor of the instruction.

The CHAIRMAN. Would not a sound policy have required that all detailed operational plans should be drawn up in the war zone?

Admiral FLETCHER. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Not the detailed plans?

Admiral FLETCHER. The detailed plans for carrying out any general instructions in the war zone would be made in the war zone, naturally. The execution of some general plan which was turned over to the commander in the war zone for execution, or the details of that execution, the plans necessary to carry it out, would be there.

The CHAIRMAN. That is, the detailed plans for operation would be conducted in the war zone?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes; just like the commander-in-chief is ordered to engage the enemy in battle. All the details of that battle would have to be planned out by the commander-in-chief, and all the details of execution would have to be made by him; but that would be all under the general plans prepared in the department.

The CHAIRMAN. And the recommendations for the carrying out of the detailed plans would naturally be up to the officer in charge of the war zone?

Admiral FLETCHER. No; they would not be apt to interfere.

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The CHAIRMAN. But you just said that the detailed plans should be in his hands.

Admiral FLETCHER. Oh, the detailed plans should be in his hands.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I say; and you agree with that.

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes, in general; but in depends very much upon the conditions. If I would take a specific case I could more clearly explain just where the work of the department ends and where the execution by the commander in the field begins.

The CHAIRMAN. Wherever the recommendations of the commander in the field could reasonably be followed as to detailed plans, it should be the policy of the department to follow them, should it not?

Admiral FLETCHER. If it does not interfere with their general plans and the policy; yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, what was the policy followed in regard to action taken on recommendations made by Admiral Sims?

Admiral FLETCHER. Mr. Chairman, as I said before I was not connected with the detailed plans or the execution or carrying out of those plans; but that information can be gotten from the officers in the Navy Department, and I was very little associated with that, had practically nothing to do with it.

The CHAIRMAN. In a general way were not Admiral Sim's recommendations on all important matters ultimately adopted by the Navy Department?

Admiral FLETCHER. Well, when he makes recommendations, of course the Navy Department would naturally take them into consideration and attach great importance to them, and I have no doubt but what they would carry them out as long as they did not interfere with their general plan or their general policy of carrying on the war.

The CHAIRMAN. The fact that the department adopted these recommendations proves that they were sound in the judgment of the department, does it not?

Admiral FLETCHER. I should say it did; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. If that was so, what justification was there for the delay of the department in acting on them?

Admiral FLETCHER. I do not know what delay you refer to.

The CHAIRMAN. The delay in carrying out the recommendations of Admiral Sims; for instance, about the sending of ships over there, and sending tugs over, and not supplying him with personnel, and other matters.

Admiral FLETCHER. Oh, yes; I assume that that delay, if there was any delay, was purely a matter of policy in the methods that the department may have adopted and approved of, in carrying on the war.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, if his recommendations were not sound, why should the department have adopted them; and if they were sound, why should not the department have adopted them as soon as possible?

Admiral FLETCHER. If they approved his recommendations, I assume that they acted upon them. I do not know the particular conditions to which you refer.

The CHAIRMAN. You are familiar with the Admiral's letter of January 7th and the various things that he touches upon in that letter, are you not?

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Admiral FLETCHER. Oh, yes; yes. Now, do you refer to his recommendation that the Navy Department should have sent immediately to the war zone all available small craft in this country? I do not think that the department approved that, so far as I know.

The CHAIRMAN. He made specific recommendations, and those specific recommendations I think that Admiral Sims shows in practically every case were followed by the department, but at a later date during the war.

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Of what importance is the time element in warfare?

Admiral FLETCHER. It is often very important. Many times it is of vital importance.

The CHAIRMAN. As a general rule, it is of vital importance, is it not?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes; not vital, but sometimes vital; but as a general rule it is of great importance.

The CHAIRMAN. On important matters, as a rule it is vital, is it not?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes; I agree to that.

The CHAIRMAN. Was the critical character of the submarine campaign in 1917 recognized by the Navy Department?

Admiral FLETCHER. It was recognized as a very important factor in the war.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you recall how many tons of shipping were sunk during the month of April, 1917?

Admiral FLETCHER. I am speaking from memory when I say that I think it was about 500,000 ton—600,000 tons.

The CHAIRMAN. It was 800,000 tons.

Admiral FLETCHER. I will accept that.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know what was the cause of the delay in sending antisubmarine forces over as Admiral Sims had recommended?

Admiral FLETCHER. No; I know nothing about the execution of the operations. That was entirely in the Navy Department, and the Bureau of Operations; but I called attention to the subject in my statement there as to the desirability of sending all our antisubmarine craft away from this coast, leaving it entirely undefended.

The CHAIRMAN. And you think that the defending of this coast at that period of the war was of more importance than the sending of as many craft as we could over to the other side to stop the submarine menace over there where it actually existed?

Admiral FLETCHER. I think I have given an answer to that in my testimony, and I am quite willing to repeat that now as an answer to that question.

The CHAIRMAN. Well——

Admiral FLETCHER. It is a conditional matter, and the conditions I stated there in my testimony to this effect, that the question arises, shall we send all our small craft at once to Europe and leave our own coast entirely unprotected, or shall we just wait until we find out the development of the war, what phase it is going to take, how important it is, and how much risk we should take?

The CHAIRMAN. But at that particular time, Admiral, when these requests were being made, during the month of April, 1917, 800,000 tons of shipping were being sunk, and that was the maxmum month during the whole war when shipping was being sunk by submarines.

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes, sir.

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The CHAIRMAN. And in no case, I believe, until the summer of 1918, did a submarine come over to this country and attack any of our shipping over here; is not that so? During the war, I refer to, now?

Admiral FLETCHER. After the war, in May, 1918?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral FLETCHER. There were three submarines came over to this coast.

The CHAIRMAN. In May, 1918?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I said, during the early summer of 1918.

Admiral FLETCHER. Now, I ask you to imagine what would have happened had we sent all of our antisubmarine craft abroad at the very commencement of the war and left our whole coast undefended, and those three submarines had appeared on our coast, entirely undefended, and the whole ocean covered with hundreds of vessels with their valuable cargoes. Those submarines could have created havoc here, and the question arises, were we justified in immediately sending all the craft abroad?

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, do you think it was on account of the coast patrol that we had over here that Germany did not send these submarines over during the early months of the war, or was it because she thought it was more important to have them operate over nearer the war zone?

Admiral FLETCHER. Well, Mr, Chairman, I have never understood why Germany did not send three submarines over here immediately. I think, and I have said before, that those subjects were thoroughly discussed in Operations, as that was their province; and while it is very interesting and I would like to answer that, I am not familiar with all the phases of that. But I think that Admiral McKean will be able to fully enlighten you on that subject.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you do not call yourself an expert on the submarine question?

Admiral FLETCHER. Oh, no, sir; I am not posing as an expert. My main testimony is from the industrial point of view. As I say, I am not familiar with all that phase of the problem. I am only speaking in a general way.

The CHAIRMAN. To what extent did the organization of the department meet the situation resulting from the war?

Admiral FLETCHER. I think it met it admirably well. The organization that we have to-day is far ahead of anything that we have had in the past; but while it may not be perfect, and in the opinion of some there might be useful changes made, still, on the whole, I think it conducted operations of war remarkably well, and I know of no serious mistakes that were made.

The CHAIRMAN. No serious mistakes that were made by the organization of the Navy Department during the war?

Admiral FLETCHER. No serious mistakes that were made in conducting the operations of the war. I know of none.

The CHAIRMAN. That is, by the bureaus, you mean?

Admiral FLETCHER. I refer in this case more particularly to the operations of the war, the operations of the fleet; the disposition of our forces.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; the work of the Bureau of Operations?

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Admiral FLETCHER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In your testimony before the House Committee on Naval Affairs in 1916 you made certain recommendations with regard to giving more authority to the Chief of Operations, and recommended that he be given authority to issue and sign orders concerning the operations of the fleet?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. What action was taken on that recommendation?

Admiral FLETCHER. I think subsequently to that recommendation Congress passed a law establishing the Chief of Operations, and gave him much more authority than the old aid for Operations.

The CHAIRMAN. But not the full authority that was considered at the time?

Admiral FLETCHER. I do not think they they gave him quite as much authority as many people thought he ought to have.

The CHAIRMAN. I think the testimony has shown that the proposition was to make him responsible for the plans and for their execution; but the word "responsible" was taken out.

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes; it was.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you feel that he should be responsible?

Admiral FLETCHER. I see no reason why he should not be made responsible for the preparation of war plans and for the conduct of operations of the fleet in time of war.

The CHAIRMAN. Did the Secretary of the Navy ever give the Chief of Operations authority to sign orders with regard to operations of the fleet?

Admiral FLETCHER. That I do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know?

Admiral FLETCHER. I do not know. I think that he does sign many orders in regard to the operations of the fleet, but I do not know the——

The CHAIRMAN. Would you say that he should have full authority to sign all orders with regard to the operations of the fleet?

Admiral FLETCHER. He should have full authority to do that, subject to the general authority and direction of the Secretary of the Navy; but you can not give any subordinate officer in the Navy Department authority superior to that of the Secretary of the Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. That is, he should have authority unless he were restrained by the Secretary of the Navy in the particular instance?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes, sir; he should have full authority, under the general direction of the Secretary of the Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. He should not have to go to the Secretary for his signature to such orders, but the Secretary should have the right to veto the order if he saw fit; is that right?

Admiral FLETCHER. Certainly.

The CHAIRMAN. In your statement before the House Committee, in 1916, you said in regard to the organization of the Navy Department:

> It is not the organization I would have there, or all I would like to have, were I the Secretary of the Navy. While the general staff feature of the organization would be made effective by the modifications in that law which I have suggestered, there are other features in the organization of the Navy Department which, in my opinion, do not conform to the general principles of sound organization.

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you recall what that had reference to?

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Admiral FLETCHER. That had reference to the old organization before we established a Chief of Operations.

The CHAIRMAN. When you had an aid for Operations?

Admiral FLETCHER. When we had an aid for Operations and an aid for Material and an aid for Personnel.

The CHAIRMAN. You stated: "While the general staff features of the organization would be made effective by the modifications in that law which I have suggested." That was in regard to the new method?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN (continuing reading): "There are other features in the organization of the Navy Department which, in my opinion, do not conform to the general principles of sound organization."

To what other features did you refer?

Admiral FLETCHER. I do not know just what I had in mind then, but the general idea that was in my mind was to establish a Chief of Operations.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, but that——

Admiral FLETCHER. Around which the organization of the Navy Department would be built, and that the staff part of it should be under control so as to meet the military requirements.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not recall what other features there were that you spoke about, particularly at that time, that you were alluding to particularly at that time.

Admiral FLETCHER. No; I do not recall the connection with that quotation you have just made.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you recall any other matters in regard to the organization that should have been changed?

Admiral FLETCHER. I can explain, in a general way, Mr. Chairman, what you wish me to say in regard to the organization of the Navy Department. I must say that I am prejudiced in favor of the Meyer organization as tentatively put into effect by Secretary Meyer. There was appointed a commission about that time, known as the Moody Commission, to study the question of organization of the Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. Was that the commission on which Admiral Mayhan served?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes. There had been so much dissatisfaction about the organization of our Navy Department that this commission was appointed to make recommendations, particularly with reference to the general principles of sound organization as applied to naval establishments. They gave a thorough study to that, and laid down the general principles that should be followed.

Subsequent to that there was appointed the so-called Swift Board, which made a thorough study of the organization of the Navy Department, of the organization of every navy department in Europe, and sent an experienced officer over to Europe to study at first hand the working of every organization in the countries of Europe, and based upon the Moody Commission report and all the information available, they got up the so-called Meyer plan of organization. You may know the general principle. It was to establish a Chief of Operations responsible for the operation of the fleet in war and in peace, a chief of material who should be responsible for the condition and the preparation and the maintenance of

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the material of the fleet, and after that was finished, it was turned over to Operations. They had complete control. And the other feature was a chief of personnel, who had similar duties in regard to personnel, and a chief inspector. So that this organization would relieve the Secretary of the Navy of a thousand details which he is tempted to carry out himself; and in principle he deals with these four principal units.

The present organization, the essential feature of it, I believe, is found in the Meyer plan, that is the establishment of a Chief of Operations. The so-called chief of material, I think, now is under Operations as a subordinate officer who deals with the various bureaus of the department, and in the same way the personnel is handled. I understand that there is a difference of opinion amongst officers in the Navy as to whether the Chief of Operations should handle the bureau work through a subordinate in his office, or whether he should do it through a chief of material who is over the heads of all the bureaus, who is responsible for the coordination of their work, and who deals directly with the Chief of Operations. There is a difference of opinion on that subject, and I believe that either plan will work well, although personally I am inclined to favor the organization which places the chief of material as responsible for the whole question of material, so that the Chief of Operations, instead of having to deal with all these separate bureaus, will deal with one single man; and the same way with the Secretary of the Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, we hope that this committee will be able to do something that will be for the ultimate good of the Navy. Now, the other day Admiral Mayo in his testimony made some suggestions about changes in the organization of the Department, or stated, at any rate, that there were remedies that could be applied to the present organization, and I asked Admiral Mayo to come back at a latter period before this committee and submit his views about a general plan for the reorganization of the Navy, if it seemed to him necessary. I have spoken to several other officers and have asked them to do the same. We should like very much to have you, if you think there are matters that should be changed in the organization of the department—and it is inconceivable, in a war like this, that new matters should not come up where changes should prove to be necessary—we should like very much to have you come before us at a later period and submit any plans that you may have in this respect; and among the other officers that we would like to have come will be Admiral Badger, who is chief of the board, and Admiral McKean, and Admiral Knight; and we think we shall ask the Assistant Secretary of the Navy if he will submit anything; provided that they have ideas about any reorganization. And we shall also ask the Secretary of the Navy to submit any plans that he may have.

Now, this committee, it is needless to say, is not made up of experts on naval matters, and my idea and the idea of several of the members of the committee with whom I have talked, is that the best thing to do would be, after we get these different recommendations, if the facts seem to warrant it, to suggest the appointment of a commission such as the Moody Commission, to which you have referred this morning, a commission on which shall be experts on

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naval matters, civilian experts such as were included on that commission, and I believe, and I hope that the committee will agree with me, that if we do that, a plan for reorganization, if it is found to be necessary, will be drawn up which will be of great value to the Navy of the United States.

Admiral FLETCHER. I think that would be of great value, particularly as we have just gone through a war; and if there are any defects and changes necessary, they should show up now better than at any other time.

The CHAIRMAN. I think so. Admiral, was any general plan ever adopted for coordinating the operations of the various bureaus of the department that you know of?

Admiral FLETCHER. I can not answer that, Mr. Chairman. I am not familiar with the detailed workings of the department for the last six or seven years.

The CHAIRMAN. And you do not know of any such plan?

Admiral FLETCHER. No, sir; I do not know of any.

The CHAIRMAN. If such a plan had been in existence, would you not have seen it?

Admiral FLETCHER. No, sir; I would not come in contact with that in the work that I have been doing the last three years.

The CHAIRMAN. Upon whom rested the chief responsibility for coordinating the operations of the bureaus?

Admiral FLETCHER. I am not speaking from accurate knowledge, but only from general impressions and hearsay. I think that the work of the bureaus is now coordinated by an aid for material acting under the Chief of Operations.

The CHAIRMAN. And the aid for material coordinates the activities and the chiefs of bureaus?

Admiral FLETCHER. The Assistant for Material is his title.

The CHAIRMAN. It is not "aid," but "assistant" for material?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes; and he is acting under the Chief of Operations.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know of any difficulties that arose during the war on account of any lack of coordination?

Admiral FLETCHER. I have heard of none.

The CHAIRMAN. And you observed no delays, you stated, through any faults of organization?

Admiral FLETCHER. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In your testimony before the House committee, in 1916, you stated that you had appointed boards to recommend complements for battleships, and as a part of their report recommended large increases, on the ground that the efficiency of a fleet demanded such increases. Were these increases authorized, do you know, before our entrance into the war?

Admiral FLETCHER. My impression is that the complements were increased before we entered the war.

The CHAIRMAN. But you do not have any accurate knowledge about it?

Admiral FLETCHER. I have no statistics on it.

The CHAIRMAN. Who would have been the one responsible in case this was not done?

Admiral FLETCHER. Well, the Secretary of the Navy is responsible for everything; and the subordinate officer having charge of such

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matters, who is responsible to the Secretary of the Navy in regard to personnel, would be the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation.

The CHAIRMAN. The light forces that we had in the Navy at the beginning of the war were in a state of unpreparedness, were they not; the light cruisers and armored cruisers and vessels of that sort?

Admiral FLETCHER. So far as I know, they were in good condition.

The CHAIRMAN. They were in a good state of preparedness?

Admiral FLETCHER. So far as I know. I was not familiar with the details of that.

The CHAIRMAN. But you do not know?

Admiral FLETCHER. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And you do not know of any efforts that had been made to put these vessels into condition before the war?

Admiral FLETCHER. I can not give you facts on that, Mr. Chairman, except it is my general impression that all those ships connected with the fleet were in good condition.

The CHAIRMAN. And there was plenty of personnel for them?

Admiral FLETCHER. No; I can not say that. I was not familiar with the data in regard to the fleet at that time. My information that you refer to there in the testimony dates back to 1916.

The CHAIRMAN. I am asking you now about matters at the beginning of the war.

Admiral FLETCHER. At the beginning of the war? I can not give you facts on that.

The CHAIRMAN. So that you are not familiar with the personnel conditions or the material conditions of the Navy at the beginning of this war?

Admiral FLETCHER. No, sir; not at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know of any particular efforts to secure additional personnel that were made?

Admiral FLETCHER. I know nothing except from general hearsay, that navigation was always making great efforts to get more men enlisted.

The CHAIRMAN. In general, Admiral, if the Navy was not prepared at the beginning of the war, on whom would rest the responsibility for the lack of preparedness?

Admiral FLETCHER. I suppose it depends upon wherein the defect occurred. If it occurred in any particular department, such as personnel or material or lack of ships, the officer charged with that part is responsible to the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of the Navy is responsible for all defects and shortages of the Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. Then, as far as the law allows him——

Admiral FLETCHER. As far as the law allows him.

The CHAIRMAN (continuing). The Secretary is responsible?

Admiral FLETCHER. He is responsible.

The CHAIRMAN. For unpreparedness?

Admiral FLETCHER. And I suppose I might go further and say that Congress is responsible for the general policy of building up the Navy and making the appropriations.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you familiar, generally speaking, with the composition of the British and German Fleets when they met at the battle of Jutland?

Admiral FLETCHER. In a general way; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You are familiar?

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Admiral FLETCHER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Then what is your definition of a fleet that is in all respects ready for battle against a fleet like that of the Germans in 1916, at the date of the battle of Jutland; that is, in May, 1916?

Admiral FLETCHER. In May, 1916?

The CHAIRMAN. What is your definition of a fleet that is in all respects ready for battle against a fleet like that of the Germans in May, 1916; that is, what units are necessary in addition to battleships?

Admiral FLETCHER. In addition to the battleships there should be units of battle cruisers, equal to and preferably superior to that of the enemy; there should be scout cruisers equal or superior to that the enemy possesses; and there should be destroyers more numerous than those of the enemy; and there should be submarines as strong and powerful and as numerous as those of the enemy.

The CHAIRMAN. Should there be light cruisers?

Admiral FLETCHER. There should be light cruisers.

The CHAIRMAN. Should there be armored cruisers?

Admiral FLETCHER. I do not know the particular conditions of that battle called for armored cruisers. The composition of every fleet, to be effective against the enemy, is based entirely, almost, upon the composition of the enemy's fleet. If the enemy has battle cruisers, you have got to have them. If he has not battle cruisers, it is not absolutely essential that you should have them in order to obtain a superiority. The composition of your fleet, and in the building up of the Navy, depends entirely upon what the possible enemy may have.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you think that a fleet composed entirely of battleships and destroyers, no matter how efficient they might be, was ready for war or battle against a fleet like that of the Germans at the battle of Jutland?

Admiral FLETCHER. That would not be sufficient. They would be at a great disadvantage.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you say that a fleet was ready for battle if it has no scouts and no screening vessels and no submarines and no air service, and a very few destroyers?

Admiral FLETCHER. It would not be at all ready, under modern conditions of war. It would not be fitted to carry on a war.

The CHAIRMAN. Would it be ready for war if its ships were not fully officered and manned?

Admiral FLETCHER. It would not be ready.

The CHAIRMAN. You can not state, of your own knowledge, whether the Navy of the United States was fully officered or manned in 1917, when war was declared?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes. Mr. Chairman, I would like to say here that I think there is a great deal of misunderstanding in regard to the expression "Is the Navy prepared for war?" You can answer that by saying yes or no, and either answer will be correct, depending upon what you mean. If you say "Is this country prepared for war, and has it a Navy large enough to overcome the enemy?" I would say no. But if you asked "Is the Navy as it is constituted and built up under the appropriations of Congress, ready for war," I would say yes, as far as it goes.

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The CHAIRMAN. Yes, but you can not say that a battle fleet is a prepared and ready battle fleet unless it is filled up with all of its necessary units, can you?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes; that is the point that is subject to two interpretations. You see, our fleet is composed now of battle cruisers and submarines and destroyers as well as battle ships; but it has no battle cruisers and other fast scout cruisers like other navies of the world have, and if anybody asked you "Is our fleet ready for war," I would say yes, as far as it is constituted. But the country is not ready for war in that it is not a properly built up fleet, being short in battle cruisers and other elements that go to make up a fleet.

The CHAIRMAN. That is, if you are going to say that it is ready for war, you mean that it is ready as far as the available resources of the country allow it; and if it is short of destroyers and the country has destroyers to supply their places, and the country or the department does not supply their places, then it is not ready as a battle fleet; and the same with regard to other units; is that correct?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes; in that way.

The CHAIRMAN. That is according to your understanding?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes, sir; when the testimony has been given here, saying that our fleet was ready for war, what was meant by that was that our fleet, as far as it goes, was prepared for war.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean that the individual ships of the fleet are prepared?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes; and the individual units of ships, and the combinations of ships, as far as it went; but I do not think that those officers who so testified meant to say or to imply that our Navy was built up and was complete in every respect.

The CHAIRMAN. Then do you mean that there were no other vessels in the United States that would be used in an ordinary navy for screening, vessels that could have been in the fleet but were not with the fleet? Because the testimony has shown as to the battle fleet that it consisted entirely of battle ships and of a few destroyers.

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. If there had been other vessels in our Navy that could be used for screening vessels, and that were not used for screening vessels because they were not in a state of preparedness, would you still say that the battle fleet was in a state of preparedness and ready for war?

Admiral FLETCHER. No; I should say that if we had cruisers that could have been put immediately into the fleet and ready to fight with us, that we were not fully prepared.

The CHAIRMAN. And the same way with destroyers?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes, sir. But of course when we are not at war, we must necessarily keep a large percentage of the fleet in reserve or at navy yards. We can not afford either financially or through a lack of personnel, to keep our whole forces mobilized.

The CHAIRMAN. But you would hardly say that while you have a battle fleet out presumably prepared for battle, that this battle fleet itself should be kept in reserve, would you?

Admiral FLETCHER. In time of peace, yes. But, of course, when war is declared, as soon as you are permitted to after diplomatic relations do not interfere, why, of course you must try to bring out every resource that you have got.

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The CHAIRMAN. That is, from February 2, 1917, certainly, to April 2, 1917, every effort should have been made to build up that battle fleet as completely as possible, and all vessels that could have been of use in building up a battle fleet should have been put in the fleet, should they not, if possible?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. To make it a prepared fleet?

Admiral FLETCHER. To what event in February do you refer?

The CHAIRMAN. When passports were given to the German ambassador.

Admiral FLETCHER. And that it became inevitable that we were going into the war?

The CHAIRMAN. I think you will agree that it was inevitable then that we were going into war.

Admiral FLETCHER. Well, I would say, if I was confronted with a condition of that kind, of course I would make every effort to get ready for war; but I do not know just how far our diplomatic correspondence made it inadvisable to take any steps toward hostilities. That is always a very important factor in the commencement of war.

The CHAIRMAN. You personally do not know what ships were available for scouting or screening at that time?

Admiral FLETCHER. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In general, would you say that the Navy of the United States was in all respects ready for war in April, 1917?

Admiral FLETCHER. As constituted, and as fast as a ship in reserve could be gotten out and put into operation, it was prepared.

The CHAIRMAN. Could be gotten out after what date; after the date of the declaration of war?

Admiral FLETCHER. No; I should say after the war became inevitable.

The CHAIRMAN. But you stated some time ago that war became practically inevitable after the latter part of 1916.

Admiral FLETCHER. Well, that is in the opinions of outsiders, but that is a matter for the administration.

The CHAIRMAN. That was in the opinion of the men in the Navy Department who were the ones to determine about preparing the Navy.

Admiral FLETCHER. The probability of war, Mr. Chairman, is a matter that the administration, the President of the United States, is better informed about than we are.

The CHAIRMAN. Therefore, if you did not prepare the Navy for war, it was the fault of the administration?

Admiral FLETCHER. For war; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And of the Secretary of the Navy? Because he was the one directly to effect it.

Admiral FLETCHER. Well, the Secretary of the Navy, of course, carries out the policy of the Government, and if the policy of the Government is not to prepare for war, of course he is not responsible for the date when they commenced the preparations, as a matter of policy. But after the policy of the country decides that we should commence to prepare for war, then that preparation, of course, is up to the Secretary of the Navy and the officers under him.

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The CHAIRMAN. You stated this morning that our Navy was as well prepared as any other navy at the time of the outbreak of the war. You mean as the British or the French Navy in 1914?

Admiral FLETCHER. That is right; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think we had as many screening vessels in proportion to the size of our Navy, for instance, at that time, as the British?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That were in an active state of preparedness?

Admiral FLETCHER. That just brings up a question, what is meant by the term "prepared." We are not prepared in battle cruisers, and in the number of scout cruisers, and in other elements of the fleet which we should have, you see, to be on an equality with the enemy; but so far as our fleet was constituted it was prepared for war just as well as any other navy in the world.

The CHAIRMAN. But, Admiral, I think you have stated that when you were in command of the fleet and you came up from southern waters, you had some screening vessels with you at the time, did you not?

Admiral FLETCHER. We had what?

The CHAIRMAN. You had some screening vessels with you?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. That shows that there were some screening vessels in our Navy?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Were there not a great many screening vessels out on the Pacific coast that were not in active commission when war broke out?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Therefore we had them, we had them in our Navy, but we did not have them ready to use. Therefore we were not ready as far as we could be.

Admiral FLETCHER. We did not have any men to put on board of them. Congress had not appropriated money for the men.

The CHAIRMAN. Therefore we were short of personnel?

Admiral FLETCHER. We were short of personnel; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know the circumstances? Other witnesses have already gone into that, about the shortness in personnel at that time.

Admiral FLETCHER. No, sir; I do not know at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know the circumstances in regard to the recommendations by the department, and the recommendations by the Secretary of the Navy to Congress about that?

Admiral FLETCHER. No, sir; I do not know about that question.

The CHAIRMAN. In general, do you think that our battle fleet at the beginning of the war, in April, 1917, would have been able to meet and to overcome the German fleet that fought at the battle Jutland, if they had met in mid-ocean?

Admiral FLETCHER. I think they would have, without difficulty. That is my opinion.

The CHAIRMAN. If the German fleet was fully equipped with screening vessels and submarines and everything of that sort, you think our fleet would have been able to defeat them with nothing but battleships and destroyers that we had?

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Admiral FLETCHER. We had a superior battle force to what the Germans had at that time, and I think that in an open contest at sea we would have been superior to the Germans.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you do not regard the screening forces that they had as of any great value as an adjunct to the fleet?

Admiral FLETCHER. Oh, no; I am just regarding—all those auxiliaries, you see, are advantages that are of use in leading up to the battle; but when you come to the final battle conditions, you put battleships right against battleships, and then it is a question of gun power.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; but might not the battleships be destroyed by submarines or other methods, before you came to battleship against battleship?

Admiral FLETCHER. Oh, yes, of course; and we had submarines at that time. But it is very difficult——

The CHAIRMAN. I am talking about the battle fleet as it was constituted, and it had no submarines. and it had nothing but battleships and a few destroyers.

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Now you say that you think that that fleet of battleships accompanied by a few destroyers could have overcome the German fleet as it fought the British at the battle of Jutland with all the screening boats and other auxiliaries that they had?

Admiral FLETCHER. Now, Mr. Chairman, it is a very difficult matter to answer a hypothetical question of that kind.

The CHAIRMAN. I would simply like your opinion.

Admiral FLETCHER. I can tell you, in a general way, that our fleet as constituted in 1917——

The CHAIRMAN. Our battle fleet?

Admiral FLETCHER. Battleships; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Our battle fleet; you mean the battleships and destroyers?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes, sir; we were inferior to the German fleet in regard to battle cruisers and in regard to other types of vessels, but we were superior to them in other ways; and, on the whole, I think that in a battle at sea we would have been superior to the Germans.

The CHAIRMAN. And you think, then, that the screening vessels were not of any great consequence?

Admiral FLETCHER. I think so; of great consequence.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not quite follow you. You say they are of great consequence? Do you mean that we had such a preponderating superiority of dreadnaughts that we could have overcome that?

Admiral FLETCHER. Mr. Chairman, it depends so much upon the conditions that it is difficult to answer. I can answer it in a general way, that I believe that our fleet at that time was just as powerful as the German fleet, considering everything.

The CHAIRMAN. Then it was more powerful in battleships and less powerful in destroyers and had not the screening vessels?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. But we were so much better in battleships that we were better than they, on the whole?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes; I think so.

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The CHAIRMAN. And so that, if we had met in midocean, the victory would have been ours?

Admiral FLETCHER. When it came right down to an actual duel that our forces would have been superior to theirs. Now, all these things that take place preliminary to that, it is too difficult to formulate any plan unless you lay down specific conditions.

The CHAIRMAN. How would we have been able to screen our battleships, for instance in a fog, at night, or anything of that kind? How would we have been able to screen the battleships with what we had?

Admiral FLETCHER. In the same way that Germany would screen hers, by destroyers and cruisers.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, but we had no cruisers. I am talking about the fleet as it was constituted.

Admiral FLETCHER. Oh, as mobilized?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; simply with the battleships and destroyers. I said that right along.

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes. Well, we could have had a number of cruisers there with our fleet.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not talking about that. I am not talking about what we might have had or would have had. I am talking about the fleet as it was actually constituted, made up, as a battle fleet, of battleships and a few destroyers.

Admiral FLETCHER. I must admit, Mr. Chairman, that it is a little confusing.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not think so. I have stated that over and over again, right along. I have particularly spoken about the fact that we had only battleships and a few destroyers; and you have stated, I think, that it would not make any difference that the fleet consisted of only those ships. Your testimony will show that.

Senator TRAMMELL. I do not think that his testimony will show that. The testimony will show that he said it would make some difference. I insist on confining it to the Admiral's answers, and not trying to make it appear that he said something different from what he did say.

The CHAIRMAN. The testimony will show clearly that I was speaking about the fleet as it was then, such as I am speaking of now.

Senator TRAMMELL. I think you are trying to make it appear that all they had was what they had assembled there when they did not expect to have a fight. If they had expected to have a fight, they could and would have had some more destroyers and cruisers.

The CHAIRMAN. I am talking about the time in April, 1917, when the war broke out. May I ask, how many cruisers did we have available on the Atlantic coast at that time?

Admiral FLETCHER. I should say, in answer to your question, Mr. Chairman, under the conditions that would bring us in contact with the German fleet off our coast in the ocean, that we had enough cruisers and enough destroyers and enough submarines and enough auxiliaries of the various types——

The CHAIRMAN. Then will you give me the make-up of the Atlantic fleet at that time—of the battle fleet?

Admiral FLETCHER. That they were available on this coast.

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The CHAIRMAN. I am talking about the vessels that were with the fleet at that time.

Admiral FLETCHER. Well, that is, not with the fleet, We consider a vessel with the fleet if it is within call.

The CHAIRMAN. That were mobilized, with the fleet?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Because I have asked you, and all the others, and I think that they all say the fleet consisted simply of battleships and a few destroyers.

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And none of these other vessels.

Admiral FLETCHER. We may have cruisers up in Boston and cruisers down in Charleston, and within a few hours call of the fleet, and we call that being with the fleet, in that sense; if they are where they can be assembled and be with the fleet on short notice.

Senator PITTMAN. The chariman wants to know whether one unit of our fleet could lick the whole German fleet.

The CHAIRMAN. Not one unit; two units.

Admiral FLETCHER. I think, had the Germans come over here with what force they would have had when they crossed the ocean, we would have been at no disadvantage, at that particular time.

The CHAIRMAN. I asked you, if they met in midocean, with equal advantage.

Admiral FLETCHER. If we had been at no disadvantage?

The CHAIRMAN. No disadvantage; that is, if we had gone out simply with battleships and destroyers. Nobody else has testified that any larger number of our fleet was ready except battleships and a few destroyers.

Admiral FLETCHER. We would not have gone out if no others were within call.

The CHAIRMAN. We would not have gone out?

Admiral FLETCHER. That is, if the cruisers were not ready and manned and prepared, they could not have gone out.

Of course, if they were not with the fleet. I think I see the point you are making, that on the outbreak of war we were not fully mobilized; that there were not enough men, and a great deal had to be done to actually engage in hostilities. I agree with that.

The CHAIRMAN. The question was, was our battle fleet prepared; and when we came to sift it, so far as we have been able to tell, it was prepared with battle ships and destroyers, but in no other way was it fully prepared.

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, what I wanted to find out was whether the fleet, so prepared, with simply battle ships and destroyers, could have held its own against the German fleet, which was perfectly prepared. It is a perfectly simple question.

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes. Well, I will say "yes" to that question.

The CHAIRMAN. You will say yes, that it could?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any further questions?

Senator BALL. No.

Senator KEYES. I have none.

Senator PITTMAN. I have some questions that I want to ask the admiral.

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TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL THOMAS WASHINGTON, UNITED STATES NAVY.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Washington, yesterday, in the course of the hearing, Admiral Wilson made a statement about the personnel of the Atlantic Fleet, and after his statement I suggested that I thought it would be appropriate for you to come before the committee and give us any information that you can about the present condition of the personnel of the Navy, and we would be very glad to hear from you on that point.

Admiral WASHINGTON. The demobilization since the armistice has been going on very rapidly, and Congress passed certain laws which gave the enlisted force inducements and reasons for getting out, and naturally we were desirous of discharging and letting go back to their regular vocations all of those whom we could spare. We demobilized from about 500,000 down to the present number of about 104,000.

This bonus of $60 which Congress authorized for these men who accepted their discharge was an inducement for them to leave the service and not to return. Had it been the other way we would not have been so badly off. The only way in which these discharged men could accept it was to accept their discharge, leave, get the $60, and go home; and, of course, the wages outside were such that the probability of their return became less and less as the 30 days or 60 days went on, the result being that all our old-timers, that is, the reenlisted, continuous-service men—not all of them but a great percentage of them—like the reserves and others, took advantage of it and left us. We had to expand our recruiting efforts greater than they have been before, and we have more men now engaged in recruiting throughout the country, probably double or treble the number, and with very poor success. The reason for that is that the wages outside are necessarily, under present circumstances, very much larger; and in the matter of the seafaring part of it, the Shipping Board and the Army Transport Service pay men for a similar class of work anywhere from two to three and one-half times the amount that the Navy pays. These men, naturally, under those circumstances, will not come back to us.

The situation as to officers has been affected in the same way. We have had thousands of applications for discharges of officers. I say thousands, with full knowledge of what it means. We have accepted a total of about 1,450. Of these officers some, but not many of them, were Naval Academy graduates. We have kept that down to the lowest limit possible.

There are now pending about 88 applications for resignation. The number of resignations is, I am glad to say, decreasing; but with a limited number such as we have, about 2,850 graduates of the Naval Academy, the loss of 150 to 200 is a very great factor to us, and we can not fill up the line of the Navy other than through the Naval Academy. The regular Navy now consists of 4,301 officers line and staff combined. Since the armistice the resignations of 439 regular officers have been accepted. There are a total of 124 of whom 88 are line officers, now pending. If these are accepted, there is no question but that many more will come in, and the only deterrent is either not to accept them, or to accept them as slowly as possible.

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Of officers temporarily commissioned in the regular Navy, that is warrant officers, civilians, and enlisted men who were commissioned in the temporary Navy, and who could, if they had so wished, have held on to their commissions, over 11,300 have resigned from the line alone. These officers were in the grades of lieutenant, lieutenant junior grade, and ensign. They could have held these commissions if they had so desired; but the inducements were greater outside than the Navy offered them, so that they left us. Many of them were very excellent men, whom we were very desirious of keeping; but on a comparison between the conditions in the Navy and on the outside, it would seem that two-thirds of the officers who were commissioned into the regular service from sources other than the regular Naval Academy source, resigned in order to accept civilian employment, 200 of the medical officers of the regular service have resigned and the Medical Corps is to-day probably worse off than it has ever been.

It may be accepted as a fact that naval officers are not paid enough to induce them to remain in the service under present conditions, and in order to insure any rate of competency it will be necessary to pass some sort of a pay bill. That not only applies to the officers, but it applies tenfold to the men. Under present rates of pay, you can, of course, get officers in the lower grades, of ensign and junior lieutenant, officers of a kind; but they are not the officers we wish to keep and to promote on up through to higher grades.

None of our ships at the present time can be considered well officered. I think I might say that not one in the service is properly officered to-day, and not one can be considered as properly manned.

The condition is worse than it probably ever has been in the history of the Navy with reference to officer and enlisted man personnel. Officers of mature age, who have families, unless they have independent means, can not, under present circumstances, leave until they are assured of some employment outside, and for that reason we are holding the married ones more extensively than the single ones, who go out with no other ties to bind them.

Practically all the officers feel keenly their present financial condition. Increased rank, due to war promotion of all officers of over eight years' service, has made an increase of pay of from 11 to 18 per cent. This increase has been effective only since July 1, 1918, and has afforded utterly inadequate relief.

Prior to 1918 the last material raise of pay that the officers had was in 1899.

In general, the officers are in straitened circumstances, and are getting deeper and deeper involved. This can not result in effective service.

Most of the younger officers who are young enough to entertain the idea of accepting outside employment, are devoting their spare time in endeavoring to obtain this employment, and I have no doubt but if the resignations of those now pending are accepted, we will have a good many applications from others coming in right afterwards. At the present time the Secretary is holding up all of those who have had less than eight years' service. On the 1st of July we will have a large number of those 8-year men who will complete their service—of the class that graduated eight years ago.

The CHAIRMAN. The policy is to allow those who have had more than eight years service to resign if they see fit to do so?

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Admiral WASHINGTON. The policy is, and my effort has been, to induce them to stay, and when they have come up to talk to me about it, I have held out the hope that something would be done, and in a short time they could probably get on their feet again. That has been my personal effort with them, because the Navy at the present time has practically one-half of the allowed number of officers, of Naval Academy graduates. It is just about one-half. We are allowed 5,449, and we have about 2,820; and we have this large number of resignations, about 88, now pending, which will practically reduce us to less than one-half; and that has been after four years to build it up from the Naval Academy. The Naval Academy will not fill up the line of the Navy for 10 years under the present circumstances.

In the matter of desertions among enlisted men it has become within the last six months appalling, and it has affected a class that we have never had show up that way before; that is, the petty officers and chief petty officers. During the last six months of 1919 there were 4,666 desertions from the Navy. Among these were 1,057 petty officers and senior rated men, of whom 60 were chief petty officers. We have never had a condition like that before. It has been a rare thing, indeed, that a chief petty officer would desert; but they are going now at the rate of so many a month.

During January of the present year there were 898 desertions, including 103 petty officers, of whom 13 were chief petty officers.

In February the number was smaller, due no doubt to the fact that the Atlantic Fleet was in southern waters, where desertion is very difficult; that is, there was no chance for them to leave the ship. Had they been north, I have every reason for believing that desertions would have been greater than in January. The total for the month of February, however, was 765, including the desertions of 60 petty officers, of whom 7 were chiefs.

I do not think that the history of the Navy will afford a condition of the enlisted personnel to parallel anything like that.

During the present year, 1920, the loss by expiration of enlistment of trained men will be, by actual expirations, 16,931, and of that 16,931, from the present outlook, I do not think we are going to get 10 per cent to stay with us.

During the year 1921 there will be 30,814 whose enlistments will expire, and if conditions continue, it may be that we will not get any of them. The result will be that we will have the Navy possibly 90 per cent manned by men on their first enlistments, and from those first enlistment men we have to make up our petty officers and chief petty officers.

We have at the present time, roughly, 101,000 men in the Navy. Of those nearly 70,000 are on their first enlistment—recruits. Now, if we add to that 70,000 these 30,000 who go out in 1921 and the 16,000 who go out in 1920, the present year, we will have left with us about 65,000 men who will have had less than three years' service in the Navy to-day. It is impossible to run efficiently a Naval Establishment on that basis.

The CHAIRMAN. You will lose most of your best men?

Admiral WASHINGTON. We lose all of our best men. I do not say all of them, but we lose so many that I can almost say it is all. The reenlistments are very small.

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These men write, and their families write, the most appealing letters to let them out; that they have not got enough money to support their families and they can not do it. They come to me daily, and the number of letters will probably run up in the hundreds every day.

In addition to that, you gentlemen probably know about the number that appeal to you.

We discharge daily an average of probably 30 on the requests of Members of Congress because of dependency. We examine each one of these cases, go into it as thoroughly as we can, and we do not let them go unless the dependency is shown to exist subsequent to their enlistment, or unless something for which this man is not really responsible has occurred since enlistment; and then we invariably let him go. I will read to you from the last two or three days' daily reports. I have only brought three with me, I see. Here is the one of March 25. We had 49 desertions. We discharged 161.

On April 6 there were 6 desertions and 77 discharged.

On April 7 there were 52 desertions and 124 discharged.

So that the Navy has shown since July of 1919 a rapid going down hill. It has been to a large extent due to desertions. The number of recruits that we get in just about balances the number that are discharged for one reason and another. It has hung around 101,000 to 104,000 now for about three months. The recruits that we get are not comparable in ability, capability, and development with what we had prior to the war. It is getting a little better in caliber now, but the good men are not coming into the Navy at $32 per month. Most of our enlistments—practically 80 per cent of them—are for two years, because the men will not come for longer periods.

Now, I will take these reports I have just read to you, beginning with the one on March 25. These reports were picked up at random from the reports on my desk as I left.

Out of 91 recruits 70 enlisted only for two years. We can not develop a man—the best in the world—in two years and get any good out of him.

On April 6, out of 121, 61 of them were for two years, and only 1 of them was for four years.

On April 7, out of 74 recruits 54 were for two years and 3 for four years.

That has been the general run of them. I do not think the two, three, and four year ratios will in any manner change. They are practically holding at 75 to 80 to 85 per cent of two-year men. That means that we can not really send these men on a foreign cruise. We give them four years' training at a training station, and we are tempted to send them on a foreign cruise. If we sent them to a foreign station, we would have to bring them back within six months after they had arrived on the station, because of expiration of enlistment. The sole cause of this, or rather the cause of 95 per cent of it, is the low rate of pay which these men get. The department has repeatedly written to both committees of Congress and called attention to this going-down-hill condition of the enlisted personnel, once on August 28, to the chairman of the Committee on Naval Affairs; on the 9th of September——

Senator TRAMMELL. What year; last year, 1919?.

Admiral WASHINGTON. 1919.

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The CHAIRMAN. You refer to the Committee on Naval Affairs of the House?

Admiral WASHINGTON. No; of the Senate. On the 9th of September we wrote to the chairman of the Committee on Naval Affairs of the House, and on the 13th of November again to the House, and on the 20th of December to the Speaker of the House, and on the 13th of February to the Chairman of the House committee, and in these letters we endeavored to express to them—to the two committees—the unfortunate condition in which the enlisted personnel was getting.

I would not be so very much concerned about it if these desertions were not taking place from the petty officers. A petty officer of the Navy leaving us, disguising himself, and going into the Shipping Board or the Army Transport Service, can always get from three to four times the amount of clear pay that he would get from the Navy. He leaves us, and he goes alongside of a transport within 50 yards of him, and his pay is trebled. We can not increase our pay except by act of Congress. The other branches of the Government service, such as the Shipping Board and the Army Transport Service, to which I refer, have lump-sum appropriations, and they therefore can change their rates of pay to agree with the existing conditions.

In the foreign services they have realized this condition since the war, and all of the important foreign navies have raised the pay of their services from one and one-half to two and one-half times, and, as I understand it, they have done it largely with money borrowed from this country.

The reenlistments among the old men are practically nil. They are so small that they are practically negligible, and, furthermore, they are not the most desirable men who reenlist with us. The best men can get better jobs elsewhere.

The number of enlistments, notwithstanding the greatly increased efforts that we make throughout the country, has been going down since the armistice, beginning with January, 1919. We began voluntary enlistments in December of 1918, so that I have taken my figures from 1919. Our reenlistments have gone down from well up into the thousands to the present time, when the figure is only 813 for a month—that is, 813 out of a Navy of 104,000. That is an awful showing. The number of desertions has increased almost from month to month. The largest number of desertions was in December—1,035. The number for March—last month—was 882. The number of two-year enlisted men was 29,834, as against 2,126 for three years.

The number that we are giving their discharges to for one cause or another, but always sufficient and good, that is principally family dependency, was in January over 3,000, in February about 2,100, and in March about the same number, 2,400.

Now, in giving those discharges I have endeavored throughout to keep it down to the lowest limit possible, because we need the services of these men. We have brought them in at the Government expense and we have given them four months' training at the training stations; and yet I have got to let them go, because of the strong appeals of their families and dependents. We have stopped enlisting men who have any dependents, so far as we can find out at the time of enlistment; but many develop afterwards, and we have to let them go.

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I think we let go possibly something about 30 per day on account of applications of Members of Congress from their districts.

The officer personnel has gone down not to as great an extent as the enlisted men, not in the same ratio; but as officers are harder to get and it takes longer to train them, the general effect has been much worse than that in the case of the men. We are at the present time short of regulars in the line of the Navy, 2,638 officers, 414 doctors 98 dentists, 380 supply officers, 57 chaplains, 155 constructors, 23 civil engineers. In other words we are short 3,765 officers, and we have got a total of about 4,300 left. We have afloat on the different ships in the dreadnaught class, 954 officers. We should have about 1,500.

On the predreadnaughts we have got 444. We should have about the same number, 1,500 there.

On the armored cruisers we have 207. They need about 1,200.

On the gunboats they have 60. They should have 150.

On the destroyers they have 875; they should have about 1,800.

On the submarines they have 269; we need about 400.

Those are line officers I am speaking of now.

The staff are proportional. I am just referring to the number of the line we need.

The Naval Academy this year will turn out about 290 officers, and resignations will pull that down to somewhere in the neighborhood of 200. At the present time we are short in the enlisted force, the authorized enlisted force, 68,529 men.

The monthly loss—that is, the loss by discharges in excess of recruits—is about 440.

On their first enlistment, on the 1st day of March, their first four-year period, there were 79,471 men out of a total of 101,911. In other words, we had about 21,000 men who had served in the Navy more than four years, and of these 21,000 men there are practically not more than 15 per cent of them reenlisting.

We polled one of the ships a short time ago, to get the petty officers who would be discharged within the next six months or a year, and out of the total number of petty officers on board that ship there was only one who announced his intention to reenlist. That was on one of the dreadnaughts.

I have here, if the committee wishes to hear it, the proportion of men forming the complements of these ships. It is very unsatisfactory reading; it is all adverse.

Senator TRAMMELL. I do not think it is necessary in order to get a general idea of the conditions. I think he has given us a pretty good general idea of the deplorable conditions.

The CHAIRMAN. If you can sum it up in a general way, I think that would be enough.

Admiral WASHINGTON. I can sum it up in a general way, or I can read off some of these figures to show the unfortunate condition that we are in with reference to them.

In the Pacific Fleet—that is under the command of Admiral Wilson—the percentage of complements by ratings which will be left on board that squadron on the 1st of August, 1920, is shown here. I have taken one battleship as a sample, and that will be a fair sample of the rest of them, to give you an idea of how the petty officers will run after August 1, when their discharges take place, the balance of

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those petty officers will be discharged before July 1, 1921. That is by the expiration of the enlistment of the rest of them—but on August 1, 1921, of boatswain's mates, first class, there was 61 per cent; boatswain's mates, second class, 30; coxswains, 22; gunners' mates, first class, 5 per cent; second class, 6 per cent; third class, 26 per cent; turret captains, 86; quartermasters, first class, 16 per cent; second class, 32 per cent; third class, 56; seamen, 21 per cent, seamen, second class—that is, new recruits—23 per cent (that is where we make up as much as possible for the deficiency); chief electricians, 70 per cent; electricians, first, second, and third class, average about 20 per cent; radio men, 47 per cent; carpenters, about 30 per cent; shipwrights, 93 per cent; shipfitters, 69 per cent; plumbers and fitters, 25 per cent; painters, about 50 per cent; chief machinist's mates, 67 per cent; machinists, first and second class, 60 per cent; engine men, about 35 per cent; water tenders, about 70; boilermakers, 80 per cent; blacksmiths, 25 per cent; coppersmiths, first class, none; second class, 37: firemen will run about 60 per cent.

That is typical of that battle fleet to-day. Our battleship fleet to-day we have manned by about 70 per cent of a crew, and we have destroyers turned over to us almost from week to week, and many of them probably have not more than two to four or six men on board. We have not got the men to put on to keep the machinery in order.

The CHAIRMAN. And about what percentage of officers?

Admiral WASHINGTON. We have just slightly above one-half of the number of line officers allowed by law.

Big destroyers should have six line officers, and that would require, roughly, about 1,800 officers. Our total of Naval Academy graduates to-day is about 2,120.

The CHAIRMAN. And the percentage of officers that the battle fleet has?

Admiral WASHINGTON. The percentage of Naval Academy officers is about 60 per cent. I did not figure it out, but that is small. We try to keep at least three Naval Academy graudates on each big destroyer, and fill up the complement by taking former warrant officers, or from the reserves.

The CHAIRMAN. You have stated that the pay in foreign navies is from one and one-half to two and one-half times what it was before the war.

Admiral WASHINGTON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Ours is how much more than it was before the war?

Admiral WASHINGTON. None.

The CHAIRMAN. Before the war?

Admiral WASHINGTON. I do not think it is anything. We have not had any raise in pay since 1917.

The CHAIRMAN. The bills that are before Congress provide for an increase in pay. Do you think they would have the effect of stopping these desertions in the Navy and getting enlistments in the Navy?

Admiral WASHINGTON. It is the only way. You can take this table graphically represented here, and show the effect. When it seemed that Congress was going to pass a bill in December, you can see how the enlistments and reenlistments went up [indicating on table]; and then when the issue was sort of side-stepped, you can see

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how it went back. You can see that curve there, which indicates how more favorable action was anticipated by the men.

At Bay Ridge, N. Y., we had some 1,200 to 1,400 men whose enlistments had expired or were about to expire. We are allowed to keep them two months. There were men there who had been 12 years to 16 years in the Navy, and we tried to get them to stay on the score that Congress was about to pass a bill for them so that they could make both ends meet; and these fellows held on there and that station was more or less crowded by these men waiting; and I intended to put them on Admiral Wilson's fleet in January. When Congress adjourned in December without any action several hundred of these men immediately asked for their discharge and it was given to them. We could not break faith with them. Others held on in the hope, that as we had stated, something would be done early in January to better their condition. January came and passed, and none of them went; and then the desertions began, and the desertions came of chief petty officers; and as I stated before, that is the most appalling feature of that to-day, to lose those petty officers in the way they are going. It hurts the morale. It has such a bad effect on these new men coming in, to see a petty officer or a chief petty officer, men who have been in the Navy from 8 years to 16 years, leaving it; and we do not get these men back. Rarely, indeed, does a chief petty officer come and surrender himself, and it is not really right, under the circumstances, to try to chase them up and punish them. The human side of the thing enters pretty largely into it.

The CHAIRMAN. You have shown us very largely and conclusively the critical condition of the personnel of the Navy, and your idea is that the remedy that must be applied and should be applied at once, is the increasing of the pay of both officers and men?

Admiral WASHINGTON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And we can not be too quick about doing it?

Admiral WASHINGTON. Mr. Chairman, it ought not to be delayed an hour. I am holding out inducements to these men from day to day, almost, to stay, in the hope that Congress is going to do something. As I said before, about 1,400 of these men, as I recollect, were willing to hold on. They are old-timers and they were holding on at the receiving ship in New York, with the hope that by December, before the adjournment of Congress—and we had every reason for hoping that—a bill would be passed. I let the information go out very generally, because I had been informed by the members of the House committee that that bill was very likely to go through before the Christmas recess. Those men were willing to stay and ship over and go south with Admiral Wilson's fleet.

The 1st of January came and no action, and the fleet went south and they were separated from their families, and their Navy pay is not enough to meet their expenses, and they naturally asked for their discharge, and it was given to them. And then, to make matters worse, the comptroller rendered an opinion to the effect that those men who went out of service and then reenlisted with us could not get the $60 bonus that Congress gave them, so that by going out and leaving us as they did, they got $60 to start with, and that is where I say that this $60 bonus is an inducement for those men to leave. They have at least had $60 to start in life with.

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I can get many of those men to come back, I think, and if they come back within 60 days they will get the benefit of their previous service, which is a matter of great importance to them; and I believe they will come back, many of them, and it is the only outlook I have that is favorable at this time. I do not believe that the recruits we are getting are going to develop into proper naval men under four years' service, and 70 to 80 per cent of those men are two-year men, and we can not train a man in two years and make a chief petty officer of him.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any questions, gentlemen?

Admiral WASHINGTON. I believe that the only solution of this personnel matter is to have immediate action on the pay bill. It must be taken if we are going to hold the men. A man will not stay with us for $32 when the Shipping Board or the Army Transport Service will give him $100 plus his subsistence.

I do not know whether the committee is aware of the different rates of pay which the Navy has to compete with, because it is quite illuminating. I have a few of them here. First, take the apprentice seaman. That is when we enlist a man for the first time, and we give him $32.60 a month. That man can go to an Army transport or to a Shipping Board vessel and he immediately gets $75, and then he gets $1.50 to $2 a day for subsistence and other expenses. I am sorry that I have not the complete tables here.

A seaman, second class, which is the next rating, gets with us $35.60. With the Army Transport Service and the Shipping Board he gets $100 plus his allowance.

In the engine room, boiler room, or fire room force we start them in the first rates at $48.70. They start them at $130 a month.

A ship cook with us, a first-class man that is qualified and has been with us possibly 4, 8, or 12 years, we try to retain him at $52. They immediately start him at his initial employment at $135.

A chief commissary steward with us, who is a man who has been probably 4 years to 16 years in service in the Nvay, is started at $83. The Shipping Board and the Transport Service start that same man at $135, and in addition to that he gets allowances which figure up to some $60. In other words, he gets more than three times his Navy pay. And those people bid for our trained men. I believe if the Congress were to pass a bill, at least so far as the men are concerned, I believe that this condition in the enlisted personnel would be immediately cured.

Admiral Wilson shows that on one of the battleships in his fleet 62 per cent of the crew are only 19 years of age. Now, that is the best we can do. They are mere boys.

Senator TRAMMELL. The Bureau of Navigation and the Secretary of the Navy have been urging this raise in Congress, as I understand; have you?

Admiral WASHINGTON. They have urged it in writing and urged it in person. The Secretary himself made recommendations as far back as last November, and since then he has followed them up by three letters to the chairman of the House Naval Affairs Committee and to the Speaker of the House and the chairman of the Naval Affairs Committee, and there were others.

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Senator TRAMMELL. He recommended increased pay both for the officers and enlisted men?

Admiral WASHINGTON. Yes, sir.

Senator TRAMMELL. The remedy, then, is for Congress to pass a pay bill increasing the salaries for both officers and enlisted men? That ought to correct this, in your opinion?

Admiral WASHINGTON. That is the only thing, so far as I can see, that will have an immediate effect, and I believe that that effect will be strictly beneficial. The pleas that come in to me from day to day there—and they run up into the scores—are heart-rending, on the part of these men. They are separated from their families and their families are away at home, and they can not make both ends meet. Their wives are at work, and they can not even make all that is necessary, under those circumstances, and it appeals to me to such an extent that almost invariably I let them go. It is better to have fewer men, possibly, that are contented, than a lot of men that are discontented; but you can not let them all go.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any recommendations as to legislation as to bonuses or terms of enlistment that you would make now, or is this other the critical question?

Admiral WASHINGTON. This is the critical question, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you would not interfere in any way with the present law?

Admiral WASHINGTON. No, sir; I think that if Congress will pass the measures that are now before the House and Senate conferees, I believe that the problem will be to a considerable extent solved. At least, it should be tried. The conditions are approaching a condition almost that portends disaster. We have not got now, to-day, a ship that is thoroughly and efficiently manned. Well, that is possibly putting it a little strong.

Admiral WILSON. That is right.

Admiral WASHINGTON. But there is not a vessel in there that is manned as we would have her manned if it was possible to do otherwise; but the circumstances are such that you can not do otherwise, and the whole difficulty lies, I think, with Congress' inaction on that measure. These men have been in the service anywhere from 4 to 20 years, and they can not stay any longer.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to say that I had a talk yesterday with the Secretary of the Navy about our plan to have Admiral Washington come before us, and he heartily approved of the plan.

Senator TRAMMELL. I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any other questions, Senator?

Senator BALL. No.

Senator KEYES. I have none.

The CHAIRMAN. We are very much obliged to you, Admiral Washington, for the very valuable information you have given us.

Admiral WASHINGTON. Not at all, sir. I would like to insert in this record these valuable tables, which I have not referred to, but which I think will be very illuminating on the subject.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

(The tables referred to are here printed in the record as follows:)

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Officer personnel, Mar. 1, 1920.

	Allowed regular and temporary until June 30, 1920.	Allowed regular and temporary for 137,485 enlisted men.	Regulars in service Mar. 1, 1920.	Temporaries in service Mar. 1, 1920.	United States Naval Reserve Force on active duty.	Shortage of regulars Mar. 1, 1920.	Shortage of regulars Jan. 1, 1920.	Average monthly loss from Jan 1, 1920, to Feb. 28, 1920.
Line	6,800	5,499	2,827	2,438	864	2,672	2,638	17
Medical	1,393	1,167	734	366	196	433	414	10
Dental	213	179	114	29	.....	99	98	½
Supply	816	660	286	387	96	374	380	3
Chaplain	171	144	87	11	17	57	57	.....
Professional	10	10	10	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Constructor	340	275	129	152	39	146	155	4½
Civil engineer	136	110	85	10	32	25	23	1
Total	9,879	8,044	4,272	3,393	1,244	3,806	3,765	36

Service of Regular officers since commissioning.

40 years and over	44
35–40 years	46
30–35 years	94
25–30 years	135
20–25 years	267
15–20 years	672
10–15 years	779
5–10 years	920

Employment.	Line.		Staff.	Chief warrant.	Warrant.	Reserve.	Total.
	Regular.	Temporary.					
At sea:							
Feb. 1, 1920	1,928	1,805	1,216	59	858	539	6,405
Mar. 1, 1920	1,924	1,785	1,219	60	833	475	6,296
Ashore:							
Feb. 1, 1920	777	675	1,130	114	425	752	[1] 3,873
Mar. 1, 1920	773	649	1,123	113	410	747	[1] 3,815

[1] Does not include officers in hospitals, on sick leave, or waiting orders.

Dreadnoughts	954
Predreadnoughts	444
Armored cruisers	207
Gunboats	60
Destroyers	875
Submarines	269
Prospective gains, Naval Academy graduating class of June, 1920	290
Losses, Feb. 1 to Mar. 1, 1920:	
Deaths	7
Resignations	14
Dismissals	5
Desertions	1

Naval enlisted personnel, Mar. 1, 1920.

Allowed by law up to July 1, 1920	170,000
In service Mar. 1, 1920 (from daily reports, file room)	101,471
Shortage	68,529
In service Feb. 1, 1920 (from daily reports, file room)	101,911
Total recruited and received for February	3,227
Monthly loss	440

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Quality of men in service Mar. 1, 1920.

First enlistments		79,471
Reenlistments		22,000
Apprentice seamen, about		28,000
Seamen, second class, about		24,000
Messmen branch, about		7,000
Desertions, Feb. 1		765
Discharged, February (not up to standard)		1,239
Number in trade schools, about		4,700
Graduated since Jan. 1, 1920		829

Employment.

At sea:		
Mar. 1, 1920		66,111
Feb. 1, 1920	65,862	
Under training:		
Mar. 1, 1920		15,730
Feb. 1, 1920	15,786	
At shore establishments:		
Mar. 1, 1920		14,270
Feb. 1, 1920	14,277	
Replacements:		
Mar. 1, 1920		5,360
Feb. 1, 1920	5,986	
From ships and station reports	101,911	101,471
Dreadnoughts, predreadnoughts, armored cruisers, cruisers, gunboats, destroyers, and submarines		41,169

(At 1 o'clock p. m., the subcommittee adjourned until to-morrow, Saturday, April 10, 1920, at 10'clock a. m.)

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NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

SATURDAY, APRIL 10, 1920.

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE
ON NAVAL AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to adjournment, in room 235, Senate Office Building, at 10 o'clock a. m., Hon. Frederick Hale (chairman), presiding.

Present: Senators Hale (chairman), Keyes, Pittman, and Trammell.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Admiral Fletcher, will you resume the stand? Senator Pittman, you have some questions, I believe, to ask Admiral Fletcher.

TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL F. F. FLETCHER—Resumed.

Senator PITTMAN. In virtue of the way the cross-examination seems to be drifting, and the statement of the chairman with regard to the purposes of the committee, I wish to read the authority of the committee in this investigation. The resolution adopted constituting this committee for this last investigation reads as follows:

That the subcommittee heretofore appointed to investigate the matter of awards made by the Navy Department for distinguished and heroic services be, and it hereby is, authorized and directed, on making its reports on the matter referred to, to investigate and report on the matters referred to in the letter of Admiral Sims to the Navy Department in criticism of its action touching operations during the war, introduced before the said subcommittee.

The chief charge in the letter of Admiral Sims touching operations during the war was to the effect that the course of the Navy Department delayed the war four months, and caused the loss of 2,500,000 tons of shipping and 500,000 lives, and the needless expenditure of $15,000,000,000. In your opinion, is that true?

Admiral FLETCHER. In my opinion that statement is without any foundation upon facts, and is wholly without value.

Senator PITTMAN. The cross-examination by the chairman yesterday seemed to have two purposes; in the first place, to establish the inferiority of our Navy, and in the second place, to establish that at some particular period of time prior to the war the Navy Department had not done exactly what it ought to do. What was the Navy's chief problem in carrying out this war?

Admiral FLETCHER. The chief problem of the Navy was to see that we got an Army across the Atlantic into France, where the war would be terminated on the western battle front.

Senator PITTMAN. The chief problem, then, was transportation?

Admiral FLETCHER. The chief problem was to afford transportation to our Army across the Atlantic.

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Senator PITTMAN. What Army did we have on the beginning of the war?

Admiral FLETCHER. We had a comparatively small Army; very insignificant as compared to the requirements of this war.

Senator PITTMAN. Were you present at any conference with Admiral DeChair with reference to the necessity for the immediate transportation of food supplies to the Allies, or to England?

Admiral FLETCHER. I do not remember any conversation upon that specific point, except that we discussed in general the conditions with which we were confronted at that time when he was over here, and I think that was just a short time before we entered the war.

Senator PITTMAN. Did you make any effort to ascertain what length of time England could hold out with the food supplies she was then receiving?

Admiral FLETCHER. That matter was discussed, because in my estimation that was a very important point. Of course, I naturally wanted information upon that. I was upon the committee appointed by the Government to receive the English commission headed by Mr. Balfour, who brought over from England all the latest information as to the situation and the conditions and requirements. I remember of having a conversation upon that subject, of just how long England could hold out against the submarine menace. It was a very important point, and I think it had been very carefully considered. The information that I received was to the effect that if the submarine menace had continued as serious as it was at that time, England would have been able to have held out until the following March; that is, the March of 1918.

Senator PITTMAN. What was the principal object of your making that inquiry of the English authorities?

Admiral FLETCHER. It bore on this fact, that it gave some indication as to the urgency of what we ought to do under those conditions.

Senator PITTMAN. Of course there was an urgency for us to get into the war as fast as we could, was there not, Admiral?

Admiral FLETCHER. I do not quite catch that.

Senator PITTMAN. I say there was an urgency that we should throw all the forces we could into this fight as soon as possible?

Admiral FLETCHER. That we should throw all the forces we could into the fight?

Senator PITTMAN. Yes.

Admiral FLETCHER. And that we should do everything we could, in our power, to stop the submarine menace at the earliest possible date; but in doing so you must weigh the risk that you take as to the gain that you obtain from it. In other words, it depends upon how urgent the situation is and just how far, in this particular case, you should leave your own shores entirely unprotected.

Senator PITTMAN. As a matter of fact, Admiral, there were a great many things we were required to do all at once, and in many cases we had to determine which was the most urgent, did we not?

Admiral FLETCHER. Exactly. It was a question of judgment and policy.

Senator PITTMAN. In your opinion, what was the greatest problem that our Government had to face in its preparation to win this war?

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Admiral FLETCHER. I would say, to throw all our energy into combating the submarine menace, which at that time was the most critical part of the war on the sea.

The CHAIRMAN. Did our Navy Department do that?

Admiral FLETCHER. As far as I know, they did. I do not know just what they did, because I was not connected with the operations of the fleet.

Senator PITTMAN. Was the preparation of an army one of our chief problems in this war?

Admiral FLETCHER. The creation of a trained and well-equipped army in France was, to my mind, the great problem of the war, and the mission of this country.

Senator PITTMAN. And you have already outlined in your testimony the tremendous obstacles that were to be overcome in the creation of that army?

Admiral FLETCHER. I have.

Senator PITTMAN. In other words, as I understood your conclusions, the chief obstacle to the creation of that army was the lack of production?

Admiral FLETCHER. That is correct. There were other causes, such as the time required to train the men. But that did not come under my direct observation.

Senator PITTMAN. There had to be places to house them and places prepared in which they might be trained, which bore on the question of production?

Admiral FLETCHER. And of training: yes, sir.

Senator PITTMAN. I gathered from Admiral Sims's testimony before this committee that he is of the opinion that all the naval operations should have been directed from London. What is your opinion in regard to that?

Admiral FLETCHER. I will say that that is an erroneous opinion, and to my mind impracticable.

Senator PITTMAN. Why do you think it is impracticable?

Admiral FLETCHER. Because the military or naval operations of a country depend very much upon the policy of the country; and, furthermore, it must be directed from some central source; that is the advantage of situation, grasping the whole theory of war, and all that is required, and should not be viewed from any one point of view; that for a military or naval officer in the field, so to speak, he is there to carry out the policy—the military operations required by the policy—of the Government, as directed by the Navy Department.

Senator PITTMAN. During my cross-examination of Admiral Sims touching the policy on the beginning of the war, of the Navy Department in protecting our own coast, I suggested that that was a technical question upon which the naval experts might differ, and the Admiral said that it was only a matter of common sense; that we might know that this coast was not subject to an attack, and there was no such intention. Now, what is your opinion in regard to that?

Admiral FLETCHER. Well, I will agree that it is a matter of common sense and good judgment.

Senator PITTMAN. I would like to know what your judgment is in regard to the policy that was pursued on the beginning of the war of protecting our own coast?

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Admiral FLETCHER. My opinion is that we should have sent all available small craft that we could reasonably spare from this coast across to fight the submarine menace; but I think it would have been a very bad policy to have left this coast without any protection before we saw what phase this problem would assume, and I think that if we had left our coast entirely unprotected, and several submarines had appeared off our coast, it would have been very unfortunate; that the slight delay that may have been—if there was any—was of very minor importance as compared to the disaster that might otherwise have occurred.

Senator PITTMAN. Germany did possess submarines that she could have placed on this coast at that time, did she not?

Admiral FLETCHER. They did have submarines that they could have sent over here and it was incomprehensible to all the naval men on this side as to why she did not send them.

Senator PITTMAN. If she had sent over submarines right on the beginning of the war to our coast, what might have been the effect of it if our coast had been unprotected?

Admiral FLETCHER. Well, I think it would have caused, to put it mildly, great consternation in this country, and would have had a very unfortunate influence upon subsequent operations. You could imagine that had we sent all our small craft abroad, and had the German submarines then appeared, they would have had to have been called back from across the Atlantic; and I doubt that this country would have been satisfied to have again sent them across the Atlantic without a great deal of difficulty. It would have delayed our subsequent operations.

Senator PITTMAN. It is very probable that Germany was very well informed as to our actions on this side at the beginning of the war, is it not?

Admiral FLETCHER. There is no doubt about it.

Senator PITTMAN. And if we had denuded our coast of protection, Germany would have known it?

Admiral FLETCHER. I believe she would, unquestionably.

Senator PITTMAN. And she would have been more apt to have sent her submarines over in that event than in the condition that actually existed?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes, sir.

Senator PITTMAN. So that I think your answer, then, explains what you mean by saying that it was a matter of common sense.

You state that in your opinion we should have spared all of the destroyers that we could to meet the submarine menace. Did we do so, in your opinion?

Admiral FLETCHER. I did not go into that problem in detail at the time, but my general impression is that we took prompt steps toward sending destroyers over there in the course of the first few days, within the first month or more of the commencement of hostilities. But you can get that information, I think, from Admiral McKean.

Senator PITTMAN. We have had some testimony on that, of course.

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes. Mine is only general.

Senator PITTMAN. Was there any extensive enlargement of the Navy prior to 1916?

Admiral FLETCHER. I beg your pardon?

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Senator PITTMAN. What I am getting at is, the cross-examination here seems to attempt to arouse a criticism that our Navy was not large enough.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not think it is proper for the Senator to impute a motive in the cross-examination.

Senator PITTMAN. I naturally thought that you had some intention, and if that is not it, I do not know what it is.

The CHAIRMAN. That is your lookout.

Senator PITTMAN. I am looking out. The opinion I gathered from the cross-examination—and of course if I am wrong the chairman can correct me—was that it was an attempt to develop the fact that the Navy Department had been derelict in its duty in not having a larger naval force upon the outbreak of this war. Now, that is what I was getting at. You have already testified that it takes years to build up a Navy. Do you know, prior to 1916, what progress there was made toward building up the Navy?

Admiral FLETCHER. The progress that we made in building up the Navy has been determined absolutely by the appropriations by Congress.

Senator PITTMAN. In 1916, I believe it was, the General Board of the Navy recommended certain increased personnel for the Navy, and under date of November 9, 1916, placed the number of men we should have during the fiscal year 1917 for all requirements, the smallest number, at 67,000, and in 1917, with a full complement for all ships ready for service in 1917, and the minimum number for shore stations, that we should have 74,700.

Subsequently the board revised those figures to 67,865. In other words, the General Board of the Navy reported almost a double increase in personnel at that time, as I take it.

On October 10, 1916, the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation made the following report to the Secretary of the Navy:

> Appreciation of the immediate needs of the service has been shown to be nation wide, and in the recent naval appropriation bill Congress carried out the wishes of the people by enacting legislation of far-reaching importance. This includes a provision for an immediate "authorized enlisted strength" of 68,700 men and 6,000 apprentice seamen, a total of 74,700. Preparation for the future was not neglected and the same bill authorized the President in emergency to increase the authorized enlisted strength to 87,000. It is evident that Congress considered the present needs of the Naval Service in deciding on this number at this time, as the usual additional allowance of apprentice seamen, 6,000, would provide for an actual enlisted strength of the Regular Navy of 93,000.
>
> It is interesting to note that the above figure closely approximates the bureau's preliminary estimate of 93,957, which provides for the number of enlisted men (including average sick allowance) necessary to fill the billets in 1921, the year of completion of almost all of the present program. From 5 to 10 per cent should be added to this for increased complements and working surplus, and the authorized enlisted strength should be increased to this number in time for the necessary recruiting and training.

In your opinion does not that indicate that the recommendations of the General Board were put into force by Congress in 1916?

Admiral FLETCHER. I am speaking only from memory, and my general knowledge that the General Board recommended something like an increase of 30,000 men, and by act of Congress they increased the personnel of the Navy by 28,000 men, about, I think, August, 1916.

Senator PITTMAN. Yes; so that at that time the personnel of the Navy was in good condition?

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Admiral FLETCHER. Yes.

Senator PITTMAN. Was the personnel of the Navy continued in good condition until we entered the war in 1917?

Admiral FLETCHER. I think it was considered in good condition. The active personnel engaged in operations afloat were well trained and well drilled and up to a high standard.

Senator PITTMAN. In 1916 the General Board recommended a Navy program, did it not?

Admiral FLETCHER. I believe they did.

Senator PITTMAN. That program involved a great increase not only in the personnel of the Navy but in the ships of the Navy, did it not?

Admiral FLETCHER. The program, I think, that you refer to, is what is known as the five-year program, and that provided——

Senator PITTMAN. Which Congress made the three-year program out of? That is the one I refer to.

Admiral FLETCHER. A three-year program?

Senator PITTMAN. Yes.

Admiral FLETCHER. And that did provide for quite a considerable increase.

Senator PITTMAN. Our Navy protected to its full capacity and ability the transportation of food and materials and soldiers to the allies, did it not?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes, sir.

Senator PITTMAN. That was the duty and the obligation of the Navy in the war—the chief duty and obligation?

Admiral FLETCHER. Under the conditions of this war, that was the principal objective of the Navy.

Senator PITTMAN. And without regard to the advisability of whether we should have had a larger Navy or not, the Navy we did have fully performed its services?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes; I think that is a correct statement.

Senator PITTMAN. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you anything, Senator Trammell?

Senator TRAMMELL. I do not think that I have any questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pittman has made a statement as to what the principal charges were in the letter of Admiral Sims to the department, and I would like to insert in the record here section 78 of Admiral Sims's letter, which sums up the charges that are made in this letter of Admiral Sims. I think it will appear very evident that there are other matters contained in the letter besides the charge that the war was delayed for a specific period.

(The section of the letter referred to is here printed in the record as follows:)

78. The above brief account of the manner in which our naval operations were conducted clearly shows that the following grave errors were committed in violation of fundamental military principles; and it is manifestly desirable that such violations should be avoided in the future:

(1) Although war with Germany had been imminent for many months prior to its declaration there were nevertheless no mature plans developed or naval policy adopted in preparation for war, in so far as its commander in Europe was informed.

(2) The Navy Department did not announce a policy until three months after war was declared—at least, not to its representatives and the commander of its forces in Europe.

(3) The Navy Department did not enter whole-heartedly into the campaign for many months after we declared war, thus putting a great strain upon the morale of the fighting forces in the war area by decreasing their confidence in their leaders.

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(4) The outbreak of hostilities found many important naval units widely dispersed, and in need of repairs before they could be sent to the critical area.

Destroyers arriving in the war zone had been cruising extensively off our seaboard and in the Caribbean, and when war was declared were rushed through a brief and inadequate preparation for distant service.

(5) During the most critical months of the enemy submarine campaign against the allied lines of communication the department violated the fundamental strategical principle of concentration of maximum force in the critical area of the conflict.

(6) The department's representative with the allied admiralties was not supported during the most critical months of the war, either by the adequate personnel or by the adequate forces that could have been supplied.

(7) The department's commander in the critical area of hostilities was never allowed to select his principal subordinates and was not even consulted as to their assignment. A fundamental principle of the art of command is here involved.

(8) The Navy Department made and acted upon decisions concerning operations that were being conducted 3,000 miles away, when the conditions were such that full information could not have been in its possession, thus violating an essential precept of warfare that sound decisions necessarily depend upon complete information.

(9) Instead of relying upon the judgment of those who had had actual war experience in this particular warfare, the Navy Department, though lacking not only this experience, but also lacking adequate information concerning it, insisted upon a number of plans that could not be carried out.

(10) Many of the department's actions so strongly implied a conviction that it was the most competent to make decisions concerning operations in the war zone that the result was an impression that it lacked confidence in the judgment of its representative on the council of the Allies and its responsible commander in the "field."

It is a fundamental principle that every action on the part of superior authorities should indicate confidence in subordinates. If such confidence is lacking, it should immediately be restored by ruthlessly changing the subordinate.

(11) "To interfere with the commander in the field or afloat is one of the most common temptations to the Government—and is generally disastrous." (The Influence of Sea Power upon History; Mahan.)

The Navy Department did not resist this temptation, and its frequent violation of this principle was the most dangerous error committed during the naval war.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, you have stated that our coast was subject to attack by German submarines at the outbreak of the war?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And that therefore it was necessary to keep vessels over here to protect our coast; and that it would have been inadvisable to have sent them abroad, because later they would probably have had to be brought back to this country. Now, Admiral Sims in his recommendations explained to the department that the critical place where the submarines should be attacked by our Navy, and the critical place that should be defended by our Navy was over on the other side, and he took the ground that we should send our ships over—all available ships—as soon as possible, in order to handle the situation over there. His recommendations were not immediately followed. Subsequently, however, they were followed, and his recommendations were adopted. Does that not indicate to you, Admiral, that he was right, and that the people on this side who had charge of the plans of the department were wrong?

Admiral FLETCHER. No; I can not say that that necessarily follows. It is so easy to say that if you had done something else, things would have been different, and better. I can readily understand how Admiral Sims, from his point of view, which was necessarily limited under the conditions which surrounded him, would do, as you state, and as he recommended, would put them all right where they could carry out his ideas, on the task that confronted him immediately; but I do not think that, reviewing the whole broad situation, that was a correct view.

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The CHAIRMAN. But the department subsequently adopted his plans.

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And his recommendations.

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And we won the war.

Admiral FLETCHER. As the war developed, we saw and could readily determine the probability of submarines coming to this coast, and we very rapidly developed a defense to meet them, and as rapidly as we developed that defense every available craft we could operate here was sent abroad.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, Admiral, you say that if we had sent these ships over very early in the war Germany would then have undoubtedly sent more submarines over to this country to attack our shipping over here, and that that would have caused us to bring back our ships from the other side. If that is true, why did not Germany send some submarines over here so as to prevent our sending ships over there?

Admiral FLETCHER. As I stated before, it was incomprehensible to us why she did not do it, and the only reason we can assume for her not doing it was because we retained enough craft on this coast to provide against any contingency of that kind.

The CHAIRMAN. You did not do it; and if you judge from events, Admiral Sims's recommendations were right, were they not?

Admiral FLETCHER. I think not. I can not agree with that view.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I have not heard an explanation why not.

Senator PITTMAN. We did not send all our ships over there.

The CHAIRMAN. You say that in your opinion operations should not have been directed from the other side. I think you mean by that that the general plan should be dictated from this side, and that the carrying out of the operations should be made on the other side. Is not that so?

Admiral FLETCHER. That is right; yes, sir. The carrying out of the details of the plan should be left, as far as practicable, to the superior officer in the field of operations.

The CHAIRMAN. And do you not think that the recommendations of the superior officer in the field of operations, about ships that he would need to carry out his detailed operations, should carry very great weight?

Admiral FLETCHER. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. You say that the chief problem was to get a thoroughly equipped army over on the other side.

Admiral FLETCHER. That was the chief mission of this country in the war; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And the only way to do that was by transporting them over to the other side, was it not?

Admiral FLETCHER. That was a very important feature.

The CHAIRMAN. It was an essential element of their being on the other side?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You would give it as your opinion that those troops should be thoroughly trained on this side before they were carried over?

Admiral FLETCHER. They should be trained as far as practicable, and the amount of training that they would receive would depend upon the urgency of the situation.

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The CHAIRMAN. But you are not a military expert as far as land troops are concerned?

Admiral FLETCHER. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not attempt to maintain that?

Admiral FLETCHER. No, sir; I am speaking only from a general point of view.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand.

Admiral FLETCHER. I would say that the amount of training that our troops received on this side depended upon the urgency with which they were needed on the other side. If the situation became very urgent, of course we would send them over with less training than we would like to give them.

The CHAIRMAN. And an equally important item, so far as those troops are concerned, would be the feeding of them, the supplying them with provisions and whatever they needed while they were over there, would it not?

Admiral FLETCHER. That is very essential, particularly in war.

The CHAIRMAN. It is equally important with carrying them over?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. So that anything that would delay the transportation of the troops, if they were otherwise ready, or that would prevent us supplying them after they got over there, would essentially tend to protract the war, would it not?

Admiral FLETCHER. Naturally, yes, sir; that would. Any delay in getting our Army over there, speaking generally, would cause a prolongation of the war.

The CHAIRMAN. In your statement you say you do not think that the failure to send ships over or to follow out Admiral Sims's recommendations, prolonged the war a single day?

Admiral FLETCHER. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. You say that because the troops were not in your opinion ready to go over at that time in large numbers?

Admiral FLETCHER. Were not equipped and not supplied. I repeat that we could have sent a million men over there four or five months sooner than we did, and they would not have constituted an army.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the most effective work that the Navy did during the war, in general?

Admiral FLETCHER. The most effective work, I should say, was combating the submarine menace, the protection of the transportation of our troops across the Atlantic, and the laying of the North Sea barrage. Those were the three outstanding features.

The CHAIRMAN. And you think they did a good deal to combat the submarine menace?

Admiral FLETCHER. A great deal; yes, sir. They did very active and very efficient work.

The CHAIRMAN. And you think, after they took hold over there that that had a great deal to do with checking the losses on account of submarines?

Admiral FLETCHER. A great deal to do.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you not say, therefore, that the sooner they got at it the better?

Admiral FLETCHER. Certainly.

The CHAIRMAN. And, in view of the fact that during the first two months of the war the submarine losses were greater than at any

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other time during the war, if we had been able to send ships over there it would have done a great deal to cut down those losses, would it not, as it did later on?

Admiral FLETCHER. It would have done a great deal. The sooner we got into it, of course, the more shipping would have been saved. But, in addition to our getting into it, there are a great many other features that tended to decrease the submarine menace, besides the active operations of our forces.

The CHAIRMAN. But that had a great deal to do with it, had it not?

Admiral FLETCHER. It had a great deal to do with it; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you recall when Mr. Balfour was over here? You referred in your testimony to Mr. Balfour's visit to this country. Do you recall when that was?

Admiral FLETCHER. I was appointed on a committee with Assistant Secretary Long of the State Department and Gen. Wood representing the Army, to go to Halifax and receive the commission, and I was with that commission several days; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. When was that?

Admiral FLETCHER. I am speaking from memory, but I think it was in March, 1917. I will have to verify that date.

The CHAIRMAN. April, 1917?

Admiral FLETCHER. It must have been April, Mr. Chairman, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you talk with him personally, at that time—with Mr. Balfour?

Admiral FLETCHER. I had some conversation with him, but only of a general nature; nothing of a specific or of a detailed character that pertained to naval matters.

The CHAIRMAN. Did he not bring out, when he was over here, the extreme importance of the putting down of the submarine menace? Was that not one of the principal things that he was advising our country upon?

Admiral FLETCHER. I think that is correct. That is my impression, that that commission did emphasize very strongly the importance of the submarine menace.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, you say that England could have held out with the supplies that she had on hand, until the following March? I do not want to quote you incorrectly.

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes, that is correct, except as to limiting it to the supplies on hand. It not only included the supplies on hand, the supplies in reserve, the supplies in the warehouses and the stores, but it included the supplies of the harvest that was coming on in the next year, it included the supplies that could be gotten through the submarine zone, the war zone, and all the imports that would come into the country for the next year.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, you mean if she could bring her supplies in without interference from submarines, she could have kept up?

Admiral FLETCHER. It meant that in spite of the loss of shipping that was taking place, a certain amount of supplies could always be gotten into England until the shipping was reduced——

The CHAIRMAN. What do you base that on; upon what losses per month?

Admiral FLETCHER. I presume that was based upon what was taking place at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. What rate was that?

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Admiral FLETCHER. About 800,000 tons, I think, a month.

The CHAIRMAN. And at the rate of loss of 800,000 tons per month, you think that England could have kept up until the following March?

Admiral FLETCHER. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. A short time ago we had Mr. Hoover before us, and I think Mr. Hoover was fairly familiar with food conditions at that time.

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And he said, "It is obvious that the war would have come to an end in almost a month if the supplies were cut off."

Admiral FLETCHER. If the supplies were cut off the war would come to an end very promptly.

The CHAIRMAN. That England had no supplies, practically, on hand that would enable her to go on; that she depended entirely upon the supplies that she got in from the outside.

Admiral FLETCHER. And upon what she could have raised during the summer.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have anything to do with a conference which was held in this country, where the officers, the representatives of the foreign Governments, were here?

Admiral FLETCHER. I was present at that conference which took place in the room of the general board, and at which were present the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Operations, the admiral representing the English Government, Admiral Browning, and Admiral Grassot, of the French Navy, Admiral Mayo, and several other officers.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you recall anything that happened at that conference?

Admiral FLETCHER. I recall in a general way that there was a discussion of the situation as it existed at that time, and as to what steps we could most effectively take to aid the Allies, and I recall particularly the discussion in reference to the situation in the Atlantic and the North Atlantic and the Caribbean and the South Atlantic, and that we arranged then and there what part of the patrol of the ocean we should take and the part assigned to the French and the part assigned to the English.

We also discussed the question of convoy and how best the ships to carry supplies could be protected, whether by single armaments, or by convoys. That is what I remember, in general, of the conference—the ground that it covered.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you recall whether anything was said about the gravity of the submarine menace at that time, and whether any demand was made on us that we do everything we could to help out?

Admiral FLETCHER. We discussed the submarine menace in general but no stress was laid upon the gravity of it in that conference. It was generally recognized that that was a very important and serious matter to deal with, and I think that the steps that were taken subsequently in detail to carry out our general ideas were taken by arrangement with the Chief of Operations and in conference with these officers. That I can not tell you in detail.

The CHAIRMAN. But that was not looked on as a particularly important part of the conference—that question?

Admiral FLETCHER. Not that, except in a general way.

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The CHAIRMAN. In his testimony the other day Admiral Wilson said, referring to this conference:

Before the conference ended, the Secretary of the Navy turned to the visiting flag officers and told them that he had noted the facts and suggestions given in the communications from their admiralties which they had read; that they could inform their admiralties that our Navy Department "accepted them in principle," and agreed that vessels of our Navy would be sent overseas to cooperate with the naval forces of our associates.

These communications, as I recollect them, while suggesting the manner in which our Navy could best help the Allies, and stating their needs as to types of ships, did not express any dire need for help or great urgency for it.

You agree with that statement, do you?

Admiral FLETCHER. As I have just said, we discussed it in general, but there was no particular stress laid upon the urgency of the case as regards submarines.

The CHAIRMAN. In his testimony of March 30, 1920, Admiral Mayo states—and the admiral was present at that meeting, was he not?

Admiral FLETCHER. Admiral Mayor and Admiral Wilson, as I remember it, were present at this conference.

The CHAIRMAN. Rear Admiral Mayo testified as follows:

At this conference Vice Admiral Browning explained the mission of his force, and read a communication from the British Admiralty interrogating the representatives of the United States as to the nature of the assistance the United States Navy was prepared to render, and stating the desire of the British Admiralty for assistance especially in antisubmarine craft. Rear Admiral Grasset explained the mission of his division and requested that the United States assist in the patrol of the Caribbean.

Admiral FLETCHER. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the language of the statement in Admiral Mayo's testimony?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. That would indicate that they called very special attention to the submarine situation, would it not?

Admiral FLETCHER. Not very especially, I should say.

The CHAIRMAN. I have read it.

Admiral FLETCHER. But they did call attention to it. Now, I recall—I am speaking only from memory, I made no notes at that time—I think that the French did ask, and all they asked for was 12 vessels, small craft, to go to the coast of France.

The CHAIRMAN. But the British were the ones that were handling the submarine situation principally on the other side, were they not?

Admiral FLETCHER. Principally; yes.

The CHAIRMAN. That is, whatever the French were doing was practically under the British?

Admiral FLETCHER. Principally; but it also included the French coast.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, yes; under British command everywhere, was it not?

Admiral FLETCHER. It centered around the British Isles more than it did in the other theaters of war; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The allied naval command was British, was it not?

Admiral FLETCHER. The allied naval command?

The CHAIRMAN. Was under the British?

Admiral FLETCHER. No, sir; I do not think it was.

The CHAIRMAN. On the other side, in European waters; in war-zone waters?

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Admiral FLETCHER. Yes. I think the commands were independent; but that they coordinated with each other to a common end. I do not think that the French Navy was placed under British command at all. It was entirely independent, and so was the Italian Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. Practically as ours was?

Admiral FLETCHER. No, sir; it was not placed under the control of the British as ours was.

The CHAIRMAN. It was not?

Admiral FLETCHER. No, sir. Admiral Wilson can tell you more accurately than I can; but that was my impression.

The CHAIRMAN. Your testimony does not quite agree with Admiral Mayo's, then, about the importance that was laid upon the submarine menace at this conference.

Admiral FLETCHER. I do not think that my testimony differs very much, Mr. Chairman; but we did recognize the importance of the submarine menace.

The CHAIRMAN. The Admiral states in his account of this meeting, and of the communications from the other side, that Admiral Browning, who, of course, represented the British, read a communication from the British Admiralty interrogating the representatives of the United States as to the nature of the assistance the United States Navy was prepared to render, and stating the desire of the British Admiralty for assistance especially in antisubmarine craft.

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That is an account of the statement of Admiral Browning?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes; I will accept that statement of Admiral Mayo. That accords entirely with my impression.

The CHAIRMAN. And therefore that was a very important matter, was it not?

Admiral FLETCHER. I always recognized the submarine menace, as I said before, as a very urgent and important matter.

The CHAIRMAN. And it was brought before that conference that it was a question of great importance?

Admiral FLETCHER. Oh, yes; it was brought before that conference, and certainly considered.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, Admiral, if there was any delay in sending ships over that were needed, upon the recommendations of Admiral Sims, and if there was any delay following his other recommendations—any delay that could have been avoided—on whom would the responsibility rest?

Admiral FLETCHER. If there was an unnecessary delay?

The CHAIRMAN. Any unnecessary delay; yes.

Admiral FLETCHER. In sending our craft abroad when they were not needed on this coast, the responsibility for that is fully up to the Navy Department.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you mean by the Navy Department?

Admiral FLETCHER. Well, the Navy Department—this particular question that we are discussing refers to the question of the operations of the fleet. It would come under that general head.

The CHAIRMAN. It was a question of policy, rather, was it not?

Admiral FLETCHER. Of policy, and the operation of the fleet; yes, sir. And that, of course, would be up to the Chief of Operations and

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the Secretary of the Navy, or the Secretary of the Navy and his advisers.

The CHAIRMAN. But the ultimate responsibility under the organization now would be with the Secretary of the Navy?

Admiral FLETCHER. The ultimate responsibility would be with the head of the department; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You have made certain statements to-day, Admiral, about the question of the personnel of the Navy.

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I shall want to look over your statement on that matter, and it is probably that at some future date the committee may want you to come before them again to explain certain matters connected with your statement.

Admiral FLETCHER. Very well, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And also any other matters, of course, that may occur to us at the time.

I have already spoken to you about submitting recommendations for any plans you may have for a necessary reorganization.

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes, sir.

Senator PITTMAN. Now, Mr. Chairman, I am going to object to that, not because I would not be interested in it——

The CHAIRMAN. Object to what?

Senator PITTMAN. I am going to object to the preparation of any plans for the reorganization of the Navy Department, on the ground that it is beyond our jurisdiction. I read the resolution upon which this subcommittee was created. My only objection to it is that I desire to complete this work that we are doing, and if another subcommittee is to be appointed, it may be very well to do that. I am not passing on that question. That is a matter for the general Naval Affairs Committee to determine. But we have certain specific duties to perform, and there seems to be an effort, or rather an inclination, to get away from that and to drift off into another subject. This will be the third time we have drifted away from the subject, and I raise the point of order. Of course I know that it will not be decided favorably at the present time, but I am going to take it before the full Committee on Naval Affairs of the Senate, so that we may be able to make a report upon the subject which we were appointed to consider and report on, and not have it interminably dragged out all summer, dealing with subjects that we are not authorized to consider.

The CHAIRMAN. We shall undoubtedly, Senator Pittman, report on the matters which we are authorized to act upon here; but I consider that it is entirely a part of that report, if we find anything that should be remedied in the organization or in any other way in connection with the department, and I consider it entirely proper for us to make recommendations; and I consider that it will be of great help to us in making such recommendations if we could get expert advice from expert officers in the department.

Senator PITTMAN. I will just read once again, here, to support my protest, the language of this resolution:

To investigate and report on the matters referred to in the letter of Admiral Sims to the Navy Department in criticism of its action touching operations during the war.

Now, you can see, if this committee is going into the question of the reorganization of the Navy, I will be deprived of the privilege of

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being here, because I have other matters to perform during the rest of the year.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not think we will decide, probably, how the Navy is to be reorganized, but I think it is entirely germane for us to get recommendations by expert officers in the department; and I can not conceive of anyone who has the best interests of the Navy at heart wanting to head off any such recommendations.

Senator PITTMAN. I do not want to head them off.

The CHAIRMAN. If our report is to be of real value, we want to get all the information we can, and hear all the objections we can; and this is in line with my suggestion.

Senator PITTMAN. I understand, but there is no use in ducking the issue that is before us on any patriotic theory.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not think we are ducking the issue, because we are going to report on all those other matters as well.

Senator PITTMAN. We would be under the suspicion that we have gotten enough of this subject and want to get into another. As a matter of fact, I think it is a good idea to report on this subject and then have the chairman recommend to the full committee with these patriotic suggestions, and then have another subcommittee formed. This subcommittee here is not the whole Naval Affairs Committee, and there may be some of the members of that Committee who are better qualified to act than we are on that broad subject.

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly; but what we proposed to get is the testimony from experts as to what will be the best thing to do, and I do not think that we need to fear the suspicion that we are not going into the whole matter as thoroughly as we can.

Senator PITTMAN. I shall certainly make my protest.

The CHAIRMAN. You can make your point of order.

Senator PITTMAN. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. I take it you have no objection to our counting Senator Ball as being present, although he is not here to-day, and to my acting for him.

Senator PITTMAN. No; I have no objection at all, except that there is no doubt but what we are expanding the thing away beyond our authority, and not only that, but I think all of us have served rather faithfully in this long drawn-out matter, considering the benefits that we have derived, and I, for one, desire to be relieved of any further consideration of this matter after this matter is terminated. I think it is perfectly fair that any member of this committee, after terminating his duties under this authorization should be permitted to perform some other senatorial work, and I am not going to act on the committee beyond its authority, and certainly, if another committee is appointed I shall present my excuses why I should not.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you object to the hearing of these officers about their ideas of a reorganization?

Senator PITTMAN. No. I would be charmed to hear from them at the proper time and under proper authority. I should like to have them at dinner, and I would like to hear every one of the British admirals and every one of the French admirals on this subject. There are so many interesting things in regard to this war in naval matters that if I had nothing else to do I think I could enjoy myself for 12 months upon it.

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The CHAIRMAN. You can make your objection before the committee. You suggested that we go ahead, I think, Senator?

Senator KEYES. Yes.

Senator TRAMMELL. I would be glad to have the chairman cite his authority for going into the question of investigating the plans for reorganization of the Navy, under the authority granted to this committee.

The CHAIRMAN. I think we are here to investigate the charges made in the letter of Admiral Sims, and having investigated the charges made in the letter of Admiral Sims it seems to me entirely pertinent for us to make recommendations, and we can best make those recommendations after we have had advices from expert officers in the department.

Senator TRAMMELL. I do not think the scope of our authority, though, embraces the question of reorganization of the Navy, and that is what we are going into, when you request the expert opinions of different naval officers as to their ideas of reorganization of the Navy. That has nothing to do with Admiral Sims's criticisms or the charge that the war was not properly carried on by the Navy Department. I do not think it has anything to do with it.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not agree with you, gentlemen, and I do not think you will carry your point about not having these reports.

Senator PITTMAN. I am perfectly confident we will not carry it here.

The CHAIRMAN. I am perfectly confident that you will not in the full committee. However, you have made objection, and we will put the matter to a vote, and those in favor of asking Admiral Fletcher to appear with suggestions for a reorganization will say aye. I understand you have no objection to our counting Senator Ball's vote?

Senator TRAMMELL. No, sir.

Senator PITTMAN. If the chairman feels perfectly confident that Senator Ball would vote that way.

The CHAIRMAN. I have already talked with Senator Ball upon the matter.

Senator PITTMAN. Then of course there would be only a delay if we objected.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Have you any objection, Senator Trammell?

Senator TRAMMELL. I have no objection to inquiry or investigation being made into the opinions of different naval officers as to their ideas of reorganization of the Navy, because we want to better the service if it can be bettered; but I do not think it is within the province of this committee under its authority under this resolution, and the subcommittee was never designated for that purpose. That is the reason that I vote against it.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you anything further, Senator?

Senator KEYES. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is all, Admiral Fletcher, and you may be excused.

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes, sir; thank you.

TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL HENRY B. WILSON—Resumed.

Admiral WILSON. Mr. Chairman, I ask to have two corrections made in the record of my testimony of the other day.

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The CHAIRMAN. Will you state them?

Admiral WILSON. Yes, sir. On page 2197, in the answer to the fourth question from the top; the question and answer read as follows:

The CHAIRMAN. You have no knowledge of Admiral Sims's communications?
Admiral WILSON. All I know was that the decision was made before he communicated, because he could not have communicated until after he had arrived there, and that decision was made prior to his arrival.

The CHAIRMAN. I will have to see the record, Admiral.

Admiral WILSON. The reason I wanted to correct my answer was, I thought that I was right, but I looked it up, and I find the meeting took place on the 11th, and Admiral Sims arrived in London on the 10th; and his first communication was dated in London the 14th.

The CHAIRMAN. It is simply a question of verifying the fact as to the dates?

Admiral WILSON. Yes. I said there in my cross-examination—not in my main testimony, or I would have had it a little better—that the decision was made prior to his arrival. It was made a few hours after his arrival.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral WILSON. Then on page 2204 of the typewritten record, the fifth question, there is a rather serious mistake. In the original manuscript of my statement, I spoke of "cold storage," but when it was copied by the typewriters in the department an error was made, so that it was made to read "coal storage," in the several copies furnished to the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. That accounted for my questions about coal storage, then.

Admiral WILSON. Yes; and that is what I was confused about. I remembered that we had a little coal there. I looked it up and found that mistake out. Therefore, I wish to make the answer to the question read:

We never had any trouble with coal. My statement refers to "cold storage," and not "coal storage."

You asked me this question:

The CHAIRMAN. You say that you increased the coal storage at Brest from 350 tons to a capacity of 750 tons?

I said that we never had any trouble with coal; and then I turned to my aid, who was sitting beside me here, and he looked at the copy before him, and the word in it was "coal," and he became confused; so that my statement refers to "cold storage," and not to "coal storage." That corrects the whole thing and makes it look right.

The CHAIRMAN. Put something in your statement there to the effect that it was a clerical error.

Admiral WILSON. Yes; I have made my statement here.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. Admiral, you stated in your testimony that as president of the board of inspection just prior to the war you were acquainted with the condition of the United States vessels, and that the Navy so provided by Congress was ready for war.

Admiral WILSON. I did, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, can you state that the vessels available for scouting and screening duty with the fleet were ready and manned in all respects for war?

Admiral WILSON. Oh, no, sir; they were not.

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The CHAIRMAN. Then, how do you say that the Navy as provided by Congress was ready for war?

Admiral WILSON. Well, they were ready when they were called upon for use. They did not keep them going all the time. The gun boats were doing duty in the West Indies. As I told you, one of the cruisers was on duty in the Mediterannean, and some of our vessels were coast guard vessels. In my statement, sir, I take up the question that war was declared on April 6, and of the forces assigned to me, or I should say assigned to the patrol force, of the 55 vessels definitely assigned to the patrol force, 24 were on stations by April 16.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, I asked you definitely whether the Navy as provided by Congress was ready for war on April 6, and you have stated that the Navy was ready for war.

Admiral WILSON. I think so.

The CHAIRMAN. Then, I ask you if you can state if the vessels available for scouting and screening duty with the fleet were ready and manned in all respects for war?

Admiral WILSON. They were not all manned, but they were ready for war.

The CHAIRMAN. In what respects were they ready for war?

Admiral WILSON. They were ready as ships.

The CHAIRMAN. But without crews?

Admiral WILSON. Without crews, probably some of them.

The CHAIRMAN. Then, they were of no value until the crews had been provided?

Admiral WILSON. No ship is of any value until the crew is on board.

The CHAIRMAN. Please answer my question.

Admiral WILSON. I am answering you.

The CHAIRMAN. I wish you would give direct answers to my direct questions. I find that on going over the record some of the answers are not as clear and succinct as they should be. In order for your testimony to be of any value, we have got to have direct answers to the questions asked.

Now, will you name the vessels in the Navy in May, 1917, that might have been ready for scouting and screening duty?

Admiral WILSON. I will name the ships that were assigned to the patrol force in the mobilization plan of March 21, 1917.

The CHAIRMAN. And in doing so, please state whether they were ships that could have been used for scouting and screening duty in each case, please.

Admiral WILSON. Yes, sir. The *Olympia*, scout; *Chester*, scout cruiser; the *Des Moines*, cruiser; the *Androscroggin*, coast guard vessel, scout; the *Birmingham*, scout cruiser; the *Sacramento*, gunboat; the *Ossipee*, coast guard, cutter; the *Dolphin*, gunboat; the *Chenango*, cruiser; the *Gresham*, coast guard vessel; the *Tacoma*, cruiser; the *Denver*, cruiser; the *Seneca*, coast guard vessel; the *Cleveland*, cruiser.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the *Cleveland*, an armored cruiser?

Admiral WILSON. No, sir; a cruiser.

The CHAIRMAN. You have not named any armored cruisers?

Admiral WILSON. No armored cruisers were assigned to my force. The *Raleigh*, cruiser; the *Onondaga*, gunboat; the *Albany*, cruiser; the *New Orleans*, cruiser; the *Apache*, I think a Coast Guard vessel.

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In addition to these vessels I know we had in the service about eight armored cruisers. I could not say from memory what duty they were performing at that date, except that I remember there were two or three in the Pacific, and that there was one in the Mediterranean.

Now, the vessels that I have named from the mobilization sheet refer to the part of my statement in which I say that of the 55 vessels definitely assigned to the patrol force, 24 were on station by the 16th of April, 13 more joined by the 20th of April, and on the latter date 18 had not reported, and that 5 of these were Coast Guard vessels being fitted out for service in the Navy, while others were still on foreign stations, and some were undergoing extensive repairs. I have no data to go into any more detail about it. I suppose that can be found from the Division of Operations.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you Chief of the Board of Inspection?

Admiral WILSON. Yes, I was president of it.

The CHAIRMAN. What were your duties as Chief of the Board of Inspection?

Admiral WILSON. We inspected all ships for material, upkeep, and reported on what we thought were necessary repairs.

The CHAIRMAN. Of ships of the Navy?

Admiral WILSON. Of ships of the Navy, which we were ordered to inspect by the Secretary of the Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. That is, he assigned particular ships you were to inspect?

Admiral WILSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You did not inspect the ships generally, of the Navy?

Admiral WILSON. I got around pretty well to all the ships on the Atlantic coast.

The CHAIRMAN. On the Atlantic coast?

Admiral WILSON. Most of our ships were on the Atlantic coast.

The CHAIRMAN. You had nothing to do with the inspections on the Pacific coast?

Admiral WILSON. The ships on the Pacific coast were inspected by a subboard, the papers of which came to our office.

The CHAIRMAN. So that they were to report to you?

Admiral WILSON. In that general sense.

The CHAIRMAN. So that you should have had, and probably did have, a report on all of the vessels of the Navy, no matter where they were?

Admiral WILSON. Yes, sir; and I think we had a pretty good report and a pretty good idea of what they were. In addition to that, we inspected and ran the acceptances and final trials of all new ships on contract work.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, Admiral, can you give the committee, for insertion in the record, a full statement of all of the ships of the Navy at the outbreak of the war, and of the degree of preparedness that they were in, both as to material and to personnel?

Admiral WILSON. No, sir; I can not; but it can be done, up in the Division of Operations, very well, sir. I have got other duties now that occupy me——

The CHAIRMAN. Have you not records that show your reports at the time the war broke out or at the time——

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Admiral WILSON. This board of inspection made individual reports, so far as the Material Division of the Navy Department was concerned, the aid for material, when I was on the board of inspection, was my chief, Admiral Winterhalter, afterwards transferred to Admiral McKean. I think Admiral McKean could give you that from reports.

The CHAIRMAN. But you can not give that yourself?

Admiral WILSON. No, sir; not in detail.

The CHAIRMAN. And you do not personally know?

Admiral WILSON. Ah!

The CHAIRMAN. If you personally know, you can give it to us now.

Admiral WILSON. But you are going back now and trying to trip me up on the question of what I said about the preparedness.

The CHAIRMAN. I want the information. The committee is not trying to trip anybody up, and we do not care for such accusations.

Admiral WILSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, I ask you if, of your personal knowledge, you can tell me about the ships in the Navy which could have been used for scouting and screening duty with the fleet at the beginning of the war?

Admiral WILSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, I have a number of questions to ask you about it.

Admiral WILSON. I have told you the names of the ships.

The CHAIRMAN. You have given all of those with which you are familiar?

Admiral WILSON. I have given you all of the ships which I think were available. There may be others. If I should take the reports of the chiefs of the bureaus, I might find more. But all that I have with me to-day is this report on the mobilization of the patrol force.

The CHAIRMAN. When you say "available," you mean ready?

Admiral WILSON. No, I mean that were built.

The CHAIRMAN. That were of a nature to be used as scouts or screening vessels?

Admiral WILSON. Exactly.

The CHAIRMAN. The list that you have given comprises all the vessels in the fleet—in the Navy—that at the outbreak of the war which in your opinion could have been used for scouting or screening duty?

Admiral WILSON. I did not say so, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I asked you.

Admiral WILSON. I said it comprises a list of the ships that were mobilized in the patrol force.

The CHAIRMAN. That is not what I asked you.

Admiral WILSON. I am not able to answer your question, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You are not able to answer it?

Admiral WILSON. No, sir; in detail; because I have forgotten what ships—that has been three years ago, now, and I do not remember the names of all the ships.

The CHAIRMAN. I think you stated the other day that the reason that there were not sufficient scouting and screening vessels with the fleet was because Congress did not appropriate for them.

Admiral WILSON. Why, to come right down to a straight answer——

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I want.

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Admiral WILSON. Yes; you can not by any reason call these vessels scouting and screening vessels, in the sense that it is applied now.

The CHAIRMAN. Which vessels?

Admiral WILSON. That I have named.

The CHAIRMAN. You can not?

Admiral WILSON. Scouting and screening; they are only slow speed. Battleships move at high speed these days. The only three ships in all that force that an Admiral would care to have along with him for scouting and screening, that we had in service there, are the *Birmingham*, the *Chester*, and the *Salem*. They made high speed.

The CHAIRMAN. How about the *St. Louis*?

Admiral WILSON. I do not think the *St. Louis* is very speedy.

The CHAIRMAN. What is her speed?

Admiral WILSON. I have forgotten; 22 knots. But she is hard on coal burning. She is a killer of the people down below in handling coal, and very hard to get at.

The CHAIRMAN. And as far as speed is concerned, a 22-knot vessel would be of use?

Admiral WILSON. Yes; but that is what she is put down for. I do not know how lately they have gotten 22 knots out of her.

The CHAIRMAN. How about the *Charleston*?

Admiral WILSON. The *Charleston* is a cruiser.

The CHAIRMAN. How about her speed?

Admiral WILSON. I imagine she is about the same thing.

The CHAIRMAN. How about the *Columbia*?

Admiral WILSON. The *Columbia* is in my command now, and she is used for carrying the captain of the train around, the man who has charge of the auxiliaries and supply.

The CHAIRMAN. What was her speed?

Admiral WILSON. It was very good at the time she was built; but she would noway make that now. She is a very old craft.

The CHAIRMAN. What was her approximate speed at the time of the outbreak of the war?

Admiral WILSON. If I threw my flag on board of her, of course she would make—I guess she is good for 16 knots.

The CHAIRMAN. How about the *Minneapolis*?

Admiral WILSON. The *Minneapolis* is in the same class. I suppose they could get 16 knots out of her.

The CHAIRMAN. And at the time of the outbreak of war, the same?

Admiral WILSON. Yes, I suppose so.

The CHAIRMAN. How about the *New Orleans*?

Admiral WILSON. I have forgotten the *New Orleans* and the *Albany*. No, I have given you those names. I read you the *New Orleans* and the *Albany* off of this list of mobilization.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I can not carry that all in my mind. I simply want to know, what was the speed of those boats?

Admiral WILSON. They are of pretty good speed. We took them at the time of the Spanish War. I suppose they are 20-knot boats.

The CHAIRMAN. We had about 8 armored cruisers?

Admiral WILSON. Yes; the armored cruisers were some of them in the Pacific, and one in the Mediterranean, and they took such large

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numbers of men to man them that they were held in reserve. I inspected them materially, and they were in pretty fair shape.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you not say that the eight armored cruisers and the *Chester*, the *Birmingham*, and the *Salem*, the *St. Louis*, the *Charleston*, the *Columbia*, the *Minneapolis*, the *New Orleans*, and the *Albany*, 18 ships in all, were the best if not the only loose cruisers available for sea-going scouts at that time?

Admiral WILSON. Exactly. I say that.

The CHAIRMAN. Were any of those vessels with the battleship forces when war was declared?

Admiral WILSON. No, sir. No, I take that back. I do not know. I know that in the mobilization plan of March 21 there was a large part of what you speak of there assigned to the patrol force, and I gave you the names.

The CHAIRMAN. But they were with the battleship force.

Admiral WILSON. I say, a part of that with the commander-in-chief's fleet; I mean Admiral Mayo's fleet. He was my commander in chief.

The CHAIRMAN. Which of those armored cruisers and which of those other ships I have spoken of were with you as a part of the battleship force?

Admiral WILSON. Oh. None.

The CHAIRMAN. None?

Admiral WILSON. You mean before I went to the patrol force?

The CHAIRMAN. I mean just before the outbreak of the war.

Admiral WILSON. I do not remember that any were, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Were any or all of these ships that had been provided by Congress, ready and fully manned for battle?

Admiral WILSON. Not fully manned; but they were ready if manned.

The CHAIRMAN. They were all ready?

Admiral WILSON. They were ready if manned.

The CHAIRMAN. How do you mean, manned?

Admiral WILSON. They were ready from a material point of view. I had nothing to do, as president of the board of inspection, with putting enlisted men on the ships. All I did was to inspect them to be put in commission, or to be put in full commission or in reserve.

The CHAIRMAN. Whereabouts were they stationed, do you know?

Admiral WILSON. As I said before, some of the armored cruisers, I think three or maybe four, were in the Pacific, one was in the Mediterranean, and I do not remember about the others. You could get all that from the Navy Department, I think.

The CHAIRMAN. But they were not with the fleet?

Admiral WILSON. With the fleet? Oh, no, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And therefore, although these ships has been provided by Congress, they were not with the fleet, and it was not through lack of action on the part of Congress that these ships were not with the fleet?

Admiral WILSON. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Immediately before the war?

Admiral WILSON. But they were mobilized as soon as we went into war.

The CHAIRMAN. You stated that the Navy was not willing to act solely on the defensive. Do you think that the fleet as a whole was

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in readiness to cross the Atlantic or to meet the German fleet in the middle of the Atlantic?

Admiral WILSON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And make as good a showing against it as the British did at the Battle of Jutland?

Admiral WILSON. No; for the reason that the British had a very much larger force than ours would have been, in fighting ships.

The CHAIRMAN. But, in comparison to the size of our forces, you think they were in equally good condition to meet the Germans as the British were to meet the Germans in the Battle of Jutland?

Admiral WILSON. They were large enough in size to meet them.

The CHAIRMAN. They were what?

Admiral WILSON. They were large enough in numbers to whip them.

The CHAIRMAN. Without any screening vessels?

Admiral WILSON. Oh, screening vessels are not of much use to you when you get into contact—when you get into a duel. They are useful in getting you there and getting you into your proper formation.

The CHAIRMAN. Would they not have been somewhat of a help if we had had them to help us get there?

Admiral WILSON. Oh, they are very desirable, but because you have not get them are you going to lay down when you meet the enemy?

The CHAIRMAN. Not lay down, but it is a great drawback not to have them?

Admiral WILSON. Yes; exactly, and that is the reason we want to get them now. There have been some appropriated for, and if we get them we will be in very good shape.

The CHAIRMAN. Then, you state these vessels that I have spoken about, at the outbreak of hostilities were not ready for battle?

Admiral WILSON. Except personnel.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, that is a rather important item.

Admiral WILSON. Every vessel. I had nothing to do, sir; mine was material—president of the board of inspection.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, we are not accusing you of anything.

Admiral WILSON. Oh, I do not expect anything like that. I do not feel that I am guilty of anything.

The CHAIRMAN. Nobody is accusing you, Admiral, of any dereliction in your duty.

Admiral WILSON. No; I know they are not. I do not want you to.

The CHAIRMAN. Therefore, if they were not in condition, you could not say that the whole Navy, as it existed in April, 1917, was ready for battle, could you?

Admiral WILSON. Well, sir, if we kept every craft——

The CHAIRMAN. I asked you a direct question, Admiral.

Admiral WILSON. I will have to answer that in an indirect way, if you want any answer at all.

The CHAIRMAN. I want you to answer it so that I can have a direct answer.

Senator PITTMAN. I think it is very unfair to an admiral in the Navy, from whom you are trying to get information——

The CHAIRMAN. I want something direct and definite.

Admiral WILSON. Let the question be read, Mr. Senator. I will give you an answer.

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Senator PITTMAN. There are some questions, you know, that can not be answered directly by yes or no.

The pending question was read by the stenographer, as follows:

The CHAIRMAN. So that if they were not in condition, you could not say that the whole Navy as it existed in April, 1917, was ready for battle, could you.

The CHAIRMAN. Why, Admiral, if a component part of the Navy was not ready, of course the whole Navy was not.

Admiral WILSON. I can not answer that question.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Senator PITTMAN. That is, by yes or no?

Admiral WILSON. Yes; I would be silly if I gave a yes or no answer to a question like that, and have it printed and go out to the service of my fellow officers to read, that I answered a question like that yes or no.

Senator PITTMAN. I think the chairman ought to appreciate that.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you accusing the committee of asking you silly questions, Admiral?

Admiral WILSON. No, sir; but you are not technical enough to understand it. My brother officers would consider it silly if I answered yes or no to that. It is not readily recognized that the Navy, doing their duty to the country and to the taxpayers, can not keep every craft we have, at all times, during peace, up to top notch in regard to personnel. But on the threatened outbreak of the war—which actually occurred on the 6th of April—then everything went with a "biz," as I told you, and we started off and put in everything we had; and anything that had any speed at all, and could drop a depth charge, was valuable.

The CHAIRMAN. I asked you if a certain important part of the Navy was ready, and from your testimony I gathered that they were not ready for battle. Then I asked you whether you could say as a general thing, that the whole Navy was ready for battle.

Admiral WINSLOW. I could not give you an answer that would be satisfactory to you.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I can not see but what that is perfectly plain English, Admiral, and it is a perfectly simple question to answer.

Admiral WILSON. I regret that I am unfortunate in not being able to answer that.

The CHAIRMAN. You stated, I think, the other day that in your opinion the whole Navy was ready for battle.

Admiral WILSON. Yes; and I repeat that.

The CHAIRMAN. You will repeat that?

Admiral WILSON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I wanted.

Admiral WILSON. Oh; but you said battle.

The CHAIRMAN. I asked you for battle.

Admiral WILSON. Yes; but you asked me the other day if it was ready for war, and I said yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Ready for war?

Admiral WILSON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. But not for battle?

Admiral WILSON. Oh, no; you take a ship and put her in comsion, and go out for battle. There is a celebrated case like that in the Revolutionary War where they were not ready, the crew had not

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been trained, but they took the chance, manned the vessel and went out, and down they went. Suicide!

The CHAIRMAN. And the fact of some of the vessels having been laid up at the navy yards, vessels which were important for work in the fleet, that they were not manned, and that there was not sufficient personnel to man them, would not interfere with the statement that the whole Navy was ready for war?

Admiral WILSON. No, sir; because you as a Senator would not give the Navy enough money to man everything we had.

The CHAIRMAN. That has nothing to do with my question, Admiral. Now, you are familiar with the battle of Jutland?

Admiral WILSON. Only the small bit that I read, sir, and I have not been able to get much. I have been waiting until we got something from both sides, so that I could put things together and study them up.

The CHAIRMAN. Did the English battleships do any considerable amount of execution in the battle?

Admiral WILSON. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What ships did?

Admiral WILSON. Battle cruisers, at first. The Germans were never keen or anyway anxious to get those two battleship forces together. They would have been silly if they had.

The CHAIRMAN. Did the English battleships attempt to get up to the front?

Admiral WILSON. Oh, I think they made every effort.

The CHAIRMAN. Was there any attack made on them by the German torpedo boats?

Admiral WILSON. Yes, sir; and they were protected by their own torpedo boats—their own destroyers.

The CHAIRMAN. What did the battleships do when they were attacked by torpedoes?

Admiral WILSON. I do not remember, exactly. I remember one time they turned away from the destroyer attack. I remember that, on one occasion; which is a proper manuever. It depends on what protection they had.

The CHAIRMAN. A battle is hardly a question of manuevering. It is a pretty serious question.

Admiral WILSON. Yes, sir; a very serious question; and it is so easy for anybody to criticize what was done then by that British admiral, with all that responsibility upon his shoulders, I think he is a remarkable man. People that do not go to sea do not know what it is, especially when you get in a little mix up.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you would say that a large number of destroyers were of considerable value to a fleet fighting even against battleships?

Admiral WILSON. Oh, yes, sir; destroyers. We want all we can get. I have now 8 battleships and about 32 destroyers down south, and our allowance is 54. I think we have about 32 destroyers. I think I said that yesterday.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Mayo stated in his testimony as follows:

* However, it should be pointed out that this fleet was lacking in types of vessels essential to efficiency, such as battle cruisers, scout cruisers, light cruisers, and fleet submarines; and, furthermore, there are none even now available.

Admiral WILSON. I am in accord with that, sir.

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The CHAIRMAN. And in spite of that, in spite of the fact that there were not sufficient destroyers with the fleet, you think that they were in a condition to go abroad and to fight, to go out in the middle of the ocean and fight the German fleet as it was at that time, and to be more effective than the German fleet?

Admiral WILSON. I said that I would go across the ocean and fight the German fleet, and we would whip her.

The CHAIRMAN. I have no doubt you would go across.

Admiral WILSON. No, but anyone would.

The CHAIRMAN. I mean, any officer would. They would do anything in the world to whip the enemy. That is the tradition of the Navy, and a splendid tradition; no doubt about that.

Admiral WILSON. Thank you, sir. I recognize, as well as anybody else, that the more of the accessories, of the auxiliaries, and everything like that you have, the better off you are; but any man who can not play the game until he has got everything perfect, I do not count him worth much.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you anything else, Senator Keyes?

Senator KEYES. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any questions to ask?

Senator PITTMAN. Yes. Admiral, Admiral Mayo testified in effect that his fleet was in the best state of preparedness that it had ever been in. Is that your opinion?

Admiral WILSON. That is my opinion. From all my experience in the Navy, I have never seen the force as it is, as constituted, in better shape than it was in the spring of 1917.

Senator PITTMAN. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. I will read into the record at this time Admiral Mayo's statement about preparedness of the fleet, which appears on page 1451 of the typewritten record:

When the active fleet arrived in Hampton Roads about the first of April after its training period in Cuban waters, it was in the best state of preparedness that it had ever been, and there was a feeling of confidence in the personnel of being able to cope with any emergency; the personnel was however on a peace basis and the transfer of trained personnel for armed guard and other duty was already being felt in a decrease in efficiency. The destroyers that were first despatched to the war zone, though they were assigned to operations for which they had not been especially trained, showed the effect of their general training by the efficiency with which they at once entered into their new duties.

However, it should be pointed out that this fleet was lacking in types of vessels essential to efficiency, such as battle cruisers, scout cruisers, light cruisers, and fleet submarines; and, furthermore, there are none even now available.

Admiral WILSON. The Admiral is also talking about crews and destroyers, after war has been declared.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is all, Admiral, and you may be excused.

Admiral WILSON. May I leave town, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. You may.

(Thereupon, at 12 o'clock m, the subcommittee adjourned until Monday, April 12, 1920, at 10 o'clock a. m.)

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NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

MONDAY, APRIL 12, 1920.

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON NAVAL AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to adjournment, in room 235, Senate Office Building, at 10 o'clock a. m., Hon. Frederick Hale presiding.

Present: Senators Hale (chairman), Keyes, Pittman, and Trammell.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Niblack, have you a statement to make about matters connected with this investigation?

Admiral NIBLACK. I have, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you proceed?

STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL A. P. NIBLACK, UNITED STATES NAVY, DIRECTOR OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE, NAVY DEPARTMENT.

Admiral NIBLACK. My official interest in this investigation is in its historical aspect as a whole rather than a controversy which deals with specific charges limited to a certain period, for Admiral Sims, in a statement as to the period of the war covered by his letter of January 7, states that "the period which it covers is almost wholly concerned with those critical months immediately preceding our entry in the war and the first year, or less, of our participation in the war," and later he corrected this testimony to say "my entire letter of January 7, 1920, refers to this early period of the war, practically all of it refers to the first six months, hardly any of it refers to anything out of the first year, 1917."

As Director of Naval Intelligence in the Division of Operations, Navy Department, I also have charge under my office of the "Office of Naval Records, and Library," which is maintained under the legislative, executive, and judicial appropriation. One of the items of this appropriation reads:

> Toward the collection or copying and classification, with a view to publication, of the naval records of the war with the Central Powers of Europe, including the purchase of books, periodicals, photographs, maps, and other publications, documents and pictorial records of the Navy in said war, clerical services in the District of Columbia or elsewhere, and other necessary incidental expenses, $20,000: *Provided*, That no person shall be employed hereunder at a rate of compensation exceeding $1,800 per annum.

The point of view which I therefore wish to lay before this committee is that historical facts rather than opinions are important. I am not here to defend any person, but am defending the United States Navy, which is now under fire, not of its enemies, but of its friends.

In connection with the work of collecting and classifying the naval records of the war with the Central Powers of Europe I am in a

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position to be informed as to the magnitude and scope of the efforts and activities of the Navy Department and the United States Navy during the war. As I served as a member of the General Board for 3 months and 10 days before our declaration of war, and went to sea on April 7, 1917, when the fleet was mobilized, serving in command of a division of four battleships and part of the time of a squadron of eight battleships on our coast, until October, 1917, and, moreover, as I was then transferred to the command of Squadron 2, Patrol Force, and of the United States patrol squadrons based on Gibraltar from November, 1917, to the conclusion of the war, I am in a position to bear first-hand testimony of a personal nature to some of the matters which Admiral Sims has brought before this committee in his letter.

While in the battleship fleet, the squadron I commanded was charged with the organizing and the duty of intensively training the men of the engineer's force of the Navy, as testified to by Rear Admiral Grant, and as commander of the patrol forces in the Mediterranean I cooperated in the antisubmarine operations in protecting the vast amount of merchant shipping which passed through the Straits of Gibraltar, representing one-fourth of the total allied tonnage of the world. I therefore have first-hand information as to the means employed for the protection of this shipping and the merits of the much-discussed convoy system for merchant shipping, which Admiral Sims says was one of the principal things which enabled the Allies to win the war. I also became familiar at first hand with the performance at sea of the armed guards on merchant vessels and have since become familiar with the historical data on file. From my own personal experience I can bear testimony to the great things which were accomplished by our Navy from the very outbreak of hostilities until the war was won, although I know little of my own knowledge of what is claimed the Navy Department did not do. I was in London in November, 1917, and received my instructions from Admiral Sims at the same time Admiral Benson arrived on his first visit, which marks the time when Admiral Sims says his troubles were more or less over, because he ceased to be almost alone in London and got an adequate staff, which a year later consisted of a total personnel of 1,200 at his headquarters, including the following officers and civilians on his personal staff:

	Officers.	Civilians.
Force staff	5	.....
Planning section	4	.....
Operations section, convoys and miscellaneous	3	.....
Operations section, antisubmarine	7	1
Secretarial and personnel section	8	.....
Aviation section	50	.....
Ordnance section	4	.....
Legal section	2	.....
Medical section	5	.....
Material section	10	.....
Disbursing section	5	.....
Repair section	3	.....
Intelligence section	13	.....
Communication section	68	.....
Scientific section	.....	2
Marine detachment, headquarters, London	2	.....
Special temporary duty, London	26	5
Duty in London, but not with Navy	3	.....
United States Naval Hospital, London	5	.....
Duty American Expeditionary Forces, France	4	.....
Total	227	8

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On the 20th of November, 1918, just after the armistice, Admiral Sims issued an order to the commanders of all bases in Europe and to the commanders of all forces, air stations, and principal port officers, to prepare a historical sketch of the activities during the war. This order was as follows:

1. The department, sometime since, directed the force commander to undertake the preparation of an official history of United States naval activities in European waters during the war, not to interfere in any way with the prosecution of the war. This task has been wholly impossible of accomplishment owing to lack of adequate and properly equipped staff, and this is so even under present circumstances.
2. It is extremely important that as much as possible toward preparing such a history be done before the present forces and bases are demobilized and officers who have been engaged in the various duties are separated from the records and files.
3. It is therefore desired that each base and separate detachment undertake at once a brief general historical sketch of its activities from the time it was initiated up to the present. It is thought that a general sketch covering the principal activities and the difficulties encountered can be prepared in a short time and with much less trouble now than later. Where war diaries are accessible, the work would be comparatively easy.
4. In addition to this sketch all statistical data that can be compiled before demobilization should be submitted covering the following subjects:
   1. Number of ships engaged by periods.
   2. Engagements with the enemy.
   3. Commendable service.
   4. Number of ships escorted.
   5. Other classes and character of duty (tabulated).
   6. Casualties; material and otherwise.
   7. Data showing volume of administrative work, communications, and so forth.
   8. Financial statistics.
   9. Statistics concerning number of inexperienced personnel handled. Changes in personnel.
   10. Any other statistics or compilations which will give a correct idea of the amount of work involved in our operations abroad.
5. It is realized that there have been many important questions involved in the work of the Navy abroad, particularly in difficulties encountered and surmounted, which are not matters of official record. All such questions should be brought out in a general way in the historical sketch above mentioned.

The commanders of all the various units in the naval forces in Europe have submitted the required historical sketch, copies of which are now on file in the historical section, with the sole exception of Admiral Sims himself, who has never submitted any report to the department of the operations of the forces as a whole, similar to that submitted by Gen. Pershing to the War Department, nor has he submitted any personal narrative except such as has appeared in the World's Work, and as expressed in his letter of January 7, which is now the subject of this investigation.

On July 28, 1919, the Navy Department wrote a letter to Admiral Sims asking him to write the history of the operations of the United States naval forces in European waters, and of all of our activities in Europe and our relations with European admiralties, not merely a technical report but an account that would give the American people a clear conception of what was accomplished and form an important part of the history of the war.

Admiral Sims replied, in a letter dated July 30, 1919, the closing paragraphs of which are:

It would, of course, be wholly impossible for me to undertake it even if I gave up my position at the War College and devoted my whole attention to it, and this for the simple reason that I have no capacity or aptitude for such work.

Moreover, I do not know of any officers in the United States Navy who is sufficiently experienced as an historian to do this work. The literary side of it alone is

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of the highest possible importance, and the job as a whole could be done creditably only by competent historians acting in collaboration with naval officers. I would not attempt, myself, to put out anything for the public to read which had not had the benefit of such literary advice.

I think you will recognize from the above brief summary of the situation that we can not hope for anything satisfactory unless this whole matter is taken up in a methodical way and put in the hands of competent people who are given the assistance and facilities that would be required.

As I have only $20,000 for next year to get together the facts as to this war, and as this committee is not limited in its expenses, I am glad it has the opportunity of getting the facts out of Admiral Sims and others. The proper perspective to write the real history of the war can only come with time and study, and this committee is apt to get more personalities and opinions than it does historical facts. In the sequence of events, the "critical months immediately preceding our entry into the war" are characterized by Admiral Sims as being worthy of special investigation. It is an interesting historical fact that Admiral Sims became president of the Naval War College on January 7, 1917, and left on his mission to England on March 28, 1917, during which entire time he was a member of the General Board and attended at least one of the monthly meetings. My services on the General Board covered exactly this same period, with a week before and a week after, and I, therefore, share with Admiral Sims the responsibility for any neglect in the critical days of 1917 in formulating any plans or making any recommendations looking toward our entry into the war. Neither Admiral Sims nor myself had been on duty in the Navy Department for many years prior to the critical days of 1917, but it should be noted that the General Board is the board of the Navy Department charged by law with the following duties:

1. The General Board shall devise measures and plans for the effective preparation and maintenance of the fleet for war and shall advise the Secretary of the Navy as to the disposition and distribution of the fleet and of the reinforcements of ships, officers, and men of the Navy and Marine Corps.

2. It shall prepare and submit to the Secretary of the Navy plans of campaign, including cooperation with the Army and the employment of all the elements of naval defense, such as the Naval Militia?, Coast Survey, Lighthouse Service, Coast Guard, and merchant vessels, and shall constantly revise these plans in accordance with the latest information received.

3. It shall consider the number and types of ships proper to constitute the fleet, the number and rank of officers, and the number and ratings of enlisted men required to man them, and shall advise the Secretary of the Navy respecting the estimates therefor (including such increases as may be requisite) to be submitted annually to Congress.

4. It shall advise the Secretary of the Navy concerning the location, capacity, and protection of fuel depots and supplies of fuel, and of navy yards and naval stations; also in regard to the establishment and maintenance of reserves of ordnance and ammunition and depots of supplies; and shall advise as to the delivery of provisions and stores of every kind required by the fleet.

5. It shall consider and report upon naval operations, maneuvers, tactics, organization, training, and such other subjects as the Secretary of the Navy may lay before it.

There is nothing in the records of the General Board to show that Admiral Sims made any suggestions as to preparation for war, but the records do show that he participated in only one discussion, and that was the location of a naval base in the vicinity of Narragansett Bay. On the other hand, the General Board was working continuously on programs and plans of various kinds, which Rear Admiral C. J. Badger can tell you all about.

On February 4, 1917, the General Board had submitted to the Chief of Naval Operations a special war plan entitled "Steps to be

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taken to meet a possible condition of war with the Central European Powers."

On March 6, 1917, the General Board recommended that our fleet be recalled from Cuba by March 15 and assembled in Chesapeake Bay.

On April 5 the General Board submitted to the department a report on "assistance the United States can give the Allies upon declaration of war." It will be noted that while the law places the responsibility for the formulation of plans upon the General Board, the responsibility for the adoption of these plans and their enforcement rests upon the Navy Department, as the General Board is without executive authority. If the testimony before this committee can be made to fix that responsibility, it can not be fixed on the General Board.

Prior to the outbreak of the war a proposition was submitted by the General Board to the Chief of Naval Operations recommending that we invite naval representatives of the Allies to come to Washington, and a proposition was made to send the following naval officers to London and Paris:

London: Rear Admiral W. S. Sims, Capt. W. V. Pratt, Commander Yates Stirling, Commander F. H. Clark, Lieut. F. A. Daubin, Lieut. G. L. Caskey, Lieut. S. C. Hooper, Naval Constructor E. S. Land.

Paris: Rear Admiral T. S. Rodgers, Capt. H. H. Hough, Commander D. F. Sellers, Lieut. H. H. Crosby, Lieut. Wadleigh Capehart, Naval Constructor H. G. Gilmor.

However, before this suggestion was made or acted upon Admiral Sims had been secretly sent abroad with his aid, Commander Babcock, and no additional officers were sent. Admiral Sims in his testimony says:

> It is due to Admiral Benson alone that I was given the opportunity to serve in this war as commander of the forces abroad. He said his insistence upon this assignment had brought upon him the enmity of pretty much all the senior officers of the Navy.

Admiral Sims was the logical man for this position, as he himself admits and this testimony verifies. On April 28 he was ordered to command the destroyers and on June 14 was made force commander, with headquarters in London.

On April 10, 1917, a few days after the declaration of war, Vice Admiral Browning, of the British Navy, and his staff, and Rear Admiral Grasset, of the French Navy, arrived in Washington and had a session on April 11 with the General Board, the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations being present. Vice Admiral Browning stated that the British Navy had had the task for three years of patroling the Atlantic coast of North America from Halifax to Panama, and suggested that the United States Navy take over this patrol, thereby releasing a great number of British ships for duty in the war zone. This was agreed to and immediately done. He also suggested sending two or three destroyers to England as an evidence of good intentions, stating that of course our fleet naturally would not be willing to part with or weaken its screen of destroyers. On the strength of this suggestion a few days later arrangements were made for the dispatch of a division of six destroyers, which arrived in Queenstown on May 4.

We come now to the actual declaration of war. Whatever the plans were, or whatever any plans ever are, the execution of them depends upon resources at hand and the magnitude of the problem

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presented. Whatever may be assumed to have been the primary mission of the United States Navy at the outbreak of the war, the problem the Navy had to face was the unrestricted submarine campaign announced by Germany in violation of the terms of international law in February, 1917, which ultimately caused our entry into the war, and which presented an entirely different problem from that which had existed for the Allies previously in the war. This and the sudden realization that the Navy had to be responsible for the safe transport to Europe of an Army of 2,000,000 men with the millions of tons of supplies and munitions presented a problem which might well stagger the imagination. It, however, being at once evident that there was little chance for our fleet to have to encounter that of the enemy on the high seas, the fleet became available for training the thousands of officers and men to meet these new demands.

The first and most important demand was providing additional men for the crews of ships in reserve and for the armed guard gun crews on merchant vessels, which alone required over 7,000 men; to provide crews for the interned merchant ships and other vessels acquired by purchase or charter for naval transports over 45,000 men were required; for the antisubmarine vessels, consisting of yachts, old destroyers, subchasers, and various kinds of patrol vessels, and for officers and men for the mine force to lay the great North Sea barrage thousands of officers and men were required; finally, to take over the American merchant marine, built and building, as organized into the Naval Overseas Transport Service (N. O. T. S.), which was going so strong when the war ended, many officers and men were required, as will be explained later.

Providing and training these officers and men became, therefore, the great problem for the Navy to solve during the first six months of the war. To conduct this training it was necessary to expand the old training stations in the United States, to build new ones, and to put all the old battleships of little fighting value into commission, and, as previously stated, this required thousands of officers and men.

As, on April 1, 1917, the personnel of the United States Navy consisted of 4,377 regular officers and 877 reserve officers in active service, and 62,677 regularly enlisted men and 1,109 reserves, or a total of 5,154 officers and 63,776 men, it can be readily seen that the task of training was prodigious, because going to sea is a skilled occupation and bears little relation to what the average men on shore know much about.

The question of a reserve created and fostered in time of peace is too well demonstrated to need elaboration. We did not have such a reserve at the beginning of this war, and the Navy had to create one. However, the war history of the United States, since colonial days, is a continuous story of war-time extravagance and injudicious peace-time economy. The pendulum swings to extremes, and now that the whole world is in ferment and war is again quite possible we are going to sleep again.

Unquestionably, on July 1, 1917, the outlook was far from reassuring, but at least a big start had been made along the lines which smacked of the offensive. By July 1, 1917, we had over 30 destroyers operating from Queenstown as a base, and we had in active service in the Navy 4,594 regular officers and 3,344 reserves, with

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126,260 enlisted men and 32,379 reserves, or a total of about 8,000 officers and 158,600 men. The additional officers and men, after July 1, 1917, were largely absorbed in manning the transports to put the Army across, the German interned ships, the purchased merchant vessels, and above all, the newly constructed cargo ships of which not enough is known to the public, or at least realized in relation to their operation by the Navy. These particular supply vessels, or cargo ships, were organized into what was known as the Naval Overseas Transport Service, or the N. O. T. S. Eventually, nearly every merchant vessel under the American flag was regularly commissioned in the Navy with officers and crew of the Regular and Volunteer Navy, but the N. O. T. S. did not really get going until January 1, 1918.

When the armistice was signed, on November 11, 1918, the N. O. T. S. fleet consisted of 347 ships in actual operation and 106 other ships ready to be turned over to the Navy as soon as crews could be provided and the ships fitted out. This made a total of 453 ships credited to the N. O. T. S. Of the 31,186 officers and 506,996 men in the United States Navy on November 11, 1918,, quite 45 per cent was absorbed in shore activities at naval stations, naval bases, training stations, aviation camps, etc. Those at sea served abroad the 40 battleships, 9 armored cruisers, 23 first, second, and third class cruisers, 7 monitors, 95 destroyers, 15 torpedo boats, 83 submarines, 13 tenders to torpedo vessels, 28 gun-boats, 5 regular naval transports, 5 supply ships, 1 hospital ship, 22 regular fuel ships, 14 converted yachts, 51 tugs, 37 mine sweepers, 4 special type ships, 300 submarine chasers, 43 transports for American troops, and 347 N. O. T. S. carrying supplies, or a total of 1,441 regular commissioned naval vessels manned and operated by the Navy, not including yard craft and the various tenders to all the naval stations and naval bases on shore. On the cessation of hostilities there were approximately 81,000 officers and men serving in Europe. This represented only about 15 per cent of the total naval personnel.

All this has to do with the question of what the United States fleet had to do on the outbreak of war, and that was to intensively train the additional men needed. This was done also by the patrol forces on the coast under command of Rear Admiral H. B. Wilson, which had relieved the British patrol. At the time we entered the war the British were using a patrol system of patrolling various areas as distinguished from the convoy system, and the placing of armed guards on board was then understood to be the best policy for the protection of single ships in conjunction with the use of smoke-boxes.

It has been frequently stated before this committee that keeping the patrol squadrons on our coast in the first few months of the war was unjustifiable. As indicated, they were originally assigned to this patrol duty at the request of Vice Admiral Browning. In the early stages the forces were undergoing thorough organization, and assisting in training additional men, and when the call came for ships to really inaugurate a convoy system, these ships were sent to escort work in France and the Mediterranean. This may not have been soon enough, possibly, but the ships were better fitted and organized for their peculiar services by the delay. The first of Admiral Fletcher's ships arrived in Brest on July 3, 1917, and the first of

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Admiral Wilson's ships arrived in Gibraltar on August 6, 1917, which was four months after war was declared.

In discussing the convoy system it is necessary to understand the difference between the "convoy" and the "escort." The "convoy" means the group of merchant ships or troop ships which are sailing together in formation, while the "escort" means the men-of-war, which, due to their armament and speed, are able to form a shield around the convoy to protect it from attack by raiders or submarines.

Before we entered the war and up to the time the convoy system got in working order, the Allied losses in merchant tonnage were as follows:

Year.	Ships.	Tonnage.
1914	67	86,665
1915	685	1,245,054
1916	1,310	2,290,437
1917	2,377	4,637,713
Total	4,434	8,259,869

By the adoption of the convoy system it was expected:

(*a*) That a relatively small number of escort vessels could protect more ships if they were in convoy than in any other way.

(*b*) That ships in convoy could not be visited and sunk by bombs, as were single ships.

(*c*) That ships in convoy would not be attacked by gunfire by submarines.

(*d*) That convoys, being few in number, would be difficult to find and consequently fewer attacks could be made by torpedo.

(*e*) That in the danger zones near ports where submarines would lay for convoys the escort by antisubmarine craft could be made so strong as to make the risk to submarines very hazardous.

The escort of cargo convoys to and from the United States and to and from the United Kingdom and the Mediterranean consisted usually of only one man-of-war, whose principal function was to regulate the radio communication and prevent the ships from straggling. It would have been futile to have regarded the escort as able to keep off a raider except where battleships were used. The great advantage of the convoy was that the ships arrived in the danger zone collectively and at a definite time, where an adequate danger zone escort could be assembled, which was fitted with depth charges and was in such numbers as to make the chances of a submarine extremely small if it attempted to attack the convoy. The point I wish to emphasize and elaborate is that with the slow-moving cargo ships the virtue of the convoy system was entirely dependent upon the efficiency of the danger zone escort at one of the terminal ports and not in the accompanying vessels during the voyage. This remark must be qualified when we speak of the Mediterranean, because the entire Mediterranean was a danger zone, and therefore the escort had to be as heavy as there were ships available to assign to this duty, generally only two-thirds of what was required.

It has been repeatedly emphasized that the size of our Army in Europe and the time of its arrival there depended on merchant tonnage, not only for the transport of troops, but for the transport of

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supplies. The ratio of troop tonnage to cargo tonnage was 15 to 85; therefore the vastly larger number of ships required for supplies emphasizes that the protection of cargo ships was really the vital question.

From July, 1917, to November, 1918, inclusive, our Army in 628 ships of various types sent 5,706,551 tons of cargo to France and England in the service of supply to the American Expeditionary Forces. I mean, that is War Department. It has nothing to do with the Navy Department. That is the Army on its own ships, which we had nothing to do with, ships of various types, sent 5,706,551 tons. A great deal of this cargo was carried in Army transports, but it remains for the historical section to develop the actual statistics as to how much of this cargo—this is Army cargo—actually came across in convoys, but only part of it did.

Admiral Sims states that our failure to send all of our antisubmarine vessels to the war zone immediately on the outbreak of war resulted in prolonging the war four months. A study of the vast problem of protecting the cargo ships of the Allies will show that the number of protecting vessels which we might have sent, and did not send, to Europe at once was so small that the results could not have been materially different. In a statement made in London in 1918 Admiral Sims stated that we had only 3 per cent of the antisubmarine forces in Europe that the Allies had.

I want to say that that figure of 3 per cent applies to the early part of the war. Afterwards the statistics were shown to be 6 per cent, finally; but this is the figure for the period we are discussing.

It is difficult to figure that with a maximum of only 3 per cent we could have shortened the war so greatly as four months; moreover, the small increase in the number of escorting vessels which we sent over between Juiy and October could not have resulted materially in increasing the amount of protection furnished the cargo-ship convoys, since it is here pointed out that the protection in the way of escort to the cargo ships was of the very scantiest character. It has been repeatedly stated that the size of our army in Europe depended as much upon the amount of cargo we could transport as upon the number of men we could furnish, and I do not think in discussing the convoy system we realize how little protection was given the cargo ship as compared with that lavished upon the troop convoys, whereby no troop transports were sunk, whereas the loss of cargo ships was very considerable, as will be shown.

Admiral Sims himself testified that nobody had had any previous experience in the form of submarine warfare which the Germans sprung, and "if we could have imagined it we would have prepared for it and built destroyers galore, if we could have persuaded Congress to give us the money." Certainly the patrol squadrons, made up as they were, of the older gunboats, Coast Guard vessels and yachts, were a poor substitute for destroyers as escorts, but this brings out one vital point in the discussion which has come before this committee as to the convoy system in general.

I think we are apt to exaggerate the effect of the convoy system in lessening the number of sinkings, because I think we should take into consideration, as Admiral Mayo also points out, the employment of new and offensive measures through the use of depth charges, ystery ships, airships, kite balloons, the laying of mine barrages,

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the firing of torpedoes from allied submarines, combined with the use of organized patrols fitted with listening devices and hunting the submarine systematically.

At the outbreak of war, in August, 1914, Germany had only 28 submarines, but she built 340 additional ones during the war. As there were about 200 of these submarines put out of action during the war, it transpires that there were 168 submarines available for service at the time the armistice was signed. The average stay at sea of a submarine was about 27 days for the U-boats and 20 days, or less, for smaller types, of which one-third of its time was spent in going, one-third in operating, and one-third in returning to its base, and the trip generally resulted in the sinking of from 6,000 to 10,000 tons of shipping. It is estimated that each enemy submarine averaged about 40,000 tons of shipping sunk before it itself succumbed to attack. The sinking of submarines was, however, not attributable to any one method employed against them, but was the result in pretty equal proportions of the various means employed against them.

But before dismissing the question of the convoy system, it is well to consider the question of the armed guard ships.

Our allies allotted only one gun to each merchant ship with only a trained gun pointer and sight setter, relying on the rest of the ship to furnish the rest of the gun crew, but from the start we furnished two guns to our merchant ships and full crews, amounting to some 20 or more men, together with radio operators and signalmen in addition. The commander of this armed guard on each ship was either a chief petty officer of great experience or a regular commissioned officer of the Navy.

There were 384 cargo ships of the American merchant marine during the war which had armed guards furnished from the enlisted personnel of the United States Navy to man the two guns with which each ship was fitted. Of these ships 2 were sunk by the gunfire of enemy submarines, 1 was sunk by bombs placed on board, and 33 were sunk by enemy torpedoes. I do not think that from this data we are justified in saying that it was futile to arm ships, because statistics show they drove off 113 submarine attacks by gunfire. That is a rather strong statement. I do not know that they actually drove them off. They had encounters in which they used their guns, and they escaped. Of course the chances for such ships to use their guns when sailing in convoy were not good, and it was of more importance for the ships which went singly. One very important phase of the discussion of the convoy system which has been entirely overlooked is that during the entire war only one escorted convoy crossed from the United States to Gobraltar, and this was the one escorted by the U. S. S. *New Orleans*. This convoy was dispersed by heavy weather, and was not regarded as entirely successful, because the ships came into Gibraltar subsequently singly. All the rest of the million tons of shipping which crossed from the United States to Gibraltar went across as single ships, going "on their own" as it were. These ships depended on their armed guard gun crews, and were independent of the convoy system. They actually encountered submarines, but they relied on their guns for protection.

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As practically all of the ships came across the Atlantic to Gibraltar unescorted, I sent the following cablegram on May 24, 1918, to the several authorities concerned:

Strongly recommend American merchant ships carrying armed guards and sailing from United States for Italy be fitted with a few depth charges prior to sailing. Such ships capable of acting as escorts to slower convoys. Am representing to Malta with cooperation of Admiral Grant and Italian liaison officer here undesirability sending such ships in slow convoys in Mediterranean where value of their speed in lost through not zigzagging. Sinking of *Tyler* good illustration. Malta fixes speed at 13 knots for sailing independently. My opinion ships which can make 11 knots much safer independently than with slow convoys unless utilized as escorts and allowed to zigzag.

This recommendation of mine was not approved, but Vice Admiral Calthrop at Malta cabled as follows:

United States vessels over 11 knots speed, when well armed, may be sailed independently without escort between Gibraltar and Genoa and Marseille.

This was in accordance with the wishes of American merchant captains who preferred to take chances zigzagging as single vessels rather than joining the slow convoys, the theory being that the longer time they were at sea the more danger they were in.

The convoy system required that ships be assembled and dispatched from some definite port. The four great Atlantic ports were Hampton Roads, New York, Halifax, and Cape Sydney (Cape Breton). Every 8 or 16 days a great convoy was dispatched from these ports, escorted across the Atlantic by a battleship or cruiser to protect it from an enemy raider, to be met on the European side by a danger zone escort of destroyers to fetch it into port. Ships bound for the Mediterranean were, however, dispatched singly to Gibraltar, also ships from the Cape of Good Hope, Montevideo, Buenos Aires, Bahia, and Rio de Janeiro were assembled singly at Sierra Leone or Dakkar and dispatched to Gibraltar. When by the admiralty order of July 22, 1917, the convoy system was applied to the Mediterranean, Gibraltar became the principal convoy port of the world, with about one-quarter of all the allied tonnage touching there to be formed up into convoys in every direction. As before this date nearly every available ship had been pretty well utilized in escorting convoys to Northern Europe, it was a great task to scare up enough escort ships to send to Gibraltar.

The date of the inauguration in the Mediterranean is when the British admiral, on July 22, 1917, telegraphed to Gibraltar to commence collecting British and allied cargo ships with speed of between 7 and 11 knots bound for ports in the United Kingdom with view to forming them into convoys, and on the 27th of July, 1917, the first regular convoy consisting of 14 ships with an ocean escort sailed from Gibraltar for the east coast of England, and thereafter these convoys sailed every four days from Gibraltar for ports on the east and west coasts of England alternately, and sailed from England for Gibraltar at regular periods from Falmouth and Milfordhaven. As previously stated, the first American man-of-war for escort duty arrived in Gibraltar on August 6. As fast as our ships arrived they were assigned to duty with allied vessels as escorts to convoys and as danger-zone escorts. The American ships differed from other nationalities based on Gibraltar in that other nationalities were employed almost exclusively in Mediterranean escort work, and Malta was the headquarters of the allied Mediterranean escort forces, whereas our forces under-

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took also practically all escort work in the Atlantic between Gibraltar and the United Kingdom. For instance, of the 225 convoys which sailed between Gibraltar and the United Kingdom during the entire war, 200 of them, or almost 90 per cent, totalling 4,269 ships, and representing 12,000,000 gross tons, were escorted both ways solely by American escort ships from our forces based on Gibraltar. This point is important because it made my headquarters Gibraltar rather than Malta. There was a further reason for my being at Gibraltar because of the enormous number of unescorted American merchant ships which arrived singly in Gibraltar from the United States.

This has to do with the importance also of each ship having an armed guard on board, as this whole traffic was independent of the convoy system. The total number of ships convoyed in local Mediterranean traffic by American forces amounted to about 4,245 ships bound for Mediterranean and Far Eastern ports, supplying the American Army through Marseilles, French forces in North Africa, allied forces at Salonika, British forces in Egypt and Palestine, and the entire supply of Italy. According to tentative figures in the historical section our cruisers and warships based on the United States escorted only 82 convoys other than troop convoys across the Atlantic during the entire war. The participation of the United States Navy in the convoy system seems historically to have begun about one month later than when that of the Allies began. This is important in its bearing on the charge that the delay of the United States Navy in sending ships across prolonged the war four months.

It has been officially stated in a publication compiled in the force commander's office in London that:

> In general transports were assigned a destroyer escort, which was about three times as strong as the escort assigned to cargo vessels.
>
> In some cases of particularly valuable transports, the escort was ten times as strong as the escort assigned to cargo vessels.
>
> As only 15 per cent of the vessels in Atlantic convoys carried troops, it became desirable, so far as practicable, to route troop transports in special lanes through which cargo convoys did not pass. This greatly increased the safety of troop transports, as it practically forced submarines to concentrate their efforts in the areas through which cargo vessels (comprising 85 per cent of the shipping) passed.
>
> If a German submarine took station in a troop-transport lane he might have remained for weeks without sighting a troop convoy. This failure to find shipping in troop lanes forced the submarine into cargo lanes and so gave a large measure of protection ot troop convoys. If the submarines had known the positions of these troop lanes and had concentrated on them, they would have found a relatively small number of ships, all of high speed, hence difficult to attack. Furthermore, they would have encountered a destroyer escort three times as strong as the escort protecting cargo vessels.
>
> Having taken the foregoing steps for the protection of troops, it was practically certain that submarines would be forced to confine their attacks almost exclusively to cargo vessels, and this was borne out by the experience of the war.

This statement really shows more the advantages of escorting than of the convoy system, because with the high speed of the transports and of the destroyers the speed element was also a great factor. Unquestionably the cargo ships bore more the brunt of the war and had much more experience in submarine attacks than any man-of-war did. In the four years of war the British merchant marine lost 3,147 merchant ships of 7,819,240 gross tons and had 14,000 men killed.

I would like to add there also that they had 1,519 officers and men on the roll of honor.

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It is very difficult to give accurate figures for the losses of American merchant ships during the war, because of the transition stage from chartered merchant ships to armed guard ships and then to N. O. T. S. vessels. Roughly speaking, prior to our entry into the war we lost 21 ships of 67,815 gross tons. After we entered the war we lost 125 merchant vessels of 225,865 gross tons. In addition to these, there were lost 13 N. O. T. S. cargo ships of 67,020 gross tons, thus making a total of 159 ships of 360,700 gross tons.

Admiral Sims cabled the Navy Department on June 22, 1917, saying:

As previously reported, convoys are in successful operation from the Mediterranean and Hampton Roads.

I merely wish to point out historically that while it is true that on May 10, 1917, the first experimental convoy was dispatched from Gibraltar to England, the next convoy, which was the first regular one, was not dispatched until June 27. His cablegram of the previous date, June 21, 1917, is a lucid explanation of the situation. He says in it that "the convoy system is merely a plan that obliges a submarine to fight antisubmarine craft in order to attack merchantmen." There is, however, an important point of view which is apt to be overlooked, and that is, with the slow-moving cargo ships in convoy and with escorts made up of yachts, gunboats, and a heterogeneous lot of vessels, the escort was powerless to prevent the sinking of at least one cargo ship, and what they could hope for was that if the submarine showed its presence by torpedoing the ship, the most the escort vessels could do was to drop depth charges and keep the submarine down and therefore from sinking a second ship. No cargo vessel that could make 11 knots was put in convoy for this reason, as it slowed her down, and she was considered much safer, even in the Mediterranean, by going on her own and zigzagging, and, moreover, much of the success of the escorting of cargo vessels in the Mediterranean was due to the absence of submarine activity, due to offensive measures taken to limit their activity.

I want to introduce finally, in the share of enumerated activities of the Navy in the war, the question of the Naval Overseas Transport Service, which was really not established until January 1, 1918, after the period which Admiral Sims has discussed, because I think it has a great bearing on how hard the Navy was pushed in other directions than by the demands made upon it by Admiral Sims.

The N. O. T. S. service, as it was called, was assigned 73 vessels when it was established, to be regularly operated with complete crews of officers of the reserve force and enlisted men of the Regular Navy and the reserve force. Of the original number, 16 were for Army account to transport stores for the American Expeditionary Forces, 52 for Navy account for transporting supplies to the naval forces operating in European waters, and 5 were named to be put in commission as soon as practicable. Before the armistice was signed 213 vessels had been assigned to the Army account as cargo vessels, manned by the Navy to carry supplies to the Army overseas. Everyone knows that the American vessels which carried troops to Europe were manned by the Navy, but few knew there were so many merchant ships carrying cargoes, also manned by the Navy. It was usual when a merchant ship, having an armed guard, was taken over by the Regular Navy to include the armed guard in the complement

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of the ship, so that the armed-guard character of the special detail was entirely lost. These considerations are important because of the difficulty in giving statistics for merchant marine ships, armed-guard ships, and N. O. T. S. ships, as they merged from one into the other. At the time of the armistice there were approximately 4,158 officers and 28,047 men on board of N. O. T. S. vessels and 514 officers and 1,128 men of the N. O. T. S. service at shore stations, making a total of 4,672 officers and 29,175 men in the N. O. T. S. service at the close of actual hostilities. Of these, only 12 were regular naval officers, the remainder being reserves, of which four-fifths were commissioned from green material. The latter, however, almost without exception, had been graduated from training camps and obtained a good deal of their first seagoing experience when they joined their ships. Of the enlisted men, however, some 18,000 were regulars and 11,000 were reserves, so this indicates why the dilution was not as great as may have been inferred. The average complement of the N. O. T. S. vessels during the war was 11 officers and 70 men.

Admiral Sims inserted in his testimony as addendum the following telegram from the Navy Department, which he received on July 10, 1917:

The following letter from the Secretary to the Secretary of State is quoted for your information and guidance as an index of the policy of the department in relation to cooperation of our naval forces with those of our allies. "After careful consideration of the present naval situation taken in connection with possible future situation which might arise, the Navy Department is prepared to announce as its policy, in so far as it relates to the Allies: First, the most hearty cooperation with the Allies to meet the present submarine situation in European or other waters compatible with an adequate defense or our own home waters; second, the most hearty cooperation with the Allies to meet any future situation arising during the present war; third, the realization that while a successful termination of the present war must always be the first allied aim and will probably result in diminished tension throughout the world, the future position of the United States must in no wise be jeopardized by any disintegration of our main fighting fleet; fourth, the conception that the present main military rôle of the United States naval force lies in its safeguarding the line of communications of the Allies. In pursuing this aim there will be, generally speaking, two classes of vessels engaged—minor craft and major craft—and two rôles of action, first offensive, second defensive; fifth, in pursuing the rôle set forth in paragraph four, the department can not too strongly insist that in its opinion the offensive must always be the dominant note in any general plans of strategy prepared. But as the primary rôle in all offensive preparations must perforce belong to the allied powers, the Navy Department announces as its policy that in general it is willing to accept any joint plan of action of the Allies deemed necessary to meet immediate need; sixth, pursuant to the above general policy the Navy Department announces as its general plan of action the following: One, its willingness to send its minor fighting forces, composed of destroyers, cruisers, submarine chasers, auxiliaires in any number not incompatible with home needs, and to any field of action deemed expedient by the joint allied admiralties which would not involve a violation of our present State policy; two, its unwillingness, as a matter of policy, to separate any division from the main fleet for service abroad, although it is willing to send the entire battleship fleet abroad to act as a united but cooperating unit when after joint consultations of all admiralties concerned the emergency is deemed to warrant it and the extra tension imposed upon the line of communications due to the increase of fighting ships in European waters will stand the strain imposed upon it; three, its willingness to discuss more fully plans for joint operations."

In commenting on this Admiral Sims says:

I wish here merely to state that the policy, as herein stated, is only to be judged by actual results in carrying it out, and they speak for themselves. I particularly wish to stress the point that this first definite statement of policy was received on July 10, a few days over three months after we had declared war, as stated in my original letter of January 7. The astounding features of this policy, however, were that, while it stated our intention to cooperate to the fullest degree, still such cooperation was con-

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ditioned upon, first, an adequate defense of own waters, and second, the future position of the United States after this war was finished. I am wholly unable to conceive of any war policy, particularly in a world war of this nature, which was certain to exhaust all participants, with the possible exception of ourselves, being based upon the requirements of any possible future war.

I wish to say that in my opinion history will demonstrate and has demonstrated that this policy, as above outlined, actually resulted in what we all know to have been the successful termination of the war, with the United States retaining a commanding position, which it now does, and when Admiral Sims says that the war was certain to exhaust all participants, with the possible exception or ourselves, he leaves out of consideration a number of the Allies and other associated powers who were not exhausted by the war, namely, Cuba, Brazil, China, and Japan.

Admiral Sims, in his testimony, says:

I am convinced that our failure to give adequate support with the means at our disposal during these first six months unnecessarily jeopardized the whole war. In my opinion it resulted in lengthening the war by several months through the increased losses in merchant shipping that resulted therefrom. I believe that this failure, combined with the equally grave one of neglecting to prepare adequately during the few months previous and the few months subsequent to our declaration of war probably postponed victory four months.

This, in my opinion, is the contention for which Admiral Sims's whole testimony stands. Historically, however, it is manifestly impossible in the few months preceding the outbreak of any war to prepare on a large scale for war without precipitating the war, which is the great argument in favor of preparedness. Whether in the few months subsequent to the war adequate steps were not taken by the Navy Department is a matter for careful and painstaking inquiry, and the testimony I have given is merely data which shows the wonderful way the naval personnel responded to its responsibilities once that war was declared. The elements which entered into the collapse of the German offensive were so numerous, so varied, and so incapable of sweeping generalizations that it is impossible, historically, to accept Admiral Sims's offhand statement.

Mr. HOOVER stated in his testimony:

The length of the war is one of the most complex questions that one can go into, as it embraces the question of land operations and the collapse in Germany of hundreds of factors that may have had something to do with bringing the war to its end and which broke down the morale of the German army, etc.

This indicates that the question is a complex one.

It is believed that a possible valuable result of the investigation now being conducted by this committee may be the development of means for accurately fixing responsibility for preparation for war, such as the present personnel situation, which is admittedly much worse than it was prior to our entry into the war.

This can be accomplished by the enactment of legislation which will make the Chief of Naval Operations responsible for making to the Secretary of the Navy such recommendations regarding building program, personnel, material afloat and ashore, and plans for national defense as will maintain the Navy in an adequate condition of preparedness to meet any probable enemy; and which will also make the Chief of Naval Operations responsible for the execution during peace and war of all plans that have been approved by the Secretary of the Navy.

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To make possible the economical and efficient execution of plans it is essential that all estimates for naval appropriations made by material bureaus should be based on approved plans, should be forwarded to Congress through the Chief of Naval Operations and the Secretary, and should, when presented to Congress, be accompanied by written comment and recommendation by both the Chief of Naval Operations and the Secretary of the Navy.

I am not in any way defending the Navy Department. It is merely my personal opinion that Admiral Sims's view was not the whole view, not necessarily the broadest view, and not necessarily the governing view in the early stages of our entry in the war, because the Navy had been relatively prepared for war on the basis of battleships and had to wage war on the basis of antipiratical submarine methods, on new methods of protecting merchant ships, and intensive methods of expanding personnel to an extent not prepared for in advance. Admiral Sims admits himself that no one could have foreseen the problem with which the Allies were confronted by "unrestricted sinking," and by the enormous efficiency of German submarine methods in sinking merchant tonnage, but to my mind it is too early to write the real history of the war. I only hope that the historical section of the Office of Naval Intelligence may profit by the large mass of information which has come before this committee.

The CHAIRMAN. That completes your statement?

Admiral NIBLACK. That completes my statement.

The CHAIRMAN. You have given us some very interesting and some very valuable information. I want to ask you a few questions that occurred to me as we went along.

You state that Admiral Sims as Chief of the War College was a member of the General Board, but that he did not take part in meetings of the General Board prior to the war, excepting in one case.

Admiral NIBLACK. A monthly meeting; yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Is the head of the War College always a member of the General Board?

Admiral NIBLACK. The president of the Naval War College is ex officio a member of the General Board, and has forwarded to him all papers for the consideration of the General Board. He can write at any time, commenting on any paper, and can attend the meetings, and he generally attends the monthly meeting, where all the papers that have been discussed during the previous month are enumerated and rehearsed.

The CHAIRMAN. And the head of the War College generally does attend?

Admiral NIBLACK. Generally, yes. It is expected, every month, at the monthly meeting—the full monthly meeting. The president of the War College was a regular member of the General Board before the war. I am now ex officio a member of the General Board as Director of Naval Intelligence.

The CHAIRMAN. And as such you attended the meetings?

Admiral NIBLACK. As such I attended meetings—have been attending meetings, and am now attending them; and I wish to state, what I have not emphasized quite enough, that the General Board has been the greatest stabilizing element in the Navy that we have had. My admiration for it is unbounded. It preserves the com-

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plete record, from its inception and founding, of all papers which have been considered by it. It has a consistent, logical history of recommendations made by it, which are submitted to the Secretary of the Navy and now to the Chief of Operations—to the Secretary of the Navy through the Chief of Naval Operations. I would like to not introduce anything extraneous, but to state one thing which seems to be very interesting, in connection with my rejoining the General Board on the 1st of May, when I became Director of Naval Intelligence.

There had been a hearing before the General Board on the question of aviation, where at least 50 officers had testified as to what they had learned about the war, in aviation; and on May 9, after I had been in Washington only nine days, I attended a session of the General Board at which all the officers who had testified before the committee, or at least a great many of them, were present, and the question was asked by the General Board as follows. They submitted to these officers and read the recommendation of the General Board made in 1913 with regard to a program for aviation in 1913. This was in May, 1919. All these experts were present, and the entire assemblage agreed that it was not necessary to change one word of the recommendations of the General Board made in 1913 for aviation; that there was not a word that would not apply right this minute, in toto, to the situation in 1919. I cite that merely to show that the General Board has always studied these questions, and simply to show that there was nothing necessary to be done with that plan——

The CHAIRMAN. What became of that plan of 1913 that so ably set forth aviation matters?

Admiral NIBLACK. That I am not able to state, because we did not get any appropriation, so that I am unable to say what became of it.

The CHAIRMAN. Was it constantly kept before the department, do you remember?

Admiral NIBLACK. You see, I had not been in Washington for 14 years prior to January, 1913; so that I could dig out of the history of the General Board; but I want to say that Admiral Badger, who has been a member of the General Board for many years and whose files and records are open to this committee, has that information. I am speaking now in an historical way, and all my testimony is intended to help the committee lay its hands on any information that you have in the files of the department or in the files of the historical section, and I am only looking at these questions from a historical standpoint.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is a correct attitude, Admiral. Now, I realize the good work of the General Board, and the value of the board, and I want to know what was done with that plan of 1913, because the testimony shows that in aviation we were rather lacking.

Admiral NIBLACK. I will be very glad to have the committee informed what became of it.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you also give us a copy of the plan?

Admiral NIBLACK. I have it here, and I will be very glad to embody it in the record. I will be glad to read it, if you like. It is not very long.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, I would like to have it read.

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Admiral NIBLACK (reading):

From: President general board.
To: Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: Aid for operations redevelopment of airships for naval use.

Returned.

2. The question raised by the aid for operations, and referred to the general board for comment and recommendation, opens up the much larger question of the value of a complete air service for the Navy including not only dirigibles, but a sufficient number of hydroplanes, with all the sheds, appliances, stations, etc., that go with them, and with a sufficient trained personnel properly organized to make the air fleet effective.

3. The general board from a study of aeronautics as applied to war, and the present state of aircraft of all classes as developed at home and abroad, is of the opinion that a complete and trained air fleet is necessary adjunct to the Navy for successful operations against any strong Navy possessing such an adjunct. This air fleet should consist not only of hydroplanes or flying boats to be used for scouting from ships of the fleet, or from naval bases and for near shore scouting, but of dirigibles for distant scouting and mining operations; and eventually contain the largest class of rigid battle airships with sheds, harbors, etc., located at strategic points.

4. The general board is of the opinion, that, in view of the large advance already made in aero warfare by other leading nations, the organization of an efficient naval air service should be immediately taken in hand and pushed to fulfillment.

5. In order to accomplish this the general board recommends:

(*a*) The establishment of an air department in the Navy Department under the Division of Operations, in charge of a director of naval aviation, not below the rank of captain, with the necessary assistants, and with the authority and responsibility to carry the organization into effect.

(*b*) That the director of naval aviation thus established, with his assistants, proceed with the organization of a naval air service suited to the needs of the Navy in war.

(*c*) That the department ask Congress for the necessary appropriations, to begin the construction of an adequate air fleet, with air stations, sheds, and all necessary appliances and the establishment of an adequate flying school.

(*d*) That since the training of personnel is more important and difficult than the construction of machines, pending the formation and organization of a regular naval air service and fleet, the few hydroplanes and flying boats now owned by the Navy be used to their capacity for training purposes; and that a dirigible of the nonrigid type, of at least 7,500 pounds useful load carrying capacity, be purchased immediately for training purposes.

6. The general board invites attention to the memorandum of the third committee attached hereto, showing the existing condition of the military and naval air services of some of the leading European nations and of the United States.

GEORGE DEWEY.

That recommendation seems as sound to me to-day as it was on the day on which it was written.

The CHAIRMAN. From your general knowledge of affairs of the Navy, should you say that that recommendation was followed out?

Admiral NIBLACK. I do not think Congress gave us the money.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not think it did?

Admiral NIBLACK. I can tell you, because I have charge of the records. I can look that up. I do not remember. I was not in Washington.

The CHAIRMAN. In any event, the recommendation was not followed out?

Admiral NIBLACK. Apparently not.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not recall whether the Secretary of the Navy made any attempt to follow it out?

Admiral NIBLACK. I have no knowledge. I was at sea at the time, and I do not know anything about anything the department has done or has not done, except by the results.

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The CHAIRMAN. And when you state that Admiral Sims did not attend the meetings of the General Board during the time you mentioned——

Admiral NIBLACK. No; he attended the one in February.

The CHAIRMAN (continuing). You do not imply that he had any greater responsibility than any other member of the board?

Admiral NIBLACK. No; but I only mean to imply that he had access and has had access as a member of the General Board to all of the records of the General Board, prior to the war and subsequent to the war, because he is still a member, and could have informed himself as to what the General Board did actually recommend and what the department, in a sense, was recommending, because it is all a matter of record in the files. They are confidential.

The CHAIRMAN. Prior to the war and subsequent to the war?

Admiral NIBLACK. Yes; and subsequent to the war he has been a member of the General Board once more.

The CHAIRMAN. And that would give him access to all the files?

Admiral NIBLACK. That would give him access to all the files, and he could inform himself.

The CHAIRMAN. What was your position in the Navy, Admiral, at the outbreak of hostilities in April, 1917?

Admiral NIBLACK. As a member of the General Board; and I went immediately to sea when war was declared and commanded a squadron of eight battleships, whose duty it was to organize and train men for the engineer force.

The CHAIRMAN. What force was that?

Admiral NIBLACK. Squadron 1, battleship force 1, consisting of the ships of the reserve.

The CHAIRMAN. The reserve squadron?

Admiral NIBLACK. The entire reserve squadron.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the condition of those ships at that time?

Admiral NIBLACK. They were operated at that time in the following manner: One ship, the flagship, stayed in active commission and the others were put in full commission from time to time and brought out for exercise and maneuvers and then put back into reserve, so as to make sure that they would work, to make sure they were in condition to be used to their maximum value.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the condition of the personnel on those ships?

Admiral NIBLACK. The personnel consisted of the selected men of the Navy, the best men possible from the Navy, picked from all of the ships for the purpose of training the green material we got for the Engineer Corps.

The CHAIRMAN. Was there a full complement of trained personnel on board at that time?

Admiral NIBLACK. We had practically a very limited deck force, but a complete engineer force, because the gunnery training was not regarded as important with those ships because of the old type of guns and fire control. The engines, however, and the boilers, were good for training.

The CHAIRMAN. Those ships were not in actual fighting condition?

Admiral NIBLACK. They were, as far as practicable, kept in condition by having target practice, which compelled them to be able to shoot in case of necessity.

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The CHAIRMAN. But their personnel was not such that they were in battle condition at the outbreak of the war?

Admiral NIBLACK. They were not intended to be, because they were equipped solely for the purpose of training engineers. They had been maintained in condition to be used to their maximum capacity in case of battle.

The CHAIRMAN. But at the outbreak of the war they were not in actual condition for battle service, were they?

Admiral NIBLACK. They were not equipped with modern fire-control or director firing, or many of the other adjuncts of modern battleship equipment; but they were meant to do their very level best for what they were worth, which was very slight.

The CHAIRMAN. They did not have the personnel to go into battle, did they?

Admiral NIBLACK. They did not; and in my statement I stated that it was necessary to train a great many men originally to put in commission some of the ships that were in reserve.

The CHAIRMAN. The first duty of those ships was to be in condition, as I remember one of the witnesses stated, as a fighting force, and second as a training force?

Admiral NIBLACK. At first it was as a fighting force, when I first joined.

The CHAIRMAN. And later that was changed?

Admiral NIBLACK. Later that was subordinated, taking a reasonable chance that the German Fleet had been knocked out sufficiently in the battle of Jutland not to risk a general fleet encounter, that we were justified in using the ships for the important problem with which the Navy was face, which was to expand ten times.

The CHAIRMAN. But they were to be used in a secondary way as a fighting force?

Admiral NIBLACK. They were, because they were kept always having target practice for that purpose. They had limited deck force, and merely enough men to man the guns, because they were loaded up with engineer force for training. We went to sea constantly with the fleet and went on with our training just the same, with the engineers. We went through all the motions.

The CHAIRMAN. You have no special knowledge about the fighting force of force number two?

Admiral NIBLACK. They were engaged in training men, I guess; and all of us were engaged in training radio men and signal men for the armed guard ships. I wish to state that the problem that the fleet encountered on the jump was armed guards for merchant ships, and that problem was dumped right onto the fleet. I got the engineer part of it only. I did not have to train men except for radio. I had radio schools on board all the ships I commanded.

The CHAIRMAN. That was even prior to the war, was it not? I am talking about the taking away of men from the ships of the Navy for the armed guards. That was done before the war?

Admiral NIBLACK. That was done before the war. It was begun before the outbreak of war.

The CHAIRMAN. I think Admiral Mayo testified that it was begun at that time.

Admiral NIBLACK. It was done while the ships were still in Guantanamo.

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The CHAIRMAN. Please let me finish my question, for the record.

Admiral NIBLACK. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Mayo has stated, I believe, that before the outbreak of the war the personnel on his ships was being diminished in order to put armed guards on merchant ships.

Admiral NIBLACK. While the fleet was still at Guantanamo men and officers were sent north from the fleet to compose the armed guards of important, fast merchant ships like the *St. Paul* and the *St. Louis* and various other American ships.

The CHAIRMAN. About what date?

Admiral NIBLACK. February. I was cognizant of it as being a member of the general board.

The CHAIRMAN. That is February, 1917?

Admiral NIBLACK. February, 1917.

The CHAIRMAN. In your testimony, Admiral, you state that on February 4, 1917, the General Board had submitted to the Chief of Naval Operations a special war plan entitled "Steps to be taken to meet a possible condition of war with the central European powers"

Can you tell me what became of that war plan?

Admiral NIBLACK. Whether this paper is on file or not in the department, I am unable to state.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you a copy of that plan with you?

Admiral NIBLACK. I have not. I have no copy, but I presume the general board has.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you get it?

Admiral NIBLACK. I will see if it is available; yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And will you give it to the committee? I would like to put it in the record.

Admiral NIBLACK. Admiral Badger will come before the committee, and he can answer that question specifically. It was February 4.

The CHAIRMAN. If possible, I would like to get a copy of that report. I would like to see it, myself, before Admiral Badger comes before us.

Admiral NIBLACK. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. So that if you can furnish it to the committee so that we can put it into the record, I would like to have it.

Admiral NIBLACK. I will do so.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pittman has suggested that it might be a secret report. Will you furnish it to the committee, and then we will take the proper steps about putting it in the record?

Admiral NIBLACK. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you tell me what became of that report?

Admiral NIBLACK. I do not know, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What action was taken on it?

Admiral NIBLACK. I do not know, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Was it a war plan in connection with a war with any specific power?

Admiral NIBLACK. It was suggesting that—it was a general plan of procedure of the department, recommending that we do certain things in view of the outlook. It was at the time of the unrestricted sinkings by submarines, which made it very probable, or possible, that we would be drawn in.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the date of that?

Admiral NIBLACK. February 4, 1917.

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The CHAIRMAN. At that time it was perfectly evident that we would be drawn into the war, was it not?

Admiral NIBLACK. It was not, apparently, to a lot of people.

The CHAIRMAN. Was it not to you?

Admiral NIBLACK. I thought so.

The CHAIRMAN. Had you thought so at any time prior to that period after the outbreak of hostilities?

Admiral NIBLACK. I was twice naval attaché in Germany, so that I was not asleep. I came from there just before the war, so that I knew the situation pretty well.

The CHAIRMAN. You were stationed in Germany just before the war?

Admiral NIBLACK. I came back in July, 1913; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know, then, whether that was used as a general war plan throughout the Navy?

Admiral NIBLACK. This was not, in a sense, a war plan. It was a suggestion as to steps to be taken. A general war plan is a moveable feat. It is drawn up and then amended from time to time to suit the conditions.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know whether there was any general war plan or not?

Admiral NIBLACK. Oh, yes; I know that well. Certainly there was.

The CHAIRMAN. When was that drawn up?

Admiral NIBLACK. It was drawn up when I was a boy, I think.

The CHAIRMAN. It was drawn up when you were a boy?

Admiral NIBLACK. I think so, sir. I have been familiar with it ever since.

The CHAIRMAN. Were there any changes made in it since you were a boy?

Admiral NIBLACK. I made many in it, myself.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean that was——

Admiral NIBLACK. I mean to say there is nothing new about a war plan.

The CHAIRMAN. That was a general war plan?

Admiral NIBLACK. Ever since we had had a Naval War College we have been studying the art of war, and they have been drawing up plans. We used to make them at the War College and then turn them over to the General Board. Now they are in Operations.

I want to call attention to this question. No war plan was worth much that was drawn up prior to February 4, 1917, because the whole plan was based on fights between battleships. Battleships are the backbone of the Navy, and we had always gone in for strong battleships, battleships whether we got anything else or not. Our battleships were not given great speed, but they were given heavy armament and great gun power in order not to have to run away from anything, but so that they could go where they wished and everything else would have to move off unless they wanted to get into trouble. The general idea had been, battleships that everybody would be afraid of. All of our plans were based on battleships, and when the unrestricted sinkings, which nobody dreamed of, took place, I point out in my testimony that a complete change in everybody's ideas took place. We saw then that we had to man these ships with armed guards, to provide escorts for convoys; that we had to put our own crews and officers on board transports in order not to

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have to trust to merchant captains to go into convoys; because they had had no training. The problem as it faced us on February 4 is shown by the fact that the General Board says such measures were to be taken, because the whole aspect of the war was completely changed.

The Allies themselves were not prepared for war, with all the war they had been in, on February 4, 1917, They could not be prepared because unrestricted sinking was unheard of. Nobody dreamed that there would be unrestricted sinking. It bouleversed the whole world. Nobody knew what to do, exactly.

The CHAIRMAN. Then this special war plan you speak of, submitted on February 4, 1917, did not cover that sinking of ships?

Admiral NIBLACK. I never said that it was a war plan. I said it was entitled "Steps to be taken to meet a possible war with the Central European Powers." I did not say it was a war plan.

The CHAIRMAN. Your testimony calls it a special war plan.

Admiral NIBLACK. Where do I say that?

The CHAIRMAN. Look on line 1.

Admiral NIBLACK. It says "Steps to be taken."

The CHAIRMAN. There is the language used, "Special war plan." I was using your own language, Admiral.

Admiral NIBLACK. That was to meet a special phase of it; the situation on February 4. It was not a war plan. I mean to say that we had a war plan, but that was not our war plan. Our war plan was for battleships.

The CHAIRMAN. By February 4 did they know about the conditions so that they could submit a special plan for them?

Admiral NIBLACK. By February 4 we knew about the unrestricted sinkings. We knew there was something else, and we had been getting ready for it.

The CHAIRMAN. This covered the unrestricted sinkings?

Admiral NIBLACK. Yes; it was as to steps to be taken.

The CHAIRMAN. Then it was a war plan for that particular purpose?

Admiral NIBLACK. Steps to be taken to meet the situation, because after all a war plan, Mr. Chairman, is a general scheme which is accompanied by all the information necessary to change the plan if you have to; because it is all based on information.

The CHAIRMAN. At all times in getting up a general, war plant you would want to take all the things you had before and add to them?

Admiral NIBLACK. Chapter 1, section 1, page 1, paragraph 1, of the Naval Regulations, says that the Office of Naval Intelligence "shall furnish intelligence on all the operations of any body or organization. That is all based on information.

The CHAIRMAN. So that on February 4 when you put in this special plan it was to be added to the plan that you already had before, and the two together made up the war plan that you had at that time?

Admiral NIBLACK. It made up for the change in situation due to the unrestricted sinkings.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; but I say that with what you had before, that made up a war plan that we had in the department then?

Admiral NIBLACK. Yes, certainly; because a war plan is a plan to meet any situation at a given time. It varies from day to day; it varies from time to time. A war plan is not a canned object, or something that is finished. It is a product that goes on from day to day, based on information, and it is subject to change.

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The CHAIRMAN. Prior to February 4, 1917, and between August, 1914, and February, 1917, had the war plan, or the plan that was on hand in the department, been changed in any respect?

Admiral NIBLACK. You see, I would not possibly know that, because it is secret, in the first place, and all done there, and I had no reason to seek to modify it, because I was not in a position to do so.

I would like to make one explanation, if you please, about the difference between troop transports and cargo transports, because it is very vital that speed was the great protection to the troop transports; the speed of the destroyers and the speed of the transports themselves. No ship was allowed to be a transport that could not make 15 knots. A submarine could not see an approaching convoy far enough off to get into position and stay there with these fast ships zig-zagging, because it was too perilous, and the speed itself was the protection to the convoy, and the zig-zagging was a protection; because the submarine could not have the nerve to put itself close enough to a zig-zagging boat like that, going at high speed, and run the risk of being run down; to a certain extent it had that element of speed in it. And, further than that, the speed of an escorting ship was a fearful thing to a submarine, because these escorting ships were very fast, and they carried depth charges, and they could reach the spot where the submarine was and drop depth charges on it before it could reach a safe distance in submerging.

The cargo ships were slower and their escorts were slow ships anyway, because those escorts were maintained by danger zone escorts, bringing the ships into port, which was the main thing; and if cargo ships were attacked, the most those escorting ships could do would be to move over as fast as they could in the general direction of where the submarine was, and drop depth charges. In my opinion the depth charges had more to do with upsetting the morale of the German submarines than anything else.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to ask you one or two more questions about the war plans. Do you recall any other special plans submitted by the General Board excepting the recommendations that appeared in your testimony on page 8?

Admiral NIBLACK. There were three. I do not recall them, but Admiral Badger, who is coming before this committee, as I understand, knows about, in a general way, for any number of years back, all of the recommendations of the General Board.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you recall what was done with the "Report on assistance the United States can give the Allies upon the declaration of war"?

Admiral NIBLACK. I do not recollect that paper thoroughly. I left on the 7th of April, and I did my best to render assistance.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you give the committee a copy of that report on assistance the United States can give the Allies upon the declaration of war?

Admiral NIBLACK. I will see what I can do, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. As I understand it, the General Board makes its plans and makes its reports to the Chief of Naval Operations?

Admiral NIBLACK. It does.

The CHAIRMAN. And he, in turn, makes a report to the Secretary of the Navy.

Admiral NIBLACK. And the Secretary himself may ask directly for a report. The Naval General Board is advisory in its functions, and

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even can, at the request of any bureau, investigate questions and make report.

The CHAIRMAN. May the Chief of Naval Operations suppress the report, if he sees fit?

Admiral NIBLICK. The Chief of Naval Operations is himself, ex officio, a member of the General Board, and attends meetings frequently. I suppose anybody could do anything in that line, if they were so inclined. It is rather a dangerous proposition, but I suppose it could be done.

The CHAIRMAN. What I wanted to know was, in the general organization of the Navy would it be advisable for the Board to report to the Secretary of the Navy instead of reporting through the Chief of Naval Operations, who might be voted down by a majority of the Board in making the report?

Admiral NIBLACK. Do you mean to amend the law?

The CHAIRMAN. To have the law amended, yes. I do not know that it would. I simply wanted your opinion about it.

Admiral NIBLACK. I think that under the law now the Chief of Naval Operations is charged with certain duties, with which the law charges the General Board in a certain sense, and in that way the General Board is now an adjunct of Operations more than it was previously; but to what extent the recommendations of the General Board are heeded by the administration or by Congress depends very largely on how well it suits their policy of the moment. It does not alter the General Board's duty in the matter.

The CHAIRMAN. In your testimony you suggest that legislation might be an advantage which would make the Chief of Naval Operations responsible for making to the Secretary of the Navy such recommendations regarding building program, personnel, material afloat and ashore, and plans for national defense, as will maintain the Navy in an adequate condition of preparedness to meet any probable enemy, and which will also make the Chief of Naval Operations responsible for the execution during peace and war of all plans that have been approved by the Secretary of the Navy.

Admiral NIBLACK. You see, the law says that the General Board has certain responsibilities in preparing these plans, and the Chief of Naval Operations should be responsible—should share the responsibility. Specifically what I mean is that the administration may have a program based upon expediency, upon the financial outlook, or upon the next election, or whatever you shoose. That does not alter the duty of the General Board to prepare a plan. If Congress is willing to accept its share of the responsibility for turning down the General Board, there ought to be on record what the General Board recommends, and that is through the Chief of Naval Operations in this case, in adition to what there is in writing from the Secretary of the Navy, concerning the administration's plans. I think many of the recommendations of the General Board are impracticable, because we have not got the money, or it does not suit the book, etc. But that does not alter the duty of the General Board. The Navy Department does work all right and has worked all right. The bureau system is a splendid system, and has stood the test of war. The bureaus provided us with everything that we asked for, more or less, and I think that the bureau system is sound in every way. Personally, I never wanted to see it particularly modified except to be

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materially controlled in the recommendations they made, by the central, responsible person, the Chief of Naval Operations.

The CHAIRMAN. But you do think that the General Board and the Chief of Naval Operations should have the responsibility so that they would be entitled to present their views to Congress as well as those of the Secretary of the Navy?

Admiral NIBLACK. I think if Congress would be willing to stand for it; but I do not think that Congress would love that, sir—that thing.

The CHAIRMAN. I am trying to get your ideas.

Admiral NIBLACK. I would like that very much. I think we would like to see that, very much, that when anything is turned down, when any recommendation is turned down, the responsibility is just as clear as daylight.

The CHAIRMAN. But you would think that the Board should report to the Chief of Naval Operations?

Admiral NIBLACK. I think that the Chief of Operations should be the responsible person, and that his recommendations should go hand in hand, in writing, at the same time that the Secretary of the Navy's goes, to the Senate Committee and the House Committee on Naval Affairs, so that we would know where the responsibility really rested in the end.

The CHAIRMAN. You stated in your testimony that it is difficult to figure out how Admiral Sims could state that our failure to send all of our anti-submarine vessels to the war zone immediately on the outbreak of war resulted in prolonging the war four months, that with a maximum of only 3 per cent, we could have shortened the war so greatly as four months.

Admiral NIBLACK. Yes, sir; I think that was later on, that it was 5 or 6 or 7 per cent, as testified by Admiral Sims in his testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. Later on it was 6 or 7 per cent?

Admiral NIBLACK. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In April, 1917, the submarine sinkings amounted to 800,000 tons, I believe: and when did we first commence to help the submarine situation?

Admiral NIBLACK. Six or eight days after the outbreak of war they started the first division of destroyers across. We had only about 50 destroyers, you must remember, all told.

The CHAIRMAN. They arrived and took part the 1st of May?

Admiral NIBLACK. The 1st of May. But when they first went over it is very important to note that the work they undertook was the patrolling of certain areas. The Allies were committed to the patrol system, of having areas patrolled by ships, which patrol system broke down and the convoy system was adopted; not suddenly, but piecemeal. The great proposition to the convoy system came from the captains of the merchant vessels themselves. They did not feel that they could sail their ships in convoy. Impossible things were done during the war. Our own division of battleships went over and joined the British battleship fleet, the Grand Fleet, and went to sea under conditions that everybody in the British Navy and in our Navy regarded as impossible, to keep the position in thick weather, with the strong currents and with the screens and all; but just as soon as they tried it, it worked. It is pretty hard to say what is impossible.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it not true that shortly after our force went over and assisted in the submarine situation, the submarine situation became less acute?

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Admiral NIBLACK. Well, that is what you call a coincidence. It was due to the adoption of the depth charge.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think it was due altogether to the adoption of the depth charge?

Admiral NIBLACK. I have testified in my testimony that the sinking of submarines can not be laid to any one cause, because some were sunk by kite balloons, or by airships, where they dropped the depth charge in the vicinity of the submarine where its situation was betrayed. Some of them were sunk on the surface at night. No one thing was solely responsible for success. Some were hunted by little motor launches, with listening devices, which dropped depth charges on them. It was everything, the science of war in every direction closing in on the submarine. What the main thing was is immaterial.

The CHAIRMAN. But do you not think that the addition of our forces had a great deal to do with stopping the submarine menace?

Admiral NIBLACK. I certainly do. We brought the best listening devices and the best depth charges, and a number of improvements in regard to the submarine.

The CHAIRMAN. And therefore would you not say that the sooner we could have gotten our forces over, the better?

Admiral NIBLACK. The sooner we could have gotten our forces over the better, provided we decided to send them over; but as you see, in the end, the maximum was only 15 per cent of our personnel.

The CHAIRMAN. But do you not think they did more than that proportion; if they were 3 per cent in practice, do you not think they did more than 3 per cent of the work of checking the submarine menace? That is not my idea of what the Navy did during the war.

Admiral NIBLACK. I certainly do. And, moreover, I call attention to the fact, and in my testimony, that at the very time that Admiral Sims was saying we had only 3 per cent of the antisubmarine forces that were in Europe, 90 per cent of all the shipping that was going between Great Britain and the Mediterranean, which meant the supply of the Far East and everything else, was escorted solely by American ships under my command at Gibralter. Of course, that is 90 per cent, because you have got to bring the thing down, now, to percentages. But this is that one phase of it. Statistics can be made to prove almost anything, if you work them right.

The CHAIRMAN. And any advantage in sending those forces over, if the plan could be followed out, would have been greater, would it not?

Admiral NIBLACK. I have no doubt. I would have been glad to have gone over much sooner, myself, Mr. Chairman; but that is not the question. The question is absolutely a question of statistics.

The CHAIRMAN. I know, but that is the question I am asking you.

Admiral NIBLACK. The question is one of statistics. I say, and others have said, that that statement of Admiral Sims is indefensible historically. I would be very glad to help my friend Sims out on it, but I can not.

The CHAIRMAN. Other witnesses have testified in a different manner.

Admiral NIBLACK. But they have not given any statistics; they have not given any data.

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The CHAIRMAN. But it is simply a question of weighing the evidence.

Admiral NIBLACK. That is all I ask you to do, sir, because I am very glad to get any testimony that helps us out in the historical section. All this testimony means more than $20,000 in value to the historical section, because we will use it. I am very glad we have taken this method of arriving at the real history of the war. I hope the report of this committee will help us out in the historical section in placing responsibilties.

The CHAIRMAN. I hope that it will. You state in your testimony that during the entire war only one escorted convoy crossed from the United States to Gibraltar, and this was the one escorted by the U. S. S. *New Orleans*.

Admiral NIBLACK. The *New Orleans*.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course a great many convoys were escorted to France, were they not?

Admiral NIBLACK. I said that as far as the Army cargo or supply ships were concerned I could not get the data; but I did say later in my testimony that there were 82 escorted convoys of cargo ships, as far as our records show, from the Mediterranean.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, the reason there were so few to Gibraltar was that it was so far away from the German base that it would have been harder for them to operate there than farther north.

Admiral NIBLACK. Submarines were operating in the Mediterranean from the Adriatic and from Germany both. The Austrians had a naval submarine base at Pola and also at a port called Cattaro; and the Germans also had a big base at

After the war I went into the Adriatic and I visited those three ports. The activities there were enormous in regard to shops. The Germans shipped submarines down in sections and put them together there.

The CHAIRMAN. Were many of the submarines of the Germans lying in wait around the Straits of Gibraltar?

Admiral NIBLACK. Never.

The CHAIRMAN. Never?

Admiral NIBLACK. They were too afraid. That was the neck of the bottle. The system of the German submarines was to submerge, stop their engines, and come in with the current. The current runs out through the straits on the top and comes in at the bottom, and all that a submarine had to do was to submerge and stop her engines and come in with the current, and the patrol would pass over them listening, but as they were not using their machinery it was rather difficult to hear them; and they never, during the entire war, made an attack on Gibraltar. They were anxious and willing enough to get through without any trouble.

The CHAIRMAN. You state in your testimony:

Historically, however, it is manifestly impossible in the few months preceding the outbreak of any war to prepare on a large scale for war without precipitating the war, which is the great argument in favor of preparedness.

Admiral NIBLACK. I will say further than that, what I have not said before, that prior to the outbreak of this war it was announced policy of the administration. Congress then did not question that we should by word or thought be neutral, and we were cautioned

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and we were not permitted to prepare for war openly. What we did do in the general board, and whatever we could do——

The CHAIRMAN. That was up to the time of the declaration of war?

Admiral NIBLACK. Up to the time that war was declared.

The CHAIRMAN. That is, not of the general war, but the time of our going into the war?

Admiral NIBLACK. Yes, up to the time of our going into the war. That is entirely a matter of policy of the Government. That, I understand, was the policy of the Government at the time. I think it would have been very difficult for the Navy to have gotten authority to do things that might have been judged advisable to do; but, on general principles, the argument for preparedness is to be ready, to make the preparation before the war. But I want to explain one thing very definitely, and that is that the Navy is always on a war footing. Its transition from peace to war is very slight.

The CHAIRMAN. But you would say, on account of the fear of precipitating the war, that we were not justified during the time——

Admiral NIBLACK. That war or any war.

The CHAIRMAN (continuing). From 1914 until the declaration of war, in making any open preparation for war?

Admiral NIBLACK. That is generally accepted as a pretty good action. But, in addition to that, we were prevented by the policy of the Government at the time; and now it is the policy of the Government—the avowed policy of the Government.

The CHAIRMAN. And you rather approve of that?

Admiral NIBLACK. I approve of anything that is preparedness for war. I am not involving myself in a discussion as to the policies of this Government, and I am an adviser of the Government in my official capacity, and I can give this committee any information it wants; but I am not prepared to state that we behaved badly before the war, or that we behaved well. I can give you the facts and the committee can judge of the results.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you would not reply "yes" to my question?

Admiral NIBLACK. I would not reply "yes" to your question, and I would not reply "no," because I do not know what the question is aiming at.

The CHAIRMAN. You are not obliged to know what the question is aiming at. You are a witness before this committee.

Admiral NIBLACK. Is the question, "Do I approve of the policy of the Government"?

The CHAIRMAN. Do you approve of the general policy that the Government adopted before the war of not allowing anything to be done to prepare for war, on the ground that it might precipitate war?

Admiral NIBLACK. I do not think it would have made much difference in the declaration of war in this particular case, whether we prepared or not, because I do not think we had very much to say, ourselves, about entering the war.

The CHAIRMAN. You stated in your testimony that at a meeting at which Vice Admiral Browning of the British Navy made a statement, he also suggested sending two or three destroyers to England, as an evidence of good intentions, stating that of course our fleet would not be willing to part with or weaken its screen of destroyers. That was the principal purpose, was it, of Vice Admiral Browning's appearance over here?

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Admiral NIBLACK. I gather it so, from the evidence.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you at that meeting?

Admiral NIBLACK. I was not at that meeting. I was just simply speaking of the General Board's view of the matter.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you do not know anything personally about that?

Admiral NIBLACK. I do not know anything personally, except what has been testified in a general way before the committee; and Admiral Wilson said that there was one officer—the trouble was, the conversation was general.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you have nothing personal to testify to about that?

Admiral NIBLACK. No, sir; I have nothing to testify.

Senator TRAMMELL. In regard to those plans that were recommended on February 4, 1917, Admiral, your language is that you submitted special war plans; and then you designate the title of the plans.

Admiral NIBLACK. Yes.

Senator TRAMMELL. You did not mean to state, of course, that it was a general war plan, at all? It was just what you said it was; it was a special plan on the question of submarines?

Admiral NIBLACK. On the question of unrestricted sinkings.

Senator TRAMMELL. You said: "That was a special war plan entitled 'Steps to be taken to meet a possible condition of war with the Central European Powers.'"

You did not mean to convey the idea that it was a new general plan, but it was dealing with that general subject?

Admiral NIBLACK. Dealing with unrestricted sinkings; the problem presented by the change in the method of warfare by the Central Powers.

Senator TRAMMELL. I believe you stated that the Navy Department has had war plans from time immemorial, practically?

Admiral NIBLACK. Since the establishment of the War College, in 1888.

Senator TRAMMELL. Yes; but that these plans were not a canned proposition, but that they had to be changed and altered upon conditions as they changed, and to meet the emergencies as they arose. But, as a matter of fact, they did have plans—war plans?

Admiral NIBLACK. Oh, yes; they had war plans.

Senator TRAMMELL. Now, you were in command at Gibraltar. Did you cooperate with the British there?

Admiral NIBLACK. Absolutely. We consolidated with them.

Senator TRAMMELL. Did you have any pretty general latitude in your command there, or did somebody else furnish you all the details?

Admiral NIBLACK. I operated under a general mission of the forces in Europe, and operated under whoever happened to be the senior naval officer present.

Senator TRAMMELL. Did Admiral Sims frequent your post there—your command there—during the war?

Admiral NIBLACK. He never visited Gibraltar during the war, and nobody visited Gibraltar during the war; that is, in the way of official inspection.

Senator TRAMMELL. So far as you were concerned, you were in command there, and cooperated with the British, whoever was in command of the Allied forces?

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Admiral NIBLACK. The allied forces in the Mediterranean were under the command of Admiral Gauchet, of the French Navy at Corfu. To that extent I was under him. Vice Admiral Calthorp, at Malta, was in charge of the Mediterranean convoy system, and to that extent I was on the staff of Vice Admiral Calthorp, because there was a Japanese rear admiral, an Italian rear admiral, and a French read admiral at Malta, and I should, under the general scheme, have been at Malta; but I did all my voting as a member of the commission at Malta by letter and by cable, and the necessity for my being at Gibraltar was due to the fact, as I say, that we had an Atlantic convoy system as well, and that was more directly under the Admiralty in London as a general porposition, and therefore Gibraltar was the half-way point. That is why I had to make Gibraltar my headquarters to cover all the ground.

Senator TRAMMELL. I think that is all the questions I want to ask.

The CHAIRMAN. When did you receive your orders for European duty?

Admiral NIBLACK. The 28th of October, 1917, and I was detached within 24 hours and ordered to report to the Chief of Naval Operations in Washington.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the character of your orders?

Admiral NIBLACK. I was ordered to proceed to Gibraltar, after I had reported to the General Board, and assume command of the forces there, and report to the senior officer present.

The CHAIRMAN. At Gibraltar?

Admiral NIBLACK. To the senior officer in Europe.

The CHAIRMAN. Through Admiral Sims?

Admiral NIBLACK. My orders at first were not to report to Admiral Sims, but implied so, because it said, "Report to your immediate superior in command for duty." Admiral Sims would have been my immediate senior in command in London.

The CHAIRMAN. No specific orders to report to Admiral Sims?

Admiral NIBLACK. No specific orders; but subsequently, at my own request and in consultation, it was agreed that I would go by way of London in order to familiarize myself with the situation, and I arrived in London in November, and received from Admiral Sims the general instructions which he gave to all of his forces, which I have here and which I can embody in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. If you had not gone to London, would you still have had to report to Admiral Sims?

Admiral NIBLACK. Absolutely; no question about it. But the advantage in going to London was that I spent time in the Admiralty offices to famailiarize myself with the submarine situation and the convoy system, and talking to the convoy officers, so as to be perfectly in accord with the entire system; and I did the same in Paris, and it was a very valuable thing to have done and a very important thing to have done.

The CHAIRMAN. Before you left this country, did you receive full information from the department as to the department's plans and policies?

Admiral NIBLACK. I received orders—I familiarized myself with the situation in Paris as regards our forces abroad, and the sinking situation, the situation as regards submarines sinkings, and as regards the convoy system and the general idea.

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The CHAIRMAN. That was what you did, but I say, did you receive from the department full information about its policies and plans for that work?

Admiral NIBLACK. No; I received orders to command a particular force.

The CHAIRMAN. With no specific information about any plans or policies of the department?

Admiral NIBLACK. No specific plan about any policy or forces, except as embodied in the instructions I got in London from Admiral Sims.

The CHAIRMAN. And did you receive any full instructions from the department about your mission?

Admiral NIBLACK. Only in the short time, several days, that I was in Washington, I familiarized myself with the situation. but I got no definite orders as to how I was to conduct the war, personally. I was simply to cooperate.

The CHAIRMAN. Under whose operation orders were the forces under your command?

Admiral NIBLACK. Admiral Sims's.

The CHAIRMAN. Operation orders, I asked.

Admiral NIBLACK. Operation orders?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral NIBLACK. Largely my own; and in conference with the Mediterranean officers. The convoys were under the regulations of the senior convoy officer in the Mediterranean, that is, Admiral Calthorp.

The CHAIRMAN. Was this situation satisfactory?

Admiral NIBLACK. Entirely so.

The CHAIRMAN. Did your forces, the forces that were under your command, become, therefore, an integral part of the British Navy?

Admiral NIBLACK. Not in the slightest degree.

The CHAIRMAN. You never lost your identity as a separate organization?

Admiral NIBLACK. On the contrary, when Vice Admiral Calthorp came to Gibraltar to inspect our forces I had to invite him especially to inspect mine, and he was very willing and very pleased to do it, but he did not assume that he had any right to do it.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have any objection to this policy of unity of command, and did you ever make any report on it?

Admiral NIBLACK. No. There was something in London about a unity of command in the Mediterranean, but it had nothing to do with my forces. It was rather a general question of the French, Italian, and British and Japanese forces, in a general way. It had no reference to the convoy system or to my forces, which were actively cooperating.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you make a report on it?

Admiral NIBLACK. None at all; only to ask what it was all about; just a personal letter to ask what the unity of command was about.

The CHAIRMAN. A personal letter to whom?

Admiral NIBLACK. I think it was to the force commander. It did not concern my forces at all. We were in the convoy business, and this other was the question of the emergence of the the *Goeben* and the *Breslau* in a raid in the Mediterranean.

The CHAIRMAN. Was any action taken on this report you made?

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Admiral NIBLACK. I did not make any report. Nothing was done——

The CHAIRMAN. Well, on this personal letter you wrote?

Admiral NIBLACK. No; no action was taken about it.

The CHAIRMAN. Which country had the greatest number of naval forces at Gibraltar?

Admiral NIBLACK. The British had about 60,000 tons of naval shipping at Gibraltar, and we had about 33,000 tons, but we had a great many ships, because our ships were relatively small.

The CHAIRMAN. Would it have been preferable to have kept the American forces as a completely separate and independent unit at Gibraltar?

Admiral NIBLACK. Oh, no; no, indeed.

The CHAIRMAN. It would have had a bad effect upon the cooperation against submarines during the war?

Admiral NIBLACK. It would. We had at Gibraltar what was called a hat pool, and every morning at a conference the Italian, British, and French officers present drew out of the hat the ships that were available and distributed them for escort work, and if we would enter a ship to sail and something would happen, we would have to substitute another.

The CHAIRMAN. Did the plan work satisfactorily?

Admiral NIBLACK. Beautifully.

The CHAIRMAN. In your general opinion, what is your opinion of the unity of command in a war such as this?

Admiral NIBLACK. I do not think that the unity of command ought to be distributed around among a number of people.

The CHAIRMAN. You say this worked satisfactorily at Gibraltar?

Admiral NIBLACK. Yes; there and in every place. But the question is whether the unity of command is local or general. They had a unity of command in France when they put Gen. Foch in command. They did not have it before that. It was a very desirable thing, and it worked beautifully.

There is a difference between a command and a task. A task is to do a certain piece of work which you have a force for. Now, who is the directing power in that case is a different matter. As I explained to you, our forces were in the Mediterranean area under one set of orders and rules and methods of procedure and everything, which were determined at Malta by this commission, which I was relatively a member of, but the meetings of which I never attended, but voted by letter or cable. On the other hand, the Atlantic convoys were on an entirely different system, and they were regulated more or less from London, except the convoys to the United States. For the west Atlantic convoys and ships which went back to the United States we had a convoy system which we ran from Gibraltar.

The CHAIRMAN. That general plan of unity of command was all right so far as you were concerned?

Admiral NIBLACK. That is a fundamental military principle which is perfectly sound, naturally.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you allowed satisfactory initiative by Admiral Sims?

Admiral NIBLACK. Absolutely.

The CHAIRMAN. Did he interfere in any way with the administration of your forces?

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Admiral NIBLACK. Not except to help me. He interfered oftener to help me, and I needed it.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is all.

Senator PITTMAN. Have you the instructions of Admiral Sims to you when you reached London?

Admiral NIBLACK. I have.

Senator PITTMAN. I wish you would read them.

Admiral NIBLACK. One is Campaign Order No. 1, of August 1. That was before I came. That did not really affect me. Then there is Force Instructions No. 1, dated August 11, 1917, which had gone out by the time I arrived.

Then I have Force Instructions No. 2, of September 22, 1917, in which the general mission was "cooperation with allied forces in destruction of enemy forces. Immediate mission: (1) Conservation of allied and neutral shipping. (2) Saving of life."

Then he gave his doctrine and his policies and routines.

Then on October 6, 1917, came Force Instructions No. 3, which did not affect my forces very much, as it had to do with duty free stores and gifts for United States naval forces operating in European waters. It was a customs house order, more or less.

Then came Operation Orders No. 2 (Campaign Order No. 2) of November 10, 1917.

Then his Operation Order No. 3 (Campaign Order No. 3), of April 2, 1918, which merely said:

The senior United States naval officer in each area shall be in immediate command of United States naval forces in that area (including personnel of bases) and shall be responsible for the efficiency of his command and for their operation, subject to the requirements of paragraph 2.

Senator PITTMAN. You have given the substance, then, of the instructions given you by Admiral Sims?

Admiral NIBLACK. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I move that they be put in the record in full.

Senator PITTMAN. Yes.

(The orders referred to are here printed in full, as follows:)

UNITED STATES NAVAL FORCES OPERATING IN EUROPEAN WATERS,
U. S. S. "MELVILLE," FLAGSHIP,
August 1, 1917.

Campaign Order No. 1.

Forces:

(*a*) Destroyer flotillas based on Queenstown, Vice Admiral Sims.
(*b*) Patrol squadrons operating on French coast, Capt. Fletcher.
  (1) Based on Brest, Capt. Fletcher.
  (2) Based on Bordeaux, commander to be designated.
(*c*) Patrol squadron based on Gibraltar, Rear Admiral Wilson.

1. Enemy submarines operating against allied line of communication.

2. These forces operate under direct military control of senior allied commanders present, in accordance with general policies of force commander as set forth in "General instructions."

3. (*x*) The senior United States naval officer afloat in each area shall be in immediate command of United States naval forces in that area (including personnel of bases) and shall be responsible for the efficiency of his command and for their operation, subject to the requirements of paragraph 2.

(*y*) The force commander shall be kept informed of military operations performed or contemplated and state of military readiness for any possible duty of which the forces in question are capable.

4. Keep force commander informed of supplies needed from United States sufficiently in advance for necessary arrangements being made.

In the absence of United States supplies, make direct request on allied base facilities and obtain and submit to the force commander, through his staff representatives, periodic summary of financial indebtedness thereby involved.

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5. Address, "Force Commander, 30 Grosvenor Gardens, London, S. W." Official cable and telegraph address, "Simsadus, London." Staff representative France, "Capt. R. H. Jackson, Ministry Marine, Paris." Telegraph address, "Jackson Marine, Paris." Use codes and ciphers as directed from time to time. In absence of contrary instructions, communicate via allied official codes to insure secrecy. Utilize allied official mail routes.

WM. S. SIMS,
Vice Admiral, Commanding.

Copies to Secretary Navy, Operations, 1; commander in chief, 1; *Melville*, 40; patrol squadron commander, Gibraltar, 20; staff office, Paris, 50, for ministry of marine, patrol squadron commanders, bases, naval attaché, Paris; naval attaché, London, 1; Rome, 1; Madrid, 1; British Admiralty, 1.

FLAG SECRETARY.

UNITED STATES NAVAL FORCES OPERATING IN EUROPEAN WATERS,
U. S. S. "MELVILLE," FLAGSHIP,
August 11, 1917.

Force instructions No. 1.
Subject: Organization and communications.

1. The official designation of these forces is "United States naval forces operating in European waters"; they constitute a task force of the Atlantic Fleet. The flag officer commanding the forces is officially styled the "Force commander" and shall be so addressed in official communications.

2. The U. S. S. *Melville* is designated as the force flagship.

3. Destroyers and parent ships based on Irish ports are officially designated by the Navy Department as "United States destroyer flotillas operating in European waters." Yachts and trawlers based on French ports are officially designated by the Navy Department as "United States patrol squadrons operating in European waters," under the immediate command of Capt. W. B. Fletcher, United States Navy Cruisers, gunboats, Coast Guard cutters, and destroyers based on Gibraltar are designated by the Navy Department as a patrol squadron and are under the immediate command of Rear Admiral H. B. Wilson, United States Navy.

4. Repair and supply bases at Brest and Bordeaux and communication office at St. Nazaire are in course of establishment under command of the senior officer of forces operating on the French coast.

5. A group of destroyers with parent ships based on the Azores is cooperating with this force, but does not at present form a part of it.

6. Task groups will be formed from time to time and duties assigned to them to meet the demands of the situation. All such dispositions of the force will be communicated to the force in campaign order.

7. For purposes of possible combined operations of the whole Atlantic Fleet, or of divers units thereof, the vessels of this force are assigned by Navy Department order of July 14, 1917 (Op.-17/20392-656) to the several forces of the Atlantic Fleet, but such assignments are not to be considered as effective for either administrative or operating purposes under existing conditions.

8. The destroyers based on Irish ports will, at an early date, be provisionally organized into divisions and flotillas as a measure of preparedness for their operation with the battleship forces, but such organization will have no effect on the execution of the duties now assigned to them.

9. The flagship *Melville* is stationed at Queenstown, Ireland. The force commander, in his additional capacity as naval representative of the United States in the allied European countries, has an office at No. 30, Grosvenor Gardens, London. A representative of the Navy Department, who is also a member of the force staff (at present Capt. R. H. Jackson, United States Navy), has an office at the ministry of marine, Paris.

10. All mail communications from vessels of the force for the force commander shall be addressed to him, and shall be forwarded as follows:

(*a*) From vessels based on Irish ports, via U. S. S. *Melville*.

(*b*) From vessels based on French ports, via the senior United States naval officer Brest, France.

(*c*) From vessels based on Gibraltar, via the senior United States naval officer, Gibraltar.

11. Naval attachés and others having occasion to address the force commander by mail should address to the London office. In France such communications should be forwarded via the staff representative at the ministry of Marine, Paris.

12. Telegraphic and cable addresses are: Force commander, "Simsadus, London." Staff representative in Paris, "Jackson, Marine, Paris." U. S. S. *Melville*, "Melvus,"

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Queenstown. Senior officer at Brest, "Ampat," Brest. Senior officer at Bordeaux, "Ambase," Bordeaux. Senior officer at St. Nazaire, "Amport," St. Nazaire.

For written communications utilize official routes and methods of transmission of the allied forces with which our forces are operating.

WILLIAM S. SIMS,
Vice Admiral Commanding.

Copies to: *Melville*, 40; senior officer, Brest, 30; senior officer, Gibraltar, 15; staff representative, Paris; Naval attachés, London, Paris, Madrid, Rome; commander in chief, 6; Navy Department, Operations.

UNITED STATES NAVAL FORCES,
OPERATING IN EUROPEAN WATERS,
U. S. S. "MELVILLE," FLAGSHIP,
September 22, 1917.

Force instructions No. 2.
Subject: General instructions.
General mission: Cooperation with allied forces in destruction of enemy forces.
Immediate mission: (1) Conservation of allied and neutral shipping; (2) saving of life.

FLEET AND NAVY REGULATIONS.

The forces in European waters, being integral parts of the United States Navy and of the Atlantic Fleet, shall be governed by Navy and fleet regulations and instructions in so far as these may apply to the conditions under which the forces are operating.

The employment of the forces of this command shall be governed by such campaign orders and force instructions as may be issued from time to time.

FORCE INSTRUCTIONS.

Force instructions are not to be considered as military orders, nor are they to interfere in any way with the demands of situations which may not have been contemplated, nor with such military orders as may be issued by allied commanders under whose immediate control any vessels of the command may be operating.

The force instructions are designed to serve the following ends:

(1) To impart the policies of the force commander to the forces under his command.

(2) To facilitate administration in accordance with the actual war conditions under which the forces are operating; these conditions will, in many cases, necessitate departures from the methods of administration established for peace conditions.

(3) To disseminate information regarding practices shown by experience to be successful.

POLICIES.

The following general policies of the force commander are announced, and they will be extended from time to time as necessity arises:

(1) All other considerations should be subordinated to the one of most efficiently cooperating with the allied forces. Operations should be carried out in accordance with the general plans of the senior allied commanders in the several areas in which the forces are operating.

(2) The mobility of the United States forces should be such that they may be continuously ready to change their areas of operations as may be made necessary by the operations of the enemy or by orders of the Navy Department. To this end they must remain, to the extreme practicable degree, independent of shore bases and facilities.

(3) The maximum degree of individual initiative should be encouraged. All forces, or divisions or units thereof, should be governed primarily at all times by the requirements of the particular situation confronting them. Commanders should act in accordance with their best judgment under such general policies of their seniors as have been previously made known to them. In making decisions the policies and wishes of the superiors upon whom responsibility will ultimately rest must be duly considered.

(4) The force commander and subordinate commanders should be kept fully informed at all times of any facts known to any member of the forces which might affect the decisions and plans of such commanders.

(5) Every officer and man should be encouraged to realize his personal share of responsibility in accomplishing the mission of the forces.

(6) All subordinate commanders, commanding officers, other officers, and men should avoid falling into a way of thinking that duty is satisfactorily performed by

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merely accomplishing the specific task assigned; they must always bear in mind the general and immediate missions of the force.

(7) The necessity for keeping the Navy Department informed of all matters which may in any way affect its responsibilities as regards these forces, and the service as a whole, must be constantly borne in mind by all.

DOCTRINE.

It is of paramount importance that each group of forces develop a doctrine covering basic tactical methods of procedure suitable for such group. Such a doctrine once developed and revised from time to time should govern all operations of the group, be thoroughly understood by all units, and provide a field within which individual initiative may be exercised with safety and with full confidence of mutual comprehension and cooperation. A doctrine to be of the maximum value must—

(*a*) Be brief.

(*b*) Be confined to fundamental essentials, having in view coordination of effort with minimum communication.

(*c*) Contemplate actual war conditions.

(*d*) Allow for the circumstances of sea, wind, weather, and navigation as practically encountered.

A doctrine must not be allowed to evolve into a mass of details which manifestly can not be standard or applicable to all situations that may arise.

Not only should all forces be prepared at all times for engagement with enemy submarines, but they should be prepared for the emergency of engagement with enemy ships of other types, either individually or in connection with fleet motions. It is essential, therefore, that such emergency be constantly borne in mind and that every preparation possible be made, based upon such information as is available or can be conjectured.

Pending the development of a doctrine for yachts and other types, the Destroyer Force Doctrine will be issued as a general guide.

Whenever any officer has any suggestions to make concerning the doctrine of the force to which he is attached, he should at once record it and make it known to his superiors. Group and division commanders should consult as frequently as possible for the purpose of making such revisions of the doctrine as may be suggested by experience.

ROUTINES—ROUTINE REPORTS.

All peace routine administration and practices should be subordinated to the requirements of war service as they develop.

It is manifestly important, both for efficient prosecution of the present war and for future professional and material improvement, that records, reports, and administrative practices be not too radically reduced. It is also important that as far as possible reports and records kept should be uniform for all vessels of a type. It is therefore desired that divisional and group commanders confer from time to time and come to an agreement as to suggested changes in established routines or practices or elimination of paper work and returns.

The senior commander of any unit or in any area should forward such recommendations to the force commander for his approval.

GROUP COMMANDER'S REPORTS.

Group commanders should periodically (weekly when practicable) submit to the force commander general reports covering military operations performed by the forces under their command. Such reports should be general in nature and as far as possible should give summaries and tabulations of important duty or data which will be of value or interest to the force commander or to the department. They should be designed primarily to assist the force commander in maintaining a general survey of operations performed without the necessity of going through war diaries and other correspondence in detail. They should also serve as a guide for the formulation of plans for the future.

WAR DIARIES.

War diaries should be kept by all commanding officers and group commanders in accordance with Atlantic Fleet Order No. 18.

A careful reading of this order shows that the war diary is not intended to be a copy of the ship's log. An inspection of some of the war diaries submitted shows that there has been some misunderstanding on this point, as many of them contain matter which is of no importance in such a diary. In the preparation of war diaries

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care must be exercised to exclude nonessential items, such as concern the weather, exact time of getting under way and anchoring, movements of other vessels, etc., unless these have an important bearing upon the militaty operations in hand and are of importance as a matter of record in connection therewith.

Entries are frequently made in war diaries early knowledge of which by other units of the force would be advantageous. When an entry is made which is thought to be in this category the officer preparing the diary should, by any convenient means, bring the fact to the attention of the superior to whom the diary is forwarded; such superior should take immediate steps to disseminate the information if, in his judgment, such action is advisable or should take such steps as may be necessary to bring the matter to the attention of the force commander.

The information contained in war diaries should, so far as practicable, be so grouped under headings that their use by the force commander and the department may be facilitated. Such headings should be descriptive of the information they cover.

PARENT AND SUPPLY SHIPS.

Parent and supply ships should subordinate all other considerations to the one of efficient repair and supply of the vessels they may be serving and should simplify their methods of administration to this end.

READINESS FOR DUTY.

Regardless of the time that may be set aside in schedules for rest, boiler cleaning, or overhaul, it is important that from the moment of arrival at an anchorage vessels undertake immediately all repairs or other work necessary to prepare them again for sea and prosecute such work without interruption until completion. For example, if five days should be set aside for rest, boiler cleaning, or other purposes, and the work can be completed in two or three days, it should be so accomplished and the remainder of the time used for rest of the personnel. Such a course is a military necessity in order that the maximum number of vessels may be available at all times to meet any unexpected enemy operations.

LEAVE AND LIBERTY.

Until further notice it is desired that leave and liberty be so regulated that vessels can put to sea, in case of emergency, on a few hours' notice. It is realized that this policy may work some hardship, but the force commander is confident that every man of the force will appreciate the importance of our forces putting forth every effort in the accomplishment of our general and immediate mission. The far-reaching effect not only upon the allied cause but also upon the record and distinction of our own service can not be foreseen at present. It therefore behooves this force to leave no stone unturned in putting forth every effort within the power of its personnel and material.

WM. S. SIMS,
Vice Admiral United States Navy,
Commanding.

Copies to: U. S. S. *Melville;* senior officer, Brest; senior officer, Gibraltar; staff representative, Paris; naval attachés, London, Paris, Madrid, Rome; commander in chief, Navy Department (Operations).

UNITED STATES NAVAL FORCES
OPERATING IN EUROPEAN WATERS,
U. S. S. "MELVILLE," FLAGSHIP,
October 6, 1917.

Force instructions No. 3.

Subject: Duty-free stores and gifts for United States naval forces operating in European waters.

The customs authorities of the United Kingdom have agreed to extend to the vessels of the United States Navy operating in European waters the same relaxation of strict customs formalities as is now granted to vessels of the British Navy. This courtesy having been extended upon the assumption that officers and enlisted men will regard themselves as in honor bound to avoid any abuse of the relaxations granted, and with the understanding that the United States naval authorities will accept the same responsibility as is accepted by the British naval authorities for the due observance of

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the regulations and the treatment of revenue offenses as a breach of naval discipline, it is incumbent upon all concerned to observe most carefully the requirements of the following agreement:

IMPORTATION OF GOVERNMENT STORES.

In cases where dutiable Government stores are transshipped from the importing vessel direct into the naval vessel for which intended, if the importing vessel is a United States naval vessel no custom. formalities are required. If, however, the importing vessel is a merchant ship, whether chartered as a Government transport or not, the stores may be transshipped without further formalities, and a commissioned officer of the naval vessel receiving the shipment will furnish the master of the importing vessel with a receipt giving sufficient details of the consignment to enable him to complete his accounts with the customs. In cases where the stores are not taken directly on board but are delivered to local agents for transportation from one ship to the other, whether in the same port or elsewhere, the agent will take over the goods and convey them under bond in the proper manner, and a commissioned officer of he naval vessel will sign the form of receipt in the ordinary shipping bill which will be presented (H. M. customs and excise Form No. 38, sale).

STORES ORDERED FROM MERCHANTS ASHORE.

The appropriate officer of the United States naval vessel making the purchase will fill out a special form of application for dutiable stores as in use for the British Navy, making the necessary alterations as required by the circumstances, and will forward it to the merchant for delivery to the local customs and excise officer. They will similarly fill out and return the special shipping bill when received from the merchant (H. M. customs and excise Forms Nos. 61, special, and 101/102, sale).

PRIVATE GIFTS TO PERSONNEL OF UNITED STATES NAVAL VESSELS.

In instances where an imported parcel containing dutiable gifts is sent otherwise than by parcel post, the forwarding agent will deliver it to the ship, and in cases where the duty would exceed 5 shillings, will present a shipping bill to be signed by the actual addressee and countersigned by a commissioned officer. In cases where the duty would not exceed 5 shillings or where the parcel is sent by parcel post, the countersignature of a commissioned officer is not required. On production of a declaration from the private donor, gifts of tobacco in quabtities not exceeding 2 pounds per man per month (or 2 pounds in any one parcel) may be sent by parcel post duty free from bonded warehouses or from tobacco manufacturers' premises in the United Kingdom.

DUTIABLE GOODS LANDED FROM UNITED STATES NAVAL VESSELS.

Any dutiable goods landed on United States Government service and accompanied by a naval permit signed by a commissioned officer, will be passed duty free subject to production for inspection of customs authorities if challenged at the place of landing. Goods landed by naval personnel for individual private use will also be passed duty free without formalities if openly produced on challenge and reasonable in amount, on the general understanding that such goods will not be surreptitiously carried or posted ashore, and that the amount of tobacco landed by any person going on leave will not appreciably exceed the amount in force for the British Navy, viz: One ounce per night subject to a maximum of 8 ounes per seven nights or more. The principal articles used on shipboard which are liable to duty in the United Kingdom are tobacco (including cigars and cigarettes), tea, coffee, cocoa, dried fruits, sugar, products containing sugar, such as jam, and matches. Dutiable goods must not be landed except under the above rules, and should cases of deliberate smuggling be detrcted the customs authorities will communivate with the naval authorities in order that appropriate disciplinary action may be taken.

WM. S. SIMS,
Vice Admiral, United States Navy,
Commanding.

Copies to U. S. S. *Melville*, 40; senior officer, Brest, 40; senior officer, Gibraltar, 30; naval attaches, London, Paris, Rome, Madrid; Capt. R. H. Jackson, United States Navy, 3; aviation headquarters, Paris, France, 15; commander in chief, 6; Navy Department (Operations), 1.

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UNITED STATES NAVAL FORCES,
OPERATING IN EUROPEAN WATERS,
U. S. S. "MELVILLE" FLAGSHIP,
November 10, 1917.

Campaign Order No. 2.
Forces:
(*a*) Destroyer flotillas based on Queenstown—Vice Admiral Sims.
(*b*) Patrol squadrons based on French coast—Rear Admiral Wilson.
(1) Based on Brest—Rear Admiral Wilson.
(2) Based on Bordeaux—Commander to be designated.
(*c*) Patrol squardon based on Gibraltar—Rear Admiral Niblack.
(*d*) Azores detachment—Senior officer present.
(*e*) Naval aviation forces, foreign service—Commander Cone.

1. Enemy submarines operating against allied lines of communication.

2. These forces operate under direct military control of senior allied commanders present, in accordance with general policies of force commander as set forth in force instructions No. 2 of September 22, 1917.

3. (*a*), (*b*), (*c*) and (*d*): The senior United States naval officer afloat in each area shall be in immediate command of United States naval forces in that area (including personnel of bases) and shall be responsible for the efficiency of his command and for their operation, subject to the requirements of paragraph 2.

(*d*) (Additional): Deny the Azores Islands to enemy submarines and operate offensively against such vessels when reported in the vicinity as far as the capabilities and radius of action of the available vessels permit. Do not operate in the vicinity of the Canary Islands east of longitude 20, and south of latitude 30, without first communicating with French naval forces in that area.

(*e*) Such seaplane and balloon stations as have been or may be established in France and in the British Isles shall be operated under the direction of the senior allied commander in the district in which they are located; the commander of naval aviation forces, foreign service, shall exercise general administrative and disciplinary control over all such stations.

(*x*) The force commander shall be kept informed of military operations performed or contemplated and state of military readiness for any possible duty of which the forces in question are capable.

4. Keep the force commander informed regarding supplies needed from the United States. Forces in France shall make requests through Paymaster J. F. Hatch, United States Navy, assistant in France to the aid for material, supplies, and repairs; all other forces shall make application for stores direct to the force commander.

When supplies can not be obtained from the United States within the necessary time, make direct requests on allied base facilities.

Local purchases may be made when it is necessary to obtain immediate delivery of supplies so procurable.

5. The force commander's mail address is 30 Grosvenor Gardens, London, S. W. Cable and telegraphic address, "Simsadus," London. Use codes and ciphers as may be directed from time to time; utilize allied official mail routes whenever possible.

This order becomes effective on receipt.

WM. S. SIMS,
Vice Admiral, Commanding

Copies to: Secretary of the Navy, Operations (1); commander in chief (5); U. S. S. *Melville* (5); Rear Admiral Wilson, for floating forces and bases (5); Rear Admiral Niblack (5); Commander Cone (5); senior officer, Ponta Delgada (5); Capt. R. H. Jackson (5); Paymaster Hatch (1); naval attachés, London (1), Paris (1), Rome (1), Madrid (1); British Admiralty (1); Admiral Bayly (1); files (5).

UNITED STATES NAVAL FORCES,
OPERATING IN EUROPEAN WATERS,
U. S. S. "MELVILLE," FLAGSHIP,
April 2, 1918.

Campaign Order No. 3.
Forces:
(*a*) Destroyer flotillas based on Queenstown—Vice Admiral Sims.
(1) Submarine detachment—Capt. Hart.
(*b*) Naval forces in France—Rear Admiral Wilson.
(*c*) Patrol squadron based on Gibraltar—Rear Admiral Niblack.

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(*d*) Azores detachment—Rear Admiral Dunn.
(*e*) Mining detachment—Rear Admiral Strauss.
(*f*) Sixth battle squadron, Grand Fleet—Rear Admiral Rodman.
(*g*) Naval Aviation Forces, foreign service—Capt. Cone.

1. Enemy submarines operating against allied lines of communication. Enemy high sea fleet contained in enemy home waters.

2. These forces operate under direct military control of senior allied commanders present, in accordance with general policies of force commander as set forth in force instructions No. 2, of September 22, 1917.

3. (*a*), (*b*), (*c*), (*d*), (*e*), and (*f*): The senior United States naval officer in each area shall be in immediate command of United States naval forces in that area (including personnel of bases) and shall be responsible for the efficiency of his command and for their operation, subject to the requirements of paragraph 2.

(*d*) (Additional): Deny the Azores Islands to enemy submarines and operate offensively against such vessels when reported in the vicinity as far as the capabilities and radius of action of the available vessels permit. Do not operate in the vicinity of the Canary Islands east of longitude 20, and south of latitude 30, without first communicating with French naval forces in that area.

(*g*) Such air stations as have been or may be established in France, and in the British Isles shall be operated under the direction of the senior allied commander in that district in which they are located; the commander of naval aviation forces, foreign service, shall exercise general administrative and disciplinary control over all such stations.

(*x*) The force commander shall be kept informed of military operations performed or contemplated and state of military readiness for any possible duty of which the forces in question are capable.

4. Keep the force commander informed regarding supplies needed from the United States. Forces in France shall make requests through Paymaster J. F. Hatch, United States Navy, assistant in France to the aid for material and supplies; all other forces shall make application for stores direct to the force commander.

When supplies can not be obtained from the United States within the necessary time, make direct requests on allied base facilities.

Local purchases may be made when it is necessary to obtain immediate delivery of supplies so procurable.

5. The force commander's mail address is 30 Grosvenor Gardens, London, S. W. Cable and telegraphic address, "Simsadus," London. Use codes and ciphers as may be directed from time to time; utilize allied official mail routes whenever possible.

This order becomes effective on receipt.

WM. S. SIMS,
Vice Admiral, Commanding.

Copies to Secretary of the Navy, Operations (1); commander in chief Atlantic Fleet (5); U. S. S. *Melville* (5); Rear Admiral Wilson, for floating forces and bases (10); Rear Admiral Niblack (5); Capt. Cone (5); Rear Admiral Dunn (5); Rear Admiral Rodman (5); Capt. Hart (3); Capt. R. H. Jackson (5); Paymaster Hatch (1); naval attachés, London (1), Paris (1), Rome (1), Madrid (1); British Admiralty (1); Admiral Bayly (1); files (5).

Senator PITTMAN. Those are all the instructions received by you from Admiral Sims?

Admiral NIBLACK. I suppose I got about 15 cablegrams a day of various kinds.

Senator PITTMAN. What was the substance of those?

Admiral NIBLACK. Sailings of ships, orders transferring officers, notification of sending me supplies and reserve officers and men, dispatch of materials, and all kinds of information that came through Operations. He had a very large force in London that kept us informed. And then we got daily bulletins from Admiral Sims of all the happenings in our command and in the war zone, which were very nice to have and very illuminating, and we had a free interchange of information, so that we would all know what the other fellow was doing, as far as we could. The thing was beautifully managed; very efficient.

Senator PITTMAN. He gave you all of the information that he had at his command?

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Admiral NIBLACK. And we, in return, gave all of ours. The situation of the submarines momentarily was given to us by radio and telegrams, and we had a great operating board in the office of the commandant, where every convoy was kept in position from hour to hour, relatively, on the chart, and there were dozens of convoys at sea all the time, and as soon as a submarine would be signaled as in a certain spot, it would be placed on the board; and then if necessary a radio signal would be sent to the meeting convoy ship to change course a certain number of degrees, or to a certain definite course, to avoid this submarine.

Senator PITTMAN. Then, when you received this information it was up to you to operate your forces?

Admiral NIBLACK. To operate my forces at need. We never closed. Everybody was on watch, and the operating table was kept up to the minute of time.

Senator PITTMAN. Do you know whether or not the report of the General Board was before Congress in 1916 when, in the general naval appropriation bill, the personnel of the Navy was increased?

Admiral NIBLACK. I do not know. I was not in Washington for 14 years prior to the war—that is, on duty.

Senator PITTMAN. By whom is the policy of the Navy fixed?

Admiral NIBLACK. By the President of the United States.

Senator PITTMAN. Does the President of the United States decide the size of the Navy?

Admiral NIBLACK. No; but he decides upon the policy of the Government.

Senator PITTMAN. You mean as to neutrality or war?

Admiral NIBLACK. He can not declare war, but he can announce policies.

Senator PITTMAN. That was what I was trying to get at, what you meant by a policy, because of course as a matter of fact the length of time that we shall remain neutral is entirely dependent upon Congress, as I understand the law.

Admiral NIBLACK. Absolutely. The power to declare war rests with Congress.

Senator PITTMAN. The question as to whether we should arm merchantmen was a question of policy of Congress, was it not?

Admiral NIBLACK. It was a question of procedure. It was then the recognized procedure, and it had been determined that we should arm our ships to prevent these aggressions.

Senator PITTMAN. By whom was that determined?

Admiral NIBLACK. That was determined by the Government.

Senator PITTMAN. I understand, but "the Government" is a very broad expression. What department of the Government determined whether we should arm our merchantmen?

Admiral NIBLACK. I do not know who recommended it, but the executive authority of the United States vested by the Constitution rests broadly upon the President, because the Constitution does not mention the Cabinet. The Cabinet is a creation entirely of Congress; and of course the Constitution is entirely silent with respect to the authority of the Cabinet, but the executive authority rests in the President.

Senator PITTMAN. Then the arming of the merchant marine came through the President?

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Admiral NIBLACK. That came through the executive authority, whatever that is. I do not know who gave the order. But it was largely a matter of policy, because we began to arm ships before war was declared, because we resented this unrestricted sinking.

Senator PITTMAN. Well, that is what I was getting at.

Admiral NIBLACK. Yes.

Senator PITTMAN. I mean as a matter of fact we did not wait until we declared war?

Admiral NIBLACK. No; we began to do that before war was declared, and it was in resentment of this outrageous attitude that Germany took.

Senator PITTMAN. In other words, months before we declared war we commenced to prepare to defend ourselves?

Admiral NIBLACK. Well, we took certain steps to prepare ourselves; but how thoroughly I am not informed. As a matter of fact, you can not do much without money. Congress holds the purse strings.

Senator PITTMAN. Yes. As a matter of fact, Congress has rather restricted the enlargement of the Navy in accordance with the views of the General Board at all times, has it not?

Admiral NIBLACK. I would like to have that question read.

(The last question above was read aloud by the stenographer.)

Admiral NIBLACK. No; it has rather increased it in accordance with the views of the General Board, at all times.

Senator PITTMAN. Yes; I put it in an inverted way.

Admiral NIBLACK. Congress has not enlarged it in accordance with the recommendations of the General Board, but often the recommendations of the General Board have not been followed by the department, and there is no compulsion on the part of the department to publish or follow the recommendations of the General Board. The General Board is advisory merely. It is not infallible. It is a valuable board, but it makes mistakes, probably; but they are generally on the good side.

Senator PITTMAN. The question whether or not we shall have a large Navy or a small Navy is purely a question of governmental policy that is determined by Congress?

Admiral NIBLACK. A governmental policy, and often a political policy.

Senator PITTMAN. Well, all Governments are political.

Admiral NIBLACK. Yes, all Governments are political.

Senator PITTMAN. You can not have a large Navy unless you have the money to build a large Navy?

Admiral NIBLACK. You can not.

Senator PITTMAN. And you are restricted in personnel?

Admiral NIBLACK. At the present moment, do you mean?

Senator PITTMAN. No, not now; in preparation and everything else you are limited by the money that is furnished by Congress to perform those acts?

Admiral NIBLACK. Absolutely.

Senator PITTMAN. The reason I asked you that question, Admiral, as to whether the report of the General Board was before the committees of Congress is that at the time that Congress was considering the increase of personnel in 1916, and also when it was considering

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the three-year naval program, the Senate Naval Affairs Committee had before it the report of the General Board, and ever since I have been a member of the Naval Affairs Committee we have had before us the report of the General Board.

Admiral NIBLACK. No; I think that that was a very exceptional case; that the General Board historically—its opinions have never been very definitely given to the committees, and this was rather exceptional.

Senator PITTMAN. In this way we have always, so far as I know, asked the Secretary, or whoever represents him there, the question as to what the opinion of the General Board was in regard to every recommendation.

Admiral NIBLACK. Yes, I think so. That is a question of history.

Senator PITTMAN. Sometimes we have been in accord with them and sometimes we have not; but I mean to say that the committee has had the benefit of that report, and the question is, dealing with the recommendation that you make, that it should be required by law that the report of the General Board should be submitted to Congress?

Admiral NIBLACK. No, that the opinion of the Chief of Naval Operations, who is to have certain power to execute these questions, should be submitted. That is quite a different thing. That is quite a different proposition. The law now gives the General Board certain authority, which also is given to the Chief of Naval Operations. I think it is very important that this committee should have before it, as I have given, the law relating to the General Board, the law as now existing relating to the duties of the Chief of Naval Operations. If I may, I will read it. It is not very long. It has to do with exactly who is responsible and how far responsible he is.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Senator PITTMAN. I have no objection to that.

Admiral NIBLACK. This is the law [reading]:

DUTIES OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS.

[Naval Regulations, chap. 2, art. 126.]

(1) The Chief of Naval Operations shall, under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy, be charged with the operations of the fleet and with the preparation and readiness of plans for its use in war. (Act Mar. 3, 1915.)

(2) This shall include the direction of the Naval War College, the Office of Naval Intelligence, the office of gunnery exercises and engineering performances, the operation of the communication service, the operations of the aeronautic service, of mines and mining, of the naval districts, Naval Militia, and of the Coast Guard when operating with Navy; the direction of all strategic and tactical matters, organization, maneuvers, gunnery exercises, drills and exercises, and of the training of the fleet for war; and the preparation and revision and enforcement of all drills books, signal codes, and cipher codes.

(3) The Chief of Naval Operations shall be charged with the preparation, revision, and record of regulations for the government of the Navy, naval instructions, and general orders.

(4) He shall advise the Secretary concerning the movements and operations of vessels of the Navy and prepare all orders issued by the Secretary in regard thereto, and shall keep the records of service of all fleets, squadrons, and ships.

(5) He shall advise the Secretary in regard to the military features of all new ships and as to any proposed extensive alterations of a ship which will affect her military value, and all features which affect the military value of dry docks, including their location; also as to matters pertaining to fuel reservations and depots, the location of radio stations, reserves of ordnance and ammunition, fuel stores, and other supplies of whatsoever nature, with a view to meeting effectively the demands of the fleet.

(6) He shall advise the Secretary of the Navy on all business of the department in regard to foreign relations, and all correspondence in regard to these matters shall be presented for the department's action through his offices.

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(7) In preparing and maintaining in readiness plans for the use of the fleet in war, she shall freely consult with and have the advice and assistance of the various bureaus, boards, and offices of the department, including the Marine Corps headquarters, in matters coming under their cognizance.

And, by the way, these war plans are always signed by the Secretary. [Continuing reading:]

After the approval of any given war plans by the Secratry it shall be the duty of the Chief of Naval Operations to assign to the bureaus, boards, and offices such parts thereof as may be needed for the intelligent carrying out of their respective duties in regard to such plans.

(8) The Chief of Naval Operations shall from time to time witness the operations of the fleet as an observer.

Admiral Coontz is going down next week. [Continuing reading:]

(9) He shall have two principal senior assistants, officers not below the grade of captain, one as assistant for operations and the other as assistant for material.

(10) He shall ex officio be a member of the General Board.

There is a further provision of the law, as follows [reading]:

SECRETARY'S ADVISORY COUNCIL.

[Naval Regulations, chapter 2, article 105.]

The Secretary's advisory council will be composed of the following members:
The Assistant Secretary of the Navy.
The Chief of Naval Operations.
The Chief of the Bureau of Navigation.
The Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance.
The Chief of the Bureau of Steam Engineering.
The Chief of the Bureau of Construction and Repair.
The Chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks.
The Chief of the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts.
The Chief of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery.
The Major General Commandant of the Marine Corps.
The Judge Advocate General of the Navy.

The Secretary's advisory council will meet every Thursday at noon in the Secretary's office, unless otherwise directed, and at such other times as the Secretary may direct.

The Naval Regulations is composed of two parts, the blue book and the white part of it. Admiral McKean has called my attention to the fact that it is only where it is stated there that it is in the law, where the reference is given, "Act of March 3, 1915," and the other is the regulations signed by the President. And what I have just read, it is stated where it is in the law. The regulations are signed by the President. Thay have executive force. They have all the effect of law, unsigned by the President.

Senator PITTMAN. Do you think that our Navy, from your knowledge of the situation, did its full part in the war?

Admiral NIBLACK. I think it did its full share in every way.

Senator PITTMAN. Admiral, is there not quite a difference in the acts that are essential for general preparation for war and the acts that are essential for a naval battle?

Admiral NIBLACK. There is a great difference. Naval battles are fought on what you might call general written, and on specific orders, which are given either in writing prior to the battle or by signal during the battle, or in the progress of the battle, and those are what you call dispositions and assignments of what you might call task groups and specific forces, as detailed for specific purposes. No plan can outline, ahead of time, what the battle is going to bring forth. Many orders, for instance, are given which change the disposition of the forces and change previous orders.

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Senator PITTMAN. Just one other question here, so that the record may not convey a wrong impression from the question asked by the Senator from Florida. As I understand, you testified that war plans were in preparation when you were a boy.

Admiral NIBLACK. I mean by that, since 1888, when the War College was created. But I was more than a boy at that time.

Senator PITTMAN. The Senator from Florida asked you if war plans were not in preparation from time immemorial. I did not want to have any misunderstanding from leaving it that way.

Admiral NIBLACK. I think we have always had a plan. We had a war plan in the Civil War. We have had lots of war plans. But I meant to say, there was nothing new about a war plan.

Senator PITTMAN. Do you know of any proposal by the General Board during the war, from the commencement of it, that was not carried out by Congress?

Admiral NIBLACK. I can not answer that question, because it is rather historical than otherwise. It is a historical question that should be very readily taken up by the Historical Section of the Navy Department and definitely answered.

Senator PITTMAN. But, I say you know of none yourself, from the information you now have?

Admiral NIBLACK. Well, I mentioned aviation as a proposition of the General Board that has not materialized.

Senator PITTMAN. There was a considerable amount of money, however, appropriated for that. Congress did its duty in that particular, I believe, during the war.

Admiral NIBLACK. The General Board has to do with the rounding out of programs, and often they get only a part of the program, and of course it is not always a complete one, for that reason; but our Navy has gone on the theory that if we got battleships, it would be like having the necessaries of life, and we could dispense with some of the luxuries.

Senator PITTMAN. Do you know what department of our Government had charge of the building of airplanes during the war?

Admiral NIBLACK. I do not know. They were very slow in getting them out. I do not know who it was.

Senator PITTMAN. Was it not under the War Department?

Admiral NIBLACK. I do not know.

Senator PITTMAN. I am not intending to criticise the War Department in that way, one way or another.

Admiral NIBLACK. I do not know what branch of the War Department is involved.

Senator PITTMAN. If there were any mistake in the matter, it is not to be blamed upon the Navy, then?

Admiral NIBLACK. No, sir; I do not know about the War Department's organization during the war.

Senator PITTMAN. This report of 1913 you referred to was a report dealing solely with Navy planes, was it not?

Admiral NIBLACK. Solely; and my object in bringing that up was to show the fact that the General Board has been alive to the situation for a great many years, and we are still alive to it, and the building program submitted by the General Board is one that apparently is too large to swallow. It would be difficult to make it, in my opinion, small enough to have it swallowed.

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The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, you stated that the Navy did its full share in the war. Everybody knows what splendid work the Navy did during the war; but do you not think that it would have been possible after 1914, and certainly after the sinking of the *Lusitania* in 1915, to put our Navy in a state of preparedness where we would have been able to do much more in the war than we did do?

Admiral NIBLACK. Well, politically it was not possible to do it. It was very desirable, but it was not politically desirable.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not allude to Congress?

Admiral NIBLACK. Just the situation; what you call the situation in our country. The views of our voters and the newspapers, and all that goes to make up the influential elements in any problem.

The CHAIRMAN. So far as Congress is concerned, I think the Senator from Florida is trying to bring out the idea that Congress is responsible in certain cases. As far as Congress is concerned, have you any doubt in your mind that if the Secretary of the Navy had put up to the Congress of the United States the fact that we needed certain vital changes, certain increases in ships and in personnel, and other changes—have you any doubt that Congress would have enacted legislation to carry out those changes?

Admiral NIBLACK. Very serious doubt.

The CHAIRMAN. After the sinking of the *Lusitania?*

Admiral NIBLACK. Very serious doubt.

The CHAIRMAN. Other witnesses have testified very differently from you.

Admiral NIBLACK. I am only giving you the idea that I do not think we can ever get what the Navy really requires to make it what our policy is at the present moment, equal to that of any other navy in the world.

The CHAIRMAN. That is a peace question; but after the sinking of the *Lusitania* it was evident to a great many people, I think to most people in this country, that eventually we were likely to get into war with Germany, and I think the feeling was very strong in this country that we should do everything possible to prepare for that war. Do you not agree with that?

Admiral NIBLACK. That was my impression from reading the newspapers. My own opinion was that the Navy is preparing for war all the time. It is preparing for war now. It is its business to prepare for war, and it should be prepared for war; and I am getting ready for the next war right now, and I am very loath to go into a post-mortem of the last war, because my interest is in the next one.

The CHAIRMAN. Precisely; but we can get a good many lessons from the past war, can we not?

Admiral NIBLACK. I hope so.

Senator PITTMAN. Admiral, the sinking of the *Lusitania* was in May, 1916. In December, 1915, and in 1916, we had a naval appropriation bill. Did the House Committee on Naval Affairs report as much as the Navy Department asked for?

Admiral NIBLACK. That is a historical question. I could very readily answer that by recourse to the records, and I hope that the history of the war will bring that out. The object of this $20,000 I have is to accumulate information for writing the history and the classification of this information, but Congress refuses to give us more than $1,800 for the salary of any one person, and I can not get

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anyone to write the history of this war for $1,800, and Admiral Sims has distinctly stated that no naval person is capable of doing it, so that I am barred as it is.

Senator PITTMAN. We are helpless in this matter.

Admiral NIBLACK. I will use all the testimony taken before this committee for the purposes of this history. I am very glad that you are going into this.

Senator PITTMAN. Let me call your attention to this: In the winter of 1915 and 1916 there was what was known as the three-year naval program submitted to Congress by the Navy Department. The House made it a five-year program and reduced it 50 per cent. That was in 1915–16, during that Congress. The Senate changed it back to a three-year program and increased it nearly to the recommendations of the Navy Department, and then a compromise was reached between the House position and the Senate position. Is that matter familiar to your recollection?

Admiral NIBLACK. That is a matter of history.

Senator PITTMAN. And that was after the sinking of the *Lusitania*. You remember in that case, therefore, Congress did do its part according to the views of the Navy Department, after the sinking of the *Lusitania*, and before we entered the war?

Admiral NIBLACK. I was in the fleet at that time, and was doing my level best to get ready for war.

Senator PITTMAN. Just one other question. You may remember historically, also, in dealing with this subject, that about the time that we decided to arm the merchant marine, at the time that the Navy Department recommended, by virtue of the position taken by the President of the United States, there was a resolution introduced in the House of Representatives known as the McLemore resolution, and there was also a resolution introduced in the Senate practically identical with that, known as the Gore resolution.

The vote upon the McLemore resolution in the House and the action taken in the Senate would not seem to indicate that the policy of the country as indicated by the two branches of Congress was very much in favor of any war-like preparation, would it?

Admiral NIBLACK. I am not informed, but that would be very valuable, to go into the history of the war, which we hope to write, and any information that any of the Senators have that would show what Congress did to prepare us for war would be very valuable as a part of the historical record. This history of mine that somebody is going to write sometime is collecting now, information, and the object is to collect and classify the information.

Senator PITTMAN. I may say, for the benefit of your history and for the benefit of both the Republican side of the Senate at the time and those on the Democratic side who were very anxious for preparation for this war, that we were so doubtful as to the situation that we conferred quietly and decided that the best thing to do was to table it, and it was tabled by a very small majority. That is simply indicative, you understand, of the difficulty of obtaining preparation for war; that is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, by the three-year program to which the Senator has reference, of course he refers to the fact which I am talking about, the steps which should have been taken to prepare our Navy. There may have been doubts in some peoples' minds as

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to whether we would need anything three or four years afterwards. There was no question in my mind, but there may have been in some peoples' minds.

As far as the armed guard question is concerned, that can not be taken as a definite step toward the increase of the Navy; but do you not recall that the General Board, I think it was in 1916, made a report to the Secretary asking for a certain number of men—for an increase in the personnel—and that at the Secretary's request the board withdrew the suggested increase of 20,000, before the matter was put up to Congress?

Admiral NIBLACK. That is a matter of official historical record, I hope, and I hope it will be available for historical purposes; and any information of that kind is very valuable. And, moreover, Admiral Badger is available as a member of the General Board. I know nothing about that proposition myself.

Senator PITTMAN. From the records of the General Board, to which you have access, is it not a fact that immediately after the sinking of the *Lusitania* the Secretary of the Navy asked the General Board to prepare a comprehensive building program, and that this was prepared and submitted to the Secretary of the Navy and that it was submitted by him to Congress?

Admiral NIBLACK. I shall look that matter up. I think that is very important.

Senator PITTMAN. And that it resulted in what is known as the naval program of 1915–16, or the three-year program, and the enlargement of personnel of the Navy?

The CHAIRMAN. And is it not a fact that that does not cover the immediate steps that I am speaking about, and which have been in use in the present war? Was not the naval program prepared held up in every possible way during the war with Germany?

Admiral NIBLACK. Well, I hope not; but I do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. I think the figures will show how much of it has been completed now, nearly four years after it has been prepared.

Admiral NIBLACK. I think that is very important as a historical fact.

Senator PITTMAN. The question that the chairman asks has been answered here several times; but I do not think it is fair to allow it to go into the record as an indication that the Navy Department laid down on its building program during the war. The testimony discloses the fact that the building of superdreadnaughts was postponed because it takes about three years to build a dreadnaught, and every navy yard in the country was necessary for the building of antisubmarine craft and vessels essential to transportation of food and soldiers to the Allies. Every dollar that was appropriated and every navy yard that was available was used, and the only slacking on building that is shown by the prior testimony was on our battleships, which could not be made available until after the war.

Admiral NIBLACK. That is a very interesting historical fact.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator is bearing out exactly what I say, and that is that that three-year program was not an immediate step going into the war; that is, it was something in the future, and had nothing to do with the immediate steps, such as putting into effect the personnel increase for manning such ships as we had on hand.

Senator PITTMAN. But the personnel report was carried out.

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Admiral NIBLACK. I think history will probably do full justice to whoever was responsible.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any questions, Senator Keyes?

Senator KEYES. No, Mr. Chairman; but this discussion as to whether Congress was responsible for the action of 1915 or not is very interesting to me, and as we are recording historical facts, I would like to have the record show that I was not a Member of Congress in 1915.

The CHAIRMAN. Nor was I. I think the records will show that Senator Pittman was the only member of this subcommittee who was in Congress at that time.

Senator TRAMMELL. I was not a Member at that time, but all of us remember about that time; and I know that the present committee has not approved of all the recommendations made even by the Secretary of the Navy very recently, so that it is possible that the Secretary made some recommendations to Congress and could not get them through.

The CHAIRMAN. We are not at war now.

Senator TRAMMELL. We were not at war then. The Navy Department and the Secretary have made recommendations considerably larger than the committee has approved of at the present time. Hindsight is better than foresight, so that three years from now, if we should get into war again, they will come and say, "I told you so," again.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there anything else?

Senator TRAMMELL. That is all I have.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is all, Admiral, and you may be excused.

(Thereupon, at 1 o'clock p. m. the subcommittee adjourned until Wednesday, April 14, 1920, at 10 o'clock a. m.)

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NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 14, 1920.

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON NAVAL AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to adjournment, in room 235, Senate Office Building, at 10 o'clock a. m., Hon. Frederick Hale presiding.

Present, Senators Hale (chairman), Ball, Keyes, and Trammell.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. Admiral Strauss, will you please take the stand and be sworn?

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL JOSEPH STRAUSS, UNITED STATES NAVY.

The witness was sworn by the chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, have you a statement to make about matters connected with this investigation?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes, sir. When war was first declared in Europe I was on duty in the department as Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, to which position I had been appointed in October of the preceding year. At that time the department was organized on the aid system. The chiefs of the material bureaus met almost daily in the office of the aid for material for conference where their work was coordinated by that aid.

Upon taking over the work of the bureau I was apprised of the policy of the department with respect to supply and reserve of ammunition, auxiliaries and their armament, reserve guns, supply and reserve of torpedoes, mines, etc. This policy had been recommended by the General Board and approved by the Secretary of the Navy, and the bureau was actually engaged in purchasing and manufacturing this material to the full extent of funds available. This was the part of preparedness for war that was assigned to the bureau of which I was the head, and I hope I will be pardoned for the personal reference, when I state that with the aid of an able staff of officers the work was pursued vigorously, so that at the end of 1915 in answer to an inquiry by the chairman of the House Naval Committee I was able to write him the following letter:

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
BUREAU OF ORDNANCE,
Washington, D. C., December 10, 1915.

Hon. L. P. PADGETT, M. C.,
Chairman Committee on Naval Affairs,
House of Representatives, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Referring to our conversation of yesterday with regard to ordnance material on hand, I will give you the following summary of conditions:

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POWDER.

The powder situation is excellent. On June 30 of this year the total shortage of powder for all ships including the *Pennsylvania* and *Arizona* amounted to only 2,510,000 pounds. That is to say, this amount is not on hand or ordered. I told you yesterday that our average product at Indianhead for the year would be 5,000,000 pounds. On examining the latest returns from the factory I am afraid this is an overstatement. We are hoping to get everything working with the increased plant in February. We may not succeed. If we do succeed the rate, as I told you, from that time on would be 6,000,000 pounds per annum, which would make the average for the year about 5,000,000 pounds. I am not counting on it, for the reason that it is not an accomplished fact.

I gave it out in my annual report that 5,000,000 pounds would be the product for the fiscal year 1916. We have had so many delays in obtaining material that I regret now I made so optimistic a prediction.

However, to return to the question of powder supply; The 2,510,000-pound shortage could be made up, as I told you yesterday, by the time the *Pennsylanvia* and *Arizona* went into commissionand required their powder. We will not work it quite that way, for reasons of expediency, but instead of supplying a full reserve for all the shortages embraced in the 2,510,000-pound shortage, we deem it advisable to begin the manufacture of powder for the *California* class, and will rest on this small shortage in other respect in order to be ahead on new construction.

This general statement can be made: That we have on hand or ordered all the powder and reserve for all capital ships of the Navy that are in commission or are about to be commissioned; that we have all the allowance of powder for all other guns in the service and nearly all of the reserves. The business in hand now in the powder department is to provide the supply and reserve for the five ships of the *California* class. Our predicted capacity at Indianhead will be 6,000,000 pounds per year, which will take care of all this call, but will not take care of the new extended building program of four ships per annum.

So I can repeat, that the powder situation leaves nothing to be desired.

PROJECTILES.

The supply of projectiles is not so satisfactory as that of powder. We have on hand and in process of manufacture in the 14-inch caliber, enough for the supply and reserve for all ships including the *Oklahoma* and *Nevada* about to be commissioned and the *Pennsylvania* and *Arizona*, which will be commissioned probably late next summer.

The reason I say it is not so satisfactory is because we must now procure the money for, and be diligent in having manufactured, projectiles for the *California* class and even the two 1916 ships which the Secretary yesterday decided would be built at navy yards.

Of the 13-inch caliber we have all that will be required. Of the 12-inch caliber we have even a slight surplus. Of the 10-inch caliber we have enough; the same with the 8-inch and 7-inch calibers. In the 6-inch caliber we have a shortage, but the number on hand and in process of manufacture constitutes 80 per cent of our total requirements as laid down. In other words, the shortage is 20 per cent. In the 5-inch caliber we are very short. The shortage amounts to about 50 per cent of the total requirements, but this shortage is tempered by the fact that we consider the reserve to apply to all the projectiles needed for ships under construction. Taking the three battleships of the *California* class and the two 1916 ships, five ships in all, mounting 110 guns, from our shortage, we find that we have on hand and ordered about 61 per cent of 5-inch projectiles for all ships up to and including the *Pennsylvania* and *Arizona*. If we exclude all ships not ready to fight, which would exclude the *Pennsylvania* and *Arizona*, the shortage would be only 34 per cent in this caliber.

In the 4-inch caliber our total shortage amounts to nearly 49 per cent. Again excluding destroyers in process of construction, this shortage would be reduced to 41 per cent.

The shortage in the 3-inch caliber is 53 per cent. I do not consider this very seriously, but yet feel that it must be made up. If we could utilize the present capacity of the country in producing these shells, the entire outfit could be supplied in a few weeks. It is presumable, therefore, that if the money is granted by this Congress this item can be excluded from the question of preparedness.

GUNS.

The guns on hand and in process of manufacture meet all requirements of the department as to armament and reserve guns, with two or three minor exceptions

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which are negligible. All of the 14-inch batteries and the reserve guns for these batteries are built or building. We are fully supplied with 13-inch guns, both mounted and reserve. There is a small shortage in 6-inch 50-caliber reserve guns. For certain reasons connected with this caliber, I do not deem it necessary to povide them. There is a small shortage in 5-inch 51-caliber guns which will require no special appropriation to make up. Current funds under "Ordnance and Ordnance Stores" will, I believe, provide sufficient money to meet this small deficiency. Of course, this small shortage in reserve guns is more than made up by the fact that it is a shortage on the total number of 5-inch guns mounted and to be mounted. Some of them will not be mounted and in use for three or four years.

TORPEDOES.

The torpedo situation is well in hand. We have now actually on hand or in process of manufacture torpedoes sufficient for the full allowance and reserve for every ship that we possess or that has been authorized. The torpedoes being manufactured will be ready for the ships as soon as they are put in commission. In this year's estimates I did ask for a large sum of money to provide replacement torpedoes for the three battleships of the *Ohio* class, for the six armored cruisers, and for destroyers. The above-mentioned vessels now have 4,000-yard torpedoes, and it was my idea to replace them with torpedoes that would range seven or eight thousand yards. The 4,000-yard torpedoes would not be wasted, as they would be kept in stock for present and future submarines, a class of vessels upon which such torpedoes would be entirely efficient. The department cut this item out from the estimates. However, the estimates include $800,000 which will be utilized for the manufacture of replacement torpedoes, principally to carry out a general scheme which we have had in hand now for two or three years, by which the pre-dreadnaught ships are to have their torpedoes changed from 4,000-yard range to about 8,000 yards. This money will complete that scheme and I hope will provide sufficient funds to give new torpedoes to the nine small submarines in the Philippines.

MINES.

We have actually ready for use at the present time two-thirds of the mines that prior to the European war were considered necessary for our needs. The remaining one-third are promised for delivery in the spring, and I believe this promise will be kept if the great dearth of material does not interfere. However, the tremendous use of mines abroad during this war has furnished an object lesson to us and to other nations as to the more extended use of the mines that is possible, and at the suggestion of this bureau, the department, upon the advice of the General Board, has placed a new figure on our needs, and has increased the previous number by 6,000 mines. If the money is made available, these 6,000 mines will be manufactured during the next fiscal year at the Norfolk Navy Yard, where the other mines are being built.

Respectfully,

J. STRAUSS, *Chief of Bureau.*

The word "shortage," used frequently in the above letter, should be explained: We counted ourselves "short" of ordnance material for a ship as soon as the ship was authorized, although the ship was not to be ready for the ammunition, for instance, for three or four years.

As the war in Europe progressed, many new things were learned, and as fast as possible these lessons were taken to heart and our plans expanded accordingly. For instance, it had long been assumed that reserves of small caliber shell (being of simple manufacture) could be produced very readily during the war as they were needed. As a result of our experience in the United States in the production of small shell for the Allies, we learned that the process would be much slower than we thought, so that I changed the policy and asked for and obtained sufficient funds to procure all the refills of ammunition that were stipulated in the General Board plans. When I left the bureau in December, 1916, these shell were being manufactured. While on this subject, I will refer to the manufacture of 12 and 14 inch armor-piercing shell. The difficulties surrounding the production of such

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projectiles were great, and the margin of profit as compared with more easily manufactured steel products was probably small, so that steel makers were not very anxious to undertake the business. This became so apparent to me in 1915 that I recommended to the Secretary that we start a shell plant of our own. He approved this and obtained an appropriation for the purpose, so that now we have a plant in Charleston, W. Va., that is manufacturing forged-stell armor-piercing shell. The failure of one firm to fulfill its contracts for the 14-inch caliber, with penalties accruing through many months promised a shortage of reserve shell if they continued to fail in meeting the specifications. However, there were three large steel plants manufacturing them when I went to sea in 1916.

We had been alive to the importance of mines in modern warfare for a long time. In 1913 we adopted a type of mine after proper tests and as soon as possible a contract was entered into with Vickers to manufacture these mines, and at the same time we started to procure equipment to manufacture an equal number at the navy yard at Norfolk. With the completion of these mines we would have had the quantity that fulfilled the requirements recommended by the General Board. As time went on it was seen that very many more mines would be used should we be involved in the war, so that the number to be procured was trebled. When the North Sea barrage was projected, it involved the manufacture of something like a hundred thousand. A new type was invented and developed by the Bureau of Ordnance to that end in the spring of 1917. In the meantime I had left the bureau.

In 1913 we had only 900 mines. The task of getting mines was pushed as much as our limited funds would permit. We had asked for money for mines in 1912, again in 1913, and in 1914 the department asked for $300,000 for this purpose, but no money was appropriated. So we had to get along as best we could, eking out the supply set by the war plans from money taken from other funds that could legally be so used. As an example of comparative preparedness I have been informed that at that time the British had no mines.

We had at the end of 1916 batteries of four guns each for 189 auxiliary ships. These batteries were housed at navy yards, and the full supply of powder, shell, primers, etc., were all prepared and ready for these ships at the nearest ammunition depots, so that in the event of war the guns could be secured on the ships and the magazines and shell rooms supplied at once.

In December, 1916, I took over the command of the battleship *Nevada* and early in January, 1917, proceeded with the fleet to Cuba for the winter exercises and maneuvers. We came north in March. The general feeling in the fleet was one of confidence inspired by the high morale and excellent condition of the ships and their personnel.

I remained on the *Nevada* until February, 1918, when I was promoted to rear admiral. I was detached in that month and ordered to command the mine force, with temporary duty in Washington, where I was apprised of the plans for constructing a barrier of mines across the North Sea to hem in the submarines. After spending a couple of weeks in studying the plans, inspecting the mine layers, then being prepared, I sailed for England, arriving at London on March 21. I reported to Admiral Sims and spent the next 10 days in discussing the problem with his staff, making the acquaintance of the Admiralty

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officials and getting their views on the task ahead of us. From London I proceeded to the two bases in Scotland. There was one at Inverness and another at Invergordon, 30 miles farther north. These bases consisted of immense assembly plants, then almost completed. After inspecting these bases I proceeded to Scapa Flow to make arrangements with Admiral Beatty by which the mine planters were to be provided with a destroyer screen and escort of capital ships when engaged in the operation of planting the mines.

The next six weeks were spent in organizing for the work so that when the mine layers arrived, in the latter part of May, they were oon loaded with mines, and on June 8 they planted 3,385 mines on the first trip.

The operation of planting the mines of the northern barrage involved 13 trips of the mine ships from the bases at Inverness and Invergordon. It had been arranged between myself and Admiral Beatty that four days before being ready the latter was to be notified by telegram that the planters would probably be ready on that date. Two days after that another telegram would be sent to Admiral Beatty by me giving the hour of readiness. Then Admiral Beatty would reply and set an exact hour when the ships were to rendezvous off the coast with the screen of British destroyers. Some hours before the time set the destroyer commander with his destroyers would arrive at the base. Admiral Beatty would furnish a routing order, principally as a guide to the swept channels on the coast. The operating order would be given by me after a consultation between the mine squadron commander, the destroyer commander, and the commander of the mine force.

When the expedition returned to harbor the navigation notes would be handed in from each ship at once and the location of the mines as handed in would be reconciled from the various data and a dispatch sent immediately to Admiral Beatty, Admiral Sims, and the Admiralty at London giving the location and number of mines planted on that expedition.

Any change affecting the plan of the barrage proceeded from the London office after consultation with the Admiralty, except on one occasion when an order was received direct from Admiral Beatty which seriously limited the barrage. Upon my making this known to Admiral Sims he had the limiting order rescinded at the Admiralty, although this took over three weeks to accomplish.

In general the British mine layers would proceed to the field from their base in the Firth of Forth, so that we would arrive there at the same time, and thus one escort would serve to protect both fleets. On October 26 the last planting of my force was accomplished and further work was suspended by the impending armistice. In all, the United States planted 56,611 mines and the British 13,652, making a total of over 70,000 mines.

I think it is due to the United States Navy under the existing circumstances to invite attention to the magnitude of this project and to the success achieved in accomplishing it. The barrier began to take toll of the enemy's submarines as early as July 9, when one was disabled on the barrier and compelled to return to Germany. From time to time after that, even in its uncompleted state, it succeeded in sinking one.

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It is not known by us how many submarines were sunk or disabled in this mine field. It has been placed as high as 23. My own estimate, based on known sinkings, is 10, although I am inclined to think that that is a modest one.

The entire project consists of various phases which may be summarized as follows:

First, the inception of the scheme which originated in the United States Navy Department as early as April, 1917. This was rejected by the Admiralty and Admiral Sims.

Second, the design of a new mine by the Bureau of Ordnance. This mine was of an entirely new type, the principal advantage of which lay in the fact that only one-third as many would be required to form a deep barrier as would be the case with the then existing types. On July 18, 1917, the design had progressed to such a point as to cause its proposal on that date for use in barring the exit of German submarines to the Atlantic. On July 30 the Bureau of Ordnance addressed a second letter to the Chief of Naval Operations submitting a proposal for a joint American-British mine barrier across the North Sea. This project was further submitted in person by Admiral Mayo at an allied naval conference in London on September 4. This was met by a demurrer on the part of the British, the objection being that it would hamper the movements of the Grand Fleet, and it was agreed that nothing should be done until an adequate supply of mines of satisfactory type could be assured.

On October 20, on the recommendation of the General Board, the department cabled to Admiral Sims directing him to ascertain from the Admiralty whether they thought, in the light of their experience, that a barrier could be maintained from abreast Aberdeen across the North Sea to the Norwegian coast abreast Egersund, and whether the Straits of Dover could be similarly mined.

On October 23 the Admiralty expressed their approval of the scheme.

On October 29 the Secretary of the Navy approved the General Board's report and the project, as finally adjusted between ourselves and the British, was favorably acted upon by the President at a Cabinet meeting on the 30th.

Third, the purchase and reconstruction of eight mine layers of large capacity and the production of mines of the new type amounting to 100,000 or more, preparation of bases, etc.

Fourth, the actual planting of the mines in the North Sea as outlined above.

You will see from these facts that the scheme was purely one originating in the United States Navy Department, urged by the department, and although it was to be a joint effort of the American and British Navies, our Navy constructed four-fifths of it.

It took 64 shiploads of mines to furnish our part of the barrage. These all had to be transported across the Atlantic in United States carriers, taken across Scotland, assembled at the bases, and finally exactly planted in the North Sea.

The production of so vast a quantity of material, all shipped to a distance of 3,400 miles in good time, is a fine example of energy and organization, and when our task was completed on the other side I wrote the following letter to the Navy Department:

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MINE FORCE, UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET.

MARCH 29, 1919.

From: Commander mine force.
To: Navy Department.
Subject: North Sea barrage.

1. I beg to furnish for the files of the Navy Department an expression of appreciation of the part played by the Bureau of Ordnance in the construction of the mine barrage in the North Sea.

2. The mine itself, though entirely novel, was highly successful in its functioning and this, I understand, was devised in the bureau in a comparatively short time. The call for mines for the North Sea barrage, that in the Aegean Sea, and across the Adriatic would have amounted in the end to probably 130,000. We actually received at the North Sea bases some 80,000 mines and used 57,000. We would have used more there had not the war been brought to a close when it was. The task placed on the Bureau of Ordnance was a very great one, and the highest credit is due the bureau for its achievement.

J. STRAUSS,
Rear Admiral, United States Navy.

Copy to: Bureau of Ordnance.

On the other side some 7,000 officers and men were employed—all belonging to the Navy; 3,000 men were busily engaged at the two assembly plants in assembling mines and anchors, testing each mine, and loading them in lighters, transporting them, and loading them on the mine layers at anchor in the harbor. This was strenuous labor, and rapidly as the layers worked, the force on shore could always keep ahead of them; 4,000 officers and men belonged to the crews of the layers. The process of laying a field of 5,500 mines only took a little over four hours after the ships arrived at the field.

As soon as the armistice was signed, the mine layers were sent home and plans were begun for sweeping up the mines. This work required considerable preparation, but on May 8, 1919, the work of sweeping was seriously begun and pursued with all the energy possible until September 30, when the last mine was removed. In the work of sweeping some 80 vessels were engaged, manned by 4,000 men.

The CHAIRMAN. In your statement you quote a letter written by you on December 10, 1915. Can you tell the committee what were the conditions in regard to powder, guns, and torpedoes and mines at the time of the declaration of war?

Admiral STRAUSS. Our declaration of war?

The CHAIRMAN. Our declaration of war.

Admiral STRAUSS. No, I can not. I have stated there that when I left the bureau in December, 1916, the full supply of shell, as stipulated by the General Board and approved by the Secretary of the Navy, was being manufactured.

The CHAIRMAN. Were they already manufactured and ready?

Admiral STRAUSS. No; but if you will look at my statement you will see that all ships then in existence had their supply of shell. What were being manufactured at that time were reserve.

The CHAIRMAN. But we had no reserves on hand?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes, sir; we did.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you tell me anything about the number of reserves we had on hand?

Admiral STRAUSS. No, I can not. I think you can very readily get a statement from the Bureau of Ordnance to answer that question.

The CHAIRMAN. This was when you left the bureau in December, 1916?

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Admiral STRAUSS. When I left was in December, 1916.

The CHAIRMAN. Was there a large reserve on hand?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. A large reserve of what, projectiles?

Admiral STRAUSS. Projectiles, powder—everything.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know about the mine situation—how many mines we had on hand at that time?

Admiral STRAUSS. When I left?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral STRAUSS. I have stated that here, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You have stated it already?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. These mines you had on hand, were they the latest, up-to-date mines at that time?

Admiral STRAUSS. They were at that time considered the very latest thing in mines in the world. But since that time we do not think much of them.

The CHAIRMAN. I am referring to that particular time.

Admiral STRAUSS. At that particular time they were supposed to be the very latest thing in mines, and were being manufactured in large numbers by Vickers for the British Government, were being manufactured, I believe, for the Italian Government, and we had put in an order. Vickers were manufacturing 1,100 for us, and they were commandeered for the British Government.

The CHAIRMAN. On what page of your statement do the facts about the mines appear?

Admiral STRAUSS. I have not my statement paged, but I will read the paragraph again, if you please.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to refer to it as you go along.

Admiral STRAUSS. It is page 4, the last paragraph.

The CHAIRMAN. Page 4 refers to your letter of December 10, 1914, does it not?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I asked you about December, 1916, when you left the bureau.

Admiral STRAUSS. Oh, yes. I can not recall the actual number of mines on hand in December, 1916. That can be gotten from the Bureau of Ordnance, quite readily.

The CHAIRMAN. You can not give me the figures now?

Admiral STRAUSS. I can not give you the figures; no, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you get a statement from the Bureau of Ordnance and furnish it to the committee so that we may put it into the record?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes, sir; that will be done.

The CHAIRMAN. I would also like a statement as to the number of torpedoes we had on hand at that time, and a statement of the powder, projectiles, and guns. You could get a statement covering all of these?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And I would like to have that put in the record; showing all the different sizes of the projectiles, and the different sizes of the guns, and whatever other matters would be of interest.

(NOTE.—The following communication, together with tables, was subsequently received from Rear Admiral Earle, Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, and is here inserted in the record.)

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NAVY DEPARTMENT,
BUREAU OF ORDNANCE.
Washington, D. C., May 7, 1920.

DEAR SENATOR: The bureau is in receipt of a letter from Rear Admiral Joseph Strauss, United States Navy, referring to his hearing before your subcommittee and requesting that you be furnished with information in reply to questions in the cross-examination which referred to the bureau.

In his testimony, page 1156 of the record, Admiral Strauss referred to the department's policy, and the method by which it was arrived at, as regards the supply of ordnance materials. All material supplied by the bureau is prepared in accordance with this department policy and where, in the appendages, materials required are referred to it will mean, of course, required in conformity with this policy.

A study of the testimony shows that statement of material as of two approximate dates, December, 1916, and when war was declared in April, 1917, are desired. These two dates are adhered to as closely as possible.

There are appended hereto, appendages Nos. 1 to 8, statements giving the information desired.

There was furnished the committee by Capt. W. V. Pratt the complete history of the North Sea mine barrage compiled by my bureau.

Very respectfully,

RALPH EARLE.
Rear Admiral, United States Navy, Chief of Bureau.

Hon. FREDERICK HALE.
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

APPENDIX NO. 1.

Statement of guns required on hand and on order as of Dec. 1, 1916, and Apr. 6, 1917.

Caliber.	Dec. 1, 1916.			Apr. 6, 1917.		
	Required.	On hand.	On order.	Required.	On hand.	On order.
16-inch, 50				45		[1] 1
16-inch, 45	40	1	40	40	1	[2] 40
14 inch, 50	125	21	104	125	31	[3] 94
14-inch, 45	80	81		80	81	
13-inch 35	40	36		40	36	[4]
12-inch, 50	36	37		36	37	
12-inch, 45	100	103		100	103	
12-inch, 40	50	48		50	48	[4]
12-inch, 35	8	13		8	13	
10-inch, 40	16	21		16	21	
10-inch, 30	14	22		14	22	
8-inch, 45	145	154		145	154	
8-inch, 35	60	68		60	68	
7-inch, 45	90	95		90	95	
6-inch, 53	40		40	70		[5] 70
6-inch 50	352	350		352	350	[4]
6-inch, 50, case		10			10	[4]
6-inch, 45	14	12		14	12	[4]
6-inch, 40	82	74		82	74	[4]
5-inch, 51	696	375	312	696	386	[3] 301
5-inch, 50	150	151		150	151	
5-inch, 40	189	177		189	177	[4]
4-inch, 50, IX	397	152	239	397	160	[3] 231
4-inch, 50, VII and VIII	104	103		104	103	[4]
4-inch, 45	259	232		259	232	[4]
3-inch, 50	1,046	876	148	1,046	880	[2] 144
3-inch, 50, AA	279	41	226	279	41	[7] 226
3-inch, 23, Sub	80	14	65	80	14	[8] 65
3-inch, L. G	75	75		131	75	[1] 56
3-inch, F. G	155	155		155	155	
6-pounder	908	862	79	908	869	72
3-pounder	489	608		489	608	
1-pounder	1,400	1,437		1,400	1,437	

[1] Made necessary by passage of appropriation act of Mar. 4, 1917.
[2] Made necessary by passage of appropriation act of Aug. 29, 1916. Delivery of these guns at all times anticipated ship requirements.
[3] Guns for battleships 40, 41, and 42 made necessary by passage of appropriation act of June 30, 1914, and for battleships 43 and 44 made necessary by passage of appropriation act of Mar. 3, 1915. The delivery of these guns at all times anticipated ship requirements.
[4] Not considered necessary to make up spares of old guns.
[5] Made necessary by passage of appropriation acts of Aug. 29, 1916, and Mar. 4, 1917. Delivery of these guns at all times anticipated ship requirements.
[6] Shore defense of Guam.
[7] Made necessary by passage of appropriation act of Aug. 29, 1916. Delivery of these guns at all times anticipated ship requirements.
[8] Made necessary by passage of appropriation acts of June 30, 1914, and Mar. 3, 1915, for submarines.

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APPENDIX NO. 2.

Statement of projectiles required on hand and on order as of Dec. 31, 1916, and Mar. 31, 1917.

Caliber.	Dec. 31, 1916.			Mar. 31, 1917.		
	Required.	On hand.	On order.	Required.	On hand.	On order.
16-inch	7,200			17,100		[1]
14-inch	36,900	7,988	10,327	36,900	8,907	[2] 25,577
13-inch	4,320	4,800		4,320	4,800	
12-inch	33,750	43,655		33,750	43,989	
10-inch	4,950	7,000		4,950	7,000	
8-inch	36,900	52,435		36,900	52,435	
7-inch	16,200	22,560		16,200	22,560	
6-inch	182,700	121,000	86,100	190,350	123,500	[3] 83,600
5-inch	478,240	181,960	380,920	478,240	187,460	[4] 416,285
4-inch	372,400	119,591	163,529	372,400	132,591	[4] 177,029
3-inch	596,700	270,134	338,788	608,850	315,134	[4] 293,788
6-pounder	544,800			544,800		[5]
3-pounder	293,400			293,400		[5]
1-pounder	861,900	220,000	80,000	861,900	221,000	79,000
1-pounder AA	270,000	60,000	222,500	270,000	60,000	[6] 222,500

[1] Made necessary by passage of appropriation acts of Aug. 29, 1916, and Mar. 4, 1917.
[2] Made necessary by passage of appropriation acts of June 30, 1914, and Mar. 3, 1915. Delivery of projectiles, less reserve, at all times anticipated gun requirements.
[3] Made necessary by passage of appropriation acts of Aug. 29, 1916, and Mar. 4, 1917. Delivery of these projectiles at all times anticipated gun requirements.
[4] Made necessary by passage of appropriation act of Aug. 29, 1916. Delivery of these projectiles at all times anticipated gun requirements.
[5] No record of projectiles on hand or on order for these calibers now available.
[6] Projectiles for 1,000 guns made necessary by the appropriation act of Aug. 29, 1916. In addition to those on hand and on order 75,000 had been advertised for.

APPENDIX NO. 3.

Statement of powder required, on hand, and on order as of Dec. 1, 1916, and Apr. 6, 1917.

Caliber.	Dec. 1, 1916.			Apr. 6, 1917.		
	Required.	On hand.	On order.	Required.	On hand.	On order.
16-inch, 50				7,200,000		
16-inch, 45	4,720,000			4,720,000		4,400,000
14-inch, 50	11,844,000	1,055,218	10,462,000	11,844,000	2,157,563	9,623,000
14-inch, 45	6,000,000	5,518,594	562,357	6,000,000	6,080,951	
13-inch, 35	960,000	1,153,427		960,000	1,153,427	
12-inch, 50	1,972,000	2,279,000		1,972,000	2,279,000	
12-inch, 45	5,900,000	8,036,889		5,900,000	8,036,889	
12-inch, 40	1,904,000	2,517,143		1,904,000	2,517,143	300,000
12-inch, 35	285,600	447,030		285,600	447,030	
10-inch, 40	615,000	559,220		615,000	559,220	
10-inch, 30	232,500	325,751		232,500	325,751	
8-inch, 45	3,635,502	4,225,190		3,635,502	4,225,190	200,000
8-inch, 35	714,350	1,116,915		714,350	1,116,915	
7-inch, 45	1,044,000	1,550,384		1,044,000	1,550,384	
6-inch, 53	720,000			1,260,000		800,000
6-inch, 50	5,370,300	6,944,549	500,000	5,370,300	6,944,549	500,000
6-inch, 45	115,350			115,350		
6-inch, 40	655,000	991,363		655,000	991,363	
5-inch, 51	10,120,500	2,942,644	2,700,000	10,120,500	3,345,659	3,000,000
5-inch, 50	1,575,000	2,025,691		1,575,000	2,025,691	
5-inch, 40	1,050,000	745,266	303,500	1,050,000	848,765	200,000
4-inch, 50	3,347,350	1,111,270	600,000	3,396,194	1,219,800	1,500,000
4-inch, 40	596,250	436,812	300,000	596,250	693,067	50,000
3-inch, 50	3,867,200	2,550,411	200,000	2,889,000	2,550,411	800,000
3-inch, 23	260,152	114,439	100,000	260,152	114,439	100,000
3-inch field gun		132,396			132,396	
6-pounder	1,293,000	892,506		1,293,000	892,506	
3-pounder	547,200	372,610		547,200	372,610	
1-pounder	359,250	145,556	50,000	359,250	145,556	200,000

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Statement of explosives on hand and on order.

Kind.	Dec. 31, 1916.			Mar. 31, 1917.		
	On hand.	Required.	On order.	On hand.	Required.	On order.
Explosive D	1,259,358	2,392,300	796,000	1,455,358	2,917,900	1,450,000
T. N. T. "A"	804,000	2,205,705	140,000	865,000	2,205,705	819,000
T. N. T. "B" and guncotton	958,000	3,141,244	2,075,000	1,808,000	4,425,844	4,125,000
Black shell powder	1,847,000	2,693,485	25,000	1,852,000	2,693,485	200,000

NOTE.—Amount of black powder on hand does not include burster charges in loaded and fused shells at depots. Record of this is not in the bureau.

APPENDIX NO. 5.

Statement of torpedoes required on hand and on order as of Nov. 1, 1916, and Apr. 1, 1917.

Type.	Nov. 1, 1916.				Apr. 1, 1917.			
	Number required [1] for—		On hand.	On order.	Number required [1] for—		On hand.	On order.
	Ships built.	Ships built and authorized.			Ships built.	Ships built and authorized.		
21-inch long	560	1,832	256	624	560	2,432	[2] 407	473
21-inch medium	752	1,256	615	546	752	2,168	[2] 818	1,255
18-inch	1,386	1,834	1,144	734	1,386	1,834	1,159	719

[1] Reference is made to the total required, 50 per cent of which total are actually required to be on the ships and 50 per cent in reserve ashore. These figures are as indicated by records at present available.
[2] Only approximately correct.

APPENDIX NO. 6.

Statement of mines required, on hand, and on order as of Dec. 31, 1916, and Mar. 31, 1917.

KInd.	Dec. 31, 1916.			Mar. 31, 1917.		
	Required.	On hand.	On order.	Required.	On hand.	On order.
Mark I anchored mine	[1] 9,000	550	.....	[1] 15,000	550	.....
Mark II anchored mine	.....	312	.....	.....	312	.....
Mark III anchored mine	.....	1,090	.....	.....	1,090	.....
Mark IV anchored mine	.....	1,280	6,000	.....	1,280	12,000
Mark I drifting mine	3,600	600	3,000	4,000	600	3,400

[1] Shows total anchored mines of all kinds required.

APPENDIX NO. 7.

Statement of depth charges required, on hand, and on order as of December 31, 1916: Required 0, on hand 0, on order 0; as of March 31, 1917: Required 10,000, on hand 0, on order 0.[1]

[1] Requisition had been submitted for 10,000, but no contract had been signed.

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APPENDIX No. 8.

Statement of gun mounts required, on hand, and on order, as of Dec. 1, 1916, and Apr. 6, 1917.

Caliber.	Dec. 1, 1916.			Apr. 6, 1917.		
	Required.	On hand.	On order.	Required.	On hand.	On order.
7-inch, 45	90	93	.....	90	93	.....
6-inch, 53 [1]	40	.....	.....	40	.....	.....
6-inch, 50 [2]	310	293	.....	310	293	.....
6-inch, 45 [2]	14	12	.....	14	12	.....
6-inch, 40 [2]	82	71	.....	82	71	.....
5-inch, 51 [2]	696	311	185	696	311	310
5-inch, 50	150	150	.....	150	150	.....
5-inch, 40 [2]	189	192	.....	189	192	.....
4-inch, 50 [3]	501	234	91	501	234	91
4-inch, 40 [2]	259	254	.....	259	254	.....
3-inch, 50 [2]	1,046	730	.....	1,046	730	.....
3-inch, 50, A. A. [3]	279	44	98	279	44	430
3-inch, 23, sub	80	14	66	80	14	66
3-inch, 23, boat	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	500
6-pounder	908	919	.....	908	919	.....
3-pounder	489	580	.....	489	580	.....
1-pounder	1,400	643	50	1,400	643	1,450

[1] Made necessary by passage of appropriation acts of Aug. 29, 1916, and Mar. 4, 1917. Delivery of these mounts has at all times anticipated ship requirements.
[2] Not considered necessary to make up spares for old type guns.
[3] Made necessary by passage of appropriation act of August 29, 1916. Orders for manufacture to meet the increased requirements due to arming of merchantmen and auxiliaries were placed as rapidly as capacity could be obtained.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you consider that at the outbreak of the war we were thoroughly prepared so far as ammunition and guns were concerned?

Admiral STRAUSS. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. Thoroughly prepared?

Admiral STRAUSS. Thoroughly prepared.

The CHAIRMAN. To take an active part in the war?

Admiral STRAUSS. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. And we had large stores of reserve ammunition and guns on hand?

Admiral STRAUSS. Ammunition and guns and powder.

The CHAIRMAN. All that could possibly be needed toward our taking an active part in the war?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes; all that would be needed—that is, my statement is as of a period one year and four months prior to the war. We had the money, and we were very active in procuring the material and in its being manufactured, and while I was not in the department when war was declared, I have not any idea in the world that the comparatively unimportant shortages of December, 1915, were not made up.

The CHAIRMAN. You say they were made up by December, 1916, after you left the bureau?

Admiral STRAUSS. I did not say that.

The CHAIRMAN. I am asking you, were they made up by that time?

Admiral STRAUSS. No; I do not know. I say I do not doubt but that by April we had plenty of ammunition.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; and I asked you to state whether in your opinion we were in a thorough state of preparedness, so far as ammunition and guns were concerned, on April 6, 1917.

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Admiral STRAUSS. Yes; thoroughly prepared.

The CHAIRMAN. But you can not state that in December, when you left, we were thoroughly prepared?

Admiral STRAUSS. Well, we were prepared in December to go to war; but if you mean were we 100 per cent prepared, I say no. And I would like to say right now about preparedness that no first-class navy, no live navy, ever considers itself thoroughly prepared. In other words, its ideals must outstrip its material accomplishments, or they are no good.

The CHAIRMAN. Had we come up, in December, 1916, to the plans that you had outlined?

Admiral STRAUSS. They were not completed; no.

The CHAIRMAN. They were not? But you do not know whether they were completed between December, 1916, and April, 1917?

Admiral STRAUSS. I do not.

The CHAIRMAN. So that your estimate that we were thoroughly prepared and that the plans were completed then is simply a guess?

Admiral STRAUSS. Not at all. I told you before that we were thoroughly prepared for war, so far as ammunition and guns were concerned, in December, 1916.

The CHAIRMAN. But you have just stated, Admiral, that your plans were not thoroughly carried out at that time.

Admiral STRAUSS. It does not matter.

The CHAIRMAN. And you have no accurate knowledge as to whether they were carried out between that time and April 6, 1917, have you?

Admiral STRAUSS. No; but I do not consider the absolute completion of my plans necessary to be prepared for war. As I say, there is an ideal state beyond what we ever accomplish.

The CHAIRMAN. For purposes of comparison, I would like to have you give me a statement of the condition of the Navy in regard to guns and projectiles, etc., those that I have already named, at the time when you left the department, and also give one at the time when war was declared, in April, 1917.

Admiral STRAUSS. I will have that prepared.

The CHAIRMAN. Both statements, so that they can be compared.

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. In December, 1916, you left the Bureau of Ordnance and took command of the battleship *Nevada*?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. With what force was she?

Admiral STRAUSS. She was with the battleship force—Force 2.

The CHAIRMAN. And she was with the battleship fleet when war broke out?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Was she in every resepct thoroughly prepared for war?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Was her personnel in every respect up to par?

Admiral STRAUSS. Quite so.

The CHAIRMAN. When war was declared?

Admiral STRAUSS. When war was declared. I am reminded that we had supplied some armed guards for several merchant ships.

The CHAIRMAN. So that your personnel had been by that time to a certain extent depleted?

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Admiral STRAUSS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In other respects, as to material, she was in good condition?

Admiral STRAUSS. She was perfect?

The CHAIRMAN. And the same is true about the fleet in general?

Admiral STRAUSS. In my opinion the condition of the fleet was excellent when we came north from Cuba in April, 1917.

The CHAIRMAN. That is, the ships that were in the fleet were in excellent condition?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I think the testimony has shown that with the exception of this personnel question, where they had been detached for armed guard duties.

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, would you say that that was a thoroughly equipped and prepared battle fleet?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. It needed no other vessels of any other kind?

Admiral STRAUSS. A battle fleet; yes. The main strength of a battle fleet, of course, is in the battleships. Now, there are required a certain number of destroyers and scouts and light cruisers.

The CHAIRMAN. And did the fleet have that certain number that would be required?

Admiral STRAUSS. We only had three scouts that had been built for scouts, at that time in commission, the *Birmingham*, the *Salem*, and the *Chester*. They had been built for scouts. They were not very good scouts.

The CHAIRMAN. Were they with the fleet?

Admiral STRAUSS. They were not with the fleet; but it did not matter. We had destroyers that could have served as scouts very well.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have a surplus of destroyers?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes; we had, in my opinion, plenty of destroyers.

The CHAIRMAN. More destroyers than you really needed for the number of battleships?

Admiral STRAUSS. No; I do not think we had more. We had 50 destroyers about that time. It is a matter of opinion how many destroyers you need per battleship. I think, though, the consensus of opinion would be that two per battleship would do. We had 16 battleships, and 32 destroyers would have afforded us a proper screen. We had 50 destroyers altogether.

The CHAIRMAN. With the fleet?

Admiral STRAUSS. No; not with the fleet.

The CHAIRMAN. How many did you have with the fleet?

Admiral STRAUSS. I think we had about 20.

The CHAIRMAN. About 20?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Which would not give even two to a battleship?

Admiral STRAUSS. We do not have to have them with the fleet.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to know, Admiral, whether the battle fleet as it existed then was a thoroughly prepared battle fleet and ready to go out and fight——

Admiral STRAUSS. It was.

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The CHAIRMAN (continuing). The German or any other navy?

Admiral STRAUSS. I want to be emphatic about that, that it was.

The CHAIRMAN. Then, we should discard all scout vessels as not necessary?

Admiral STRAUSS. No; we had in existence enough destroyers to screen the fleet and provide scouts.

The CHAIRMAN. Where did we have them?

Admiral STRAUSS. Had them in the United States.

The CHAIRMAN. Part of them in the Pacific Ocean?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Were not the most adequate screening vessels that we had in the Pacific Ocean scouting and screening vessels?

Admiral STRAUSS. What do you refer to?

The CHAIRMAN. I am referring to the cruisers that were laid up in the Pacific.

Admiral STRAUSS. At the outbreak of the war we had eight armored cruisers, so listed. We had two other ships that had always been listed as armored cruisers; that is, the *Rochester* and the *Brooklyn*. That made 10. Then we had two of the *St. Louis* class which would have served that purpose, light cruisers or armored cruisers.

The CHAIRMAN. Where were they?

Admiral STRAUSS. They were on the west coast, all except one, the *Montana*, which was on the east coast.

The CHAIRMAN. Was she in condition?

Admiral STRAUSS. She was in condition and actually did go out.

The CHAIRMAN. But she was not with the fleet?

Admiral STRAUSS. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You see, it is a very interesting matter for this committee, as a part of the Naval Affairs Committee, to get the opinion of naval officers about what is necessary to constitute a battle fleet, and if it is not necessary to provide these screening vessels, we want to know about it.

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes; it is necessary to provide them.

The CHAIRMAN. It can not be very immediately necessary if you say that the fleet was all ready to go out for battle that did not have them.

Admiral STRAUSS. I want to differentiate between perfection and what will do.

The CHAIRMAN. How would it do against a fleet that had them?

Admiral STRAUSS. I think that our destroyers would have formed sufficient scouts as against the German fleet's vessels—not in all weathers.

The CHAIRMAN. Not in all weathers?

Admiral STRAUSS. Not in all weathers.

The CHAIRMAN. Not in fog?

Admiral STRAUSS. In fog; yes.

The CHAIRMAN. In darkness?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And in storm?

Admiral STRAUSS. The weather might be so bad that they could not stand it very well, although it is a fact that our destroyers stayed out in all weathers on the other side. The destroyers are not ideal scouts, but if you have not other scouts, you have got to use them, and you can use them successfully.

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The CHAIRMAN. You would use them if you had them with the fleet?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes; scouting for the fleet.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; but would you say that a fleet of 10 battleships and 20 destroyers could go out and fight a fleet of 10 battleships and 20 destroyers and a number of scouting vessels at the same time?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And beat it?

Admiral STRAUSS. I would hope to beat it.

The CHAIRMAN. If they were equal in efficiency?

Admiral STRAUSS. No; not if they were equal in efficiency.

The CHAIRMAN. I mean, if the battleships and destroyers were equal in efficiency in each case?

Admiral STRAUSS. No, I would not; unless the personnel was superior.

The CHAIRMAN. So that it would be simply a question of the personnel?

Admiral STRAUSS. Personnel, drill, and morale.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think it is safe enough for us to depend upon the superiority of the personnel and discard some of these ships?

Admiral STRAUSS. No; I think we ought to build scouts.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think that a thoroughly equipped battle fleet, when it went out to fight, ought to have scouts?

Admiral STRAUSS. It ought to have scouts.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think that our fleet in 1917, when the war commenced, if we had been called on to go out immediately—do you think we would have had scouts?

Admiral STRAUSS. Do you mean that we could have gone without scouts?

The CHAIRMAN. No; that we could have had an adequate supply of scouts when we went out.

Admiral STRAUSS. I think we would have used our destroyers successfully as scouts.

The CHAIRMAN. You think we could?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes, sir. I would rather have scouts; but if we did not have them we would take destroyers.

The CHAIRMAN. There is a great deal of difference between the cost of a scout cruiser and that of a destroyer, is there not?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. So that it is economy to build destroyers instead of scout cruisers?

Admiral STRAUSS. Not at all. You have to pay more for the better implement.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you think, Admiral, that our fleet as constituted in April, 1917, could have gone out in mid-ocean and engaged the German Fleet if it had come out, successfully, do you?

Admiral STRAUSS. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. Even if the fleet had come out without engaging the British—if they had slipped by the British?

Admiral STRAUSS. I do; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. On what do you base that?

Admiral STRAUSS. Our ships themselves were superior. The guns were superior. I believe the morale to have been superior.

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The CHAIRMAN. You do not think there would have been any danger of their being attacked by submarines—or torpedo—in any way?

Admiral STRAUSS. No danger at all from submarines in mid-ocean, according to my notion.

The CHAIRMAN. And no danger from destroyers?

Admiral STRAUSS. No more danger than the Germans would have been in from our destroyers.

The CHAIRMAN. Did the Germans at that time have a larger number of destroyers with their fleet than we had?

Admiral STRAUSS. I do not know how many destroyers the Germans had. I fancy they had more than we had.

The CHAIRMAN. Did they not have more battle cruisers?

Admiral STRAUSS. They had some battle cruisers; but I would not have a battle cruiser in the line of battle.

The CHAIRMAN. You are talking about an actual line of battle, where battleship meets battleship?

Admiral STRAUSS. I am; yes.

The CHAIRMAN. But in the Battle of Jutland the battle cruisers had something to do with it?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes; England had three of them—the *Indefatigable*, the *Queen Mary*, and the *Invincible*—go down in a few minutes; all sunk there within a few miuutes. My idea is that the battle cruisers have not any business in the line of battle. The purpose of a battle cruiser, the use of a battle cruiser, is an entirely different one.

The CHAIRMAN. But you regard the battle cruiser as a useful adjunct to a battle fleet?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes, sir; you must have battle cruisers as anti-raiders, to meet the battle cruisers of other nations. An example, and a very good one, of their usefulness is in the destruction of Von Speiss' squadron down in the Falkland Islands by Sturdee, in which Sturdee employed battle cruisers.

The CHAIRMAN. Did not the German destroyers make an attack on the British battleships in the Battle of Jutland and turn them back?

Admiral STRAUSS. I have not made up my mind about the Battle of Jutland yet. I have read pretty nearly everything about it that I can get hold of, but I do not feel that I am able to express a good opinion about that battle to-day. In fact, it may take a long time before we get sufficient perspective to judge what really did take place at the Battle of Jutland.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the limit of the size of the guns on our destroyers; do you know?

Admiral STRAUSS. Four-inch.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the limit of the size of the guns on scout cruisers—ordinary scout cruisers?

Admiral STRAUSS. Our design scout cruisers contemplate having 8-inch guns as the largest guns.

The CHAIRMAN. So that the scout cruiser, if it came into direct contact anywhere with destroyers, when the battleships were not around, of course would sink the destroyers at any time?

Admiral STRAUSS. It could; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Would that not give them a certain advantage?

Admiral STRAUSS. That would undoubtedly give the scout cruiser an advantage.

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The CHAIRMAN. But in spite of all these advantages you feel confident that our fleet was ready to start with its battleships and destroyers—and what else?

Admiral STRAUSS. Battleships and destroyers; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What else was it ready to start with?

Admiral STRAUSS. Nothing. Well, we had the cruisers.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; but they were not ready, were they?

Admiral STRAUSS. I do not know; but I mean to say with the battleships and destroyers we could have gone out into the Atlantic Ocean and, in my opinion, whipped the German Fleet.

The CHAIRMAN. And in your opinion whipped the German Fleet as it was then?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You say that the inception of the barrage idea originated in the United States Navy Department as early as April, 1917, and that it was originated by the Admiralty and Admiral Sims?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. When do you mean it was originated by them?

Admiral STRAUSS. I have not got exactly the date when they originated it. It was practically at once.

The CHAIRMAN. That is, during the first few weeks of the war?

Admiral STRAUSS. Oh, well, very soon after it was proposed. Now I would like to say that all these things took place in my absence, but I have gone to the records.

The CHAIRMAN. You did not go over until March, 1918, was it?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes; March, 1918. But you will undoubtedly have witnesses before the committee who can give you the exact information about when it was originated.

The CHAIRMAN. What I wanted to find out was, Admiral, whether Admiral Sims—you stated that Admiral Sims turned down the whole proposition, or turned it down during the earlier stages of the war, and for what reasons he turned it down during the earlier stages of the war?

Admiral STRAUSS. I think you had better get all that information from some other witness. They probably have all the documents, and I have not. I only state the bare fact that it was turned down.

The CHAIRMAN. When were you assigned to the mine-laying squadrons—assigned to the laying of the northern barrage?

Admiral STRAUSS. I was detached from the *Nevada* in February, 1918, spent the next two weeks at the Navy Department, and on about the 10th of March left the United States by passenger steamer and reported to Admiral Sims in London on the 21st of March, 1918. All these data in connection with the command of the mine force.

The CHAIRMAN. When did you arrive in Europe?

Admiral STRAUSS. The 21st of March, 1918.

The CHAIRMAN. What part did you have in drawing up the original plans for the operation?

Admiral STRAUSS. I had no part.

The CHAIRMAN. What part did you have in developing and perfecting the material and mines used in the operation?

Admiral STRAUSS. Nothing at all. I would like to amend that, that as the mines arrived from Scotland, certain faults were developed which we had to correct out there. You might say that that was developed.

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The CHAIRMAN. What part did you have in the equipping of the mine layers?

Admiral STRAUSS. You mean in the construction of the mine layers?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral STRAUSS. Nothing at all.

The CHAIRMAN. The equipping them for their work?

Admiral STRAUSS. I did not equip them.

The CHAIRMAN. Or the training of the personnel?

Admiral STRAUSS. Nothing at all.

The CHAIRMAN. Who was responsible for the preparation of the mine force?

Admiral STRAUSS. The Navy Department.

The CHAIRMAN. Over here?

Admiral STRAUSS. Over here.

The CHAIRMAN. Entirely?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. What arrangements had been made in Europe for the laying of the barrage before your arrival?

Admiral STRAUSS. Agreements had been made between the Admiralty and the London office, approved by the department, and I think Admiral Mayo had something to do with that, as to the loca- of the barrage.

The CHAIRMAN. Made by the department with the Admiralty?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Were the mine bases completed and ready for the laying of the mines before your arrival in Europe?

Admiral STRAUSS. No, sir; not quite.

The CHAIRMAN. Who carried out this preliminary work?

Admiral STRAUSS. All my own bases were built by the British Government, with the original idea that they were to be assemblage plants for their own mines. We were to supply mines, or rather have our mines with their anchors. The first change was made when they asked us to supply the men to man these plants. The second change was made when they asked us to supply anchors, too. So that finally we took over everything there.

The CHAIRMAN. And who did you say had done the preliminary work?

Admiral STRAUSS. The British.

The CHAIRMAN. The British. Was not this work done under Admiral Sims's direct orders—the preliminary work?

Admiral STRAUSS. I do not know. There was a British commission went up there and selected the bases. The work itself was done by British labor under British direction. That is, in the preparation of the bases. I do not know how much was referred to Admiral Sims in the matter.

The CHAIRMAN. Did the admiral give his full support to the equipment and preparation of the mine bases?

Admiral STRAUSS. I think he did, but I was not there then.

The CHAIRMAN. What was your position abroad when you arrived there?

Admiral STRAUSS. I was commander of the mine force.

The CHAIRMAN. Commander of the mine forces?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes, sir.

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The CHAIRMAN. What were your relations with the other allied commanders?

Admiral STRAUSS. How do you mean?

The CHAIRMAN. Were you under any other orders?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes. By direction from Admiral Sims I received orders from Admiral Beatty.

The CHAIRMAN. You received your orders direct from Admiral Beatty?

Admiral STRAUSS. I received routing orders, as I have explained it in my letter, from Admiral Beatty; orders when to start mining and——

The CHAIRMAN. Were you under the force commander on the other side?

Admiral STRAUSS. Sir?

The CHAIRMAN. Were you under the command of the force commander on the other side?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Under his orders?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Who was in command of all the operations in the North Sea?

Admiral STRAUSS. Mining operations?

The CHAIRMAN. All operations?

Admiral STRAUSS. The only operations in my part of the North Sea were the mining operations, and I was in command myself.

The CHAIRMAN. You were in command yourself of the mining operations?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Who was in command in general in the North Sea?

Admiral STRAUSS. They did not have a general North Sea commander that I know of. Admiral Beatty was the senior allied naval commander over there.

The CHAIRMAN. Was the actual planning of the various mining operations after you got over there done by you?

Admiral STRAUSS. Do you mean did I go out every time they planted?

The CHAIRMAN. I say, did you plan them?

Admiral STRAUSS. The operations?

The CHAIRMAN. Plan them, yes; not plant? Did you make the plans yourself for laying down the mines?

Admiral STRAUSS. I made them in conjunction with my staff; yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Was this done in connection with the Allies?

Admiral STRAUSS. No; the only—do you mean, did they plan the actual laying of the mines?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral STRAUSS. No.

The CHAIRMAN. You had entire charge of that?

Admiral STRAUSS. We did. On one occasion I went out in command of both fleets, the English and the American mine-laying fleets; and on another occasion a British admiral went out and commanded both of our fleets.

The CHAIRMAN. Then, the plans for each mine-laying expedition were not made by Admiral Sims or by the British at the Admiralty?

Admiral STRAUSS. They were not. They were made by me.

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The CHAIRMAN. Entirely?

Admiral STRAUSS. Entirely.

The CHAIRMAN. Without reporting to them?

Admiral STRAUSS. I reported when I finished.

The CHAIRMAN. But not before?

Admiral STRAUSS. I would report when I was ready to proceed.

The CHAIRMAN. From whom did you receive operation orders for mine-laying expeditions?

Admiral STRAUSS. I issued my own operating orders. As I have explained in my statement, the routing orders were received from Admiral Beatty.

The CHAIRMAN. Had the commander in chief of the Grand Fleet any control over your force except while engaged in actual mine-laying operations in the North Sea?

Admiral STRAUSS. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What were your relations with the commander in chief of the Grand Fleet?

Admiral STRAUSS. What do you mean?

The CHAIRMAN. Were your relations friendly with him?

Admiral STRAUSS. Quite so.

The CHAIRMAN. In every way?

Admiral STRAUSS. In every way.

The CHAIRMAN. And the same with the British vice admiral at Inverness in charge of mining operations?

Admiral STRAUSS. They did not have a British vice admiral at Inverness.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not say British vice admiral, but British admiral, at Inverness, in charge of mining operations.

Admiral STRAUSS. They did not have one there.

The CHAIRMAN. There was no British admiral there?

Admiral STRAUSS. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have any difficulties with the members of your own staff?

Admiral STRAUSS. I do not know what you mean.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have any trouble with any of your own staff?

Admiral STRAUSS. No. Do you mean with any forces under my command—any of the officers of my command?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral STRAUSS. I had the usual occurrences which were met by disciplinary action, but no trouble.

The CHAIRMAN. Nothing out of the ordinary run?

Admiral STRAUSS. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have any other problem to consider than that of the actual laying of mines?

Admiral STRAUSS. In the North Sea?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes; I was a member of an allied conference at Malta, in which we considered and fixed upon mining in the Mediterranean. We arranged to place a barrier of mines across the Asiatic, and one in the Agean Sea.

The CHAIRMAN. Those were the only other problems, were they?

Admiral STRAUSS. Those were the only other projects.

The CHAIRMAN. And they had to do with the laying of mines?

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Admiral STRAUSS. We had already started to building up at Biserta, with the object in view of laying those two barriers.

The CHAIRMAN. Who was responsible for coordinating the mine-laying operations with all other allied operations?

Admiral STRAUSS. You mean so far as our service goes?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral STRAUSS. Oh, Admiral Sims.

The CHAIRMAN. Was it not a part of Admiral Sim's task in London to exercise general control to coordinate the operations of your forces with the operations of other allied forces?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Did not the actual carrying out of your operations depend on the general situation in the North Sea?

Admiral STRAUSS. Do you mean the naval situation?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any definite evidence that Admiral Sims did not support the laying of the mine barrage as soon as it was undertaken?

Admiral STRAUSS. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have any disagreement of any kind with the British authorities?

Admiral STRAUSS. I do not recall a single one. You mean a quarrel I suppose?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; any difference of opinion?

Admiral STRAUSS. A row?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral STRAUSS. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Any great difference of opinion?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Did Admiral Sims support you in all essential matters?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes, he did.

The CHAIRMAN. In the case of the opposition of the commander in chief to the laying of mines in the western area of the barrage, what recommendations did you make to Admiral Sims?

Admiral STRAUSS. I recommended that he press the matter very strongly with the British Government.

The CHAIRMAN. The British objected, did they not, to extending the barrage over because they thought it would interfere with their fleet?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. What recommendations did you make to Admiral Sims?

Admiral STRAUSS. I recommended that he make strenuous efforts to get them to lay mines in area B.

The CHAIRMAN. And what did Admiral Sims do?

Admiral STRAUSS. He did. He succeeded in——

The CHAIRMAN. He backed up your recommendations?

Admiral STRAUSS. He backed up my recommendations very well. I attended a meeting at the Admiralty with Admiral Sims and the sea lords, and Admiral Sims was very emphatic about insisting that the mines be laid in area B.

The CHAIRMAN. And did not the Admiralty yield to his representations with respect to laying the mines in area B?

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Admiral STRAUSS. They did.

The CHAIRMAN. Did any question arise concerning the laying of surface mines?

Admiral STRAUSS. The original plan contemplated the laying of an equal number of mines at each of the three depths. This was changed afterwards to an increased number of surface mines at the expense of the number of deep mines.

The CHAIRMAN. And you made recommendations?

Admiral STRAUSS. No; that was done in London by the Admiralty; that change was made there.

The CHAIRMAN. What was your attitude on this?

Admiral STRAUSS. My attitude was that while it might be a good scheme the confusion in manufacture might make it inadvisable to change the plans at so late a date. We did make changes at the bases. Of course, it meant an immense amount of trouble and an immense confusion over here in the United States in getting out the material, so that I acceded to the change with a good deal of reluctance.

The CHAIRMAN. Did Admiral Sims back up your attitude?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes; very well.

The CHAIRMAN. Did he insist upon the completion of the mine-laying operations in 1918?

Admiral STRAUSS. I do not believe I understand your question.

The CHAIRMAN. In 1918 he insisted on having the barrage completed?

Admiral STRAUSS. It was all done in 1918; yes. Everything was done in 1918.

The CHAIRMAN. And he insisted on that? He agreed with you about that?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. What action was taken with regard to the closing of the Norwegian territorial waters at the eastern end of the barrage?

Admiral STRAUSS. Somewhat late in the operation the Norwegians laid mines about the Island of Utsar. We had stopped our barrier within a marine league of that island, and that left a passageway which finally the authorities of Norway agreed to close.

The CHAIRMAN. And you took the ground that it should be done?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes; from the very start.

The CHAIRMAN. And Admiral Sims agreed with you on that and backed you up?

Admiral STRAUSS. He agreed with me.

The CHAIRMAN. What action was taken on this matter?

Admiral STRAUSS. The Norwegians mined about the island of Utsar out to the 3-mile limit.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you ever have any difficulty with the commander in chief of the grand fleet concerning orders issued from him contrary to instructions issued by Admiral Sims?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes; I mentioned that in my statement.

The CHAIRMAN. In your statement?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes; you have got that.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you state in your answer here briefly about that? Refer to the page of your statement.

Admiral STRAUSS. When an order was received direct from Admiral Beatty which seriously limited the barrage—and that order was not

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to place any mines west of the meridian of Greenwich and would have left a gap in the barrier of about 70 miles; that is, from the Orkneys east 70 miles—upon my making this known to Admiral Sims he had the order rescinded at the Admiralty, although this took over three weeks to accomplish.

The CHAIRMAN. But Admiral Sims had the order rescinded?

Admiral STRAUSS. He had it rescinded.

The CHAIRMAN. Instructions were issued by the Admiralty itself to the commander in chief to countermand these orders, were they not?

Admiral STRAUSS. I had a telegram from Admiral Beatty rescinding the order.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know whether he was ordered by the Admiralty to countermand his order?

Admiral STRAUSS. I do not know, but I presume he was.

The CHAIRMAN. At any rate, it was as the result of Admiral Sims's intervention?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes; I think so. He could tell you more about that than I could. I only know that I informed him that this order had been issued to me, and about three weeks afterwards the order was rescinded. I presume he was instrumental in having it rescinded.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you familiar with Admiral Sims's testimony about the magnitude of operations involved in the laying of the northern barrage?

Admiral STRAUSS. I have read it.

The CHAIRMAN. In general, do you agree with it?

Admiral STRAUSS. That it was a great operation?

The CHAIRMAN. Well, do you agree with what he says about the magnitude of the operation?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you agree with his statement that the preparation of material for the barrage, and the actual operation, reflected the highest credit upon those engaged?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you aware of any previous project requiring as large an amount of material as the northern barrage?

Admiral STRAUSS. Requiring as large an amount of material?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral STRAUSS. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Would it have been possible to lay such a barrage without antenna mines?

Admiral STRAUSS. It would have been possible, but very much more difficult.

The CHAIRMAN. Very much more difficult?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes, sir; it would have taken about three times as many mines; or, you could have laid a barrage not so destructive to the enemy, with the same number of mines.

The CHAIRMAN. I think you said in your statement the advantage of the antenna mines was that you required a less number of them than of the other mines?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that the only advantage?

Admiral STRAUSS. That is the only advantage.

The CHAIRMAN. When was the antenna mine fully, finally perfected?

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Admiral STRAUSS. About June, 1917.

The CHAIRMAN. About June, 1917?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes; it had gone far enough in June, 1917, to assure the Bureau of Ordnance that it was a feasible scheme.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have any difficulty with it in actual operation abroad?

Admiral STRAUSS. What is that?

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have any difficulties with the antenna mines?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes; we had some difficulties; but we succeeded in correcting them at the bases.

The CHAIRMAN. Were there any delays caused by premature explosions due to imperfections in the mines?

Admiral STRAUSS. There was always a certain number of premature explosions when the mines were planted. That generally ran about 4 per cent; and we could afford to neglect it. They made an alteration in the mine on this side which in August increased that loss to as much as 15 per cent, and we stopped work until we could correct that difficulty and prevent so great a waste of mines by premature explosions. However, the delay was not considerable.

The CHAIRMAN. What length of time was required after the perfection of the mine before arrangements were completed, for laying the barrage?

Admiral STRAUSS. About seven or eight months.

The CHAIRMAN. Seven or eight months?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes; that is between the time the mine was perfected—the mine was perfected, we will say, in July, 1917. The first of the mines was laid June 8, 1918. That delay, of course, involved the procuring of ships, rearranging their interior and mechanism for the purpose, as well as the construction of the mines.

The CHAIRMAN. And it required a large number of ships to take these mines over?

Admiral STRAUSS. It required 64 cargoes—64 shiploads.

The CHAIRMAN. Sixty-four shiploads, for how many mines?

Admiral STRAUSS. About 80,000 mines.

The CHAIRMAN. Of which you said you used about 56,000?

Admiral STRAUSS. Fifty-six thousand six hundred—about 57,000, say.

The CHAIRMAN. Fifty-seven thousand mines. Do you know of any delays that occurred in preparing this material?

Admiral STRAUSS. I do not.

The CHAIRMAN. When was the laying of the Northern barrage begun?

Admiral STRAUSS. On June 8, 1918, the first mine was dropped. On that date we dropped 3,385 mines.

The CHAIRMAN. And when was the barrage completed?

Admiral STRAUSS. We never acutally completed the barrage as originally designed, but on October 26 the last mine laying took place, and further work was suspended then by the impending armistice.

The CHAIRMAN. But the barrage was not quite completed?

Admiral STRAUSS. It was not quite completed; but still it was a very effective barrage?

The CHAIRMAN. In what respect was it not completed?

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Admiral STRAUSS. Oh, we expected to lay another line up to the northward. But, as it was, it was very effective.

The CHAIRMAN. But the barrage extended from the Norwegian coast to the Scotch coast?

Admiral STRAUSS. Within 10 miles of the Orkney Islands. It did not extend all the way over.

The CHAIRMAN. What were the merchant tonnage losses from enemy submarines, in June, 1918, as compared with April, 1917?

Admiral STRAUSS. I have not that at hand.

The CHAIRMAN. In April, 1917, the losses were 800,000 tons.

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And in June, 1918, I think, the testimony has shown that they were between 100,000 and 200,000 tons.

Admiral STRAUSS. They were about 250,000 tons, I think.

The CHAIRMAN. Was not the German submarine menace pretty well checked before the barrage was completed?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes; although, as I have stated in my statement, we did get a submarine on July 9, 1918, with the barrage.

The CHAIRMAN. At what time was the barrage sufficiently completed to be considered as a serious difficulty to enemy submarines?

Admiral STRAUSS. About the 7th of September, 1918.

The CHAIRMAN. The 7th of September?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the tonnage loss during that month?

Admiral STRAUSS. I have not the table here.

The CHAIRMAN. Was it not somewhere around 100,000 tons?

Admiral STRAUSS. No; very much more than that. In September, 1918?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral STRAUSS. It was proabbly 200,000 tons; but, without putting that down, let us look it up and get it exact. It was about 250,000 tons in September.

The CHAIRMAN. You think it was about 250,000 tons?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you put in the record exactly?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes; I will put the exact figures in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. You stated that in your opinion substantially 10 submarines were sunk in the northern barrage?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. How do you get definite proof of the sinking of a submarine in the barrage?

Admiral STRAUSS. Well, of course, the most absolute proof is to get hold of the submarine on the bottom, and as a matter of fact, in sweeping the barrage we did have positive evidence of at least three. But you can not always get that. We got those in places where the sweeps brushed along the bottom.

The CHAIRMAN. You got the submarines themselves?

Admiral STRAUSS. Where the sweeps brushed along the bottom. But I had a statement from the Admiralty upon which I based my figures as to the number lost. They did not state that 10 had been lost. I think they gave me 8, and I put it at 10. There had been a submarine damaged on July 9. That was the first we heard from the effects of the barrage. The British fleet at Roshithe heard her wireless calls and Admiral Beatty sent out two battle cruisers to

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catch her, but she had a pretty good start and went home on the surface. That loss, in effect, would have been reported if we had patrolled the barrage, and we wanted to patrol the barrage. I made a recommendation that we at least have sentries out on the barrage, so that in case a submarine was injured and had to come to the surface she could be attacked, or that in case the enemy swept the barrage—mutilitated the barrage—they could bring forces there to fight them. That was never done. We never guarded the barrage.

The CHAIRMAN. Then on what do you base your evidence of the 10 submarines that were sunk?

Admiral STRAUSS. On the statement that I received from the Admiralty.

The CHAIRMAN. In view of the fact that the submarine campaign had been practically defeated in June, 1918, and that these losses had been much reduced and that the merchant tonnage construction was generally increased, do you consider that the northern barrage was the chief casue of the checking of the enemy submarines?

Admiral STRAUSS. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you consider it one of the major operations of the war?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You do consider it one of the major operations of the war?

Admiral STRAUSS. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. It was undoubtedly a tremendous piece of work; there can be no question about that, and it was mostly American work, was it not?

Admiral STRAUSS. Eighty per cent.

The CHAIRMAN. Who was in actual command at sea of the various mine-laying expeditions carried out by our force?

Admiral STRAUSS. I was in command of three of them at sea. My duties as commander of the force comprised the management of the whole scheme afloat and ashore. It also demanded my attendance at this allied conference at Malta, and I spent about a month there, and during my absence the Chief of Staff, Capt. Belknap, was in command.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, if you do not consider that the northern barrage was the chief cause of the defeat of the enemy submarines, on what ground do you base your contention that it was one of the major naval operations of the war, in view of the fact that the armistice came soon after its completion?

Admiral STRAUSS. It does not matter, really, whether it was the greatest contributing cause to the ending of the war or not, so far as being a big operation is concerned. One of the biggest things we did in this war was to get 4,000,000 men enlisted. Only 2,000,000 of them got over, but that does not rob the fact of our getting 4,000,000 men together of its importance.

The CHAIRMAN. And as being a very great stunt to do?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes; and having a very great effect. If the war had been continued and the barrage had been completed to the Orkneys and the barrier across the Straits of Dover had been properly completed, it would have ended the submarine menace so far as submarines going from the North Sea into the broad Atlantic was

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concerned. Also the barrier that we were to build across the Adriatic and across the Aegean Sea, when completed, would have actually ended the submarine operations.

Now, the tonnage losses were comparatively small in the last month of the war; that is, they averaged about 250,000 tons, but they still were 250,000 tons a month, and this would have put an end to that still tremendous loss. The very last month of the war—that is, October—we lost 112,000 tons. The submarine warfare ended on the 11th of October, by agreement, so that that 112,000 tons is only for 11 days.

The CHAIRMAN. Not one-half the month?

Admiral STRAUSS. Not one-half the month. As I repeat, you still had a very serious thing to manage, and that was the loss of 250,000 tons a month. The barrier would have stopped that.

The CHAIRMAN. What recommendation did you make to Admiral Sims with regard to the command of the joint mine-laying expedition?

Admiral STRAUSS. I do not remember that I made any.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not remember that you made any?

Admiral STRAUSS. No.

The CHAIRMAN. You had command yourself?

Admiral STRAUSS. The English and the United States squadrons acted, generally, separately; but on occasion, when they acted together, either Admiral Clinton Baker or myself commanded the joint expedition afloat.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you make any request when the first mine-laying expedition was ready, to Admiral Sims, that you yourself be not required to take actual command at sea?

Admiral STRAUSS. No, sir. Where did you get that, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. I am simply asking the question. There was nothing of the kind?

Admiral STRAUSS. Nothing of the kind.

The CHAIRMAN. Then, how many of the joint expeditions at sea did you command?

Admiral STRAUSS. Three expeditions I commanded.

The CHAIRMAN. What forces were under your command on these joint expeditions?

Admiral STRAUSS. My own force once, and the combined forces two other times.

The CHAIRMAN. The combined forces two other times?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. But under you?

Admiral STRAUSS. One other time I was in command and another time Rear Admiral Clinton Baker was in command.

The CHAIRMAN. Was not the assignment of the British force and the United States mine-laying force during these operations required by the principle of unity of command?

Admiral STRAUSS. Will you repeat that?

The CHAIRMAN. Was not the assignment of the British force and the United States mine-laying force during these operations required by the principle of unity of command?

Admiral STRAUSS. It did not seem to require it. We got along very well without it.

The CHAIRMAN. Without it?

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Admiral STRAUSS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. But the policy was to assign them in mine-laying expeditions?

Admiral STRAUSS. I do not think that I have understood your questions.

The CHAIRMAN. You have said that on two of the mine-laying expeditions the British forces went along with you on the mine-laying expeditions?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes; we laid close to and parallel to each other.

The CHAIRMAN. And the general policy of having them go along together, handled under your command, was sound, was it not?

Admiral STRAUSS. For that occasion it was; but their activities sometimes were a couple of hundred miles away from ours—150 miles. Of course you could not have a joint command then.

The CHAIRMAN. In general, do you think it was sound military policy to require one allied command of all operations in the North Sea?

Admiral STRAUSS. I do not understand that.

The CHAIRMAN. I say, in general do you consider that it was sound military policy to require a unified command of all operations in the North Sea?

Admiral STRAUSS. No; I do not consider it necessary, at all.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not think it was necessary?

Admiral STRAUSS. Not at all.

The CHAIRMAN. And you think you could have had a cooperation of mining operations with their operations in the North Sea, without such unity of command?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And you think it would have been better to have kept the American mining force as a completely separate force under a separate command?

Admiral STRAUSS. I think it would have been better. I would have preferred to have operated with my own force of destroyers, as a screen, and the battleship squadron that we had out there as a protection, because we lost half of our time in waiting for the other people to get ready, and in waiting for orders from Admiral Beatty. We expended just one-half of the time we were in the North Sea, waiting for this unity of command.

The CHAIRMAN. What would have been the effect so far as protection of the mine force by the Grand Fleet was concerned?

Admiral STRAUSS. It would have been all right if we had had a fleet of destroyers, what we called the six-battleship squadron—Admiral Rodman's battle squadron—to protect us in our operations. We would have done the work in half the time.

The CHAIRMAN. Upon what forces were you dependent for the protection and screening of the mine force in mine laying operations?

Admiral STRAUSS. The British.

The CHAIRMAN. How could you have had this protection unless your operations had been coordinated with others under the general command of the commander of the allied fleet in the North Sea?

Admiral STRAUSS. The North Sea was not a special command. Admiral Beatty was the senior British naval officer afloat. His area of operations was anywhere that the Navy was in the North Sea or

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in the broad Atlantic. I think you have an idea that this North Sea was a special, separate command. It was not.

The CHAIRMAN. But I assume that the forces that were there were coordinating, and that the subordinate officers were under the higher officers, in some cases in other places, were they not?

Admiral STRAUSS. In an allied operation or in an operation of any country, the senior naval officer is in command by virtue of his rank and position.

The CHAIRMAN. That makes a certain unity of command, does it not?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And that you approve of?

Admiral STRAUSS. I approve of that for a battle; but if you are trying to get at whether I think we would not have done better in laying this barrage without the English, I will have to say no. I think we would have done it better and quicker if we had acted singly. We did not even need the routing orders of Admiral Beatty, if we had had mine sweepers to precede our layers; and as I stated before, we would have gained a lot of time.

The CHAIRMAN. It would have required the protection of our American destroyers?

Admiral STRAUSS. Destroyers and battleships.

The CHAIRMAN. And that would have taken them from some other service, would it not?

Admiral STRAUSS. It would have either taken them from Scapa Flow, or down from Roshithe, near Edinborough.

Senator KEYES. Admiral, in your letter of December 10, 1916, you say the powder situation left nothing to be desired?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes, sir.

Senator KEYES. You speak of the torpedo situation being well in hand, and you speak of various supplies, of theirs being a sufficient supply and sufficient reserves. When you say there is a sufficient supply, was that based on the peace program of November, 1915?

Admiral STRAUSS. No, sir; we work altogether on a war program. That is, the Navy is supposed to be prepared for war at all times, and when a ship is prepared, a declaration of war makes no difference in her supplies or internal economy, whatever.

Senator KEYES. I understood, you, in answer to a question of the chairman, to say that the Navy was fully prepared for war.

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes.

Senator KEYES. I think he asked you on more than one occasion?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Then would you say that the Navy was fully prepared for war when you wrote this letter?

Admiral STRAUSS. What I mean to say, that the Navy is fully prepared for war, I want to go back to this, that if our fleet had been called upon to meet the German Fleet in midocean in battle, I believe we would have defeated it. Now, if you ask, were we ideally prepared, no. If you wish to remove every chance against, you will be ideally prepared; but that is a thing that we can only hope for. Our ideals, as I stated before, must exceed what we have accomplished materially, or we will be at a standstill.

Senator KEYES. Then, in other words, if I understand you correctly, the Navy is always prepared for war, and always has been?

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Admiral STRAUSS. No; I do not think that follows. Very often it has not been.

Senator KEYES. Do you think it was prepared for war in 1914?

Admiral STRAUSS. I think in 1914 we could have gone forth all right; yes.

Senator KEYES. That is, we could have sent our ships to sea? I just want to know if you want to make the statement——

Admiral STRAUSS. I want to stick to that statement, that in 1917, when we declared war, we could have gone out into the Atlantic and whipped the German Fleet. That is my belief.

Senator KEYES. Yes; I understand you to make that statement, and it is very clear; and I am not sure but what you are right about it. I think you would have done it. But what I am trying to find out is whether the Navy was prepared in April, 1917.

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes; I think so. All of the ships that we had—and we had a fine fleet of 16 capital ships, and I am not counting the predreadnaughts, or anything like that—could have gone forth with their ammunition and everything aboard of them, and crews trained and everything, and whipped an enemy of the size of Germany.

Senator KEYES. Can you tell us at what time, in your opinion, the Navy became fully prepared for war?

Admiral STRAUSS. I think we could have done that in 1915.

Senator KEYES. That does not answer my question. Will you just answer my question? I am not asking you whether you think that the ships could have gone out and put up a good fight, etc. My question was, at what time do you think the Navy became fully prepared for war?

Admiral STRAUSS. No; I can not answer.

Senator KEYES. You made a statement that at a certain time it was fully prepared?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes.

Senator KEYES. I would like to know when that time arrived.

Admiral STRAUSS. I can not tell you.

Senator KEYES. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Was it fully prepared in 1914?

Admiral STRAUSS. No; I do not think so.

The CHAIRMAN. Was it fully prepared in 1915?

Admiral STRAUSS. The end of 1915, at the time that I took stock of things, yes; so far as my own knowledge goes, that is in my own department.

The CHAIRMAN. And thereafter, until the date of the declaration of war, you would say that it was fully prepared?

Admiral STRAUSS. Well, so far as my own department goes, at that time; that is the supply of ordnance material. Now, there are other departments of which I was not informed, that is about the personnel and food supplies, and all that sort of thing.

Now, pass on to 1917, when I was with the fleet, and I can answer your question. I think at that time that we were fully prepared. That is when I was in the fleet and had first-hand knowledge of conditions. Before that time, that is up to the three years preceding December, 1916, I only had a part of it under my supervision, that is the supply of ammunition, torpedoes, mines, and so forth.

Now, your question about when we were fully prepared had better be asked of somebody in the Division of Operations, where they have all of these things under their charge.

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Senator KEYES. We shall ask.

The CHAIRMAN. But you state that in your opinion, when war was declared, the Navy was fully prepared?

Admiral STRAUSS. I do; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Was it as fully prepared as it should have been, in view of the fact that the world had been at war since 1914?

Admiral STRAUSS. I think so. Now, war was declared by England on August 4, I think, 1914.

The CHAIRMAN. When you say the fleet was prepared, you do not mean only in regard to matters with which you were connected, but in regard to everything else, too?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes; I do. Of course there is not such a thing as 100 per cent preparedness. I have repeatedly stated that. The question I wish to answer is, Were we ready to go forth and whip the Germans at sea on the 6th of April, 1917, and I answer yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Did the British whip the Germans completely at the battle of Jutland?

Admiral STRAUSS. I will have to give you my previous answer on that question, that I have not made up my mind about the battle of Jutland yet.

The CHAIRMAN. Was the British fleet at the battle of Jutland more powerful than our fleet?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Very much more?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And yet you can not say whether they actually defeated the Germans at the battle of Jutland or not?

Admiral STRAUSS. No; I can not answer that question yet, whether they did; but there were certain well-known defects in the British fleet, defects of equipment that we did not have, and according to Jellicoe's own book——

The CHAIRMAN. They were not defects in screening, were they?

Admiral STRAUSS. No; they were defects of ammunition. Now, we did not have those defects.

The Germans did not have them. Admiral Jellicoe speaks of his inferior shell; and I have heard from other authorities that that was a source of great failure in their shooting.

Senator KEYES. I understand that we had a large and sufficient, ample supply of powder at the time we declared war?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes, sir; perfectly ample, even a year before we declared war.

Senator TRAMMELL. You were connected with the War Department in 1915, Admiral, according to your testimony?

Admiral STRAUSS. In 1913; ending October, 1913.

Senator TRAMMELL. 1913. During 1913 you were bending your energies towards building up the supply of ordnance, were you?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes, sir.

Senator TRAMMELL. You left the department in December, 1916?

Admiral STRAUSS. I left the department in December, 1916.

Senator TRAMMELL. At the time you left, in December, 1916, you state in a general way that the supplies were all up to the standard, as far as war requirements?

Admiral STRAUSS. Well, that they were going along in very good shape.

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Senator TRAMMELL. Now, in regard to the question of screening vessels, the question of whether or not we would have had to had them if we had met the German fleet, that, of course, is not involved directly, because we did not meet the German fleet, and some seem to think that there was no particular probability of our meeting the German fleet in midocean. But did you have sufficient vessels to carry out the mission and the purpose that was assigned to you?

Admiral STRAUSS. You mean——

Senator TRAMMELL. Did you have sufficient screening vessels, and so on?

Admiral STRAUSS. In the North Sea?

Senator TRAMMELL. Yes.

Admiral STRAUSS. The screening was done altogether by the British. I had no screen at all. The British did that for us. The vessels that would have screened my force were down there operating from Queenstown under a British commander. Admiral Bayley was commanding them.

Senator TRAMMELL. That was more or less a question of strategic location, was it not? If our vessels had been up there assisting you, these other vessels might have had to be down in the location where our vessels were? As a matter of fact, you were utilizing the whole force in a cooperative way—the British and American forces there? You did have ample protection? You had ample protection, did you not, in the eay of screening vessels?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes.

Senator TRAMMELL. You spoke of our having a good many more destroyers than had been mobilized with your fleet. Did not that question of mobilizing rest upon the conditions and the work you would have to perform and the duties that you were undertaking? In other words, if your object and purpose and expectation was a battle with the German fleet, would you not have assembled more of your screening vessels with the fleet?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes.

Senator TRAMMELL. So that the fact that you did not have them there would not mean that you could not have had them there if your main objective had been engaging in battle with the German fleet?

Admiral STRAUSS. Exactly.

Senator TRAMMELL. And when you were going over there, your primary mission being that of laying mines, you did not necessarily have to have the screening vessels and protection from our own Navy that you would if your main object had been to go and engage in battle with the German fleet?

Admiral STRAUSS. I wanted a screen—had to have a screen and a covering force in this operation. Now, we were allied with the British, and it was a matter of whether we got it from the British or from ourselves. It took these destroyers and battleships to do it.

Senator TRAMMELL. You did not care where you got them; you had the protection and the screening force?

Admiral STRAUSS. I did not care where I got them; yes.

Senator TRAMMELL. And they were an assistance to you just the same as you would have been an assistance to them?

Admiral STRAUSS. Well, they were, except that they used them for a double purpose. They used them for screening the British opera-

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tions as well as ours. Therefore we lost half of our time waiting for the British to come along; so that it would have been better if we had had our own screening force and protecting fleet.

Senator TRAMMELL. Do you know about how long it takes to construct these scout cruisers?

Admiral STRAUSS. I fancy it would take two and one-half to three years to construct the latest design. You can get that better from the chief constructor.

Senator TRAMMELL. Do you know whether or not this country would have had more or less of them in course of construction at the time the war came on, in 1914?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes; we had some under construction.

Senator TRAMMELL. Some in course of construction?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes, sir.

Senator TRAMMELL. From your knowledge of the condition in the Navy in 1915 and 1916, was there more or less of a concert of action to better equip and build up the Navy and get it in better condition for war purposes during that time?

Admiral STRAUSS. During the time I was in the Bureau of Ordnance?

Senator TRAMMELL. Yes.

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes, sir; there was decided activity, everywhere.

Senator TRAMMELL. If you had not been making special efforts, would it have been necessary to make so much preparation in connection with the mining project? Do you not think that the fact that war was going on, and the desire of the Navy Department to make special preparation, actuated the department to quite an extent in enlarging and extending your line of preparations?

Admiral STRAUSS. I think so. War broke out about six or seven months after I entered the bureau. I started to tell you a little while ago that three days after the declaration of war I asked the department to send abroad two officers as special observers of the effects of shell fire and torpedo fire, and to find out everything they could about what was going on abroad. One of them was Lieut. McCrary and the other was Lieut. Babcock. Lieut. Babcock stayed there only 10 days, and he wrote a letter saying that he would like to come back as it was too expensive; so that he came back on the *Tennessee*. Lieut. McCrary stayed there some time longer, and I think other bureaus of the Navy Department also had observers out, although I did not have much luck with mine.

Senator TRAMMELL. That was prior to the time we entered the war?

Admiral STRAUSS. Prior to the time, but immediately after the outbreak of the World War.

Senator TRAMMELL. Then, as a matter of fact, you know that so far as the branch of the service you were connected with was concerned, you were trying to get as much first-hand information as you could, and you sent over officers for the purpose of observing and reporting?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes; within three days after war broke out I had those orders issued for Babcock and McCrary; and if Babcock had stayed over there, I have no doubt that he would have gotten a lot of information.

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Senator TRAMMELL. Now, I believe you stated in your direct testimony that some time in April, the month in which we entered the war, the Navy Department here took up this matter of recommending the barrage.

Admiral STRAUSS. In April.

Senator TRAMMELL. In April?

Admiral STRAUSS. In April, 1917, I think, a very few days after we declared war. I fancy the matter had been considered some time before that, but very soon after our declaration of war, I am informed that the department proposed this barrier across the North Sea in conjunction with the barrier across the Straits of Dover.

Senator TRAMMELL. That recommendation was not approved of at that time, and I believe you stated that it was not until September, 1917, when Admiral Mayo went abroad, that they finally agreed to the idea of the barrage?

Admiral STRAUSS. It was quite late in the year. But, if you will permit me to suggest, I think it would be better to ask Admiral Benson or Capt. Pratt, if they are to appear before the committee, as they were here in the department and knew all about these movements.

Senator TRAMMELL. We will make inquiry of them as to the more direct information. But if there was a six months' delay in going ahead with the mine-laying and the barrage, it could not be attributed to the United States Navy?

Admiral STRAUSS. No; I think it was attributable to the reluctance that the British had to going into the whole question of the mine barrier across the North Sea.

Senator TRAMMELL. Eliminating the question of the value of the barrage itself, if its benefits were deferred for six months, and it did not act in its effectiveness in helping to shake the submarine menace six months sooner, that was not chargeable to the Navy of the United States?

Admiral STRAUSS. No; you can not charge the United States Navy with any delay in agreeing to that barrage.

Senator TRAMMELL. I believe you stated that while you considered that our Navy was fully prepared in April, 1917, you, of course, did not mean an ideal condition, and that no navy was ever 100 per cent prepared?

Admiral STRAUSS. No. If any navy or department of the navy say that they are thoroughly and absolutely prepared, I believe they are in a bad way. They not only can not say that they are absolutely prepared before a war, but the developments during a war always make us a step behind. I will give you an example of that, the invention of the paravane during the war, which was a very clever scheme for defeating the surface mine, an attachment that they affixed to a battleship, and as the battleship steamed along it cut these mines adrift automatically. It took some time for us to put paravanes on our ships, and we were behind in that respect, because this was an invention that proceeded out of the war.

Senator TRAMMELL. I think you are thoroughly correct in your views upon that subject, and your opinion that the necessities and the developments, of course, make new things necessary, and the changes are lightninglike during the war, not only in the Navy operations, but the Army, too.

Admiral STRAUSS. Admiral McKean has just reminded me of the depth charge. That was entirely a development of this war, and a

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very important one. And that not only runs along in peace time that way, but it runs along in war; so that if you wanted to be captious, you might charge that we did not have depth charges or paravanes.

Senator TRAMMELL. From your general knowledge of the preparation that has been made by the Navy and the effectiveness of the Navy in connection with this war, do you think that our Navy delayed the final victory to any great extent?

Admiral STRAUSS. I do not.

Senator TRAMMELL. Admiral Sims has stated that on account of our not entering wholeheartedly into the war in the first four to six months, and on account of the lack of preparedness, the United States Navy had caused the death of approximately 500,000 more people than would have been killed, the loss of 2,500,000 tons of shipping, and the expenditure by all the allied powers of $15,000,000,000 more than would have been necessary if we had entered into the matter wholeheartedly in the first four to six months and had not had a lack of preparedness. That is the substance of his statement. Do you agree with that, from your knowledge of the entire situation?

Admiral STRAUSS. I have prepared a statement on that subject.

Senator TRAMMELL. I would be very glad to have it.

Admiral STRAUSS. I have studied Admiral Sims's statement with respect to tonnage losses in connection with this question, and compared it with the information bulletin he sent out from London in September, 1918. The losses given in the bulletin from May to July, 1917, inclusive, total 1,825,670 tons. In the remaining five months of 1917 the losses total 2,004,725 tons. Grand total from the time we might have become active on May 1, 1917, until the end of that year, 3,830,393. Of this loss Admiral Sims states in his hearings a million and one-half tons would have been saved by our earlier cooperation. That is 39.2 per cent of all that was sunk.

Now take the next year. Admiral Sims cites the losses in October as being 100,000 tons. As a matter of fact it was 112,427, but he should have excluded October altogether from monthly comparisons, since according to agreement the Germans called off all submarine warfare against merchant tonnage on the 11th of that month.

However, the total 1918 loss, according to the bulletin, amounts to 2,625,848, and Admiral Sims gives it as his opinion that we could have saved 1,000,000 of that if we had cooperated sooner. That is 38 per cent of the total for 1918. Now note that after fully entering into the business of protecting shipping, instead of a rise in percentage we are credited with a drop. With all due pride in our very efficient work in the war I would give a lower estimate as our share, since the British, operating in their home waters, actually had 3,000 vessels devoted to this duty as against our 232. Furthermore, Admiral Sims himself gives as our share less than 5 per cent of the total number of all patrol craft operating against enemy submarines in British and eastern Atlantic waters. (See Admiral Sims's memorandum to House Naval Committee, August, 1918.)

I feel that the data I have presented should be substituted for the complex calculation submitted by Admiral Sims, as showing that no action of ours, between our declaration of war and the cessation of hostilities, could have saved anything like two and one-half million tons. As the war progressed many things contributed to the sup-

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pression of the submarine—the wholesale use of depth bombs in the spring of 1918, improved listening devices, the northern barrage, experience in fighting them, etc. All of these, as well as our share of the patrol and convoy, were factors.

On December 2, 1917, Gen. Pershing cabled the War Department as follows:

* * * the minimum number of troops we should plan to have in France by the end of June (1918) is four Army corps of 24 divisions in addition to troops for service n the rear, * * *

And, further:

A study of American tonnage shows sufficient American tonnage to bring over this number of troops, but to do so there must be a reduction in tonnage allotted to other than Army needs.

He had previously defined shipping for Army needs as including that for transport of steel, coal, and food.

The above excerpts from Admiral Sims's quotations from Gen. Pershing's report are significant. It states, in effect, that we must further disturb the economic condition of the country by diverting tonnage from trade to the pressing military needs, but leaves us to infer that if the troops and equipment are there they can be transported. I have seen no statement anywhere that leads me to doubt that when the troops were ready to go transportation was there to take them. Twenty-four divisions of 20,000 each equals 480,000 men. By the end of June, the date set, we had over a million men in France. This number must have exceeded the highest hopes of the allied military leaders.

In my opinion, as a result of the above figures, the answer is no.

The CHAIRMAN. You believe that our Navy had considerable to do with putting down the submarine menace, do you not?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Much more than 5 per cent?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes; I think the true figures lie somewhere between the 5 per cent that Admiral Sims told the House committee about and the 38 or 39 per cent that he accuses us of negligently losing.

The CHAIRMAN. And the sooner we got them over there, the better for checking the submarine menace?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. So that if there was any delay in getting them over there, it tended to prolong the war?

Admiral STRAUSS. I do not think so.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not see why not.

Admiral STRAUSS. I do not think so, at all. The war was decided really and finally by the victory over the Central Powers on the western front. That is a fact.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral STRAUSS. Now, the submarine was a menace, but it did not contribute anything in the world to change the result of that victory. The greatest successes of the Germans never helped them to be fed better or to get more munitions. It did not do them a bit of good in that respect. The submarines might have defeated us, but they certainly never helped the Germans to win.

The CHAIRMAN. They did not help the Germans to win?

Admiral STRAUSS. Not at all.

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The CHAIRMAN. Because the Germans did not win?

Admiral STRAUSS. I know; they took no part in assisting them to win. They did not win, of course.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you think that the German use of the submarine in destroying shipping was not a very important feature of the war?

Admiral STRAUSS. I say it might have been very important. If it had finally succeeded I think Admiral Sims said it would have defeated us. But—it is sort of paradoxical there—it did not help them to win.

The CHAIRMAN. Because they did not win. But if it had succeeded, and they had been able to cut off the supply of food of the Allies——

Admiral STRAUSS. Well, it did not succeed.

The CHAIRMAN (continuing). Would it not have had a material effect in causing the Allies to lose?

Admiral STRAUSS. Let me interrupt you.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral STRAUSS. When I say it did not help them to win, you say they did not win. Now, I can say the same thing about your hypothetical question about our losing. We did not lose.

The CHAIRMAN. We did not lose; precisely. But was there not a very critical condition over there on account of the submarine?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes, I think so; but not so bad as is generally made out. Take the question of food for England. England normally raises about 20 per cent of her food, as I understand it. By extraordinary effort, in this war when the war closed she was raising 80 per cent of her food, and that meant that they could get along on short rations, even without our food, if it meant anything.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you consider that the German submarines could have effectively blockaded England, and that England still could have kept on?

Admiral STRAUSS. How is that?

The CHAIRMAN. You consider that the German submarines could have effectively blockaded England and prevented their getting supplies of food, and that they still could have kept on in the war?

Admiral STRAUSS. I will not say that. What I did say was that so far as the food supply of England was concerned, the condition was not as serious as they made out. I believe this, though, that if the submarine had been unchecked, and had sunk all the ocean tonnage, it would have caused the Central Powers to win. But they did not, and the Central Powers did not win.

The CHAIRMAN. Because the submarine was checked?

Admiral STRAUSS. It was checked.

The CHAIRMAN. If it had not been checked, do you think it would have been possible for us to send our armies over?

Admiral STRAUSS. No; we had to check the submarine. We had to check the submarine.

The CHAIRMAN. So that the checking of the submarine was perhaps the principal cause of our getting troops over there and helping to win?

Admiral STRAUSS. No; the Germans had 160 or 170 submarines in existence when our troops were going over there. I think it was 160. Our troops were going over there all the time, and these submarines were flying around.

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The CHAIRMAN. But the submarines were checked by the allied and American forces which were used to check them, were they not?

Admiral STRAUSS. They were sinking 250,000 or 260,000 tons per month while our troops were going over.

The CHAIRMAN. That is, compared with 800,000 tons per month before we went in.

Admiral STRAUSS. If they had been spry enough to divert the sinkings from other ships to troop ships, it would have been a very serious blow; but they could not do it. You must reduce the whole thing down to, Did they ever stop our troops from going abroad? They never did. We never lost a man.

The CHAIRMAN. Because they were stopped by the Allies, with our assistance.

Admiral STRAUSS. We had not obliterated the submarines when we started to take troops across. They were there, and in tremendous numbers, sinking ships every day. But they did not sink our troopships.

The CHAIRMAN. By the effective use of convoys and of depth charges and of destroyers and other patrol boats, we prevented them from sinking our troop ships, did we not?

Admiral STRAUSS. They were sinking 250,000 or 260,000 tons per month, anyhow; but they never sunk our troopships.

The CHAIRMAN. That was very much of a reduction, of course, from what they had done before.

Admiral STRAUSS. It does not matter. Two hundred and fifty thousand tons of troopships a month would have been a very serious business for us; but they did not sink them.

The CHAIRMAN. No; we prevented them from sinking our troopships by our effective measures, did we not?

Admiral STRAUSS. But it was not prevented by a delay of a few weeks in getting our patrols started there, was it?

The CHAIRMAN. But if our assistance was of any value, it was of value as soon as we could get it over there.

Admiral STRAUSS. We sent over our first ships June 24. They were in pretty full blast at that date.

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly we were not as effective as we were later on?

Admiral STRAUSS. No; that was two months after the war began.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, you say that you sent two officers, Lieut. McCrary and Lieut. Babcock, over to study the situation in regard to gunnery on the other side?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you say that Lieut. Babcock returned to this country because he found that it was too expensive on the other side?

Admiral STRAUSS. That it was too expensive; that was his principal reason, and he said that he could not get much information anyhow.

The CHAIRMAN. And he was allowed to come home?

Admiral STRAUS. Yes; he was allowed. He came home on the *Tennessee*.

The CHAIRMAN. Does that look as though the department was making any very strenuous efforts to find out the situation as to gunnery on the other side, if an officer was allowed to come home simply because it was too expensive for him on the other side?

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Admiral STRAUSS. That was not his only reason. That was the principal reason he seemed to dwell on. The other was that he could not get any information.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that should be said.

Admiral STRAUSS. I do not know what the department did otherwise, and what their other agents were. I presume they had them. I am just giving you an instance of our effort to get this information. What becomes of it afterwards I do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you get any information from Lieut. McCrary?

Admiral STRAUSS. Very little; very little.

The CHAIRMAN. You say that the department had a plan for barrage during the first few weeks of the war?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And that it was not approved by the British Admiralty. Would it have been feasible without the consent of the British Admiralty, to lay any barrage?

Admiral STRAUSS. I hardly think it would have been the proper thing to do. It was a sort of front yard of the British islands, and the operation was near their coast, I think, and it was the waters in which they would operate their fleet. We should have had their consent.

The CHAIRMAN. Would it have been feasible to lay any barrage without the antenna mines which were later discovered?

Admiral STRAUSS. Oh, yes; perfectly feasible. The British shared in this barrage, and they had no antenna mines, at all. Their mines are not antenna mines.

The CHAIRMAN. Would it have been feasible for us to have sent over a sufficient number of the other, the old-fashioned mines, which as you have already stated required at least three to one of the antenna mines, to have constructed this barrage?

Admiral STRAUSS. For a barrage equal to the one we laid, it would have taken about 180,000 mines.

The CHAIRMAN. About 180,000 mines?

Admiral STRAUSS. And we actually sent 80,000.

The CHAIRMAN. And a considerable number of ships, to take them over, would it not?

Admiral STRAUSS. Well, we kept a certain number busy going back and forth. We got 64 cargoes in all, but most of them were repeats—the same ship. We ran a sort of a line of mines from the United States to the coast of Scotland.

The CHAIRMAN. And you think it would have been feasible to have gone ahead with the other barrage?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Did not the department accept the view of the admiralty that with the old mines it was not feasible to go ahead with the barrage?

Admiral STRAUSS. I do not know. I was not here in the department. That is another question that I would suggest that you ask some witness about, who was on duty in the department.

The CHAIRMAN. And after the new mines were recommended, did not Admiral Sims do everything in his power to go ahead with the barrage, as far as you know?

Admiral STRAUSS. As far as my personal contact with Admiral Sims goes, with respect to this barrage, he did everything that

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could to further it. I got over there, as I say, on the 21st of March, and Admiral Sims did everything he could to see that the work was done.

The CHAIRMAN. These two observers that you speak of that were sent over were ordered home, were they not? They came home under orders of the department?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes, sir.

Senator TRAMMELL. Regardless of the accomplishment of these officers that were sent abroad for the purpose of gaining information, as far as the Navy Department was concerned and your particular branch of the service, you were vigilant in trying to get the information, were you not?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes, sir. The department readily acceded to my request to have these men sent over there.

Senator TRAMMELL. If there was any dereliction or if there was any failure, then, it was not of the Ordnance Department, because the Ordnance Department did all it could to try to get the information by sending these men?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes, sir.

Senator TRAMMELL. I do not say that anybody made any failure, but it seems that they were not able to get the information.

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes.

Senator TRAMMELL. That was due, of course, to the fact that the British Admiralty were not opening up very much, and were not revealing very much of their plans to officers from some neutral country.

Admiral STRAUSS. That was a fact, and I think that, coupled with the other condition, was what induced Mr. Babcock to give up.

Senator TRAMMELL. You have been asked a good many hypothetical questions about failure. As a matter of fact, did the United States and the allied powers fail in this last war, so far as ultimate results were concerned? Of course I know that is a silly question, but it is no more silly than it is to keep on talking about——

Admiral STRAUSS. I will answer the question. I do not think it is too much to say that the record of the United States Navy in this war, as it was in the Spanish War, was one of brilliant success.

Senator TRAMMELL. You did not hear of any nations or any armies starving to death over there for the want of food, did you?

Admiral STRAUSS. No; I guess they were pretty well supplied.

Senator TRAMMELL. You did not hear of any thousands or hundreds of thousands of our troops that were ready to be transported that could not get transportation, did you?

Admiral STRAUSS. I have no knowledge of any lack of transportation, but I must say that I am not well informed on the subject. I have read Gen. Hines's book to find out, but it does not tell, really, whether there was lack of transportation or not. It does not make it clear.

Senator TRAMMELL. The facts are, so far as you know, that we cooperated and performed such service as to have the allied powers supplied with the necessary food, both civilians and armies. We also cooperated and carried on our activities to such an extent as to get our own troops there in time for them to win a victory.

Admiral STRAUSS. We certainly did.

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Senator TRAMMELL. The submarine menace, severe as it was and as annoying as it was, proved a failure so far as giving Germany success, did it not?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes.

Senator TRAMMELL. In other words, the United States and the allied powers coped with the situation successfully; that is the fact?

Admiral STRAUSS. Yes.

Senator TRAMMELL. They coped with the submarine menace successfully. That is all I have to ask.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is all, Admiral, and you may be excused.

(Thereupon, at 1 o'clock p. m., the subcommittee adjourned until to-morrow, Thursday, April 15, 1920, at 10 o'clock a. m.)

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NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

TUESDAY, APRIL 15, 1920.

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON NAVAL AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to adjournment, in room 235, Senate Office Building, at 10 o'clock, a. m., Hon. Frederick Hale, presiding.

Present: Senators Hale (chairman), Keyes, and Trammell.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. Admiral Badger, have you a statement to make in connection with the matters involved in this investigation?

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL CHARLES J. BADGER, UNITED STATES NAVY.

(The witness was sworn by the chairman.)

Admiral BADGER. I have a general statement, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. We will be glad if you will give it to us.

Admiral BADGER. I presume I am called before this committee to make such statements bearing upon the Navy's participation in the Great War, its preparation and conduct, as my service for the past five and one-half years as a member of the General Board of the Navy and chairman of its executive committee may have qualified me to give.

2. It may be well to say here that the General Board was created in 1900 by the then Secretary of the Navy and has been continued in existence by all succeeding Secretaries to date. The Admiral of the Navy, George Dewey, was president of the board from its creation until his death in January, 1917. The board is composed of officers of rank and experience, all of its ex-officio members, of which there are four, holding high executive positions in the naval organization.

3. The General Board is purely advisory in its functions and has no executive powers whatever. In the performance of its duties it is directly under the Secretary of the Navy and is independent of any other office or any bureau of the Navy Department.

4. Three of the principal duties of the General Board as laid down in the Navy Regulations, read as follows:

(1) The General Board shall devise measures and plans for the effective preparation and maintenance of the fleet for war and shall advise the Secretary of the Navy as to the distribution of the fleet and of the reinforcements of ships, officers and men of the Navy and Marine Corps.

(2) It shall prepare and submit to the Secretary of the Navy plans of campaign, including cooperation with the Army and the employment of all the elements of naval defense, such as the Naval Militia, Coast Survey, Lighthouse Service, Coast Guard, and merchant vessels, and shall constantly revise these plans in accordance with the latest information received.

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(3) It shall consider the number and types of ships proper to constitute the fleet, the number and rank of officers, and the number and ratings of enlisted men required to man them, and shall advise the Secretary of the Navy respecting the estimates therefor (including such increase as may be requisite) to be submitted annually to Congress.

5. I have quoted the above from the Navy Regulations to show that in the routine performance of its duties the General Board was at all times in position to know what was going on in the Navy and though during the war all of its members were not always informed as to the details of minor operations they were thoroughly cognizant of the more important operations and methods, many of which were submitted to it for investigation and recommendation. I will append to this statement a memorandum, marked "A," giving by title the principal General Board communications to the Navy Department on war preparations and subjects from August 1, 1914, to December 5, 1918.

I think it is unnecessary to read this.

The CHAIRMAN. Does it show the different plans that were submitted by the board?

Admiral BADGER. These are the papers that were submitted bearing upon the war. For instance, "August 1, 1914, withdrawal of battleships to home yards." "November 7, 1914, proposed gun and projectile to be used against air craft." These are all recommendations.

The CHAIRMAN. They are all detailed recommendations?

Admiral BADGER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. No general plan recommendations?

Admiral BADGER. Yes, sir; only titles of the papers here. I will touch on the subjects as I go on with my statement.

The CHAIRMAN. Let that go into the record.

Admiral BADGER. Yes.

(The paper referred to, as presented on the following day, April 16, 1920, with the insertion following each recommendation of the action taken in regard thereto, as requested by the chairman, is here printed in full, as follows:)

FEBRUARY 6, 1920.

SUBJECTS ACTED UPON BY THE GENERAL BOARD UPON WHICH RECOMMENDATIONS WERE SUBMITTED TO THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY RELATIVE TO THE WORLD WAR.

July 28, 1914: Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia.
July 31, 1914: State of war in Germany.
August 1, 1914: Germany declared war on Russia.
August 3, 1914: Germany declared war on France.
August 4, 1914: Great Britain declared war on Germany.
August 6, 1914: Austria-Hungary declared war on Russia.
August 10, 1914: France declared war on Austria-Hungary.
August 12, 1914: Great Britain declared war on Austria-Hungary.
August 16, 1914: Japan demands German possessions at Kiao Chau.

August 6, 1914: The General Board having been in attendance upon the summer conference at the Naval War College, as has been customary, took the following action at the meeting of the executive committee:

"Capt. Knapp stated that he considered that the General Board should return to Washington at once in order to be easily accessible to the Secretary of the Navy for counsel, due to the present critical situation in Europe; and, further, that, as a general principle, the board should be in close touch with the Secretary.

"Admiral Fiske stated that in his opinion the Secretary has a high and proper appreciation of the value of recommendations made by the General Board.

"The following resolution was unanimously adopted:

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"'*Resolved*, That the executive committee of the General Board should, in view of the unprecedented conditions now existing, return to Washington and resume its duties in the Navy Department.'

"This sense of the board was communicated to the Secretary by letter the same day, in reply to which the Secretary on August 7 telegraphed:

"'Consider it desirable General Board remain in Newport for the present. Daniels.'"

August 7, 1914: Extracts from minutes of the executive committee:

"Admiral Fiske asked consideration as to whether there is anything the General Board can suggest that should be done by the Navy Department, in view of existing war by the European nations, as regards enforcement of obligations of neutrality, etc."

August 1, 1914: Withdrawal of battleships to home yards. (G. B., 420–1.)

August 2, 1914: No formal approval, but handed to the President. Signed, Z. H. Madison, Lieutenant Commander.

September 9, 1914: Withdrawal of battleships from Mexican and West Indian waters. (G. B., 420–1.)

September 10, 1914: No formal approval, but handed to President. Signed, Z. H. Madison, Lieutenant Commander.

September 23, 1914: Lack of gunboats and small cruisers. (G. B., 420–12.)

September 30, 1914: Considered, but no action taken, in view of consideration of building program by General Board. Signed, Z. H. Madison, Lieutenant Commander.

October 17, 1914: Armed merchant vessels. (G. B., No. 438.)

October 23, 1914: Copy forwarded to State Department. Signed, Z. H. Madison.

November 7, 1914: Proposed gun and projectile to be used against aircraft. (G. B., No. 430.)

November 9, 1914: Approved and referred to Material. Signed, Z. H. Madison, Lieutenant Commander.

November 14, 1914: Immediate need of trained personnel. (G. B., No. 421.)

Read to Secretary in General Board room at meeting November 12, 1914, and held by his direction.

January 6, 1915: Suggested method of attacking submarines. (G. B., No. 420–15).

No record of action by department.

March 13, 1915: Information desired in connection with revision of war plans. Periodical reports on preparedness of bureaus. (G. B., No. 425.)

May 28, 1915: Approved. Given to bureaus concerned. Signed, B. McCandless.

April 14, 1915: Plan of employment of vessels of cruiser squadron. (G. B., No. 420–1.)

No record of action by department.

April 17, 1915: Utilization of Coast Guard by Navy Department in time of war. (G. B., No. 425.)

No record of action by department.

April 24, 1915: Commander Cruiser Squadron recommends organizing armored cruisers in Atlantic. (G. B., No. 420.)

April 28, 1915. Approved in principle. Signed, Z. H. Madison, Lieutenant Commander.

May 15, 1915: Proposed procedure for inspection of merchant vessels, and their use in time of war. (G. B., No. 442; serial 270.)

June 9, 1915: Instructions to bureaus to make reports given. Signed, B. McCandless.

May 29, 1915: Method for protection of American merchant vessels in War Zone. (G. B., No. 442.)

June 8, 1915: Approved. Hydrographer informed that G. B. does not approve proposed method. Signed, B. McCandless.

June 5, 1915: Organization of active battleship fleet. (G. B., No. 420.)

No record of action by department.

June 16, 1915: Question of experimenting with gas dispersing shell. (G. B., No. 430.)

No record of action by department.

July 30, 1915: Naval policy with present requirements. (G. B., No. 420–2.)

No record of action by department.

November 9, 1915: Building program. (G. B., No. 420–2.)

November 10, 1915: Handed to Secretary of the Navy by B. McCandless.

December 15, 1915: Preparations necessary to insure a state of preparedness for war. Reserve stock of materials. (G. B., No. 425; continuation of serial No. 329.)

December 20, 1915: Bureau Supplies and Account informed that General Board recommendations are approved. Signed, Josephus Daniels.

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December 31, 1915: Commander cruiser squadron. Recommendations for cruiser force, United States war fleet. (G. B., No. 420.)

January 12, 1916. Commander cruiser squadron informed General Board's recommendation approved. Signed, Josephus Daniels.

January 28, 1916: Black war plan. (G. B., No. 425.)

Withdrawn by General Board.

March 1, 1916: Necessity for dirigibles. (G. B., No. 449.)

March 30, 1916: Paper filed. Unsigned.

April 24, 1916: Duty to be performed by patrol motor boats; machinery characteristics. (G. B., No. 420–14.)

April 24, 1916: Approved and papers forwarded to steam engineers for action. Signed, Josephus Daniels.

May 17, 1916: Men necessary to man "C" fleet and its auxiliaries; supply of clothing to be kept on supply ships. (G. B., No. 425.)

May 18, 1916: Approved and Bureau of Supplies and Account directed to take proper action. Signed, Josephus Daniels.

May 17, 1916: Mobilization—war in the Atlantic. Proposed plan of anchorage. (G. B., No. 425.)

May 18, 1916: Approved. C. in C. directed to make such use of plan as expedient. Signed, Josephus Daniels.

May 24, 1916: Antiaircraft guns. (G. B., No. 430.)

May 25, 1916: Approved. Referred to Bureau of Ordnance, unsigned.

June 24, 1916: Development of aeronautics. Military functions and characteristics of aircraft. (G. B., No. 449.)

No record of action by department.

September 8, 1916: Principle plans necessary for preparation of fleet for war. (G. B., No. 425.)

September 28, 1916: Letter sent to Lieut. Allen. No signature.

October 19, 1916: Asphyxiating shell. (G. B., No. 430.)

December 11, 1916: Letter included in annual report of Secretary. Signed, V. O. Chase, captain, United States Navy.

October 27, 1916: Illuminating projectiles. (G. B., No. 420–16.)

October 30, 1916: Approved and returned to Bureau of Ordnance. Signed, V. O. Chase.

November 3, 1916: Need for net-planting vessel, mine force. (G. B., No. 420–5.)

February 14, 1917: Approved. C. in C. Atlantic Fleet and Bureau of Ordnance informed. Signed, V. O. Chase.

January 26, 1917: Nonrigid dirigibles. (G. B., No. 449.)

No record of action by department.

February 1, 1917: Apportionment of merchant vessels to War and Navy Departments for war service. (G. B., No. 442.)

February 5, 1917: Approved and referred to joint Army and Navy board of survey for merchant vessels for information. Signed, Josephus Daniels.

February 4, 1917: Steps to be taken to meet a possible condition of war with the Central European Powers. (G. B., No. 425.)

No record of action by department.

February 10, 1917: Mine force. (G. B., No. 431.)

February 13, 1917: C. in C. Atlantic Fleet and Bureau of Ordnance informed. Signed V. O. Chase.

February 14, 1917: Supply of floating mines. (G. B., No. 431.)

February 16, 1917: Approved and forwarded to Bureau of Ordnance. Signed V. O. Chase.

February 21, 1917: Additional supply of naval defense mines. (G. B., No. 431.)

February 23, 1917: Approved and returned to Bureau of Ordnance. Signed V. O. Chase.

February 24, 1917: Vessels for Coast Artillery Corps in time of war. (G. B., No. 442.)

February 27, 1917: Referred to joint Army and Navy board. Signed, V. O. Chase.

March 6, 1917: Discussed movement of fleet in view of international situation. Recommended fleet be recalled by March 15 and assembled in Chesapeake Bay.

Verbal discussion by General Board. Record in minutes.

March 17, 1917: System of patrol and sweeping for protection of shipping off New York. Estimate of situation. (G. B., No. 425.)

April 16, 1917: Referred to commandant third naval district for information and return. Signed, V. O. Chase.

March 20, 1917: Protection of American shipping. (G. B., No. 425.)

No record of action by department.

March 20, 1917: Safety of lives and property of United States citizens on American ships on the high seas. (G. B., No. 425.)

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(Secretary and Assistant Secretary present for discussion of two preceding subjects.)
No record of action by department.
March 26, 1917: Construction of submarine chasers. (G. B., No. 420–14.)
March 27, 1917: Approved Signed, V. O. Chase.
(Assistant Secretary of Navy present at meeting for discussion of above subject.)
March 29, 1917: Admiral Mayo, commander in chief Atlantic Fleet appeared before board.
In minutes of meeting.
March 30, 1917: Batteries for naval auxiliaries. (G. B., No. 420–23.)
No record of action by department.
April 5, 1917: Assistance United States can give Allies upon declaration of war. (G. B., No. 425.)
June 8, 1917. All recommendations acted upon favorably and measures taken in accordance therewith so far as practicable. Signed, F. H. Schofield.
April 5, 1917: Proposal to send naval officers to England and France to observe methods of warfare and secure general information. (G. B., No. 425.)
June 9, 1917: Officers and making investigation. Signed, F. H. Schofield.
April 9, 1917: Bases in the Carribbean for use in war with black. (G. B., No. 408.)
June 28, 1917: Approved. Signed, F. D. Roosevelt, Acting Secretary.
April 18, 1917: Development of mining and obstruction materials. (G. B., No. 431.)
April 25, 1917: Approved. Paper referred to commander in chief Atlantic Fleet. Signed, V. O. Chase.
April 20, 1917: Types of vessels to be built for present and future condition. (G. B., No. 420.)
No record of action by department.
April 26, 1917: Methods of detecting presence of enemy submarines. (G. B., No. 420–15.)
April 28, 1917: Letter written to Mr. Lake. Signed V. O. Chase.
April 27, 1917: Proposed type of motor boat for destroying submarines. (G. B., No. 420–14.)
April 27, 1917: Referred to commander in chief Atlantic Fleet. Approved. Signed, V. O. Chase.
April 28, 1917: Value of City Island, N. Y., for naval purposes. (G. B., No. 414–3.)
No record of action by department.
May 2, 1917: Rear Admiral de Chair, R. N., accompanied by Commodore Gaunt, R. N., appeared before the board to give views and answer questions relating to patrol and regulation of shipping around the British Islands and French coasts.
Record in minutes of meeting.
May 3, 1917: Further recommendations as to employment of patrol craft to meet submarines. (G. B., No. 425.)
No record of action by department.
May 3, 1917: Vice Admiral Chocheprat, French Navy, and the French naval attaché appeared to discuss matters of cooperation between our Navy and those of the Allies.
Record in minutes of meeting.
May 5, 1917: Patrol vessels for duty in European waters. (G. B., No. 425.)
No record of action by department.
May 12, 1917: Increase and training of mine force. (G. B., No. 431.)
June 21, 1917: Approved. Forwarded to commander in chief Atlantic Fleet. Signed, V. O. Chase.
May 12, 1917: Training of sweeping vessels. (G. B., No. 431.)
June 21, 1917: Approved. Forwarded to commander in chief Atlantic Fleet. Signed V. O. Chase.
May 19, 1917: Naval bases outside continental limits. (G. B., No. 425.)
Discussed in meeting of General Board.
May 19, 1917: Japanese cooperation with the Allies. (G. B., No. 425.)
July 2, 1917: Approved and forwarded to State Department. Signed, F. H. Schofield.
May 25, 1917: Naval base sites in the Antilles. (G. B., No. 404.)
No record of action by department.
May 26, 1917: Purchase of six additional colliers and one tanker. (G. B., No. 420–5.)
No record of action by department.
May 28, 1917: Methods of combating submarine menace. (G. B., No. 442.)
June 11, 1917: Approved. Referred to Bureau of Ordnance. Signed V. O. Chase.
May 31, 1917: Suggestions for routing supplies for European powers cooperating with United States. (G. B., No. 425.)
June 4, 1917: Approved. Referred to War College for information, Capt. Maxwell. Signed V. O. Chase.

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June 6, 1917: Submarine trap nets. (G. B., No. 403.)
June 26, 1917: Approved. Referred to commander in chief Atlantic Fleet. Signed, W. V. Pratt.
June 12, 1917: Location and necessity for training station, Marine Corps base, and base of operations for the fleet in the vicinity of Hampton Roads.
Discussion in minutes of meeting.
June 26, 1917: Concentration of marines. Disposition April 30, 1919. (G. B. No. 432.)
June 28, 1917: Approved. Referred to major general commandant. Signed, F. H. Schofield.
July 13, 1917: Comment on report, Submarine warfare. Number and military characteristics of a new type of destroyer. (G. B. No. 420–429.)
July 20, 1920: Letter placed before the Secretary. Signed, F. H. Schofield.
July 26, 1917: Use of homing pigeons by Navy. (G. B. No. 420–16.)
No record of action by department.
August 16, 1917: Increase of personnel. (G. B. No. 421.)
August 29, 1917: Referred to Bureau Navigation. No action pending decision on manning of merchant marine. Signed, F. H. Schofield.
August 29, 1917: Naval policy—Building program. (G. B. No. 420–422.)
Original misplaced in Office of Naval Operations. Copy placed in hands of Secretary by Rear Admiral C. J. Badger. No record of action by department.
September 17, 1917: Distribution of drifting mines. (G. B. No. 431.)
September 21, 1917: Approved and forwarded to Bureau of Ordnance. Signed, F. H. Schofield.
September 22, 1917: Increase of enlisted personnel. (G. B. 421.)
No record of action by department.
October 12, 1917: Submarines in active offensive against submarines. (G. B. No. 420–15.)
October 13, 1917: Referred to bureaus for compliance. Signed, F. H. Schofield.
October 20, 1917: Inquiry re mine barrier in North Sea. (G. B., No. 425–5.)
October 24, 1917: Cable sent. Signed, W. V. Pratt.
October 22, 1917: Plans for opposing enemy submarine activity in Atlantic trade routes by mine barrage at entrance to North Sea. (G. B., No. 425–5.)
No record of action by department.
October 24, 1917: Proposed measures to prevent German submarines from operating against allied commerce in the Atlantic. (G. B., No. 425–5.)
No record of action by department.
October 27, 1917: Suggestions for the conduct of the war. (G. B., No. 425–5.)
November 1, 1917: Approved as recommended. Signed, F. H. Schofield.
(This includes the consideration by the board of 229 suggestions by various officers bearing upon improving methods and material for prosecuting the war.)
November 16, 1917: Enemy aliens as menace to utilization of resources. (G. B., No. 425–5.)
No record of action by department.
November 27, 1917: Lieut. Commander F. R. E. Davis, Royal Navy Air Service, appeared to give information concerning aeroplanes and aviation in the British Navy.
Record in minutes of meeting.
November 30, 1917: Army and Navy technical members of Aeronautical Commission to Europe submit recommendations re general aeronautical policy of the United States. (G. B., No. 449.
January 16, 1918: Approved. Signed, N. E. Irwin.
December 13, 1917: Treaty concerning prizes captured during present war.
In minutes of meeting.
December 15, 1917: Reply to German Government re reciprocal repatriation of sanitary personnel, etc. (G. B., 438.)
January 11, 1918: Referred to State Department. Signed. L. McNamee.
December 15, 1917: Guns for long-range bombardments. (G. B. 430.)
No record of action by department.
December 15, 1917: Shore mounting for heavy guns. (G. B., 430.)
No record of action by department.
December 19, 1917: Lieut. C. H. Varley, Royal Navy, appeared to discuss characteristics of special type of submarine for use in hunting enemy submarines and also the practical operation and methods employed in submarine hunting.
Record in minutes of meeting.
December 21, 1917: Naval Constructor S. V. Goodall, Royal Navy, appeared to discuss proposed type of submarine for hunting enemy submarines.
Record in minutes of meeting.

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December 29, 1917: Senior Member Special Board on Submarine Devices re detection of submarines. (G. B., No. 420–15.)
No record of action by department.
January 5, 1918: Plan for blockading enemy coast by submarines. Capt. J. K. Robinson. (G. B., No. 425–5.)
February 19, 1918: Referred to Commander Submarine Force for information. Signed, L. McNamee.
January 31, 1918: Naval Constructor S. V. Goodall, Royal Navy, appeared to discuss relative merits of tripod mast vs. cage mast, from British Admiralty viewpoint.
Record in minutes of meeting.
February 7, 1918: Unity of control in the distribution and transportation of war munitions. (G. B., No. 451.)
No record of action by department.
February 14, 1918: Proposed tactical method for operating against submarines. (G. B., No. 418.)
No record of action by department.
February 14, 1918: Plan of attack on German bases. Lieut. H. F. D. Davis. (G. B., No. 425–5.)
No record of action by department.
February 19, 1918: Tentative solution of problem of overseas transportation during war. Rear Admiral H. P. Huse. (G. B., No. 451.)
March 4, 1918: Referred to Council of National Defense. Signed, L. McNamee.
February 21, 1918: Type of vessel most suitable for submarine hunting. (G. B., No. 420–14.)
February 23, 1918: Approved. W. V. Pratt.
February 26, 1918: Control of the air in Dunquerque-Calais region to prevent passage of Dover Strait by enemy submarines. (G. B., No. 425–5.)
March 1, 1918: Approved. Signed, L. McNamee.
March 20, 1918: Present and future building program for submarines. Commander Submarine Force. (G. B., No. 420–15.)
April 20, 1918: Paper filed. No action having been taken. Signed, L. McNamee.
March 21, 1918: One-man semi-submersible boat to fire torpedoes. W. Shearer. (G. B., No. 420–14.)
No record of action by department.
March 21, 1918: Strategic use of Shearer one-man torpedo boat. (G. B., No. 420–14.)
No record of action by department.
March 30, 1918: The Dunkirk-Calais aircraft offensive. (G. B., No. 425–5.)
April 18, 1918: Reviewed. Approved in part. Signed, L. McNamee.
April 3, 1918: Small subsurface or submarine boats for offensive warfare in North Sea. (G. B., No. 420–15.)
No record of action by department.
April 10, 1918: The Dunkirk-Calais air offensive against submarines. (G. B., No. 425–5.)
No record of action by department.
April 20, 1918: Submarine building policy. (G. B., No. 420–15.)
No record of action by department.
May 3, 1918: Radio control of torpedoes. John Hays Hammond, jr. (G. B., No. 407.)
Delivered to Secretary by Lieut Commander Landoz, 2.30 p. m., May 3, 1918. No other record of action.
May 17, 1918: Mr. Cheradame, author on International politics and strategy, discussed informally political and strategical conditions in the Balkan States and in Austria-Hungary and Russia.
In minutes of meeting.
May 23, 1918: Capt. C. Gilbert More, Royal Air Service, on staff of Vice Admiral Sims, and temporarily on duty in the office of aviation, appeared to discuss status of aeronautics abroad.
In minutes of meeting.
June 18, 1918: Lieut. Col. J. C. Port, Royal Air Force, discussed practice of storing and launching aeroplanes on ships of the British Navy.
In minutes of meeting.
July 15, 1918: Plan for patrol and protection of Atlantic and Gulf coasts and Caribbean. (G. B. No. 425–5.)
No record of action by department.
July 17, 1918: Two hundred and fifty feet patrol boat. (G. B. No. 420–14.)
July 27, 1918: Construction of 250-foot boats will not be undertaken. Signed Josephus Daniels.

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July 23, 1918: Cork protection, U. S. S. *Chester*. (G. B. 420–11.)
July 30, 1918: Approved. Action will be taken as recommended. Signed J. T. Tompkins.
August 1, 1918: Capt. Gilbert More, R. A. F., temporarily attached to aviation section, informally discussed conditions at various seaplane stations noted on his recent tour of inspection.
In minutes of meeting.
August 5, 1918: Use of homing pigeons in combatting submarines. (G. B. No. 417.)
August 9, 1918: Approved. Signed W. Evans.
August 15, 1918: Lieut. Col. F. Lucas, R. A. F., discussed development of airships abroad.
Record in minutes of meeting.
August 17, 1918: Lieut. L. Townsend, jr., U. S. N., accompanied informally by Capt. David Albala, of the Serbian Army, and Capt. Henry M. Sguippa, of the Jugo-Slav Army, discussed Jugo-Slavic political and military situation in the Balkans.
In minuted of meeting.
August 21, 1918: Rigid airships. Recommendations of Joint Army and Navy Airship Board. (G. B. No. 449.)
September 4, 1918: Approved. Bureaus concerned notified. Signed W. V. Pratt.
August 22, 1918: Plan for patrol and protection of Pacific coast and Pacific Islands of United States. (G. B., 425–5.)
Secret document. No record of action taken by department.
September 10, 1918: Building program, 1920. (G. B. No. 420–2.)
In annual report.
October 14, 1918: Secretary of Navy present for consultation to hear General Board's explanation of the proposed building program for 1920.
Record in minutes of meeting.
November 14, 1918: H. M. S. *Argus*, airplane carrier, development of use of aircraft in connection with United States Atlantic Fleet. (G. B. No. 449.)
No record of action by department.
December 2, 1918: Terms and conditions that should be insisted upon by the United States in armistice and peace conferences following present war. (G. B., 438.)
Secret document. No record of action taken by department.
December 5, 1918: Capt. J. W. W. Ashworth, R. A. F., discussed latest development of aircraft material and personnel.
Record in minutes of meeting.

The foregoing list does not include the numerous hearings before the board which were held on all important subjects requiring consultation with experienced officers and other qualified specialists.

These hearings covered every range of naval activity and gave the board and the department the benefit of the experience and advice of officers returning from active duty in the theater of operations, including foreign officers (listed above) and foremost military and civilian experts and scientific men.

6. The gist of the criticism of the operations of the Navy Department and the Navy now under investigation is contained in the charges of unpreparedness to enter the war; absence of war plans or policies at the commencement of the war; vacillating and hand-to-mouth policies and plans after war was declared resulting in extending the duration of the war and thereby enormously increasing the allied war losses in lives, ocean tonnage, and money.

7. To each and all of these I enter emphatic denial. I do not mean to say that we had attained to perfection in the Navy—we never shall; that no errors of judgment or mistakes were made—they will always occur, but I assert that the Navy when it entered the war was, as a whole, well prepared and administered.

8. Despite the adverse criticisms that have recently been widely circulated it may confidently be maintained that the Navy met and efficiently stood the stress of a great war; it aided greatly the allied nations, and if success is any test of a military or any other organization, then the alleged shortcomings of the Navy and its directing

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heads can properly and justly be dismissed from serious consideration.

9. The preparation of a Navy for war is not a matter of weeks or months but of years, even of generations. The creation of our modern Navy may be said to have commenced in 1890 with the authorization of the *Oregon* class of battleships and since that time has steadily progressed in power, efficiency, and numbers of ships and personnel until at the commencement of the war in Europe in 1914 there were only two navies superior in power to our own. When, after our entry into the war, our battleships, destroyers, and other types of ships were called into cooperation with allied ships of similar types they measured up fully to the standards of the best. I do not know that any better example of preparation can be brought forward.

10. After the commencement of war abroad in August, 1914, and until the United States entered it, April 6, 1917, a period of nearly three years, the policy of this country was one of strict neutrality. The people, the Congress, and the administration hoped until the last moment to be able to keep out of the war with honor and every effort was made by the Government to avoid showing bias as between the belligerents as well as any expectation on our part of becoming embroiled. Although there were many, particularly of the Navy, who believed our eventual participation in the war to be inevitable, the Navy Department was handicapped in making preparations which would indicate to belligerent agents, in close watch upon our doings, that we were preparing for war. Only the normal increase in our naval power was, under these conditions, permitted us.

11. Nevertheless, the Navy Department in view of the probability of our finally being drawn into war did make such preparations as could be made without violation of our national policy of strict neutrality. Doubtless in the course of this investigation the committee will be informed of the measures adopted along these lines and of the important, efficient, and far-reaching part they played as the war progressed. It should be particularly noted in this connection that the prewar organization of the Navy Department adjusted itself efficiently to war demands. Without material change it stood the strain of enormous expansion and subsequently of speedy and orderly contraction to normal or nearly normal conditions with the minimum of friction or confusion.

12. It has been testified to before this committee by the officers best qualified to do so that on April 6, 1917, the battle fleet of the United States had never been in such efficient condition for war. In some types, principally of small craft, we were deficient and that mainly because of the rapid development of the submarine after war began and the uses to which it was put had given a new and unexpected turn to warfare on the sea—as unexpected by the nations abroad as by ourselves. The difference between us when we entered the war and the Allies was that they had had three years in which to follow the submarine method of warfare and so far as possible in the time build the necessary craft with which to combat it. This, as I have said before, was denied us by our neutral attitude and effort to avoid giving ground for the belief that we were preparing to take part in the war. I would like to accentuate this for it explains many things.

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13. Always bearing in mind the difference in size and power between the British and German Fleets and out own in 1914, I do not hesitate to say that we were as well prepared as to our Navy when we entered the war as were the other belligerents in 1914. For the reasons given above we had to catch up with the development of the previous three years and the strides we made in the year and a half before the armistice in producing the types of craft needed were unsurpassed anywhere.

14. As to policies and plans: The policy of the United States before we entered the war was that of strict neutrality, to keep out of the war if we could with honor. After the war, it was to cooperate with the Allies and to the utmost of our power to aid in the winning of the war. This policy of course obtained for the Navy as well as all other departments of the Government. One of the principal criticisms now before this committee for investigation is that the Navy Department had no plans. This is both unjust and incorrect. We had plans, well-considered ones. The trouble is that the plans and the execution of them did not meet with the approval of the critics. It is a difference of opinion. For many years the General Board, in pursuance of the duties required of it, has had in progress plans of campaign by able and competent officers. It is a process that never ends, for constant revision is needed to keep up with modern developments.

15. Among these plans of campaign is one for war in the Atlantic Ocean. To-day this plan is comprised in 170 typewritten pages. All the fundamental information, strategy, probable fighting areas, logistics, organization of the fleet, bases, administration, etc. possible to obtain is incorporated in this plan and has been for years. It contains a fund of useful and essential information of the greatest value for the study and prosecution of war activities in the Atlantic to which we may be a party.

16. To meet special conditions or variations or after contact with the enemy, plans can not be made beforehand upon which dependence can be placed. War is waged in the field and that is why we have commanders in chief and able staffs to assist them. It is unfortunate but true that the enemy may not play the game as we want him to do. The elements alone may upset the best-laid plans and necessitate sudden change and perhaps complete revision. The stories of practicable plans which cover all the varying vicissitudes of a campaign and lead inevitably to success are fairy tales. Operating plans change from day to day, and while every effort can be and is made to foresee what is likely to happen, a wise commander will always be prepared to make radical changes when occasion demands. He knows what is essential to be done—how and when he does it depends upon circumstances.

17. The Navy Department always had in view the things necessary to be done in case we entered the war. I will read, with your permission, a letter, marked "B" from the general board, dated March 13, 1915, approved and put into effect immediately. It proved of great value in expediting and coordinating the department's preparations for war. As the reports came in, the general board examined them, noted progress made or the reverse, and returned them with comments to the department. I will ask you to let Commander Baum read that letter for me.

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The letter in question, which was here read aloud by Commander Baum, is here printed in full as follows:

G. B. No. 425 (confidential).

MARCH 13, 1915.

To: Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: Preparation necessary to be made by the bureaus and offices of the Navy Department to insure a state of preparedness for war.
Inclosures: As enumerated in paragraph 2.

The strategic study of war in the Atlantic Ocean, in which the United States is a belligerent, shows that the full naval force of the United States, together with the necessary merchant auxiliaries, must be manned, fitted out and mobilized within two weeks after the Government decides that war is imminent and a mobilization of the naval force is necessary. In order to accomplish this it is necessary that all preparations possible be systematically made during time of peace and this state of preparedness be constantly maintained.

2. The administrative section of the plan for war in the Atlantic gives generally the work to be inaugurated now and diligently prosecuted by the bureaus of the Navy Department to insure a state of preparedness, and there are forwarded herewith copies of that part of the plan that concerns the activities of the following offices and bureaus: Office of Solicitor, Office of Naval Intelligence, Bureau of Ordnance, Bureau of Construction and Repair, Bureau of Steam Engineering, Bureau of Yards and Docks, Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, Bureau of Navigation, and headquarters of Marine Corps.

3. The General Board recommends that each office and bureau be furnished with the part of the plan that pertains to its own duties and directed to comply with the requirements of the plan so far as may be practicable, and especially to be directed to report to the department as soon as practicable, not later than one month from the approval of this letter, and thereafter at the end of each calendar quarter, the progress made in the work of preparation and to comment upon any defects in the plan which makes its execution impracticable or that seem cumbersome.

4. It is recommended that copies of these reports be forwarded by the department to the General Board for the purpose of keeping the war plans up to date.

GEORGE DEWEY.

Admiral BADGER. The effort of the department to obtain a well-balanced fleet has been continuous and consistent, but the great cost of new construction made it difficult to procure the various types of ships in the numbers needed. Compromise had to be made. When battleships, the real backbone of the fighting fleet were added, their cost prevented any considerable expenditure for cruisers or destroyers or other types, but in the annual estimates submitted the principle of an ultimately well-balanced fleet was never lost sight of.

In 1911 battle cruisers and a new type of scout cruiser commenced to be recommended, but it was not until 1915 (for the fiscal year 1917) that any were authorized. In that year, influenced by the war then in progress abroad and in order that a more comprehensive program might be inaugurated in preparation for our possible participation in it, the Secretary of the Navy, on October 7, 1915, addressed a letter to the General Board directing the submission to him of a building program to continue through five years, with an expenditure of about $100,000,000 a year for new construction during that period. This, so far as I know, was the first suggestion for a continuing program for the increase of our naval power. I here offer this letter, marked "C." [Reading:]

Confidential.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, October 7, 1915.

To: General Board.
Subject: Building program for the Navy.

1. The department desires that the General Board submit at the earliest practicable date a building program for the Navy that will continue over a period of five years,

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with an expenditure of about $100,000,000 each year for five years, on new construction only. It is desired that this program be so arranged as to provide the fleet with the necessary fighting units and auxiliaries as will make it as powerful and well balanced as possible at the end of this period.

JOSEPH DANIELS.

On October 12, 1915, the General Board submitted such a program, which provided for 10 dreadnaughts, 6 battle cruisers, 10 scouts, 50 destroyers, 9 fleet submarines, 58 coast submarines, and a number of fleet auxiliaries, the whole, including an appropriation for aviation and reserve ammunition, totaling $499,876,000. I offer here this letter, marked "D." [Reading:]

G. B. No. 420-2.
Confidential.

OCTOBER 12, 1915.

To: Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: Building program to be authorized within a period of five years in accordance with:
Reference: Secretary's letter No. Op-9 of October 7, 1915.

In accordance with the directions contained in the above-referenced letter, the General Board has drawn up a program which "will continue over a period of five years, with an expenditure of about $100,000,000 each year for five years, on new construction only"; the program to "be so arranged as to provide the fleet with the necessary fighting units and auxiliaries as will make it as powerful and well balanced as possible at the end of this period."

2. Omitting certain ships now nearing the end of their usefulness, the General Board estimates that at the end of the fiscal year 1921 the effective strength of the present Navy, including all ships now authorized, will be as follows:

TABLE 1.—*Ships of the present fleet remaining serviceable in 1922.*

Dreadnoughts, first line	17
Predreadnoughts, second line	13
Superannuated predreadnoughts, third line	9
Battle cruisers	0
Scouts	21
Destroyers	58
Fleet submarines	3
Coast submarines	72
Fuel ships, coal	10
Fuel ships, oil	3
Repair ships	2
Supply ships	4
Transports	4
Hospital ship	1
Mine ships	3
Destroyer tenders	2
Fleet submarine tender	1
Ammunition ships	0
Harbor-defense monitors	6
Harbor-defense battleships	3
Gunboats	22
River gunboats	2

3. The names of the ships of the Navy classified in accordance with the above list are hereto appended, marked "A."

4. The General Board is of the opinion that the $500,000,000 mentioned in the above reference should be so expended that at the end of the quinquennial period a well-ballanced fleet will have been authorized in which the ships of the several types will exist in the proportions suited to the geographic and strategic situation of the United States.

5. To accomplish this end the General Board recommends the authorization within the next five fiscal years, 1917, 1918, 1919, 1920, and 1921 of ships as given in the following table. To this table of ships has been added the sum of $7,000,000 for aircraft service and $11,000,000 for a reserve of ammunition. The last item is to establish a sufficient reserve for ships now in service or authorized. The necessity for it exists now without any reference to future shipbuilding.

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TABLE 2.—*Classification of new construction, with estimated cost.*

10 dreadnaughts, at $18,800,000	$188,000,000
6 battle cruisers, at $17,500,000	105,000,000
10 scouts, at $5,000,000	50,000,000
50 destroyers, at $1,360,000	68,000,000
9 fleet submarines, at $1,500,000	13,500,000
58 coast submarines, $650,000	37,700,000
3 fuel ships, oil, at $1,355,000	4,065,000
1 repair ship, at $2,051,000	2,051,000
1 transport, at $2,000,000	2,000,000
1 hospital ship, at $2,450,000	2,450,000
2 destroyer tenders, at $2,000,000	4,000,000
1 fleet submarine tender, at $1,510,000	1,510,000
2 ammunition ships, at $1,500,000	3,000,000
2 river gunboats, at $300,000	600,000
Total	481,876,000
Aircraft service	7,000,000
Reserve ammunition	11,000,000
Grand total	499,876,000

6. In order to admit of the expenditure of the sum of $500,000,000 upon the most favorable terms the General Board suggests that the appropriation for "new construction only" should be for $100,000,000 each year as a continuing appropriation. The General Board further recommends that the appropriation acts should authorize new construction each year during the quinquennial period about in accordance with the following table, but for the first year, 1917, it definitely recommends the items as given.

TABLE 3.—*Building program, 1917 to 1922.*

	First year, 1917.	Second year, 1918.	Third year, 1919.	Fourth year, 1920.	Fifth year, 1921.
Dreadnoughts	4	2	2	2	
Battle cruisers	3		1	2	
Scouts	4	2	1	3	
Destroyers	10	10	10	14	6
Fleet submarines	2	2	2	2	1
Coast submarines	20	10	10	10	8
Fuel ships, oil	1			2	
Repair ship				1	
Transports				1	
Hospital ship	1				
Destroyer tenders	1			1	
Fleet submarine tender				1	
Ammunition ships	1			1	
River gunboats	2				
Aircraft Service	$3,000,000	$1,000,000	$1,000,000	$1,000,000	$1,000,000
Reserve ammunition, first year	11,000				

7. The general board believes that this schedule provides the most needed ships at the earliest dates. Under such an arrangement the annual expenditures for new construction only would run in detail approximately as shown in appendix B.

8. The expenditures in appendix B and the unit prices set forth in table 2 are in accordance with estimates made by the Bureau of Construction and Repair, Navy Department, based upon current prices of labor and material. They are subject to change before the expiration of the quinquennial period. The board believes that prices of material are not unlikely to diminish in the future, particularly upon the conclusion of the present European war.

9. With a view of obtaining as large an addition to the Navy as possible from the total appropriation, the above building program should be revised, and if necessary, modified from year to year not only to take advantage of further developments of the present war and its professional lessons, but also to profit by the probable fall in prices.

GEORGE DEWEY.

The development of submarine warfare and the necessity for antisubmarine craft for our Navy after we entered the war as well

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as the adoption of a great merchant shipbuilding program to meet the submarine menace, prevented the commencement of the capital ships and many large auxiliaries authorized for the five-year program as planned, but after the war it was again taken up and is now progressing satisfactorily. The whole history of this matter is interesting and shows no lack of effort to prepare the fleet for any eventuality as soon as our change from a neutral to a war policy became possible.

18. On February 4, 1917, the general board forwarded a communication to the department, a plan of procedure to meet a possible condition of war with the Central European powers. I will ask your forbearance while I read it in order to show that the department was neither neglectful nor ignorant of the critical situation, as has been charged. The communication referred to is marked "E," and is as follows [reading]:

G. B. No. 425. Confidential. Serial No. 666.

FEBRUARY 4, 1917.

From: Senior member present.
To: Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: Steps to be taken to meet a possible condition of war with the Central European powers.

On account of existing conditions, the general board recommends that the following steps be taken to meet a possible condition of war with the Central European Powers:

1. Complete complements and allowances of all kinds, first of the A and B fleet, then of the C fleet, and naval districts.

2. Mobilize the A fleet in the Lower Chesapeake, and increase it immediately to the B fleet. (See Black Plan.)

3. Dock and repair all ships in reserve and ordinary that will be used.

4. Arrange for the supply of fuel to the fleet and stock all fuel depots to capacity.

5. Establish additional recruiting stations and increase personnel of the Navy and Marine Corps to the total number required to supply complements for all the ships built, building, and authorized, and to maintain shore establishments and naval-defense districts, including avaiation service, with 10 per cent additional for casualties as follows: Enlisted force—Navy, 150,000; Marines, 30,000; officers in the proportion prescribed by law.

6. Mobilize the naval districts, including the coast-guard and lighthouse services, and put patrol vessels, mine sweepers, etc., of the Atlantic coast districts, on their stations; no commercial vessels to be mobilized in the Pacific Coast districts at present.

7. Prepare to the utmost detail for the employment of mines along our coast as may be necessary

8. Prepare nets and other obstruction for submarines, ready for immediate use, at the Chesapeake Capes, Delaware Capes, Entrance to New York Bay, eastern entrance to Long Island Sound, Narragansett Bay, Panama Canal, and Guantanamo. Other places as their need becomes apparent. The General Board considers it of the utmost importance that net protection shall be immediately provided for the fleet during its mobilization in Chesapeake Bay.

9. Establish immediately the guards at all navy yards, magazines, radio stations, powder factories, munitions plants, bases, shipbuilding yards, and naval shore utilities in accordance with the mobilization plans.

10. Reduce the force of marines in Haiti and Santo Domingo to the smallest number that can maintain order there, transferring these men to the United States to perform necessary guard duty at navy yards, magazines, radio stations, shipbuilding plants, and to form cadres for the organization of new regiments as recruits are obtained. Organize the advanced base force and complete its equipment.

11. Leave in the Caribbean a sufficient number of light cruisers to keep a lookout for submarines in those waters and for the protection of our interests there. Protect the canal and Guantanamo as far as possible by the use of mines and where possible by monitors, submarines, and nets.

12. For the present use the greater part of the destroyer flotillas as patrol for submarines in the vicinity of the principal ports of entrances leading to them.

13. Base the submarines at canal, Guantanamo, and points along the coast in accordance with the Black Plan.

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14. Rush to completion all naval vessels building or authorized; also build up the Aviation Service as rapidly as possible.

15. Guard all bays and harbors on the coast of Maine to prevent their use as bases of supply. Patrol waters of Haiti, Santo Domingo, Porto Rico, and Danish West Indies, Cuban Coast Guard Service to assist in patrolling all bays and gulfs of the coast of Cuba.

16. Prepare to close entrances to all ports at night and discontinue or change such aids to navigation as may be necessary.

17. Organize a comprehensive system of intelligence service covering the whole theater of war in accordance with the plans of the office of Naval Intelligence.

18. Take possession of all interned vessels of war of central powers; also take control of all commercial vessels of central powers now in United States waters.

19. Place under surveillance all citizens of the central powers in the Navy or in Government employ in naval establishments and remove them from positions in which they may do possible harm.

20. Arm our merchant ships for purposes of defense.

21. In accordance with Black Plan, carry out the following:

(*a*) Issue proclamation prescribing defensive sea areas and put rules in regard to them in force.

(*b*) Issue proclamation prescribing press regulations and establishing censorship of cable and radio, including naval control of all commercial and private radio stations.

(*c*) Issue President's order in regard to visit and search, capture, etc.

22. And as most important, arrange, as soon as possible, plans of cooperation with the naval forces of the Allies for the joint protection of trans-Atlantic commerce and for offensive naval operations against the common enemy.

CHAS. J. BADGER.

On March 20, 1917, war being imminent, but we being still neutral, precautionary measures for the protection of American shipping were recommended. It is not long and I think should be read. It is as follows:

G. B. No. 425–A. (Serial No. 689.) Confidential.

MARCH 20, 1917.

From: Senior member present.
To: Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: Protection of American shipping.
Reference: Secretary of the Navy's confidential letter, March 20, 1917.

Of the measures advocated by the General Board in its letter of February 4, 1917, G. B. No. 425, Serial No. 666, especial attention is invited to the following which, bear directly upon the protection of our commerce in transit between the United States and Europe:

(*a*) Escort vessels to deep water from our ports and similarly from deep water to our ports.

(*b*) Arrange with British and French Governments for the convoy of our merchant ships through the barred zones.

(*c*) Merchant ships to proceed on high seas from points of leaving and receiving escorts, depending upon their guns for protection, and upon changes of course to follow alternate routes.

(*d*) Arrange with British and French Governments a code of signals to be used in directing merchant ships as to routes to be followed and points of meeting escorts.

(*e*) Establish a patrol of the Atlantic coast.

(*f*) Recruit up to the limit allowed by law for emergencies in order to provide crews for patrols and auxiliaries, and fill battleship complementswhich have been depleted to supply gun crews to merchant ships.

2. In order to obtain what the General Board regards as the greatest measure of protection to American lives and American shipping on the high seas the General Board invites attention to its letter March 20, 1917, B. G. No. 425, Serial No. 688, and of its previous letters of—

February 6, 1917, G. B. No. 425–1, Serial No. 553–b;
February 17, 1917, B. G. No. 425–1, Serial No. 672;
March 17, 1917, G. B. No. 425, Serial No. 683, on the same subject.

CHAS. J. BADGER.

On April 5, 1917, the country being then committed to war on the side of the Allies, though the declaration had not yet been made, a

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paper on the subject of "Assistance that United States can give Allies upon declaration of war," appended marked "G," was submitted. The recommendations are in effect those of February 4 already read to the committee. I will quote from the letter of April 5, as follows:

The General Board believes that the mission of our Navy when war is declared against Germany will best be determined by arrangement with the allied powers now engaged in war with that country. We should immediately obtain from the allied powers their views as to how we can best be of assistance to them and as far as possible conform our preparations and acts to their present needs, always bearing in mind that should peace be made by the powers now at war, we must also be prepared to meet our enemies single handed. We should not depend upon the defensive but prepare for and conduct a vigorous offensive.

* * * * * * *

"There is no doubt that, if desired by the Allies, sending immediately a number of destroyers to cooperate with the allied powers in the barred zone would greatly add to the moral effect, at home and abroad, of the participation of the United States in the war. The number of this type which may eventually be sent abroad will depend upon the development of a German offensive on this side of the Atlantic, our immediate needs, and the increase of this type in our Navy."

This letter "G" is in effect the reiteration of the law of February 4, "Preparations for War," from which I have quoted. I wish to say that this letter came back to the General Board with this indorsement on it:

"The recommendations contained in the General Board's letter, G. B. No. 425 dated April 5, 1917, have been received and action has been taken, as follows: All recommendations acted upon favorably and measures taken in accordance therewith as far as possible.

"By direction of the Secretary:

"F. H. SCHOFIELD."

That is signed by Capt. Schofield, who was attached to Operations, and later in London.

The letter referred to is here printed in full in the record, as follows:

G. B. No. 425 (serial No. 699). Confidential.
From: Senior member present.
To: Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: Assistance that United States can give Allies upon declaration of war.
References: (*a*) General Board's letter, G. B. No. 425 (serial No. 666), February 4, 1917; steps to be taken to meet a possible condition of war with the Central European Powers; (*b*) General Board's letter, G. B. No. 425–1 (serial No. 553–b), February 6, 1917; Black plan, tactical problem I; (*c*) General Board's letter, G. B. No. 425–1 (serial No. 672), February 17, 1917; solution of problem, Black; (*d*) General Board's letter, G. B. No. 425 (serial No. 683), March 17, 1917; estimate of the situation as to system of patrol and sweeping best adapted for protection of shipping off port of New York; (*e*) General Board's letter, G. B. No. 425 (serial No. 689), March 20, 1917; protection of American shipping.

The General Board believes that the mission of our Navy when war is declared against Germany will best be determined by arrangement with the Allied Powers now engaged in war with that country. We should immediately obtain from the Allied Powers their views as to how we can best be of assistance to them and as far as possible conform our preparations and acts to their present needs, always bearing in mind that should peace be made by the powers now at war we must also be prepared to meet our enemies single handed. We should not depend upon the defensive but prepare for and conduct a vigorous offensive.

2. This recommendation has already been made by the General Board, references (*a*) and (*e*), and is as follows:

"And as most important, arrange, as soon as possible, plans of cooperation with the naval forces of the Allies for the joint protection of trans-Atlantic commerce and for offensive naval operations against the common enemy."

The General Board wishes to emphasize strongly the necessity of such preliminary arrangement, in order that economy of effort and concentration of purpose may become effective as early as possible.

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3. The General Board suggests that consideration be given to the following measures in anticipation of cooperation with the Allies:

(*a*) Protect shipping proceeding to and from our ports from submarine or other attack.

(*b*) Prevent the use of unfrequented bays or harbors on our own coasts in the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean from use by submarines as bases.

(*c*) Take over as far as may be desired and practicable the patrol of trade routes in the western, north, and south Atlantic and eastern Pacific, and prevent the exit of enemy merchant ships now finding asylum in the South American ports.

(*d*) There is no doubt that, if desired by the Allies, sending immediately a number of destroyers to cooperate with the allied powers in the barred zones would greatly add to the moral effect, at home and abroad, of the participation of the United States in the war. The numbers of this type which may eventually be sent abroad will depend upon the development of a German offensive on this side of the Atlantic, our immediate needs, and the increase of this type in our Navy.

(*e*) Should United States troops be sent to Europe it will be necessary to escort the transports from shore to shore. At present we are short of transports and convoying vessels, and cooperation in this duty with the Allies would be necessary.

(*f*) The transportation of supplies for the Entente Allies is of the first importance. Requisition all enemy merchant ships detained in our ports, and seize enemy converted ships interned, repair them and place them in service as transports or supply ships.

(*g*) Mobilize the shipbuilding industries, both commercial and governmental so that the energies of the Nation be extended in the directions needed to provide vessels to combat submarines, to escort merchant shipping, to replace shipping destroyed, and for other necessary additions to the fleet.

(*h*) Keep constantly in view the possibility of the United States being in the not distant future compelled to conduct a war single handed against some of the present belligerents and steadily increase the strength of the fighting line, large as well as small vessels, doing this with as little interference with the rapid building of destroyers and other small craft for the Navy and cargo ships for the merchant marine as possible.

(*i*) Manufacture the number of medium-caliber guns which will be needed for merchant shipping and patrol craft.

CHAS. J. BADGER.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, June 8, 1917.

Subject: 699 assistance that United States can give Allies upon declaration of war. Memorandum for the General Board.

The recommendations contained in the General Board's letter, G. B. No. 425, dated April 5, 1917, have been received and action has been taken as follows: All recommendations acted upon favorably and measures taken in accordance therewith so far as possible.

By direction of the Secretary.

F. H. SCHOFIELD.

Admiral BADGER. On the same date, April 5, 1917, the General Board, not being aware that Admiral Sims was then en route to London, recommended sending to England and France commissions of United States naval officers to collect information at first hand as to the true situation and further suggested that the British and French Governments be requested to send experienced officers to the United States to give information. The officers recommended as heads of the American commissions were Rear Admiral T. S. Rodgers to France, and Rear Admiral W. S. Sims to Great Britain. I offer here the letter marked "H," which is as follows. [Reading:]

G. B. No. 425–A. (Serial No. 700.) Confidential.

APRIL 5, 1917.

From: Senior member present.
To: Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: Detail of a commission of officers to Great Britain and France.

In view of the existing state of war and the value to us of definite technical information as to methods of naval operations developed by the allied powers in the

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present war, the General Board believes that steps should be immediately taken to get all the practical information possible for our guidance in our own operations and in order that we may heartily and efficiently cooperate with the Allies.

2. The General Board therefore recommends that negotiations be immediately entered into with Great Britain and France to send experienced naval officers to the United States to give information, and also obtain permission for two commissions of our own naval officers to visit England and France, respectively, so that they may as rapidly as possible acquire the desired information at first hand.

3. The main points on which information is desired are as follows:

(*a*) Methods of placing nets, mines, and obstructions, and their character;
(*b*) Methods of mine sweeping and countermining;
(*c*) Methods of submarine detection, chasing, capture, and destruction;
(*d*) Types of antisubmarine vessels and of aircraft for all naval purposes;
(*e*) Methods of patrol, escort, and convoy for the protection of both merchant shipping and naval forces against submarine and mine menace;
(*f*) Methods of communication actually employed in antisubmarine warfare;
(*g*) Methods and codes to be employed by our forces in cooperating with those of the Allies;
(*h*) Best methods and manner of cooperation and nature of service to be rendered by our forces, particularly in escorting merchant shipping.

4. The General Board recommends that the commission be constituted of officers on the active list, as follows:

GREAT BRITAIN.

One rear admiral; five lieutenant commanders or lieutenants; one captain; one naval constructor; two commanders.

FRANCE.

One rear admiral; two lieutenant commanders or lieutenants; one captain; one naval constructor; one commander.

The General Board recommends this number of officers so that the work can be divided up and expedited and believes that if this number of officers is detailed the information desired can be obtained in about two months.

CHAS. J. BADGER.

APRIL 5, 1917.

Memorandum for the Chief of Naval Operations.

Names suggested for commissions (to be sent abroad to obtain information as to methods of prosecuting naval war abroad. See G. B. Serial No. 700):

FRANCE.

Rear Admiral T. S. Rodgers, Capt. H. H. Hough, Commander David F. Sellers, Lieut. H. H. Crosby, Lieut. Wadleigh Capehart, and Naval Constructor H. G. Gilmor.

ENGLAND.

Rear Admiral W. S. Sims, Capt. W. V. Pratt, Commander Yates Stirling, Commander F. H. Clark, Lieut. F. A. Daubin, Lieut. G. L. Caskey, Lieut. S. C. Hooper, and Naval Constructor E. S. Land.

(Sent in accordance with your request.)

CHAS. J. BADGER.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, June 9, 1917.

Subject: 700 detail of commission of officers to Great Britain and France.

Memorandum for the general board:

The recommendations contained in the general board's letter, G. B. No. 425–A, dated April 5, 1917, have been ——— this date and action has been taken, as follows: Officers are making investigations.

By direction of the Secretary:

F. H. SCHOFIELD.

At his time (April 5) much information, most of it of an alarming character, as to the chances of success of the allied forces both afloat and ashore, was coming in. On April 11 Vice Admirals Browning

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and Grasset, respectively, commanding the British and French cruiser and patrol squadron in the western Atlantic, with members of their staffs, met in the general board room in conference with the Secretary of the Navy, the Assistant Secretary, and a considerable number of our leading naval officers, to discuss the war situation and to set forth the ways which in their opinion the United States could best render assistance to the Allies. While a discussion of the general subject was had the British and French admirals were particularly concerned as to the patrol of the east coast of North and South America for which their forces were considered inadequate. My recollection of this conference is that everything asked for was heartily accorded and steps were immediately taken to carry the agreement arrived at into effect.

23. On May 2 Rear Admiral de Chair, Royal Navy, and Commodore Gaunt, Royal Navy, naval attaché at Washington, appeared before the board to give information and their opinions as to the best methods of cooperation between the Allies and ourselves. Rear Admiral de Chair had been sent specially by the British Admiralty to fully acquaint the Navy Department with the naval situation abroad from the British point of view.

24. On May 3 Vice Admiral Chocheprat, French Navy, and the French naval attaché, appeared to discuss matters of cooperation between our Navy and those of the Allies, principally the French.

25. The naval attachés from all the Allied nations were, after the declaration of war, extremely active and were ready at all times to give information from their respective Governments or to immediately try to obtain any that was desired by our department.

26. Later Vice Admiral Grant, Royal Navy, commander in chief of the British North Atlantic cruiser squadron, brought his flagship to Washington and remained for several months as a liaison officer between the British Admiralty and our Navy Department.

27. From start to finish of the war the Navy Department suffered from no lack of accurate information as to the progress of the war from sources outside of our own information gatherers. (See the general board's summary of the situation May 3, 1917, appended, marked "I.")

The summary above referred to is here printed in the record as follows:

G. B. No. 425. (Serial No. 724.) Confidential.

MAY 3, 1917.

From: Senior member present.
To: Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: Further recommendations as to the employment of patrol draft to meet submarines.
References: general board letter, G. B. No. 425, of April 28, 1917 (serial No. 721). Subject: Immediate steps to be taken for efficient cooperation against submarines.

Since forwarding the above reference, the general board has obtained from the senior naval members of the British and French commissions now in this country, additional specific information in regard to the submarine situation; the measures which the British and French are now taking; and suggestions as to the measures which the United States may best take to supplement British and French endeavor, which is now a probable maximum.

2. The General Board has also interviewed the officer in charge of naval districts, in order that concrete and specific information might be the basis of the recommendations which the General Board feels called upon to make in the present great emergency, and as supplementary to its discussion of the urgency of the present situation, in reference (a), copy appended.

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3. The statements of the senior naval members of the British and French commission before this board May 2 and 3 may be briefly summarized as follows:

(*a*) The number of patrol vessels, both British and French, now available or in prospect, is not sufficient to meet the submarine campaign waged by Germany.

(*b*) The present rate of destruction of food carriers to England and France, unless it can be reduced in the next two months, will result in starving both England and France.

(*c*) England will be starved out before France.

(*d*) The need for patrol craft is immediate; the critical period is now; and in the next two months the fate of England may be decided.

(*e*) Unless armed patrol craft, destroyers, and any surface craft able to keep the sea are dispatched in the next few weeks, they will be too late to prevent disaster to England first, and to France, second.

(*f*) Fifty armed surface craft dispatches now would be "a real help." Two hundred sent now would do much to prevent the disaster which threatens England, especially.

(*g*) The vessels most desired are destroyers; then sea-keeping craft armed with 5-inch, 4-inch, or 3-inch guns, capable of a sustained cruising speed of 13 knots; then any armed sea-keeping craft to relieve British patrol craft of greater speed. Ocean-going tugs are also most valuable for patrol work and for towing into port damaged vessels.

(*h*) In regard to other assistance, Great Britain needs now two mine layers of 18 knots speed and a large number of Navy defense automatic mines.

(*i*) The belief was expressed that Germany was building submarines faster than they were being destroyed.

4. The officer in charge of naval districts, who appeared before the General Board, stated that approximately the following numbers of listed vessels could be armed and used for patrol in British and French waters if the Government had and exercised the authority to take them over for naval purposes:

Seagoing tugs, armed with 3 to 5 inch guns	50
Yachts, armed with 3 to 5 inch guns	30
Steam fishing vessels, armed with 3 to 5 inch guns	50
Steam trawlers, armed with 3-inch guns	10
Total	140

Approximate number of Government vessels available for patrol in British waters:

Destroyers	36
Naval converted yachts and gunboats	15
Revenue cutters	10
Total	61
Grand total	201

5. The Bureau of Ordnance states that there are in service the following naval guns, thus indicating that there are sufficient guns to arm any patrol vessels that it is practicable to fit out:

3-inch	864
4-inch	491
5-inch	673
6-inch	318
Total	2,346

6. The General Board is convinced that the emergency exists now; that the time element is of overwhelming importance; that every effort should be made, first, to meet or prevent submarine attack, and, second, as of less importance, to supply additional food and munition carriers, and that sending 200 or more patrol craft to Europe in the next two months will go far toward preventing the collapse of Great Britain.

7. The General Board, in view of the above considerations, and those more fully stated in reference (*a*), makes the following recommendations and urges with all the emphasis at its command that action to carry them out be immediate, and that such action be prosecuted uninterruptedly, to the exclusion of other war preparations if necessary, having constantly in view the statement of the naval members of the British and French commissions that Great Britain's fate may be decided in the next two months by the submarine campaign alone.

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(*a*) Concentrate department effort upon the passage at once of legislation, if needed, to enable the President to take over and utilize the yachts, tugs, and other craft necessary for the above patrol duty.

(*b*) Take over, arm, and fit out such patrol craft, in the least possible time, utilizing the full resources of navy yards and private plants to expedite the work, postponing other work which in any way interferes therewith.

(*c*) Dispatch at once at least 36 destroyers for patrol work in British and French waters, accompanied by repair ships, and provide for the necessary fuel and supply ships at stated intervals.

(*d*) Establish a base at a point on the Irish coast for destroyers, from which they may operate to patrol shipping routes. The senior naval member of the British commission suggests Berehaven, on Bantry Bay, Ireland, as the most suitable location and possessing all the facilities necessary for a base. Also as the patrol craft become available establish a base at Brest.

(*e*) Send in advance 100 enlisted men and necessary officers to Great Britain and the same number to France for instruction in mine sweeping.

(*f*) Manufacture naval mines of the anchored automatic type for use in British waters in the number to be agreed upon with the British naval authorities.

(*g*) Fit out and dispatch two mines layers, 18 knots speed.

8. The General Board wishes to reiterate with the utmost earnestness that it believes disaster to Great Britain can only be prevented by immediate action as recommended above.

CHAS. J. BADGER.

Admiral BADGER. In fact, the department fully understood the situation at all times. The action that it took is now a matter under discussion. Before and after the war commenced the direction of the operations of the fleet was in the hands of some of the ablest officers in the service, who were in a position to obtain and did obtain a broader view and more complete information as to the whole situation (for the Navy Department was not the only one to be considered in the operations of the war) than was possible at any other place than the seat of government. Since that direction and operation resulted in complete success, it seems to me to be a waste of time to discuss at this late date the differences of opinion as to what should or should not have been done in the early days of the war, particularly as from it I can see no possible good to the Navy or to the country.

29. Finally, as to the statement that the failure of the United States to immediately send its full force of destroyers and antisubmarine craft to the war zone prolonged the war four months and occasioned the loss to the Allies of 2,500,000 tons of shipping, 500,000 lives, and $5,000,000,000. This is a very grave charge, but one that I believe to be utterly unfounded. It is in my opinion based upon an entire misapprehension of the influence of the enemy submarines upon the duration of the war.

30. Looking broadly at the progress and conduct of the Great War, the blockade stands out as one of the most salient and decisive features.

31. From almost the day war was declared by Great Britain an effective sea blockade was instituted and maintained against the Central Powers to the very end. At no time did the development of submarine warfare loosen the grip of this blockade, which worked silently, slowly, and unceasingly to exhaust the material war resources of the enemy.

32. Enemy submarines, it is true, destroyed an enormous amount of ocean tonnage, supplies of all kinds, a considerable number of lives, and placed the Allied cause in great peril, but with all their efforts they failed to break that strangling blockade or do sufficient damage

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to extort a favorable peace proposition and so, in the end, failed of their purpose.

33. The submarine operations added nothing to the Central Powers' material strength. The submarines did not open their ports to food or raw materials or other necessities for the prosecution of successful warfare. Actually the Central Powers were no better off, internally, with submarine operations in full blast than without them. Unless the submarines could so exhaust the Allied resources that men and supplies could not be furnished in sufficient volume to the fighting fronts, they had no decisive effect upon the progress or duration of the war.

34. Laboring under the handicap of our strict neutrality, creation of our new armies was not commenced until after war was declared, though doubtless plans had been previously made for hastening a general mobilization when the time should come. Under the best of conditions, it took time to recruit, equip, organize, and give some preliminary training to the men destined for foreign service. It was not until a good many months after the declaration of war that we began to send our troops abroad in great numbers, though Admiral Gleaves escorted the first convoy of regular troops across the ocean in the latter part of June, 1917. By good management—it was not luck—we got a little more than 2,000,000 abroad in the course of a year and a half without loss and despite the submarines.

35. It is important to realize that the number of men we sent abroad in the time was phenomenal, and was not limited by lack of over-seas transportation. In the emergency, transport was found and utilized, and so far as the submarines are concerned, they can not be said to have even checked the ocean transit of our troops. It was the arrival on the continent of fresh troops from America in increasing and seemingly unlimited numbers, that finally broke the morale of the enemy, already near the breaking point from four years of strenuous fighting and the material exhaustion due to the blockade.

36. His submarine campaign failed to relieve the blockade, failed either to check the flow of troops from the United States as soon as made ready to cross the ocean or to stop delivery of the necessary supplies for the use of the armies at the front. It did not, in fact, delay the progress of the war, which, as was already predicted, had to be fought out on the Western front, though it came measurably near doing so.

37. The enemy fought until he was exhausted, materially as well as morally. Nothing that the submarine did contributed toward relieving the exhaustion of materials. They weakened the resources of the Allies, but fortunately not to the point where they could not support their civil populations and provide liberally for their armies in all their needs. The doors were closed to the enemy and nothing could enter. The submarine failed to open those doors even a little way and collapse ensued. I am of the opinion that the absence from the submarine danger zone, for a few weeks or even months, of a comparatively small number of United States destroyers or other anti-submarine craft in the early days of the war had no effect whatever upon its duration.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not recall in any of the testimony that has been given before the committee so far, any reflection upon the activities or the efficiency of the General Board. The question is whether

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the plans that you did give out—did give to the department—were followed out. Now, you have given us a number of plans that were made by the board and were submitted to the department prior to the outbreak of hostilities. What action was taken on those plans?

Admiral BADGER. I have reason to believe that in the majority of cases favorable and immediate action was taken. I have read here, for instance, in one of these papers, the indorsement of the department, coming from operations, saying that all of the recommendations that were possible had been carried out. I believe that on the whole the plans were carried out by the executive officers in accordance, as far as possible, with the recommendations of the General Board.

The CHAIRMAN. As I understand it, the General Board is advisory.

Admiral BADGER. Absolutely, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And until its recommendations are accepted by the Navy Department, they do not have any effect?

Admiral BADGER. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that correct?

Admiral BADGER. No; there is no executive power in the General Board.

The CHAIRMAN. And who accepts them?

Admiral BADGER. The Secretary of the Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. In your appendix marked "A" I think you refer to certain detailed recommendations that were made?

Admiral BADGER. Yes; I gave in that a list of the advisory papers either sent originally or in answer to requests, or in accordance with its routine duty, to the Secretary, with regard to the preparations for and the conduct of the war. I introduced that paper more for the purpose of showing that there was no lack of effort to keep the department informed, and that the department was informed. What action the department took afterwards depended upon the opinions of the executive authorities.

The CHAIRMAN. Was it the custom of the department to notify the General Board when its recommendations were accepted?

Admiral BADGER. Of late years; yes. But during the very busy times that came to the department, of the war, that custom was honored more often in the breach than in the observance. However, we were informed as to how things were going, because the ex officio members of the General Board included the Chief of Operations, the Director of Naval Intelligence, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and the president of the War College. Admiral Sims was the president of the War College immediately preceding the war, but after the war was declared he was, as you know, abroad, and they appointed no one in his place. From these ex officio members, from direct communication from the Secretary or the Assistant Secretary or the chiefs of bureaus, we knew in a general way, and sometimes particularly, how our recommendations were going, and as a rule they were executed where it was possible to do so, I should say.

The CHAIRMAN. But you have no knowledge that they were actually accepted by the department, except in cases where you have informed us that a letter came accepting them?

Admiral BADGER. No; I have no official written statements to that effect.

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The CHAIRMAN. And until they were accepted officially by the department, they were not orders of the department. They were simply advisory matters that can be used or not as the department should see fit?

Admiral BADGER. That is true; and these papers have been introduced to show that plans and preparations were made.

The CHAIRMAN. Precisely; that the General Board did everything that it could?

Admiral BADGER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you say that you have no knowledge that the matters in Appendix A were really accepted by the department?

Admiral BADGER. Oh, I do not say that for all those numerous papers. I say that in a number of cases the——

The CHAIRMAN. But, Admiral, it is very easy to find out whether they were or were not officially accepted.

Admiral BADGER. I think it would be easy to do it.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you get the record in each case—any official acceptance that was made?

Admiral BADGER. Yes; I can make a note of that and do that.

The CHAIRMAN. In each case.

Admiral BADGER. In each case on Appendix A?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; and state in each case who signed the acceptance.

Admiral BADGER. Yes. But I want to make it plain that the fact of not having received that official notification of the fact that it had been approved, or what action had been taken at that time, will not show that it was not accepted and was not carried out, because as I have said everybody was very busy, we were sending officers away from the department, and papers of that kind came in and were acted upon, and they did not go to the trouble of sending back to say, "We approve of that paper," but they took it and acted upon it.

The CHAIRMAN. They may not have sent back the approval, but they would have to approve them in order to make them official, would they not? Otherwise, they were mere advice.

Admiral BADGER. I do not think so, Mr. Chairman. Remember, I was not in the executive department. I think you could find that out from others, from Capt. Pratt, when he comes up, for instance. I think that the probable method that was adopted was, when one of these papers came in, ordinarily they went through the Division of Operations, but if they got to the Secretary I think what he did was to say to the Chief of Operations or to one of the aids, "Take that paper and carry it out"; and that was the way that was done. We did not hear of it.

The CHAIRMAN. But you have no means of knowing that that was done?

Admiral BADGER. I can not swear that that was done, but that is the way I believe it was done.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, in the same way with Appendix B, a letter of the General Board dated March 13, 1915, approved and put into effect immediately. You say that was approved and put into effect immediately. It was approved by the Secretary of the Navy?

Admiral BADGER. It was approved probably from the Secretary's office; from Operations, I take it. Capt. Schofield was one of the

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officers in the Secretary's office, and I think was principally employed in the planning section, and later was sent over and became one of the principal officers of the planning section of Admiral Sims's in London.

The CHAIRMAN. And with authority to sign the paper?

Admiral BADGER. With authority to sign by direction of the Secretary.

The CHAIRMAN. And that was sufficient?

Admiral BADGER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. So that everything that was done that way, anything that was approved officially, made the recommendation one of the orders of the department; is that right?

Admiral BADGER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. So that Appendix B, this letter from the General Board dated March 13, 1915, was approved?

Admiral BADGER. Oh, that was approved and carried into effect. We know that, because the results of it came to the General Board quarterly thereafter in the reports.

The CHAIRMAN. I see that this letter provides that various bureaus shall make monthly reports.

Admiral BADGER. No; quarterly reports.

The CHAIRMAN. Quarterly reports?

Admiral BADGER. But one month after that letter was approved, to start; one month after.

The CHAIRMAN. To the department; and "that copies of these reports be forwarded by the department to the General Board for the purpose of keeping the war plans up to date."

Admiral BADGER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. That was done?

Admiral BADGER. That was done; and further, as I have stated, the General Board commented upon those reports and pointed out where the progress had not been made, or the reverse, where distinct progress had been shown, and sent them back to the Secretary's office; so that he had a paper that had been critically scanned by the General Board, showing how that particular bureau or office was progressing.

The CHAIRMAN. The general recommendations of this letter were followed out?

Admiral BADGER. Yes, sir; absolutely.

The CHAIRMAN. You know that?

Admiral BADGER. I know that.

The CHAIRMAN. Appendix E referred to a plan to "meet a possible condition of war with the Central European Powers." This was submitted on February 4, 1917. What was done with that recommendation of the General Board?

Admiral BADGER. As I have said, so far as I know, no official acknowledgment of that was returned to the General Board; but from conversation, and with the knowledge of what was going on, I believe that the majority of these things were carried out.

The CHAIRMAN. This had to do with the so-called three-year war program—building program—did it not? It is referred to on the last page of your testimony.

Admiral BADGER. Appendix C was the letter of the Secretary of the Navy to the General Board suggesting a five-year building program, to cost $500,000,000, $100,000,000 annually, for new con-

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struction; and the letter marked "D," of October 12, 1915, gives the action of the General Board in conformity with this letter, and substantially the bill was passed by Congress for that five-year program in 1916.

The CHAIRMAN. It was not made a five-year program, however, was it?

Admiral BADGER. Well, there were variations, but I think it was called a three-year program eventually, when they got it.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral BADGER. But the number of ships and the types of ships were substantially unchanged. Now, as I stated, during the whole war, so far as we were concerned, we had to turn to other construction, to the construction principally of anti-submarine craft, and the three-year program was held in abeyance because we had not the facilities. But after the war the Congress began to take the matter up.

The CHAIRMAN. The shipbuilding facilities had to be utilized for other purposes?

Admiral BADGER. For other purposes.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you had no official acceptance of Appendix D?

Admiral BADGER. No, sir; I do not think that we had any official acceptance.

The CHAIRMAN. But you think it was substantially followed out?

Admiral BADGER. It was absolutely followed out; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It states here that "on March 20, 1917, war being imminent but we being still neutral, precautionary measures for the protection of American shipping were recommended." Now, can you tell me what was done in regard to that recommendation? Was it officially accepted?

Admiral BADGER. I have no official acceptance of the paper, but I believe that every one of these recommendations was carried out; but Capt. Pratt can testify about that, as he had the execution, either directly or under the Chief of Operations, of these various recommendations.

The CHAIRMAN. And do you know when the various recommendations were carried out?

Admiral BADGER. I think they were taken up almost immediately, in those cases. There were some that were not possible. There were some things that required legislation by Congress. There were some cases where legislation came afterwards, that had to be obtained. But, in general, the recommendations were carried out as soon as possible.

The CHAIRMAN. One of the recommendations is to arrange with the British and French Governments for the convoys of merchant ships through the danger zone.

Admiral BADGER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Sims' testimony shows that there was great delay in adopting the convoy system.

Admiral BADGER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Apparently you recommended it on March 26th.

Admiral BADGER. We then were not at war, when that paper was written. We could not send our own men-of-war to convoy our ships throughout——

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The CHAIRMAN. Certainly not, but it says here that it was brought to the attention of the department, and you say that it was followed as quickly as it was available after we entered the war.

Admiral BADGER. Exactly. Now, with regard to the convoy system, the submarine was a new weapon. It possessed the quality of invisibility. It was believed for more than three years of the war, or very nearly three years of the war, that to gather merchant ships into groups would give an opportunity for the submarine to attack them, much greater or more fatal to the shipping than to disperse the ships throughout the zone; and you will find in Admiral Sims testimony as late, I think, as June of 1917, a statement to this effect, that "up to the present time the dispersion of merchant shipping throughout the danger zone is considered here the best policy," and it was not until later, until a month or two months after our entry into the war, that a trial convoy was established by the British, and I think it was a South African convoy which they brought up through the Channel. and having succeeded with that, then they proceeded to put a convoy system into effect. What the General Board did was really to recommend the convoy system three months before the British adopted it at all.

The CHAIRMAN. What date was that?

Admiral BADGER. That was about March 20.

The CHAIRMAN. Three months before it was finally put into operation?

Admiral BADGER. Before it was put into operation abroad. It took the French and the British—the Allies—three years to determine that the convoy system would be a good thing to adopt.

The CHAIRMAN. But you do not know whether the adoption was done on account of this recommendation of the board?

Admiral BADGER. Oh, no; I have not the slightest idea that it was. They never knew anything about this recommendation. That convoy system was adopted because the other system failed, and they were willing to try anything they could.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you do not know whether the various things recommended in this report were adopted on account of the making of this report or whether they were adopted in the ordinary routine process of the war?

Admiral BADGER. No; that information will have to be obtained through the Division of Operations.

The CHAIRMAN. And you received no official acceptance?

Admiral BADGER. Not in the majority of these cases.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, in regard to the next appendix, the paper on the subject of property of United States citizens on board of American ships on the high seas?

Admiral BADGER. This Appendix F is merely renewing a part of the recommendations of the general letter of February 4, and it recommends for the protection of our commerce in transit between the United States and Europe that arrangements be made to escort vessels to deep water from our ports, outgoing, and similarly from deep water to our ports, incoming.

The CHAIRMAN. What action was taken on this report, if any?

Admiral BADGER. I have only the general knowledge that we did escort our vessels, as soon as it was practicable, to deep water. Again, that is for the executive department to state, and I have no

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doubt that they can give you a perfectly satisfactory answer—a definite answer.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, the next is a paper on the subject of "assistance that United States can give Allies upon declaration of war." That is "G."

Admiral BADGER. Yes, sir. That paper bears on it the memorandum which I have already read, from Capt. Schofield, stating that all the recommendations contained in this paper have been acted upon favorably and measures taken in accordance therewith as far as possible.

The CHAIRMAN. You consider that an acceptance?

Admiral BADGER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. "As far as possible." How far does that qualify?

Admiral BADGER. For that I must refer you to Operations.

The CHAIRMAN. That is, it might or might not mean that the recommendations were followed?

Admiral BADGER. Well, I suppose that if you take it in that point of view; but I happen to know that in most of these statements it was done.

The CHAIRMAN. Was it done immediately?

Admiral BADGER. As soon as practicable, I believe; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. But you have no knowledge of just when it was done?

Admiral BADGER. No; it would not come to me.

The CHAIRMAN. On May 3 you made a summary of the situation, which is in Appendix I.

Admiral BADGER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Was that officially accepted by the department?

Admiral BADGER. I never heard from it officially.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know whether the provisions of that were adopted at once?

Admiral BADGER. No, I do not. But I do know that on all the general lines we began dispatching——

The CHAIRMAN. In many respects that report coincides with Admiral Sims's recommendations, does it not?

Admiral BADGER. Yes, it does. In fact all of these reports do.

The CHAIRMAN. That bears out Admiral Sims's contention about the grave danger of the submarine menace, and the importance of sending our vessels abroad as soon as possible to meet it.

Admiral BADGER. The information was the same from the foreign people on this side as it was from Admiral Sims, in effect. Admiral Sims's opinion was perhaps more voluminous, but the real situation was in the possession of the Navy Department without regard, or practically without regard, to what came from abroad.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you given any information about Admiral Sims's recommendations, from abroad?

Admiral BADGER. Yes; many if not all of his recommendations, telegrams, and cablegrams, came to the General Board.

The CHAIRMAN. So that in making this report Admiral Sims's recommendations were consulted?

Admiral BADGER. That was a part of the information of the General Board.

The CHAIRMAN. Was not that the most authoritative information you had on hand at that time?

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Admiral BADGER. I did not so consider it. I rather preferred the information of the people who were directly concerned, such as Admiral de Chair, who made the greatest impression upon me personally, and Admiral Browning from England.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Browning?

Admiral BADGER. Admiral Browning also.

The CHAIRMAN. And in regard to Admiral Browning you have stated as follows:

While a discussion of the general subject was had the British and French admirals were particularly concerned as to the patrol of the east coast of North and South America for which their forces were considered inadequate. My recollection of this conference is that everything asked for was heartily accorded and steps were immediately taken to carry the agreement arrived at into effect.

Admiral BADGER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. That was of more relative importance than the submarine situation, was it?

Admiral BADGER. No, not in the case of Browning; although the main situation and the question of submarines, and the submarine menace, was discussed.

The CHAIRMAN. But it was not very important, according to your recollection, was it?

Admiral BADGER. At that particular meeting it was important, and I was concerned because it was their duty to look out for the patrol of the eastern Atlantic. What they wanted us to do was to give assistance there for the moment; so that to them, for the moment, that was the most important thing.

The CHAIRMAN. So that when you say you depended upon the information you got especially from Admiral Browning, you do not refer to the information about patrolling the east coast of North and South America, but you——

Admiral BADGER. No; but I said Admiral de Chair was the man that made the greatest impression upon me. He came in May. Do not misunderstand me, Mr. Chairman, to say that we did not give full weight to and appreciate the value of the information that was furnished to us from our people abroad; but I thought that we got a closer idea of the British view of the situation from the British themselves than we could get from our people.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, one of the witnesses testified that there was very little talk at this meeting of April 11, of any great urgency in the submarine situation.

Admiral BADGER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Now I want to know whether it was the talk about the urgency of that situation at that meeting where Admiral Grasset and Admiral Browning appeared, that gave you your information about the gravity of the submarine menace?

Admiral BADGER. I think that the gravity of the situation was touched upon by these officers, and touched upon very strongly.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Mayo bears out that statement, that it was touched upon very strongly.

Admiral BADGER. Very strongly, yes. But those particular men were interested in their duty that was assigned to them, and that was the protection of British and allied commerce against raiders upon the east coast of the Americas.

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The CHAIRMAN. Then, in general, you would state that the British officers who were over here and who gave us information about the submarine situation gave practically the same information that Admiral Sims gave?

Admiral BADGER. Yes; I should say that.

The CHAIRMAN. And bore out his recommendations?

Admiral BADGER. Yes. Much if it was prior to Admiral Sims's statement. That is to say, he elaborated very much upon that later.

The CHAIRMAN. So that even prior to Admiral Sims's statement the department was aware of the critical condition on the other side; and the General Board, as well?

Admiral BADGER. The department was aware at all times of the real situation. What they did to meet that situation was carried out after a study of the situation and the belief of the people charged with that duty that the steps they were taking were the proper steps to meet that condition abroad.

The CHAIRMAN. What steps did the General Board take after the outbreak of the European war in 1914, and prior to these reports that you have given us, in recommending more preparedness to the United States Navy?

Admiral BADGER. Our recommendations were largely, in those cases, with regard to the building program. You gentlemen know the difficulties of pushing through a considerable building program. The question of money and other questions come in that do not affect the General Board. The recommendations are made rather from the military needs, and that point of view, than from the other points that have to be taken into consideration; the financial needs of the country and other necessities that do not affect us for our recommendations.

Now, up to 1914 we had no knowledge that war was likely to take place in the immediate future. It came as a surprise.

The CHAIRMAN. Up to August, 1914?

Admiral BADGER. Up to August, 1914. It came as a surprise. Of course it was known that conditions were very much strained abroad, but still we hoped that there would not be any war, and it was a surprise when in 1914 war was suddenly precipitated. Suppose I give you a summary here of the recommendations for preparation, going back to 1906.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Admiral BADGER. The General Board recommended two battleships, two scout cruisers, four destroyers, four torpedo boats, and a number of smaller craft that it is not necessary to enumerate—auxiliaries mostly. The department recommended two battleships, two scout cruisers, and four destroyers, and four torpedo boats, practically the same that the General Board had recommended. But Congress authorized one battleship and two destroyers. That is all we got out of that recommendation.

In 1907, for 1909, the General Board recommended 4 battleships, 4 scout cruisers, 10 destroyers, and 4 submarines. The department substantially repeated that recommendation, 4 battleships, 4 scout cruisers, 10 destroyers, 4 submarines.

Congress gave us 2 battleships, 10 destroyers, and 8 submarines. They cut us a good deal, there—more than half.

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In 1908, for 1910, the General Board recommended 4 battleships, 4 scout cruisers, 10 destroyers, 4 submarines.

Congress gave us 2 battleships, 5 destroyers, and 7 submarines.

In 1909, for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1911, the General Board recommended 4 battleships, 4 scout cruisers, 10 destroyers. The Battleships were with an armament of 14-inch guns. Those are the first ships with the 14-inch guns. I am only giving you the fighting ships here.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral BADGER. The Navy Department cut us down that year to two battleships.

Congress gave us two battleships, six destroyers, and four submarines.

For the fiscal year ending 1912, the recommendations being made in 1910, the General Board recommended 4 battleships, 16 destroyers—we were going up then and looking forward to the light craft of the ocean—4 scouts, tenders, etc.

We got out of that two battleships, eight destroyers, and four submarines, with two gunboats.

For 1913, when things began to look rather serious abroad, the General Board recommended 4 battleships, 1 or more cruisers; that is as many as we could get we wanted, of battle cruisers; 16 destroyers, 4 scouts, 5 submarines.

We got one battleship, no battle cruisers, six destroyers, and eight submarines. That was for 1913. That is to say, the recommendation was made in 1911. In all these recommendations they do not commence until two years later. It really is about a year and a half.

The CHAIRMAN. The recommendation was made in 1911?

Admiral BADGER. The recommendation was made in 1911. The action of Congress is for the fiscal year ending June 30 of the next year.

The CHAIRMAN. You said it began to look more like war?

Admiral BADGER. It began to look a little bit more like war. In 1911 we had some incidents abroad that came very near precipitating war then; came very close to it.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator TRAMMELL. Excuse me, Admiral, I just want to get matters straight in the record. Did Congress act on that recommendation in 1911?

Admiral BADGER. Yes.

Senator TRAMMELL. As I understand, they acted in 1911?

Admiral BADGER. No; the recommendations were made in 1911 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1913. If the board makes a recommendation in September of 1920, now, it is not acted upon until 1921, in Congress—say, the spring of 1921.

The CHAIRMAN. It is acted upon by Congress in 1920 and takes effect in 1921?

Admiral BADGER. It is acted upon probably not until January or February of 1921. The Navy bill does not come up until then.

The CHAIRMAN. That is, the board's recommendations are not acted upon for a year?

Admiral BADGER. The board's recommendations for this fall—suppose in September or October we make those recommendations, in 1920. Then Congress takes it up in the year 1921, and the appropria-

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tion does not become available until after July 1 of 1921, which is the fiscal year of 1922.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Congress takes it up within a few months after the board makes the recommendations?

Admiral BADGER. Yes; exactly.

The CHAIRMAN. And makes the appropriation a year from the following July?

Admiral BADGER. Yes; it is nearly a year before Congress can authorize the thing. So that is what this means here, for 1912. Now, for 1912 the General Board recommended 4 battleships, 2 battle cruisers, 16 destroyers, and 1 destroyer tender, 2 transports, 1 ammunition ship, 6 submarines, 1 submarine tender, 1 supply ship, 2 gunboats, 2 seagoing tugs, 1 dry dock, 1 submarine testing dock.

Then the Navy Department approved substantially that recommendation, except that they cut 1 battleship, making the recommendation of the department for 3 battleships.

Congress gave us 1 battleship, 6 destroyers, 4 submarines, 1 supply ship, and 1 transport; so that we did not get any too much that time.

In 1913, for 1915, the board recommended 4 battleships, 16 destroyers, 8 submarines, and a lot of other things; but owing to our lack of success with the battle cruisers, and some difference of opinion as to the advisability of battle cruisers that existed at that time, we did not ask for any. We got 3 battleships, 6 destroyers, and 8 submarines.

In 1914, for 1916, the board recommended 4 battleships, 12 destroyers, 3 fleet submarines, 16 coast submarines, 4 scouts, 4 gunboats, and some tenders.

We got from Congress 2 battleships, 6 destroyers, 16 submarines, 2 fleet submarines, and 1 fuel-oil ship.

The CHAIRMAN. That was the recommendation made in 1914?

Admiral BADGER. Yes. Now, in 1915, the recommendation of the General Board was 4 battle cruisers, 4 dreadnaughts, 6 scouts, 30 coast submarines, 7 fleet submarines, 28 destroyers, 6 gunboats, with a number of auxiliaries. It was in that year that the five-year building program was introduced and started, covering a total expenditure for new construction of $500,000,000, and the Congress did authorize in 1916 that very large program, which is here: Ten battleships, 6 battle cruisers, 10 scout cruisers, 50 destroyers, 9 fleet submarines, 58 coast submarines, 1 submarine with Neff system of propulsion, 3 fuel ships, 1 repair ship, 1 transport, 1 hospital ship, 2 destroyer tenders, 1 fleet submarine tender, 2 ammunition ships, and 2 gunboats. That was the $500,000,000 program, and that program was recommended in view of the preparation for war on the sea by the United States; and had we been able to go on and complete it, it should have been completed, under the hastening process of the war, in three years. If the war had continued, we should have had many of the essential ships about a year after it ended; but we could not foresee that it was going to end so soon.

The CHAIRMAN. Those are recommendations as to the building of boats?

Admiral BADGER. As to the building. And those that I have read you, I have read you the authorization by Congress, those things actually have been or are being done now.

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The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Did you make any other recommendations aside from those for a building program to the department.

Admiral BADGER. Oh, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. My question was whether you made any recommendations for more preparedness for the United States Navy?

Admiral BADGER. I think that those recommendations are covered in the various papers that were sent in, that of February 4, that of March 20, and that of April 5 being typical of the papers that were sent to the department.

The CHAIRMAN. What I wanted to know was whether you made any recommendations before those to which you have referred; from August, 1914, at the outbreak of the war, to February 4, when I think your first recommendation that I think you have referred to was made?

Admiral BADGER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And if so, will you please state what recommendations were made by the board toward further preparedness?

Admiral BADGER. I will read the titles of some of these papers, if you care to have me do so. I did not take them all, but these are typical papers. From the 1st of August, 1914, the withdrawal of battleships to the home yards was recommended as a preparatory measure, and on the 9th of September, 1914, the withdrawal of battleships from Mexican and West Indian waters was recommended.

On the 23d of September attention was called to the lack of gunboats and small cruisers in the Navy.

On the 15th of October—this is all in 1914—the recommendation was for arming merchant ships.

On the 7th of November, 1914, proposed gun and projectile to be used against aircraft.

November 14, 1914, immediate need of trained personnel.

January 6, 1915, suggested method of attacking submarines.

March 13, 1915, information desired in connection with revision of war plans. Periodical reports on preparedness of bureaus.

April 14, 1915, plan of employment of vessels of cruiser squadron.

April 17, 1915, utilization of Coast Guard by Navy Department.

April 24, 1915, commander cruiser squadron recommends organizing armored cruisers in Atlantic.

And so it goes. I do not know that you can gain much from this. These were constant and continuous recommendations.

On the 1st of March, 1916, there was a paper on the necessity for dirigibles in case we go to war.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to have a full list of those. You need not give them now. We will put them in the record.

Admiral BADGER. They are all here in this list, Appendix A.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know whether those recommendations were in all cases accepted by the department?

Admiral BADGER. They certainly were accepted; but whether they were carried out, I am not in a position to tell you.

The CHAIRMAN. Were they officially accepted?

Admiral BADGER. They were never returned.

The CHAIRMAN. No; but I say were they officially accepted by the department?

Admiral BADGER. Yes. I have already covered that point, sir. It was always the custom to acknowledge. It depended somewhat

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upon who was in charge of the desk that looked over these things. Sometimes we got a receipt for them, concerning the action taken, and sometimes we did not. I will have that looked up in the General Board, and see if I can find that out, and will send it to you.

The CHAIRMAN. If you will do that, Admiral, and send a list to us, we would like that.

Admiral BADGER. I will send a list. I will send another copy of this with what we can find.

The CHAIRMAN. You have no means of knowing whether the recommendations that were not officially accepted, were adopted or not?

Admiral BADGER. I have not, except where it came to my attention in the general course of duties that they were being done. In most cases we did know, and had they been disapproved, the chances are greatly in favor of our knowing it, because we were always on the lookout to see that they received proper consideration.

The CHAIRMAN. In November, 1914, did the General Board make a specific recommendation to the Secretary of the Navy as to numerical increases in the enlisted personnel?

Admiral BADGER. What is the date, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. I think you said just now that in November, 1914, you made a recommendation as to the enlisted personnel?

Admiral BADGER. Yes. This whole paper gives the history of the personnel and the recommendations of the board, as to personnel, in the same way that the one I have been discussing gave it as to material.

The CHAIRMAN. From what date?

Admiral BADGER. This commences in 1900, for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1902, and it follows it all the way down to last year. Now, in some years we made no recommendation, but you can see the recommendations here. There has been a steady increase in personnel as the material has increased.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it would be well, as long as you have put in the building program from 1906, to put in also the personnel recommendations from 1906 down to the present time.

Admiral BADGER. In the same way?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; in the record. Put them in the record.

Admiral Badger. I can put in this paper here.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; so that we will begin in 1906 instead of 1900.

Admiral BADGER. I can put both of these papers right in as they stand, if you desire.

The CHAIRMAN. And have both papers begin in 1906.

Admiral BADGER. Then I will have to take them back and furnish them later in that shape.

(The papers referred to are here printed in the record as follows:)

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
GENERAL BOARD,
April 2, 1920.

From: Senior member present.
To: Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: Building programs; recommendations by General Board and Navy Department, and action by Congress.

In compliance with your verbal request of March 27, 1920, the following information, compiled from the files of the General Board, is submitted:

The following table shows the progress of construction resulting from the program for every year between 1906 and 1919:

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Year.	Battleships.		Armored cruisers.		Protected cruisers.		Scout cruisers.		Destroyers.		Colliers.	
	Completed.	Authorized.	Completed.	Authorized.	Completed.	Authorized.	Completed.	Authorized.	Completed.	Authorized.	Completed.	Authorized.
1906.....	19	2	8	1	6	3	4	4	22	3	2	2
1907.....	24	2	10	1	9	3	8	4	25	3	5	3
1908.....	26	2	11	1	12	3	12	4	28	3	7	2
1909.....	28	2	12	1	15	3	16	4	31	3	10	2
1910.....	30	2	13	1	18	3	20	3	34	3	12	2
1911.....	32	2	14	1	21	3	24	3	37	3	14	2
1912.....	34	2	15	1	24	3	27	3	40	3	16	2
1913.....	36	2	16	1	27	3	30	3	43	3	18	2
1914.....	38	2	17	2	30	4	33	3	46	3	20	2
1915.....	40	2	18	2	33	4	36	3	49	3	22	2
1916.....	42	.....	19	.....	36	4	39	3	52	3	24	2
1917.....	44	.....	20	.....	40	.....	42	3	55	3	26	2
1918.....	46	.....	22	.....	44	.....	45	.....	58	3	28	.....
1919.....	48	.....	24	.....	48	.....	48	.....	61	.....	30	.....

1906: FOR FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1908.

Recommendation by General Board:

2 battleships.
2 scout cruisers.
4 destroyers.
4 ships, motor torpedo boats.
1 river gunboat (*Helena* size).
2 small gunboats.
2 shallow-draft river gunboats.
2 squadron colliers.
1 ammunition ship.

"No submarines are recommended this year pending a determination by the department, under the terms of the last appropriation bill, of the best type for our purposes."

Recommendation by Navy Department:

2 battleships.
2 scout cruisers.
1 gunboat.
4 gunboats, light draft.
4 destroyers.
4 torpedo boats.
1 ammunition ship.
2 colliers.

Authorized by Congress:

1 battleship.
2 destroyers.

1907: FOR FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1909.

Recommendation by General Board:

4 battleships.
4 scout cruisers.
10 destroyers.
4 submarines.
4 ships, motor torpedo boats.
1 ammunition ship.
1 repair ship.
2 fleet colliers.
2 mine-laying ships (conversion and equipment for that purpose of 2 cruisers now on the Navy list).

That the Navy should be of such strength that there may be one fleet concentrated in the Atlantic and one fleet concentrated in the Pacific, each sufficient to cope with any emergency that may require immediate action in its own sphere.

All obsolete armored vessels should be replaced by new battleships as rapidly as possible.

The ratio of destroyers to battleships as set forth in letter of February 9, 1903, to be changed from one torpedo boat destroyer for each battleship, to four destroyers for each battleship.

Recommendation by Navy Department:

4 battleships.
4 scout cruisers.
10 destroyers.
4 submarines.
1 repair ship.
1 ammunition ship.
2 mine layers (conversion and equipment for that purpose of two cruisers now on the Navy list).
4colliers.

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Authorized by Congress:

2 battleships.	8 submarines.
10 destroyers	5 colliers.

1908: FOR FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1910.

Recommendation by General Board:

4 battleships.	1 repair ship.
4 scout cruisers.	1 ammunition ship.
10 destroyers.	2 mine laying ships (conversion and equipment for that purpose of two cruisers now on the Navy list).
4 submarines.	
3 colliers.	

Recommendation by Navy Department:

4 battleships.	3 colliers.
4 scout cruisers.	4 submarines.
10 destroyers.	1 repair ship.
2 mine-laying ships (conversion and equipment for that purpose of two cruisers now on the Navy list).	1 ammunition ship.

Authorized by Congress:

2 battleships.	7 submarines.
5 destroyers.	1 collier.

1909: FOR FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1911.

Recommendation by General Board:

4 battleships (armament 14-inch guns).	1 repair ship.
4 scout cruisers.	1 ammunition ship.
10 destroyers.	1 oil-tank ship.

Recommendation by Navy Department:

2 battleships.	1 repair ship.

Authorized by Congress:

2 battleships.	4 submarines.
6 destroyers.	2 colliers.

1910: FOR FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1912.

Recommendation by General Board:

4 battleships.	4 colliers.
16 destroyers.	3 gunboats, 1 for service in Chinese rivers.
1 repair ship.	2 tugs.
4 scouts.	1 mine-laying vessel.
2 tenders for destroyers.	2 transports.
3 tenders for submarines.	1 hospital ship.

Recommendation by Navy Department:

2 battleships.	1 submarine tender.
2 gunboats.	2 tugs.
2 submarines.	1 collier.

Authorized by Congress:

2 battleships.	1 submarine tender.
2 gunboats.	2 tugs.
8 destroyers.	2 colliers.
4 submarines.	

1911: FOR FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1913.

Recommendation by General Board:

4 battleships.	2 tenders for submarines.
1 or more battle cruisers.	4 fuel ships.
16 destroyers.	1 ammunition ship.
1 repair ship.	1 mine-laying vessel.
4 scouts.	2 transports.
2 tenders for destroyers.	5 submarines.

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Recommendation by Navy Department:

2 battleships.
2 fuel-oil ships.

Authorized by Congress:

1 battleship.
6 destroyers.
8 submarines.
1 destroyer tender.
1 submarine tender.
2 fuel-oil ships.
1 river gunboat (appropriated for in 1898 to replace the *Michigan*).

1912: FOR FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1914.

Recommendation by General Board:

4 battleships.
2 battle cruisers.
16 destroyers.
1 destroyer tender.
2 transports.
1 ammunition ship.
6 submarines.
1 submarine tender.
1 supply ship.
2 gunboats.
2 sea-going tugs.
1 dry dock.
1 submarine testing dock.

"The General Board recommends the conversion of the *Prometheus* into a repair ship, and if this is approved, one fuel ship should be provided for in the building program to replace the *Prometheus*. The *San Francisco* having demonstrated its efficiency as a mine transport, the General Board recommends that the *Baltimore* be likewise converted into a mine transport."

Recommendation by Navy Department:

3 battleships.
2 battle cruisers.
2 gunboats.
16 destroyers.
6 submarines.
1 destroyer tender.
1 submarine tender.
1 submarine testing dock.
1 supply ship.
1 repair ship.
2 tugs.
2 transports.
1 dry dock.

Authorized by Congress:

1 battleship.
6 destroyers.
4 submarines.
1 supply ship.
1 transport.

1913: FOR FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1915.

Recommendation by General Board:

4 battleships.
16 destroyers.
8 submarines.
2 oilers.
2 gunboats.
1 transport.
1 supply ship.
1 hospital ship.
1 destroyer tender.
1 submarine tender.
2 dry docks.

Recommendation by Navy Department:

2 battleships.
8 destroyers.
3 submarines.

Authorized by Congress:

3 battleships.
6 destroyers.
8 submarines.

1914: FOR FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1916.

Recommendation by General Board:

4 battleships.
12 destroyers.
3 fleet submarines.
16 coast submarines.
4 scouts.
4 gunboats.
2 oil fuel ships.
1 destroyer tender.
1 submarine tender.
1 Navy transport.
1 hospital ship.
1 supply ship.
Air Service—$5,000,000.

Recommendation by Navy Department:

2 battleships.
1 gunboat.
6 destroyers.
7 submarines.
1 fleet submarine.
1 fuel oil ship.

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Authorized by Congress:

2 battleship.
6 destroyers.
16 submarines.
2 fleet submarines.
1 fuel oil ship.

1915: FOR FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1917.

Recommendation by General Board:

4 battle cruisers.
4 dreadnaughts.
6 scouts.
30 coast submarines.
7 fleet submarines.
28 destroyers.
6 gunboats.
1 destroyer tender.
2 fleet submarine tenders.
4 fuel oil ships.
1 supply ship.
1 transport.
1 hospital ship.
1 ammunition ship.
1 repair ship.
Air Service—$5,000,000.

The following five-year building program, 1917 to 1922, was recommended October 12, 1915, to comply with Secretary of Navy letter of October 7, 1915:

	First year, 1917.	Second year, 1918.	Third year, 1919.	Fourth year, 1920.	Fifth year, 1921.
Dreadnoughts	4	2	2	2	
Battle cruisers	3		1	2	
Scouts	4	2	1	3	
Destroyers	10	10	10	14	6
Fleet submarines	2	2	2	2	1
Coast submarines	20	10	10	10	8
Fuel ships, oil	1			2	
Repair ship				1	
Transport				1	
Hospital ship	1				
Destroyer tender	1			1	
Fleet submarine tender				1	
Ammunition ship	1			1	
River gunboats	2				
Aircraft Service	$3,000,000	$1,000,000	$1,000,000	$1,000,000	$1,000,000
Reserve ammunition	11,000,000				

Recommendation by Navy Department:

2 battleships.
2 battle cruisers.
3 scout cruisers.
2 gunboats
15 destroyers.
25 submarines.
5 fleet submarines.
1 hospital ship.

Authorized by Congress:

10 battleships.
6 battle cruisers.
10 scout cruisers.
50 destroyers.
9 fleet submarines.
58 coast submarines.
1 submarine with Neff system of propulsion.
3 fuel ships.
1 repair ship.
1 transport.
1 hospital ship.
2 destroyer tenders.
1 fleet submarine tender.
2 ammunition ships.
2 gunboats.

Appropriations for some of the above construction were not made until a later date.

1916: FOR FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1918.

Recommendation by General Board:

"The General Board recommends that the following vessels, whose construction has been authorized by act of Congress, be included in the department's estimates for new construction in the building program, 1918":

4 battleships.
2 battle cruisers.
4 scouts.
20 destroyers.
9 fleet submarines.
18 coast submarines.
1 fuel ship.
1 transport.
1 destroyer tender.
1 fleet submarine tender.
1 gunboat.

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"The following vessels are also recommended for inclusion in the building program:"

12 mine sweepers.	Air Service, $6,000,000.
1 supply ship.	Advanced base material, $460,000.
2 seagoing tugs.	Net defenses, $2,000,000.

Recommendation by Navy Department:

3 battleships.	14 submarines.
1 battle cruiser.	4 fleet submarines.
3 scout cruisers.	1 destroyer tender.
15 destroyers.	1 fleet submarine tender.

Authorized by Congress:

By act of March 4, 1917, funds were appropriated for the construction of the following vessels previously authorized:

3 battleships.	1 destroyer tender.
1 battle cruiser.	1 submarine tender.
3 scout cruisers.	18 coast submarines (800 tons).
15 destroyers.	

Under naval emergency fund:

Twenty coast submarines (800 tons).

New construction authorized:

229 destroyers.	74 tugs.
31 submarines.	392 submarine chasers.
54 fleet mine sweepers.	112 patrol vessels.

1917: FOR FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1919.

Recommendation by General Board, August 29, 1917;

Destroyers, as many as the resources of the country will permit.	30 fleet submarines.
15 scouts.	2 dreadnoughts.
5 battle cruisers.	Air service, $45,000,000.

"Under the special conditions created by the war, the General Board, for the building program of 1919, does not recommend additional fleet auxiliaries, mine sweepers, seagoing and patrol craft. Such needs as have not already been provided for under emergency appropriation must be met by taking over from the merchant marine, as the need arises, vessels of the types required and equipping them for naval uses."

Revised recommendation by General Board June 15, 1918:

"The General Board believes its analysis of present and future needs to be sound. These needs, expressed in numbers of fighting ships of several types, should form the basis of a continuing naval program to be started as soon as practicable. Without violating the confidential argument of the General Board's report, these numbers may be summarized for the purpose of this paper. Comparison of the estimated strength of certain navies and attainment of a desriable equality by December 31, 1920, require the addition to the United States Navy, over and above the three-year program authorized by Congress August 29, 1916, of the following vessels:

Battleships	10– 12
Battle cruisers	15– 16
Scouts and cruisers	30– 63
Destroyers	158– [1] 200
Submarines	[2] 91– 127

"The General Board fully realized that the shipbiulding facilities of the United States taxed to capacity, could not undertake the task set by these numbers; but believed that present facilities could be increased so as to provide for immediate construction of the following, as the building program for 1919:

Destroyers: As many as the resources of the country will permit.[1]	
Scouts	15
Battle cruisers	5
Fleet submarines	[2] 30
Battleships	2

[1] Destroyers: The department has meanwhile assured immediate construction of 150 of the 200 eventually needed.

[2] Submarines: The General Board has submitted a supplementary building program largely increased from these figures by reason of war developments.

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"Since no part of this program has been included in the pending naval appropriation bill, the General Board believes that the time has arrived to obtain authority for the full numbers of essential battle units, viz: Battleships, battle cruisers, and scouts which nearly 10 months ago were reported by the General Board as needed. It is therefore recommended that Senator Francis' bill receive the approval of the department in principle; that construction of 12 battleships, 16 battle cruisers, and 30 scouts be authorized now, and be started as soon as practicable, and that the funds determined to be necessary for the first year of construction be appropriated."

Recommendation by Navy Department:
No increase over vessels authorized.

Authorized by Congress:
Available until expended—
Destroyers, $125,000,000.
Coast submarines, $32,397,000.

1918: FOR FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1920.

Recommendation by General Board:
"The General Board recommends as based on the naval policy, that the department request Congress to authorize the following new construction with the proviso that the program shall be completed not later than June 30, 1925, viz:"

12 battleships.
16 battle cruisers.
30 scouts.
108 destroyers.
21 fleet submarines.
146 S-type submarines.
24 antisubmarine submarines.
42 mine-laying submarines.
284 mine sweepers.
12 destroyer tenders.
6 submarine tenders.
6 airplane carriers.
376 patrol vessels.
1,704 large seaplanes.
156 dirigibles.
544 kite balloons.
24 rigid airships.

Recommended by Navy Department:
Building program recommended by General Board.

Authorized by Congress:
Continue construction of vessels already authorized.

1919: FOR FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1921.

Recommendation by General Board:

2 battleships.
1 battle cruiser.
10 scout cruisers.
5 flotilla leaders.
6 submarines.
2 airplane carriers.
1 destroyer tender.
1 submarine tender.
Aircraft construction, including experimental development, $27,000,000.

CHAS. J. BADGER.

G. B. No. 421 (confidential).

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
GENERAL BOARD,
April 5, 1920.

From: Senior member present.

To: Secretary of the Navy.

Subject: Increase in personnel; recommendations by general board and Navy Department, and action by Congress.

In compliance with your verbal request of March 27, 1920, the following information compiled from the files of the general board, covering recommendations made by the general board and the Navy Department and the action taken by Congress on increases in personnel of the Navy, is submitted.

1906: FOR FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1908.

Recommendation by general board: No recommendation.
Recommendation by Navy Department: Increase of 3,000 men.
Action by Congress: Permanent strength of enlisted men fixed at 38,500 men.

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1907: FOR FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1909.

Recommendation by general board: No recommendation.
Recommendation by Navy Department: Increase of 6,000 men. Submits report of personnel board which recommends that number of officers be based on percentage of number of men. The numbers in grades to be distributed in certain ratios.
Action by Congress: Permanent strength of enlisted men fixed at 44,500 men. Established Female Nurse Corps. Increased Marine Corps, as follows: 1 major general commandant in lieu of brigadier general commandant; 1 colonel; 1 lieutenant colonel; 2 majors; 18 captains; 7 first lieutenants; 14 second lieutenants; 1 assistant adjutant and inspector, rank of lieutenant colonel; 1 assistant quartermaster, rank of lieutenant colonel; 1 assistant quartermaster, rank of major; 3 assistant quartermasters, rank of captain; 1 assistant paymaster, rank of major; 1 assistant paymaster, rank of captain; 2 sergeant majors; 15 quartermaster sergeants; 20 first sergeants; 50 sergeants; 125 corporals; 10 drummers; 10 trumpeters; 518 privates.

1908: FOR FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1910.

Recommendation by General Board: No recommendation.
Recommendation by Navy Department: No record of recommendation.
Action by Congress: No increase.

1909: FOR FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1911.

Recommendation by General Board: No recommendation.
Recommendation by Navy Department: Increase of 3,000 men.
Action by Congress: Permanent strength of enlisted men fixed at 47,500 men.

1910: FOR FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1912.

Recommendation by General Board: Recommended increase consistent with increase in vessels.
Recommendation by Navy Department: No record of recommendation for increase.
Action by Congress: No increase.

1911: FOR FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1913.

Recommendation by General Board: "The General Board invites the attention of the department to the continued needs of the fleet in personnel and in dry docks."
Recommendation by Navy Department: Recommended personnel bill which was introduced in the House of Representatives February 13, 1912, as H. R. 20045. Provides for basing the personnel of the Navy in officers and men on tonnage of the Navy; 70 men for every 1,000 tons and fractions in proportion of the battleships and cruisers of the Navy fixed on July 1 of each year. Three line officers for every 1,000 tons and fractions in proportion of the battleships and cruisers. The total authorized number of commissioned line officers not to be increased more than 10 per cent nor decreased more than 5 per cent in any fiscal year. Distribution in grades to be in the proportion of 1 flag officer, 4 captains, 5 commanders, 13 lieutenant commanders, 30 lieutenants, 12 lieutenants (junior grade), 35 ensigns. The bill makes further provisions as to the ultimate distribution and of percentages allowed for Staff Corps, etc.
Action of Congress: Permanent strength of enlisted men fixed at 51,500 men.

1912: FOR FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1914.

Recommendation by General Board: No recommendation.
Recommendation by Navy Department: No record of recommendations made.
Action by Congress: No increase.

1913: FOR FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1915.

Recommendation by General Board: "In the opinion of the General Board, a naval policy in relation to personnel is of even greater importance, as all history teaches us that the greatest element of success in all enterprises, and more especially in the enterprises of war, lies in the personnel conducting the enterprise and its morale.
"The General Board has from its incipiency given careful consideration to this question, and made recommendations to the department from time to time. These recommendations have varied in details at times to meet conditions existing at the

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time, but have all been founded on the same fundamental ideas, which are expressed in the citation made in paragraph 11 of this letter from general board letter No. 420–2 of October 17, 1903. The same idea is expressed in paragraph 4 of General Board letter No. 58 of February 9, 1903, which reads:

"'4. The General Board further strongly recommends, as an essential part of an intelligent continued naval policy, that whenever an appropriation is made for an increase in the material of the fleet, the corresponding indispensable increase in personnel of officers and men be simultaneously provided for.'

"In the opinion of the General Board, the question of personnel is more urgent now than at any time in the history of the Navy; and the board believes that the adoption and continued advocacy from year to year of a regular policy by the department of expansion and regulation of the personnel, coequal with the expansion of the fleet, will result in eventual success.

"The General Board recommends as a basis for such a policy:

"(*a*) That the personnel of the Navy, officers and enlisted men, including the active list and an established and trained naval reserve, shall at all times be sufficient to fully man the entire fleet for war.

"(*b*) That the officers and enlisted men of the Navy on the active list shall bear a definite fixed ratio to the total displacement of the fighting units of the fleet.

"(*c*) That the officers of the active list of the Navy shall be distributed in the various grades in a ratio that will insure the best efficiency of the fleet, by having in all grades the proper proportion of numbers for the duties of the grade, and so regulated as to bring each officer to the grade with sufficient experience and at the age when best equipped to perform the duties of the grade."

Recommendation by Navy Department: Recommend reestablishment of grade of vice admiral. Recommended increase in number of chaplains by 24. No record of any further recommendation for a definite increase.

Action by Congress: No increase.

1914: FOR FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1916.

Recommendation by General Board: That personnel of Marine Corps should be 20 per cent of that of the Navy. Extract from General Board letter to Secretary of the Navy, August 7, 1914:

"In view of its study and the conclusions arrived at, the General Board specifically recommends that the department exert all its efforts to obtain legislation embodying the following features:

"(1) The obtaining of sufficient officers on the active list to man the fleet adequately on a peace basis; and this the General Board fixes at a minimum of three line officers per thousand tons, and the corresponding number of staff officers.

"(2) The obtaining of sufficient enlisted men to man the fleet adequately on a peace basis; and this the General Board fixes at a minimum of 70 men per thousand tons, exclusive of apprentices for training and prisoners.

"(3) The reorganization of the commissioned personnel of the Navy, both line and staff, and a redistribution in grades that the numbers in grades may correspond to the duties of the grade, and that officers may remain in the various grades during the period of life when they are best mentally and physically equipped for those duties. This requires legislation providing a total to be fixed in accordance with recommendation (1), and the distribution of this total in a fixed proportion between grades, with a service qualification for eligibility for promotion and a fair method of elimination for preserving the best for the active service as the grades go up and the number of places decrease. The General Board recommends as the right proportion between grades, 1 flag officer to 4 captains, to 6 commanders, to 15 lieutenant commanders, to 67 junior officers in the grades of lieutenant, lieutenant (junior grade), and ensign.

"(4) The establishment of an active reserve list of the Regular Navy for certain specified duties in peace and war, to be composed of officers not promoted to the higher grades on the active list for lack of places in those grades, and who have hence been honorably transferred from the active list in accordance with recommendation (3).

"(5) The establishment of the grades of admiral and vice admiral in the Navy, and the distribution of the flag officers in the flag grades in the proportion of 1 admiral to 2 vice admirals to 8 rear admirals.

"(6) The further development and increase of the Naval Militia.

"(7) The establishment of a national naval reserve, to be composed of ex-officers who have resigned or been honorably discharged, merchant and yacht captains and officers, ex-enlisted men who have been honorably discharged, and all men in other Government seafaring services and all merchant seamen and yachtmen of good character, who can be induced to join and receive training, to the end of obtaining a reserve

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for fully manning the fleet on the outbreak of war, and supplying losses caused by casualties in war."

The following is an extract from General Board letter to the Secretary of the Navy, No. 420–2 of November 17, 1914:

"39. The General Board can not too strongly urge upon the department the necessity of using its best endeavors to carry out the repeated recommendations of the General Board made from year to year, to provide the fleet with a personnel, active list, and trained reserve, equal to the manning of the fleet for war.

"40. In the opinion of the General Board this is a matter of even more serious import than that of construction; for it can not be too often repeated that ships without a trained personnel to man and fight them are useless for the purposes of war. And the training needed for the purpose is long and arduous, and can not be done after the outbreak of war. This must have been provided for long previous to the beginning of hostilities; and any ship of the fleet found at the outbreak of war without provision having been made for its manning by officers and men trained for service can be counted as only a useless mass of steel, whose existence leads only to a false sense of security.

"41. The strength of fleets is measured too often in the public mind by the number and tonnage of its material units. The real strength of a fleet is a combination of its personnel—with their skill and training—and its material; and of these two elements the more important—the personnel—is too often forgotten and neglected in making provision for our fleet. The General Board can not impress this point too strongly on the department or recommend too earnestly that every effort be made to correct it, and that legislation be urged to provide for a personnel on the active list, supplemented by a trained reserve, sufficient to man every vessel of the fleet when the call comes.

"42. No nation in time of peace keeps all the ships of its navy fully manned and in full commission. But all leading nations except ourselves provide an active list, officers and men, sufficient to keep the best of their fleet in full commission and all the serviceable ships of their fleet in a material condition for war; and in addition a trained reserve of officers and men sufficient to complete the complements and fully man every serviceable ship of their navies, and furnish a reserve for casualties. Thus, every nation with which conflict is possible is prepared to mobilize its entire navy by order with officers and men trained for the service. We alone of the naval powers provide no such reserves, and an active personnel too scant, and trust to the filling of the complements of our ships by untrained men recruited after war is imminent or declared. To quickly man all of the ships of the Navy serviceable for war (including ships which are now in reserve or ordinary) with trained crews is impossible owing to the absence of a trained reserve.

"43. In view of all that has been herein set forth, the General Board recommends:

"(*a*) That legislation be asked for providing an active personnel, officers and enlisted force, capable of keeping in full commission all battleships under 15 years of age from date of authorization, all destroyers and submarines under 12 years of age from authorization, half of the cruisers and all gunboats, and all the necessary auxiliaries that go with the active fleet; and of furnishing nucleus crews for all ships in the Navy that would be used in time of war, and the necessary men for the training and other shore stations.

"(*b*) That the general policy be adopted of expanding the active personnel with the expansion of the fleet in the proportions indicated in (*a*).

"(*c*) That immediate steps be taken to form a national naval reserve of trained officers and men, and that this work be pushed until this reserve in connection with the naval militia has reached the point where, combined with the active list, it will be possible to fully man the entire fleet with war complements and furnish 10 per cent additional for casualties.

"(*d*) That the naval militia be expanded in number and that the department encourage the continuance and improvement of its training to the end that it may still more efficiently serve to reinforce the regular service at need."

Recommendation by Navy Department: No record of any recommendation for increase.

Action by Congress: Established naval reserve act of March 3, 1915. Provided for appointment of pay clerks, increased number of naval constructors, and increased Marine Corps by 20 gunnery sergeants, 20 sergeants, 70 corporals, and decreased the number of privates by 110.

1915: FOR FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1917.

Recommendation by General Board: Extract from letter G. B. No. 420–2, July 30, 1915:

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"Personnel: 11,000 men. This number will provide for the needs of the present ships of the Navy, including those nearing completion, but it must be borne in mind that the personnel, commissioned, warrant and enlisted, will have to be further increased as the new construction progresses. * * *"

Extract from G. B. No. 420–2, November 9, 1915, to Secretary of the Navy:

"23. The General Board recommends that legislation be sought for the fiscal year 1917 which will authorize an active personnel, officers and enlisted force, capable of—

"(*a*) Keeping in full commission all battleships under 15 years of age from date of authorization, all destroyers and submarines under 12 years from date of authorization, half of the cruisers, all gunboats, and all necessary auxiliaries that go with the active fleet.

"(*b*) Providing partial complements for all other ships in the Navy that would be placed in active use in time of war.

"(*c*) Providing the necessary personnel for training and for shore stations.

"ENLISTED MEN.

"Navy:

"24. The partial crews mentioned under (*b*) should be 50 per cent of the full complement for battleships, cruisers, destroyers and submarines. They should be permanent in order that they may be kept thoroughly trained and the ships maintained as efficient units of the fleet, ready for immediate service in case of emergency by simply filling the complements. For other ships the partial crews should be adequate for their upkeep.

"25. This does not provide sufficient personnel for war. With full war complements for all ships of the Navy ready for service in 1917 and a minimum number required at shore stations 74,700 men will be needed. In addition, upon the outbreak of war the personnel of the Navy must be greatly expanded to provide for aviation, coast defense districts, patrol craft, and other auxiliary duties of every sort as well as for a reserve of men under training to replace casualties. The coast guard, naval militia and naval reserve will be far from sufficient to meet these demands. The Navy is the first line of defense of the country. For peace requirements in the fiscal year 1917 the general board regards as inadequate any smaller force than 67,000 men in the regular Navy.

"Marine Corps:

"26. The Marine Corps should also be increased. There are now new demands from many points to provide guards at magazines, powder factories and other important property. To meet them it has been necessary to interfere seriously with the maintenance of detachments of proper strength on board ship and with the continuance of the training of the advance base force. These new demands would be accentuated if the United States were itself at war. The Navy Department has approved the recommendation of the general board that the strength of the Marine Corps should be 20 per cent of that of the Navy. The general board recommends that the authorized strength of the enlisted men of the Marine Corps for the fiscal year 1917 be 13,400 men.

"Officers:

"27. At the present time, the expansion of the Navy calls for an increase in the number of officers and revision of their distribution in the various grades.

"28. In recommending an increase in the number of officers of the Navy the general board has had in view—

"(*a*) Adequate complements for all ships included under paragraph 23.

"(*b*) A sufficient number to fill the necessary stations on shore.

"To accomplish this the general board finds that the total number of commissioned line officers, exclusive of flag officers, should number 2,700 for the fiscal year 1917. The general board recommends that Congress be requested to authorize this number to be reached through the Naval Academy as speedily as possible.

"29. In every grade the numbers in the grade should correspond with the number of positions to be filled, whose responsibilities are in accordance with the rank. A very considerable increase is needed in the number of lieutenants and lieutenant commanders; less proportional increase is needed in the higher grades. As the Navy increases the duties appropriate to each grade will increase in about the same ratio as the whole strength of the Navy.

"30. The various ranks of the Navy are established to correspond broadly to various classes of duty whose importance and responsibilities vary. Increased responsibilities are assigned to increased rank. At present the numbers in all the grades, except those of ensign and lieutenant (junior grade), are fixed by law. The present increase in numbers in the body of officers is entirely in those two grades.

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"31. The general board invites particular attention to the serious congestion in the grade of lieutenant (junior grade), which demands a remedy at the earliest practicable moment. The present condition is a serious detriment to the efficiency of the service and it is rapidly growing worse.

"32. The general board limits the part of its report regarding the numbers in grade to an earnest recommendation that those numbers be established by Congress as a percentage of the entire number of officers. At the present time the grades have a strength established by fixed numbers, except as noted in the grades of ensign and lieutenant (junior grade), without reference to the total number of officers. This method has no flexibility; in order to keep the numbers in grades properly proportioned to the needs of the service it is necessary to revise them periodically. This readjustment, while it is made from time to time by Congress, has not been done frequently enough to meet the needs of the service. The establishment of fixed percentages in grades would automatically provide for readjustment, while at the same time Congress would keep the whole matter under its control by establishing the total number of officers instead of the numbers in each of the several grades.

"33. The officers of the Marine Corps, line and staff, should number 4 per cent of the total number of enlisted men of that corps. They should be recruited from the graduates of the Naval Academy.

"34. The numbers of officers of the Medical and Pay Corps should be increased in accordance with the requirements of the service as stated in paragraph 28; those of the other Staff Corps should be increased in accordance with the requirements of their special duties. Entries to the Pay Corps should be from graduates of the Naval Academy.

"35. The laws of promotion should be so adjusted as to provide that officers of the rank of ensign in the line, and those of corresponding rank in the Marine Corps, Pay Corps, and Civil Engineer Corps, shall have promotion to the next higher grade after the same length of service in the lower grade, and the general board so recommends.

"36. In concluding its remarks upon personnel the general board invites attention to the fact that the repeal of the feature of the law of 1899 providing for the forced retirement of line officers operates to cause a stagnation in promotion. It recommends that the department seek from Congress remedial measures to insure a proper flow of promotion in line, staff, and Marine Corps, as otherwise the service will suffer grave loss of efficiency."

Extract from third indorsement G. B. No. 425 (serial No. 535), May 17, 1916, as follows:

"2. The total number of men for which provision is to be made at present, for war in the Atlantic, is 100,000."

Recommendation by Navy Department: That 3½ per cent, or 2,152 men, in Hospital Corps be allowed as additional to authorized strength of personnel; that 2,000 additional marines be authorized; that authorized enlisted strength of Navy be increased 10,000; that 30 civilian engineers be appointed each year to a total of 300; and that civilian aviators be appointed, not to exceed 40 a year.

Action by Congress: Authorized increase to the number of 68,700 enlisted men, 6,000 apprentice seamen, 2,929 Hospital Corps, 350 enlisted men Flying Corps, 84 chaplains, 84 Dental Corps officers, 1,762 midshipmen, 150 Flying Corps officers, and 14,981 marines (enlisted men, including 67 men in Marine Band).

Commissioned officers of line on active list, exclusive of commissioned warrant officers, to be 4 per cent of total authorized enlisted strength of the active list, exclusive of Hospital Corps, prisoners undergoing sentences of discharge, enlisted men detailed for duty with Naval Militia and Flying Corps.

Commissioned officers of staff corps on the active list, exclusive of chief warrant officers, to be based on percentages of the total number of commissioned officers of the active list of the line of the Navy as follows: Pay Corps, 12 per cent; Construction Corps, 5 per cent; Civil Engineer Corps, 2 per cent.

Commissioned officers of Medical Corps to be 0.65 per cent of the total authorized number of officers and enlisted men of the Navy and Marine Corps including midshipmen, Hospital Corps, prisoners undergoing sentence of discharge, enlisted men detailed for duty with Naval Militia and the Flying Corps.

Authorizes the Secretary of the Navy to appoint annually in the line of the Navy for a period of 10 years, 30 acting ensigns for the performance of engineering duties only. Number of surgeons increased by one for duty with the Red Cross. Established Naval Reserve Force on definite basis.

1916: FOR FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1918.

Recommendation by general board: Enlisted force Navy to 150,000, marines to 30,000, and officers in the proportions prescribed by law.

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Recommendation by Navy Department: Recommended temporary increase to 150,000 men.

Action by Congress: Act of May 22, 1917, authorized temporary increase to 150,000 men. Marines increased temporarily to 30,000.

1917: FOR FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1919.

Recommendation of general board (G. B. 421, ser. 765, Aug. 16, 1917):

"In accordance with the reference the general board has habitually included its recommendations for the personnel in the annual building program. There is now in preparation the program for the fiscal year 1919. In advance of its completion the board has deemed it urgent to represent to the department certain conditions affecting the authorized strength of the personnel—conditions which have developed on account of the war and since the board's last annual program was submitted.

"2. Although in some respects the ultimate needs of the Navy in personnel can not be foreseen, being dependent upon the duration of the war, immediate needs are apparent. Enlisted men must now be available for: (*a*) Fighting fleet; (*b*) maintenance of shore establishments; (*c*) coast defense ships; (*d*) new destroyers, yachts, and other submarine chasers; (*e*) transports, and impressed German ships; (*f*) foreign aviation service; (*g*) armed guards already on merchantmen; (*h*) an addition of 3 per cent for sick; (*i*) an addition of 10 per cent for casualties.

"3. According to the opinion of the Chief of Bureau of Navigation, as expressed to the general board, the total of present requirements (*a*) to (*i*) of paragraph 2 already equals and probably exceeds the total present authorized strength of the Navy in regular enlisted men.

"4. The personnel of the fighting fleet must be left intact as far as possible so that the vessels composing it may be ready at all times for any emergency.

"5. Naval Rserves will yield, without additional legislation, the number required for further increase of naval duties. They should be enrolled in numbers as required, together with an excess of several thousand for training and contingencies.

"6. The next large increase of naval duties will come about immediately upon the recognition of the necessity of manning all merchant vessels by men of the Navy. This is a war measure and follows directly the development of the present war.

"7. Recognition of this necessity is demanded for the following reasons: First. Definition of the status, now uncertain, of the crews and armed guards of merchantmen, assuring them rights of belligerents; second, suppression of strikes, and enforcement of discipline; third, increased safety of ship and cargo, insuring through central authority strict obedience as to routing, zigzagging, speeding in the submarine zone and to orders affecting lights and lookouts; fourth, increased speed of loading, of discharge, and of voyages; fifth, decreased cost of wages; sixth, increased intelligence of crews; seventh. American citizenship of enlisted men.

"8. All American merchant vessels now engaged in overseas trade should be manned by naval crews, as soon as practicable. The general board is informed that a large number of Naval Reserves is now available toward this purpose.

"9. All American merchant vessels building, including those under the Shipping Board and Emergency Fleet Corporation, should be commissioned as fast as completed with naval crews.

"10. The General Board recommends, therefore, that the Bureau of Navigation be directed to proceed in the enrollment of Naval Reserves to accomplish the objects stated."

In G. B. letter No. 420–2, August 29, 1917, G. B. 421, Serial No. 765, August 16, 1917, is again quoted with the following additional recommendation as to personnel:

"At the present the general board emphasizes its recommendations as stated above to meet the requirements as given above by an immediate increase in the Naval Reserves.

"25. In its annual report for 1916, G. B. No. 420–2, August 16, 1916, the general board recommended 'that the enlisted force of the Marine Corps be maintained at 20 per cent of the total authorized enlisted personnel of the Navy, exclusive of the Hospital Corps.' The act of Congress of May 22, 1917, increasing the strength of the Navy to 150,000, authorized an increase of the Marine Corps to 30,000, thus maintaining the above percentage, as between the regular enlisted forces of the Navy and Marine Corps.

"26. The general board calls attention to the fact that there is now no provision in law to provide automatically or otherwise for an adequate number of senior officers above the grade of lieutenant in the Navy or major in the Marine Corps to properly care for and supervise in war the increased material and enlisted personnel already provided for by legislative enactment.

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"27. Since the last annual report of the general board the authorized enlisted force of the Regular Navy has been increased by law to 150,000 men, which, together with seamen apprentices and the Hospital Corps brings the authorized strength of the Regular Navy to about 163,000 enlisted men.

"28. To organize this force so that the greatest efficiency may be obtained there should be created a sufficient body of officers, distributed among the various grades in such manner and in such numbers as will provide responsible officers of commensurate rank and experience to perform all the duties which will devolve upon the Navy during the war.

"29. Excluding the apprentice seamen and Hospital Corps and considering only the 150,000 enlisted men now authorized by law, it is to be noted that the Congress already has enacted, after exhaustive investigation and hearings, a law which provides that the total number of commissioned line officers shall be 4 per cent of the authorized enlisted force and that this total shall be apportioned to the various grades of the Navy in certain specified percentages.

"30. Following the principles recognized in this act, 6,000 line officers should be provided for 150,000 enlisted men.

"31. There are now 2,390 regularly commissioned line officers in the Navy and 325 holding temporary commissions, a total of 2,715, leaving a shortage of 3,285, which must be provided to make the Regular Navy thoroughly efficient—to properly organize it, in fact.

"32. While recognizing the difficulty of obtaining this number of additional officers and after consultation with officers representing the Bureau of Navigation, the General Board believes it can be done if immediate steps are taken to that end. The sources of supply, besides the Naval Academy, are, in order of importance, the warrant officers and enlisted men of the Navy itself, the Coast Guard, the Naval Militia, National Naval Volunteers, the Naval Reserve, and others not belonging to any of these organizations who can demonstrate their fitness for positions in the Navy.

"33. The General Board recommends that the provisions of the act of August 29, 1916, apportioning the officers in the different commissioned grades of the Navy upon the basis of 87,000 men be extended to apply to the 150,000 men authorized in the act of May 22, 1917, and to any further increase of enlisted men which may be authorized.

"34. The General Board further recommends that the upper grades of the line of the Navy be filled at once up to the authorized numbers based upon a strength of 87,000, by the promotion of officers now in the regular service and the issuance of sufficient temporary commissions in the lower grades to make up the total number. When the total numbers of officers for the 87,000 men have been obtained by permanent and temporary commissions as authorized for this enlisted strength, every effort should be made at once to procure the additional number of temporary officers authorized for an enlisted strength of 150,000 men, the corresponding temporary increases in all higher grades being filled by temporary promotions for the period of the war in the proportions specified in the act of August 29, 1916, of line officers now in the regular Navy, the original temporary appointments being made by selection from the sources enumerated in paragraph 32 after such examinations as to fitness as the department may prescribe.

"35. Because the time required to train officers for the more onerous duties and added responsibilities of the higher grades, it is the opinion of the General Board that training in the advanced grades should be started now, not wait until the emergencies of the war have actually to be met with a greatly expanded untrained personnel, when the time for necessary preparation and preliminary training will not be available. Additional senior officers are imperatively demanded to officer not only the battleship forces, but also to organize, supervise, and direct the operations of convoys, supply and transportation trains, and the numerous squadrons and divisions of smaller vessels, cruisers, destroyers, and patrol craft which must be organized and put into service. Reliefs for senior officers must also be provided to fill vacancies caused by sickness and war casualties.

"Staff Corps:

"36. What holds in regard to the expansion of the commissioned officers of the line of the Navy holds similarly for the Staff Corps, and the General Board recommends that steps be taken at once to provide additional permanent and temporary officers for these corps, in accordance with the percentages prescribed in the act of August 29, 1916.

"Marine Corps:

"37. The act of Congress of August 29, 1916, provided for officers for the Marine Corps in proportion to the number of enlisted men, these officers to be apportioned to he different grades in a certain fixed proportion. The act of Congress approved May 22, 1917, authorized a temporary increase of the Marine Corps from 17,400 to 30,000, and

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provided for an increase of officers therefor by temporary commissions in the proportions already fixed by law, but limited these temporary commissions to the rank of major and below.

"38. The General Board believes that the number of officers in proportion to the number of enlisted men and the proportions in the different grades as fixed by the law of August 29, 1916, are required to properly officer the Marine Corps as a military organization, and recommends that the officers required for the temporary increase be authorized in all grades by temporary commission for the duration of the war according to that proportion.

"Naval Reserves:

"39. The present necessity for the expansion of the Naval Reserves has been discussed in paragraph 24 of this paper. The recruitment and training of officers of the Naval Reserves, in total numbers and percentages in grades, similarly to those provided for the Regular Navy should be immediately taken up."

General Board letter to the Secretary of the Navy (G. B., No. 421; serial No. 770), of September 22, 1917:

"Paragraph 2 of the General Board's letter No. 421, of August 16, 1917, states:

" 'Although in some respects the ultimate needs of the Navy in personnel can not be foreseen, being dependent upon the duration of the war, immediate needs are apparent. Enlisted men must now be available for:

" '(*a*) Fighting fleet.

" '(*b*) Maintenance of shore establishments.

" '(*c*) Coast defense ships.

" '(*d*) New destroyers, yachts, and other submarine chasers.

" '(*e*) Transports and impressed German ships.

" '(*f*) Foreign aviation service.

" '(*g*) Armed guards already on merchantmen.

" '(*h*) An addition of 3 per cent for sick.

" '(*i*) An addition of 10 per cent for casualties.'

"2. In its No. 1159–1094 of August 29, 1917, to the department (copy furnished to the General Board), the Bureau of Navigation made an estimate of the enlisted personnel required for the Regular Navy by March 1, 1919. Over and above 162,466, the present authorized strength, the Bureau of Navigation estimates that an increase of 48,848 is required.

"3. The General Board accepts these figures as a conservative estimate. Anticipating the need of sufficient time for recruiting and training, it is recommended that the department include in its estimates for the coming fiscal year legislative provision for the increase stated by the Bureau of Navigation as required by March 1, 1919."

Recommendation by Navy Department:

To increase the number of midshipmen authorized to 3,128.

To temporarily increase the enlisted strength of the Navy to 180,000 plus 14,000 for trade schools, plus 10,000 for aviation, plus 24,000 for apprentice seamen; total of 228,000.

Recommends an increase of 50,000 men in the permanent strength of the Navy.

Recommended temporary increase of Marine Corps to 75,000.

Action by Congress:

Sixty-fifth Congress, second session, act of July 1, 1918:

Permanent enlisted strength, 131,485; apprentice seamen, 6,000; Flying Corps, 350; total, 137,835.

Temporary enlisted strength, 181,485; apprentice seamen, 24,000; Flying Corps, 10,000; trade schools, 14,000; total, 229,485.

Marine Corps to temporary strength of 75,500 and to enroll reserves without limit.

1918: FOR FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1920.

Recommendation by General Board:

Extract from G. B. No. 421 (serial No. 915), June 7, 1919, as follows:

"The General Board does not at this time recommend a final settlement of the permanent enlisted force, which must depend upon necessities of the Navy after the demobilization of the temporary force now contemplated has been completed.

"The General Board recommends that the permanent force shall remain as at present, 137,485, not including the medical complement provided by law, and that until July 1, 1920, the personnel of the Navy remain as follows:

	Permanent.	Temporary.	Total.
Until Oct. 1, 1919	137,485	112,515	250,000
Oct. 1, 1919, to Jan. 1, 1920	137,485	87,515	225,000
Jan. 1 to June 30, 1920	137,485	62,515	200,000

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"The General Board wishes to add that it considers the present personnel situation in the Navy as most serious and that any reduction below that recommended above should not be made for the present, having in view not only the efficient operation of the Navy as now constituted but also the gravely unsettled international situation."

Recommendation by Navy Department:

To authorize the temporary strength of the Navy at 25,000 men until June 30, 1920.

To authorize the permanent enlisted strength of the Marine Corps to be 26,297 men.

Action by Congress:

Act of July 1, 1918, temporary strength of the Navy to be:

July 1, 1919, to September 30, 1919, 241,000; October 1, 1919, to December 31, 1919, 191,000; January 1, 1920, to June 30, 1920, 170,000.

The above figures include the Hospital Corps, apprentice seamen, Flying Corps, etc. The President is authorized to increase the authorized enlisted strength to 191,000 men.

CHAS. J. BADGER.

The CHAIRMAN. I asked you specifically about the recommendations in 1914. You do recall a specific recommendation as to numerical increase in the enlisted personnel that was made at that time?

Admiral BADGER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. In the report of the board?

Admiral BADGER. I do not find that in that recommendation there was a specific program in 1914 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1916. There is quite a lot of material here that I can read, but it hardly bears on the subject of your question. But I can read this. This is an extract from the General Board's letter to the Secretary of the Navy, No. 420–2, of November 17, 1914. [Reading:]

39. The General Board can not too strongly urge upon the department the necessity of using its best endeavors to carry out the repeated recommendations of the General Board made from year to year, to provide the fleet with a personnel, active list and trained reserve, equal to the manning of the fleet for war.

40. In the opinion of the General Board this is a matter of even more serious import than that of construction; for it can not be too often repeated that ships without a trained personnel to man and fight them are useless for the purposes of war. And the training needed for the purpose is long and arduous, and can not be done after the outbreak of war. This must have been provided for long previous to the beginning of hostilities; and any ship of the fleet found at the outbreak of war without provision having been made for its manning by officers and men trained for service can be counted as only a useless mass of steel, whose existence leads only to a false sense of security.

Then further they say:

43. In view of all that has been herein set forth, the General Board recommends:

(*a*) That legislation be asked for providing an active personnel, officers, and enlisted force, capable of keeping in full commission all battleships under 15 years of age from date of authorization, all destroyers and submarines under 12 years of age from authorization, half of the cruisers and all gunboats, and all the necessary auxiliarys that go with the active fleet; and of furnishing nucleus crews for all ships in the Navy that would be used in time of war, and the necessary men for the training and other shore stations.

(*b*) That the general policy be adopted of expanding the active personnel with the expansion of the fleet in the proportions indicated in (*a*).

(*c*) That immediate steps be taken to form a national naval reserve of trained officers and men, and that this work be pushed until this reserve in connection with the naval militia has reached the point where, combined with the active list, it will be possible to fully man the entire fleet with war complements and furnish 10 per cent additional for casualties.

(*d*) That the naval militia be expanded in number and that the department encourage the continuance and improvement of its training to the end that it may still more efficiently serve to reinforce the regular service at need.

Now, the action by Congress on that was that it established a Naval Reserve by the act of March 3, 1915, increased the Marine Corps by a small amount of noncommissioned officers and 110

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privates, and increased the number of pay clerks and naval constructors. But the naval reserve act of 1915 was intended to meet the requirements of these recommendations, to give a reserve which would, in connection with the regular men of the Navy, serve in time of emergency to man all of the vessels of the fleet.

The CHAIRMAN. You were on the General Board at that time?

Admiral BADGER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That report that you have read was the report that was finally submitted to the Secretary of the Navy. Was that the first report that was submitted to the Secretary of the Navy on this matter?

Admiral BADGER. No; it is not. There was a report——

The CHAIRMAN. For numerical increase, was there not?

Admiral BADGER. There was a report prepared in which it was recommended that there be a numerical increase of 19,600 enlisted men, and as I remember it, 1,070 commissioned officers of the line.

The CHAIRMAN. And the report with the numerical increase in it was not published, was it?

Admiral BADGER. It was never sent in. The Secretary of the Navy, for what reasons I do not know, objected to publishing any report giving concrete numbers. He came and attended a meeting of the board, and this report of the personnel, which was then a very live question indeed, was read to him. My recollection is that he said——

The CHAIRMAN. That had the provision for 19,600 enlisted men in it?

Admiral BADGER. In it; yes, sir. Whether that was a special letter or whether it was embodied in the report itself, I am not sure. but I rather think it was a special letter. However, substantially it recommended the 19,600 men and——

The CHAIRMAN. And that was cut out?

Admiral BADGER. It was changed. The principle was maintained. but those figures were cut out. I will try to give it to you exactly as I recall it, now.

The Secretary said that he had no objections whatever to the 19,000 appearing in the report, but that he did not feel under the conditions and circumstances he could publish the report of the General Board with that in it. The report of the General Board never had been published in full before the present Secretary of the Navy came in, and Admiral Dewey, who was always most anxious to increase the influence of the General Board and the knowledge of people as to its workings, was anxious that that particular report should be published, and he suggested, and talked over with the General Board, the idea of putting in it the same principle exactly, and leaving out those particular numbers, and that was done. There was no pressure whatever from the Secretary of the Navy beyond the fact that he would not publish the report with those numbers in, and he gave no reasons for his action.

Now, as I remember, the 19,600 men were the number that we believed were required to do what I have already read to you, that legislation be asked for providing for active personnel, officers, and enlisted force capable of keeping in full commission the battleships under 15 years of age, etc. That has been already read.

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It was our idea, as I remember it, that the 19,600 men were needed to do that, and by leaving out the 19,600, we still maintained the principle, and the report would be published; and that is all that I remember about it.

The CHAIRMAN. And was Congress informed of the recommendation of the board for the 19,600 additional men?

Admiral BADGER. No; I think not; not that I know of.

The CHAIRMAN. And they were not provided for?

Admiral BADGER. My recollection—and I think it is correct—is that following this recommendation of the board for the keeping in commission—having men to keep in full commission—various ships enumerated, the Bureau of Navigation, which has charge of the manning of ships and the personnel of the Navy, made a report which was published—I read it—in which it stated that there were then enough men in the Navy to do all these things and to have something over; I think something like 500 or 600 men more in the Navy at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. The General Board was familiar with that when it made these general recommendations?

Admiral BADGER. The General Board believed that they needed that number of men, 19,600 men.

The CHAIRMAN. In addition to what it had?

Admiral BADGER. To meet the requirements. That was the General Board's recommendation.

The CHAIRMAN. And the Secretary had that?

Admiral BADGER. The Secretary of the Navy, without either approving or disapproving, except in so far as he stated that he would not publish the report if those figures were left in. They were left out, and it was attempted to provide for it.

The CHAIRMAN. But the action of the Secretary in not putting it up to Congress and not asking that increase, would indicate that he was not in favor of the 19,600 increase, would it not?

Admiral BADGER. Well, of course, the Secretary of the Navy has to do as he thinks best in these matters. I do not know what actuated him. That 19,600 never reached him afterwards.

The CHAIRMAN. But it did reach him in the first letter sent him by the General Board?

Admiral BADGER. No, he came over to the General Board, and it was read to him, and there he expressed his disapproval, and it was changed there.

The CHAIRMAN. I will read you Capt. Taussig's statement about that matter.

Admiral BADGER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. [Reading:]

The General Board of the Navy, in its 1914 annual report to the Secretary of the Navy, recognized that the unsatisafctory personnel conditions greatly impaired the efficiency of the fleet, and made recommendation to the department that an additional 19,600 enlisted men be immediately requested. The Secretary of the Navy did not accept the report of the board with this recommendation, but returned the report to the board with the request that all mention of a numerical increase be eliminated. This the board did in order that the other important features of the report be not lost to the public.

Admiral BADGER. The report never left the board containing that 19,600. It never left the board at all, and never was returned.

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The CHAIRMAN. But whether it went to him officially or not, it went to him?

Admiral BADGER. He knew it, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. After the Secretary declined to accept the report of the General Board for the numerical increase of 19,600 men, did the board, before sending the deleted report back to the Secretary, send to the Secretary a letter in regard to the needs of the personnel, giving more details than those contained in the printed report? That report was the letter to which you have referred.

Admiral BADGER. No, that letter was never sent—no letter of that kind was sent to the Secretary.

The CHAIRMAN. Was not this letter read to the Secretary at a meeting of the General Board?

Admiral BADGER. It was, yes. That is what I have stated.

The CHAIRMAN. Was any action taken by the Secretary on this letter, or was it simply filed?

Admiral BADGER. Filed.

The CHAIRMAN. With the General Board?

Admiral BADGER. Filed with the General Board, to be produced whenever, in case——

The CHAIRMAN. Does the General Board keep minutes of its proceedings?

Admiral BADGER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Was the fact that this letter was read to the Secretary in such a meeting of the General Board reported in its minutes?

Admiral BADGER. I can not tell you, but I think so.

The CHAIRMAN. Does it still appear in the minutes of the General Board?

Admiral BADGER. It would appear if it is there. Of course, I can not remember the minutes of that occasion.

The CHAIRMAN. You testified that the letter was read to the Secretary at a meeting of the General Board?

Admiral BADGER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And that minutes of the General Board were kept?

Admiral BADGER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And that, therefore, it must appear in the minutes, in the record of the General Board.

Admiral BADGER. I say therefore it ought to be in the minutes of the General Board. I can not swear that it is absolutely there, but I believe it to be there.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you conceive of any possibility of its not being there?

Admiral BADGER. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you verify that fact, Admiral, and notify the committee as to whether it is there and whether it has been there continuously, as far as you can find out?

Admiral BADGER. Yes; I have recently seen the paper itself. I have not seen the minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. I refer to the minutes, now.

Admiral BADGER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I say, will you do that as soon as you can, so that we can put it in this record?

Admiral BADGER. Yes. I will do it immediately.

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The CHAIRMAN. Did the General Board in 1914, after the outbreak of the World War, consider that it was possible that the United States would be drawn into the war?

Admiral BADGER. I think we all feared that we should be drawn into the war, yes. It seemed impossible that such a general war as that could proceed without a nation like the United States being drawn into it eventually.

The CHAIRMAN. And this was considered possible immediately after the outbreak of the World War?

Admiral BADGER. I should say so, so far as I am personally concerned, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And you think that the General Board thought all along, from that time until the declaration of war, that we would be drawn into the war?

Admiral BADGER. That there was great danger of our being drawn into the war, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Were there any special reports made to the department after August, 1914, and prior to these reports that you have already alluded to, beginning February 4?

Admiral BADGER. As I have said, all the letters that have been quoted in this appendix A bore upon the possibility of war and the preparation therefor. There are I do not know how many here. There are 70 or 80 papers, doubtless, or more. And this does not include by any means all the information that was gathered, because throughout the continuance of the war, from the early days, whenever officers of our own service returned from abroad, and whenever foreign officers came—as many did come, here, the General Board had them before them and conducted hearings, and those hearings are in existence now, in bound volumes, and an enormous mass of information in regard to the situation was obtained that does not appear——

The CHAIRMAN. And you are going to inform the committee about the acceptance by the department of those various recommendations?

Admiral BADGER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. If any of them were not accepted, on whom was the responsibility?

Admiral BADGER. As I say, the mere fact that we did not receive a statement showing what the action of the department was does not mean either that it was accepted or rejected. Frequently nothing was done even preceding the commencement of the war, to show what action the department had taken.

The CHAIRMAN. But even so, Admiral, if they were not adopted, whether they were formally accepted or not, if they were not adopted, the failure, and the responsibility for the failure to adopt them, was on whose shoulders?

Admiral BADGER. I am not sure that you can say. They might have not been good recommendations.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; but who has the final say?

Admiral BADGER. The final say is with the Secretary of the Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. And you are going to inform the committee whether the recommendations made by the board in 1915 for increasing the personnel of the Navy, were approved by the department? That was one of the things that you were to inform the committee about.

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Admiral BADGER. Well, I can——

The CHAIRMAN. I asked you, in each case where you made recommendations, to let us know whether they were accepted by the department?

Admiral BADGER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Is the word "accepted" or is it "approved?"

Admiral BADGER. "Officially approved," would be the language. But again I will say that the mere fact that we did not receive a return does not prove that it was not accepted and approved, and put into effect by the department.

The CHAIRMAN. But in case of an increase in personnel, it is very simple for you to find out whether, if approved, it was carried into effect?

Admiral BADGER. Yes; we can find out what the recommendations of Congress were in that year.

The CHAIRMAN. So that, will you give me that also? And, in the case of all recommendations for increases of personnel, if they were not approved and not adopted, the responsibility was on the Secretary of the Navy, was it not?

Admiral Badger. The responsibility is always on the head of the department, whatever it may be.

The CHAIRMAN. Were there any other plans with regard to naval operations, prepared by the board, before those plans which you have already given us, the first of which I think is dated February 4, 1917?

Admiral BADGER. Yes; I have read you one, commencing; a preparatory plan was in 1915. That was establishing reports by the various bureaus as to the status of preparation in each bureau for war.

The CHAIRMAN. Were there any others besides that?

Admiral BADGER. Only that all recommendations of the General Board for increase of the Navy, the types of ships, for everything with which it was charged, were in the line of preparation for war; not necessarily for this particular war, but for all wars.

The CHAIRMAN. Was any plan drawn up to meet the case of a war in which the United States naval forces would be used almost exclusively against submarines?

Admiral BADGER. No; because it was believed that we should have to do what the people abroad were doing; to follow their lead. You understand that we entered the war under this handicap that we came in to cooperate after the others had been at war three years. Our neutrality had prevented us from completing the necessary ships to prepare for a new type of warfare, and the recommendations throughout were as soon as we entered the war we should cooperate to the best of our ability with the belligerents on the allied side. We all knew that the submarine had started a new type of warfare. As early as March, even before we entered the war, we had begun to build submarine chasers. The first order for submarine chasers was placed on the 17th of March, 1917; and I think it covered about 44. Every preliminary thing had been done toward increasing our destroyer force, and as soon as war was declared we commenced to sign contracts and commenced just as soon as practicable a vast increase in our destroyers. I think we contracted for in the neighborhood of 350 destroyers, costing somewhere in the neighborhood of $2,000,000

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apiece, in the very few months succeeding the commencement of war, commencing almost immediately. They had very great difficulty in finding facilities for so greatly increasing that kind of craft, but the idea of the Secretary of the Navy and of the General Board and of every other department, so far as I am informed, was that our plan must be dependent upon the plans of the Allies, brought about by familiarity with three years of war under these exceptional conditions.

The CHAIRMAN. But did the General Board have any plan drawn up for a war in which the United States naval forces would be used almost exclusively against submarines; in which the naval warfare would be practically restricted to the submarines?

Admiral BADGER. We could not say that; no, sir. We knew we would have war with these submarines, but I should not say that we thought necessarily it would be confined to submarine warfare. We thought it possible and very probable that our fleet would be called into service.

The CHAIRMAN. But you did not formulate a general plan of submarine warfare?

Admiral BADGER. A general plan?

The CHAIRMAN. You did not draw up any general plan for a submarine warfare?

Admiral BADGER. I do not think it was possible to draw up any plans for submarine warfare.

The CHAIRMAN. On what did you base your recommendations with respect to submarine warfare?

Admiral BADGER. With respect to submarine warfare?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral BADGER. We had the reports of our own officers abroad. We had the reports of the foreign officers who were here, notably the British, and Commodore Gaunt, the naval attaché, who was an unending fount of information on that subject. We had the reports of officers returning, and we had the reports, so far as they went, of losses. All of those combined to acquaint us with the situation and the steps that were taken.

The CHAIRMAN. Had any plans been formulated, prior to our entrance into the war, for sending antisubmarine craft abroad?

Admiral BADGER. Not that I know of.

The CHAIRMAN. When were such plans formulated?

Admiral BADGER. I have read you here this morning where the General Board said that undoubtedly it would add much to the moral effect by sending our destroyers abroad and antisubmarine craft, and also that we should, in view of the emergency, send them abroad as soon as possible.

The CHAIRMAN. That was in your recommendation of May 3, was it not?

Admiral BADGER. I think it was.

The CHAIRMAN. Was any general plan governing antisubmarine operations ever drawn up in the Navy Department?

Admiral BADGER. I do not know. I do not believe that any such plan was prepared.

The CHAIRMAN. Was it better, in the opinion of the General Board, to keep the antisubmarine craft on the Atlantic coast or to send them to the war zone?

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Admiral BADGER. Now, you are opening a very broad question, Senator, and one that is very controversial.

The CHAIRMAN. Your report of May 3 recommended sending abroad as much as possible.

Admiral BADGER. As much as the condition of our fleet and the number that we had would permit. Now, I do not object to saying this on one view of the situation. It looked in April and May very much as though peace would have to be declared by the British and the French—the Allies. The reports that we were receiving were most pessimistic here, that they could not hold out. In that case, if the German navy had remained untouched, there was no telling how we in this country might become involved with Germany ourselves, and therefore it was a very doubtful policy whether we should strip ourselves and run the chance of coming in at the last moment and being defeated on the other side as far as prevention of the collapse of the allied powers was concerned, or whether we should look out for ourselves and our own fleet until we could see about it. Therefore the men who had a responsibility of that kind considered it from that point of view also, that we must look out for our own fleet, in addition to the fleets of the other powers concerned, and not strip our battleships of protection against the submarines that might attack them. We had our fleet here in the Chesapeake. We went to sea for practice purposes, to keep them up, without any real protection, and it was a very dangerous thing, but we had to take the chance, because we had to send all of our other vessels abroad.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the mission of our naval forces in home waters? Was it to protect against operations by an enemy capital fleet or against raiders or submarines?

Admiral BADGER. Both, if necessary; but certainly against raids on our coasts by submarines or by destroyers, or by light craft generally.

The CHAIRMAN. Therefore it had three missions; one to protect against the capital fleet, one to protect against raiders, and one to protect against submarines?

Admiral BADGER. Well, say submarines, yes, sir; and all had to be taken into consideration.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think there was very much danger of a capital fleet coming against it?

Admiral BADGER. There might have been, if the Allies had sued for peace and the Germans were free to follow their own inclinations, in view of the attitude that we had assumed all through the war. There was a good deal of hatred.

The CHAIRMAN. You have stated in your testimony that the fleet was in splendid condition.

Admiral BADGER. Yes, I have stated that, according to all the reports that I have heard, it was in splendid condition.

The CHAIRMAN. That is as a fleet, or in respect to the individual vessels?

Admiral BADGER. As a fleet.

The CHAIRMAN. It was a complete battle fleet?

Admiral BADGER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What did it consist of?

Admiral BADGER. It consisted of battleships, destroyers, submarines, and cruisers.

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The CHAIRMAN. All with the fleet?

Admiral BADGER. All forming part of the fleet, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Were they actually with the fleet?

Admiral BADGER. It is not necessary that they should be. The fleet is the ships that compose the Navy—compose the fleet.

The CHAIRMAN. I am talking about a battle fleet, now, that I asked you about.

Admiral BADGER. Yes. Well; battleships, destroyers, and submarines.

The CHAIRMAN. And cruisers?

Admiral BADGER. And cruisers also, if we had wanted them with the fleet.

The CHAIRMAN. Were the cruisers and submarines that you speak of all prepared and ready for war, in every way, as to the personnel and material?

Admiral BADGER. No; they were not fully prepared. We had had misfortunes with the submarines, and who is to blame I do not know. Our cruisers were not up to the modern standard so far as speed is concerned, but they were good cruisers of their class and of their kind. The cruisers with which it is usual to compare them now are the cruisers really that were built after the war commenced, in 1914, and we could not do it.

The CHAIRMAN. You are familiar with the details of the battle of Jutland?

Admiral BADGER. Well, I have read it.

The CHAIRMAN. In your opinion, would it be wise to send the battleship force of the United States Navy as it was then, at the time of the war, to meet a fleet like that of Germany as it was constituted at the battle of Jutland, when our battleships were unaccompanied by battle cruisers or scouts or screening vessels, and with only a small force of destroyers?

Admiral BADGER. I think that it would have been a dangerous thing to do. Germany admittedly had a more powerful fleet than ours, and we were striving to get a fleet which would, first, equal that, and then which would equal that of the most powerful nation. When we entered the war in 1917 there was no doubt about the superior power of the German fleet over ours. We had been striving to reach that point where we could equalize the power of those two fleets. Therefore, to say that you can put a less powerful fleet against a more powerful one with a chance of sucess is not good military tactics. I think, however, that the battle fleet as it stood, that is to say, the battleships, and ship for ship the destroyers were fully equal to the Germans', and I am rather under the impression that our battleships in fleet were as powerful as the Germans'.

The CHAIRMAN. But without the screening vessels?

Admiral BADGER. Without the screening vessels, which we were still trying to build as a part of our fleet, and which constituted the main difference in power between the German fleet and our own.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you do not consider that a Navy or a fleet is in all respects ready for war when it is short of screening vessels?

Admiral BADGER. That may be; but that responsibility can not always be placed on the shoulders of the Navy or the Navy Department, because we had been trying to obtain cruisers and other ships for many years where the total cost prevented the growth of that

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type of ship as rapidly as we wished. But you can not say that because we did not have them in 1914, the Navy Department was to blame, because the Navy Department had been trying——

The CHAIRMAN. Are you of the opinion that all of the adequate screening vessels we had were prepared and ready at the time of the outbreak of hostilities in April, 1917?

Admiral BADGER. No; I do not think they were.

The CHAIRMAN. So that the fact that Congress had not provided those vessels is not the determining factor in the case, because we had vessels that were not ready?

Admiral BADGER. Yes, sir. I am not speaking there of the fact that they were not as good vessels of their class, in some cases, as the more modern cruisers abroad.

The CHAIRMAN. But we did have screening vessels which we could have had ready, and did not have ready?

Admiral BADGER. I am not prepared to say absolutely on that, but I think that we did not put the smaller cruisers into commission until after the war was declared.

The CHAIRMAN. At the beginning of the World War were not gun crews taken from our battleship force before it left Cuba to return to the United States, to put armed guards on merchant ships?

Admiral BADGER. I do not know when they began to take them out of the fleet. They did before war commenced.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Mayo, I think, has testified that before the declaration of war the personnel of his fleet was being depleted.

Admiral BADGER. Yes, I think they did before the war started. I do not know exactly.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you consider that a Navy or a fleet is in all respects ready for war when its battleship personnel must be depleted to furnish armed guards for merchant vessels?

Admiral BADGER. I think that was an entirely new and unexpected development, taking the men out of the battleships. It came suddenly and could not have been foreseen.

The CHAIRMAN. But if our Navy had been in all respects complete as to personnel, could we not have taken those men from some less important forces than the actual battle forces which made up our battle fleet?

Admiral BADGER. There we have been struggling ever since I have been in the Navy for a naval reserve. We have been struggling for more men. It is one of the most difficult things in the world to get through Congress—let us put it there for the time being—provision for men for the Army and the Navy. Now, we had when we entered the war all that had been provided for in the Navy. We found a new duty for those men to perform, and that was to act as armed guards for merchant ships. We supplied that, and it was one of the best things that the Navy has ever done, the way that it met the emergency, supplied that demand, and took in the new drafts who were given, drilled them, and made good the absence of those men who had been sent away, at the earliest possible moment. I have inquired on many occasions from competent officers of that fleet what the result was, and while they have sometimes said that it would reduce their secondary batteries, yet they had been able to hold the main battery crews in good condition, so that I do not think that the actual fighting capacity of the ships was seriously injured by the armed guard crews detachments.

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The CHAIRMAN. The personnel was materially lowered by it?

Admiral BADGER. We got the men back almost immediately.

The CHAIRMAN. But not trained men?

Admiral BADGER. Not as well trained, but we proceeded to train them.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral BADGER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. But now, Admiral, assuming that Congress was responsible for the lack of personnel, I think the testimony already given shows that when the General Board recommended an increase of 19,600, it was not allowed to put up this report to Congress. The Secretary of the Navy had that cut out.

Admiral BADGER. He had the figures cut out, but my contention is that he did not have the principle cut out.

The CHAIRMAN. But he made no attempt to get it?

Admiral BADGER. He made no attempt, so far as I know.

The CHAIRMAN. Therefore Congress was not shown the need for those 19,600 men.

Admiral BADGER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And I think the testimony also has shown that in January of 1917, and at several periods thereafter extending well up into 1918, the Secretary ordered enlistments in the reserves stopped. Now, that can not be very well attributed to Congress, can it?

Admiral BADGER. Oh, no; no, not in that case.

The CHAIRMAN. How many armored cruisers of large size, protected cruisers capable of making 15 knots, did we have in our Navy in April, 1917, do you know?

Admiral BADGER. We had 10 of the armored cruisers to start with. I do not know whether it was 9 or 10 at that time. We had either 9 or 10. We lost one down in Haiti, or somewhere. Yes, it was 9 armored cruisers.

The CHAIRMAN. Nine armored cruisers, and how many large sized protected cruisers capable of making over 15 knots speed?

Admiral BADGER. I should say there were only about 5.

The CHAIRMAN. Only 5 protected cruisers capable of a speed of over 15 knots?

Admiral BADGER. Over 15 knots? Let me see. That is, not including the armored cruisers, you understand?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral BADGER. Cruisers, first class, the *Rochester*, *Brooklyn*, *Charleston*, and *St. Louis*. Those were cruisers of the type that you speak about, large cruisers ranging along about 9,000 tons.

Of the cruisers, second-class, we had the *Chicago*, *Columbia*, *Minneapolis*, and *Olympia*, ranging anywhere from 7,500 to 4,500 tons. That makes four more.

Of cruisers, third-class, of the *Marblehead* type—they would not come under your question.

There were 10 of 18 or 9 of 17 cruisers, I will say. There were 3 cruisers of the *Birmingham* class, which would make about 21, altogether.

The CHAIRMAN. Were these vessels manned and ready for immediate action at the outbreak of war in 1917?

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Admiral BADGER. I do not remember. Some of them were and some of them were not. How many were, I do not now remember.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you remember whether any of them were immediately available for use with the fleet?

Admiral BADGER. I think that some of the armored cruisers were immediately available. They were in the Pacific. We brought them up at a very early date to the Atlantic coast and turned them into the cruiser squadron patrol for the American coast.

The CHAIRMAN. But when the war broke out, on April 6, 1917, if within two weeks thereafter we had had to go into a great naval engagement with the German fleet, do you know whether any of these armored cruisers or protected cruisers would have been available for action with the fleet?

Admiral BADGER. I think that the majority of them would have been available; yes. They were in commission on the Pacific coast, and they could have been brought through the Canal. But to get the exact data on that——

The CHAIRMAN. But were they brought through the Canal immediately?

Admiral BADGER. They were not brought through the Canal immediately. They were left on that side.

The CHAIRMAN. So that they were not a part of the Atlantic Fleet?

Admiral BADGER. They were not a part of the Atlantic Fleet

The CHAIRMAN. And for any urgent action they could not have been brought out. They would have needed several weeks notice, would they not?

Admiral BADGER. Not several weeks. It would probably have taken them two weeks to get to this side.

The CHAIRMAN. But they were all manned and ready?

Admiral BADGER. They were all ready; and a part of the Pacific Cruising Fleet.

The CHAIRMAN. All of them?

Admiral BADGER. Some of them; not all.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not recall how many?

Admiral BADGER. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. As commander in chief of a fleet, would you not have preferred to have had all these cruisers, scouts and screening ships with the battleships?

Admiral BADGER. The more ships I could get, the better I would like it.

The CHAIRMAN. But you would not say that these vessels were absolutely necessary?

Admiral BADGER. That type of vessel?

The CHAIRMAN. In order to make up a complete battle fleet?

Admiral BADGER. They are not absolutely necessary, but they would help out a great deal. The information service could have been carried on with destroyers alone, as we have been carrying it on in our Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. But would you say that the destroyers could take the places of these larger vessels?

Admiral BADGER. As scouts; as scouting vessels, they would have to. They have done it.

The CHAIRMAN. And as screening vessels?

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Admiral BADGER. Yes. That is one of their duties, as screening vessels—destroyers.

The CHAIRMAN. Then, do you think it necessary for us to appropriate large sums of money for these other types of vessels?

Admiral BADGER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You do?

Admiral BADGER. Because they help greatly; but I am speaking about the possibility of using the fleet without them. That is quite possible, although of course it would be very much better to have them.

The CHAIRMAN. And you think it would have been dangerous to have engaged in a battle without them?

Admiral BADGER. Not the type of cruiser we had. I think not. They can not approach the battle of the great battleships—the great armored class of ships. They would have to be kept out of range.

The CHAIRMAN. No cruiser can approach a battleship, can it?

Admiral BADGER. No; not with any safety.

The CHAIRMAN. Not with any safety. So that they were not different from other scout cruisers in that respect?

Admiral BADGER. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you consider a well-equipped air service as of importance in connection with naval operations to-day?

Admiral BADGER. Of very great importance.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think that such an air service would have been useful with our naval service in the war zone immediately upon our entry into the World War?

Admiral BADGER. Of great use; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Could it have been used successfully against German submarine bases?

Admiral BADGER. We hoped they would, but the practice did not show it.

The CHAIRMAN. Did the General Board advise the Navy Department of the importance of such a service in 1913?

Admiral BADGER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Did the Navy Department ask Congress for the necessary appropriations promptly to develop that service?

Admiral BADGER. I do not remember now what they asked. We were trying for an aeronautic service, and money was asked at various times, but I am under the impression that we did not—in 1915 we asked for $5,000,000, which seemed to be a very large sum in those days, and there were appropriations previous to that, and we had a very small number of airships. We were backward all the way in this country in airships when war commenced. We spent quite enough money to have gotten a better exhibit than we did, but the Navy is to be highly commended for the way in which it proceeded at once to provide the necessary bases and all the facilities for utilizing both heavier than air and lighter than air craft abroad.

The CHAIRMAN. I have some more questions to ask you, Admiral, and it is nearly 1 o'clock now, so we will adjourn until to-morrow morning at 10 o'clock. Will you be here then?

Admiral BADGER. Yes.

(Thereupon, at 1 o'clock p. m., the subcommittee adjourned until to-morrow, Friday, April 16, 1920, at 10 o'clock a. m.)

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NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

FRIDAY, APRIL 16, 1920.

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON NAVAL AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to adjournment, in room 235, Senate Office Building, at 10 o'clock a. m., Hon. Frederick Hale presiding.

Present: Senators Hale (chairman), Keyes, and Trammell.

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL CHARLES J. BADGER, UNITED STATES NAVY—Resumed.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. Admiral Badger, will you proceed.

Admiral BADGER. Mr. Chairman, yesterday you asked me to supply certain things for the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral BADGER. One of them was the action of the Navy Department in the case of papers under Appendix A.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral BADGER. I have made notes on this list of all the cases, and I will hand it to the stenographer.

The CHAIRMAN. Stating what action was taken?

Admiral BADGER. Stating what action was taken in each case. I will state that where no action appears on the record it does not mean either approval or disapproval by the department. It is simply on account of inaction on the part of the receiving clerk, I take it.

The CHAIRMAN. You have stated which ones of your recommendations were formally accepted by the department.

Admiral BADGER. All of those for which we have any acknowledgment at all, it is stated what that acknowledgement is. It is in the majority of cases. There are some where no action was forwarded to the board.

The CHAIRMAN. It is not stated what action was taken in regard to following out recommendations, even after they were accepted?

Admiral BADGER. No, sir; that comes under the executive part of the department.

The CHAIRMAN. And you are not familiar with that?

Admiral BADGER. No, sir; not familiar with that, in most cases.

The CHAIRMAN. In 1917 a number of these approvals were signed by V. O. Chase.

Admiral BADGER. Yes, sir; V. O. Chase. He was at that time senior assistant to the Chief of Operations.

The CHAIRMAN. And he accepted?

Admiral BADBER. He signs by direction for the Secretary.

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The CHAIRMAN. For the department?

Admiral BADGER. Yes, sir; and you will find some other signatures there; as that of Schofield.

The CHAIRMAN. And in some cases they signed, by direction, for the Secretary?

Admiral BADGER. For the department.

The CHAIRMAN. For the Secretary?

Admiral BADGER. For the Secretary.

The CHAIRMAN. Did the Secretary ever sign any himself?

Admiral BADGER. I am told that some of them are signed by the Secretary.

The CHAIRMAN. In any event, it has the same effect?

Admiral BADGER. It has the same effect.

(Appendix "A," including the additional notations above referred to by Admiral Badger, will be found where originally offered in evidence.

Admiral BADGER. I have also here a statement that you asked for with regard to the personnel, the 19,600 enlisted men, which I took from the hearings of the House committee, Sixty-third Congress, third session, 1915–December 10, 1914. You asked for that yesterday, with regard to the action of the Secretary of the Navy, or on the reading of a paper from the General Board, requesting 19,600 enlisted men.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you read your statement?

Admiral BADGER. I have headed it "Action of the Secretary of the Navy as to an increase of personnel for the 1915 program." That was the point on which you were questioning me yesterday. This is taken from the hearings of the Committee on Naval Affairs of the House of Representatives on estimates submitted by the Secretary of the Navy, Sixty-third Congress, third session, 1916. Secretary of the Navy's hearing, December 10, 1914, on personnel, pages 572 to 585. On page 573 the Secretary states:

I have not asked for any increase of enlistments, and I will tell you why.

In this statement of reasons for not asking for more enlisted men in the 1915 Navy bill is introduced a tabular statement of "Distribution of personnel required for the fleet" from Rear Admiral Victor Blue, dated November 28, 1914, showing (from the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation's point of view) that there was a surplus of 384 enlisted men in the Navy after providing for its requirements on that date.

That is all that I know with regard to the Secretary's action.

The CHAIRMAN. There was no statement made to the committee?

Admiral BADGER. There was no statement made to the board. That is his action before the House committee.

The CHAIRMAN. I say there was no statement made to the House committee, so far as you know, by the Secretary, telling them of the recommendation of the board?

Admiral BADGER. Not that I know of; no, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I also asked you about the minutes of the board.

Admiral BADGER. Here is a copy of the minutes. [Reading:]

GENERAL BOARD, NAVY DEPARTMENT,
November 12, 1914.

The executive committee met at 10 a. m. Present: Rear Admirals Badger and Fiske, Capts. Winterhalter, Knapp, Oliver, Hood, and Huges, and the secretary of the board. Rear Admiral Nicholson entered at 10.50 a. m.

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Nicholson was at that time Chief of the Bureau of Navigation.

The minutes of the executive committee meeting of November 10, and of the General Board meeting of November 11, were read and approved. It was directed that the minutes of the meeting of November 11 be submitted to the Secretary of the Navy before finally becoming a part of the record of the board.

Capt. Hood read to the committee the amended portions of the letter on building program and personnel, 1916, in which reference to the war in Europe is eliminated in accordance with the direction of the board at yesterday's meeting.

Capt. Winterhalter suggested that the figures regarding shortage in enlisted personnel be reconciled with recent information from the Bureau of Navigation.

Admiral Dewey entered at 11 a. m. and the meeting resolved itself into a meeting of the General Board.

The Secretary of the Navy entered at 11.03 a. m.

The letter regarding "The immediate need of the Navy for trained personnel to meet the situation which exists at the present time and assure the national defense," G. B. No. 421, November 13, 1914, was read to the Secretary of the Navy. Minor changes were made in the letter during the reading. Admiral Dewey directed that the letter be filed with the war plans.

The Secretary of the Navy and Admiral Dewey withdrew at 11.30 a. m. The meeting resolved itself into a session of the executive committee and Serial No. 298, building program and personnel, 1916, was again taken up for discussion.

The section about personnel was read and discussed.

Admiral Nicholson withdrew at 12.05 p. m.

A paper from the chief of the Bureau of Navigation to the Navy Department regarding present and suggested distribution of the personnel, was read and discussed. It was directed that the paper, Serial No. 298, as revised, be drawn up in smooth form for consideration tomorrow.

The executive committee adjourned at 12.50 p. m., to meet again at 10 a. m. tomorrow.

Approved by the executive committee, November 17, 1914.

E. H. CAMPBELL,
Commander, United States Navy,
Secretary General Board.

The CHAIRMAN. I asked you yesterday, Admiral, the following question: After the Secretary declined to accept the report of the General Board for that numerical increase of 19,600 men, did the board, before sending the deleted report back to the Secretary, submit to the Secretary a letter outlining the needs of the Navy as regards the personnel, giving more definite recommendations than those contained in the printed report?

Admiral BADGER. There was such a letter. It was read to the Secretary of the Navy, and while I do not remember what the Secretary of the Navy said in the matter, the letter was not forwarded officially.

The CHAIRMAN. And took no action on it?

Admiral BADGER. And took no action on it so far as I know; no action on that particular paper, certainly.

The CHAIRMAN. And in his hearing before the House committee he made no allusion to that?

Admiral BADGER. He made no allusion to that paper, which the minutes of the report of the hearing, which I just read, show.

The CHAIRMAN. The minutes?

Admiral BADGER. I mean the report of the hearing before the House committee.

The CHAIRMAN. That shows that that letter was read to the Secretary?

Admiral BADGER. No; that shows that the Secretary made no allusion to that letter there.

The CHAIRMAN. But you have stated that that letter was read to the Secretary at this meeting.

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Admiral BADGER. Yes, at the meeting of the General Board.

The CHAIRMAN. At the meeting of the General Board?

Admiral BADGER. Now, when the Secretary appeared before the House Naval Affairs Committee on the subject of the recommendations for 1915 for personnel——

The CHAIRMAN. I understand; he made no mention of that.

Admiral BADGER. He made no mention of that?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral BADGER. And that information I get from studying the hearings of the House Naval Committee upon that bill.

The CHAIRMAN. What I want to know is whether the minutes of the General Board show that letter was read to the Secretary of the Navy.

Admiral BADGER. The following is the paragraph referring to that in the minutes of the board which I read:

The letter regarding "The immediate need of the Navy for trained personnel to meet the situation which exists at the present time and assure the national defense," G. B. No. 421, November 13, 1914, was read to the Secretary of the Navy. Minor changes were made in the letter during the reading. Admiral Dewey directed that the letter be filed with the war plans.

The CHAIRMAN. What letter was that; your original letter; the amended letter?

Admiral BADGER. No; that was another letter.

The CHAIRMAN. That was the letter referred to in my question?

Admiral BADGER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. The letter outlining the needs of the Navy as regards enlisted personnel?

Admiral BADGER. I think so.

The CHAIRMAN. And the minutes do refer to that letter?

Admiral BADGER. The minutes, I believe, refer to that letter; yes, sir. I have not the number of that letter here, but I am safisfied that that reference in these minutes that I have read was to that letter.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you get that letter and put it in the record?

Admiral BADGER. I believe so; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to have that for the record.

(The letter referred to is here printed in the record, as follows:)

(Confidential.)

G. B. No. 421.

NOVEMBER 14, 1914.

To: Secretary of the Navy.

Subject: The immediate need of the Navy for trained personnel to meet the situation which exists at the present time, and assure the national defense.

Reference: (*a*) G. B. letter No. 420–2, of November 14, 1914: Increase of the Navy: building program and personnel, 1916.

In its letter of November 14, 1914 (reference *a*), the General Board summed up the situation of the Navy in regard to personnel, showed clearly the deficiencies which exist for manning all the ships of the Navy for war, and recommended the passage of the two laws which would eventually, when they had come into full operation, provide for these deficiencies, and put the naval branch of the national defense in a state of readiness for war.

2. It was shown that at the present time the Navy is lacking about 1,070 line officers, and a proportionate number of staff officers, and about 19,600 enlisted men—allowing the usual number for unavailable prisoners—to fully man all the ships of the Navy with peace complements. It was shown that the only reserves in sight are the partially trained 596 officers and 7,132 enlisted men of the Naval Militia. It was stated that war complements should be 10 per cent above peace complements.

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3. We are therefore faced with this condition: If the Navy should be called on suddenly to prepare for an emergency we would be short about 19,600 men to fill the existing vessels of the Navy with peace complements. These places would have to be filled by new enlistments of untrained recruits, though probably some ex-Navy men would return to the service, so that the entire number might not be wholly without some training. In addition, we would have the 7,132 Naval Militiamen, who would just about serve to increase the peace complements to war complements. Even if the 19,600 men were immediately available, this would not provide complements for vessels building nor for the many auxiliaries that would have to be taken into service for war, and would leave no reserves to meet casualties which would occur in war. In other words, should an emergency arise in the near future calling for putting the fleet on a war footing, we should have the available vessels of the Navy as they exist to-day manned in large proportion by 19,600 untrained recruits and 7,132 partially trained Naval Militia, and have no provision for manning new ships that would be hurried to completion, or for auxiliaries that would be taken into service, and no reserve provided for casualties.

4. In view of the actual existing situation in the world's affairs to-day, the General Board is of the opinion that this is a dangerous situation, and believes that considerations of national security and defense call for the promptest application of the most effective remedy.

5. If there was no need for considering the present disturbed condition of international affairs, the two laws proposed in the General Board's letter of November —, 1914, would eventually meet the situation and provide and maintain the trained personnel, active and reserve, that is required by the national defense to man the entire fleet for war. When these two laws shall have been passed and shall have become fully operative, the Navy will be in the state of readiness as regards personnel that the country has a right to expect; a state that does not now exist, and that never has existed. With the most expeditious action possible on the part of Congress in passing the two laws recommended, and with the very best efforts of the department in carrying them into effect, there will be a considerable interval of time extending over many months, if not several years, before the trained reserve called for by the proposed laws is fully organized and effective, or before the Navy will be in a complete state of preparedness to meet an emergency.

6. Meantime, during this interval, we are faced by the most complicated and delicate situation in international affairs that has ever arisen; and the General Board is of the opinion that the national defense is not in proper condition to meet any crisis which may arise at any time from this delicate situation. Causes of friction have already arisen, and are increasing in number as new and hitherto unrecongized interpretations of international law are being made by one or another of the belligerent nations in matters relating to contraband, blockade, closure of open seas, seizure of noncombatant persons from neutral vessels on the high seas, and other questions, all of which affect our national rights and seriously interfere with our legitimate trade and with our national prosperity. As the war develops there may also arise at any time a question even more nearly affecting our national interests in the form of changes of sovereignty in outlying possessions of the belligerent or other nations which lie on or near the American continent, or flank our ocean routes to the Panama Canal or across the two oceans. The general disturbed international situation is further complicated for the United States by the continued unsettled state of affairs in Mexico, Haiti, and Santo Domingo; and by the as yet unsettled questions in dispute between this Nation and Japan. Authentic reports show that popular feeling against us in the latter country is growing more unfriendly, and this at a time when Japan's alliance with Great Britain and Russia leaves her free from fear of restraint from those quarters.

7. The General Board hopes that no combination of circumstances will arise that would draw us into this present world conflict; but, from the causes briefly sketched above, foresees grave danger of such a possibility, or of a derogation from our rights as a nation. In the opinion of the General Board this possibility is fostered by our well-known state of military unpreparedness, and is likely to become a probability unless a prompt remedy for it is applied at least to that branch of the national defense that forms its first line—the Navy—during this interval covering the time between the present state of unpreparedness and the time when the proposed laws will have operated to supply a continued remedy.

8. To meet this situation the General Board believes that the personnel of the Navy should be increased and trained in the quickest possible manner until it is at least sufficient to fully man the available ships of the existing Navy. The best way—and, in fact, the only possible way to get men quickly and train them—is by enlistment in the regular service, and training in that service. If the General Board's provisions are correct, the element of time is of such importance that even this method of correcting the major deficiency in our naval preparation—lack of trained personnel—is

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rather palliative than remedial, but it is the best that can be applied at this late date and no other would even approach effectiveness.

9. It has been shown that we should have about 19,600 more trained men, together with the 7,132 naval militia we already have, to fully man the available ships of the Navy for war, leaving out of consideration the matter of the needed reserves. The passage of the laws recommended in General Board letter No. 420-2 of November —, 1914, would provide immediately for about 4,700 men, in the general plan of manning the Navy in the future. This leaves about 15,000 of the 19,600 men believed to be immediately required by present conditions unprovided for, until sufficient time shall have elapsed for the proposed laws to come into full operation and shall have provided the needed reserve. The General Board believes the present exigencies make such delay a national danger. It is, therefore, recommended that, in addition to the two laws already recommended for the general regulation of the naval personnel, an emergency law be passed authorizing the immediate enlistment of 15,000 men additional and that these men be enlisted, trained, and held in service until the operation of the two general laws already recommended shall have provided the trained personnel—active and reserve—required to fully man the entire fleet for war.

GEORGE DEWEY.

The CHAIRMAN. Then I asked you if the minutes of the board referred to that letter, and the reference to the letter was in the minutes of the General Board and had been in those minutes right along.

Admiral BADGER. As I have already said, I believe that that reference that I have just read, that section from the minutes, refers to that letter, and that letter has been in the files of the General Board since that time. You will observe that Admiral Dewey, who was presiding, directed that the letter be filed with the war plans.

The CHAIRMAN. And the minutes you have read this morning were the minutes prepared at that time?

Admiral BADGER. November 12, 1914.

The CHAIRMAN. And you have been on record ever since?

Admiral BADGER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any further papers to file?

Admiral BADGER. Here is a paper. You made some reference yesterday to the action of the General Board in 1913 on the subject of naval aviation.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral BADGER. I believe you asked if we had any data on that subject. At all events, the secretary of the General Board, Commander Baum, thought you did, and got a copy of that letter. If you would like to have it read, it can be read now. This is on development of airships, for naval use, August 30, 1913.

The CHAIRMAN. That letter was put in the record by Admiral Niblack during his testimony, and will be found at page 2441 of the typewritten record.

In a memorandum of the General Board, dated November 20, 1914, 425, serial 476, you recommended that the British Admiralty be cabled concerning details of the proposed mine barrier, and stated:

It is believed that the great experience of the British naval forces in North Sea operations and their experience in naval mining during the present war puts them in the best position to decide whether the proposed scheme is practicable in construction and maintenance, and whether in the opinion of the Admiralty it is the best scheme in sight for limiting the operations of enemy submarines.

Admiral BADGER. Yes, sir; I remember a telegram of that kind.

The CHAIRMAN. Did the General Board uniformly base its recommendations and decisions upon the necessity of basing all plans upon the latest and most complete information available concerning war operations?

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Admiral BADGER. Yes, sir, always; but not necessarily from the British Admiralty or the French naval office or any other particular place. We based our recommendations upon what we considered the best available information.

The CHAIRMAN. But in general, in such cases, you believed that the experience of the nations who had been operating in the war zone was of great value, did you not?

Admiral BADGER. Oh, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And that, as you said, it put them in the best position to decide whether the proposed scheme was practicable?

Admiral BADGER. That was a particular scheme, Senator, and involved propositions in mine laying. The great distance that had to be covered, the usual depth of water, the weather conditions in the North Sea and up in the Orkney region, and the experience of the British, particularly in laying mines in the open sea, of which we had had very little in our Navy, all led us to refer that matter to the British Admiralty through the proper channels, to find out whether in their opinion it was practicable to lay mines and keep and maintain them there in such deep water under such conditions. We attached a great deal of importance to their opinion on that subject.

The CHAIRMAN. And, in general, you would say that the experience of the men who had been through the mill should be followed rather than the experience of men who had not?

Admiral BADGER. Oh, yes; certainly.

The CHAIRMAN. Was such information available in Washington?

Admiral BADGER. Not as authoritative. We had line officers who had had experience in the laying of mines, one of them, notably, Capt. Reginald Belknap, and during the consideration of this mine barrier Capt. Belknap was temporarily attached to the general board to give us the result of his experience; so that while we had an experienced officer in the laying of mines, we thought it would be better to get the local experience of men who were familiar with the North Sea conditions.

The CHAIRMAN. And from what sources did you obtain this information?

Admiral BADGER. That was addressed to the representative of the Navy Department in London; I suppose, undoubtedly, to Admiral Sims.

The CHAIRMAN. And it was through him that you got that information?

Admiral BADGER. Through him that we got that information; as we got all other information requested from London. All those requests went to the senior officer in London.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, if such information was available in Washington, why did the general board in this memorandum consider it necessary to refer the question to London, to the British Admiralty?

Admiral BADGER. Because we thought that they had had more experience than we had had, and would be guided in a measure by the reply that they sent in our findings.

The CHAIRMAN. It is essential, is it not, in warfare, when conditions are changing rapidly, that all operational plans should be based upon full information and well-informed discussion by responsible leader?

Admiral BADGER. Yes.

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The CHAIRMAN. Would not a sound policy, therefore, require that all detailed operational plans should have been drawn up in the war zone?

Admiral BADGER. All the details from day to day; yes. That is the duty of a commander in chief in the field.

The CHAIRMAN. That is detailed operational plans?

Admiral BADGER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Were the recommendations of Admiral Sims accepted on the assumption that they were based on full information and full agreement with the Allies?

Admiral BADGER. Why, of course, we always believed that what came from Admiral Sims had the highest authority.

The CHAIRMAN. And came from the Allies?

Admiral BADGER. And came from the Allies?

The CHAIRMAN. From an agreement with the Allies?

Admiral BADGER. We did not go into that—how he got it. We got his recommendation, and we believed that it was a recommendation based on his best judgment from the information he received from the Allies, or wherever he was stationed.

The CHAIRMAN. And you assumed that he was in full agreement with the Allies, did you not?

Admiral BADGER. I can not say that we had such an assumption. We did not know. In general, yes, I suppose; but not on particular occasions. I do not know that he would have been of very much use if he had no opinion of his own. He would have had to have differed once in a while, I suppose.

The CHAIRMAN. But you did not feel that in every case where you got a recommendation from Admiral Sims that you had to look up the question whether the British Admiralty agreed with him or not?

Admiral BADGER. Oh, no. We do not do that with any officer, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Of what importance is the time element in warfare?

Admiral BADGER. I should say it was of the first importance.

The CHAIRMAN. Was the critical character of the submarine campaign in 1917 recognized by the Navy Department?

Admiral BADGER. I can not speak for the Navy Department. I can speak for myself; yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You thought that it was recognized by the Navy Department?

Admiral BADGER. I think it was; yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And in view of the importance of the time element and the critical needs of the situation, was not any delay in throwing all available force into the campaign a great military error?

Admiral BADGER. That seems to be a simple general question, but as a matter of fact——

The CHAIRMAN. I am not asking you, Admiral, if there was any delay, but I am asking you if there was any delay, was it not a military error?

Admiral BADGER. Then that depends on what caused that delay; whether it was the opinion of the directing authorities that the delay was proper or necessary. One man might think there should be delay, and another might think there should not. There is always that difference of opinion. The governing opinion lay at the head-

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quarters of the Navy. If they decided that there should be delay in the sending of those ships over, I accept their decision in the matter.

The CHAIRMAN. But, still they would be committing a military error if they were delaying it beyond the necessities of the case?

Admiral BADGER. If they had a good reason for the delay—I do not know what the reason may have been in that particular case.

The CHAIRMAN. So that if they did delay beyond any necessities of the case, it was a military error?

Admiral BADGER. Putting it that way; yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Sims in his testimony has shown that in regard to his recommendations as to the sending of antisubmarines craft to the other side, great delays occurred, and that his recommendations were adopted after many months' delay and put into effect; was not that a military mistake?

Admiral BADGER. No, sir; I am not qualified to say that. The vessels were sent by the Navy Department—by the directing head of the Navy Department, of which some of the ablest naval officers were representing the department and directing its movements, and if they, knowing the conditions as I have tried to show in my statement, thought at the time that the delay should take place in sending certain types of ships abroad, then I consider that it was their duty to act in the way that they did. It is a question of opinion, as between one man and another, in that case.

The CHAIRMAN. But the fact that they subsequently adopted the recommendations of Admiral Sims indicated that the recommendations were all right, did it not?

Admiral BADGER. I have stated here that operational plans were changed from day to day. What they might refuse to-day, they may accept to-morrow. You can not tell.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Sims has stated that all of the vessels sent to Europe in the first year of the war were in existence on the 1st of April, 1917. How can a delay in sending forces under these conditions be justified?

Admiral BADGER. That, sir, the officers who were responsible, will have to justify themselves. The men are available, and will, I understand, appear before this committee. I can not say what their action was.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it a question of the officers? Is it not a question of the policy of the department about sending them over?

Admiral BADGER. Oh; it is a question of policy of the department. Nobody else could send them except the department.

The CHAIRMAN. I asked you, could a delay in sending the forces over under those conditions be justified?

Admiral BADGER. I say you will have to ask the men who are responsible to justify. I can not. I was not an executive officer during the war, and I can not say any more.

The CHAIRMAN. If it is a question of policy, you have already stated that that was a question for the head of the department. The final responsibility rests upon the head of the department?

Admiral BADGER. Oh, yes; as always. The responsibility rests upon the head of the organization finally.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Sims in his testimony referred to the department's delay or failure of six months in sending over specific requirements of battleships, submarines, and tugs, after conference

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of Admiral Sims and the Allies. Were the recommendations of Admiral Sims in your opinion sound?

Admiral BADGER. What is that; sending over what?

The CHAIRMAN. The delay in sending over specific requirements of battleships, submarines, and tugs.

Admiral BADGER. That was Admiral Sims's summing up of the situation, that he needed these things at that time, and I am trying to make it clear that while it was his duty to make such recommendations in accordance with his belief as to the proper thing to do, it was the duty of the directing heads, the responsible heads, in Washington, to decide whether they would comply with those recommendations or not. If they did not, then the responsibility lies upon them for their action.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, I asked you if the recommendations of Admiral Sims were sound. They were sound, were they not, when the department sent those vessels over later, as they did, in every case?

Admiral BADGER. Generally speaking, recommendations of that kind are sound. But I do not know, and I can not testify, whether they were sound at the moment or not, when the whole situation was taken into account. They might have been sound from that side but they might not have been sound from this side of the conditions.

The CHAIRMAN. At least, they were needed over there, were they not, and the department recognized that by sending them over at a later period?

Admiral BADGER. Undoubtedly they were added and were needed; but the department decided whether that was the proper time, considering everything else, to send them or not. They had the recommendations, and they were the ones who took the action.

The CHAIRMAN. Then, do I understand that you question the fact that they were needed when they were asked for, but admit that they were needed at a later date?

Admiral BADGER. I do not state that. I say that they may have been needed; and yet the action of the department in not complying immediately with the request may have been based on perfectly just and sound reasoning.

The CHAIRMAN. But at least it caused a delay in sending the vessels over?

Admiral BADGER. At least, they did not act immediately on the request of Admiral Sims, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And presumably that had some effect, when they did not send them over when they were asked for, and probably not a beneficial effect?

Admiral BADGER. It may have had an effect upon the plans on this side and may have had an effect on the plans on the other. We can not tell. I can not tell you. It is impossible for me to testify to a thing like that. That must come from the men themselves.

The CHAIRMAN. You would not be willing to state that the delay in sending these ships over held up certain plans on the other side, regardless of the effect it had on this side? You would not be willing to say that it held up the plans on the other side?

Admiral BADGER. No, I do not state that either, Senator. Whatever action was taken either held up or hastened results. Now,

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what I have been trying to make clear to you is that they may have been needed on the other side and Admiral Sims's recommendation may have been perfectly just and proper and covered the situation; but on this side there may have been other reasons which were considered serious enough and important enough not to carry out at that time those recommendations. Therefore it can not be said that there was neglect on either side.

The CHAIRMAN. But if they were held up on this side for certain reasons which appeared to be important, perhaps, to the department at that time on this side, and which later turned out not to be important, and then not sending them over held up certain plans on that side which were of great importance, does it not prove that it was a military error not to send them over?

Admiral BADGER. No, sir, I can not agree with you there.

The CHAIRMAN. Does it not prove that it was a mistake in general not to send them over?

Admiral BADGER. No, I will not even say that. I think that in viewing it in the light of future events, you might say, that implication should not go because the conditions at the moment made the authorities at headquarters—the governing, directing, responsible headquarters—take a certain action which later on was found possibly to have been unnecessary, but which they could not, at the time they took that action, know would be unnecessary. I can not see that any charge lies for neglect or dereliction.

The CHAIRMAN. Could you conceive of any possible delay that the department made which would be a dereliction on their part in such a case?

Admiral BADGER. Well, of course you can conceive anything, but I should not ever say that a bad result was obtained by any action of the department unless I knew the reasons which impelled the department to take that action; and those reasons I do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. And even if the department was mistaken you are not willing to admit that it was a mistake?

Admiral BADGER. Oh, yes; if I should think it was a mistake. But this is not one of those mistakes that I feel that I can judge upon. I have got to have more information than I have at present.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you are not prepared to say that the recommendations of Admiral Sims were sound, about sending these vessels over?

Admiral BADGER. On the contrary, I am willing to say that from his point of view they were sound.

The CHAIRMAN. How about the point of view of the general board?

Admiral BADGER. The point of view of the general board was also sound.

The CHAIRMAN. I say, how about Admiral Sims's recommendations from the point of view of the general board?

Admiral BADGER. I think they were sound. I think the whole thing was sound.

The CHAIRMAN. You think that the general board agreed with Admiral Sims's recommendations?

Admiral BADGER. The general board believed that the vessels should be sent at the earliest possible moment; but it qualified that, if you will remember, by saying that depended upon the possibility of submarine action by Germany or the Central Powers, upon our

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immediate needs for ourselves, and upon the number of antisubmarine craft that we had, or might be expected to have. Now, I have not quoted it exactly, but I have given you the gist of it, and it is in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Was the general board much impressed with the danger of attacks of submarines on this side?

Admiral BADGER. The general board believed that it was possible, and believed that everything should be done to meet such an attack should it take place.

The CHAIRMAN. They believed, did they not, that the essential way to fight the submarines was to go for them in the war zone?

Admiral BADGER. In general, yes. But they also believed that the submarines might find their way over here; that they might, by some skillful way in which they had shown themselves to be well versed, find bases on this coast, and that we might find ourselves under serious attack from the German submarines and raiders. They therefore believed that proper precautions should be taken to meet any such attack. If the war abroad had ended suddenly there was reason to believe that some of these vessels, or many of them, might be diverted suddenly to our coast, and that we would find ourselves, as the saying goes, "holding the bag." We wanted to be sure whether we were going to be in that position or not before we denuded our coast of proper protective measures.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, if on account of the lack of our assistance on the other side—our immediate assistance—the submarines had been successful and had driven England and France to withdraw from the war, thus leaving us at war with Germany, do you not think that the fact that we could have sent vessels over to help them and did not do so would go down in history as a military mistake?

Admiral BADGER. Oh, I think if it could be shown that that was a good reason for it. But I do not consider that it was a good reason. I do not consider that the presence or absence of the very small number of destroyers that we could have placed there within the first three or four months of the war had any effect on the duration of the war at all.

The CHAIRMAN. There were other vessels besides destroyers that were asked for, were there not?

Admiral BADGER. Yes, sir; but the real crux of the situation lay with the destroyers.

The CHAIRMAN. And you do not think that our destroyers and other vessels going over there had anything to do with putting down the submarine menace?

Admiral BADGER. Oh, yes. I beg your pardon; yes; a great deal to do with it. I do not know what the percentage is, but the vessels that were sent over, the destroyers, were equal in every way, and if we chose to be a little bit conceited we might say better than the other destroyers in those regions in the danger zone. I think they did their part in reducing the destruction by the submarines. I think that they aided the Allies in many ways. I think that they aided our own Government in carrying out the transportation of troops, particularly through the war zone. But I do not think that they had anything to do with the duration of the war—the length of the war—and I do not believe that their being delayed four months or six months would have had any effect whatever on the length of the war.

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The CHAIRMAN. You do not think that the naval forces and their activities in the war had anything to do with shortening the war?

Admiral BADGER. Oh, no; I do not say that. I say they had everything to do with it.

The CHAIRMAN. I was simply asking from your answer.

Admiral BADGER. I say they had everything to do with it. I place the blockade as the most important naval operation of the war in its results. It was not spectacular, but there it was. It shut Germany up so that it could not get anything from anywhere else. It lived on its own fat. It was exhausted. The whole country was suffering for food and for all the material, the raw material that makes it possible to carry on war; and the submarines did not in any way, shape, or manner loosen that blockade or permit stores to come in. The submarines destroyed an enormous amount of supplies and an enormous amount of tonnage, but they had to be absolutely successful in order to change the question of the duration of the war. They did not stop the supplies getting to the allied countries in sufficient quantity to keep the civil population alive and to supply with liberality the armies at the front, and until that could be done they had no effect on the duration of the war.

The Germans were a military race who were determined to fight to the end, and they did fight to the end until they had to collapse, and the mere fact of those submarines working and destroying tonnage and supplies never came to the point where it stopped that.

The CHAIRMAN. You say that the blockade was the principal naval operation of the war?

Admiral BADGER. Yes; I said it was one of the most decisive naval operations of the war, and I think the most decisive.

The CHAIRMAN. When was that blockade effected?

Admiral BADGER. The day that Great Britain declared war with Germany.

The CHAIRMAN. And it was effective thereafter until the end of the war?

Admiral BADGER. From that until the end of the war. There was a little smuggling and a little aid through the Scandinavian countries, but it was a mere drop in the bucket and could not do anything for Germany.

The CHAIRMAN. Our forces had nothing to do with that blockade, and had nothing to do with the establishment of it. That blockade was effective before we came in.

Admiral BADGER. Before we came in. We had nothing to do with it.

The CHAIRMAN. Before we came in the blockade was effective?

Admiral BADGER. For three years; yes, sir—nearly three years.

The CHAIRMAN. And it would have been effective without us?

Admiral BADGER. Just the same, whether we were there or not.

The CHAIRMAN. So that that was not one of the services rendered by our Navy in the war?

Admiral BADGER. I say until we came into the war.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; but you say they could have got along just as well without us so far as that was concerned?

Admiral BADGER. Oh, well, we helped. When we came in, we were reenforcements.

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The CHAIRMAN. We helped——

Admiral BADGER. I can not state absolutely, but I think you will find that when our destroyers went over to Queenstown and established themselves there, very shortly the British destroyers were withdrawn, and in a little while we found that the United States destroyers were the only ones present. I do not know when that occurred, but I think after we got something like 20 of our destoyers there the British took their own destroyers away.

The CHAIRMAN. And took them back to their fleet?

Admiral BADGER. They used them with their fleet or somewhere else in the channel, at some other point. But that area to the south and west of Ireland was never unpatrolled. What we did was to bring reenforcements to them, and we did it very well; and the aid that we gave in sending these reenforcements was very great. That is the point. That is where we come in.

The CHAIRMAN. So that these vessels of ours were used largely in submarine warfare?

Admiral BADGER. Almost entirely. We had there only five battleships with the Grand Fleet in the North Sea, and later we had three battleships for use in emergency, should the German cruisers get adrift on the Atlantic trade routes. And then we had, from time to time, the convoy vessels that may have touched in one port or the other on the other side; escort vessels for convoys across the ocean. But our fleet as a fleet never got there.

The CHAIRMAN. And our destroyers had a great deal to do with putting down the submarine menace?

Admiral BADGER. Oh, yes; they had a part commensurate with their number and power.

The CHAIRMAN. And much more, did they not?

Admiral BADGER. Well, let us concede it, and say so; yes.

The CHAIRMAN. A part that was much more than commensurate, would you not say, with the number of vessels we had, in comparison with the number of vessels used by the British? It has been stated that there were 3,000 vessels of the British, and there were a very small number of our vessels.

Admiral BADGER. Oh, yes; but what I was speaking of was a comparison between 36 American destroyers of the latest type and 36 of the British of the latest type. I do not know that we can claim any more than what our national pride causes us to claim, that we were better than anybody else.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you not think that Germany depended a great deal upon the success of submarine warfare?

Admiral BADGER. Oh, yes; but it had to be complete.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you not think that had a great deal to do with Germany continuing the war—the fact that she expected to win through her submarines?

Admiral BADGER. That is entirely a matter of opinion, you understand, Mr. Chairman. I do not know exactly how far you can go under oath as a matter of opinion.

The CHAIRMAN. I want your opinion.

Admiral BADGER. I have been reading since the war certain books on the subject; for instance, Gen. Ludendorff's book and Admiral von Tirpitz's book, and some others, and there, in those books, are well set forth the hopes of Germany from the submarime war. At one time they were very high, as is shown by the statements in these books.

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Later on, particularly the army of Ludendorff, they began to lose hope of any decisive result coming from the submarine. They were not yet exhausted. They hoped, and the submarine was doing great work; but they saw—and comment upon that—that it was not doing the work that they expected it to do. They had realized that in a way it was a failure. They were doing a great deal of damage to the Allies, but they were not doing the fatal damage, and did not get there. If it had not been for the antisubmarine craft, the destroyers, sloops, and subchasers, trawlers, and all the other things that came, the barriers of mines, and what not, that checked it and held it, they might have succeeded and forced a peace by destroying so much tonnage and by so having interfered with the supplies, so broken the communications of the allied countries that they would have had to have acknowledged defeat; and to prevent that these submarine defensive or offensive vessels, mines, etc., prevented the submarines from making a success of their efforts.

If we had withdrawn antisubmarine craft, the war would have immediately been decided in favor of Germany.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you mean, if America had withdrawn her antisubmarine craft?

Admiral BADGER. No; I say that if all the nations had withdrawn their antisubmarine craft. If America had withdrawn, the damage would have been greater, because the reinforcements we sent would not have been available. Whether or not our reinforcements saved the situation, I do not know. I hope that they did and believe that they did, because we gave them efficient reinforcements at a very critical time. But they did not, by having them there, affect in any way the duration of the war. It would have lasted just as long as it did. What broke the morale of the Germans finally was our troops arriving as they did in such great numbers and such unexpected numbers. A million men in the year was considered something extraordinary, when we began talking about sending men abroad, and we sent 2,200,000 men, I think, taking the actual time that the new armies were going across, in something about a year—a year and one month or two months. It was phenomenal. Nobody believed it was possible. They had had four years of fighting. They had lost enormously. Their material was nearly exhausted, and when they saw these reinforcements that they would have to meet they made two grand final attempts in the spring and summer of 1917, and failing in those, in which our troops, by the way, to the number of I do not know how many, about 600,000 or 800,000 men, were in the front lines, they gave up; and that was the real end of the war; and it was not due to the submarine at all. The submarine hurt the Allies, but it did not help them up to the time of their collapse.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course the submarines had a great deal to do with the sending of our troops over, did they not?

Admiral BADGER. No; I think not. We had to take all sorts of precautions against the submarine, but the submarine did not, as I have stated in my statement here, even check the transport of our troops from the United States to the Continent of Europe.

The CHAIRMAN. And it had nothing to do, either, with the question of feeding the troops after we got them over?

Admiral BADGER. It gave us great anxiety, but it did not prevent us from feeding them. In that they failed also.

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The CHAIRMAN. Because we checked them?

Admiral BADGER. Because we checked them, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, Admiral, I do not like to feel that it was altogether the Army that won this war. I like to feel that the Navy had some part in it.

Admiral BADGER. You misunderstand me, Senator. Neither one side or the other was the determining feature. The Navy and the Army in all wars where navies participate, have to work in cooperation. The thing might be accomplished without the Navy—probably would.. This war would have been a failure without the Navy. We could not have sent any troops abroad if it had not been for the Navy—or the navies of the Allies. We did our part in the protection of our transports, but we did not do it all, because our Navy was smaller. The Navy was as essential as the Army. One could not have gotten along without the other.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; but necessarily there was not any chance for our Navy to get into any great naval engagements with the navies of the enemy, and it seems that the principal thing that our Navy did was to take care of this submarine menace, and it seems to me that they did splendid work on it.

Admiral BADGER. They did splendid work.

The CHAIRMAN. It seems to me that the work they did had a great deal to do with cutting it down, and bringing the war to a close.

Admiral BADGER. They had a great deal to do with it. I am trying to make it clear that I speak of the duration of the war, in this.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, bringing the war to a close.

Admiral BADGER. No; up to the end it did not shorten the war at all, or lengthen it.

The CHAIRMAN. The Navy did not help shorten the war?

Admiral BADGER. It did not help shorten the war or lengthen it, as it stood; no.

The CHAIRMAN. You would state that the work of the Navy had nothing to do with bringing the war to a close?

Admiral BADGER. No; I do not say that. I say that it did not make it longer by not sending those destroyers to the other side; that it did not lengthen the war.

The CHAIRMAN. In what way did they shorten the war?

Admiral BADGER. They did not shorten the war.

The CHAIRMAN. The Navy did not?

Admiral BADGER. No. I do not know whether that is going to show my real ideas or not, but I hope that will read all right when we get it in print.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, well, you can explain in any way you want to.

Admiral BADGER. No; I think it will be understood.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you not think that the complete readiness of our entire fleet for war, with all its auxiliary forces ready to move at once, and the knowledge by Germany that our fleet was so nearly ready, might have decidedly influenced Germany's action and convinced the German people that they would lose the war, and that brought them to recognize the necessity of suing for peace sooner than they did?

Admiral BADGER. No, sir; I do not think so.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not think it would have had anything to do with bringing that about?

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Admiral BADGER. No, sir; the Germans were in for a war on the Continent of Europe. They believed that they were going to win it, and they deliberately challenged the United States to enter the war by adopting the submarine warfare that they did. They knew we would go to war with them if they did, and they deliberately took the chance of what we should do.

The CHAIRMAN. But they knew just how well we were prepared, did they not?

Admiral BADGER. Yes; they knew what we had.

The CHAIRMAN. Absolutely, they knew as well as we did.

Admiral BADGER. They knew as well as we did what we had, and they knew that it would all be in service against them as soon as they declared war.

The CHAIRMAN. And they knew exactly the state of preparedness we were in, did they not?

Admiral BADGER. They knew we were in a very good state of preparedness, according to my idea, Mr. Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. And they had full knowledge of out state of preparedness?

Admiral BADGER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. In breaking the submarine menace and defeating Germany's submarine campaign, would it not have been wise to bend all efforts to closing the channels through which the submarines left their bases before they reached the open sea, before combating them?

Admiral BADGER. If that could have been done, it would have been very much better.

The CHAIRMAN. That is, if we could have sent over a fully equipped fleet, could we not have cooperated with the English and closed them in?

Admiral BADGER. I do not know about closing them in. With the whole British fleet, so far as they were called upon to assist, and what we sent over later, as you said, over 3,000 antisubmarine vessels, with tens of thousands of mines, every effort that could be made in three years of warfare was made, but they did not even close the English Channel up to the end of the war. One of the things that the General Board in its report on the feasibility of the northern barrage said was that if they could not close the English Channel it was futile to put that barrage down; and they promised to close that, but they did not.

The CHAIRMAN. Could we not have helped close the English Channel if we had had our battle fleet there?

Admiral BADGER. We were able to send over there, and did send over, in something like a year and a half—because we were not able to begin until after war was declared—no money was appropriated—the feeling of the people of this country was against war or against showing anybody that we wanted to go to war or thought that we were going to war, and we were behind the others in the development of the means of successfully combating submarine warfare or the submarine menace, nearly three years.

Now, it took us some time to get on a level with those people who had been three years combating this warfare and building with great rapidity. They had, as you stated here a little while ago, 3,000 antisubmarine craft in use when we entered the war. We had com-

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paratively little. I do not suppose all of the ships that we had would number over 60 or 70, as against over 3,000 that they had; and we had to go to work and build. We did build, and we built with astonishing rapidity. We had not commenced when the war ended. The war ended before we had began to show what we could do, either ashore or afloat.

The CHAIRMAN. That was building ships?

Admiral BADGER. That was building; and we had to do it after the war commenced.

The CHAIRMAN. That was the building of additional ships?

Admiral BADGER. Yes. Now, we never did get over there, on account of the short time, more than in the neighborhood of 220 ships. It is given here in this table as 220 ships, I think it was on October 1, 1918. It is down here that we had 300 ships there, made up of 68 destroyers, 11 tenders, 28 yachts, 11 tugs, 5 gunboats, 3 cruisers, 6 Coast Guard ships, 11 submarines, 42 sub chasers, 5 battleships, 10 mine layers, 11 mine sweepers, and 24 miscellaneous cargo vessels belonging to the Navy, making 375. Later we had over there, on July 1, 1918, 120 sub chasers built especially for this work. Now, in all, then, we were able to have, let us say, somewhere in the neighborhood of 200 actual antisubmarine craft, as against the 3,000 of Great Britain. We did our share, and we did more than our share; but we did not decide the war.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course the destroyers were the most effective thing, Admiral, in the meeting of the submarine menace, and our proportion of destroyers was very much larger than our proportion of vessels as a whole, over there?

Admiral BADGER. Yes; it was. We had on the 4th of May, 1917, 6 destroyers over there. On the 1st of June we had 19. On the 1st of July we had 30. On the 1st of August we had 47. No; I beg your pardon; those are other vessels.

On the 1st of July we had 28, on the 1st of August 37, on the 1st of September 39, on the 1st of December 45, and finally, as the ships were built and gotten ready and sent over, on November 11, 1918, we had 74. Those are destroyers. We only started with about 50.

The CHAIRMAN. How many of those destroyers were new vessels that we did not have at the beginning of the war?

Admiral BADGER. We had 51 at the beginning of the war, and we had 74 in the war zone at the end of the war.

The CHAIRMAN. We had 51 at the beginning of the war?

Admiral BADGER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. So that, other things being equal, if those 51 destroyers had been in a state of preparedness, and it had been deemed desirable to have sent them over, we could have sent them over at the beginning of the war?

Admiral BADGER. If it had been deemed desirable to send them over, we could have sent them over very much quicker than we did; that is to say, sent them all. Our destroyers were in very good condition before the war began—all the larger destroyers. A good many of them were in reserve, but they had, in the vast majority of cases, considerable reserve crews. During the Mexican troubles in 1914 I was commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet, and I took the reserve destroyers and took them down into the Gulf of Mexico with half crews, and they did everything that the destroyers with

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the full crews did. They were ready, and I took them out suddenly, by order.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to get from Admiral McKean later the exact condition of preparedness of the destroyers at the beginning of the war, and all the other vessels of the Navy.

Admiral BADGER. All right.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, if all of our naval force except battleship force No. 1 and a limited force to guard our own coast, had been sent over immediately after the declaration of war, would not the moral effect have been greatly augmented, and could not the German bases have been closed through the joint action of the Allied fleets?

Admiral BADGER. That means the Battleship Fleet?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral BADGER. No; I do not think we could have sent them over at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. That is, it means not only the Battleship Fleet but with the other vessels that should have been and might have been prepared.

Admiral BADGER. No; while they were able to cruise about in the submarine area, and after the early days of the war in fact never lost one of their capital ships, they did not cruise around without having a base on which they could——

The CHAIRMAN. My question does not refer in any way merely to the Battleship Fleet and destroyers. It refers to the Battleship Fleet and destroyers and all other vessels of the United States Navy except battleship force No. 1 and a limited force to guard our coast.

Admiral BADGER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. That would have included all of the scouting and screening vessels and other vessels which we had.

Admiral BADGER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. If they had been in a state of preparedness.

Admiral BADGER. We talked of sending over a large fleet there, and for certain reasons, and I think they came from the Admiralty, not necessarily through Admiral Sims, we found that we could not maintain a fleet over there of that kind. They did not want them. There was want of harbors. The question of supplying the fleet with food, and the question of fuel were to be considered. When we did send over, later, the five battleships, the request was not for our latest type and best of the oil-burners, but it was for coal-burners because they could not supply them with oil, and they did not want more than five, and my recollection is that in other cases wherever we talked of sending over some ships other than the small type, the purely antisubmarine craft, and the convoy escort ships, the question of maintenence always came in. The Grand Fleet was in such a state that it did not need reenforcements materially. Our five battleships that went over there were for the purpose of allowing five of their ships to be put out of commission in order to utilize their crews in some other way; and also, we were very glad to do anything possible and to add to our cooperation, to add to our forces abroad. But the British never wanted an American fleet over there under American command. They wanted the American aid to be in the way of reenforcements to their own fleet, and I am not

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sure but they were perfectly correct in that, because to have had two separate commands in the same zone would have been perhaps difficult, if not disastrous to carry out.

The CHAIRMAN. You state that the Secretary of the Navy did not ask Congress for the 19,600 men that the General Board said were necessary to man the fleet in 1915?

Admiral BADGER. For the 1915 program, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. For the 1915 program?

Admiral BADGER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. In view of the new ships which were ready in 1917, and which I think at that time it was evident would be ready, was it not plain that the fleet would be undermanned without this increase of personnel in 1917?

Admiral BADGER. To the General Board it was plain that it would be the part of prudence and perhaps necessity to have more personnel for the fleet, yes. There is no doubt of that. Now, what prevented that being accepted as a proper view, I do not know. I have told you that the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation who has charge of the personnel needs of the Navy, in a tabular statement which he presented to the Secretary, and which by the Secretary was presented to the House of Representatives Naval Committee, stated that we had enough men to look out for all the ships in the Navy without any new ones, for that year. We had gotten an increase the year before of 4,500 enlisted men. But we knew we were short of men and we knew we were very short of officers in case we went to war, and we were. We were short of officers then and we are short of officers now for the regular establishment nearly 2,500 line officers.

The CHAIRMAN. Now I want to ask you a few questions, Admiral, about the battleship fleet.

Admiral BADGER. I am afraid you will have to get someone else for that.

The CHAIRMAN. If our battleship force was screened only by a small force of destroyers, would not the scout cruisers of the enemy fleet seek to destroy these destroyers in the first stage of a battle?

Admiral BADGER. Oh, yes; that is a part of the duty of a scout.

The CHAIRMAN. That is one of the first things they would try to do?

Admiral BADGER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. If our weak screen of destroyers had been smashed, would not our battle force have been open to serious danger from submarine and torpedo attack?

Admiral BADGER. Yes; it is very dangerous to go out with battleships——

The CHAIRMAN. Would the General Board justify putting the fleet in action in such a condition, simply having a few destroyers as screening vessels?

Admiral BADGER. No, sir; and that is the reason why we did not want to send them abroad as long as we had a fleet that might be in action. We did not want to denude the fleet to the point where we could not send a fleet on the high seas without great danger.

The CHAIRMAN. That is a denuded fleet. But how about the fleet as it then was?

Admiral BADGER. I think, as the fleet then was, we took a risk whenever we sent that battleship fleet out of the Chesapeake Bay for practice, and we did it on many occasions. We took a great

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risk that we might lose some of those ships by enemy submarines which had come over there knowing that we were doing that, and taking that risk. There are two sides to the question, in other words, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Certain officers who have appeared before this committee have testified that our battleship fleet, consisting simply of battleships and of destroyers with them, which were few in number, could have met the German fleet and beaten it. Now, would you say that after smashing our weak screen of destroyers, as I put my question to you——

Admiral BADGER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN (continuing). Would not a night attack upon our battleships by enemy destroyers have endangered our fighting line and weakened it before the main engagement with enemy battleships?

Admiral BADGER. Yes; if I had had my screen entirely smashed I would have gotten out of there as soon as I could.

The CHAIRMAN. Had the 20 or more armored and other cruisers and our total destroyer force been present ahead of and in the flanks of our battleship force, would not our chances of victory over the enemy battle fleet have been very much greater?

Admiral BADGER. The bigger the fleet and the more complete it is, the better it is.

The CHAIRMAN. Is a fleet without screening vessels and submarines and scouting vessels of all kinds a homogeneous fleet?

Admiral BADGER. It is not a well balanced fleet. "Homogeneous" is a term referring usually to one particular type. It is not a well balanced fleet. It has not the proper auxiliary vessels to accompany it and to do the auxiliary duty.

The CHAIRMAN. And as commander in chief of a battle fleet, would you not say that the presence of screening vessels was of vital necessity?

Admiral BADGER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Would not 10,000 or 15,000 additional men have manned all of these vessels that we had in 1917?

Admiral BADGER. Oh, yes; I think so.

The CHAIRMAN. Who was responsible for their not being so manned?

Admiral BADGER. I do not know that it took very long to man them. I am not competent to say how long it took to man those reserve ships, particularly the destroyers. When I was familiar with the reserve destroyers, they had a nucleus crew on board, a crew which, as I told you, was found to be large enough to handle them under rather strenuous conditions. But they could not have kept it up very long; the work would have been too hard. But they had a nucleus crew.

Now, aboard of all ships there are certain highly trained men that are absolutely essential to the efficient manipulation of that ship, and as we go on that number of highly trained men is increasing on board each ship and type of ship. On board of some ships, like submarines, they all have to be trained to the work. But there are also in all except the submarines other men who are, so to speak, hewers of wood and drawers of water. In the old Navy they used to call them "beef." Now you can incorporate, if you have a destroyer

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that has a crew of 90 men, and you have a nucleus crew of 45 trained men—which was about what the reserve ship had—you can take the extra 45 men and train them in a very short time to do that part of the duty that they are called upon to do.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you mean by a very short time?

Admiral BADGER. I should say that you could incorporate such a number of intelligent men—and in the early part of the war we got particularly intelligent men—on a 50–50 basis on board of a destroyer in not to exceed six weeks.

The CHAIRMAN. Before they would be effective?

Admiral BADGER. Before they would be thoroughly effective.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it not true that the best of the enlisted personnel were put on the battle fleet at the beginning of the war?

Admiral BADGER. I do not know that, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And the fact that Admiral Mayo has testified that the personnel of the battleships was depleted on account of sending men on the armed guard ships, does not that indicate that he had no particular reserve to draw on of trained men?

Admiral BADGER. Oh, he had to take them and train them; and that was a very large part of the duty of that fleet in the Chesapeake; and eventually we devoted two divisions almost entirely to training. That showed what our straits were. They were very great.

The CHAIRMAN. But the primary object of that fleet was as a battle fleet, was it not?

Admiral BADGER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. That is Force No. 2. Its primary object in the first part of the war was that of a fighting fleet, and its secondary object was for training?

Admiral BADGER. Yes; we mobilized those ships to do a necessary work in the war. We soon found that we had to expand. I am probably very nearly right when I say that the enlisted force of the Navy on the 6th of April, 1917, was 51,500 men. There may be a slight error in that number.

At the end of the war the number of enlisted men was more than 500,000. Now, those were the requirements. You can see what an enormous expansion there was there. We never would have supported, and no country could have supported, anything like that in time of peace. Those 500,000 men had to be provided and trained. We trained them on board of our ships. It hurt our efficiency a little bit, just the same as it hurt the efficiency of a regiment at the front when they put in 300 or 500 recruits to fill out losses or vacancies. But the ships met that demand, and in a very short time we were able to turn them out without seriously reducing the efficiency of the fleet. Now, as to how much that might be, I am not able to answer, because I was not with them.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, we are straying a little from the point. I say, would not 10,000 or 15,000 additional men have manned all of these screening vessels that I spoke to you about, that we had in 1917?

Admiral BADGER. I think they would at the commencement of the war, the very first day.

The CHAIRMAN. And who was responsible for their not being manned?

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Admiral BADGER. The responsibility lay with the administration, with the Navy Department, because they were the heads, and they were the directing force.

The CHAIRMAN. If you were told that only one of the 11 armored fast cruisers on the Pacific coast, and few, if any, of the remaining 10 vessels of this class in the Navy were fully manned and officered in 1917, would you consider the fleet ready for battle?

Admiral BADGER. If I was told they were not manned?

The CHAIRMAN. If you were told that only one of the 11 armored and fast cruisers on the Pacific coast, and few, if any, of the remaining 10 vessels of this class in the Navy were fully manned and officered in 1917, would you consider that the fleet and the Navy were ready for battle?

Admiral BADGER. No.

The CHAIRMAN. How long do you think it will take to prepare a half-manned ship for battle against a ship of the same class that has been in full commission for two years?

Admiral BADGER. That is merely a matter of opinion, sir. It depends on the kind of men. I should say from three to six months for large ships.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you, or the General Board, consider it wise to submit our Navy to such a condition?

Admiral BADGER. If we could keep every ship in the Navy manned and ready for battle, as we keep a moderate number of them, we should be glad, and that is what we, from a military point of view, consider the proper course; but no nation can stand for the expense that would be entailed by such a policy. Even Great Britain had only a small number of her fleet fully manned and ready. Great Britain, however, and Germany also, so far as that goes, had the advantage of a large and more or less trained naval reserve, which they could bring in, as they did bring in, when the war commenced. But you can take it that the General Board or the Navy Department or any other set of officers, if they could get the men, if they could get the money to supply the men to keep a war complement aboard every ship, would recommend it every time. Of course we want it.

The CHAIRMAN. The Secretary tried to stop enlistments in the Naval Reserve both before and after the war commenced.

Senator TRAMMELL. In view of the fact that the Admiral does not know what the testimony was, unless he has read it, I want to say that the Secretary was endeavoring to do all that he could to build up the strength of the Regular Navy, and that it was not up to its full strength by a good deal, and he was bending all his efforts on that. That is a fair statement in regard to his activities as to personnel.

The CHAIRMAN. It is also a perfectly fair statement that he could not fill up the Regular Navy, that he found that he could not get men to go into the regular service, but he could get men for the naval reserve. You can take that up later on, when you examine the Admiral.

Senator TRAMMELL. I want him to know all the facts.

The CHAIRMAN. What plan was adopted in regard to antisubmarine operations on our coast?

Admiral BADGER. I have only a general knowledge of that, sir, and I can not testify. That would come, in all its details, from Operations, and I have no doubt that Operations can give it to you.

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The CHAIRMAN. Who was informed as to that?

Admiral BADGER. There may have been many, but I can name Admiral Benson, Admiral McKean and Capt. Pratt.

The CHAIRMAN. Who drew the plans?

Admiral BADGER. I do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. Did the General Board have anything to do with it?

Admiral BADGER. Not the detail of the plan on this coast, no, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you seen the plan?

Admiral BADGER. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you have no special knowledge about it?

Admiral BADGER. I have no special knowledge.

The CHAIRMAN. Is not antisubmarine warfare a very specialized operation?

Admiral BADGER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. What are the special elements in it?

Admiral BADGER. What are the special elements in it?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral BADGER. Well, it is the weapon itself, which possesses a particular power of making itself invisible at will, which in order to meet it requires special methods of warfare. We developed those principally. Perhaps the most useful of all if not in the destruction. in injuring, and injuring the morale also of the crews, was the depth bomb; that is to say, dropping bombs around them. Later on the destroyers and submarine chaser specialized in methods of dropping those bombs, and toward the end no submarine liked to get in the vicinity of any of those bomb-carrying vessels because of the chances of their being injured if not sunk. I think that perhaps would express the greatest specialization as developed by submarine warfare.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know what steps were taken to prepare our forces for these special operations?

Admiral BADGER. Yes; we supplied listening devices. We went very extensively, perhaps more extensively than any other country—I do not know about Germany—into the development of those listening devices by which we could hear the submarine when we could not see her, and the United States can claim, I think, a very high place in its discoveries along those lines and its use of them.

The depth bomb was not, as far as I know, an American discovery, but we certainly used them well, and probably improved on them and in the manufacture of them. I do not know that we developed anything else especially excepting a very good lookout and very active pursuit of the submarine when we were in waters frequented by them.

The CHAIRMAN. Was not the use of seaplanes one of the special operations?

Admiral BADGER. Yes, we used that also. Of course the seaplanes had a full opportunity along the coast up toward the end of the war. The seaplane area of action was rather circumscribed particularly on the water. It was not until rather late that we began to get efficient heavier than air carriers which, in the future, will form part of every fleet. But from the shore they used both heavier than air and lighter than air craft, not only for patrolling but for escorting vessels.

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The CHAIRMAN. What steps were taken to prepare our forces for these special operations, including the use of fleet vessels?

Admiral BADGER. I am not prepared to tell you exactly what we did in the aeronautical field, but very early in the war we began establishing numerous seaplane stations, both in England, in Scotland, and France, and our force of aircraft expanded, before the end of the war, from 200 or 300 at the beginning of the war, to something like 50,000 at the end of the war.

The CHAIRMAN. Very little was done before the war began in that line, was it not?

Admiral BADGER. Very little was done. We had airplanes, but we had not gone very deeply into it. Here is this report of the General Board of August 30, 1913, signed by Admiral Dewey, as president of the board, which has already been put in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. When submarines appeared on our coast in June, 1918, what forces operated against them?

Admiral BADGER. I have only a general knowledge of that, too, and I think if you want absolutely correct information you will have to get it from Admiral McKean.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know what instructions these forces received from the department?

Admiral BADGER. No, sir; not of my own knowledge.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know how far the department was informed as to their method of operation?

Admiral BADGER. I do not.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any questions, Senator Keyes?

Senator KEYES. Admiral, on page 3 of your testimony read at the hearing yesterday, you state "after the commencement of war abroad in August, 1914, and until the United States entered it, April 6, 1917, a period of nearly 3 years, the policy of this country was one of strict neutrality."

Then on page 4 of your statement you said:

> Although there were many, particularly of the Navy, who believed our eventual participation in the war to be inevitable, the Navy Department was handicapped in making preparations which would indicate to belligerent agents, in close watch upon our doings, that we were preparing for war. Only the normal increase in our naval power was, under these conditions, permitted us.

That is to say, our Government being in the position of a strictly neutral nation, would not be justified in making any extra preparation for war, and that we should be confined to, as you say, a normal increase in our naval force. That is correct, is it?

Admiral BADGER. I want to say that that depends upon the point of view that the Nation takes of it, or that the administration takes of it, or that the people take of it, or that Congress takes of it. We could have built more ships if we had wanted to. We could have increased our Navy to its war standard. We could have built 250 destroyers, and we could have said, "We think we may get into this war." But our policy was—and, recollect, I am not criticising in the slightest degree that policy—our policy was to take no steps. Our policy, as shown by what we did, was to take no steps that would indicate that we even expected to get into the war. That is what I mean to say. It was not essential that we should not prepare for war, because we could have done it; but we would have had to explain what we were doing.

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Senator KEYES. In other words, it was the purpose of the Government, to use the common expression, "To sit tight and await developments"?

Admiral BADGER. Yes; you can put it that way.

The CHAIRMAN. But had it not been for our neutral position it would have been possible, would it not, to undertake various plans for war preparations; and, if such preparations were not made, the failure, if any, to make such preparations would be due to the policy of our Government?

Admiral BADGER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. That being so, how do you explain the recommendation of the General Board of October 12, 1915, about one year after the breaking out of the war and approximately a year and a half before we entered the war, which provided for the greatest program of development in the history of our Navy, involving, as you state, the construction of 10 dreadnaughts, 6 battle cruisers, 10 scouts, 50 destroyers, 9 fleet submarines, 58 coast submarines, and a number of auxiliaries, and the whole including an appropriation for aviation and reserve ammunition totaling $499,876,000? You state that the Navy was handicapped and permitted to make only a normal increase in our naval power?

Admiral BADGER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to ask you if you consider the recommendation of the General Board referred to as providing simply for normal increase?

Admiral BADGER. In the first place, the General Board was not always guided in its recommendations by what might be called the political policy of the country. We were guided in our recommendations most frequently, and are still and always will be as long as we exist, by what we consider military conditions; but we have to and we do sometimes recommend things that we know we are not going to get. Nevertheless, in order to show a consistent policy, and also that we believe those things are necessary for the proper military progress or naval progress of this nation, we recommend them.

Now, with regard to that particular program that you speak of there, we had been trying for years to get, from one year to another, some sort of a building policy. Sometimes we got two battleships; sometimes we got three. One year we got five. And we got other vessels. About that date the yearly appropriations for new construction would run from $40,000,000 to $50,000,000. We never knew the next year, what we were going to get. So when that opportunity came, through the suggestion of the Secretary of the Navy as that had done, to bring about a continuing program of around $100,000,000 a year so as to bring our Navy up to where it ought to be in our opinion, we seized that with great avidity and put in that program. It was, in a way, the normal increase under very favorable circumstances.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you think that would attract the attention of any of the belligerent nations?

Admiral BADGER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And would make them think that we might be preparing for war?

Admiral BADGER. It did. It does not now.

The CHAIRMAN. But I understand you to say that the policy of the Government was not to do that?

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Admiral BADGER. The policy of the Government was not to take that course. But that is a 5-year policy, and they could afford to wait a little before they got nervous about that.

The CHAIRMAN. I know, but you have stated what the general policy of the Government was. I am extremely interested in trying to find out whether our Government did have a policy in those four years between 1914 and 1917.

Admiral BADGER. It did.

The CHAIRMAN. Then, if you did have a policy and if the policy was what you have stated it was, then your recommendation was entirely inconsistent with that policy.

Admiral BADGER. We regarded it as we had done many times before.

The CHAIRMAN. And the action of Congress was entirely inconsistent with that policy, then.

Admiral BADGER. The action of Congress was perhaps inconsistent; yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Did the Secretary object to it?

Admiral BADGER. The Secretary suggested it.

The CHAIRMAN. Therefore the Secretary's suggestion was entirely inconsistent?

Admiral BADGER. That may be. I think they deserve great credit.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, I do not want you to be put in any false position about anything you may say here before this committee, and if you would like to qualify the statement that you made about the Navy not having anything to do with shortening the war, I should be very glad to have you do so and put it in along with your statement.

Admiral BADGER. Oh, no; I do not want to make any qualification of the statement I made in the statement I read. I consider that absolutely correct, in my opinion. The only thing was that in this long series of questions I hope that I have not said anything that in any way contradicts what is in my written statement. My real opinion is in writing—in that statement. I stand on that.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; but of course the testimony is a part of the record.

Admiral BADGER. Yes. We went through so much; and I could not tell whether I might not have said something that in some way might be considered as modifying my views, as expressed in the written statement. I do not modify them at all. They stand.

The CHAIRMAN. You have nothing to add?

Admiral BADGER. No, sir.

Senator TRAMMELL. Admiral, as I understand, the chairman was referring more particularly to your statement this morning—some 30 minutes ago, probably—in regard to your stating that the Navy did not shorten the war. I did not understand you to say that the Navy did not have some part in shortening the war or bringing it to a termination, but that you did not mean to claim that the Navy was entirely responsible for the shortening of the war. That is the point, I think, that the chairman had in mind as to whether you really meant to say that the Navy had no part in bringing the war to a conclusion at the time it was ended.

Admiral BADGER. Oh, no; I made no such statement as that, Senator.

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Senator TRAMMELL. I do not mean in your written statement. I can explain to you. The chairman started out by questioning you a good deal on the matter of whether or not the war was prolonged on account of inactivity and lack of wholeheartedness, and so on, on the part of the American Navy. That was the substance of it. You said emphatically that it was not prolonged on account of that; and later you said that the Navy did not shorten the war.

Admiral BADGER. No; then let me see how I can make that statement. I had no intention of stating anything that would in any way invalidate that written statement of mine, and I think we might let let it go at that, sir. I do not know; I would have to examine the testimony to see whether there was any variation in that.

Senator TRAMMELL. I will ask you some questions, then. Do you not think that the activities of our Navy were of sufficient importance to have had some effect upon the war probably being terminated sooner than it would have been if we had not been active?

Admiral BADGER. Oh, yes. Yes, sir, undoubtedly.

Senator TRAMMELL. That is the point.

Admiral BADGER. The Navy did many things. It assisted in getting the Army across. The movement of the troops shortened the war. In my opinion, it shortened the war greatly.

Senator TRAMMELL. And without our Navy that would have been impossible.

Admiral BADGER. Without our Navy the troops could not have gone across.

Senator TRAMMELL. They could not have moved them. So that the Navy performed a very important function there?

Admiral BADGER. Yes; it performed a very important part also in checking the destruction of supplies and material. It did all the things that the other navies did. It was essential to the conduct of the war.

Senator TRAMMELL. In other words, the Navy filled its mission?

Admiral BADGER. The Navy filled its mission.

Senator TRAMMELL. In bringing to an end the war?

Admiral BADGER. The only thing was that the enemy submarines were unable to do such damage to the Allies that the Allies had to sue for peace.

Senator TRAMMELL. In other words, the submarine menace was severe, and a source of great anxiety and annoyance, and did a good deal of damage, but their damage was not effective—it was not fatal?

Admiral BADGER. It had to be complete to be fatal. That is the point. It did not reach the complete state.

Senator TRAMMELL. Now, on the question of policy, while we all know that this country was assuming neutrality, was not the Navy Department during the years, say, 1914, 1915, and 1916, engaged in trying to better the service and enlarge and increase the Navy?

Admiral BADGER. I think so, sir; and that I have stated in my statement—that it did make preparations.

Senator TRAMMELL. But you, of course, had hanging over you the question of not committing an act of war, or doing something that would precipitate war?

Admiral BADGER. That was it.

Senator TRAMMELL. If the Navy Department had committed an act that could have been considered one of hostility toward a partic-

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ular nation, and probably precipitated war, if it had precipitated war two years sooner than it did, were we in better fix then or were we in better fix at the time we did get into it?

Admiral BADGER. Well, we had increased the Navy its normal increase in those two years. The Navy was more powerful in 1916 than it was in 1914. It was more powerful in 1917 than it was in 1916.

Senator TRAMMELL. In other words, we could have better afforded to have gotten into the war when we did than to have committed some rash act that would have been considered an act of war two years sooner? Were we not in better condition when we did get into it?

Admiral BADGER. So far as the Navy was concerned, we were far more powerful. The Navy became better each year in its normal development than it was in the year just past. It should be better this year than last year. That is true on that ground.

As to when we should have gotten into the war, that is a thing that I am not prepared even to reach an opinion on.

Senator TRAMMELL. Now, as to the question of sending over of our antisubmarine craft: Of course, we know the policy that was followed out by the department, and I will be frank in stating that I have been unable to find any testimony yet that showed that that resulted in a failure. None whatever. But if we had sent all of our fleet—submarines and everything else—over there, and left the coast entirely undefended and had taken no precautions whatever on this side, is there not at least some possibility or probability that they might have transferred some of their activities to our coast, and would not that have been regarded as a colossal blunder if we had done that?

Admiral BADGER. If they had sent ships over here and found our coasts undefended, yes.

Senator TRAMMELL. That would have been considered a colossal blunder and mistake on the part of our people. Now, as a matter of fact the policy that we did follow resulted successfully. Is there anything to make it appear that it was a failure, except purely a matter of conjecture?

Admiral BADGER. That is what I state in my written statement.

Senator TRAMMELL. Results count, and not a matter of conjecture?

Admiral BADGER. We succeeded, and it is a matter of difference of opinion as to whether the procedure we adopted was right or wrong.

Senator TRAMMELL. The procedure we followed did result successfully?

Admiral BADGER. Yes.

Senator TRAMMELL. There is no question about that. It resulted successfully. And, in your opinion, from your general knowledge of the situation, the fact that we took a general, broad view of the entire situation, did not restrict ourselves merely to the zone over there, did not, in your opinion, prolong the thing from four to six months, did it?

Admiral BADGER. It did not prolong it at all, according to my ideas.

Senator TRAMMELL. You were asked some questions in regard to the personnel. In the first of 1917, with the Regular Navy not filled up to its full strength, would you regard it as more important to try and recruit the Regular Navy to full strength at that time, rather

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than to try to build up a reserve, when we needed men in the Regular Navy?

Admiral BADGER. If we had any vacancies, the first thing was to fill those vacancies in the Regular Navy. As to the reserve, of course until the war was declared we had no reserve to speak of.

Senator TRAMMELL. Does not a man get much more rapid and much more intensive training in the Regular Navy than in the Reserves?

Admiral BADGER. Under normal conditions; yes, sir.

Senator TRAMMELL. This is hypothetical: If you were trying to build up your Regular Navy strength to its full authorization, and you found that you were having a great deal of difficulty in doing that, and you probably attributed it more or less to the fact that men were going into the Reserve instead of into the Regular Navy, which would you then continue, if you felt that you had to discontinue one or the other until you built the other up; would you discontinue your Reserve temporarily or discontinue the regular naval strength?

Admiral BADGER. If you found the conditions as you state——

Senator TRAMMELL. I said that.

Admiral BADGER. I would, of course, prefer to fill up the Regular Navy first.

Senator TRAMMELL. I will state that the testimony here shows that at the time the Secretary discontinued the enlistments in the Reserves, the testimony of the same witness also is to the effect that the Secretary was bending his energies and doing everything that he could to build up the authorized strength of the Regular Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. Which time?

Senator TRAMMELL. At the very same time he was doing it. Admiral Palmer so stated. He was doing everything that he could; publishing notices in the newspapers and doing all that he could.

I will ask you another hypothetical question, Admiral: If you found that quite a good many men were being enrolled and commissioned in the Reserve as officers, scattered around over the country, when you had no particular use for them, some of them just on little craft, little boats, would you think it time to put a check on enlisting people in the Reserve until you investigated that?

Admiral BADGER. I can only answer that in the general way, that if I thought improper enlistments were being made anywhere in the administration of the Navy, I would investigate it, and if I found that it was wrong I would stop it.

Senator TRAMMELL. A question was asked you in regard to what if we had had 15,000 more men at the time we went into the war, would we not have been able to have manned all the ships with their full quota, and so on? As a matter of fact, did we not provide the necessary personnel and the necessary officers to meet the situation and meet it successfully?

Admiral BADGER. We did, yes. But of course it took a little longer to do it in that way.

Senator TRAMMELL. The 15,000 men would have been a very small percentage of the additional 450,000 that you raised, would it not?

Admiral BADGER. Yes, sir.

Senator TRAMMELL. This arming of merchantmen, I believe you stated that that was an entirely new and undreamed-of and unthought-of proposition that came on?

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Admiral BADGER. No, sir; I did not make that statement. It was unexpected.

Senator TRAMMELL. Unexpected; that is what I mean.

Admiral BADGER. Not unknown or not undreamed of.

Senator TRAMMELL. I mean as far as necessity was concerned. You stated that no one could have anticipated that?

Admiral BADGER. Yes.

Senator TRAMMELL. That was one of the necessities that arose from the progress made by the submarine menace, was it not?

Admiral BADGER. Yes. I think that you have misquoted me there, Senator; not seriously, at all, but I do not think I dilated at all on the unexpected part of arming the merchantmen.

Senator TRAMMELL. I do not know that you said it in your written statement.

Admiral BADGER. Here is what I said in my statement:

In some types, principally of small craft, we were deficient and that mainly because the rapid development of the submarine after war began and the uses to which it was put had given a new and unexpected turn to warfare on the sea, as unexpected by the nations abroad as by ourselves.

That is the only time I remember having used the word "unexpected." But it was unexpected that we would have to arm merchant ships until only a reasonably short time before the war commenced. We commenced arming our ships before we entered the war. The first ship that we armed was armed before the war commenced, I think in March, 1917. That was one of the steps for self-protection that we took.

Senator TRAMMELL. Of course I elaborated a little too much when I said that you said it was undreamed of.

Admiral BADGER. Yes.

Senator TRAMMELL. But you said that nobody could have expected or anticipated the necessity of having to put so many men on the merchantmen?

Admiral BADGER. Yes. We did not expect it to the extent to which it went; no.

Senator TRAMMELL. That was successfully carried out so far as you know, was it not?

Admiral BADGER. The reports were very good. It did not do as well as we had hoped. That is to say, it did not stop the depredations of the submarine upon the slower ships—the cargo ships. In many cases, however, it drove off the submarines and undoubtedly saved a great deal of property.

Senator TRAMMELL. It was at least one of the deterring operations against submarine progress?

Admiral BADGER. Yes. I have been recently going through, on the Board of Awards, the history of the armed guard that we used during the war, and I find a considerable percentage of cases where the submarine was driven off, and a few cases where the submarine was hit and damaged by the defensive guns on board the merchant ship.

Senator TRAMMELL. You have been asked more or less questions in regard to whether or not the board and the department agreed with Admiral Sims about thus and so. As a matter of fact, was not a good deal of the activity, even abroad, thought of, conceived, suggested, even before you heard from Admiral Sims in regard to it, or did he initiate all the activities?

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Admiral BADGER. Oh, no; we had a constant flow of information from abroad from many definite sources. In saying that I do not mean in any way to question the value of the information forwarded through our naval representatives in London or our naval representative in Paris, or anywhere else.

Senator TRAMMELL. You do not question the value of it; but the point I am getting at is as to whether or not everything rallied around and everything agreed upon was subsequent to the time he had made his suggestions, and that he was the main light that was furnishing information, and so on.

Admiral BADGER. He was the main light, but I do not consider that everything that was done, by any means, was due to his recommendations. However, we looked upon our headquarters in London, or abroad, as being the sources from which we could get the greatest amount, the greatest flow, of information: but as I have stated in my statement yesterday, the Navy Department was never suffering, it never lacked any information on the important subjects connected with the allied conduct of the war, from representatives of the allied nations and also from our own officers who were on that service, and so on, who came to Washington and explained.

Senator TRAMMELL. I do not mean to reflect upon Admiral Sims.

Admiral BADGER. Yes.

Senator TRAMMELL. I have not that in view, I assure you. But I want to know whether or not we are going to accept a proposition that means that Admiral Sims was the only officer that was doing anything, and that everything that was worth while was initiated, suggested, by him, and all the rest of you officers just agreed to it—finally agreed to it. I want to find out whether anybody else had any thought or any initiative at all or not.

Admiral BADGER. I do not think that we should accept that point of view, sir.

Senator TRAMMELL. That is the point I am getting at. For instance, there is some of his testimony here about sending over antisubmarine craft. The chairman asked you if you all did not finally agree with Admiral Sims, and do thus and so. Your testimony shows that you had some antisubmarine craft over there on the 4th day of May. I want to know, now, whether the people over here, and other officers, were doing something besides Admiral Sims. So far as I know, I think he rendered a good service. I think that; but I have not gathered the idea that he did all the good work that was done in the Navy. I think a great many of you other officers rendered very good and capable services. But the chairman has asked you several times "Well, you agreed with Admiral Sims, then? You finally came to Admiral Sims's suggestion?" as though he practically was the only one that made any suggestions. That is what I want to find out, whether it was run entirely by him, even if action was deferred, or whether the other officers had some initiative?

Admiral BADGER. I will answer your question. The thing was run here in Washington according to their views of what was proper, but of course influenced by the information which came in, of which Admiral Sims was a very important source.

Senator TRAMMELL. You gave his suggestions proper consideration?

Admiral BADGER. Yes; that is my opinion.

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Senator TRAMMELL. Just as you did information that you might have received from other sources?

Admiral BADGER. Yes, sir.

Senator TRAMMELL. As far as the question of sending over anti-submarine craft, was your board active in that, later, and was the department active in that matter even in the very early stage of the war?

Admiral BADGER. We recommended it. The action taken was by the executive board.

Senator TRAMMELL. When did you recommend that?

Admiral BADGER. We advised it. There are several papers that have been introduced here on that.

Senator TRAMMELL. There is one of May 3.

Admiral BADGER. Of May 3, and one of April 5, I think. I am not sure about that, but there is one dated May 3.

Senator TRAMMELL. I think your first suggestion was probably on April 5.

Admiral BADGER. I think the tenor of all the papers of that time was that we should cooperate in every way with the Allies, and also that our operational plan would very largely depend upon what we would find theirs to be when we entered the war.

Senator TRAMMELL. When did you have the first conference with representatives of the British Admiralty?

Admiral BADGER. The first official conference with Admirals Browning and Grasset was on April 11, 1917.

Senator TRAMMELL. And you agreed at that time that you would render all assistance that you could?

Admiral BADGER. Yes.

Senator TRAMMELL. And that assistance applied to the submarine campaign as well as anything else, did it not?

Admiral BADGER. No definite agreement was made on sending abroad to the submarine campaign. The definite agreement we made was for patrolling of the east coast of North and South America.

Senator TRAMMELL. You were acting upon information then? Your first information was direct from the British Admiralty on April 11?

Admiral BADGER. Yes.

Senator TRAMMELL. And we entered the war on April 6?

Admiral BADGER. Yes; that was simultaneous, almost, with Admiral Sims's first dispatches, if I remember. Admiral Sims arrived in London April 7, and he took two or three days to look up the situation before he sent any information. It is all shown in here, and what that time was. But my recollection is that we got no information until about the 11th, which was the day that Browning and Gresset came. The most illuminating man was De Chair, early in May. He came directly from the Admiralty.

Senator TRAMMELL. Who was in the better position to know what was the wisest disposition to be made of our entire Navy along in the early beginning of the war—Admiral Sims, in London, or the department here that was in touch with the entire situation, not only on that side but on this side?

Admiral BADGER. I have already said that I consider it was the department here at the seat of government. The naval department, the naval situation, was not the only situation that governed in the

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plans for the prosecution of the war. The directing heads had to be guided also by the situation of the War Department, and very particularly of the State Department. I do not know that they ever clashed at all, but in the direction of a war of that kind, particularly in the early stages, those two departments had to be consulted in order to get concerted action of all the power of the country.

Senator TRAMMELL. In regard to your recommendations in 1914 as to increased personnel, I believe you stated that the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, under whose department personnel came direct, compiled a statement in which he showed that you had a surplus of a few hundred men.

Admiral BADGER. Yes.

Senator TRAMMELL. I judge from this that the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, who was a naval officer dealing directly with the question of personnel, did not agree with your recommendation that you should have the 19,600 men increase at that particular time?

Admiral BADGER. He did not, sir.

Senator TRAMMELL. So that if the Secretary of the Navy did not recommend it, he did rely upon information and upon the position which was assumed by the officer directly in charge of personnel? That is, it is to be presumed that he relied upon it?

Admiral BADGER. That would be a reasonable conclusion upon the face of it, yes, sir.

Senator TRAMMELL. I think that is all that I have to ask.

Senator KEYES. Admiral, in answering some of the questions asked by Senator Trammell, I understood you to say that you knew of no act on the part of the United States Government that precipitated or tended to precipitate war prior to 1917. He was speaking of the general policy of this country.

Admiral BADGER. Well, I may or may not have said it, but I will answer it now. I do not know of any act that precipitated war.

Senator KEYES. On the contrary, the Government was doing all it could to keep us out of war, was it not?

Admiral BADGER. To keep us out of war, yes.

Senator KEYES. You may remember that there was a great number of papers written about that time not only to Germany but to Great Britain, and Senator Trammell also asked you, I think, if we were not better prepared for war in 1917 than we were or would have been in 1915 or 1916 to have entered the war.

Admiral BADGER. Yes.

Senator KEYES. I would like to ask you if you do not think we would have been better prepared in 1921 if we had waited until then?

Admiral BADGER. That was the impression I intended to convey by my answer to the Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not consider naval preparedness an act of war, do you, Admiral?

Admiral BADGER. No; but abnormal preparedness is sometimes considered an act of war, and the foreign nations will make inquiries—immediate inquiries—if they see any abnormal preparations made. The diplomatic blue books or white books teem with letters and with protests made, particularly by Great Britain when Germany was building her fleet; and agreements were made. There was not a movement that explanations were not demanded as to why they were doing this, and so on.

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The CHAIRMAN. That is to say, if we had gone ahead with naval preparations, Great Britain would have asked why?

Admiral BADGER. Yes; would have asked why.

The CHAIRMAN. After 1914 do you think Great Britain would have been disturbed about it?

Admiral BADGER. I do not know who would have been disturbed.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think Great Britain would have questioned us if we had done it after the outbreak of the World War in 1914..

Admiral BADGER. It would be only a thought. Yes, I think Great Britain would not have liked it.

The CHAIRMAN. You think Great Britain would not have liked it? Do you think France would have liked it?

Admiral BADGER. I think France would have cared less.

The CHAIRMAN. But would have cared?

Admiral BADGER. I do not think they would have cared at all.

The CHAIRMAN. How about Italy?

Admiral BADGER. Would not have cared.

The CHAIRMAN. Or any of the Allies?

Admiral BADGER. Would not have cared.

The CHAIRMAN. But you think Great Britain would have cared?

Admiral BADGER. Yes; that is my own opinion, you understand.

The CHAIRMAN. So that we did not prepare ourselves to go into the war because we thought Great Britain would question it?

Admiral BADGER. That would be the reasoning. Again, it is my opinion we did not do it because the feeling of the people of this country was to keep out of that war if we could, and that if we made any of these preparations it might influence the other countries. It is just my individual opinion that it would not have influenced anybody except Great Britain.

The CHAIRMAN. How about Germany?

Admiral BADGER. Well, Germany would not have been—it would have influenced Germany in a way, because they would have known that we were increasing our power. I think it would have influenced Germany. But it did not make much difference at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. That is, it would have influenced Germany because we were increasing our power presumably to fight against her?

Admiral BADGER. Well, to fight against her; yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think Great Britain would have minded our increasing our power to fight against Germany?

Admiral BADGER. No; if she could have been dead sure.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think she would have objected to it?

Admiral BADGER. I do not think she could have liked it.

The CHAIRMAN. Even if it was for the purpose of fighting with her against Germany?

Admiral BADGER. Look here, Mr. Senator, we are getting into pretty deep water.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think Germany would have objected to our building up our naval personnel and material, with the ships and the Navy that we then had.

Admiral BADGER. No, I do not think so; and I do not think it would have made any difference if she had. We had a perfect right to go ahead and do anything that was not abnormal and showing intention to join in the war. I would like to scratch out one or two of those questions, there.

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The CHAIRMAN. But it is an extraordinary conception to me, Admiral, that any of the Allies should have objected, after the outbreak of the World War, to our making ourselves as efficient as possible to go into a war when anyone must have known at that time that if we did go into the war it would be against the central powers. I do not think there ever was any question of our going in on the side of the central powers, after the outbreak of the war.

Admiral BADGER. Oh, no; there never was any question of that, at all.

Senator KEYES. Was there any great disturbance in England at our building program in 1913?

Admiral BADGER. No, but if you will take the service literature you will doubtless find criticisms and articles on the increase of our Navy, and I have seen one such article by a Mr. Hurd (?) when the General Board's policy of having a Navy equal to that of the most powerful was stated here about a year or two ago there was a very grave discussion of the reasons for our having any such policy, or the necessity for it was exploited, in one of the principal English reviews. The British take more interest, in general, in the Navy, in their own navy, and in the naval policy of the world, than we do. They long have regarded their navy as their safeguard. They know more about it, and they have more expert civilian writers and investigators than we have. Anything that occurs that is of interest to naval officers or naval domination or anything of that kind, is exploited in that country much more completely and thoroughly than in any other country I know of.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, Admiral, at least if we were paying attention to the objections of Great Britain, we took the most objectionable course we could possibly take in preparing for a future expansion, did we not, when we finally did act?

Admiral BADGER. Yes. I think, perhaps, you misunderstand, Mr. Senator. What I said was that we did not want anybody to believe that we were getting ready for war, and that we only were permitted the normal increase.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not understand why we should not want the Allies to know that we were getting ready for war.

Admiral BADGER. We were permitted only the normal increase of the Navy, and that applied to our own country as well as any other country. It was a part of the policy of neutrality. Now, what particular nation I do not think is of any importance. They all might object, or they all might say, "Go ahead."

The CHAIRMAN. You have stated that putting down the submarine menace did not enable us to get the troops abroad, did you not?

Admiral BADGER. No, sir; no, sir. I said that we got the troops abroad without the flow being checked by the submarines. If we had had nothing to combat the submarines, we would have got no troops over.

The CHAIRMAN. Therefore it did have a great deal to do with getting the troops abroad?

Admiral BADGER. It had everything to do. We got them abroad, though, in phenomenal time, and unchecked by the submarine.

The CHAIRMAN. Because by the action of our force and the Allied forces we protected them?

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Admiral BADGER. The Allied forces protected them. Without it we could not have gotten them there.

The CHAIRMAN. And therefore, by checking the submarine menace, they did enable us to get our troops abroad?

Admiral BADGER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And getting our troops abroad helped to shorten the war?

Admiral BADGER. Yes, but it would not have ended it a day sooner than it did, according to my idea.

The CHAIRMAN. But are you an expert on the question of the Army, Admiral? Do you know anything about the troops of the Army?

Admiral BADGER. I am not an expert, but I do know that to get the 2,100,000 men across 3,000 miles of ocean, to recruit them and equip them and give them some little training—and they did not all get that, they were simply herded aboard ship almost as soon as they got their clothes—was an extraordinary performance.

The CHAIRMAN. It was an extraordinary performance. There is no question about that. But can you testify from naval knowledge as to whether they could have been gotten over sooner had we been able to check the submarine menace, and had we been able to send cargo ships over?

Admiral BADGER. My opinion, as I stated, is that they could not. That is what I have been saying.

The CHAIRMAN. That is merely an opinion?

Admiral BADGER. That is merely an opinion.

The CHAIRMAN. You have not made a study of that matter?

Admiral BADGER. It is merely an opinion.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Trammell has spoken, in questioning you, of the colossal blunder that it would have been to have sent antisubmarine forces over at the early stage of the war and to have left our coast undefended.

Senator TRAMMELL. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have you state my entire question.

The CHAIRMAN. I am simply stating it from memory.

Senator TRAMMELL. I stated if we had sent them over there and then they had come over here with their vessels and attacked our coast, with our coast unprotected, and without any defense here, then would not that have been regarded as a colossal blunder—a colossal failure?

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I intended to convey.

Senator TRAMMELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. If we had had battleship force No. 1 over here and the boats or vessels which we had over here on our coast after we had sent our antisubmarine forces abroad, could they not have given our coast some protection?

Admiral BADGER. Oh, yes; they would have given some protection to the coast. It depends on how many ships they had retained. The battleships in force No. 1 could hardly have been sent to look for submarines, though. It would have been very dangerous.

The CHAIRMAN. I spoke of the other vessels.

Admiral BADGER. Yes; the other vessels. And we had very few. When the submarines did come over, we had very few antisubmarine craft on this coast, to my thinking. I do not remember how

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many, but you can find out from the Operations officers how many there were. But we had stripped ourselves by that time to below what would ordinarily have been called a safe limit, and nothing but the emergency abroad, I think, could have influenced the officers to so strip themselves.

The CHAIRMAN. But we had a large force over in the summer of 1917—a large antisubmarine force—did we not?

Admiral BADGER. Yes; we had a large force over there.

The CHAIRMAN. And in doing so, we must have stripped ourselves on this side to a certain extent?

Admiral BADGER. We did strip ourselves very close.

The CHAIRMAN. And when did the first German submarine come over?

Admiral BADGER. I have forgotten the date. I am told that it was May, 1918.

The CHAIRMAN. So that in spite of the fact that we had stripped our force over here, no submarines came over?

Admiral BADGER. Submarines had been here before we entered the war.

The CHAIRMAN. Not for 9 or 10 months?

Admiral BADGER. I beg your pardon.

The CHAIRMAN. No submarine came over for 9 or 10 months?

Admiral BADGER. Exactly, but that did not mean that they could not send them if they wanted to.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Trammell says that we must judge by results. We won the war, and therefore we did what was right. How about applying that to this question? No submarine did come over, and therefore there was no great danger to our coast over here, as proved by what happened.

Admiral BADGER. We could not see the point then, you know.

The CHAIRMAN. But is it not true, Admiral, that the large bulk of the expert naval opinion of the Allies was to the effect that the submarine menace was principally over on the other side?

Admiral BADGER. Oh, yes; it was, undoubtedly.

The CHAIRMAN. And that the value of the submarine to Germany was for what it could do over on the other side near her base?

Admiral BADGER. It undoubtedly was; but we had had two object lessons before the war, apparently. We had had a submarine come over, go into harbor——

The CHAIRMAN. Before we entered the war?

Admiral BADGER. Yes; go into the harbor of Newport with all the privileges of a visiting man of war, leave Newport, go out over the shoals past Nantucket lightship, and sink some five or six ships then and there, and then go back home again.

The CHAIRMAN. And that fear of what might happen and what did not happen would justify us in withholding our assistance from the other side?

Admiral BADGER. For a reasonable time.

The CHAIRMAN. And for just as long as we withheld that assistance, by just so long we delayed putting down the submarine menace?

Admiral BADGER. We delayed to that extent; but I am not saying——

The CHAIRMAN. To the extent that we withheld it, we delayed?

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Admiral BADGER. I do not want to get this mixed. I am not saying that the submarines did not go on destroying property. What I am standing for is that because we did not send over sooner than we did we did not prolong the war and cause those enormous losses stated in the hearing of Admiral Sims.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Trammell asked you if it was a question between getting men for the naval reserve or men for the regular Navy, whether you would not give up the naval reserve in order to get men for the regular Navy.

Admiral BADGER. The question was, as I understood the question, Would it be preferable? Supposing you were building up a naval reserve, but had vacancies in the regular Navy, which would you fill first? And I say that I would fill the vacancies in the regular Navy first.

The CHAIRMAN. Undoubtedly; but if you found that you could not get men into the regular Navy, would you not in every way try to get them for the reserve?

Admiral BADGER. Oh, yes; but we want men first in the Navy, and second in the reserve.

The CHAIRMAN. Testimony, I think, has shown that in many cases it was not possible to get them for the regular Navy, whereas you could get them into the reserve.

Admiral BADGER. I do not know as to that.

The CHAIRMAN. In such cases you would do everything you could to get them into the reserve at least, as the second best thing you could do, would you not?

Admiral BADGER. If within the law, I would get men for the reserve if I could not get them for the regular Navy; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And after the war had commenced it made very little difference whether the men were in the reserve or in the regular Navy; they were all used, were they not?

Admiral BADGER. They were all used; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And they were all given training?

Admiral BADGER. Yes, sir; they were all used. They were all given training, of course. They had their values. There were some classes of the reserve; there were certain limitations upon their employment, etc. But, speaking generally, the reserve was absolutely necessary.

The CHAIRMAN. And the reserve, of course, did a great deal of value during the war?

Admiral BADGER. A very great deal. We could not have gotten along without them.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you consider that we were adequately prepared as to personnel at the outbreak of the war?

Admiral BADGER. I think not. I think that in accordance with the General Board's views we should have had more men at the commencement of the war.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you not at one time in your testimony refer to armed guard preparation as early as 1917?

Admiral BADGER. I have said that the first ship with an armed guard was in March, 1917, I think, a month before the war.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; but did you not refer in your testimony to the question of putting armed guards on ships as early as 1914 or 1915?

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Admiral BADGER. No; we recommended at that time—yes; the arming of merchant ships for defense. We did not say anything about armed guards. It was arming merchant ships for defense.

The CHAIRMAN. That was in what year?

Admiral BADGER. That was in 1915, I think. I will look it up.

The CHAIRMAN. And in 1915 the *Lusitania* was sunk, and if I recall the matter correctly, there was considerable talk about her being armed at that time, was there not?

Admiral BADGER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. So that it was not entirely a new question, the question of arming merchant ships?

Admiral BADGER. Oh, no; it was general here. At the commencement of the nineteenth century it was general. Ships from Salem went out armed as sloops of war, with double crews.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Trammell has asked you about the recommendations of Admiral Sims, and as to whether or not they should have governed entirely in the operations of the department?

Admiral BADGER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you in any case send over any antisubmarine vessels that were not recommended by Admiral Sims in the early part of the war?

Admiral BADGER. I do not know, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. When you made your report about what you would do in relation to putting down the submarine menace you had before you the recommendations of Admiral Sims, had you not?

Admiral BADGER. Oh, yes; Admiral Sims and a great many others. The policy of the department, as I understood it, after we entered the war, was to cooperate in every possible way we knew, and that all of the ships we properly could send across against the submarine menace should be sent; and they were sent.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Sims was sent over to cooperate with the British and to get their ideas and to act in conjunction with them?

Admiral BADGER. That is my understanding of his mission; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And it was understood that he was to make reports to the department, and was there to study the situation so far as our cooperation with the Allies was concerned?

Admiral BADGER. He was to be our naval representative in London. He was the senior officer there.

The CHAIRMAN. So that it would have been improbable that any action in relation to our cooperation with the Allies would be taken without his knowledge or recommendation, would it not, or without consulting with him?

Admiral BADGER. No; not entirely. I think, speaking generally, that would be true. He was the acknowledged and accredited representative abroad; but the Navy was being handled by the proper authorized officers senior to Admiral Sims.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the general handling of the Navy; but I mean——

Admiral BADGER. And whatever they did was determined here. Of course, what he said had influence—very great influence; but they might have operated contrary to his recommendations.

The CHAIRMAN. But you would hardly take action without consulting his recommendations?

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Admiral BADGER. I think you would take action. I do not think you could lay that down as a necessary thing to do. If it was self-evident, if there was no doubt about it in the minds of the directing officers here, the action would be taken without regard to Admiral Sims or anyone else. It happens to be Admiral Sims in this case.

The CHAIRMAN. That is, the action about cooperation with the British?

Admiral BADGER. Yes; the relation might be so direct and in such direct force. As I have said, we had here for a number of months the military attaché, a vice admiral in the Navy, Admiral Grant, who was constantly at the Navy Department. In fact, I think that he had an office there, or a desk, and he was in daily or perhaps hourly communication with the Admiralty via the British embassy here. If Admiral Grant came in with a statement of the necessities of the case from the Admiralty, I have no doubt action was taken.

The CHAIRMAN. As a matter of fact, was any action taken as far as cooperation with the British was concerned, without consultation with Admiral Sims?

Admiral BADGER. I do not know, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know of any ships in any way that were sent over that he had not recommended?

Admiral BADGER. I think the blanket recommendations covered everything we sent over, not only the recommendations as——

The CHAIRMAN. I am not talking about the action of the board, but of the department?

Admiral BADGER. It was the general idea of the Navy Department that we should send everything that was possible and that it was prudent to send in cooperation with the Navy, and that governed in sending ships.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you tell me who was the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation in 1914 when the Secretary would not recommend the increase of 19,600 men recommended by the General Board?

Admiral BADGER. Admiral Victor Blue.

The CHAIRMAN. And you say that he was not in favor of the increase?

Admiral BADGER. According to his tabular statement, no, sir; according to his statement which was incorporated in the Secretary's hearing before the House Naval Committee.

The CHAIRMAN. In a matter of increasing personnel, which is a broad policy in the department, ordinarily would the recommendation of the General Board or the recommendation of the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation hold?

Admiral BADGER. I think that the recommendation of the Chief of Navigation would obtain.

The CHAIRMAN. And which would make the report to Congress?

Admiral BADGER. Navigation does it, in routine. The General Board is supposed to look at it very much more broadly and say that an undoubted increase is needed, and in collaboration——

The CHAIRMAN. The General Board makes a recommendation to Congress in such case?

Admiral BADGER. The General Board makes a recommendation to the Secertary of the Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. Which is then given to Congress, in such case?

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Admiral BADGER. Yes, if he so desires. There is no law covering the subject. The General Board exists only by the Secretary's order.

The CHAIRMAN. And the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation——

Admiral BADGER. Exists by law.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand. The Chief of the Bureau of Navigation is the appointee of the Secretary and would be apt to reflect the Secretary's views rather more than the General Board, would he not?

Admiral BADGER. Well, I would not like to say that. I think that every man——

The CHAIRMAN. I mean that the General Board does not feel bound by the views of anybody?

Admiral BADGER. No. That is true.

The CHAIRMAN. While the bureau chiefs undoubtedly would?

Admiral BADGER. Bureau chiefs have to be, within proper limits, loyal to their chief, or get out, one of the two.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there any such thing as a war and navy board?

Admiral BADGER. There is a joint board; yes, sir. There are several of those boards, but you are doubtless referring to what is called the joint board?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral BADGER. Composed of naval officers and Army officers of high rank. Formerly the joint board, until within, indeed, the last year, had two members of the General Board of the Navy on it.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you on the joint board during the war?

Admiral BADGER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Did that board meet?

Admiral BADGER. We met, but we did not meet very often or very satisfactorily.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you instructed to draw up any plans?

Admiral BADGER. No; the trouble with the joint board was that there were many ranking officers on it, the Chief of Staff, the Assistant Chief of Staff, the commander of the Coast Artillery, and the president of the War College—there was not any War College during the war, so that there was the Chief of Staff, the Assistant Chief of Staff, and the commander of the Coast Artillery—and it was almost impossible to get those men, because they were busy with war duties, and had no time for coming to any board. On the Navy side we had the Chief of Operations, an admiral who was on the Council of National Defense, myself, and the president of the War College, I think; and we never could get anybody but myself. I was usually the only man who would attend the board meetings.

The CHAIRMAN. Was there any other board that could act jointly with the Army?

Admiral BADGER. I think there was no regular board. There were several minor boards composed of Army and Navy officers.

The CHAIRMAN. But not for any general thing?

Admiral BADGER. Not for any general thing.

The CHAIRMAN. So that there was no actual cooperation as between the members of that board?

Admiral BADGER. As a general thing we did have meetings, and the officers laid down very important things, to me, when there was any necessity for it; but it was very difficult to get meetings; that is what I mean.

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The CHAIRMAN. Were the recommendations of that joint board followed in any case?

Admiral BADGER. I do not know. I think so. So far as I can remember, they always came back approved. There were no very important, far-reaching questions discussed during the time of the war.

The CHAIRMAN. You never took up the question of handling the recruits who were to go abroad?

Admiral BADGER. No.

The CHAIRMAN. How about the matter of the coast defenses?

Admiral BADGER. Those questions came up, and recommendations were made with regard to the coast defenses in various ways, particularly with regard to the mining of the entrances to harbors.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you receive any orders to meet as a board?

Admiral BADGER. No; we met when papers accumulated.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you receive any orders not to meet?

Admiral BADGER. No, not during my membership.

The CHAIRMAN. Simply, you never did much of anything? It never was regarded as an active board?

Admiral BADGER. It was regarded as an active board, but in the stress of the war operations it was not frequently called upon in important matters.

I want to say that that board has been rehabilitated now. They have changed the membership, and they have regular meetings and from all that I hear, without being absolutely involved—I am no longer a member, myself—I understand that they are taking up very important questions and settling them now. It has become a very important board.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you in February, 1917, receive a request from the Secretary of the Navy to draw up a war plan—did the General Board receive such a request?

Admiral BADGER. I remember that case. There was a paper sent, involving a problem of war—connected with this particular war.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the problem?

Admiral BADGER. It was quite a paper. It involved advice as to the operations necessary to conduct the war, taking up the question of submarine warfare, among the others.

The CHAIRMAN. Was it a general war plan?

Admiral BADGER. No, it was a problem with regard to the conduct of this particular war.

The CHAIRMAN. With regard to all problems of this particular war or some specific problem of this particular war?

Admiral BADGER. As I remember it, it was rather restricted.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you get a copy of that letter for the committee so that we can put it in the record?

Admiral BADGER. I can not give you a copy of that letter.

The CHAIRMAN. You can not give a copy of that letter?

Admiral BADGER. No, sir. I have searched for that letter, and it has disappeared from the records. I have had a search in the records of the General Board, and I can not find it in the general records of the Navy Department or in the records of the Division of Operations. In fact, I can not find a copy of it.

The CHAIRMAN. And you have no way of getting it?

Admiral BADGER. No way of getting it. The answer was prepared under Admiral Fletcher, who was then the head of the planning

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section of the General Board, and I have had Admiral Fletcher in. but he can not remember anything about it, either.

Considerable importance has been attached to it, apparently. because it is lost. Nobody knows where it is lost. I think it is entirely accidental. I do not think it was a particularly important paper, and from my knowledge of what went through, I think it was largely based upon those two papers I have put in here, of February 4 and February 5. I do not know who signed it. It was a paper from Capt. Chase, who was assistant to the Chief of Operations.

The CHAIRMAN. The same officer who signed the acceptances, Capt. V. O. Chase?

Admiral BADGER. V. O. Chase; yes, sir. I can supply a copy of the letter.

The CHAIRMAN. You can supply a copy of the letter?

Admiral BADGER. No; of the order or the request for a solution of this problem. I can give you that, and a statement when it was sent in.

The CHAIRMAN. I thought you said that the request was lost. You have the request?

Admiral BADGER. No; the reply, the solution, was lost.

The CHAIRMAN. The board did make a reply?

Admiral BADGER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And did present a plan?

Admiral BADGER. Did present a plan.

The CHAIRMAN. What was done with that plan?

Admiral BADGER. I do not know. It was lost. It was sent, and of course was sent through the usual channels and got, in all probability, to operations; but we do not know what the contents of that answer were.

The CHAIRMAN. So that it was drawn by the General Board?

Admiral BADGER. It was drawn by the General Board.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like a copy of that request to be put in the record.

Admiral BADGER. All right.

The CHAIRMAN. It was not a general plan?

Admiral BADGER. No, sir; it was not. But it was a request for procedure, as you will see when you get it.

The CHAIRMAN. For new procedure? Was not that in the plan which the General Board already had?

Admiral BADGER. Yes; but this was, I do not remember exactly; but this was asking, "What, in view of the present situation, would you recommend for antisubmarine operations?" I am quite sure that that was one of the clauses.

The CHAIRMAN. In any event, no action was taken on the answer to the request?

Admiral BADGER. None, that I know of. It was lost sight of, entirely.

(The letters above referred to were subsequently presented by Admiral Badger and are here printed in full in the record, as follows:)

FEBRUARY 10, 1917.

To: The general board.
Subject: Solution of problem.

1. The department desires the general board to consider the following problem and submit its solution as soon as practicable:

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PROBLEM.

General situation.—Conditions as at present except that war with Germany is declared.

Special situation.—The allies do not desire our battleship force at present.

Required.—Naval estimate of the situation: First, as to the grand strategy demanded by the situation; second, as to disposition of battleship force; third, as to method of assisting in maintaining communications with Europe including scheme for cooperation with allies; fourth, as to methods of driving submarine from the sea.

Assume.—Mobilization of all naval vessels and possibility of mobilizing merchant vessels as required.

JOSEPHUS DANIELS.

GENERAL BOARD, NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, February 17, 1917.

To: Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: Solution of problem, Black. Reference (*a*) Navy Department confidential letter of February 10, 1917.

1. In accordance with reference (*c*), the general board submits herewith problem and solution based upon the general and special situations described in the Navy Department's instructions.

CHARLES J. BADGER.

Senator TRAMMELL. How is the General Board created and constituted, of which you are a member?

Admiral BADGER. It is created by order from the department. Do you mean originally?

Senator TRAMMELL. I mean at the present time; what is the authority of the creation?

Admiral BADGER. The President is supposed to be the authority that makes the regulations of the Navy. Really it is, of course, the department. The working person is the Secretary.

Senator TRAMMELL. How is a person assigned to membership on the board?

Admiral BADGER. The members are ordered to the board to fill it up. There is a certain membership.

Senator TRAMMELL. Excuse me; the point I am getting at is, who appoints the membership of the board?

Admiral BADGER. The Secretary of the Navy.

Senator TRAMMELL. The Secretary of the Navy?

Admiral BADGER. Yes.

Senator TRAMMELL. As far as the question of an officer conforming his recommendations and his conduct to please the Secretary of the Navy, then, a member of the board gets his appointment from the Secretary just the same as the chief of one of these bureaus, does he not?

Admiral BADGER. Yes. I want to say that I do not want to be understood in the slightest degree, in anything that I have said, to mean that any officer is improperly influenced by his environment; but every officer must take proper heed to the wishes and desires of his immediate superior. On board ship an executive officer may register his protest, but he must obey the captain; and so it is with all official relations. In the case of the General Board, the Secretary of the Navy never does try to impress upon the board his opinions so as to modify its wishes, and it is recognized that the value of the board depends upon its independence of any control. Now, the Secretary of the Navy can accept a thing and put it in the waste-paper basket, so far as I know, but he never tries to cause the General

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Board to make a specific recommendation in any way; and, as I say, the real value of the board to the service lies in that independence.

Senator TRAMMELL. You do not know of the Secretary of the Navy attempting any undue influence or duress over the chief of any of these departments to make them do just what he wants them to do, do you?

Admiral BADGER. No, sir.

Senator TRAMMELL. The chairman stated that you were not an expert on the question of how long it took to prepare soldiers and to equip them and to get them ready for transportation, and so on: and you very modestly stated that you were not; but do you not think you are just about as much of an expert on that as the average naval officer that has appeared before this committee?

Admiral BADGER. I am, as an average naval officer; but I have not the information that an Army officer would have.

Senator TRAMMELL. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. I have just one or two more questions. You have stated that the joint Army and Navy board was never instructed to meet. Were they discouraged, from meeting do you know?

Admiral BADGER. Not during my connection with the board; never.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you not think that there should be plans at every important seaport of this country for complete coordination of Army and Navy forces?

Admiral BADGER. Those are in existence now.

The CHAIRMAN. And should not these plans for coordination be specific, with an organization ready to put these plans into effect?

Admiral BADGER. There are such plans now.

The CHAIRMAN. There are now, but were there at the beginning of the war?

Admiral BADGER. I do not know; but I know that all the harbors had been under consideration for a number of years and there were plans particularly, as I say, for mines, and so forth, for each of the harbors. Recently, and during the war, we went over the plans once again and some changes were made.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you not think that Bernstorff and the Germans knew the exact state of unpreparedness of our Navy for war at all times?

Admiral BADGER. That is my impression, that they knew everything that was of importance in regard to our state of preparedness.

The CHAIRMAN. But you stated that it was considered unwise to send our fleet across for fear of an English collapse which would enable the Germans to attack our coast.

Admiral BADGER. No, I say that it was a possibility.

The CHAIRMAN. Would there not have been plenty of time for our fleet to have returned to home waters, if necessary, before the English nation and the Grand Fleet had collapsed or been defeated?

Admiral BADGER. It might have been in the same engagement. It is a matter purely of opinion.

The CHAIRMAN. In general, would you say that the best defense is a vigorous offensive?

Admiral BADGER. I believe in that, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you tell me how many cruisers of all classes, large and small, and how many torpedo boats and destroyers of all

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classes, were in reserve and unmanned or only partly manned when we declared war?

Admiral BADGER. No, sir, I can not tell you that.

The CHAIRMAN. Did the obligation of neutrality forbid this country from safeguarding itself against a German attack by making our fleet, in all respects, ready for battle after the sinking of the *Lusitania*, during 1915 and 1916?

Admiral BADGER. No. It depended on how far they wanted to go.

The CHAIRMAN. You think that was enough of a warning so that we were at liberty to prepare ourselves in every way?

Admiral BADGER. Yes, sir.

(Thereupon, at 1.40 o'clock p. m., the subcommittee adjourned until Monday, April 19, 1920, at 10 o'clock a. m.)

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NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

MONDAY, APRIL 19, 1920.

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NAVAL AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to adjournment, in room 235, Senate Office Building, at 10 o'clock a. m., Senator Frederick Hale presiding.

Present: Senators Hale (chairman), Pittman, and Trammell.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you a statement to make, Capt. Pratt, about the matters connected with this investigation?

Capt. PRATT. Yes; I have prepared a statement.

The CHAIRMAN. First, will you state what were your duties in the Navy from the time of the commencement of the World War in August, 1914, up to the present time?

TESTIMONY OF CAPT. W. V. PRATT, UNITED STATES NAVY.

Capt. PRATT. Yes, sir. Just previous to the World War Admiral Sims and I went to the torpedo flotilla together, he as commander of the flotilla and I as Chief of Staff. We were serving in this capacity in 1914 when the World War broke out. I was Chief of Staff and in command of the submarine chaser *Birmingham*. I served on that ship and with Admiral Sims until November, 1915, on which date I was ordered by Operations to proceed to the Panama Canal in connection with the defense of the canal, working in cooperation with Gen. Clarence Edwards, who was in command of troops.

I served on that duty until September, 1916, when I was ordered to the Army War College, where I was serving until April 6, 1917, when we went into the World War.

Prior to that date, about February 1, I was doing additional duty in the plans section of the Office of Operations. I continued on that additional duty until the outbreak of the World War in April, 1917, when I did duty entirely in the Office of Operations, in the plans section. I continued on planning duty with no executive functions until July, 1917, when, on the death of Capt. V. O. Chase, I was appointed aide for operations to Admiral Benson, and some time after that was appointed Assistant Chief of Naval Operations by the Secretary, which duty I held until January 5, 1919.

The CHAIRMAN. And you are now——

Capt. PRATT. I am now in command of the U. S. S. *New York*, having been detailed to that duty in January of 1919.

The CHAIRMAN. So that you are no longer in the Bureau of Operations?

Capt. PRATT. I am no longer in the Office of Operations.

Gentlemen of the committee, with your permission I would like to handle the subjects under discussion; that is, the points brought up

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by Admiral Sims's letter and the additional evidence introduced, in the following manner:

(*a*) Review of first 77 paragraphs of Admiral Sims's letter.

(*b*) Discuss some of the points brought up in the additional testimony.

(*c*) Sum up the charges set forth in paragraph 78 of the letter and in the additional testimony.

The above gives a viewpoint of the subject at the present date, April, 1920.

It is then considered desirable to present additional testimony in the shape of—

(*d*) Letter written in November, 1918, after the armistice, outlining in general terms the naval activities during the war.

(*e*) Certain documents on file in the department bearing on the critical six months mentioned in Admiral Sims's testimony.

(*f*) Final statement.

As authority for the statements I may make, I desire to inform the committee that from the date of our entry into the war in April until June 25, 1917, I was attached to the office of operations in a subordinate capacity as a member of the plans section and acted in a somewhat advisory capacity with no actual administrative functions. On June 25, 1917, upon the death of my predecessor, Capt. V. O. Chase, United States Navy, I was appointed first aid to the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Benson, and some time after was appointed Assistant Chief of Naval Operations by the Secretary, which office I held until January 5, 1919.

I was in general charge of plans, policy, and operations and acted as a sort of general manager under my chief, Admiral Benson. To the best of my knowledge I was in his full confidence and believe that I enjoyed the confidence of the Secretary of the Navy in all matters pertaining to my sphere of activities.

From the date of my appointment to the above offices I assume full responsibility for all advice given pertaining to my office, and for any acts which I may have committed either while Acting Chief of Naval Operations during Admiral Benson's visits abroad or while Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, or aid for operations.

Before commencing upon the routine I would like to speak of the letter, Mr. Chairman, which you sent to the Secretary, dated April 13, 1920, which I received only the other day, April 17, relating to certain correspondence which you wished filed before your committee, and state the action that I have taken. I have here your letter together with the Secretary's reply to it, which I have presented to the Acting Chief of Naval Operations, and asked him to give me everything pertaining thereto. If you find there is something you need more, I can then send it all over to you. This is the first opportunity that I have really had to collect possibly some of the data which you might want.

(The letters referred to are here printed in the record, as follows:)

UNITED STATES SENATE,
April 13, 1920.

Hon. JOSEPHUS DANIELS,
Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: On January 9 Senator Page wrote you a letter asking for detailed information concerning all ships of the Navy prior to and on the declaration of war with Germany. In your reply to him of February 4 you stated that you would

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have this information collected and that you hoped to have it ready by the time the subcommittee should take up its investigation. On March 24 I wrote you a letter asking for this information, and it has not been furnished either to Senator Page or to myself. Will you please see that I have the information at once, as I shall need it for use in the investigation which is now going on? I have received no reply to my letter of March 24, which also asked for official copies of all the letters and cables from Admiral Sims to the department and from the department to Admiral Sims quoted from or given in full in Admiral Sims's testimony before the subcommittee, and a statement in regard to what action, if any, was taken in regard to each such letter or cable. This information also I would like at once for use in the investigation.

Sincerely, yours,

FREDERICK HALE.
Chairman Subcommittee Senate Committee on Naval Affairs.

MY DEAR SENATOR: I have your letter of the 13th in which you refer to letters and cables, requesting official copies of all the letters and cables from Admiral Sims to the department and from the department to Admiral Sims quoted from or given in full in Admiral Sims's testimony, and a statement in regard to what action, if any, was taken in regard to each such letter or cable.

I note that in Admiral Sims's testimony, on page 27, that Admiral Sims states in answer to a question from the chairman:

"To give you an idea of the magnitude of the job, I may say that I do not know how many dispatches there were, but they are in the hundreds of thousands. I asked my statistician some time ago how many there were and he said that if they were bound up in boards and set on a shelf, that shelf would have to be 140 feet long in order to contain them. Of course, the committee does not want them all.

"Senator TRAMMELL. And your reference will refer to the particular numbers, so that they can be found?

"Admiral SIMS. Out of those miles of dispatches I am only selecting representative ones, and out of those representative ones I am selecting those that illustrate the point in question; and of all those dispatches, of which there are probably 200,000, I am only selecting a certain number, and those can be included; and if, after my testimony is concluded, you decide that it would be advisable, you can put them in in full: but in the meantime there are only extracts from these dispatches."

All the clerical force of the Navy Department is now only sufficient to care for its regular work, and to comply with your request regarding making official copies of all the letters and cables from Admiral Sims to the department and from the department to Admiral Sims quoted from or given in full in Admiral Sims's testimony will take some time.

However, if you insist, I shall be pleased to have these copies prepared.

As to making a statement in regard to what action, if any, was taken in regard to each such letter or cable, I am unable at this late date to make proper reply. The officers most capable of answering these questions are Admiral Benson, Rear Admiral McKean and Capt. Pratt. These officers will undoubtedly be called before your committee and will be in a position to answer any questions regarding them you may submit.

I shall forward a copy of this correspondence to Admiral Benson, Rear Admiral McKean, and Capt. Pratt.

Very respectfully,

JOSEPHUS DANIELS.

Hon. FREDERICK HALE,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, April 16, 1920.

From: Secretary of the Navy.
To: Capt. W. V. Pratt, United States Navy.
Subject: Request of Hon. Frederick Hale, chairman subcommittee Senate Naval Affairs Committee, for certain copies of official documents and certain statements in regard to same.
Inclosures: (A) Copy of letter from Hon. Frederick Hale, chairman subcommittee Senate Naval Affairs Committee, to the Secretary of the Navy, dated April 13, 1920.

(B) Copy of letter from the Secretary of the Navy to Hon. Frederick Hale, chairman subcommittee Senate Naval Affairs Committee, dated April 5, 1920.

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1. There are forwarded for your information copies of the above-mentioned correspondence.

JOSEPHUS DANIELS.

Capt. PRATT. I shall read each paragraph of the letter of Admiral Sims upon which I wish to comment and then read the comment that I have to make upon that section. Where I make no comment I note that no comment is necessary. On the first paragraph of Admiral Sims's letter no comment is necessary.

The second paragraph of his letter reads as follows:

2. This is especially true of a naval war of such a peculiar character that the experience of former wars was of little assistance in determining the proper policy and in developing the unusual tactics that were rendered necessary by the number, geographical position, and resources of the countries involved, and by the enemy's method of submarine attack upon merchant shipping in disregard of the tenets of international law and the laws of humanity.

Paragraph 2. This is somewhat misleading. No new principles of broad general policy and strategy are introduced. A novel weapon, the submarine, has been introduced. The introduction of this weapon has rendered necessary certain tactical innovations to combat it. But the broad principles which must govern the general conduct of war remain the same.

Paragraph 3. No comment.

Paragraph 4. No comment.

Paragraph 5 of Admiral Sims's letter read as follows:

5. This is not presented solely from the viewpoint of the commander of our relatively small naval forces in Europe, but specifically as a result of the experience necessarily gained in the unusual and very responsible position of the Navy Department's representative in the naval council of the Allies, where only all allied plans and policies could be continuously discussed, and where only all essential information, both current and general, was at all times available.

The answer to that paragraph, 5, is that our forces in Europe were relatively small in comparison with the forces of the Allies, but toward the close of hostilities they were not small compared with our own forces at home. In this paragraph the major mission has been correctly stated which was that of "Navy Department's representative in Europe." More specifically he was the commander of our forces in European waters, also the direct representative in the war zone of the Chief of Naval Operations. His duties, in order of relative importance, comprise the following:

(*a*) The direct representative of the Chief of Naval Operations in Europe (with office in London).

(*b*) Our naval representative in the Allied Naval Council.

(*c*) Our chief naval executive in Europe who received, referred, transmitted, and carried out such parts of the plans of the Allied Naval Council, as involved our naval forces abroad; which plans and policies has received the approval of our own Government.

(*d*) The executive abroad in all other matters of United States naval policy and strategy, when that policy and strategy had received the sanction of the home government.

(*e*) The chief naval executive in all matters pertaining to the broad questions of naval tactics in the war zone, exercising his authority either directly or through his subordinates who were in command of our various naval forces operating in different localities in the war zone.

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(*f*) Commander of our naval forces in European waters.
(*g*) The general liaison officer between our Navy Department and all Allied Navy departments in Europe.

As the direct representative of the Chief of Naval Operations in Europe, he was responsible for and had direction of the carrying out of all matters of policy and strategy in the war zone which had received the approval of the Navy Department.

As the Navy Department's representative in the Allied Naval Council, he acted: First. In an advisory capacity. Second. As the agent with whom the Allies discussed their naval plans and policies in which they wished the cooperation and participation of the United States Government. Third. As the agent who presented to the Allied Council the views of the Navy Department and its approval or disapproval of the plans and policies referred to it. Fourth. As the executive who carried out such plans and policies involving our forces in European waters which had received the approval of the Navy Department. Fifth. As the responsible authority who directed the execution of any plans coming within the field of his own initiative.

As commander of our naval forces in European waters, he had a determining voice in the naval strategy to be adopted by those forces, and this strategy having been discussed with the Navy Department and settled, his was the power in matters of tactical distribution and operation of the forces abroad, after they had been assigned to his command.

As chief naval liaison officer between our naval forces and all allied naval forces (or perhaps better expressed, as our chief naval attaché in the war zone) he had access to information of every description. Our attachés forwarded all vital information through him, and in turn he was expected to furnish the department at home with this information, and with all other important information gleaned from any source.

Like the commander in chief of the fleet, like the chief of our transportation service, Admiral Gleaves, the commander of our forces in European waters had under him various forces engaged in numerous activities in many localities, and many subordinates to carry out these activities, but the final power to coordinate the activities of the different naval commanders outside of the war zone with the commander of our forces in European waters was always vested in the Chief of Naval Operations.

To best sum up all of Admiral Sims's functions and authority, he was primarily the assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations, and his office in London was a branch of the Office of Naval Operations in Washington.

To further illustrate, his position was somewhat analogous to that of Admiral Grant, Royal Navy, commander in chief of the British naval forces in North Atlantic waters, though their spheres of activity were different. Admiral Grant was in command of all the British operations and forces on this side of the water, but his principal function was that of representative of the Admiralty, with his office in Washington. He had free hand in the movement of his forces, but he was subject to instructions from the Admiralty, and in the matter of general plans and policies he referred back to the Admiralty for final decision. In the same manner that our commander of United States forces in European waters acted in London,

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Admiral Grant, Royal Navy, acted as the liaison officer between the Admiralty in London, and the Office of Operations, Washington, and as his office was established here, he was in daily consultation with our office.

Paragraph 6. On this I make no comment.

Paragraph 7 of Admiral Sims's letter is as follows:

7. Brief orders were delivered to me verbally in Washington. No formal instructions or statement of the Navy Department's plans or policy were received at that time, though I received the following explicit admonition: "Don't let the British pull the wool over your eyes. It is none of our business pulling their chestnuts out of the fire. We would as soon fight the British as the Germans."

In reply to that, I would say: I have no first-hand knowledge as to what person made this remark. I have this comment to make. In April, 1917, Admiral Sims, an officer with friendly sentiments toward the British, was sent to England. On June 25, 1917, Capt. Pratt, who had formerly been Chief of Staff for Admiral Sims for over two years, and himself holding friendly sentiments toward the British and French, was made Admiral Benson's aide for operations. Shortly after he was appointed Assistant Chief of Naval Operations. On February 2, 1918, Admiral Mayo's estimate that he should proceed to European waters and take command there was not approved by the department. On April 12, 1918, a similar decision of Admiral Mayo was not approved by the department. On August 10, 1918, another estimate and similar decision of Admiral Mayo was again not approved by the department. These estimates of Admiral Mayo's were sound from the viewpoint of our fleet, but Admiral Benson's entire desire was to cooperate along the lines of and in accordance with plans laid down by the Allies and not to disrupt the present arrangement which might have taken place, as Admiral Mayo was senior to Admiral Sims. This seems to indicate a desire to cooperate with our allies even at the expense of our own naval pride, and to support Admiral Sims.

Paragraph 8. No comment, except that his assumed mission was in harmony with the department's intention.

The ninth paragraph of Admiral Sims's letter is as follows:

9. I arrived in Liverpool on April 9, and in London on April 10, 1917, and went immediately to the admiralty, where the naval situation was fully explained by the responsible officials. This explanation showed that the Navy Department did not understand the seriousness of the submarine situation; that its information was very incomplete and inaccurate. This was due to the insufficient scope of its intelligence service, very few naval officers having been sent to Europe for information before we entered the war.

In regard to paragraph 9, quite correct. This information was later partially given by the various allied missions sent to Washington. For the greater part, however, this information was given to us by the splendid service built up in Europe largely through the efforts of Admiral Sims, with the cooperation of the Office of Naval Intelligence in Washington, which is a division of the Office of Operations. In my opinion our intelligence service in Europe should have been expanded earlier, whether we contemplated entering the war or not.

Paragraph 10 of Admiral Sims's letter is as follows:

10. A review of the cables sent to the department in April, 1917, shows that the situation was very serious, and that the enemy was rapidly winning the war by the destruction of merchant shipping. Throughout the following year numerous cables and letters of the most urgent possible character were sent with the object of impressing

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upon the department the vital necessity of our maximum effort being exerted in the European waters with the least possible delay, but without producing the desired results.

Paragraph 10. The statement of fact in the paragraph is correct, but the statement of the conclusion drawn, "but without producing the desired result," misleading and subject to discussion. It produced the desired effect at once and every effort was made to put all the naval forces desired in the war zone, but owing to our previous lack of preparation in material and personnel it was not possible to place them at the front, and ready to operate, as soon as was desired. Nor was the organization or administration of the department at home such that it lent itself to the most efficient handling of a great war, at the beginning.

The entire building program of the Navy had to be changed to make it effective to engage in operations for which it had never been planned, that is, to operate against the submarine exclusively.

These conditions were true when we entered the war, and they lasted until the defects could be remedied, but by April, 1918, which is the end of the period covered in the statement in paragraph 10, these defects had been in the main remedied, and many ships, destroyers, yachts, and personnel had been sent across the Atlantic and were operating in the war zone. In addition many troops had been convoyed to Europe. By this time the organization of the Office of Operations had been modified and the methods of administration changed.

Paragraph 11. Correct.

Paragraph 12 of the letter is as follows:

12. It may be well to state here that the delays in taking action and the lack of support, involving the efficiency of the United States naval assistance in the war, can be fully understood only through an examination of the communications exchanged between the department and the naval headquarters abroad.

Paragraph 12. Correct in so far as it goes. To fully appreciate the situation the difficulties in supplying immediately all that was asked for by the admiral must be given full consideration. To request these articles is a very simple matter compared to supplying them under the conditions then prevailing in our country.

The thirteenth paragraph of the letter reads:

13. For some reason which has never been explained, the Navy Department, during at least the first six months of the war, failed to put into actual practice a wholehearted policy of cooperation with the allies, the policy required for winning the war with the least possible delay.

Paragraph 13. From the date on which I took over the work of Assistant Chief of Naval Operations on June 25, 1917, I know every effort was made to cooperate most heartily, and I further know that this same spirit prevailed throughout the entire Naval Establishment.

Bearing on the subject of cooperation, and as a side light to some of the many operations the department was engaged in to furnish the assistance needed by the allies at this time, I beg leave to read extracts from portions of plans relating to destroyers and ship construction, all of which had received the approval of the Chief of Naval Operations and Secretary of the Navy.

My first inclosure which I will submit is a letter of May 28, 1917, from Gen. Goethals to the Secretary of the Navy.

I submit also a letter of June 8 from Gen. Goethals, in which he asked permission to place merchant ships on ways where our battle-

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ships were supposed to be laid down, and in every way to help him out in his merchant ship construction on a very large scale.

The CHAIRMAN. Are those originals or copies of those letters?

Capt. PRATT. They are copies. Those letters were taken up and discussed. I bring this matter up now. There was not an entire consensus of opinion upon the subject as to what should be done. I remember at that time submitting a minority report, which report was practically accepted. My views were adopted, because I was very soon after, on the death of Capt. Chase, appointed to the policy and plans section, which carried out the execution of these very matters which I am touching upon now, so that I know that it went through.

(The two letters above referred to by Capt. Pratt are here printed in full in the record as follows:)

UNITED STATES SHIPPING BOARD
EMERGENCY FLEET CORPORATION.
Washington, May 28, 1917.

Hon. JOSEPHUS DANIELS,
Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The Emergency Fleet Corporation of the United States Shipping Board desires to carry out its proposed steel cargo vessel building program so as not to interfere with the naval building program, and is directing its efforts to that end by enlisting the assistance of the structural-steel shops in turning out standard fabricated steel ships up to 5,000 tons, which, for assembling and riveting, would not necessarily require the use of existing shipyards. For cargo vessels of 7,500 and 10,000 tons dead-weight carrying capacity, which will be very much needed, it does not seem to be advisable to attempt to assemble or rivet same except at an established shipyard, and I have not been able to satisfactorily provide in a preliminary way for the construction of these larger cargo vessels, as practically all of the existing shipyard facilities have been or feel obligated to put their facilities at the disposal of the Navy Department.

The existing emergency and great necessity of obtaining cargo vessels within the next 18 months impel me, therefore, to submit the following to you for consideration and approval:

First. In view of the pending negotiations of the Emergency Fleet Corporation with structural-steel manufacturers, will it be agreeable to the Navy Department not to make any definite arrangements toward fabricating steel vessels for the Navy, in case the Navy intends to consider building vessels of this kind for itself, without ascertaining in advance whether this step would interfere with arrangements already made by the Emergency Fleet Corporation?

Second. Will it be possible for the department to permit the use of any, or all four, of the building ways under construction, or about to be undertaken for the Navy for battle cruisers, for the larger steel cargo vessels for the Emergency Fleet Corporation before starting the battle cruisers or any additional battleships thereon? It is believed that from two to four cargo vessels could be laid down simultaneously on each of these large building ways. One set of these cargo vessels thus laid down would delay the battle cruisers, but would greatly facilitate the building of large cargo vessels by this corporation, which are going to be very difficult to arrange for.

Your cooperation in the above matters will be greatly appreciated.

Very sincerely, yours,

GEO. W. GOETHALS, *General Manager.*

UNITED STATES SHIPPING BOARD
EMERGENCY FLEET CORPORATION.
Washington, June 8, 1917.

Hon. JOSEPHUS DANIELS,
Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Referring further to my letter of May 28, in which I submitted for your consideration certain propositions which would tend to facilitate the building by this corporation of cargo carrying merchant vessels with as little interference as possible to the naval program for battleships and battle cruisers, I might say that

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information is coming to my attention through persons (not connected with either the New York Shipbuilding Co. or the Newport News Shipbuilding & Drydock Co.) to the effect that officers of both of these corporations have stated that they would be in a position to turn out a large number of the larger cargo vessels for this corporation provided the Navy program to which they are committed could be deferred.

2. In order not to interfere with the Navy program I have been careful to make no inquiries of any of the large shipbuilding companies, including the foregoing, who are already all committed to naval vessels. Based on this later information and as an alternative to the suggestion contained in my letter of May 28, above referred to, I desire to ask that you consider the possibility of permitting this corporation to avail itself of the facilities for building large cargo vessels that are only available at large shipbuilding plants by permitting two of the larger plants as selected by you to place their entire facilities at the disposal of this corporation as soon as practicable, so far as the naval interests are concerned.

Yours, very truly,

GEO. W. GOETHALS, *General Manager.*

Capt. PRATT (continuing). This minority report I have mentioned I will read portions of, because it indicates what we did right in line with building up the destroyer force of the Navy to combat the submarine menace, and I know that it was carried out. [Reading:]

DECISION 3-E—IMMEDIATE MISSION.

OUTLINE OF THE POLICY FOR COOPERATING WITH THE EMERGENCY FLEET CORPORATION ALONG THE LINES SUGGESTED BY GEN. GOETHALS.

JUNE 7, 1917.

From: Capt. W. V. Pratt, United States Navy.
To: Chief of Naval Operations.
Subject: Cooperation of the Navy with the Emergency Fleet Corporation in the matter of propositions submitted by Gen. G. W. Goethals, general manager of the Emergency Fleet Corporation.
Reference: (a) Letter of May 28, 1917, from United States Shipping Board to the Secretary of the Navy.

1. The importance and seriousness of this subject, together with the necessity of arriving first of all at a correct naval policy which shall coordinate its efforts with the efforts of those engaged in supplying the tremendous wastage in cargo tonnage caused by the submarine campaign, leads me to submit this letter. Were all views thoroughly in accord there could be no discussion. There is, however, a decided difference of opinion in the matter of the naval policy to be pursued. This letter is not in accord with the general view of the office; but it is submitted as one view of what the policy should be.

2. Owing to the present emergency, the Navy Department recognizes the building of cargo vessels is a measure of importance commensurate with the building of warships itself. Since in the department's opinion the building of a wooden fleet is not an adequate or a permanent way of meeting the situation, which must be met by steel construction, the Navy Department is glad to cooperate with the Emergency Fleet Corporation in every way possible in enabling it to put its building program into operation.

3. A statement of the department's policy as regards the order of importance of warships to be laid down is as follows: (1) Submarine chasers. (2) Destroyers. (3) Scout cruisers. (4) Submarines—large and small. (5) Battleships. (6) Fuel ships. (7) Destroyer tenders. (8) Submarine tenders. (9) Hospital ships. (10) Ammunition ships. (11) Repair ships. (12) Transports. (13) Gunboats. (14) Battle cruisers.

4. The first five types, with the exception of (3) scout cruisers (of which only a limited number to serve as destroyer flotilla leaders should be laid down), are types of ships which are needed at present, and the naval needs are such that all vessels of these types authorized should be begun at once.

5. Of equal importance to the above ships come the heavy merchant cargo carriers contemplated by the Emergency Fleet Corporation.

6. Naval ships coming under heads (6) to (12), inclusive, could if necessity arose be supplied out of the very types of ships to be built by the Emergency Fleet Corporation.

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7. It, therefore, becomes evident that any cooperation of the Navy with the Emergency Fleet Corporation must be along lines represented by classes (3) and (14).

8. It is therefore believed that the first proposition submitted by Gen. Goethals is sound and that the Navy Department should cooperate to this extent. No new ships for the Navy of classes (6) to (12), inclusive, will be laid down on ways outside of navy yard ways without an adjustment first with the Emergency Fleet Corporation, so long as the present emergency exists. If, however, due to this policy the shortages in such types of naval auxiliaries severely handicap the Navy, it is agreed that the Emergency Fleet Corporation will meet this need out of its own vessels building.

9. It is also believed that the second proposition is sound and that the Navy Department should cooperate to the extent of relieving any or all of the four building ways (not in a navy yard on the Atlantic coast) now under construction for the battle cruisers, in order that said ways may be used by the Emergency Fleet Corporation. This arrangement to hold good during the present emergency, or unless a new military necessity demands a new arrangement.

10. It is not the department's policy to allow cargo carrying merchant ships to be laid down on any ways in the existing navy yards. Such construction cramps the yard facilities and handicaps the purpose for which these yards were originally established, viz, the repairs of naval vessels already in service. But in view of the present emergency it is believed that any battle cruisers' ways laid down in a navy yard on the Pacific coast could be temporarily loaned to the Emergency Fleet Corporation.

11. The above views are held because it is believed:

(*a*) A successful termination of this war will preclude the chance of another for some term of years.

(*b*) For the allied purposes, merchant ships are as essential to the successful termination of this war as battleships, and that their construction is even more important at present.

(*c*) The counter for the United States, in case of an unsuccessful termination of this war, lies in: (1) In our naval submarine. (2) In conscription.

(*d*) Of new future possible opponents other than the present opponents—(1) The chances are remote, owing to present alliances. (2) We are already stronger than any other probable opponents. (3) It would be better to buy our battle cruisers or battleships from our present allies (in case they were needed) than to lay them down now in the present emergency, an emergency which must be met now.

(*e*) In case this war terminates successfully, the merchant ships laid down by us will be the most useful types in existence in furthering the ultimate good of the country.

12. Finally, we did not enter this war alone. We have allies, and their efforts against the now common enemy have stood between us and possible aggressions for over two years. They have needs. Their needs are immediate and imperative. Their cause is our cause now. The decision to the estimate of the situation as made in this office was as follows:

"IMMEDIATE MISSION.

"To render the maximum possible support now to the enemies of the Central Powers."

And a second important but future mission was:

"Develop the full military and naval strength of the United States as far as possible."

In a paper of April 5, 1917, the General Board, writing on the subject "Assistance that United States can give allies upon declaration of war," makes several pertinent suggestions, of which one is as follows: "Keep constantly in view the possibility of the United States being in the not distant future compelled to conduct a war single-handed against some of the present belligerents and steadily increase the strength of the fighting line," etc. That remark is pertinent and sound, but it does not mean that one fraction of the strength of the effort we should put into the successful accomplishment of the immediate mission should be sacrificed to any possible future contingency. Moreover, the day that the conscription law passed and universal training was assured to the peoples of our country its future security was guaranteed in a manner past every future building program the Navy might attempt.

13. A hasty review of the international situation leads me to the conclusions that England's fleet will never be allowed to pass into German hands, nor can it be quiescent while Germany works her will on any of the present allies. It is the death of England to allow it. If at the end of this war strained relations should arise with England (a proposition which seems to me untenable), no amount of feverish building of dreadnoughts or battle cruisers could hope to put us in a position to cope with her fleet on the high seas. In such a contingency our efforts should now be directed toward augmenting our submarine fleet in both the offensive and information types.

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14. It must have been noted that upon our entry into this war a certain tension existing between this country and Japan was immediately relaxed. They immediately, in certain press articles, suggested a close cooperation with the United States. This close cooperation now with Japan is, to my mind, the key to the solution of what might have been a future problem.

15. Therefore if we concentrate our present naval building efforts to—

(1) A standard type of destroyer to meet present needs.

(2) Submarines, large and small, to meet future needs.

(3) Battleships laid down and now on the ways.

(4) Certain types of small craft, such as tugs and sweepers.

(5) Cooperate with the Shipping Board to produce cargo carriers, we will have put forth the Navy's best efforts not for the Navy alone, but for the country, and especially for the Allies, whose war is now our own.

16. For the above reasons I am obliged to differ with the consensus of opinion expressed in the Office of Operations and implied in the General Board's recommendations, and do concur in the opinion and propositions expressed in Gen. Goethals's letter of May 28, 1917, with the modification set forth in paragraphs 8, 9, and 10.

W. V. PRATT.

The CHAIRMAN. That was signed by you?

Capt. PRATT. I signed it. At the time, in view of the letter written, I was appointed as head of the board by the Secretary of the Navy. We did not submit our plans finally until July 6. It took some time to mature it and get it out; that is, how we would best work to operate against the submarine. This was called the Board on Devices and Plans. That is, it was a board of devices and plans connected with submarine warfare.

The CHAIRMAN. The members were appointed by the President?

Capt. PRATT. It was a board appointed some time in May or June to confer with the British and French scientists that came over here, and in doing so we went beyond our instructions a bit, and took into consideration everything which could be done in every way, not only in connection with sound devices, which was the principal motive of this mission, but we went further, having already introduced that letter, and put forth a plan which the Secretary signed immediately, adopting a very extensive plan, of the switching of the entire battleship program to a destroyer program.

That report is as follows:

REPORT OF BOARD ON DEVICES AND PLANS CONNECTED WITH SUBMARINE WARFARE TO SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
Washington, July 6, 1917.

From: Board on devices and plans connected with submarine warfare.
To: Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: Summary of conclusions of the board, with recommendations.

1. The board designated by your orders to consider devices and plans connected with submarine warfare has carefully considered many suggestions for dealing with the submarine situation, and submits a preliminary report of its conclusions, with recommendations.

2. The board has given careful study to the discussions of the English and French scientific commissions to this country; has considered the progress made in the United States on the study of the submarine situation; has considered various reports from commanding officers of armed guards; reports from Vice Admiral Sims, and Naval Intelligence reports.

3. The board now considers it a duty to bring to your attention the urgent need of immediately securing an adequate supply of material required for an aggressive submarine campaign, and the formulation of plans to impress into service at the earliest possible moment all available United States vessels that will be of use in offensive operations against enemy submarines.

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MERCHANT SHIP PROTECTION.

4. Torpedo nets and similar protecting devices of many forms have been considered, and rejected, as being impracticable. They all have the serious fault of greatly reducing the ships' speed; are very cumbersome and difficult to handle; and above all are of very doubtful usefulness in preventing damage to the ship carrying them.

5. Plans for reducing visibility have been considered; including methods of ship's painting; smoke elimination by use of oil engines; and smoke elimination by use of special fuels. The board is of the opinion that every practicable means of reducing visibility should be employed.

6. High speed and zigzag steering are considered to be very simple and effective means of preventing successful submarine attack. In clear weather all vessels in the danger zone should be required to steam at highest speed and on zigzag courses.

7. The armament of merchant ships has been considered. There are two considerations to be met. First, engagement at long range, for which guns of 3-inch caliber and above are required. Second, engagement at very close range, for which small caliber guns capable of large angle of depression are required. One-pounder guns mounted on the ends of bridges are considered by the board to be satisfactory for this latter purpose. Howitzers of the most efficient type should be supplied as soon as possible. Their use at ranges below 2,000 yards is of the utmost necessity.

8. Armed guards and lookouts must be made as efficient and effective as possible. This board is of the opinion that the present methods of supplying armed guards, their training, etc., are in general satisfactory. In connection with the training of the armed guards it is strongly urged that merchant ship captains and other officers be required to attend a naval school of instruction and be taught all methods of avoiding submarine attack. The board is also of the opinion that lookouts must be very carefully selected and trained.

9. Depth charges for merchant vessels present a debatable question. If launched over the side they would be a source of danger to own vessel, unless launched from a point near the stern when the vessel was making at least 10 knots. The board is of the opinion that even a remote chance of using a depth charge successfully in this manner warrants the issue of a small number of those charges to those merchant vessels whose armed guard is under the command of a commissioned officer. The projection of depth charges by means of a howitzer or bomb-throwing device is considered by the board to be a very important matter. Some simple equipment of this kind should be supplied merchant vessels without delay.

10. Smoke boxes of two types have been considered, both of which have sufficient merit to warrant their use. The first type is for use on board own vessel; the second type for use by throwing overboard. A smoke-producing torpedo has been proposed. The board is of the opinion that this plan is impracticable. A smoke-producing bomb, to be thrown by the depth-charge howitzer or the bomb-throwing device, has also been considered. The board is of the opinion that this idea should be developed and the plan put into operation.

11. Several special methods of ship construction and loading of cargoes to render vessels unsinkable have been considered. The board is of the opinion that while this general subject is of great interest and that the plans should be encouraged, they are not preventive methods with which this board is principally concerned.

12. If a simple and efficient sound detection device can be perfected which can be used at speeds up to 12 knots, the board is of the opinion that all merchant ships should be required to carry these devices as a means of evading submarines.

FIXED BARRIERS.

13. Fixed barriers, consisting of several types of nets, anchored mines, and the combination of nets and mines, have all been considered. The board is of the opinion that these devices should be used to completely protect the important harbors of our own coast; and that there may be use for such obstructions abroad. The board is of the opinion that the United States Navy should immediately collect ready for use, a very large quantity of this material, especially offensive mines.

FLOATING BARRIERS OR TRAPS.

14. Floating obstructions consisting of nets, mines, or a combination of nets and mines have been considered, and the board is of the opinion that while there are many objections to the use of these devices when uncontrolled, there is a real use for mine-

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loaded nets and mine-loaded sweeps, either by a single vessel or by a pair of vessels. There are objections to this last plan, but it has some merit, and a limited supply of necessary material should be made available, at least enough to insure a thorough trial.

UNDERWATER SOUND DETECTORS AND DIRECTION INDICATORS.

15. Several devices and plans for underwater sound detection and direction finding have been considered; not in detail, but their general characteristics considered with regard to their practical use, and the board is of the opinion that two general classes or outfits are required for immediate use; 1st, a simple microphone or magnetphone constructed so as to be a direction indicator, suitable for use on all small patrol vessels. 2d, a more elaborate detector of audible or subaudible sound waves which can be installed on destroyers, yachts, merchant vessels, etc., and be used effectively when the vessel is under way at high speed. The board is informed that encouraging progress is being made to develop both classes of devices, and is of the opinion that plans should now be made for their supply and issue, and that immediate steps should be taken to instruct and train the personnel required to operate these devices.

MAGNETIC DETECTORS.

16. Magnetic detectors have been considered. The board is of the opinion that there is little hope for success in developing a magnetic detecting device that can be used successfully on board a rolling and pitching vessel. At best such a device would have but very limited use. Experimental work along these lines should be conducted so as not to interfere with more important experiments and tests. The principal reason for carrying on experimental work along this line is the hope that it may lead to the development of some useful device.

SOUND ECHO METHODS.

17. Sound echo methods are being investigated by the engineers of the General Electric Co. and the Western Electric Co. It is hoped that this method can be developed for use in detecting mine cases and submarines when resting on the bottom or so operating that sound devices can not be employed. It is believed that this method will require considerable time for its development and that when developed, the apparatus used will not be simple in construction and operation.

UNDER-WATER VISION.

18. No means of securing under-water vision have been proposed, although the idea has been suggested. The board can make no comment on this subject; except that even though a successful means is found, its useful application must necessarily be so restricted as to make it of very little value.

AIRCRAFT.

19. Many suggestions have been made for the employment of aircraft alone and, in conjunction with patrol vessels, for the detection and destruction of submarines. The board is of the opinion that with the development of our coastal air stations there should be undertaken as quickly as possible tests and experiments to fully determine the usefulness of all types of aircraft for this purpose.

20. Aircraft are used abroad in large numbers in antisubmarine warfare. The board is of the opinion that this branch of the United States Naval Service should be very largely expanded to be prepared for such operations. As aircraft will undoubtedly prove of very great value, especially as the war progresses, the board is of the opinion that large numbers of the most suitable types be contracted for immediately, so that these will be available when a definite plan has been worked out for their employment. Otherwise delay in securing the aircraft will prevent the prompt execution of the plan.

VESSELS FOR CHASE AND DESTRUCTION OF SUBMARINES.

21. The board has considered the question of the best type of vessels to be used in hunting down and destroying submarines, and is of the opinion that the one best type of vessel is the destroyer, fitted with sound-detecting devices capable of use while the destroyer is under way and of determining direction. The reasons for this opinion

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are that only this type has the necessary characteristics of speed, seaworthiness, habitability, reliability, and endurance. The submarines must be hunted, trailed, and destroyed. For this task the destroyer is the best type of vessel known. The board is of the opinion that every effort should be made to put into service as many destroyers as possible, and that a large number of new antisubmarine destroyers of a practical type should be built in the least possible time.

22. The board deems it advisable to submit its recommendations in such form that if approved they may be readily issued as instructions to those responsible for carrying them into effect.

RECOMMENDATIONS.

Bureaus of Ordnance, Steam Engineering, and Construction and Repair.—(*a*) Board recommends that the bureaus put in operation every possible means of expediting the completion of destroyers now building; authorize approval of plans by bureaus' local inspectors; authorize any satisfactory changes under the contract that will expedite work; encourage contractors to utilize the services of subcontractors in getting out material; and regardless of additional expense, secure the completion of destroyers now building at the earliest possible moment, submitting to the Secretary for approval any plan or plans to accomplish this end.

(*b*) Board recommends that the bureaus confer in getting out plans for a new type antisubmarine destroyer which will meet the military requirements specified by the department; and which may be constructed quickly on one standard design which will enable all auxiliary machinery and equipment to be procured in lots of identical units and thus secure the benefits of quantity production. The board further recommends that the plans provide for the immediate construction of 200 destroyers of the new type, and that the bureaus submit data necessary for the department to prepare draft of legislation required to secure these new destroyers as quickly as possible.

Naval Operations.—(*a*) Board recommends that plans be immediately prepared to fit out and equip all available vessels that can be spared for service abroad to be used in the antisubmarine campaign.

(*b*) Board recommends that plans be immediately prepared to secure a large number of the most suitable types of aircraft; to train the naval aviators in antisubmarine operations; and to perfect the plans for the use of all types of aircraft in the detection and destruction of submarines.

Bureau of Steam Engineering.—(*a*) Board recommends that the bureau procure 500 simple underwater microphone or magnetophone sound and direction indicators for issue to patrol vessels; these to be put in service as soon as possible in order to train personnel. The board further recommends that when a satisfactory device is available all patrol vessels in service be supplied with the listening devices.

(*b*) Board recommends that the bureau immediately arrange for the manufacture of a large number of underwater sound-detecting and direction-finding devices of the Fessenden type in order that United States' and allies' destroyers and other vessels engaged in hunting submarines may be equipped as quickly as possible; also that merchant vessels may be so equipped in order to avoid enemy submarines.

Bureau of Ordnance.—(*a*) Board recommends that the bureau be authorized to immediately arrange for the manufacture of a large supply of mines, nets, aeroplane torpedoes, aeroplane guns, aeroplane bombs, howitzers, depth charges, smoke boxes, smoke bombs, blunt-nose explosive shell, and other ordnance material which is now required and which will be required in the near future, to enable the allied navies to prosecute a successful aggressive campaign against the enemy submarines. Board recommends that the bureau immediately submit estimates of funds required to carry out the above recommendations.

W. V. PRATT,
Captain, United States Navy.
F. L. PINNEY,
Commander, United States Navy.
E. S. LAND,
Naval Constructor, United States Navy.
W. R. VAN AUKEN,
Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy.
S. C. HOOPER,
Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy.
G. K. CALHOUN,
Professor of Mathematics, United States Navy.
J. H. TOWERS,
Lieutenant, United States Navy.

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On July 6 that was submitted, and on July 6 the Secretary signed the following letter, which I will submit. That letter went in with the plan. The letter is as follows [reading]:

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, July 6, 1917.

From: Secretary of the Navy.
To: Chief of Naval Operations, Bureau of Ordnance, Bureau of Steam Engineering, and Bureau of Construction and Repair.
Subject: Report on submarine warfare.
Inclosure: (*a*) Report of board on devices and plans connected with submarine warfare.

1. The department forwards herewith copy of report of board on devices and plans connected with submarine warfare.
2. The department has approved this report and recommendations.
3. Please take immediate steps to carry out the board's recommendations.

JOSEPHUS DANIELS.

NOTE.—This report was sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to Bureaus of Navigation, Medicine and Surgery, Supplies and Accounts, and Yards and Docks on July 9, 1917, directing them to take such action as necessary to carry out board's recommendation.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C., July 14 1917.

From: The board on devices and plans connected with submarine warfare.
To: The Chief of Naval Operations.
Subject: Its recommendations of efforts which should be made in the endeavor to put an end to the submarine menace. Particular reference to the recommendation for the construction of 200 antisubmarine destroyers.

PRELIMINARY.

1. This letter is forwarded to the Chief of Naval Operations in response to his verbal instructions of July 14, directing them to make a statement expounding their reasons for the recommendation of 200 anti-submarine destroyers.

2. *Quotation from board's report, page 9:* "Vessels for chase and destruction of submarines."

21. The board has considered the question of the best type of vessels to be used in hunting down and destroying submarines, and is of the opinion that the one best type of vessel is the destroyer, fitted with sound detecting devices capable of use while the destroyer is underway and of determining direction. The reasons for this opinion are that only this type has the necessary characteristics of speed, seaworthiness, habitability, reliability, and endurance. The submarines must be hunted, trailed, and destroyed. For this task the destroyer is the best type of vessel known. The board is of the opinion that every effort should be made to put into service as many destroyers as possible, and that a large number of new antisubmarine destroyers of a practical type should be built in the least possible time.

22. The board deems it advisable to submit its recommendations in such form that if approved they may be readily issued as instructions to those responsible for carrying them into effect.

3. *Quotation from board's recommendation re the destroyers now building and the type suggested for new construction:* "Recommendations—Bureaus of Ordnance, Steam Engineering, and Construction and Repair."

(*a*) Board recommends that the bureaus put in operation every possible means of expediting the completion of destroyers now building; authorize approval of plans by bureaus' local inspectors; authorize any satisfactory changes under the contract that will expedite work; encourage contractors to utilize the service of subcontractors in getting out material; and regardless of additional expense, secure the completion of destroyers now building at the earliest possible moment; submitting to the Secretary for approval any plan or plans to accomplish this end.

(*b*) Board recommends that the bureaus confer in getting out plans for a new type antisubmarine destroyer which will meet the military requirements specified by the department and which may be constructed quickly on one standard design which will enable all auxiliary machinery and equipment to be procured in lots of identical units and thus secure the benefits of quantity production. The board further recom-

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mends that the plans provide for the immediate construction of 200 destroyers of the new type and that the bureaus submit data necessary for the department to prepare draft of legislation required to secure these new destroyers as quickly as possible.

4. *Reasons for recommendations:*

In making the above recommendations the board was actuated by the following reasons:

(*a*) *The seriousness of the present situation.*—Every report from abroad indicates that the present submarine situation is extremely serious. This is a matter of fact.

(*b*) The statements from abroad that vessels of the destroyer type or those approximating the destroyer type are the best antisubmarine craft afloat.

(*c*) The reiterated statements both from our own officers operating abroad and from foreign officers that one of the most important factors is time, necessitating speed in building and speed in placing those ships which can successfully operate against the submarines in the war zone.

(*d*) The information received from abroad that while the 110-foot chasers will be used against the submarine, as will also any type of craft which can keep the sea and is not too valuable, still it is not an unqualified success. It is more of a makeshift than it is a desirable sea-keeping antisubmarine craft.

(*e*) The belief that a standardized type could be developed which while not displacing present destroyers building efforts would in the near future outspeed the present destroyer policy.

(*f*) That what was needed now was speed in construction and standardization, not improvement (with an eye to the future), and that to get what is now needed certain concessions in the present evolved type of destroyer principally in the direction of speed would have to be made to secure a more rugged type of craft.

(*g*) The knowledge that England has been forced to develop a type especially for antisubmarine work.

(*h*) The belief that drastic and perhaps novel methods would have to replace conservative estimate if we were to grasp the present situation in time.

(*i*) The conviction that the antisubmarine destroyers asked for differed practically so little from the development of the best of the 750-ton type that it would be extremely useful not only now but in the future.

(*j*) The conviction that the present established naval building policy would have to be modified; that a new policy would have to be decided upon and established, and that no policy could succeed unless the will to drive it through at all cost were there.

5. *The board's conception of the naval building program which should be adopted:*

Before arriving at a decision 200 of the antisubmarine destroyers, the board had to formulate its conception of what an adequate building policy should be now, in order to do its best to meet present conditions while still attempting to safeguard the future.

(*a*) As a basis of original estimate, the Department's policy in regard to the order of importance of warships to be laid down was taken under consideration. The order of importance as laid down is as follows:

(1) Submarine chasers.
(2) Destroyers.
(3) Scout cruisers.
(4) Submarines, large and small.
(5) Battleships.
(6) Fuel ships.
(7) Destroyer tenders.
(8) Submarine tenders.
(9) Hospital ships.
(10) Ammunition ships.
(11) Repair ships.
(12) Transports.
(13) Gunboats.
(14) Battle cruisers.

(*b*) Owing to the present emergency, the board recognized the building of cargo vessels as a measure of importance commensurate with the building of warships itself.

(*c*) In order to meet both naval needs and merchant ship needs, it was necessary to effect the closest cooperation between the two representative interests. A definite naval building policy must be established that there might be no conflict between the two paramount interests.

(*d*) It was believed that certain concessions in the present naval building program would have to be made to the merchant ship building interests, as represented by the Emergency Fleet Corporation. That these concessions would be most useful and

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practical (in view of the present submarine situation) if made along the lines of the big naval ships. And that such concessions, in so far as they are matters of practical shipbuilding, should be made. That so far as the present big naval tonnage is concerned, it was more a question of clearing the ways and releasing the men and machinery, rather than a question of how many of the big types we should lay down.

(*e*) The views stated in (*d*) were held because it was believed that—

(*a*) Successful termination of this war will preclude the chance of another for some terms of years.

(*b*) For the allied purposes, merchant ships are as essential to the successful termination of this war as battleships, and that their construction is even more important at present.

(*c*) The counter for the United States, in case of an unsuccessful termination of this war lies: (1) in our naval submarine; (2) in conscription.

(*d*) Of new future possible opponents other than the present opponents: (1) The chances are remote, owing to present alliances; (2) we are already stronger than any other probable opponents; (3) it would be better to buy our battle cruisers or battleships from our present allies (in case they are needed) than to lay them down now in the present emergency, an emergency which must be met now.

(*e*) In case this war terminates successfully, the merchant ships laid down by us will be the most useful types in existence in furthering the ultimate good of the country.

(*f*) Finally, we did not enter this war alone. We have allies, and their efforts against the now common enemy have stood between us and possible aggressions for over two years. They have needs. Their needs are immediate and imperative. Their cause is our cause now.

(*f*) Therefore, the board believed that we should concentrate our fresh building efforts on:

(1) A standard type of destroyer to meet present needs.
(2) Submarines, large and small, to meet future needs.
(3) Battleships laid down and now on the ways.
(4) Certain types of small craft, such as tugs and sweepers.
(5) Cooperate with Shipping Board to produce cargo carriers.

If this be done, we will have put forth the Navy's best efforts, not for the Navy alone, but for the country, and especially for the Allies, whose war is now our own.

(*g*) Following the above line of reasoning, the board made as its first recommendation the construction of 200 submarine destroyers. The general specifications which were laid down for the type were practically a modernized type of the old 750-ton destroyers made more seaworthy and more enduring, but with less speed. The final letter only went in after cabled advices from abroad, Vice Admiral Sims, seemed to point to this same general type.

(*h*) No recommendations could be made as to submarines, for this type has never yet with us been standardized to the extent that the destroyer type has. Moreover, our general policy as to their future use is still not entirely settled, though the Germans, the greatest experts in this particular type, have clearly indicated their policy.

6. The prime requisite to put through such a policy as indicated above:

(*a*) The first steps to be taken to put any such policy through would be for the naval representatives, the merchant ship representatives, and the builders to get together and to definitely decide upon the ways and means to do it.

(*b*) The above may not be the true solution of our building problem. It is, however, a definite statement of a policy and the reasons that influenced that choice.

W. V. PRATT,
Captain, United States Navy.
F. L. PINNEY,
Commander, United States Navy.
E. S. LAND,
Naval Constructor, United States Navy.
W. R. VAN AUKEN,
Lieut. Commander, United States Navy.
S. C. HOOPER,
Lieut. Commander, United States Navy.
G. K. CALHOUN,
Professor of Mathematics, United States Navy.
J. H. TOWERS,
Lieutenant, United States Navy.

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NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington.

Memorandum for the Chief of Operations.
Subject: (*a*) General Board's recommendations in re destroyers building program.
(*b*) Submarine Device Board's recommendation for 200 submarine destroyers.

1. Referring to General Board's conclusions that certain shipyards now engaged in building destroyers, battleships, merchant ships, etc., could furnish the Government better returns by becoming utilized to the limit of their capacity in the building of the present type of destroyer which may be called a "fleet" destroyer 35 knots speed, etc., in so far as the shipyards mentioned and concerned under the present conditions in those yards, I agree with the General Board's recommendation and recommend that these yards be assigned 50 or 60 "fleet" destroyers according to the present approved plans to which they are building and that every facility and encouragement be given to these yards to complete a minimum of 50 or 60 of these destroyers prior to January 1, 1919.

2. Referring to recommendation contained in (*b*) of 200 submarine destroyers, I also entirely agree with the program. These last vessels are to be of the type standardized by the board and to be built by other yards than those building under program in paragraph 1. They should be built under the "assembly" plan along the lines used by Gen. Goethals in building the ship commission's vessels—that is, a distribution of the various parts to yards and works adapted to the building of each part and then the complete destroyer be assembled at a certain yard assigned as assembly yard, these 200 to be absolutely standardized in every respect and particular, to have only one type of engine, to have only one type of boilers, to have only one type of auxiliaries, to be built absolutely according to one set of standardized plans, so that any parts will assemble at any yard into a completed vessel. This will undoubtedly require the expansion of a number of works, such as pump builders, boiler builders, etc., and it will also require that pump builders, boiler builders, etc., now engaged in the building of their own special type, be converted into factories for the building of the standardized type. In short, it will require the Government to direct the builders, so that we will obtain what we want instead of the previous method of taking what each separate designer or builder thought we needed or knew that he could best produce. This may also require the advance of certain per cent of prices where expansion is necessary. That can be arranged and I believe that the present laws will permit any other control of these factories or workshops that may be necessary to attain our purpose.

3. As a result of the above programs (outlined in paragraphs 1 and 2), I believe it possible for the fleet to be increased by 50 standardized destroyers and 150 to 200 submarine destroyers, all to be in commission by or before January 1, 1919, and the deliveries of which should commence in large number by February 1, 1918.

J. S. McKEAN.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, July 19, 1917.

Memorandum for Capt. Pratt.

As stated in my previous memorandum on general board's recommendation, I am in full agreement with the joint letter, paragraphs 6, 7, and 8, in so far as relates to the following plants and to them only: Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., New York Shipbuilding Co., Wm. Cramp & Sons, Fore River Shipbuilding Corporation, Union Iron Works. I believe that these firms can furnish in addition to those already under contract, 50 more destroyers of the fleet type, with certain simplifications such as elimination of reduction gear, etc

As to the other part of the program, the standardized submarine destroyer, this should be undertaken with works other than those referred to in paragraph 1, and it should be done and could only be done satisfactorily along the line suggested in paragraph 5. I believe that this assembly plan (subletting contracts for different parts to different firms and assembling at certain other yards) would produce from 150 to 200 submarine destroyers by January 1, 1919.

The above programs would call for the construction of both 1 and 2 being given precedence over battleships and to a certain extent over merchant ships building by the Shipping Board. Materials, workmen, and machines should be furnished for this job first. This is logical in view of the fact that the Shipping Board program is in its ultimate results a process of feeding submarines to death. This program contemplates poisoning them.

McKEAN.

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NAVY DEPARTMENT.
Washington, July 19, 1917.

Memorandum.

1. The General Board, Vice Admiral Sims, and all officers agree that we should make our maximum effort in building destroyers for antisubmarine warfare.

2. Sixty-six destroyers are now under construction. The contractors for these destroyers can take in hand 50 additional destroyers for delivery previous to January, 1919. The General Board and I are in agreement that contracts for these destroyers should be placed immediately.

3. Operations has recommended that additional standardized destroyers to the number of 200 be authorized. It does not desire a new type of vessel, but a vessel of proven character similar to the 750-ton destroyer of the Beale, Jouett, Jenkins type. The idea being to produce these destroyers on the assembly plan. The technical bureaus report that is is mechanically possible to produce a total of 200 additional destroyers by the exclusive employment of the five largest yards in the country by January, 1919. They state that this would require the merging of those yards under a single management.

4. Operations recommends for special construction destroyers of less speed and greater reliability and simplicity than those now building—a vessel of less than a thousand tons. It recommends an armament of 4-inch-fifty guns because these guns are more quickly obtainable and are an adequate reply to any guns known to be carried by enemy submarines. The General Board recommends substantially the same character of vessel, but armed with 5-inch guns. Larger guns require greater tonnage. These differences are not essential except as they influence speed of construction.

5. I recommend (*a*) Contracts be let for 50 additional fleet destroyers. (*b*) Contracts be let for 150 additional standardized destroyers. (*c*) That every effort be made to have this program carried out, not only by utilizing the five ship yards now building destroyers but using any other yards that might be utilized. The building of capital ships should continue.

The country and Congress do not understand the full significance of events now passing on the sea. They can not believe that control of the sea and with it the permanent isolation of each of the Allies is gradually but surely passing into the hands of our enemies. They are fed on visions of victory through inventions yet to be made or through spectacular detached aerial effort but vaguely comprehended. The vast untraveled expanses of a barren ocean separating allies who would fight strongly together, but instead fall singly before a united enemy has not yet been pictured in their consciousness.

We of the Navy understand these things. We know that the great decision must finally be had on the land. We know that there can be no uniting of our forces there against our common enemy except by way of the sea. We know that of all enemy weapons the submarine alone may be able to prevent that union of strength. We know that of all our weapons the submarine fears the destroyer most. We know that the true answer to the submarine is to drive him from the seas with the sole vessel capable of doing it—the destroyer. We know that when this is done that war on the sea will come back to the surface. Decency and chivalry will then once more hold up their heads while Democracy comes into her own.

With an earnestness beyond expression backed by a conviction that has endured from the first, I ask that we meet this great world crisis by contributing our maximum national effort in building, manning, and fighting destroyers to drive enemy submarines from the sea.

The question of types may rest for the moment while we make the great decision to do our utmost. Let it not be said by posterity that we, seeing our duty, hesitated until it was too late, or that we failed to distinguish essential from incidental effort.

Two hundred destroyers would mean victory for us. They may be had within a year and a half.

The power to accomplish will follow the decision to accomplish.

Let us decide.

SCHOFIELD.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
GENERAL BOARD,
Washington, July 13, 1917.

From: Senior member present.
To: Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: Number and military characteristics of a new type of destroyer.
Reference: (*a*) Navy Department letter 28754-26:23, of July 6. 1917.—Report of board on devices and plans connected with submarine warfare. (*b*) General Board's third indorsement, G. B. No. 420-14, of May 29, 1917.

In accordance with the verbal request o the Chiet of Operations tor the opinion of the General Board as to the number and military characteristics of a new type of destroyer recommended by a "board on devices and plans connected with submarine warfare," the General Board states as follows:

2. As no comments or recommendations of the technical bureaus of the Navy Department, having cognizance of the subject matter under consideration, accompanied this report, the General Board, in order to be fully informed, requested the attendance of the Chiefs of the Bureaus of Construction and Repair, Steam Engineering, and Ordnance, and these officers discussed from the standpoints of their respective bureaus the practicability at this time of building standardized destroyers in the number and of the type proposed.

3. From the statements made by the chiefs of the technical bureaus consulted the General Board's careful consideration of the subject and its previous recommendations in reference (*b*) advocating additional destroyer construction, the board arrives at these conclusions:

(*a*) The object sought to be attained by the construction of a standardized destroyer of the type proposed in reference (*a*) is to save time in order to get into service to meet the emergencies of the war a great number of destroyers with the least possible delay. With this object the General Board is thoroughly in sympathy; but the statements of the Chiefs of Bureaus of Construction and Repair and Steam Engineering lead to the conclusion that only after 30 months can the number of destroyers of the new type, reference (*a*), by the method proposed, be had in greater numbers than the type now under construction, and that for 18 months, which may be considered to be the critical period of the war, the type now under construction can certainly be had in greater numbers than the type proposed.

(*b*) To proceed with the immediate construction of 200 destroyers of the type and along the lines recommended would necessitate the taking over and operating them as a unit by the Government of the following shipbuilding companies: Newport News, New York, Cramp's, Fore River, and the Union Iron Works. All other naval construction now in hand at these yards would have to be dropped, and in addition no further work at these yards upon naval vessels, nor upon upon merchant ships, could be undertaken until the completion of the destroyer program.

(*c*) The labor situation at this time is a most embarrassing obstacle to enlarging the activities at these plants sufficiently to complete such a destroyer program as contemplated in reference (*a*). The force required would be approximately 60,000 men. The total number now employed at these plants is approximately 30,000. There is now no additional skilled shipbuilding labor immediately available from which to draw the increased force required.

(*d*) To suspend for two and a half years naval construction now in hand and to that extent delay the construction of other essential fleet units already authorized, or which may be authorized, will not sufficiently strengthen the existing fleet to meet a possible new alignment of powers at the end of the present war or the German Fleet if it succeeds in taking the offensive.

(*e*) The Chiefs of the Bureaus Construction and Repair and Steam Engineering state that the standardization and construction of destroyers of the type proposed in reference (*a*) at this time by the five shipbuilding firms above mentioned would encounter many difficulties and complications. These yards are now crowded to the limits of their building capacity by the work in hand and in prospect by that already contracted for. The firms controlling them would have to be persuaded or coerced to suspend work in hand, cancel contracts, remodel and enlarge their plants to do standardized and specialized work, change their methods, double their working forces, and train the new personnel.

(*f*) Time, a most important element in the present war emergency, would be consumed in making the necessary changes and adjustments before actual construction work could be started.

(*g*) Complications and delays are to be feared from insufficient supplies of the standard fittings and equipment adopted for the standardized destroyer, and from inability to use other equally good fittings and equitpmen to be readily supplied or

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purchased in open market. For example, if in engineering it were decided to standardize as to space and weight to accommodate a certain type of pump, that pump and no other would have to be supplied for all destroyers, although other equally good pumps might be available in the market.

(*h*) From the statements of the Chief of Bureau of Construction and Repair, it appears that 66 destroyers are now contracted for of the type recommended by the general board for the building program of 1918; that six of these will be delivered by January, 1918; 60 more by September, 1918; that probably 50 in addition, if contracted for now, can be delivered by January, 1919; and that boats in excess of this number may be turned out subsequent to January, 1919, at the rate of one or two a month.

(*i*) From the statements of the Chief of Bureau of Steam Engineering, it appears practicable, so far as propulsive machinery and the equipment under cognizance of that bureau are concerned, to complete the above program—that is, to complete the 66 boats now contracted for by September, 1918; 50 additional by January, 1919, and to provide for additional boats after that date.

(*j*) From the statements of the Chief of Bureau of Ordnance it appears practicable to supply the 50 additional destroyers with 5-inch guns by January, 1919. If 200 5-inch guns are contracted for now deliveries will probably commence by January, 1919, and if sufficient numbers of new guns are not ready by the time the destroyers are ready, their batteries could be completed by taking guns from other naval vessels and merchant ships temporarily supplying their places with 4-inch guns of which 2,000 are now under contract. In this connection the general board is of the opinion that, in order to cope with the heavy armament now being installed in the larger type of German submarines, 5.9-inch caliber—and to prevail decisively against the larger destroyers now building abroad, it will be necessary to increase the caliber of guns carried by future destroyers to 5-inch.

4. In view of the above considerations, and especially in view of the opinions of the chiefs of the technical bureaus consulted that no time can be saved in getting boats of the type proposed in reference (*a*) into service in the present congested condition of the country's shipbuilding industries; and further, that more boats may be expected in 18 months of the type building under the present method than by that proposed, the general board makes the following recommendations:

(*a*) Proceed with the construction of boats of the type recommended by the general board for the building program of 1918; but, as an emergency measure, the contract speed of 35 knots may be reduced, but not below 30 knots for acceptance.

(*b*) Contract now for the construction of 50 additional destroyers of the present type, to be completed by January, 1919. The general board does not recommend a larger number at this time because of the impracticability of getting more into service in the next 18 months.

(*c*) Install batteries of four 5-inch guns and one antiaircraft gun.

(*d*) Contract now for two hundred 5-inch guns.

CHAS. J. BADGER.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *July 14, 1917.*

To: Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: Destroyers—Special 1918 program.
Reference: (*a*) Report of board on devices and plans connected with submarine warfare (undated). (*b*) Department's letter No. 28754-26:23 (undated). (*c*) Special 1918 destroyer characteristics. (*d*) Department's letter No. 8557-238 of 7 July.

1. Reference (*a*), page 10, paragraph (*b*), recommends that 200 destroyers of a new type to meet certain military characteristics of the department be immediately constructed.

Reference (*b*) approves reference (*a*).

Reference (*c*) contains the military characteristics which briefly specify: Speed, 28 knots; guns, four 4-inch; tubes, 4 triple.

Reference (*c*) also specifies that all destroyers of this program be built from identical plans and be standardized in every particular of hull, machinery, boiler, auxiliaries, fittings, and equipment.

Reference (*d*) approves reference (*c*) and directs that plans and data be prepared with the utmost expedition.

2. The following report indicates the shipbuilding facilities that are necessary in order to carry out this program, assuming that these 200 destroyers, in addition to those now building, shall be ready for delivery in January, 1919, 18 months hence:

In order to build destroyers with expedition, it is necessary that the work be in the hands of people who have had experience in this line. While it would be possible, in time, to obtain destroyers from firms that have not hitherto built them, our past

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experience indicates conclusively that this can not be done with expedition. At the five large shipbuilding plants—Newport News, New York Shipbuilding Co., Wm. Cramp & Sons, Fore River Shipbuilding Corporation, and Union Iron Works—there are now building 49 destroyers, the deliveries of which are due subsequent to January 1, 1918.

3. The first contract date of delivery of any of these vessels was originally September 30, 1918, but the department has already taken steps to speed up the construction of these vessels with a view to having as many as possible completed by the beginning of next year. Assuming that delivery of the 49 vessels above will begin on January 1, 1918, launchings should begin not later than November 1, 1917. To launch these vessels, and an additional 200 before January 1, 1919, would mean about 18 destroyers per month, or about one a week by each of the five conpanies referred to, if the work were assigned to them. This would require at each yard not less than 12 and probably 15 ways assigned as building berths for destroyers. It is mechanically possible to provide these if the yards are devoted exclusively to destroyers.

4. To build the hull and machinery for the total number of destroyers above referred to would require on the average the labor of 60,000 men. This is nearly double the total number of men now employed on all work by the five big shipyards above referred to. In order, then, to carry out the proposed program it would be necessary not only to employ the entire capacity of the five largest shipbuilding plants in the country on destroyers, to the exclusion of all merchant and other naval work, but to practically double their capacity either at the yards proper or through subordinate companies.

5. In order to carry out the program in the manner desired; that is, to insure complete standardization, it would be necessary practically to merge these five plants into one organization, under one management. This would necessitate the delegation by the President, to one man, of very large powers. To accomplish such an unprecedented program, however, would, in our opinion, require that complete authority, as well as responsibility, should be vested in one man, who would be charged with this work to the exclusion of all other duties, and with preference as regards material and labor over all merchant shipbuilding and any other conflicting military preparations.

6. In the opinion of the bureaus, time would be saved by complete standardization only if it is the intention of the department to continue to construct destroyers at the maximum capacity of the country for at least 2 years and possibly 30 months. If it is the department's desire to obtain the greatest number of destroyers practicable during the next 18 months, we believe it would not be wise to undertake the construction of a new standardized type, but that the maximum results be obtained by duplicating the vessels now under construction, with omissions rather than changes. Owing to the gearing situation, it might be necessary to use direct drive instead of the geared drive in some cases, but one builder is already undertaking the construction of destroyers with direct drive, and this machinery can be duplicated with a minimum delay by other builders should they be unable to obtain the gearing.

7. The additional number of destroyers which could be completed by January, 1919, along the above lines, without materially interfering with the construction of submarines, and without entirely stopping the construction of merchant ships at the large yards, but slowing up all large naval vessels as necessary to avoid interfering with destroyers, can be determined only by detail investigation and consultation with the shipbuilders. We estimate, however, that they would be between 40 and 50. This might involve special measures to increase the facilities at the shipyards, and undoubtedly would require that special consideration be given destroyer material.

8. It is recommended that the bureaus be authorized to take up at once with the shipbuilders the possibilities in the way of construction of destroyers by January, 1919, along the lines indicated above. Orders should be placed at an early date so as to relieve as much as possible the material situation by allowing it to be ordered well in advance.

GRIFFIN.
TAYLOR.

Paragraph 14 of Admiral Sims's letter is as follows:

14. The headquarters in Europe was not infrequently left in ignorance of the department's policies, plans for operation of United States forces, and its intended action upon my many dispatches. Not until July 10, 1917, did the Navy Department outline a policy as regards naval cooperation with the Allies—in a cable quoting a letter to the State Department.

Paragraph 14. The policy letter of July 10 was drawn up and signed on July 3, 1917, by the secretary. It remained a standard doctrine throughout the war. After June 25 I personally handled

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every dispatch of Admiral Sims, as well as all other dispatches, and prepared answers at the time of their receipt for the approval of the Chief of Naval Operations and the secretary on matters pertaining to policy, plan, and operation. As many of Admiral Sims' dispatches were repetitions it was not necessary to answer all of them. The policy laid down in the letter of July 3, while it may have seemed new to the admiral, was in fact the department's guiding standard since we entered the war.

I will not read that letter. It has been read a great many times.

At the same time that I submit that letter I will submit two other documents, which I have marked C–2 and C–3, which are Admiral Mayo's reports on his visit to the British Admiralty, and his statements, which we are already familiar with, as to the conditions of policy with the British Admiralty when their policy went into effect, which was at a date later than ours, even though they had been at war since 1914; so that our policy arrived in London practically coincident with the policy of the British Admiralty, but at a trifle earlier date. I submit these extracts from Admiral Mayo's report, which has already been put in in full.

The letter and the two extracts referred to above are as follows:

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, July 3, 1917.

Confidential.

SIR: Referring to the cablegram from Ambassador Page in London, dated June 23, 1917 (copy attached). After careful consideration of the present naval situation, taken in connection with possible future situations which might arise, the Navy Department is prepared to announce as its policy in so far as it related to the Allies—

(1) The heartiest cooperation with the Allies to meet the present submarine situation, in European or other waters, compatible with an adequate defense of our own home waters.

(2) The heartiest cooperation with the Allies to meet any future situation arising during the present war.

(3) A realization that while a successful termination of the present war must always be the first allied aim and will probably result in diminished tension throughout the world, the future position of the United States must in no way be jeopardized by any disintegration of our main fighting fleets.

(4) The conception that the present main military rôle of the United States naval forces lies in its safeguarding the lines of communication of the Allies. In pursuing this aim there will, generally speaking, be two classes of vessels engaged—minor craft and major craft—and two rôles of action; first offensive, second defensive.

(5) In pursuing the rôle set forth in paragraph (4), the Navy Department can not too strongly insist that in its opinion, the offensive must always be the dominant note in any general plans of strategy prepared. But, as the primary rôle in all offensive operations must perforce belong to allied powers, the Navy Department announces as its policy that, in general, it is willing to accept any joint plan of action of the Allies, deemed necessary to meet immediate needs.

(6) Pursuant to the above general policy, the Navy Department announces as its general plan of action the following:

(*a*) Its willingness to send its minor fighting forces, comprised of destroyers, cruisers, submarine chasers, auxiliaries, in any numbers not incompatible with home needs, and to any field of action deemed expedient by the joint allied admiralties, which would not involve a violation of our present State policy.

(*b*) Its unwillingness, as a matter of policy, to separate any division from the main fleet for service abroad, although it is willing to send the entire battleship fleet abroad to act as a united but cooperating unit when, after joint consultation of all admiralties concerned, the emergency is deemed to warrant it, and the extra tension imposed upon the line of communications due to the increase in the number of fighting ships in European waters will stand the strain imposed upon it.

(*c*) Its willingness to discuss more fully plans for joint operations.

Sincerely, yours,

JOSEPHUS DANIELS.

The honorable the SECRETARY OF STATE.

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TAKEN FROM ADMIRAL MAYO'S REPORT AFTER VISIT TO EUROPEAN WATERS.—GENERAL IMPRESSIONS REGARDING CONDITIONS IN BRITISH ADMIRALTY.

OCTOBER 11, 1917.

Paragraph 5. (*a*) There is little doubt that the British Admiralty is at a loss when asked for the history of the war to date. Reports of operations are so isolated and scattered and without system that there is not available any comprehensive record of original plans, the governing reasons therefor, and the degree of success or failure in each case. The inevitable inference is that the war has been carried on from day to day and not according to any comprehensive policy to serve as a guide to plans looking to the effective coordination and cooperation of effort against the enemy.

(*b*) It is apparent that despite the so-called war-staff arrangements put into effect in the Admiralty during the past three years, until very recently there has been no planning section, nor was there any definite body of men charged with the function of looking ahead, or even of looking back to see wherein lay the causes of success or failure, nor any means of furnishing the heads of the Admiralty with analyses and summaries of past operations in order that decisions as to continuing old operations or undertaking new ones might be reached with a due sense of "perspective," both as to past operations and as to the coordination of new operations in a general plan.

(*c*) The statement of present Admiralty policy, originally dated July, 1917, now revised to September 17, 1917 (reference (*b*) and inclosure B is not really a statement of policy, but rather a summary of current activities). That these activities are based on an underlying idea of the defensive may readily be inferred from the leading words in the subparagraphs of paragraph 1 of the paper referred to, namely, "protection," "prevention," "protection," "resistance." See also references (*h*), (*i*), (*j*), and inclosures H, I, J.

(*d*) The statement of proposed future Admiralty policy dated September 17, 1917 (reference (*c*) and inclosure C), indicates growing appreciation of the necessity for more energetic offensive measures against the submarine in the way of preventing his egress from the North Sea.

(*e*) While the development of the submarine menace has been gradual and measures undertaken to meet it have had to be evolved and applied to new developments as they appeared, the present dispersion of allied naval effort against the submarine menace has reached large dimensions and the actual offensive against the submarine has suffered through the accumulation of large numbers of vessels to carry out protective measures. The number of vessels engaged in protective (defensive) effort includes practically the entire British Navy in northern waters except the Grand Fleet, many of whose destroyers and other small craft are also engaged in protective work.

(*f*) Referring again to the proposed plan of future antisubmarine operations in the North Sea (reference (*c*) and inclosure C), it appears that it may be necessary to withdraw some vessels engaged in protective work in order to make the offensive effective. However, the effectiveness of the offensive should be cumulative, thus enabling perhaps nearly all the available vessels gradually to be diverted from the protective (defensive) to the offensive.

[Taken from Admiral Mayo's report after visit to European waters, Oct. 11, 1917.]

NOTES ON THE GENERAL NAVAL SITUATION.

Paragraph 13. (*a*) Apparently the naval plans of the Allies have been in most general terms. Great Britain to control the North Sea and Channel; France her west coast and the French Mediterranean Coast; Italy, assisted as necessary by France, to control the Adriatic, British forces based on Gibraltar, Malta, Alexandria, assisting in the Mediterranean. Recently the Japanese have given assistance in the Mediterranean, having there 1 cruiser and 12 destroyers. United States forces are operating from Queenstown, Brest, and Gibraltar.

(*b*) (1) It is apparent from conversations with officers attached to the Operations Divisions that up to the present there have been no definite naval plans. So far as can be learned there has been no statement of British naval policy previous to that issued by the Admiralty in July, 1917, which is in reality a defense of what was being done and not a real statement of policy.

(2) The defensive nature of this so-called policy is plainly indicated by the paragraph stating the objects to be attained by naval power; the leading words of the four subparagraphs which state these objects are: (1) Protection; (2) prevention; (3) protection; (4) resistance.

(3) All of these objects and many more would be obtained by the destruction of German naval power.

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(c) (1) In the first month of the war the offensive policy was much more pronounced than at present. The British fleet was, in fact, undergoing a test mobilization when the probability of war became evident. The forces were maintained in a mobilized condition, and therefore began the war in a most advantageous state.

(2) The disposition of the fleet was made with a view to opposing the movements of enemy forces out of the North Sea. The main battle fleet was based in the North of Scotland, but kept the sea almost continuously. A second battle force was based in the south of England to prevent the passage of any force of less strength than the High Sea Fleet through the Channel. The armored and light cruisers were continually on scouting duty in the North Sea. The British submarines were stationed in the Helgoland Bight with a view to attacking the German fleet if it came out. No mines were laid in Helgoland Bight by the British during this phase.

(3) The frequent attacks on British cruisers by German submarines, especially the catastrophe in which the Hogue, Cressy, and Aboukir were lost, caused a change in plan as follows:

(4) The main fleet was withdrawn from continuous service underway and placed in a base adequately protected from submarines. The heavier cruisers were withdrawn from scouting work and their place taken by light cruisers and destroyers. The mining of Helgoland Bight was begun. The development of the auxiliary services of mine sweeping and patrol was made more rapid.

(5) The present operations are merely developments of this plan. The fleet is ready and anxious to fight a major action, but it is only sent to sea as a fleet when the German fleet is out or thought to be coming out, or occasionally for exercises. The various divisions of the fleet are often under way for target practice, etc.

(*d*) See references (*h*), (*i*), (*j*) and inclosures H, I, J.

Paragraph 15 of Admiral Sims's letter is as follows:

15. As usual in such cases, the policy thus set forth was academically sound, but that it was not carried out, or was not understood by the department, is shown by the fact that for 10 months after its receipt I was still urgently recommending an increase of forces—still trying to convince the department that the war was in the eastern Atlantic; that the United States naval front was off the European coast and not off the United States coast; that it was there only that the naval enemy was operating; that it was there only that United States shipping, let alone allied shipping, could be protected with the maximum efficiency.

Paragraph 15. This policy was perfectly understood by everybody in the department, and was accepted as standard doctrine.

Paragraph 16 of Admiral Sims's letter is as follows:

16. A review of the dispatches makes it apparent that the department did not accept the reports and recommendations with the seriousness that the critical situation demanded. There are many instances that illustrate this. One that may be cited is the case of our battleships that were requested as reinforcement of the Grand Fleet.

I beg you to take particular notice of that expression "reinforcement of the Grand Fleet," as expressed in his letter of January 7, 1920.

As to paragraph 16, I remember the cable, and upon its receipt a cable was drafted in reply. The reason why these ships were not sent at that time can, of course, best be explained by the Chief of Naval Operations. I am, however, under the impression that the cable sent by Admiral Sims did not sufficiently impress the Chief of Naval Operations with the gravity of the situation, and that he did not wish to break up the organization of our battleships unless it were absolutely necessary to do so, feeling that we might be called upon to use these units as a whole, and as a reserve. Personally, I was not in accord with this policy as I favored making concessions and sending the ships at once, but Admiral Benson's views turned out to be correct in the end, as nothing happened to justify the fears expressed. In fact, in this case the gravity of the situation as regards the Grand Fleet, if such existed, was not stated in such definite terms as to leave no doubt in our minds. The reason assigned, viz, that the Admiralty contemplated placing five of the King Edward class

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out of commission to get the personnel for other craft, did not carry such weight with it as a simple statement to the effect that "the Grand Fleet required reinforcement" would have carried. To have obtained quicker results it would have been better had Admiral Sims presented his views in the manner outlined.

In this connection with regard to many of Admiral Sims's despatches, had he confined himself to simpler statements and repeated himself less he would have presented his views better and would have eliminated the chance of being judged to have overstated his case. From long experience with Admiral Sims in the past, I seldom misunderstood him, but to others less familiar with his methods, his real attitude of mind was not so apparent. This is merely given as my judgment, but I believe it to be correct.

Paragraph 17 of Admiral Sims's letter is as follows:

17. Following a conference with Admiral Jellicoe, then first sea lord, or "chief of naval operations," of the British Admirality, and Admiral Beatty, the commander in chief of the Grand Fleet, it was strongly recommended on July 21, 1917, that four of our coal-burning battleships be sent at once. There was great delay before there was even an acknowledgement of this request. This naturally subjected me to much embarrassment. The request, though repeated, was finally refused.

Paragraph 17. This matter was handled immediately by me and a favorable reply drafted. The answer was not sent immediately and then it was not a favorable one. The question was being weighed by the Chief of Naval Operations and the Secretary, I think.

Paragraph 18 of Admiral Sims's letter is as follows:

18. In the following November the Chief of Naval Operations arrived in England with the Col. House mission. After discussing this question of the necessity of sending our battleships with the same officials with whom I had discussed it, he cabled at once recommending that they be sent. The result was that it was over four months after the original request (November 28) that the four ships sailed from the United States.

Paragraph 18. Correct. Cable to that effect was received from Admiral Benson, who was then in London. The matter was taken up immediately by me with the Secretary, and his approval to the plan secured at once. Admiral Mayo was called up in conference at the office. The ships to go were selected, the admiral to command was picked out, and the ships were dispatched as soon as they could be made ready. The ships were docked at this time to give them the last finishing touch before sending them out to fight. This is common naval practice where it is possible to carry it out, and it is sound. From the date of receipt of order to proceed until the date of arrival at Scapa Flow was one month less one day, I believe. The ships had a very severe winter passage over.

Paragraph 19 of the letter is as follows:

19. This is but one of a number of examples of a similar kind, and strikingly illustrates the nature of the delays caused by the department's insistence upon trying to understand the intricate details of rapidly changing conditions 3,000 miles away. As it was of course a physical impossibility to keep the department fully and accurately informed, and as the department insisted upon making decisions concerning both the disposition and the actual operations of the European forces, the inevitable result was unsound decisions, and in some cases long delays before the department was induced to accept the original recommendations that were based upon exahustive discussions of the actual conditions with the heads of the allied navies.

Paragraph 19. This statement, in my opinion, should not be accepted at its face value. All information relating to plans and poli-

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cies, unless the urgency of the situation demanded instant action, should be sent to the department to decide upon. We were, in the summer of 1917 when the office of communications had been established in the office of operations, in complete control of the radio and cable situation, handling easily some 2,000 dispatches daily. In addition to naval dispatches we were handling some of the cable work for the Army and some of the similar work for the State Department, principally because our cipher codes were better. We were daily in receipt of cables from Admiral Sims, going into minute detail as to his material, personnel, and supply needs. These cables used hundreds of words and were in cipher. It was a much simpler matter to give a general explanation of a plan or policy and most necessary to do so. It would be an unsafe act of the department to inaugurate the principle of cutting itself adrift from the broader phases of plan and policy in the war zone, and to leave these decisions entirely in the hands of its naval officer in command there. The department at home must keep its hands on such matters, or else it might become involved in affairs which had not received the approval of the home government and which might commit our country to actions not approved here. The commander of our forces in European waters had full authority within his own realm of discretion and his judgment and advice were always given paramount weight. On the other hand, for the department to interfere with him in matters of detail pertaining strictly to his own forces and not involving other forces, was an error. Without doubt the department committed some such errors, though I do not recall specific instances. Though they might be embarrassing at times, there were none made which affected the favorable outcome of the war.

Paragraph 20 of the letter is as follows:

20. Judging from the actions that were finally taken, after extensive cabled and written communications, and consequently long delays, it is apparent that if I could have appeared daily in Washington to explain fully my recommendations, and the discussions before the conferences upon which they were based, they would undoubtedly have been carried out from two to six months earlier. The point is that if the department considered that there was anyone in Washington more competent to form just conclusions, he should have been sent to Europe for that purpose; but, failing this, the recommendations of the Navy Department's representative, based upon conferences with the allied commanders, should have been accepted and immediately acted upon. The action of the department in this respect was a violation of a fundamental principle of warfare—see Mahan or any authority—and it was continuous throughout the war. It added greatly to the burden of my work.

Paragraph 20. The Chief of Naval Operations and the Secretary of the Navy, in so far as I know, had the fullest confidence in Admiral Sims. His reports were excellent and there is no officer in the service who could have done the work he was doing better, or even so well. He understood our need for information and the desirability of spreading it effectively. He kept the department well informed. During the war it was thought that the closest cooperation existed between his office in London and our office in Washington.

The Chief of Naval Operations has often said, if I recollect correctly, that he could not find another officer to take Sims's place. There is a marked difference between having the fullest confidence in an officer, being guided by his opinions and judgment, and giving over to that officer the complete power to make ultimate decisions beyond the scope of those he ought legitimately to make. It is no violation of

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the principles of Mahan, nor of the dictates of common sense, in a war of this magnitude, where so many of the influencing factors lay outside of the war zone, and in our own country, for the department to keep a general hand of the situation. Whatever criticisms is made should not be directed at the principle, but at the practical working of that principle, if just criticism there be. When all is said, in broad matters, it was not Admiral Sims's final decisions that were needed, but the final policy and decision of the home Government back of him, based on his preliminary views and directed by his judgment at the front. Request after request was made by Admiral Sims, and were acted upon immediately by the department, but he in turn does not seem to realize the difficulties confronting those whose duty it was to supply the demands made.

Paragraphs 21 and 22 of the letter of Admiral Sims are as follows:

21. There was great delay and reluctance in accepting the indisputable fact, which should have been apparent to anyone, that the critical sea area was in the eastern Atlantic in the so-called submarine war zone; that the submarine campaign could be critical and could affect the ultimate decision of the war only in that area

22. This attitude in Washington greatly slowed the sending of the necessary assistance, and necessarily resulted in prolonging the war.

Paragraphs 21 and 22 can not be concurred in. The officers at home in the Office of Operations were men trained in the same school of thought as Admiral Sims and were loyally giving him their full support. There is no office in the department to which he is more indebted. From the Secretary down there was not, from the time I entered the office, the slightest doubt as to where the war was being waged. We knew it even before he told us. Every plan—and there were many—every effort, was directed toward throwing our effective forces there. The results were by no means as satisfactory as any of us desired, but the reinforcements demanded can not be created in a day and moved like pawns on a chess board. The difficulties confronting us could not have been fully appreciated, or so sweeping a statement would not have been made.

Paragraph 23 of the letter is as follows:

23. It would seem to be self-evident that the department could not possibly have been kept completely informed in detail, by cable code messages, of the actual situation in the war zone, and particularly of the rapidly changing conditions during the critical period of the war in the summer of 1917.

Paragraph 23. The department was kept wonderfully well informed by Admiral Sims. We had a fund of information accumulated in the office through cables from the admiral, through his letters and reports, and through the literature furnished us by the Admiralty through Admiral Sims. The work he did in this respect was deserving of every praise.

Paragraph 24 of the letter is as follows:

24. As a matter of fact, this was a physical impossibility during all of that most critical period. The work of collecting the necessary information, or even the purely mechanical work of transcribing it, would have been away beyond the physical capacity of one man assisted by the one aid I was allowed during that time. The best that could possibly be done was to keep the department informed by cable in a general way of the conclusions reached by the various discussions with the allied commanders at the "front" and of the decisions based thereon.

Paragraph 24. Admiral Sims has a just complaint in this case. He should have been allowed more assistants, and earlier. It was

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impossible to meet all his demands, but greater effort should have been made in the beginning, I think.

Paragraph 25 of the letter is as follows:

25. In cases where the department declined to approve such decisions the only recourse was to try to explain by letter as fully as time and insufficient assistance would permit. The result was, of course, long, embarrassing, and dangerous delays.

Paragraph 25. The gist of this paragraph seems to be that Admiral Sims has a cause for complaint because the department did not accept all his recommendations and act on them favorably, without reserving the right of ultimate decision for itself. In all cases of an unfavorable decision the department accepted the responsibility for it. It was not placed on Sims's shoulders. Had the ultimate outcome of these decisions been disastrous, Admiral Sims's claim would have had more force, but it was not so. On the whole, the Navy did play a successful rôle, as successful a rôle as a Navy which was not prepared specially a long time ahead to enter this particular kind of a war could have been expected to play.

Paragraph 26 of the letter is as follows:

26. If the department had promptly accepted the recommendations made, beginning four days after my arrival abroad, and continuing for some months, and had sent at once all the destroyers and other craft which were finally sent in the next four or five months, it follows that the United States naval intervention would have been much more efficient.

Paragraph 26. The department did accept this information as indicating the true state of affairs, and it gave heed to the recommendations of Admiral Sims. From the date I entered the office I know that the accepted doctrine was "the war is over there." The forces did not go over as fast as any of us desired, but the reasons for it do not lie in the failure to accept the recommendations made. The failure to get into the war immediately, in full force, upon the declaration is not the fault of Operations or the failure to recognize the character of the war, and where it was being waged, but were, for the most part, due to natural causes and to causes which antedated our entry into the war. It was not possible to press a button and move ships, men, and supplies with the rapidity desired either by Sims or by the department. All of the destroyers were not ready to move instantly; navy yards and mercantile shipyards were not ready to undertake the vast amount of work thrown at them. Submarine chasers had to be built. Tugs had to be bought, refitted, and built. Yachts had to be bought, stripped and made ready for war service. The transports, which were the seized German ships, had to be repaired, manned, and put into service. Other transports and supply ships had to be built. Arrangement had to be made with the Army for the transport of its great military force to Europe.

The reorganization and expansion of the Office of Operations and of the bureaus had to be undertaken. The coordination of the bureaus with this office had to be developed; the methods of administration had to be divested of their prewar conservatism, the red tape abolished, and more authority given to subordinates in the matter of detail; habits of quick and accurate thinking and quick decision under the stress of war, had to be developed. The personnel had to be expanded and trained; the task of creating sufficient reserves of war supplies had to be undertaken. The organization of the various

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bodies which acted as the cooperating agents between the Navy Department and all other departments and with the allied representatives on this side of the water had to be undertaken. Certain essential problems of home defense had to be undertaken. Though we knew that the immediate and pressing problem was the suppression of the submarine menace and acted in accordance with this knowledge, we also knew that this problem had to be considered in connection with all the other problems I have outlined. Our country could not afford to make any disjointed effort nor to move forward along any one line of action, without due consideration of all lines. We had to profit, if we could, by any previous mistakes of our allies, and we had to prepare for the contingency of a long war. The situation demanded of us that we should make a united, powerful effort, and in this effort the naval establishment had to play its appointed rôle, in harmony with every other effort our country was putting forth. Every master of military warfare and naval warfare knows that the great general's first concern is with the reserves. The weight of the first blow is ultimately controlled by the strength and coordination of the reserves. To build up our reserves was one of our naval problems and had to be considered at the same instant we were called upon to strike at the front.

All of these conditions were difficulties to surmount. They retarded the flow of ships and supplies to Admiral Sims, but the spirit was willing, and the principles he laid down were, in the main, accepted. He always had back of him the loyal support of the office of operations and of the bureaus.

Paragraph 27 of the letter is as follows:

27. I realize that it is difficult at the present time to believe that any policy involving such delays could have been persisted in, particularly when combined with a failure to comply with my requests for additional staff officers to assist my one aid; but a review of the dispatches and letters exchanged with the department during this period (the first four months of the war) will show that the department insisted upon the impossible; that is, upon full and detailed substantiation of every proposition advanced, even many of those concerning the disposition and handling of the naval forces in actual contact with the enemy.

Paragraph 27. I wish to emphasize the fact that this policy of delay, so styled, was not persisted in so far as my particular work is concerned. In this matter I can vouch for the attitude of every person in the department with whom I came in contact, from the secretary down. In my opinion Admiral Sims was not given an adequate staff early enough and I think this should have been done at the expense of every other activity, if necessary. It was a difficult task to accomplish satisfactorily, when all the other necessary activities in which we were engaged are taken into acconut. However, it should have been done. If the admiral was handicapped by interference with the movements of his force in contact with the enemy, this was wrong in principle. He has cited instances and I have yet to note one which materially affected the outcome of the war.

Paragraphs 28 and 29 of the letter are as follows:

28. For example, in the above-mentioned statement of policy, from the Navy to the State Department, a copy of which was sent me, it is clearly set forth that readiness completely to cooperate by sending our light forces abroad was dependent upon the condition that the Allies should keep the department fully informed through me of their plans and intentions.

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29. In other words, while the department's first statement of policy (which was dated July, 1917, or three months after we entered the war) was what I had recommended since the beginning, it nevertheless withheld putting it into effect, apparently because of a conviction that the Allies were not keeping it fully informed of their plans.

His statement in paragraph 29 shows that he had already accepted the policy of the Navy Department that went out to him on July 2 as being the policy that should be adopted, and there is nowhere in that letter or any other cable that was sent—and I know, because I wrote that letter—any statement that we were holding back because we thought he had failed to give us information.

The reason therein given by Admiral Sims as the department's reasons for our failure to reinforce him as rapidly as he desired, was that the Allies had failed to give the department full and complete information and that therefore the requested aid was withheld. This implies definite knowledge of the department's motives in this matter, or else it is an assumption based on his own opinion. From the end of June until the signing of the armistice, I can state that to the best of my knowledge no such motive as he claims existed, and I do not recollect any such information having been sent abroad to him. We entered the war in the middle of April, and of necessity our entire organization had to go through the transition from a peace to a war basis. Before we entered the war, our naval establishment was on a peace basis and our forces were enjoined to preserve a strict neutrality. It would be far more just to ascribe the failure to produce the desired results immediately, to the difficulties attendant upon the transition from peace to war than to an ungenerous motive which was not true. I doubt whether we shall ever be prepared to wage effective war at the instant of its declaration. As a military man, I do not believe that our democratic form of government lends itself to the same instant readiness to strike other nations that an autocratic form of government does. Yet in the end, we should be thankful. We may be slow to start but later we gain a strength and momentum which no militaristic form of government can combat, due to the united force of a free people joined together in one common purpose. These were our two conditions at the beginning and at the end of this war. We ran true to form.

What we lost in efficiency at the beginning was more than counterbalanced in the end. In this particular war we were fortunate in being given a period for preparation, due largely to the fact that the control of the sea was held by the British fleet, and that barring the submarine, the German fleet was contained. Had the situation been reversed and had the German fleet controlled the sea, our difficulties in preparation would have been greatly increased, if not rendered impossible. Gentlemen, the statement made in Admiral Sims's paragraphs 28 and 29 is not correct, whatever the inferences may be which he draws from cables, etc.

Paragraph 30 of Admiral Sims's letter is as follows:

30. The truth of the matter was that nothing was being withheld, and that all policies and plans which were in writing, which were actually of an official nature, and which in any way affected United States naval cooperation, had been transmitted to the department as completely as long distance communication—coded messages—permitted.

Paragraph 30 is entirely correct. We were in receipt of the fullest information at all times. The cooperation which existed be-

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tween ourselves and the governments with which we were associated in this war seemed excellent in naval matters.

Paragraph 31 of the letter is as follows:

31. Certain suggestions were made by the British Admiralty as to uses of our forces in the campaign. For example, in April, 1917, there was anxiety lest the enemy should attempt a raid in the Channel with a heavy force and get away before he could be intercepted by a force from the Grand Fleet, the nearest base of which was at Rosyth near Edinburgh. Accordinly, the Admiralty suggested that a squadron of our battleships be based on Brest or in the Channel. No reply was made to this suggestion. Also, the value of submarines in the campaign was first explained April 19, 1917. None were sent until October, 1917, when five arrived in Ireland, followed by seven more in January and February, 1918.

Paragraph 31. I do not not recall now the suggestion for the squadron of battleships to Brest or channel ports. It was before I was in the office in an executive capacity. No direct request was ever made for such forces at any time I was in the office, except in the case of the ships to reinforce the Grand Fleet, discussed elsewhere.

I will read you a summary of the situation concerning sending our submarines to the war zone, compiled from data on file in the office of operations:

[Extract from letter from Admiral Sims dated Apr. 19, 1917.]

SUBMARINE VERSUS SUBMARINES.

There has always been opposition to using submarines against submarines, principally on the grounds that the possibilities of their accomplishments would not be sufficiently great to justify the risk involved of mistaken identity and resulting damage to friends.

The director of antisubmarine warfare believes, however, that such operations promise well, and the experiment is now being tried with as many submarines as can be spared from the Grand Fleet.

Some enemy submarines have been destroyed by this method, usually torpedoes. One valuable feature of this method lies in the fact that as long as our submarines are not so used, the enemy submarine is always perfectly safe in assuming that all submarines sighted are friends. If this certainty is removed the enemy will be forced to keep down more and to take much greater precautions against detection. This is an advantage of no small amount.

In addition to the possible offensive work that may be accomplished by our submarines on such duty, the plan furnishes us with more reliable information as to the limitations and capabilities of enemy vessels under the actual conditions existing in the areas in which they operate. Without this knowledge based on actual experience too much is left to conjecture which is liable to lead to a great deal of misdirected effort.

MEMORANDUM RE S/MS, STATIONS AND DUTIES.

1. In a general report, by letter dated April 19, 1917 (date of receipt in department not known), Admiral Sims set forth the probable usefulness of allied S/Ms against enemy S/Ms. No definite recommendation, the letter being in nature of a report setting forth the situation.

2. On June 30, 1917, Admiral Sims in replying to certain proposals in a Navy Department paper dated April 17, 1917, cabled that "All S/Ms we can send at any time to Irish coast will be invaluable there," etc.

3. On July 2, 1917, department directed C. in C. by letter to designate 12 S/Ms for European service and set August 15 as tentative sailing date. On July 16, 1917, C. in C. designated 12 S/Ms and made certain recommendations concerning fitting them out; all but one of them had been at navy yards since early in May engaged in extensive repairs and alterations. Department issued final orders by letters, under date of August 15, 1917, directing preparations for S/Ms going on distant service.

4. Admiral Mayo cabled August 29, 1917, "After consultation with Admirals Jellicoe, Beatty, and Sims, recommend sending one division of S/Ms to Azores," etc. There had been messages between department and Admiral Sims concerning protection of waters of Azores prior to this.

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5. As soon as ready, four K class S/Ms sailed for Ponta Delgada with Bushnell as escort only—own tender not being ready. Sailing date, from New London, was October 12, arrived October 27, and Bushnell returned immediately.

6. Eight E and L class S/Ms, with Bushnell and three tugs left navy yards November 18 and sailed from Newport for Azores December 4, 1917. Expedition was broken up and separated by very stormy weather; four S/Ms and Bushnell arrived Ponta Delgada by December 24 and were held there by Admiral Sims's order until January 19, 1918, waiting for the others to join. Bushnell's division reached Queenstown January 27, 1918.

7. During summer of 1918 there were several despatches between department, Admiral Sims and Admiral Dunn (Azores), concerning unsuitability of K class S/Ms and their relief by better S/Ms was recommended and decided upon. Relieving division arrived just before signing armistice.

8. During spring and early summer of 1918, Admiral Sims did not recommend increase to our S/Ms in Irish waters and in connection with information concerning probable visits of German S/Ms to Atlantic Coast pointed out that our S/Ms were the best counter measure to use.

9. The department's cable of September 9, 1918, stated that there was great concern over enemy S/Ms activities along our troop lanes west of Brest, suggested operating Bushnell's S/Ms in that locality and asked if the O class S/Ms were wanted abroad.

10. Admiral Sims's cable of September 13 stated that S/Ms were proving of little use in open sea hunting there, gave statistics of enemy S/Ms destroyed by allied S/Ms for past six months and ended, "It would, however, be desirable to send the O boats to this side to intensify our search efforts in other equally important areas."

11. Admiral Sims's cable of October 3, 1918, then stated "Owing to lack of success in operations against S/Ms west of Brest, admiralty proposes adopting department's suggestion and sending S/Ms to operate in this area" and stated that sending O boats would improve chances of success.

12. Savannah's division of 8 O boats which had been engaged on antisubmarine work on Atlantic coast was immediately sent to navy yard to dock, sailed from Newport November 2 and arrived at Azores after the armistice.

THOS. C. HART.

He was in charge of the submarine division of operations. He was also in command of the L-boats that went abroad, to Queenstown. I would like to submit this table in connection with that letter, owing to the testimony that has been submitted by Admiral Grant as to the unsuitability of our submarines. I think every naval officer knows that they were not what they should be, and we all wanted better, but it might be interesting to note that these boats, which we supposed to be very poor, performed as well as—I will not say better than—any of the submarines that were over on the other side, as this table submitted will show. It will possibly be interesting for me to read a few lines of it.

Capt. Pratt here read the table referred to, which is here printed in the record as follows:

Submarine Division 5 performances from Dec. 1, 1917, to Nov. 1, 1918.

	AL-1	AL-2	AL-3	AL-4	AL-9	AL-10	AL-11
Number of days at sea	115.9	125.4	134.0	90.2	108.0	136.6	106.2
Number days on patrol	76.5	83.0	89.0	60.0	62.0	95.0	78.0
Miles on surface	12,072.3	17,562.3	12,093.8	10,871.6	12,251.8	15,617.3	13,066.3
Miles submerged	2,353.0	1,879.0	3,120.0	2,126.0	2,058.6	2,891.8	1,906.8
Hours submerged	1,245.4	1,163.1	1,669.2	1,285.1	954.8	1,794.5	1,597.0
Hours charging batteries (starboard)	265.6	343.6	368.0	207.1	214.7	287.7	227.6
Hours charging batteries (port)	312.2	306.1	332.0	237.4	181.3	275.9	227.5
Fuel used, gallons	50,413.0	66,076.0	55,373.0	42,216.0	52,008.0	58,749.0	57,545.0
Lubricating oil used, gallons	12,956.0	15,379.0	12,767.0	10,944.0	16,084.0	19,765.0	13,272.0
Exercise torpedo runs	12.0	10.0	11.0	14.0	8.0	15.0	12.0
Torpedoes lost	1.0	1.0	.....	.....	.....	2.0	.....
Torpedoes wrecked	.....	1.0	.....	.....	1.0	.....	.....
Number times enemy sighted	3.0	5.0	2.0	5.0	1.0	2.0	3.0
Times enemy attacked with torpedoes	1.0	.....	.....	2.0	.....	.....	1.0
Number torpedoes expended	4.0	.....	.....	5.0	.....	.....	2.0

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The CHAIRMAN. Does that "times enemy attacked with torpedoes" mean that the enemy attacked us?

Capt. PRATT. No, that we attacked the enemy.

Paragraph 32 of the letter of Admiral Sims reads as follows:

32 In spite of the numerous messages sent in April, the only information received up to April 27, 1917, was that six destroyers only would be sent. The situation was then so very critical that I appealed to the American ambassador in London, who sent a most urgent message to the President, and on May 3, 1917, the first definite information was received of the department's intention to send more than six destroyers—that ultimately 36 and two repair ships would be sent.

Paragraph 32. I am not thoroughly familiar with the situation in April, not being in the office in an administrative capacity at that time.

I will here read a statement showing the number of destroyers at the first of each month, in Europe, under repair at home and available but being used in home waters. This list does not include the 5 old destroyers on the Pacific coast of 450 tons, which were shortly moved to the Atlantic. These destroyers were old, small and not very useful. They were later used to swell our coast defenses, relieving better boats to meet the requests from Halifax, and two later having been repaired, got as far as the Azores. The destroyers left at home as you will note, did not exceed 9 or 10. They were used to screen the fleet in sea maneuvers, protect transports from this end of the voyage until they met the European destroyers. They were used to convoy valuable ships, principally British, to our own ports. Despite the acute situation in British waters, each valuable ship of theirs requested a destroyer escort on approaching our ports. The requests came to us from their Admiralty through their naval representative here.

I desire to submit at this point the following papers:

(E) List of destroyers, showing their duty, availability and use from Jan. 1, 1917, to Dec. 1, 1918.

(E1) Order to destroyer commander.

(F) List of U. S. vessels in commission on the 1st of each month from Apr. 1, 1917, to Nov. 1, 1918, inclusive, operating in European waters.

(G) List of U. S. naval vessels in commission on the 1st of each month from Apr. 1, 1917, to Nov. 1, 1918, inclusive.

(H) Location and availability of submarine chasers.

(H1) List of results in European waters April 6, 1918.

First, there is the following memorandum in regard to destroyers:

First destroyers sailing for Europe (Apr. 24, 1917): *Conyingham*, *Davis*, *McDougal*, *Porter*, *Wadsworth*, and *Wainwright*.

Destroyers sailing from the Philippines (Aug. 1, 1917): *Bainbridge*, *Barry*, *Chauncey*, *Dale*, and *Decatur*.

New destroyers were commissioned from May 1, 1917, to January 1, 1918, and sailed as follows: *Manley*, October 15, 1917; *Stockton*, November 26, 1917; *Caldwell*, December 1, 1917; *Isabel* (fast yacht, classed as destroyer), December 28, 1917.

The five destroyers in home waters which were not at navy yards on June 1, 1917, were: *Allen*, *Ammen*, *Henley*, *Shaw*, and *Terry*.

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Status of oil-burning destroyers from Jan. 1, 1917, to Jan. 1, 1919.

Date.	In home waters.		En route to Europe.	In European waters.			Total.
	At yards.	Not at yards.		Brest.	Queenstown.	Gibraltar.	
1917.							
Jan. 1		46					46
Feb. 1		46					46
Mar. 1	2	44					46
Apr. 1	20	26					46
May 1	27	14	6				47
June 1	14	5	4		24		47
July 1	7	5	7		28		47
Aug. 1	5	7			35		47
Sept. 1	7	5			35		47
Oct. 1	6	6			35		47
Nov. 1	4	6	3		35		48
Dec. 1	6	5	3		36		50
1918.							
Jan. 1	7	4	(1)	2	36		49
Feb. 1	4	3	4	3	36		50
Mar. 1	2	4	1	5	38		50
Apr. 1		6		6	38		50
May 1	4	5		6	38		53
June 1	3	6	4	6	38		57
July 1	1	10	1	22	26		60
Aug. 1	1	15		23	25	2	66
Sept. 1	2	19		23	25	2	71
Oct. 1	5	21	3	25	25	2	81
Nov. 1	9	20	1	28	25	4	87
Dec. 1	11	21		25	27	8	92

[1] 1 sunk Dec. 6.

I have made a distinction between the oil-burning and the coal-burning, because both in fleet operations and in operations requiring quick movement a distinction must be made between the tactical uses of these two. The coal burner makes a good deal of smoke and is easy for a submarine to find on the surface. The oil burner can run smokeless, and is therefore by far the most protective of all destroyers, owing to their sea-keeping qualities; anything less than a 750-ton boat, unless she is perfectly brand-new, is not to be classed with her as a sea-keeping ship.

The CHAIRMAN. Can an oil-burning destroyer make an equally effective smoke screen as a coal-burning destroyer?

Capt. PRATT. Yes; more effective. She has the power to run smokeless, or she can make a screen so dense, as I saw it once when I was with Admiral Sims, from Boston Harbor all the way down to Cape Ann everything was so completely clouded and the smoke was so thick that you could not see the forecastle because of the moisture in the atmosphere with the oil smoke.

Now, here is the status of the coal-burning destroyers:

Status of coal burning destroyers from Jan. 1, 1917, to Jan. 1, 1919.

Date.	In home waters.	En route to Europe.	In European waters.
1917.			
Jan. 1	21		
Feb. 1	21		
Mar. 1	21		
Apr. 1	21		
May 1	21		
June 1	21		
July 1	21		

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Status of coal burning destroyers from Jan. 1, 1917, to Jan. 1, 1919—Continued.

Date.	In home waters.	En route to Europe.	In European waters.
1917.			
Aug. 1	11	6	4
Sept. 1	9	7	5
Oct. 1	9	5	7
Nov. 1	9	.....	12
Dec. 1	9	.....	[1] 11
1918.			
Jan. 1	9	.....	11
Feb. 1	6	3	11
Mar. 1	6	.....	14
Apr. 1	6	.....	14
May 1	6	.....	14
June 1	6	.....	14
July 1	6	.....	14
Aug. 1	7	.....	13
Sept. 1	8	.....	12
Oct. 1	8	.....	12
Nov. 1	8	.....	12
Dec. 1	8	.....	12

[1] 1 sunk Nov. 19.

NOTE.—"Home waters" includes Atlantic coast and Pacific coast and the Philippines. Of these 21 destroyers 5 were 750 tons—*Reid, Smith, Flusser, Lamson, Preston.* The remainder were smaller vessels classed as coast torpedo boats of approximately 400 tons.

We had in home waters on January 1, 1917, 21 destroyers. That includes five of the 750-ton boats, and the other 16 are not classed as destroyers exactly, but I will show you in this book, which I will submit afterwards [indicating], in which I have marked the page, how they come in. They were old 400-type boats. They were scattered all over the world—a few of them were. But of those 21, the five really effective ones were the five 750-ton coal burners.

There has also been given in Capt. Taussig's report, I think, a statement which may have left some impression as to his failure to have received orders to cooperate fully with the forces on the other side after his arrival. I will submit a copy of his orders, and will read such pertinent extracts as relate to the operations. [Reading]:

ORDERS ISSUED TO COMMANDER, EIGHTH DIVISION, DESTROYER FORCE, APRIL 14, 1917.

(Secret and confidential.)

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, D. C.

To: Commander, Eighth Division, Destroyer Force, Atlantic Fleet, U. S. S. *Wadsworth*, Flagship.

Subject: Protection of commerce near the coasts of Great Britain and Ireland.

1. The British Admiralty have requested the cooperation of a division of American destroyers in the protection of commerce near the coasts of Great Britian and France.

2. Your mission is to assist naval operations of Entente Powers in every way possible.

3. Proceed to Queenstown, Ireland. Report to senior British naval officer present, and thereafter cooperate fully with the British navy. Should it be decided that your force act in cooperation with French naval forces your mission and method of cooperation under French Admiralty authority remain unchanged.

Route to Queenstown.—Boston to latitude 50 north, longitude 20 west, to arrive at daybreak then to latitude 50 north, longitude 12 west, thence to Queenstown. When within radio communication of the British Naval forces off Ireland, call G CK and

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nform the vice admiral at Queenstown in British general code of your position, course, and speed. You will be met outside of Queenstown.

4. Base facilities will be provided by the British Admirality.

5. Communicate your orders and operations to Rear Admiral Sims at London and be guided by such instructions as he may give you. Make no reports of arrival to Navy Department direct.

JOSEPHUS DANIELS.

I will now submit a list of United States naval vessels in commission on the first of each month from April 1, 1917, to November 1, 1918, inclusive, operating in European waters. This list is as follows [reading]:

List of United States naval vessels in commission on the first of each month from Apr. 1, 1917, to Nov. 1, 1918, inclusive, operating in European waters.

	Battleships.	Cruisers.	Gunboats.	Torpedo boats.	Destroyers.	Submarines.	Converted yachts and patrol vessels.	Subchasers.	Tugs and minesweepers.	Auxiliaries.	Miscellaneous.	Coast Guard.	N. O. T. S. vessels based on Cardiff.	Total.
Apr. 1, 1917	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
May 1, 1917	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
June 1, 1917	.....	.....	.....	.....	24	.....	.....	.....	.....	1	.....	.....	.....	25
July 1, 1917	.....	.....	.....	.....	34	.....	7	.....	.....	2	.....	.....	.....	43
Aug. 1, 1917	.....	.....	.....	.....	40	.....	7	.....	.....	2	.....	.....	.....	49
Sept. 1, 1917	.....	1	4	.....	41	.....	12	.....	.....	3	.....	1	.....	63
Oct. 1, 1917	.....	2	5	.....	48	.....	14	.....	7	3	.....	4	.....	86
Nov. 1, 1917	.....	2	7	.....	48	3	15	.....	8	4	.....	5	.....	93
Dec. 1, 1917	.....	2	7	.....	49	3	15	.....	8	4	.....	5	.....	94
Jan. 1, 1918	4	2	6	.....	50	8	22	.....	8	4	.....	5	.....	110
Feb. 1, 1918	5	2	6	.....	54	10	25	.....	14	4	.....	5	4	129
Mar. 1, 1918	5	2	6	.....	59	11	27	.....	16	6	.....	5	5	142
Apr. 1, 1918	5	2	6	.....	59	11	27	.....	15	6	1	5	5	142
May 1, 1918	5	4	6	.....	59	10	26	37	22	7	1	5	5	187
June 1, 1918	5	4	6	.....	64	10	26	55	25	7	7	6	6	221
July 1, 1918	5	3	6	.....	65	10	26	82	27	9	9	5	6	253
Aug. 1, 1918	5	3	5	.....	66	10	27	103	27	10	9	5	9	279
Sept. 1, 1918	7	3	5	.....	66	10	27	103	27	10	9	5	19	291
Oct. 1, 1918	8	4	4	.....	66	10	26	103	29	11	8	4	34	307
Nov. 1, 1918	8	5	5	.....	68	9	26	121	30	12	8	5	57	354

Senator PITTMAN. I wish you would read again the figures for April and May.

Capt. PRATT. There were none on the 1st of April. There were none in European waters in April, 1917. We had not gone to war. Our destroyers did not sail until the 24th of April and did not arrive over there until the 4th of May.

Senator PITTMAN. I understood you to say there were none in European waters in May.

Capt. PRATT. No, sir; on the 1st of May; and on the 1st of June it shows what had come over in May. On the 1st of June there were 24 destroyers and 1 auxiliary, making a total of 25.

The CHAIRMAN. When did the 24 arrive on the other side? That is, some arrived on May 4 and the other 18 arrived when?

Capt. PRATT. I have not got that date.

The CHAIRMAN. The latter part of the month?

Capt. PRATT. Yes; I have that also. I have it later on in my statement. I have another paper which shows what we had on April 6, 1918, and that is given, and the ships are named with the date of sailing and date of arrival of each. That statement will include those dates.

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I would like to submit a list of naval vessels in commission on the first of each month from April 1, 1917, to November 1, 1918, inclusive. This is a list of all naval vessels including those abroad and on this side. Of battleships there were 29.

The CHAIRMAN. Are the oattleships there by name?

Capt. PRATT. No; this is just the classes. Admiral McKean has the full list showing the comparative readiness. Admiral McKean is more qualified to give the preparation than I am, as I was merely an operator, taking what was handed to me and then operating it. His information is more accurate than mine.

This list is as follows:

List of United States naval vessels in commission on the first of each month from Apr. 1, 1917, to Nov. 1, 1918, inclusive.

	Battleships.	Cruisers.	Gunboats.	Torpedo boats.	Destroyers.	Submarines.	Converted yachts and Patrol vessels.	Subchasers.	Tugs and mine sweepers.	Auxiliaries.	Miscellaneous.	Coast Guard.	Transports.	N. O. T. S.	Eagle boats.	Total.
Apr. 1, 1917	34	29	21	14	66	41	13	.....	14	39	99	....	2	.....	....	272
May 1, 1917	34	30	21	15	67	41	19	.....	14	39	9	....	2	.....	....	291
June 1, 1917	34	30	21	16	67	41	28	.....	14	39	9	35	3	.....	....	337
July 1, 1917	37	30	22	16	67	41	31	.....	15	41	9	35	3	.....	....	347
Aug. 1, 1917	37	32	23	16	67	41	33	.....	23	45	9	35	12	.....	....	373
Sept. 1, 1917	37	32	23	17	67	42	37	.....	28	52	11	35	17	.....	....	398
Oct. 1, 1917	38	32	24	17	67	46	46	.....	27	55	12	35	20	.....	....	419
Nov. 1, 1917	38	32	24	17	68	46	164	21	52	57	16	37	20	.....	....	502
Dec. 1, 1917	38	32	27	17	69	46	283	47	74	58	19	34	22	.....	....	726
Jan. 1, 1918	38	32	27	17	69	47	294	74	77	58	21	34	23	.....	....	811
Feb. 1, 1918	38	32	27	17	70	47	305	110	77	31	25	34	24	70	....	885
Mar. 1, 1918	38	32	27	17	70	49	315	136	80	31	23	34	25	75	....	952
Apr. 1, 1918	38	32	27	17	70	51	315	213	93	32	27	34	26	116	....	1,024
May 1, 1918	38	32	27	17	73	51	320	270	93	32	27	34	33	122	....	1,170
June 1, 1918	39	32	27	16	77	52	325	301	93	31	28	34	41	136	....	1,225
July 1, 1918	39	32	26	16	80	58	323	302	94	31	32	34	41	161	....	1,275
Aug. 1, 1918	39	31	26	16	86	64	321	302	99	31	34	34	41	180	....	1,304
Sept. 1, 1918	39	31	26	16	91	68	314	300	103	31	37	34	42	239	....	1,371
Oct. 1, 1918	39	31	27	16	101	72	302	300	112	33	37	33	42	294	....	1,439
Nov. 1, 1918	39	31	27	16	107	79	291	299	123	32	38	33	41	341	1	1,498

November 1, 1918, there were 1,498 ships being operated by the Navy.

I will submit also a list of our submarine chasers. [Reading:]

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, March 18, 1920.

Memorandum for Capt. Pratt:

There were no submarine chasers in European waters in 1917.

Submarine chaser convoys sailing for Europe:

	Number.		Number.
Feb. 22, 1918	11	June 28, 1918	18
Mar. 18, 1918	1	Sept. 26, 1918	18
Mar. 25, 1918	13	Oct. 18, 1918	4
Mar. 31, 1918	12	Oct. 24, 1918	10
Apr. 25, 1918	18		
May 18, 1918	24	Total	135
June 10, 1918	6		

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Location and availability of submarine chasers.

In commission.	In United States.	In Europe or en route.	In commission.	In United States.	In Europe or en route
Aug. 1, 1917			Apr. 1, 1918	169	37
Sept. 1, 1917	1		May 1, 1918	213	55
Oct. 1, 1917	1		June 1, 1918	222	79
Nov. 1, 1917	21		July 1, 1918	199	103
Dec. 1, 1917	42		Aug. 1, 1918	199	103
Jan. 1, 1918	73		Sept. 1, 1918	197	103
Feb. 1, 1918	97		Oct. 1, 1918	179	121
Mar. 1, 1918	121	11	Nov. 1, 1918	164	[1] 135

[1] 14 en route.

Between March and April, 1917, contracts for over 300 110-foot submarine chasers were let. The dates in this table are the dates when they sailed for Europe; and also the number en route or already in Europe.

There were no submarine chasers in European waters in 1917. They were not built; nor did we have any tugs and escort vessels in time to get them over in that year. They had to be built and put into shape.

Senator PITTMAN. The question as to where these were built, etc., probably will be answered by Admiral McKean.

Capt. PRATT. That comes under Admiral McKean, and he knows about when the contracts were let and the way they were built.

I can, of course, give some idea of the efforts we were making to put them in shape, and will state that there was an office under Capt. Tompkins, organized in the office of operations as soon as the submarine chasers began to be available, and they were sent to New London for the crews to train, and to fit them with the sound-detecting devices, which was then done in New London, and for some experimental work in actually operating with our submarines submerged, and to have the personnel in training, in order to fit them as rapidly as possible to project to Europe.

The CHAIRMAN. None of them, however, reached Europe?

Capt. PRATT. None of them reached Europe until 1918. The first one was only completed in September, 1917.

Senator TRAMMELL. I believe you stated there were 135 in Europe on the first of November?

Capt. PRATT. 1918.

Senator TRAMMELL. 1918?

Capt. PRATT. Yes, 1918; and not 1917.

The CHAIRMAN. That was at the end of the war.

Capt. PRATT. I have here also a book of data, which is the last book published, the issue of which went out of date with the beginning of the war because the information therein contained was supposed to be confidential and secret, and we did not wish to keep it up to date after we went into the war. But it gives you, type for type, the vessels that we had in our Navy. It is called "Ships' Data of United States Naval Vessels," published by the bureau of construction and repair. It shows you the name of every ship we had in the Navy on November 1, 1916; and, of course, that is what we had when we went into the war. We had not built anything more, practically

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we had not anything more that was new and that might be useful in case anyone wanted to read it, so that I have submitted it here.

I have here also a list of the vessels in European waters April 6, 1918, which gives their date of sailing and date of arrival in Europe. This gives you complete information as to the ships and the dates of sailing and dates of arrival. This list is as follows. [Reading:]

List of vessels in European waters Apr. 6, 1918.

DESTROYERS.

Name.	Date of sailing.	Date of arrival in Europe
Bainbridge	Aug. 1, 1917	Oct. 20, 1917.
Barry	do	Do.
Dale	do	Do.
Decatur	do	Do.
Macdonough	Jan. 16, 1918	Feb. 20, 1918.
Isabel	Jan. 17, 1918	Do.
Stewart	Jan. 16, 1918	Feb. 9, 1918.
Truxton	Aug. 31, 1917	Sept. 17, 1917 (Azores).
Whipple	do	Sept. 17, 1917.
Worden	Jan. 16, 1918	Feb. 9, 1918.
Smith	July 16, 1917	July 26, 1917 (Azores).
Lamson	do	Do.
Preston	July 22, 1917	July 31, 1917 (Azores).
Flusser	July 30, 1917	Aug. 12, 1917 (Azores).
Reid	July 21, 1917	July 31, 1917 (Azores).
Paulding	May 21, 1917	June 1, 1917.
Drayton	do	Do.
Roe	Nov. 9, 1917	Dec. 13, 1917.
Terry	Jan. 9, 1918	Feb. 6, 1918.
Sterrett	May 21, 1917	June 9, 1917.
McCall	Jan. 17, 1918	Feb. 22, 1918.
Burrows	June 14, 1917	July 5, 1917.
Warrington	May 21, 1917	June 1, 1917.
Monaghan	Nov. 9, 1917	Dec. 13, 1917.
Trippe	May 21, 1917	June 1, 1917.
Ammen	June 17, 1917	July 5, 1917.
Patterson	May 21, 1917	June 1, 1917.
Fanning	June 14, 1917	July 6, 1917.
Jarvis	May 25, 1917	June 13, 1917.
Beale	Jan. 9, 1918	Feb. 6, 1918.
Jenkins	May 21, 1917	June 1, 1917.
Cassin	May 7, 1917	May 21, 1917.
Cummings	May 15, 1917	May 24, 1917.
Downes	Oct. 18, 1917	Nov. 8, 1917.
Duncan	Oct. 31, 1917	Nov. 15, 1917.
Aylwin	Jan. 4, 1918	Jan. 16, 1918.
Parker	June 16, 1917	July 6, 1917.
Benham	May 15, 1917	May 24, 1917.
Balch	Oct. 25, 1917	Nov. 8, 1917.
O'Brien	May 15, 1917	May 24, 1917.
Nicholson	do	Do.
Winslow	May 7, 1917	May 21, 1917.
McDougal	Apr. 24, 1917	May 4, 1917.
Cushing	May 15, 1917	May 24, 1917.
Ericsson	May 7, 1917	May 21, 1917.
Tucker	do	Do.
Conyngham	Apr. 24, 1917	May 4, 1917.
Porter	do	Do.
Wadsworth	do	Do.
Wainwright	do	Do.
Samson	May 15, 1917	May 24, 1917.
Rowan	May 7, 1917	May 21, 1917.
Davis	Apr. 24, 1917	May 4, 1917.
Allen	June 14, 1917	July 5, 1917.
Wilkes	do	Do.
Shaw	June 17, 1917	July 6, 1917.
Caldwell	Feb. 14, 1918	Mar. 5, 1918.
Stockton	Jan. 30, 1918	Feb. 12, 1918.
Manley	Nov. 24, 1917	Dec. 6, 1917.

MINE LAYER.

Baltimore [1]	Mar. 4, 1918	Mar. 18, 1918.

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List of vessels in European waters Apr. 6, 1918—Continued.

YACHTS.

Name.	Date of sailing.	Date of arrival in Europe.
Aphrodite	June 14, 1917	June 27, 1917.
Arcturus	Nov. 4, 1917	Dec. 7, 1917 (Azores).
Barnegat	Dec. 20, 1917	Jan. 23, 1918 (Azores).
Christabel	June 9, 1917	June 26, 1917 (Azores).
Corona	Aug. 5, 1917	Aug. 19, 1917 (Azores).
Corsair	June 14, 1917	June 27, 1917.
Druid	Nov. 3, 1917	Dec. 6, 1917 (Azores).
Emeline	Aug. 4, 1917	Aug. 19, 1917 (Azores).
Galatea	Dec. 15, 1917	Jan. 22, 1918 (Azores).
Harvard	June 9, 1917	June 26, 1917 (Azores).
Lydonia	Oct. 30, 1917	Dec. 7, 1917 (Azores).
Margaret	Nov. 4, 1917	Do.
May	....do	Dec. 6, 1917 (Azores).
Nahma [2]		
Nokomis	Dec. 17, 1917	Jan. 24, 1918 (Azores).
Noma	June 9, 1917	June 26, 1917 (Azores).
Rambler	Nov. 4, 1917	Dec. 7, 1917 (Azores).
Remlick	Aug. 4, 1917	Aug. 19, 1917 (Azores).
Scorpion [3]		
Sultana	June 9, 1917	June 26, 1917 (Azores).
Utowanah	Nov. 4, 1917	Feb. 9, 1918 (left Azores).
Vidette	June 9, 1917	June 26, 1917 (Azores).
Venetia	Dec. 21, 1917	Jan. 23, 1918 (Azores).
Wakiva II	Aug. 26, 1917	Sept. 6, 1917 (Azores).
Wanderer	Aug. 4, 1917	Aug. 19, 1917 (Azores).
Wenonah	Nov. 4, 1917	Dec. 6, 1917 (Azores).
Yankton [1]	Aug. 20, 1917	Sept. 2, 1917 (Azores).

TUGS.

Courtney	Aug. 26, 1917	Sept. 6, 1917 (Azores).
Genessee	Dec. 4, 1917	Jan. 12, 1918 (Azores).
Gypsum Queen	Dec. 20, 1917	Jan. 24, 1918 (Azores).
Montauk	Jan. 8, 1918	Feb. 5, 1918 (Azores).
Nahant	Dec. 17, 1917	Jan. 24, 1918 (Azores).
Penobscot	....do	Do.
Surveyor	Jan. 8, 1918	Feb. 5, 1918 (Azores).

[1] These vessels were in the United States Navy prior to declaration of war.
[2] Commissioned in European waters Aug. 27, 1917.
[3] Interned at Constantinople, Turkey.

TRAWLERS.

City of Lewes	Aug. 26, 1917	Sept. 6, 1917 (Azores).
Hilton	....do	Do.
Hubbard	Sept. 29, 1917	Oct. 17, 1917 (Azores).
McNeal	Aug. 26, 1917	Sept. 6, 1917 (Azores).
James	....do	Do.

MINE SWEEPERS.

Cahill	Aug. 26, 1917	Sept. 6, 1917 (Azores).
Carola IV	Aug. 4, 1917	Aug. 19, 1917 (Azores).
Concord	Dec. 15, 1917	Jan. 23, 1918 (Azores).
Douglas	Aug. 26, 1917	Sept. 6, 1917 (Azores).

COAST GUARD CUTTERS.

Manning	Aug. 29, 1917	Sept. 9, 1917 (Azores).
Ossipee	Aug. 15, 1917	Aug. 25, 1917 (left Azores).
Seneca	Aug. 19, 1917	Sept. 4, 1917.
Tampa	Sept. 29, 1917	Oct. 17, 1917 (Azores).
Yamacraw	Aug. 30, 1917	Sept. 11, 1917 (Azores).

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List of vessels in European waters Apr. 6, 1918—Continued.

TENDERS.

Name.	Date of sailing.	Date of arrival in Europe.
Melville	May 11, 1917	May 24, 1917.
Dixie	May 31, 1917	June 13, 1917.
Panther	July 30, 1917	Aug. 12, 1917.
Bushnell	Oct. 12, 1917	Oct. 27, 1917.
Prometheus	Dec. 5, 1917	Feb. 11, 1918.
Tonopah	Jan. 7, 1918	Do.

GUNBOATS.

Sacramento	July 22, 1917	Aug. 1, 1917.
Machias	July 30, 1917	Aug. 16, 1917.
Castine	Aug. 1, 1917	Do.
Nashville	Aug. 2, 1917	Aug. 12, 1917.
Wheeling	Aug. 31, 1917	Sept. 17, 1917.
Marietta	Sept. 13, 1917	Sept. 24, 1917.
Paducah	Sept. 29, 1917	Oct. 17, 1917.

CRUISERS.

Birmingham	Aug. 8, 1917	Aug. 17, 1917.
Chester	Aug. 26, 1917	Sept. 2, 1917.

SUBMARINES.

K-1, 2, 5, 6	Oct. 12, 1917	Oct. 27, 1917.
L-1, 2, 3, 4, 10, 11	Dec. 4, 1917	Jan. 27, 1918.
E-1	do	Jan. 12, 1918.
L-9	Jan. 17, 1918	Feb. 22, 1918.

BATTLESHIPS.

Delaware	Nov. 25, 1917	Dec. 7, 1917.
Florida	do	Do.
New York	do	Do.
Wyoming	do	Do.
Texas	Jan. 30, 1918	Feb. 11, 1918.

I submit also the following list:

French submarine chasers.

Departed United States during—	Numbers.	Total.
December, 1917	28, 29, 67, 170, 171, 172, 160, 314	8
January, 1918	173	1
March, 1918	30, 32, 142, 146, 161, 169, 174, 175, 176, 350	10
April, 1918	33, 140, 162, 313	4
May, 1918	31, 163, 249	3
September, 1918	357, 358, 359, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 371, 372, 373, 374, 376, 377, 378, 379, 381, 382, 393, 394, 395, 396, 360, 375, 380, 383, 384, 397.	20
October, 1918	368, 369, 370, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406.	20
No record	5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 75, 76, 65, 66, 243, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 347, 348.	23
Sunk Dec. 10, 1917, in United States	141	1
Grand total		100

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In these books I have submitted for the reference of the committee I have marked the places that refer to our smaller submarine types, and merely submit these in case any questions are to be asked on the subject.

I have had difficulty, because in a way the files that I operated under during the war have been more or less disrupted since I left, in order to get historical data. I have not always been able to lay my hands on everything I would like, as I could while we were at war, but in order that the state of personnel preparedness may be accurately determined by the gentlemen of the Senate Naval Committee, I have here the list and directory of January 1, 1917, February 1, 1917, March 1, 1917, April 1, 1917, and May 1, 1917, in which I have placed little slips which indicate the number of ships on full commission and vessels operating in the reserve due to personnel conditions; so that that gives you the complete story when you get Admiral McKean's material report. I leave these books here for your reference.

The CHAIRMAN. They are not to go in the record?

Capt. PRATT. No, sir. I have prepared a list of destroyers showing the complements on board in January, 1917, and also the complements on March 31, 1917. I did that because it would help the committee a great deal in being able to read the summary rather than to have to go through those five blue books that I submitted and look it up for themselves, and I therefore, with your permission, would like to submit this paper to go in the record at this point. I think that will tell you the whole story as far as I know it.

The CHAIRMAN. This is as to condition and personnel?

Capt. PRATT. No; as to personnel and condition, Admiral McKean will furnish the full account of personnel. I do not like to go outside of my own bailiwick. I could do it from the lists, but I would rather he should do it.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

(The list referred to is as follows:)

APRIL 19, 1920.

Destroyers, 1917.

Vessel.	Complement.	On board January, 1917.	On board Mar. 31, 1917.
Allen	98	A-33	96
Ammen	88	R-53	96
Aylwin	96	A-85	91
Bagley (torpedo boat)	26	O-13	13
Bailey (torpedo boat)	26	R-18	41
Bainbridge	76	A-56	84
Blach	96	A-87	98
Barry	75	A-60	76
Beale	88	R-44	60
Benham	96	A-87	92
Burrows	88	R-49	74
Cassin	96	A-81	94
Chauncey	82	A-79	74
Cummings	96	A-80	98
Conyngham	96	A-78	88
Cushing	96	A-80	98
Dale	74	A-67	74
Davis	98	A-98	115
Decatur	74	A-73	78
Drayton	88	A-75	79
Duncan	96	A-85	88

A—Active duty. R—Reserve. O—Ordinary.

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Destroyers, 1917—Continued.

Vessel.	Complement.	On board January, 1917.	On board Mar. 31, 1917.
Ericsson	96	A-72	8
Fanning	88	A-73	8
Flusser	84	R-52	6
Henley	88	R-49	3
Jacob Jones	96	A-83	2
Jarvis	88	R-76	8
Jenkins	88	A-63	7
Jouett	88	R-44	4
Lamson	84	R-57	6
McCall	88	R-69	6
McDougal	96	A-84	9
Monaghan	88	R-54	6
Nicholson	96	A-84	9
O'Brien	96	A-85	10
Parker	96	A-88	9
Patterson	88	R-56	7
Paulding	88	A-78	8
Porter	96	A-77	9
Preston	84	R-39	3
Reid	84	R-54	3
Roe	88	R-52	5
Rowan	98	A-97	9
Sampson	98	A-83	2
Smith	84	R-74	8
Sterrett	88	R-47	6
Stewart	72	R-42	7
Terry	88	R-42	4
Trippe	88	R-45	6
Truxton	72	R-41	7
Tucker	96	A-81	8
Wadsworth	96	A-79	8
Wainbright	96	A-83	8
Walke	88	R-44	3
Warrington	88	R-48	6
Whipple	72	R-38	7
Wilkes	96	A-92	9
Winslow	96	A-83	8

A—Active duty. R—Reserve.

Gentlemen, these lists speak for themselves. Of all the antisubmarine types, which are the destroyers, the subchasers, yachts, gunboats, coast-guard vessels, the destroyer of 750 tons and above is the only real efficient fighter. Of these craft you will note all except 9 or 10 were immediately sent over, or docked and put in war condition and sent over. The older destroyers of 400 tons, the coast-guard ships with a few exceptions, and the yachts in the Navy (and I want to say about the yachts that there were only three yachts that were ready to go, the *Mayflower*, the *Yankton*, and the *Scorpion* interned in Constantinople; they were the only three yachts that could really cross the ocean); and the yachts that were in the Navy at the beginning of the war, at that time, were of the Spanish War vintage, and practically incapable of crossing the Atlantic, a 3,000-mile voyage. The gunboats, except the *Sacremento* and about four coast-guard ships, were of the same age or older. They, however, were sent, and the patrol of the coast, as soon as the agreement made with the British and French admirals on this coast (acting as representatives of their two admiralties) was treminated. All of the subchasers which were sent had to be built. Yachts sent had to be the latest and best types with sufficient radius to cross the Atlantic, and they had to be commandeered and fitted after war was declared. Gentlemen, every one of these antisubmarines types except a few of the latest destroyers are not built for cross Atlantic work.

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Some of our destroyers, even, had a short 2,000-mile working radius, necessitating fuel-oil bases at St. John's Newfoundland, and the Azores, to help them across. When you consider the difficulties to be surmounted to get these antisubmarine craft across the Atlantic some of them in midwinter, praise and not criticism should be given. No other nation in the world has ever done this before, and it speaks for the determined efforts made on this side of the water and of the personnel manning these boats that they ever got there at all. I wish also in this connection to read a short pertinent extract from our coast-defense plan and to submit it. It will be noted that this plan is signed by Commander Babcock, the officer who stood closest to Admiral Sims and was perhaps best able to express the opinions of the admiral at that time.

This plan was worked up in the office of operations when it was considered necessary that we might be called upon to avoid a submarine menace on this side.

The CHAIRMAN. When was that?

Capt. PRATT. The plan is dated February 6, 1918. There was a special board to formulate a plan of defense in home waters, consisting of the Chief of Naval Operations, and others. I submit this report as a whole. It is dated March 19, 1918.

I will only read pertinent extracts, and submit the report as a whole for the record. [Reading:]

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, February 6, 1918.

From: A Special Board to Formulate a Plan of Defense in Home Waters.
To: Chief of Naval Operations.
Subject: Defense against submarine attack in home waters.

* * * * * * *

1. Pursuant to instructions, reference (*a*), the board convened at 10 a. m., Monday, February 4, 1918.

* * * * * * *

GENERAL POLICY.

6. The general policy of the United States is to send the maximum possible force abroad, for offensive operations in the active theater of war. This policy the board has kept constantly in mind to the end that there might be no weakening of it,.

7. With regard to any force still retained or in the future to be held in American waters which might be suitable abroad, the board has been governed by the consideration that trans-Atlantic transit, the security of which is the chief task of the naval force based on America, depends for its success upon a sufficient guard in American as well as in European waters. The force retained in American waters can not, with reasonable military prudence, be reduced below the minimum required for meeting the emergency here being considered. It has devolved upon this board to determine what that minimum is; and such determination should be held to against the repeated urgings, to send all force abroad, of individuals who have not fully considered the situation as a whole. In the course of our discussions this principle has repeatedly to be adverted to and reaffirmed. Emphasis is laid upon it as the basis of any plan for defense against hostile operations near our coast.

POLICY IN THE FACE OF SUBMARINES.

8. In the event of actual submarine hostilities on this coast, first disclosed perhaps by the sinking of a steamer by a mine, what shall be the policy as to shipping? Shall it continue with the least possible interruptions, or shall it be held in port until the enemy submarines shall have been located and destroyed? The latter course would be to surrender at once to the enemy a large measure of success in his purpose.

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9. It is recognized that to keep on sending out shipping may involve the loss of some vessels soon after departure from our ports. We are, notwithstanding, convinced that this course should be pursued. To hold vessels in port until all is clear will encourage the enemy both near and abroad; it will help prolong his period of activity on our coast and will demoralize and confuse our arrangements on shore far more than would the loss of one or two vessels. Abroad, the suspension of arrivals for several weeks would have an effect serious beyond calculation. On the other hand, to continue with our sailings boldly, unshaken in our general offensive policy, would hearten our own people while giving no ground to the enemy submarine. The escort with our convoys would force the submarines to take a chance for every sinking they might attempt. From the first disclosure of their presence their accomplishing anything in our waters should become increasingly difficult, and this can only come about by our taking the strong line of action.

10. On this point it is therefore the decision of the board that we should keep on sending shipping out with the least possible delay, at the same time taking all possible offensive measures to remove the danger.

* * * * * * *

37. The kind of force that should accompany convoys has already been stated. In addition, it is the board's conclusion (*bb*) that, in addition to harbor and inshore vessels, there should be a force of destroyers and of submarines ready to act upon information of hostile submarines near our coast. (*cc*) That the strength of these should be, in the first naval district, 2 destroyers, 1 submarine; third naval district, 4 destroyers, 5 submarines; fifth naval district, 4 destroyers, 5 submarines.

* * * * * * *

42. The board concluded, therefore, (*dd*) that new destroyers should remain on our coast for one month shakedown after commissioning, to be available for service in the event of the appearance here of hostile submarines; but that not more than nine at one time need be so detained, if prepared earlier to sail for distant service.

That is signed by the members of the board, among whom are Commander J. V. Babcock, who was at that time acting as liaison officer between ourselves and Admiral Sims.

That was approved by Admiral Benson.

(The document above referred to is here printed in full in the record, as follows:)

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, February 6, 1918.

From: A special board to formulate a plan of defense in home waters.
To: Chief of Naval Operations.
Subject: Defense against submarine attack in home waters
Reference: (*a*) Opnav letter No. — of February 1, 1918, convening board.

1. Pursuant to instructions, reference (*a*), the board convened at 10 a. m. Monday, February 4, 1918, all members present except Lieut. Commander Foy, who was present beginning with the afternoon session. As a result of its deliberations, the board submits the following report:

BASIS OF DISCUSSION.

2. The Germans have completed a number of cruising submarines of large radius and large capacity, and these may be used on our coast, with a view to divert some of our military activity away from European waters. The constant increase of antisubmarine forces abroad may compel an enemy effort to cause such a diversion, and the comparative openness of American waters offers a good field for submarine activities. Information is indefinite as to the number of enemy submarines possibly intended for American waters, but an approximation is sufficient for discussion. The salient features of the situation are therefore taken to be as follows:

GENERAL SITUATION.

3. A division of 4 submarine cruisers, each armed with 6-inch guns, 36 mines, and 16 torpedoes, and capable of at least one month's activity on our coast, may appear in American waters without warning.

4. Their aim will be to destroy shipping; interrupt the transport of troops and supplies to Europe; interfere with our coastwise shipping; by these means causing the

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recall from abroad of some of our naval force for defense of home waters. Bombardment of coast towns may also be done, with a view to heighten popular demand for local protection and thereby embarrass the naval administration.

5. They will employ mines, guns, torpedoes, and bombs. Their principal activities may be expected to be directed against the main shipping centers; Halifax, New York, Hampton Roads, and Florida Straits. At the same time, by activity of some kind in several localities so separated as to suggest the presence of a large force, they may expect to produce a maximum popular disturbance early in their campaign.

GENERAL POLICY.

6. The general policy of the United States is to send the maximum possible force abroad, for offensive operations in the active theater of war. This policy the board has kept constantly in mind, to the end that there might be no weakening of it.

7. With regard to any force still retained or in the future to be held in American waters which might be suitable abroad, the board has been governed by the consideration that trans-Atlantic transit, the security of which is the chief task of the naval force based on America, depends for its success upon a sufficient guard in American as well as in European waters. The force retained in American waters can not with reasonable military prudence be reduced below the minimum required for meeting the emergency here being considered. It has devolved upon this board to determine what that minimum is; and such determination should be held to against the repeated urgings to send all force abroad of individuals who have not fully considered the situation as a whole. In the course of our discussions this principle had repeatedly to be adverted to and reaffirmed. Emphasis is laid upon it as the basis of any plan for defense against hostile operations near our coast.

POLICY IN THE FACE OF SUBMARINES.

8. In the event of actual submarine hostilities on this coast first disclosed perhaps by the sinking of a steamer by a mine, what shall be the policy as to shipping? Shall it continue, with the least possible interruptions, or shall it be held in port until the enemy submarines shall have been located and destroyed? The latter course would be to surrender at once to the enemy a large measure of success in his purpose

9. It is recognized that to keep on sending out shipping may involve the loss of some vessels soon after departure from our ports we are, notwithstanding, convinced that this course should be pursued. To hold vessels in port until all is clear will encourage the enemy, both near and abroad; it will help prolong his period of activity on our coast; and will demoralize and confuse our arrangements on shore far more than would the loss of one or two vessels. Abroad, the suspension of arrivals for several weeks would have an effect serious beyond calculation. On the other hand, to continue with our sailings boldly, unshaken in our general offensive policy, would hearten our own people while giving no ground to the enemy submarine. The escort with our convoys would force the submarines to take a chance for every sinking they might attempt. From the first disclosure of their presence, their accomplishing anything in our waters should become increasingly difficult, and this can only come about by our taking the strong line of action.

10. On this point it is therefore the decision of the board that we should keep on sending shipping out with the least possible delay; at the same time taking all possible offensive measures to remove the danger.

11. The measures necessary to put into effect the foregoing policy divide under two general heads, control of shipping and military offensive.

CONTROL OF SHIPPING.

12. After discussing the several questions involved successively, the board came to the following conclusions:

Outbound shipping.—(*a*) That where mines have appeared, outbound shipping should be routed clear of them, through a swept channel.

(*b*) That shipping should use swept channels as soon after the sweeping as circumstances permit.

(*c*) That coastwise shipping should proceed at night and independently. (See change.)

(*d*) That ocean shipping should proceed in convoys.

(*e*) That the convoys should be as large as the available escort permit.

(*f*) That convoys should be preceded to the 50-fathom curve by four submarine chasers equipped with listening attachment. (See change.)

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(*g*) That air scouts should patrol the convoy's intended course out to the 50-fathom curve from the convoy's departure until it clears 50 fathoms or darkness comes on. (See change.)

(*h*) That convoys should be accompanied by an ocean escort, by an antisubmarine escort to the 50-fathom curve, and by one or more escorting submarines for lookout. (See change.)

(*i*) That the ocean escort should be a cruiser, or a converted merchant vessel in naval commission, armed with guns of 5-inch or larger caliber.

(*j*) That the antisubmarine escort should consist of submarine chasers armed with depth bombs and guns up to 3-inch caliber. (See change.)

(*k*) That the antisubmarine escort for a convoy should be the number required by approved instructions in force at the time.

(*l*) That the escorting submarines with a convoy should precede it, running awash, to keep lookout for enemy submarines and warn and divert the convoy before the enemy submarine can sight it. (Omit, see changes.)

13. Considering a suggestion that interference with shipping would be made more difficult by sending convoys out of more ports than are so used at present, it was concluded that available escort vessels were too few, that land transportation would be disarranged, and that harbor facilities would be taxed too much beyond their normal capacity to offer any success for such a measure. Accordingly,

(*m*) The dispatch of convoys should be limited to New York and Hampton Roads, as at present.

14. The foregoing applies mainly to the area between Nantucket Shoals and Cape Hatteras. Shipping out of the Gulf, including the important fuel oil supply, has not as yet been convoyed and escort force is not available to establish such a convoy service.

15. A division of submarines and an aviation station are located at Key West, and dependence must be placed upon these and upon local and passing traffic and the coastwise lookout service for information of hostile submarines in the vicinity, and in such event shipping out of the Gulf of Mexico should be routed south of Cuba. (See change.)

16. In the event of submarines operating against shipping coming from the canal, shipping may be routed via Cape Horn; but action as to this would be too much subject to the particulars of the situation at the time for any more definite conclusion by this board. (Omit, see changes.)

17. *Incoming shipping.*—In order to route incoming shipping clear of submarine dangers, it is the consensus of the board that the best means would be return convoys. This would insure the correct receipt of and compliance with routing instructions. Not enough cruisers being available to convoy return shipping, however, there is no choice but that—

(*n*) Return shipping to the United States must be independent of convoys. (See change.)

18. Considering the great extent of coastal waters inside the 50-fathom curve, it will be at best possible only to keep one avenue of approach to New York and one to Hampton Roads sufficiently swept for a practical degree of safety from enemy mines. Our sweeping task is lessened by the fact that only a small number of mines can be brought over by submarines. Judging by the latest experience abroad, these may be planted in small groups in several widely separated locations. There being only a few mine sweepers available, they can be employed to the best advantage by searching out a route clear of mines rather than by attempting to keep several fixed routes swept clear. In searching formation sweepers can cover more ground than in a sweeping formation. The board concludes, therefore—

(*o*) That incoming shipping should be routed into port through approach channels that have been found by searching or sweeping to be safe.

19. *Secrecy in routing.*—To the end that vessels may be warned daily of the positions of submarines and mines and receive directions for their movements—

(*p*) Return shipping to the United States should be controlled by radio from the United States.

20. To provide for the necessary secrecy of such radio control.

(*q*) Each belligerent vessel should carry a commissioned communication officer of her own or of United States nationality. Such officer would be in charge of codes, would decipher code messages and transmit them to the master of the vessel, but would have no authority over nor responsibility for the vessel. He need have no seagoing experience, but must be trustworthy and of sufficient education; hence to supply these communication officers, our trained personnel need not be drawn upon.

21. The foregoing provision must be undertaken immediately to be available for use when wanted; but wholly apart from its value in emergency, the board strongly

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recommends its adoption as a measure that will greatly promote the safe routing of ships in the war zone and thereby reduce tonnage losses.

22. Until commissioned communication officers shall have been established on board belligerent vessels, as provided in paragraph (*q*) above, other means to facilitate communication with incoming ships are recommended to be established, consisting of a system of secret routing for ships approaching this coast, similar to the method in use in the war zone. The board does not consider this as an alternative, but only as a temporary means, pending the adoption of the commissioned officer system, which alone of the two has the requisite reliability and flexibility.

MILITARY OFFENSIVE.

23. The foregoing measures cover the procedure necessary to carry out the policy recommended affecting shipping, namely, to continue sending it out with the least possible interruption. These measures alone constitute one means of combating enemy submarines both actively, by resisting their attacks upon convoys, and passively, by wearing out their endurance, ultimately depriving them of their main object—breaking the supply abroad. But active measures to remove the submarines from our waters are necessary in addition, lest their stay be prolonged to our disadvantage and the attendant risk to shipping continue long enough to have serious internal effect in this country.

24. *Fixed and local defense.*—Connected with measures of active offense the subject of purely passive defensive measures were considered. Fixed fortifications under the Coast Artillery should be sufficient to prevent the actual penetration of our interior waters. In addition to this, all districts have patrols at the entrance to principal harbors, and in the second, third, and fifth districts there are guns afloat in the old battleships *Massachusetts*, *Indiana*, and *Iowa*. These means the board considers sufficient to frustrate any attempt which might be made to enter interior waters.

25. Request has been made of the War Department to supplement the forces of the naval districts employed in coast defense by one or two gun batteries at salient points along the coast which might be bombarded. While such an attack might cause no great material damage, popular clamor might compel some military dispositions seriously affecting the active theater of operations. The War Department has replied, however, that no guns can be employed for this purpose.

26. *Submarine nets.*—Submarine nets were considered as part of fixed defenses. As to offshore nets outside New York and Hampton Roads and Long Island Sound, even if the material were available, the operation of planting them is too extensive to be undertaken within a short time; and even when in place, the nets are of small effect unless thoroughly patrolled, not to mention the effort and material required for upkeep.

(*r*) The board concludes, therefore, that no outside nets should be considered, but that inside nets, as maintained or planned by the Coast Artillery, and at base 2 and Cape Henry by the Navy, should be retained, and that these nets, together with fixed fortifications and harbor patrols, will afford sufficient security against any hostile attempt to enter a principal harbor.

27. *Mines.*—Mines which are submerged at a depth which is dangerous to surface craft, including submarines (subsurface mine fields), would be a greater embarrassment to our own vessels in the situation under consideration than to the enemy's. We can not afford to endanger or restrict the movements of our own vessels, which are at best very limited in number, and there being no hostile surface vessels involved, the board concludes—

(*s*) That no subsurface mine fields should be included in the present plans. (See change).

28. At present the Mark VI mine has no attachment for safety in case of shallow planting, and the mines of earlier marks are not capable of deep planting without modification of the depth regulating apparatus. Even with such modification, they could not be planted at a rapid rate. These mines also have no safety provisions against shallow planting. As a whole, therefore, we have no mines suitable for deep mine fields at present. A safety attachment for the Mark VI mine is being developed, and mines of that mark are being manufactured in considerable number, so that within several months we may have a supply which could be used in emergency for deep mine fields on our own coast, though destined for another project abroad.

29. The free operation of our own submarines would, however, be endangered in the vicinity of deep-mine fields, and hostile submarines may be expected to operate far enough offshore to be clear of any deep fields large enough to embarrass them, unless we used a number of mines beyond any possibility of supply. The chance of

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deep-mine fields contributing materially to the destruction of enemy submarines is remote, on account also of the small number of submarines that may be expected to operate. The board therefore concludes that—

(*t*) Unless hostile activities on our coast be prolonged beyond control by other measures, no deep-mine fields should be planted; but

(*u*) That naval districts be prepared to plant mines and that steps be taken to make mines available for planting a deep barrier across the approaches to New York Harbor and Hampton Roads; and further (see change),

(*v*) That districts should be prepared to announce fictitious mine fields in the event of the emergency contemplated actually arising, and to route shipping accordingly.

30. As a whole, the passive defenses of the first, second, third, and fifth districts are deemed sufficient for the defense of the principal harbors in those districts.

ACTIVE OFFENSIVE.

31. The purpose of measures of active offense is to locate and destroy the submarines.

32. The principal operations of these submarines must be conducted in the offing of New York, off the capes of the Chesapeake, and in the Florida Straits and Yucatan Channel. In order to continue their operations beyond their self-contained capacity, the enemy submarines must replenish from some near-by base or by some means of supply from our coast or some neutral source.

33. *Information service.*—To locate the submarines, we have an organized lookout service in operation along the coasts in the several naval districts, and also a secret service of sufficiently wide extent and connections. These should be warned to be on the lookout for evidences of any use of our coasts and of any support to enemy submarines from on or near our coast.

34. The same applies to the possibility of the enemy's use of a base in the Bahamas. Connection of our intelligence service with that of the British in the Bahama Islands should be sufficient provision to secure timely information. In this connection it is stated by the commander of squadron 2, Cruiser Force, that a reconnoissance of the Bahama Islands shows little suitability of that region for use as a submarine base.

35. *Air patrol.*—The naval air service, in addition to assisting the escort of convoys, may contribute materially to the locating of submarines by air scouting off our coast, including the use of kites and dirigibles, especially between Nantucket Shoals and Cape Hatteras. It is assumed that this may and will be done, should the contemplated emergency arise.

36. *Active forces.*—The situation has not yet sufficiently developed to enable the board to do more than outline the offensive action that may be taken. The conclusion was reached

(*aa*) That provision should now be made for forces to be available where likely to be needed, to detect and locate enemy submarines, to act upon information of their whereabouts, and to be capable of attacking a submarine if encountered.

37. The kind of force that should accompany convoys has already been stated. In addition, it is the board's conclusion

(*bb*) That, in addition to harbor and inshore vessels, there should be a force of destroyers and of submarines ready to act upon information of hostile submarines near our coast.

(*cc*) That the strength of these should be, in the first naval district, 2 destroyers, 1 submarine; third naval district, 4 destroyers, 5 submarines; fifth naval district 4 destroyers, 5 submarines.

38. The possibility of there being more submarines capable of service, at the New London and other bases, and of more destroyers being under shake down, after the building program shall have begun to yield more frequent deliveries, was taken into account; as also the submarines at Key West and Panama and the vessels already in the several districts. The forces named in paragraph (*cc*) above are the minimum increase needed.

CONTROL OF ACTIVE FORCES.

39. The lookout service and reports of coastwise and other passing traffic first come under the cognizance of the naval districts, and these districts will have at disposal the forces intended to act according to the situation that may arise. The success of measures against submarines in the majority of cases will probably depend on the celerity with which the forces act on information received. This indicates that their direction and control should be in the hands of the respective naval district commandants, and the board so recommends.

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40. *Providing the necessary forces.*—Adverting to the policy laid down in paragraph 7, the board, examining the sources that could be drawn upon for the force specified in paragraph (*cc*), concluded that the best practical plan was to utilize new destroyers and new submarines during the shake-down period, before departure for European waters.

41. Considering first the destroyers, this would involve a delay at first, but this is unavoidable if adequate provision is to be made for the contingency under consideration; besides the delay is not so long as at first apparent. Not less than two weeks is the probable minimum required by the average new destroyer for preliminary shake-down. To this some few days more may be needed for new fittings constantly being added, which would be installed on board on this side instead of abroad. During the time so spent the destroyer would be available for emergency if here, but if abroad she would not be operating, so no operating time is lost on this account. Further, by a somewhat longer shake-down time on our coast, together with a quick run across, instead of a slow passage for shake-down en route, the ultimate date of beginning service in the war zone would be little affected. The same applies to the submarines.

42. The board concluded, therefore—

(*dd*) That new destroyers should remain on our coast for one month shake-down after commissioning, to be available for service in the event of the appearance here of hostile submarines, but that not more than nine at one time need be so detained, if prepared earlier to sail for distant service.

(*ee*) That the nine destroyers so detained shall be stationed, one in the first, and four each in the third and fifth naval districts, the commandants of which shall be instructed to use them as necessary in the event of hostile submarines appearing on this coast; otherwise not to employ them, but instead to allow them all possible freedom in their training for active service.

(*ff*) That to provide the necessary submarines for the emergency service contemplated, new submarines should have a shake-down period of two months; their training course not to be interrupted, but to continue in its normal course from its usual base; but, upon the appearance of hostile submarines, one division to be escorted to New York and one division to Hampton Roads; further, while based on these places, to continue their training to such extent as the situation may permit; the respective naval district commandants to observe the same attitude as towards destroyers, stated in paragraph (*ee*).

43. Still other forces are required, which with available sources may be stated briefly:

(*gg*) Participation by any force from the Atlantic Fleet, other than the cruiser force as now employed in convoy duty, is not counted upon.

(*hh*) A force of 30 submarine chasers each, based on New York and on Hampton Roads, will be needed for convoy escort and listening service. To provide these, the earliest deliveries intended for other districts should be diverted to the third and fifth districts until the necessary total numbers are present in these districts.

(*ii*) One destroyer and one submarine permanently employed in experimentation are counted upon, with one new destroyer under paragraphs (*dd*) and (*ee*), to make up the force for the first naval district.

(*jj*) In order to accomplish the sweeping task without delaying shipping, in or outbound, there must be based at New York and Hampton Roads, sweepers enough to keep in service two sweeping groups of three pairs each. For this there must be 18 or more mine sweepers at each place named. As neither the third district nor the fifth has this number, the board recommends that sweepers from the first and second districts be added to those of the third district when the occasion arises, and similarly those from the fourth district to go to the fifth district.

(*kk*) For the air service to be performed, it is estimated that a force of 40 airplanes will be needed at Rockaway Inlet and at Hampton Roads in order to insure 16 planes being serviceable for escort duty; and this number should be made available. (See change.)

44. *Weakness of district vessels.*—The armament of such vessels of the naval districts as are seaworthy is too light for engaging a single submarine with success, except by surprise. It is therefore recommended—

(*ll*) That in view of the possible appearance of submarines armed with 5-inch or 6-inch guns, the armament of district vessels be replaced by larger calibers as soon as practicable, but not to the deprivation of suitable armament for vessels navigating the war zone.

45. *Aids to navigation.*—In order to increase the navigating difficulties of submarines, especially in fog and darkness, and also to prevent the converging of shipping at a point favorable for submarines to operate, the board recommends—

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(*mm*) That immediate steps be taken to install on board all outside lightships on the Atlantic coast radio and listening equipment.

(*nn*) And that, upon the appearance of a hostile submarine in American waters, all submarine signal bells be stopped, the bells and whistles on outside buoys silenced, and Nantucket Shoal lightship we withdraw. (See change; see additions (*oo*) and (*pp*).

46. The board has included in this report only such detail as has seemed necessary to make its recommendations clear, to show the extent to which existing dispositions have been taken into account. to make a decision where there has been or may be doubt or wide difference of opinion, and especially to strengthen the statement as to the minimum of increase in force necessary to retain on this side. In view of existing machinery for executing plans, it seems inadvisable to go further into details.

M. Johnston, rear admiral, United States Navy; Philip Andrews, captain, United States Navy; S. S. Robison, captain, United States Navy; L. R. de Steiguer, captain, United States Navy; R. R. Belknap, captain, United States Navy; I. McNamee, captain, United States Navy; J. R. Y. Blakely, captain, United States Navy; J. V. Fullenwider, commander, United States Navy; J. V. Babcock, commander, United States Navy; E. J. Foy, lieutenant commander, United States Navy.

Approved as changed by modifications, etc., appended.

W. S. BENSON.

[Confidential.]

MARCH 19, 1918.

From: Chief of Naval Operations.
To: Commandants, first, second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, and fifteenth naval districts.
Subject: Defense in home watters
References: (*a*) Report of Special Board February 6, 1918. (*b*) Approval with modification by Chief of Naval Operations March 6, 1918. (*c*) Memorandum for all divisions of Office Chief of Naval Operations March 13.

1. Your attention is invited particularly to the analysis of the distribution of the responsibility among the several divisions of the Offices of Operations in working out the plans of defense set up in the report and approval subject to above reverences (*a*) and (*b*).

2. The commandants of the several districts will perfect provision for the defense of the several districts in conformity with these plans. Concentration of all mine sweeping and of more or less of the mine laying groups from other districts particularly the first, second, and fourth districts, in the third and fifth districts is indicated and in laying out the district defenses the withdrawal from district forces of such units must be compensated for. The policy indicated in the report is to mine sweep the approaches to the harbors of New York and Norfolk only and in view of this, the difficulty of making such compensation will not be great inasmuch as the service of mine sweeping will not be required elsewhere.

This should not result, however, in the curtailment of plans for training district forces in these activities.

3. Attention is further invited to the requirements indicated in respect to torpedo boats and submarine chaser boats for use in defensive and convoy work.

4. The responsibility for working out these defensive plans and maintaining at all times the requisite force and material rests as to each district with the district commandant. Commandants will report promptly and in sufficient detail when perfected and dispositions established for maintaining these defense plans, and will take necessary steps to secure any equipment lacking to this end and report fully in respect thereto.

5. This letter and the references cited above and the subject matter is highly confidential in character and must be so regarded by all having knowledge of it.

H. OSTERHAUS.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, March 13, 1918.

Memorandum for all divisions of Office of Naval Operations.
Subject: Execution of a plan for defense against submarine attack in home waters.

1. In accordance with the attached plan and approved modifications, the following parts thereof are assigned to the divisions of this office for information and action. Where a part has been assigned to more than one division the officers in charge will cooperate in its execution in accordance with the duties of their respective divisions.

2. Provisions of the plan that require the action of any bureau will be prepared by the head of the division concerned and transmitted to the bureau after signature by the Chief of Naval Operations.

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Operations Division.—Assistant for operations: Paragraphs 6, 7, 10, and 45. Overseas transportation: Paragraphs 12 (*c*), (*d*), (*e*); 13 (*m*), 17 (*n*); 19 (*p*); and 22. Ship movements: Paragraphs 12 (*i*); 19 (*p*); 36 (*aa*); 37 (*bb*), (*cc*); 39; 42 (*dd*), (*ff*); 43 (*gg*), (*hh*), (*ii*), (*jj*).

Submarine detection: Paragraphs 12 (*j*); 36 (*aa*); 37 (*bb*), (*cc*); 42 (*dd*), (*ee*), (*ff*); 43 (*hh*), (*ii*), (*jj*); and 45 (*mm*), (*nn*), (*pp*).

Material Division.—Paragraphs 12 (*i*), (*j*); 26 (*r*); 27 (*s*); 29 (*t*), (*u*); 36 (*aa*); 43 (*ii*), (*kk*); 44 (*ll*); 45 (*mm*), (*pp*).

Intelligence Division.—Paragraphs 32, 33, and 34.

Communications Division.—Paragraph 19 (*p*); 20 (*q*); and 21.

Naval Districts Division.—Paragraphs 12 (*a*), (*b*), (*c*), (*f*), (*g*), (*h*), (*j*), (*k*); 15; 18 (*o*) 24; 26 (*r*); 27 (*s*); 29 (*t*), (*u*), (*v*), 32; 33; 34; 35; 37 (*bb*), (*cc*); 39; 42 (*dd*), (*ee*), (*ff*); 43 (*hh*), (*ii*), (*jj*), (*kk*), 44 (*ll*); 45 (*mm*), (*nn*), (*oo*), (*pp*).

Aviation Division.—Paragraphs 12 (*g*); 15; 35; 36 (*aa*); and 43 (*kk*).

W. S. BENSON.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, March 6, 1918.

The foregoing plan, "Defense against submarine attack in home waters," with the following alterations, modifications, or changes is approved. Steps will be taken immediately to put it into effect.

MODIFICATION AND CHANGES OR ALTERATIONS—OUTBOUND SHIPPING.

Paragraph 12 (*c*).—That the best practice is to have the coastwise shipping proceed by day, hugging the shore and keeping within the 5-fathom curve or as near it as practicable. Also, since it is the policy of the shipping committees charged with such work, to allocate the smallest and least valuable ships to the coasting trade, it, as a matter of expediency, should be the policy to protect said shipping by the means within the capacity of the naval districts through which the coastwise shipping passes, rather than to attempt to divert guns from ships in the trans-Atlantic trade, or to allocate cruisers for the protection of our coastwise trade, except in such cases where the districts could not afford protection, or the guns were readily available.

That if it were found expedient to route coastwise ships at night, that they should sail independently, being routed with due regard to the warnings received of the location of enemy submarines.

Paragraph 12 (*f*).—Change to read: "That convoys should be preceded to the 50-fathom curve or as far beyond as necessary by four submarine chasers equipped with listening attachments."

Paragraph 12 (*g*).—Change to read: "That air scouts should patrol the convoys intended course out at least to the 50-fathom curve and as far beyond as circumstances permit, or until darkness comes on.

Paragraph 12 (*h*).—Omit the words "and by one or more escorting submarines for lookout." It is the policy to use our submarines offensively against hostile submarines, and their movements are influenced by the movements of hostile submarines, not by the movements of our convoys.

Paragraph 12 (*j*).—Add at the end of paragraph: "and also of destroyers if advisable."

Paragraph 12 (*l*).—Omit entirely.

Paragraph 15.—Last two lines. Change to read: "Shipping out of the Gulf of Mexico should be routed north or south of Cuba as circumstances existing at the time render most expedient."

Paragraph 16. Held to be not sound as the delay thus caused to shipping practically reduces its efficiency to a lower limit than the actual submarine sinkings could impose.

Paragraph 17 (*n*). Add the words "until such time as convoys can be established."

Paragraph 27 (*s*). That in view of the slight advantages to be derived as compared to the inordinate risk to shipping, the subsurface mine will not be used offensively against hostile submarines. That it is legitimate to use it defensively, but that such use should be confined to the purpose of barring entrance and exit to our principal shipping ports and confined to the lowest limits compatible with a fair degree of safety. That even when a defensive mine field is laid, a clear and ample passage must be left for the transit of shipping, and this passage must under no circumstances be mined but be patrolled and protected by other means. That all mines upon being detached from their moorings must become innocuous. That the three places to be considered now as coming within the scope of defensive mining are New York, capes of the Chesapeake, and east entrance to Long Island Sound.

Paragraph 29 (*u*). After the words Hampton Roads add: "But that owing to the great demand for mines abroad this step be not considered now."

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Paragraph 43 (*kk*). Read that a force consisting of at least one squadron of 20 airplanes will be needed at each station, Rockaway Inlet and Hampton Roads, and that this number should be made available as soon as practicable, not to interfere with the European program.

Paragraph 45 (*nn*). Omit the words "and Nantucket Shoal Lightship be withdrawn."

Paragraph 45. Add new paragraph: "(*oo*) Be prepared upon special order of the Navy Department to withdraw all light vessels on the Atlantic Coast, but this will be done only when the necessity is strongly apparent."

Paragraph 45. Add new paragraph "(*pp*) Establish listening stations at the entrances to Chesapeake Bay, New York, and the east end of Long Island Sound. If these stations prove effective and are needed, to extend the system to other important localities."

W. S. BENSON.

During the time from April to July the organization for handling of communications to and fro between Admiral Sims and ourselves was cumbersome and, in my opinion, not efficient.

Just as a side light, I will say about that cablegram for Admiral Sims that went to Petrograd, I think the trouble was we had to send our cables from Operations to the Office of Intelligence, and it was afterwards sent by them to the British Embassy for coding, and from the British embassy it was sent abroad, and it was there that the mistake of sending it to Petrograd took place, I think.

In April, and until the communication system was reorganized directly under the office of operations, in the early summer of 1917, most of our cables came through the Office of Naval Intelligence. The system after reorganization became very efficient. It was used by the State Department during the peace conference.

Paragraphs 33 and 34 of Admiral Sims's letter are as follows:

33. Most earnest requests were made for tugs because of the urgent need for them in the submarine zone. These requests fully explained how many torpedoed ships could have been beached and salvaged if these tugs had been available. Experience has shown that such vessels could be repaired and put in service again in a short time—a very short time compared to that required to build new ships—thus resulting in a great saving of tonnage.

34. A year after we entered the war but four tugs had been sent, and two of these were specifically allocated to Italy by the department. Nine more were eventually sent at various times, but none before April 23, 1918.

Paragraphs 33 and 34. This is true. The department was having its own difficulties in getting tugs. There was a tremendous demand for tugs on our own coast to assist our transports, handle coal, and for the many purposes connected with our own logistic situation at home. The principal duty of our naval establishment as a whole may be summed up in Army terms, "the preservation of the line of supply," and by that is meant the line of supply both for material and for troops. The center of all these efforts originated at home. It was therefore more important for us to use those facilities which helped build up and sustain our vast system of reserves affecting the Army, Navy, and allied civil industries in this way than it was to send them abroad.

To further increase economy of effort the tug facilities in each of our two great ports of embarkation were pooled. Apart from the above needs and the strictly naval needs of mine sweeping, and of bringing in disabled shipping on our own coast, the policy was to fit out tugs for the service abroad. I wish distinctly to point out the difference between tugs and other naval antisubmarine craft. The destroyers, chasers, yachts, and gun boats were fighters, and their

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place was abroad, where the fighting was. The rôle of the tug is, however, first commercial, and its location is properly at the center of commercial activity, that is here at home. Its second rôle was that of the fighter. When our war reserve needs could be met, and long before that time even, the preparation of tugs which could not be spared here was begun. The above conceptions naturally influenced the flow of tugs abroad. So great was the demand for this type that both the Navy and the Shipping Board had to start building these craft immediately. Had the transport service stopped, had the coal situation become more acute than it was, then the whole service of supply in the rear would have been paralyzed. The Army can appreciate what this means. The Army itself was in the market for tugs. Those we obtained were, for the most part, harbor tugs which could not cross the ocean. All that we did get had to be overhauled and repaired. This took time. The Salvage Division was formed to assist in effecting the work the admiral mentioned, but this took time. The first two tugs ready were sent to Italy, where they were badly needed. Italy at that time had received less than any of the other Allies, and the pressure brought to bear to send them there was great. It is a matter of judgment whether it was wiser to send these two tugs to England or to Italy, where there were very limited war transportation facilities. The department decided in favor of Italy.

There is herewith submitted a list of the seagoing tugs available for crossing the Atlantic.

When you come to examine the great numbers of tugs on our coast you will find them essentially harbor tugs. They can not cross the Atlantic. We lost several tugs at sea in the war.

(The list of tugs referred to is as follows:)

Number of seagoing tugs in European waters:		Number of seagoing tugs in home waters:	
June 1, 1917	None.	June 1, 1917	27
July 1, 1917	None.	July 1, 1917	30
Aug. 1, 1917	None.	Aug. 1, 1917	32
Sept. 1, 1917	None.	Sept. 1, 1917	42
Oct. 1, 1917	7	Oct. 1, 1917	35
Nov. 1, 1917	8	Nov. 1, 1917	35
Dec. 1, 1917	8	Dec. 1, 1917	40
Jan. 1, 1918	8	Jan. 1, 1918	43

Name.	Material of hull.	Breadth.	Mean draft.	Displacement.	Gross tonnage.	Speed, knots.	Length over all.	Length.	Fuel capacity, coal, oil.	Cruising radius.
		Ft. in.	Ft. in.	Tons.			Ft. in.	Ft. in.	Tons.	
Anderton	Wood	23 8	10 3	.....	290	12.0	139 7	.....	220	1,683
Chemung	Steel	26 7½	11 6	575	.....	11.0	123 6½	.....	.....	3,000
Concord	.....	26 0	11 6	.....	.....	12.5	.....	140 0	175	4,530
Comber	.....	22 6	.....	.....	.....	11.0	.....	143 0	.....	3,000
Conestoga	.....	29 0	16 0	.....	.....	13.0	.....	170 0	286	4,300
Cahill [1]	.....	24 6	12 0	.....	299	12.0	150 0	.....	.....	1,120
City of Lewes [1]	.....	24 0	9 0	748	.....	12.0	150 0	.....	80	1,940
Courtney [1]	.....	23 4	8 6	.....	276	10.4	155 0	.....	56	1,000
Davis	.....	22 0	8 6	.....	.....	10.4	150 0	.....	.....	.....
East Hampton	Wood	26 6	.....	.....	.....	12.5	.....	162 9	210	2,880
Edwards, W. A.	...do...	23 10	10 0	660	.....	9.5	160 0	.....	.....	1,000
Douglas [1]	.....	24 0	8 9	.....	300	10.4	158 0	.....	.....	1,000
Gorgona	Steel	30 0	15 6	732	.....	12.0	125 6	.....	[2] 50,610	3,456
Genesee	.....	29 0	16 0	.....	.....	15.0	170 0	.....	286	4,300
Gypsum Queen	Iron	27 0	14 0	.....	.....	14.0	.....	135 0	151	3,600
Hinton [1]	Wood	23 9	10 3	.....	184	11.5	160 0	.....	100	1,200
Hubbard [3]	...do...	22 0	8 6	.....	276	13.0	155 0	.....	100	1,500
Iroquois	Steel	26 0	13 6	702	.....	13.2	152 0	.....	[2] 41,752	3,920
James, W. T. [1]	.....	22 0	8 5	.....	267	13.0	150 0	.....	100	1,000

[1] These tugs were operating in European waters on Oct. 1, 1917.
[2] Gallons of oil.
[3] This tug was operating in European waters Nov. 1, 1917.

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Name.	Material of hull.	Breadth.	Mean draft.	Displacement.	Gross tonnage.	Speed, knots.	Length over all.	Length.	Fuel capacity, coal, oil.	Cruising radius.
		Ft. in.	*Ft. in.*	*Tons.*			*Ft. in.*	*Ft. in.*	*Tons.*	
Long Island	Wood	24 1	6 9			1.5	164 4		180	3,380
Lykens		29 0	15 0				170 0			4,300
Mohave	Steel	24 0	12 10	575		11.11	122 6		149	
Macomber	Wood	22 8	9 0			10.0		138 7	425	3,830
McKeever Bros		24 0	12 0			10.0		136 0		1,000
McKeever, E. J.		24 0	12 0			10.0		136 0		1,000
McKeever, S. W.		24 0	12 0			10.0		136 0		1,000
McNeal, G. H.		21 0	9 6		244	10.0	140 0		100	1,000
McNeal, K. L.		24 0	9 0			10.0	160 0		120	1,000
Nahant		26 0	14 7		405	13.0		134 7	230	4,147
Ontario	Steel	35 6	12 6	1,120		13.2	185 2		445	6,612
Osceola	Steel	26 3	14 0	571		14.0	138 0		154	2,550
Passaic	Wood	27 0	9 6	401		10.5		124 4	45	
Patapsco	Steel	29 ½	12 3	755		13.0		148 0	324	
Patuxent	Steel	29 ½	12 3	755		13.0		148 0	324	5,420
Peoria	Steel	25 0	10 6	487		9.0		131 0	70	
Potomac	Steel	28 6	12 0	785		16.0		138 9	200	2,700
Palmer, J. A.	Wood	22 0	9 6			12.0	155 0			1,000
Penobscot		24 6	13 6		269	11.0	121 0		[1] 1,248	5,070
Pocomoke	Wood	18 5	8 6					115 0		1,123
Price, E. F.	Wood	18 9	8 8			12.0		125 5		1,500
Sagamore	Steel	30 0		1,000				149 3½		
Sonoma	Steel	34 0	12 6	1,120		13.08	185 2		435	6,220
Sappho	Wood	28 9	8 9			15.0	180 0		25	360
Struven, Peter C.	Wood	22 0	9 ½			11.5	152 0			
Tavernilla	Steel	29 10	13 3	732		11 2	125 6		140	5,744
Tillamook	Steel	24 0	12 10	575		10.55	122 6		149	
Unadilla	Steel	25 0	9 11	355		12.0		110 0	263	
Uncas	Steel	25 0	12 0	441		12.0		119 3	120	2,880
Victorine		27 9	15 6			12.0	168 9		143	
Wando	Steel	26 7½	11 6	575			123 6½		150	
White Cap		22 8	13 6		303	11.0				3,000

[1] Barrels of oil.

Paragraph 35 of Admiral Sims's letter is as follows:

35. The department caused serious embarrassment and delays in putting into effect the convoy system, which was the most important of all the measures used in defeating the submarine war against allied shipping.

Paragraph 35. I was not Assistant Chief of Naval Operations at the time when Admiral Sims first brought this subject up, but I remember that the plan was at first looked at with disfavor. There was much to say on both sides, and some British officers on this side had doubts as to its success. It was by no means a proved project at this time, though it later proved to be a success. Our first troop convoy went out June 14, guarded by destroyers, escorting our first 14,000 troops to France. It was always within the province of the British to establish their own convoy system and to prove its worth. On date July 5, 1917, we accepted the convoy system in toto, and after that used every available ship we had for this purpose excepting the battleships which were not so used until September 9, 1918, and ships were allotted to our own and to British convoy impartially, always excepting the primary duty of guarding our own troop convoys, which was one of the, if not the major, sea operations engaged in by our naval forces during the war.

While we are being criticized for not agreeing to convoy immediately, there was a similar dissension of opinion among some of the British authorities in Queenstown. Our destroyer forces there were working on the British patrol system when they first went over, this being the plan in vogue at that time, and they continued under that system for some time. This system was later admitted to be inefficient.

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This subject of convoy will be discussed more at length later when t comes to a discussion of operating plans; that is, plans which have been commented upon in the statement of Admiral Sims.

I likewise submit the cable in which we accepted the convoy in oto. [Reading:]

To O. N. I.:
Please send the following message to Vice Admiral Sims through British Admiralty—ecret:

"Sims. Replying your 72. Department agrees to scheme of convoy outlined by dmiralty. Has designated eight ships for work, *Denver* class; steaming radius, erage conditions, 4,500 miles. Three can be available New York July 8, four more ailable about July 10. At 10 knots can steam to longitude 20 and return to base thout refueling."

Paragraphs 36 and 37 of Admiral Sims's letter are as follows:

36. The department was repeatedly assured that the Allies at all times had remarkly accurate information as to the movement of submarines and that it was practally certain that they could not reach our coast, or even leave European waters, thout advance information being supplied. Subsequent events proved this assurce to be correct.

37. No submarine visited our coast until May 1918, and the department was in all es informed when they started across, and often as to their exact destination, where y were to lay mines, etc.

I wish to invite your attention to the fact that in sections 36 and 37 impression is conveyed that we were informed at all times as to movement of submarines and that they could not come over hout our being informed, in 1917, as well as 1918, when the marine did come across. This is correct, but requires further lanation. In 1918 the situation was exactly as Admiral Sims tes. When the first German submarine arrived about the 1st of e, 1918, it arrived on schedule, and we had been expecting it. In 7, however, the situation was somewhat different, especially in first few months of the war.

n all of the letters about that time from the Admiral his main iety was lest we become over anxious for the safety of our coast thus hold back the craft which ought to go abroad. He exned at length how profitable it would be if the entire submarine paign could be transferred to our coast. This had been accepted is before he even broached the subject, as sound military doc-. And we also knew that large numbers could not cross, even e Germans wanted to send them. Therefore we had, of our own rd, fortified by his assurances, planned our efforts so that nothing ld interfere with our major mission of getting all available ubmarine craft across the Atlantic, except the barest minimum patible with common sense, even though in 1917 he could not lid not give us the assurances he did in 1918. It is a fairly conve proof of our steadfastness in adhering to the doctrine above d, that when the submarines did strike our coast, no panic was ed and the plans for getting troops across went on just as ly as though nothing had happened. Neither did we hold back estroyers in any appreciable numbers, except that it was necesto double our guards sailing with the troop convoys, particuas we were sailing many ships from both New York and Hampoads, frequently forming junctions at sea, and it was considered judgment to give them an offing beyond the range of submarine ties. No absolute guaranty could be given to us, once the arine got clear of European waters and ceased to use its wire-

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less, nevertheless that did not worry us; we are probably the best judges of our own frame of mind.

In this connection it might be well to explain that by agreement entered into with the Admiralty, we were responsible for the safety of the seas west of longitude 30, and the British forces and our forces under Admiral Sims were responsible east of longitude 30. This did not prevent us from making any pertinent suggestions we chose concerning waters outside our own particular jurisdiction, neither did it preclude the Admiralty nor Admiral Sims from making any suggestions they chose concerning our waters. We certainly had no objection to receiving any or all suggestions that might be offered, and the Admiralty, while they may have been amused, apparently felt no resentment. Admiral Sims seems to be the only one of the trio who had any feeling in the matter, and this is difficult to understand, as he through his close association with both the Admiralty and the department was always in close touch, and his judgments and opinions were given paramount weight. This sense of dissatisfaction appears to me to be of somewhat recent origin, for I did not note it during the progress of the war, though I was in close touch with Admiral Sims. So thoroughly did we have the radio and cable situation in hand after we had reorganized the service in the summer of 1917, that the matter of long messages to and fro was only a question of very few hours indeed.

Paragraph 38 of Admiral Sims's letter is as follows:

38. My dispatches show that with all possible emphasis I tried to induce the department to view the campaign as a whole; to consider our naval force as but one relatively small item of an allied naval team; that our mission was the protection of all allied lines of communication, and not the United States lines of communication alone; that, particularly in the early part of our campaign, the strictly United States lines of communication, as compared to allied lines, were inconsiderable; and that it was quite possible to give our relatively small commerce quite superior protection at the expense of losing the war by denying essential protection to the vastly greater allied commerce upon which the success of our common cause chiefly depended.

Paragraph 38. This statement is correct. It is also true that this point of view was accepted by the department or, speaking more specifically, by the Office of Operations, which is that office of the department dealing in policy, plans, strategy, and the movement of ships. We had no commercial convoys of our own to protect, except in 1918, when for the service of our Army in France, a convoy route was established to French bay ports. We did, however, from the beginning, assume that our primary duty in convoy matters was to protect our own troop transports. After that primary duty was performed, our second task was to protect our own supply lines to France when they were organized. Subject only to these restrictions, our men-of-war were available to guard any convoy and our commercial ships sailed in any convoy. Admiral Sims was conversant with this policy. The plan of commercial convoy we accepted from the Admiralty, July 5, 1917. In 1918, a British officer from the Admiralty was sent to Washington to assist and cooperate in joint convoy plans. The plans and routings for our troop convoys were handled entirely by our own forces. The troop convoy plans, as prepared by Admiral Sims, were accepted, but where one end of the route rested in Europe under Admiral Sims, and one in the United States under Admiral Gleaves, the Office of Operations acted as the coordinating agent between the two individual commanders. The first troop convoy of June 14, the plan for which originated in the

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United States, none yet having been sent us by Admiral Sims, or at least not having been received yet, was not an unqualified success, in that it was a waste of effort, for the protecting force of destroyers. The troops were sent over safely, but the measures which had to be taken to guard them were not economical. This was the subject of criticism by Admiral Sims. His suggestions were immediately accepted, and his plan, which we received after the first troop convoy sailed, was adopted for other troop convoys.

Paragraph 39. No comment.

Paragraph 40. No comment.

Paragraph 41 of Admiral Sims's letter is as follows:

41. As the possession of adequate shipping was an imperative requirement in this war, it follows that the essential policy was to pool all antisubmarine forces and use them to the best possible advantage for the protection of all shipping, regardless of the flag it happened to be under. As the winning of the war was the paramount object, and as our antisubmarine forces and those of the Allies were always inadequate, and as it was consequently impossible to prevent a certain amount of loss, it is apparent that the game was to reduce the combined loss of allied shipping below a point which would defeat the objective of the enemy and thus insure victory of the common cause as a whole.

Paragraph 41. This is correct. This policy relating to shipping was accepted by the department. We concurred in the policy of pooling antisubmarine forces, as evinced by the disposition of our destroyers based on the Irish coast, under a British admiral, and in the disposition of our forces in the Mediterranean and at Gilbraltar. We reserved the right merely of protecting our troops and the supplies to those troops as a right of paramount importance.

Paragraph 42 of Admiral Sims's letter is as follows:

42. It was repeatedly explained that if we could actually entice the enemy into shifting his submarines to our coast it would be greatly to the advantage of the common cause, even granting that our shipping would suffer somewhat more severely; that the chances of the enemy shifting any of his operations to the United States coast without our having advance knowledge, while remote, was a fully justifiable risk, and therefore that such considerations should not deter us in any way from throwing every possible bit of naval strength into the fight on the actual "front;" that is, in the "war zone" in European waters. Moreover, that the risk was slight, as vessels could be sent back, if necessary, before submarines could reach our coast or could do much damage. In making long passages submarines necessarily steam at slow speed—from 5 to 6 knots.

Paragraph 42. This is correct. This was accepted by the department as being true, and the department's policy was to send all antisubmarine craft to Europe which could be efficiently used there. There was much pressure brought to bear upon the department from various sources to make it keep back some of our antisubmarine forces on this side. From private sources; from the British commander in chief in Atlantic waters; from Admiral Gleaves, the commander of our transport forces; from Admiral Mayo, commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet, pressure was brought to bear to give to their forces submarine protection, but the chief of naval operations never deviated from his general policy of sending our antisubmarine craft to Europe. Practically the sole exception to this policy was in the few destroyers kept on our own coast for the convoy of our own troopships, and the tugs essential for our own uses. The numbers of these destroyers were few. The War Department insisted upon it, and the public opinion would not stand for our troops going across without a certain amount of protection being given to the ships from the beginning of the voyage to the end.

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I remember a conference held in the chief of naval operations' office, I think in the spring of 1918, between the chief of naval operations, Admiral Benson (the commander in chief), Admiral Mayo, and the commander of the transport forces, Admiral Gleaves, at which I was present, when the policy of sending all of our destroyers abroad was discussed. Both Admiral Mayo and Admiral Gleaves thought that it would be wise to keep more destroyers on this side both for the fleet and for the transport service, in view of the fact that we never could be quite sure of where and when the German submarine would strike. In this matter I remember Admiral Benson stood firm and did not change his policy of endeavoring to send all of the effective antisubmarine craft abroad. However slow the actual desired results may have been; however delayed the destroyers were in getting across, and the dalays were many and disappointing to us, as well as to Admiral Sims, there was no question as to the department's attitude of mind, nor of the efforts taken by operations to hasten them along.

Paragraph 43 of the letter of Admiral Sims is as follows:

43. Submarines attacked almost exclusively merchant vessels, thus cutting off supplies essential to the armies. This was their correct mission, and they wisely avoided conflict with allied naval vessels. It was, therefore, our mission to adopt such tactics as to force the submarines into contact with the Allies' military vessels, while protecting the merchant shipping. This meant antisubmarine craft in such numbers that the submarines could not reach their prey without encountering them. It was for this reason that it was continuously urged that everything be sent, not only destroyers, which are preeminently the best antisubmarine craft, but also yachts, gunboats, tugs, etc.; in fact, any craft that could steam across the ocean or be towed across.

Paragraph 43. Submarines did attack merchant vessels oftener than troopships, but not from the military reason that it was better to sink supplies than troops. Our troops were carried in merchant ships, but our troop convoys were much better protected than the merchant convoys; they were more dangerous to attack, and the ships themselves more difficult to sink. However, one troopship when sunk was usually worth much more than one supply ship. Many merchant ships could be sunk without eliciting one iota of the general anxiety in our country which the sinking of one troop transport would cause. The public opinion is a very important factor for any military organization to reckon with in war. The public and the War Department demanded adequate protection for their troop transports and it was given. Even though there were times and places where the Navy did feel that a little reduction in the protecting forces could be made, we could afford to take no chances with the troops, and this was sound military judgment, I think, for our military forces were the units intended to deal the final blow to the Germans, the blow which was delivered when a sufficient force had been landed and trained in France. So important was it considered to get our troops over, that beginning with the spring of 1918 and through to July and August the French and British military missions in our country were directing every effort to that end, especially in the matter of Infantry divisions and machine-gun battalions, even at a sacrifice in the matter of supplies, and some ships that had been carrying supplies were converted into troop transports.

The CHAIRMAN. It is 12.30 o'clock, Captain, and I think we will have to stop now. We will continue to-morrow morning.

(Thereupon, at 12.30 o'clock p. m., the subcommittee adjourned until to-morrow, Tuesday, April 20, 1920, at 10 o'clock a. m.)

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NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

TUESDAY, APRIL 20, 1920.

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NAVAL AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to adjournment, in room 235, Senate Office Building, at 10 o'clock a. m., Hon. Frederick Hale presiding.

Present: Senators Hale (chairman), Pittman, and Trammell.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. Will you continue, Capt. Pratt?

TESTIMONY OF CAPT. W. V. PRATT—Resumed.

Capt. PRATT. Continuing my testimony from where I left off yesterday, paragraph 44 of the letter of Admiral Sims reads as follows:

44. It is quite true that there were many naval activities outside of the Eastern Atlantic, such as in Caribbean, South Atlantic, Pacific, and Asiatic waters. But, considering the rapidity with which at the time in question we were losing the war in the submarine zone, these forces were of little importance—practically none as regards ultimate success. A great deal of unnecessary effort was expended in these areas. It was repeatedly pointed out that we could afford to lose some antisubmarine craft, but could not afford to continue the loss of merchantmen at the rate then being sustained.

My comment on that is, the office of operations realized full well that the areas mentioned were not vital areas with one exception. It was strictly necessary to preserve the flow of oil from Mexico and the Gulf to Europe. This oil was vital to the British fleet and to our own, and the oil reserve was low. We began in the early summer of 1917 with few exceptions the task of withdrawing our few remaining forces of every description from all other stations in the world and of focusing them in the war area. The destroyers in the Philippines were sent through the Red Sea to the Mediterranean, only a few old submarines and small gunboats taken during the Spanish War, together with one old monitor, were left in Asiatic waters. All submarine chasers built and building, except about five, and all submarines except five for training purposes, all destroyers, together with all valuable cargo and supply ships, were drawn around to the Atlantic from the Pacific. A division of four cruisers, which was later reduced, was maintained in South American waters under Admiral Caperton, to cooperate with South American countries, principally Brazil, which had entered the war. The Caribbean station and patrol was arranged, in April, after joint conference with the British commander in chief and French admirals in our waters, acting as naval representatives of their respective countries. Our

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forces in home waters were, according to accepted policy, being reduced to the minimum, and this minimum consisted for the most part of some submarine chasers and those yachts, destroyers, and tugs which were not fit and did not have the steaming radius to cross the Atlantic.

All other craft except the battleships, some submarines, and a few cruisers and destroyers for convoy duty were started, if they had not already gone, on their way to Europe, as they became materially available. When our submarines were asked for, they were sent as soon as they could be made ready; but if I recollect correctly, at the time of asking Admiral Sims did not want them all sent, and at various times he advised their use by us in home waters in case of attacks by German submarines. The new destroyers building were, with very few exceptions, upon completion slated to go across for operations in European waters.

Paragraph 45 of Admiral Sims's letter is as follows:

45. It was realized, of course, that if a considerable number of antisubmarine vessels was not kept on our coast there would be risk of public criticism which, in time of war, must not be based upon inadequate information, because to inform the public would be to inform the enemy. But I strongly advise that this risk be accepted; that we should not be influenced in our war measures by the possibility of such adverse criticism; that the situation made it imperative that every possible means be used to defeat the enemy as speedily as possible, regardless of other considerations, and thus save many valuable lives.

This was realized at home in the department as well as in Europe, and it was not permitted to handicap our efforts. The craft on this side made a brave showing, but apart from our submarines they were practically useless as submarine fighters and were almost exclusively craft that could not get across the Atlantic.

Paragraph 46 of Admiral Sims's letter is as follows:

46. Perhaps the most remarkable situation disclosed by the correspondence with the department is that during the most critical period—the first four months after we entered the war—I had but one aid, and that for more than the first year I had a wholly inadequate staff.

This is true, and it was an error in judgment, I think. The office of operations was just as badly off. We gave them in London the best men that we had in our office here to help them out when we could not spare them. At the beginning of this war the Navy was very short in trained officers and men to cope with operations of the magnitude which we were called upon to undertake. This shortage retarded the flow of trained men and ships to Europe. The fleet and all home craft, including the cruisers used in convoy, had to be used for training purposes. The Navy had to be expanded from some sixty thousand and odd men to over five hundred thousand, and while training had to operate at the same time.

Paragraph 47 of the letter is as follows:

47. With all the insistence possible it was explained, in numerous cables and letters, for four weary and anxious months, the absolute necessity of further assistance in order to handle the situation effectively, but only to receive always the same answer, namely, that officers were "not available."

Paragraph 47. This is correct. We were in the same fix and far worse at home. The fleet claimed it was being ruined by lack of trained officers. There were only so many, and they had to be spread out in a very thin layer.

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Paragraph 48 of the letter is as follows:

48. Finally, in July, 1917, my only aid was unable longer to support the continuous train of the past four months' work, including the very anxious task of planning for nd handling the troop convoys then arriving. And it was only after this fact had een cabled that three officers were sent out, though the department still declined) provide the adequate staff that had been requested, with full explanations of the ′pes of officers required and the necessity for each. I urged the department to ve me at least the staff that the commander of one flotilla of destroyers would have ı time of peace. But all in vain.

Paragraph 48 of the letter, no comment.

Paragraph 49 of the letter is as follows:

49. As it gradually became apparent that support in this matter need not be ex- cted, I began slowly building up a staff by detaching officers from some of the ips. This was, of course, regrettable, as many of the ships were at that time short officers, but it was necessary, on pain of the whole force becoming ineffective through ; rapidly growing and essential administrative work getting beyond the capacity the headquarters force. Ultimately this force consisted of about 60 regular and) reserve officers and 1,000 enlisted men and clerical force for the administration, ıply, and operation of widely dispersed forces of about 370 ships of all classes,)0 officers, and 75,000 men. Its necessity was finally, I believe, tacitly recognized the department, but not until near the end of the war, when a few officers were t for staff duty. If it had been recognized from the beginning, as well as the essity of sending all possible antisubmarine forces, there can be no doubt that end of the war would have been hastened and hundreds of thousands of tons of)ping and many lives would have been saved.

This policy had already been started on this side of the water. miral Sims's forces were the only ones that were anywhere near nned to full complement, either in officers or men. In propor- ı to the forces he had under him, he had more trained men and :ers than the rest of the Navy. This was a perfectly correct cy to pursue, in view of the fact that these were the men who ld be most actively engaged with the enemy. Everybody wanted o with Sims, where the fighting and glory were to be, and none ted to stay at home with the drudgery. I must reiterate again the necessity for sending antisubmarine forces abroad was fully gnized. The results were not what either Admiral Sims nor we ed; but the principle was recognized, and an earnest effort was g made to get them fit and overseas as fast as possible.

ıragraph 50. Correct. No comment.

ragraph 51. Granted.

ragraph 52. No comment.

ragraph 53 of Admiral Sims's letter is as follows:

If the department realized these conditions, it is made clear by the records was not influenced by them. The correspondence shows that I was trying to e department to understand that I was confronted with an impossible task— was actually physically impossible for me and one aid to carry on efficiently cessary operations of the forces, let alone comply with the department's de- for the details of information concerning all the various plans of the Allies, ails of all methods and appliances used, etc. All this, not to mention the required concerning new construction, new types of vessels, new methods of , etc.

agraph 53. Granted. It was a stupendous task with which s confronted. An adequate staff was required from the be- g. When Admiral Benson went abroad, this office was strip- some of its best men when they could not be spared. In of the difficulties, the fund of operating information, plans, s, data from all of the allied nations except Russia, etc., col- in our office through the efforts of Admiral Sims, was enormous.

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Paragraph 54 of the letter is as follows:

54. In a word, it would hardly be possible to conceive of a more complete misunderstanding by the department of the actual situation that confronted me on the other side, particularly during the critical period of the war.

This seems hardly the correct way to express the situation. It was natural that the complete understanding and cooperation, which we hoped for and which grew as the war progressed, should not exist at first in the same degree that it did later. It is not possible to jump from peace to war, and in a few days have every man alive to the situation, and to the danger and responsibilities confronting him, to the same extent that he is later. We all developed as the war progressed. It was not a misunderstanding, but rather a natural period of transition, during which the viewpoints became adjusted.

Paragraph 55 of the letter is as follows:

55. On a number of occasions I invited the department's attention to the fact that it was impossible intelligently to direct the operation of our forces from Washington; that if we were to cooperate with the allied navies, which was the only efficient way of participating in the war, it was essential that we keep in close personal touch with the heads of the allied navies in the war area.

This principle seems sound so long as the operations were confined to tactical operations, and conformed with the general plans and policies approved by the Admiralty and in Washington. The Department at home should not interfere with the detailed movements of our naval forces at the front, and did not in any marked degree do it, but should set its mark of approval upon every change of plan of magnitude or any new important plan, before the operations involved in these changes are carried on at the front, without reference to the Department. If this paragraph is intended to carry the suggestion that the Navy Department should be moved to London, the suggestion is not sound.

Paragraph 56. No comment.

Paragraph 57. No comment.

Paragraph 58. This is correct. No comment.

Paragraph 59 of the letter is as follows:

59. The policy indicated by the dispatches in question may be summed up by the statement that ships as well as troops in the field, no matter what their individual skill, would be very heavily handicapped if their combined efforts were not coordinated and directed from the most central source of all available information.

This is correct. With reference, however, to our total naval effort, this position is not necessarily at the front. Our total naval effort in this war consisted less in the operation of forces at the front than in a logistic effort in the rear, in which the greatest problems we had to contend with, originated and had to be solved, here at home. It must be noted that in this war the main united naval effort was one of logistics.

Paragraph 60 of Admiral Sims's letter is as follows:

60. The department frequently omitted to keep its naval representative abroad informed of its plans, intentions, and sometimes even the movements of forces in the European area, and there was at times embarrassment caused by lack of general information concerning the Navy's activities in other areas, such as the South Atlantic Pacific, etc. As foreign forces and shipping were also operating in those areas, it was embarrassing not to be able to answer in conference with the Allies all questions concerning our actual naval activities as well as prospective plans, the carrying out of which would necessarily influence allied plans.

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It was always the department's intention to keep Admiral Sims fully informed in all such matters. If we failed in this respect it was, of course, an error and an omission. Errors happened, naturally, but in the vital essentials he was informed. There was, moreover, a double check in this matter. We were at all times in the closest touch here with the various naval representatives of the Allies, particularly with the British Commander in Chief and with the French Commander in Chief, and the various liaison officers. We had no secrets from them and they had none which they kept from us. Matters of importance which we might have forgotten to inform Admiral Sims about would be almost sure to reach the naval department of one of the allied powers with which we were closely associated. Admiral Sims's representatives in Europe were closely in touch with each allied office. He was almost sure to be in touch with all information he had been, at his own request created attaché in London, and had directed all other attachés to forward their important information through him first, before sending it to us, that he might be in position, if necesary, to act immediately without reference to the department at home if the urgency of the situation demanded.

Paragraph 61. No comment.

Paragraph 62 of the letter is as follows:

> Apart from the resulting lack of coordination, it was very difficult—I fear some- impossible—to avoid the impression conveyed thereby to the heads of the navies that I was not being supported or was not in the confidence of the de- ent.

ragraph 62. This seems difficult to understand in view of the ng the Office of Operations was giving the admiral.

ragraph 63 of the letter is as follows:

> Delays and confusion were caused by the department's dealing directly from gton with European naval officials in Europe without using its own representa- ere to investigate conditions at the "front," discuss all details with the allied and thus coordinate effort.

igraph 63. Not understood. It had a perfect right to do so. uld however keep Admiral Sims informed.

graph 64 of the letter is as follows:

> r example, on May 8, without previous explanation, the department an- its intention to establish naval bases at Bordeaux and Brest, although on had been informed of the results of a conference with the French naval s and their agreement that our forces should remain concentrated at that ne area of greatest enemy activity.

, 1917, was before the time I came into very active connec- h the Office of Operations. The Chief of Naval Operations stant for Material are more qualified to speak on this par- oint than I.

aph 65 of the letter is as follows:

> s and confusion were also caused by dealing with representatives of foreign ationed in America, who made independent and strenuous demands for and other supplies, etc., without reference to the demands or necessities The department thus ignored its own representative who was manifestly ne paramount purpose of investigating the details of all such requests, ning, after conferences with the allied navies, their relative merits and, their relation to the necessities of the antisubmarine campaign.

ph 65. This is a matter of opinion. We were the source olies and the center of all supply efforts. This is one of

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the reasons why, as I have stated before, this war was one of logistics. The War Industries Board, the War Trades Board, the Army supply and transportation facilities, the railroad transportation facilities of the country, the Naval supply and transportation system, and many other war organizations, all centered here. It was right and proper that foreign representatives should be here in the interests of their various countries. The Office of Operations had its representatives in every war organization, and being also in touch with Admiral Sims, could handle such matters in a manner which accorded best both with our country's resources, and with the demands made upon them. This could be done better here than in London. The office in London might have presented the naval demands, but I do not believe it could have better presented all demands, and it was not in touch with the supplies at source, nor with the numerous war organizations created here to cope with exactly this problem. All of Admiral Sims's requests for supplies, and his representations to us concerning foreign needs received prompt attention. The Admiral was not the only person in this war with whom the department had dealings. It seems necessary to explain that Admiral Sims, important as he was, could not and ought not to attempt to handle the work of the entire Navy. There were many things for the department to do with which he had no concern, nor had he the organization for it. Though he was the Assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations at the front, it is also necessary for him to have a correct perspective of the department's position.

Paragraph 66 of Admiral Sims's letter is as follows:

66. I realized, of course, that a correct policy would have placed a heavy responsibility upon me, but as it was impossible to decide such questions efficiently and rapidly without access to all the information and without opportunity for personal conferences, either this policy should have been adopted or else the person or persons in Washington assumed to be competent to decide such matters from a distance should have been transferred permanently to headquarters in Europe where personal contact, all available information, and continuous conferences would have been possible.

This position is untenable. The admiral evidently has no conception of the various war organizations built up in the United States. The representatives of the Allies had to be here at source. It is a fair claim that the final decision must be made here in Washington.

Paragraph 67. No comment.

Paragraph 68. No comment.

Paragraph 69 of the letter is as follows:

69. There was insistence by the department upon finding new naval plans—a royal road to victory—such as blocking the enemy in his ports. The objection to radically new plans was that the situation was critical and their preparation would delay striking quickly with all available forces. This insistence assumed that the department, incompletely informed as it necessarily was, and without previous experience in the war, was more competent to decide upon practical plans than their own representative in continuous conference with the leaders of the allied navies, who had had nearly three years' experience. This attitude was maintained until after the commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet and the Chief of Naval Operations had visited Europe and learned something of the situation.

Many suggestions were received by us, and these ideas were sent to Admiral Sims to discuss with the Admiralty as to their practicability. Without doubt, many were entirely impracticable, but the method has common sense, nevertheless. None of these plans, moreover, were forced upon the admiral against his objections. As a matter of record, two plans, the North Sea mine

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barrage plan and the plan for placing our 14-inch guns in France did originate, or were in a great measure worked out in the department. Both of these plans were reasonably successful.

Paragraph 70. No knowledge. This matter concerns the Bureau of Navigation.

Paragraph 71 of the letter is as follows:

71. Throughout the war the department refused to trust to my discretion in the promotion of reserve officers, both for gallantry in action with the enemy and for conspicuous ability. Many of these officers were performing services the value of which was out of all proportion to the rank they held, and were far junior to the corresponding officers of allied services with whom they necessarily worked.

Paragraph 71. This was a matter of policy and handled by the Bureau of Navigation and the Secretary of the Navy. Any other system, however, than the one adopted by the Navy would have created hard feeling in the rest of the service. Uniformity of system throughout the service was evidently what was aimed at. The officers and men who were not able to get to the front, through force of circumstances, were never quite satisfied with their lot and felt that they were in a position which gave them much hard work and drudgery, with very little opportunity to reap any of the glory. Admiral Sims's recommendations should have been given great weight.

Paragraph 72. No comment.

Paragraph 73. No comment.

Paragraph 74 of the letter is as follows:

At no time during the war was I permitted to select my subordinate flag officers and but very few of my other subordinates.

Paragraph 74. It is the universal practice of the Navy for flag officers to make the recommendations for their subordinates. The assignments are made by the Secretary in consultation with the Chief of Naval Operations. It is conducive to efficiency to associate flag officers together whose relations are bound to be harmonious.

Paragraph 75. No comment.

Paragraph 76. No comment.

Paragraph 77. No comment.

I will now proceed to the next phase in the testimony, which is the consideration of our plans in preparation for entry into the war, during such time as I was a member of the small planning section we had in the Office of Operations. To start in the very beginning, it is necessary to understand what a plan is, and the difference between base plans and operating plans.

As far in the testimony that I have seen there has been drawn a marked line of distinction between these two separate thoughts. The province of the general board and the province of any board prepare a preliminary plan to outline a plan of preparation. It takes in the activities of every bureau. It sets us in a position so that when war is to be declared we enter the war with all of our industries, as far as we can so do it, and at least all of our naval forces prepared to commit themselves to a first operation. Also the general scheme—that is, the broad strategy of the situation—in so far as it is possible to do so, must be outlined in this preliminary plan. The movement in a preliminary plan should not be committed to its conception of grand strategy and to the first movement

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in which the forces may be engaged. To do anything else is to commit an error, because it commits your commander in the field, or whoever may be the commander detailed to handle local operations, to a movement to which he can not adjust himself well. Therefore, a distinction must be drawn, as I said before, between the base plan, which it is the province of the board to draw, and the more detailed plans of operations, which must continually adjust themselves to local conditions as they occur. I wish also at this time to make a comment upon Admiral Fiske's interpretation of what a general plan must be. If we were to accept in toto all that Admiral Fiske has stated about a general plan, and the ability to put your hand in a drawer and pull out a plan which at once throws us into war, that is at once to accept the proposition that we are a military nation, and having a man like Von Moltke, he can put his hand in a drawer and commit himself to a movement at once, because that means that the aggressive nation can always take the initiative.

A nation on the defense has got to adjust itself to the initial movement that enemy plans against it, and that is why there must be a distinction made between the general plan, as Admiral Fiske has outlined it, and a general plan which a nation like the United States must make in order to prepare itself for war. There is a vast difference in the conception of the two ideas and in the execution.

I submit herewith a list of plans of preparation. [Reading:]

DISCUSSION.—I. PLANS PREPARATION.

1. General plan (discuss), General Board plan.
2. Armed neutrality.
2a. Armed guard plan.
3. Naval district.
4. To render the maximum possible support now to the enemies of the Central Powers.
5. Make a general estimate of the character of service which will be required of our naval forces in order to serve best our own interests and to cooperate with our allies.
6. Adopt the policy that our present mobile naval forces shall be so distributed and used that they further the immediate mission and do not handicap it.
7. Organize the destroyers and remaining naval mobile forces into a patrol force to cooperate with the naval district force in combating the present submarine warfare.
8. Patrol force.
9. Make an estimate of the numbers and types of small craft necessary to obtain now in addition to the naval craft already assigned in order to put the coast defense districts in a position to cope with the immediate situation—antisubmarine war.
10. Outline the general scheme whereby we may furnish assistance to the allies in the shape of small craft without interfering too greatly with our own similar needs and without disrupting our own organizations.
11. Direct the policy of our naval bases as to their repair, reserve operating and supply facilities to meet the following conditions: 1. The needs of the immediate situation. 2. The future needs.
12. Plan for the expenditure of the naval emergency fund, so as to best supplement current appropriation for a period of six months.
13. Establish a policy with reference to the use of mines in the present emergency.
14. To indicate the steps tending to make life, ships, property, of vessels carrying armed guards, self protecting.
14a. To make an estimate of the number of merchant ships fit for such service it might be necessary to commission as naval auxiliaries to cooperate with the allies in protecting shipping from German raiders.
15. To outline the general plan whereby naval vessels may be requisitioned for guns to place on merchant shipping.
16. Mobilization, April 6, 1917. (Ship's data and readiness for service).
17. Plan for cooperating with Allies.

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8. Establish the policy to be adopted toward the German vessels now lying in ports.
9. Fuel oil for naval purposes.
0. Outline general scheme for the efficient cooperation of information—plans—rations..
1. To outline the best general plan to get troops to the western front in a manner ich will—
a) Least interfere with any active offensive the Navy may be called to participate (*b*) not interfere with the mission of logistics; (*c*) best safeguard the certainty of arrival of the Army forces at the destination; (*d*) least endanger our country's ire interests.
2. Taking over transports.
3. The naval position and needs in the matter of Panama Republic with special rence to the defense of canal.
4. Outline of the policy for cooperating with the Emergency Fleet Corporation ig the lines suggested by Gen. Goethals.
5. Inaugurate a naval building program which will best meet our immediate needs which will not be inharmonious with any future policy we may be called upon to pt.
6. Report of submarine board already submitted, marked B.
7. Policy for priorities of personnel.
8. Mobilization plan, November 3, 1917.
9. District defense—Already submitted, marked I.
0. Revised plan for coast defense by submarines.

Now, the first general plan of which I have any knowledge—ause I did not come into the office until after February, or during first part of February—which in any way affected the detailed vement, which were necessary for us to commit ourselves to in er to have proper plans for this work, is the one spoken of by the eral board, its plan of February 10, 1917. The general board a that Admiral Badger speaks about (I have not seen it) I think plan which puts us in readiness to cope with our enemy alone. t was not the situation which faced us.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the date of that plan?

Capt. PRATT. Number 4, I think, was the one I speak of; but one, the first one we took up, is one dated February 10, and is the plan, by the way, which the general board submitted in copy, and which has been lost. I can find no trace of it anywhere. The only reasonable assumption that I can make is that my lecessor, Capt. Chase, who drew it up, or who drew the assumps up, had the plan submitted to him, and it was mislaid at his . There was but one copy. I do not know where that is, and ody else knows; but I can read the assumptions upon which that was based; and, incidentally, I wish to say that did not have a t deal of bearing on the subject.

The CHAIRMAN. That was the plan of February 10, 1917?

Capt. PRATT. Yes; the plan of February 10; and I can state that a certain degree of assurance, because, being in the plans section onjunction with Capt. Scofield and Capt. Scott, I personally my-wrote all of these on the typewriter, so that I know something t what we were thinking of at the time.

n February 10 Capt. Chase submitted to the general board the wing letter, which I will read. It is the first time I have seen note made of this particular subject. [Reading:]

FEBRUARY 10, 1917.

The general board.
Subject: Solution of problem.
The department desires the general board to consider the following problem and t its solution as soon as practicable:

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PROBLEM.

General situation.—Conditions as at present except that war with Germany declared.

Special situation.—The allies do not desire our battleship force at present.

Required.—Naval estimate of the situation: First, as to the grand strategy demanded by the situation; second, as to disposition of battleship force; third, as to method of assisting in maintaining communications with Europe including scheme for cooperation with allies; fourth, as to methods of driving submarine from the sea.

Assume.—Mobilization of all naval vessels and possibility of mobilizing merchant vessels as required.

JOSEPHUS DANIELS.

The CHAIRMAN. What date was that?

Capt. PRATT. February 10, 1917.

The CHAIRMAN. That was the one the answer to which was lost?

Capt. PRATT. That is the one the answer to which was lost.

On February 17 the General Board submitted to the Secretary of the Navy the following [reading]:

GENERAL BOARD, NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, February 17, 1917.

To: Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: Solution of problem, Black. Reference (*a*) Navy Department confidential letter of February 10, 1917.

1. In accordance with reference (*a*), the general board submits herewith problem and solution based upon the general and special situations described in the Navy Department's instructions.

CHARLES J. BADGER.

The CHAIRMAN. That is not a reply to that letter?

Capt. PRATT. No, no; not a reply, but it simply authenticates the fact that a reply was sent.

Now, to come to the plans. The work on these passed from the General Board to the plans section in operations. On March 8, 1917, there was worked out by Capt. Schofield in the plans section, a complete plan of armed neutralty. That was the plan from which the armed guard system flowed. It was drawn up purposely as the last resort that this country might possibly take unto itself to keep from being involved in war. The whole plan is here, and I offer it. The important factor in it is the policy upon which the details of the plan were based.

The CHAIRMAN. It was an operational plan and not a general detailed plan?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, no; it actually carries the operations; prescribes all the rules and regulations which the merchant captains must adopt. It prescribed when they may open fire and when they may not. It was my plan.

The CHAIRMAN. I say it was an operational plan. You make a distinction between the two, do you not?

Capt. PRATT. Yes; an operational plan, and put up by the plans section of operations. It was put out by Capt. Schofield. [Reading:]

POLICY.

American merchant vessels are armed for the sole purpose of defense against the unlawful acts of the submarines of Germany and of her allies. Their armament can not be used for any other purpose.

It is lawful for the submarines of Germany and her allies to exercise all the rights of belligerent vessels of war and it is unlawful for any American merchant vessel to resist the exercise of any of those rights.

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t is unlawful for the submarines of Germany or of her allies (1) to attack a mer-
ant vessel by gunfire or by torpedo fire except that the vessel attempt to escape
resists or does not heed a summons to stop; (2) to approach a merchant vessel sub-
rged as if for attack; (3) to sink or attempt to sink a merchant vessel before the
w and passengers have been placed in safety, except that the vessel is at the time
isting or attempting to escape; and (4) to require the passengers and crew of a
rchant vessel to take to the ship's boats when such act places the lives of the pas-
gers and crew in serious jeopardy.

The rest is detail, rules for the masters to adopt, and so on. The hole plan I will submit.

The plan is as follows:

ARMED NEUTRALITY—RULES FOR THE CONDUCT OF AMERICAN MERCHANT VESSELS.

POLICY.

American merchant vessels are armed for the sole purpose of defense against the lawful acts of the submarines of Germany and her allies. Their armament can not used lawfully for any other purpose.

The belligerent right of visit and search can not be lawfully resisted by a neutral rchant vessel. The announced policy of Germany to sink all vessels that enter tain areas of the high seas has led the Government of the United States to authorize merchant vessels to resist any and all attempts of the submarines of Germany and her allies to approach, visit, or search American merchant vessels on the high seas.

American merchant vessels are forbidden to pursue or to search out the submarines Germany or of her allies, or to engage in any other offensive warfare against them.

The following regulations amplify and define more precisely the policy above out d:

REGULATIONS.

The belligerent right of visit and search is hereby denied to the submarines of many and her allies.

It shall be lawful for any American merchant vessel to fire upon any submarine ermany that attempts to approach or that lies within 4,000 yards of the commercial e of the vessel sighting the submarine.

No American merchant vessel shall attack a submarine of Germany or her allies is retiring or is attempting to retire.

No American merchant vessel shall ever assist in hunting for submarines of Ger- or of her allies.

No American merchant vessel shall fire at any submarine of Germany or of her that lies more than 4,000 yards from the commercial route of the vessel sighting bmarine except that the submarine shall have fired first.

Every effort compatible with the safety of the merchant vessel shall be made to he lives of the crew of any submarine that may be sunk or that submits.

Every effort shall be made to avoid the submarines of Germany or of her allies.

American colors shall be displayed conspicuously at sea during daylight.

POLICY NO. 2.

rican merchant vessels are armed for the sole purpose of defense against the ul acts of the submarines of Germany and her allies. Their armament can not l lawfully for any other purpose.

belligerent right of visit and search can not be lawfully resisted by a neutral nt vessel. The announced policy of Germany to sink all vessels that enter areas of the high seas has lead the Government of the United States to authorize chant vessels to resist any and all attempts of the submarines of Germany her allies to approach, visit, or search American merchant vessels within the roscribed by Germany. American merchant vessels outside the zones pro- by Germany shall not resist the exercise of the belligerent right of visit and y the submarines of Germany and of her allies.

can merchant vessels are forbidden to pursue or search out the submarines of y or of her allies, or to engage in any other offensive warfare against them.

llowing regulations amplify and define more precisely the above outlined:

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REGULATIONS.

1. The belligerent right of visit and search is hereby denied to the submarines of Germany and her allies within the zones proscribed by Germany.
2. The belligerent right of visit and search is permitted to the submarines of Germany and of her allies on the high seas outside of the zones proscribed by Germany.
3. It shall be lawful for any American merchant vessel to fire upon any submarine of Germany or of her allies that attempts to approach or that lies within 4,000 yards of the commercial route of the vessel sighting a submarine, if the submarine is sighted within the zones proscribed by Germany.
4. It shall not be lawful for any American merchant vessel to take any offensive action against any submarine of Germany or of her allies on the high seas outside of zones proscribed by Germany, unless the vessel is fired at either by guns or torpedoes or unless the submarine is submerged.
5. No American merchant vessel shall attack a submarine of Germany or of her allies that is retiring or attempting to retire.
6. No American merchant vessel shall ever assist in hunting for submarines of Germany or of her allies.
7. No American merchant vessel shall fire at any submarine of Germany or of her allies that lies more than 4,000 yards from the commercial route of the vessel sighting the submarine except that the submarine shall have fired first. Further, if the submarine that fires first is sighted outside of the zones proscribed by Germany, the presumption shall be that the shot is a warning shot and not an attack until the contrary fact is established.
8. Every effort compatible with the safety of the merchant vessel shall be made to save the lives of the crew of any submarine that may be sunk, or that submits, or is in distress.
9. Every effort shall be made to avoid the submarines of Germany and of her allies.
10. American colors shall be displayed continuously at sea during daylight.

POLICY NO. 3.

American merchant vessels are armed for the sole purpose of defense against the unlawful acts of the submarines of Germany and of her allies. Their armament can not be used for any other purpose.

It is lawful for the submarines of Germany and of her allies to exercise all the rights of belligerent vessels of war and it is unlawful for any American merchant vessel to resist the exercise of any of those rights.

It is unlawful for the submarines of Germany or of her allies—

1. To attack a merchant vessel by gunfire or by torpedo fire, except that the vessel attempt to escape, or resists, or does not heed a summons to stop.
2. To approach a merchant vessel submerged as if for attack.
3. To sink or attempt to sink a merchant vessel before the crew and passengers have been placed in safety, except that the vessel is at the time resisting or attempting to escape.
4. To require the passengers and crew of a merchant vessel to take to the ship's boats when such act places the lives of the passengers and crew in serious jeopardy.

PRECAUTIONARY.

Communicate with the commandant of the naval district before leaving a United States port to make sure you have the latest information and instructions.

Your safety requires that you obey all instructions from vessels of war of the United States or of friendly powers.

Keep your intended route secret, but file it with your agent before sailing. Patrol vessels may prescribe your route to avoid new dangers or to insure that vessels shall scatter on the high seas.

Sail near dusk or at hour designated by local authorities.

Make land falls at night.

Make port at dawn or at hour designated by local authorities.

Proceed through neutral waters—that is, waters within 3 miles of a neutral shore, whenever practicable.

Advantage should be taken of the protection afforded by patrol vessels wherever such protection is afforded.

Always proceed at highest possible speed when within 150 miles from land. Speed is an excellent protection against submarines.

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Make no entries in log concerning sighting of vessels of the United States or of friendly powers or concerning any communication received from such a vessel.
Do not show navigational lights at night except to avoid collision. Keep ships thoroughly darkened at night.
Keep boats rigged out ready for lowering.
Never go to the assistance of a vessel that is being attacked or that has just been attacked.
Always carry steam ready for a spurt of speed.
Zigzagging in narrow waters or whenever the presence of submarines is suspected an excellent safeguard against submarine attack.
Look out for explosives in taking on board fuel or cargo.
Have sharp lookouts kept for submarines and mines at all times, particularly from ead to abaft either beam.

ON SIGHTING A SUBMARINE.

)n sighting a ship at sea, change course so as to insure that you will not close her ess she gives chase, in which case bring her astern and keep her there until chase bandoned or vessel is recognized.
' the submarine is sighted on the surface beyond torpedo range, bring submarine 't the beam and keep her there. If su' marine attempts to close, bring her astern proceed at highest possible speed.
submarine is sighted close aboard forward of the beam, the greatest safety lies in ging course directly toward the submarine.
submarine is sighted close aboard abaft the beam, the greatest safety lies in turning from the submarine and proceed at highest speed.

ON OPENING FIRE.

Hoist national colors before first shot is fired.
)nce it has been decided to open fire, do not submit to the gun fire of a sub- e so long as ship's battery can be used.
)o not fire on a vessel at night unless attacked by that vessel.
end all persons except bridge force and the guns' crews below decks while is under fire.
/atch out for torpedoes and maneuver to avoid them. If unable to avoid them, ver so that they will strike a glancing blow.
capture is imminent, destroy all documents, log books, papers, etc., by burning.

MISCELLANEOUS.

ı see a suspicious object in the water, do not watch it so hard that you will not ossible mate near by.
ıll floating torpedoes found. Look out for the nose of a torpedo, as a moderate ere will explode the torpedo. Never ram a torpedo, but sink it by gun fire ıding a small boat alongside to attach a heavy load to the tail.
ll mines sighted at sea, using rifle fire. High velocity, small bore, rifles, with lets are best for this purpose.
assume that a mine or torpedo is safe. It is not.
to the Navy Department, or nearest naval authorities all mines, torpedoes, es, and suspicious objects that are encountered at sea. The report should ollowing information:
Exact position in which sighted.
Date and hour.
Distance at which seen and examined.
Shape and general appearance.
Whether floating or moored.
What was done with object.
What did ship do.
Additional details and remarks.
r and noncombatant members of the crew can not lawfully engage in perations except under the orders of the master or the officer in charge of

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INFORMATION.

Submarines have been known to disguise themselves as fishing vessels, as small steamers showing smoke coming from their funnels, and as sailing vessels.

Submarines lay mines that may show a dummy periscope. The genuine periscope may be recognized by the fact that it does not bob about and wabble and by the fact that it is usually in motion, leaving a frothy wake.

Submarines do not like to use their torpedoes, as they carry only a limited number. When these are exhausted, they must lose time by returning for a new supply. They prefer to attack by gunfire.

Submarines that attack at night are usually not submerged. A heavy rifle or machine-gun fire is very effective in beating off the night attack of a submarine.

Shallow water by day is fairly safe from submarines, but mines are more apt to be encountered in shallow water than in deep water.

NAVAL DETACHMENT.

The master of a merchant vessel commands the vessel, her passengers, and crew. The naval detachment is subject to the orders of the master of the vessel in all matters except as to the employment of the ship's battery.

The ship's battery, being a part of the military force of the United States, shall be used in accordance with the instructions of the Navy Department. The senior naval officer on board the merchant vessel shall be responsible for the execution of all instructions of the Navy Department relating to the employment of the ship's battery.

Fire shall never be opened except by joint consent of the master and the senior naval officer on board. The joint consent of the master and the senior naval officer on board may be given in advance of the emergency, but the responsibility of the naval officer for the proper employment of the battery shall not thereby be lessened.

Fire shall cease when the senior naval officer on board so directs.

The movements of the ship shall not be controlled, even during action, by the senior naval officer on board, but he shall advise with the master as to methods of directing the movement of the ship for defensive purposes.

The naval officer commanding the naval detachment shall rank as an officer of the ship next after the master, except that he shall not be eligible for succession to command of the ship.

The discipline of the naval detachment shall be administered by the naval officer commanding the detachment.

The members of the naval detachment shall perform no ship duties except those connected with the serving of the gun, military lookout duty, and the cleanliness of their quarters.

The enlisted personnel of the naval detachment shall be quartered and messed together in a manner satisfactory to the naval officer commanding the detachment.

The senior naval officer on board shall be responsible for—

(*a*) The condition of the battery and its appurtenances.

(*b*) The training of the guns' crews and spotters, including members of the ship's crew detailed by the master to assist in the service of the guns.

(*c*) The readiness of the ship's battery day and night.

(*d*) The readiness of the naval detachment to man the guns at any time, day or night.

(*e*) A continuous lookout near each gun.

(*f*) The making of all reports required by the Navy Department.

MEMORANDUM.

ARMED NEUTRALITY.

The term "armed neutrality" has its origin in the League of Russia, Prussia, Sweden and Denmark, of 1780.

Previous to that date, the respective rights of neutrals and belligerents had been settled and defined clearly by the conventional law of Europe, to which all maritime powers had given sanction. The principles governing these rights were:

(*a*) That free ships gave freedom to the merchandise except contraband goods.

(*b*) That neutrals might sail freely to and between enemy's ports except such as were blockaded.

When the war between France and Spain on the one hand and Great Britain on the other broke out, Great Britain betrayed a disposition to deviate from the above principles. Great Britain's nonadherence to the principles above mentioned caused Holland to join with France in the war, and caused the Empress Catherine of Russia

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to issue her celebrated declaration containing the principles to which the commanders of her naval armaments were told to adhere.

Those principles were:

First. Neutral vessels may freely sail from port to port and on the coast of the nations parties to the war.

Second. The goods belonging to the subjects of the said nations at war are, with the exception of contraband articles, free on board neutral vessels.

Third. With respect to the definition of contraband articles the Empress adheres to the provisions of the Tenth and Eleventh articles of her treaty of commerce with Great Britain, and extends the obligations therein contained to all the nations at war.

Fourth. To determine what constitutes a blockaded port, this denomination is confined to those the entrance into which is manifestly rendered dangerous in consequence to the dispositions made by the attacking power with ships stationed and sufficiently near.

In the treaty which Russia made with the other members of the league, the following were the binding principles:

First. That the cargo of a neutral ship, though the property of an enemy, should not be seized unless the vessel be found laden with a larger quantity of articles contraband of war than is necessary for the use of the voyage.

Second. That no merchandise should be deemed contraband of war but such as was directly used in war.

Third. That nothing should be carried into the port or city of one belligerent power while blockaded, or shut so closely by the ships of war or batteries of the other nation, that a merchant vessel could not attempt to enter without danger.

These principles were communicated formally to the powers at war, together with the statement that the league had determined to maintain these principles by arms if necessary.

In 1800 the armed neutrality of 1780 was revived and several additional powers adhered to the principles of the league. The methods taken to enforce the armed neutrality were convoy and squadrons cruising in the vicinity of the commerce which it was their duty to protect.

On May 16, 1797, John Adams, then President of the United States, addressed Congress regarding the protection of American commerce at sea. The orders of France to her cruisers were to seize all vessels carrying goods of British manufacture, no matter whether these goods were then owned by neutrals and in neutral ships or not. President Adams stated in his speech that he entertained no doubt as to the propriety of the policy permitting vessels to employ means of defense while engaged in lawful foreign commerce. He said further: "It remains for Congress to prescribe such regulations as will enable our seafaring citizens to defend themselves against violations of the laws of nations, and at the asme time restrain them from committing acts of hostility against the powers at war."

At the same time the President asked for increase in naval forces to give additional security to American commerce at sea. As a result of the President's request, Congress passed a law authorizing employment of force for the protection of commerce. The provisions of the law found expression in the instructions of the Secretary of the Navy to armed vessels. These instructions were as follows:

JOHN ADAMS,

President of the United States:

Instructions to the commanders of armed vessels belonging to the United States, given at Philadelphia the 10th day of July, in the year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and ninety-eight, and in the twenty-third year of our independence.

In pursuance of the acts of Congress, passed the 28th day of May, the 28th day of June, and the 9th day of July:

You are hereby authorized, instructed, and directed to subdue, seize, and take any armed French vessel, or vessels, sailing under authority or pretense of authority from the French Republic, which shall be found within the jurisdictional limits of the United States, or elsewhere on the high seas; and such captured vessel with her apparel, guns, and appurtenances and the goods and effects which shall be found on board the same, together with all French persons and others, who shall be found acting on board, to bring within some port of the United States; and also to retake any vessels, which may have been captured by any French vessel—in order that proceedings goods, and effects of the citizens of the United States, or persons resident therein, may be had concerning such capture or recapture in due form of law, and as to right all appertain.

By command, etc.,

(Signed) BEN STODDART.

From letters to officers of ships of war, volume 1, 1798.

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Instructions to the commanders of armed vessels, belonging to the United States, given at Philadelphia, this 28th day of May in the year of our Lord, 1798, and in the 22d year of the independence of the said States.

Whereas it is declared by an act of Congress, passed the 28th day of May, 1798, that armed vessels, sailing under authority or pretense of authority from the French Republic, have committed depredations on the commerce of the United States, and have recently captured the vessels and property of citizens thereof, on and near the coasts, in violation of the law of nations and treaties between the United States and the French Nation;

Therefore, and in pursuance of the said act, you are instructed and directed to seize, take, and bring into any port of the United States, to be proceeded against according to the laws of nations, any armed vessel sailing under authority or pretense of authority from the Republic of France, which shall have committed or which shall be found hovering on the coasts of the United States, for the purpose of committing depredations on the vessels belonging to citizens thereof; and also to retake any ship or vessel of any citizen or citizens of the United States which may have been captured by any such armed vessel.

By command,

———— ————.

From letters to officers of ships of war, volume 1, 1798.

ARMING MERCHANT VESSELS.

The right of merchant vessels to arm is a survival of the ancient practice of arming all merchant vessels as a protection against the piratical acts of other vessels or of irresponsible communities.

The arming of merchant vessels, not holding letters of marque, has been generally a private act. The convoy of merchant vessels is a public act. Armed neutrality is a public act in which the neutral engages to maintain by force if necessary his rights against any or all belligerents. Armed neutrality has the sanction of international law in so far as it seeks to support the principles of international law, but it is a measure founded on the decision to use force rather than diplomacy.

As one of the methods of using force is convoy, the following rule of convoy is pertinent:

"Neutral vessels under convoy of vessels of war of their own nationality are exempt from search. The commander of the convoy gives orally or in writing at the request of a commander of a belligerent ship of war, all information as to the character of the vessels and their cargoes which could be obtained by visit and search."

From the foregoing it will be seen that arming merchant vessels and armed neutrality are not the same unless the armed forces of the Government participate in the arming of merchant vessels. The duty of the Government, in the latter case, is obviously to announce the principles that shall govern its armed neutrality, and to announce further that these principles are applicable alike to all belligerents.

Armed neutrality does not do away with the belligerent right of visit and search. Resistance to this right by the armed forces of the Government, no matter where those forces may be, is an act of war.

Following that, and previous to the declaration of war, seeing that it was impossible to have our neutrality respected, the problem of placing armed guards on ships was done. It might be a violation of neutrality, but it was at that time a necessity, and as war did flow shortly afterwards, I suppose no question could be raised. The complete plan for that, in many pages, I will submit.

When it became necessary later to make use of more guns than we had in reserve, it became necessary to evolve another plan, which is likewise done, and I will read it, whereby we could strip ourselves a little more than we had done, and take those guns which we considered would not be needed, from our heavy naval ships, our second line of battleships, and place them on the merchant ships for the simple reason that there would be no probability of our second line battleships being called upon to engage with the enemy and there was every probability of the merchant ships which needed to supply our troops, having to pass through the war zone and come in contact with the enemy's submarines, and possibly with the enemy's raiders. This plan is as follows:

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Armed Guard Plan—Estimate of the Situation.

Arming merchant vessels with naval guns for defense.

(Commander W. Pitt Scott, U. S. N., Mar. 1, 1917.)

The international situation has been growing steadily worse and has resulted in a breaking off of the diplomatic relations of this country with Germany, with the prospect of an actual state of war rapidly increasing.

It has been decided to arm merchant vessels with naval guns for defense. Our decision is made. The problem that now confronts us is as to how we are to accomplish this; in other words, to prepare a plan.

It may then be stated as our:

Mission.—To prepare a plan for arming our merchant vessels with naval guns for defense, including rules for conduct of ships and personnel.

In considering this problem the procedure will be considerably facilitated if the requirements are discussed in their logical sequence, viz: (*a*) What vessels are to be armed; (*b*) How to arm them; (*c*) How to man the guns; (*d*) Rules for conduct of merchant ships; (*e*) Rules for officers and men of naval service if assigned to duty on merchant vessels; (*f*) Rules for masters of merchant vessels to which naval gun crews have been assigned.

Enemy forces.—Their strength, disposition, and probable intentions.

Strength.—The enemy forces that are a menace to our merchant vessels are limited German and Austrian submarines, with the possibility of a detached surface raider; t under the present conditions, the menace of this latter may be considered as of s moment.

The number of German and Austrian submarines is unknown. The number that h country had at the beginning of the war is useless in forming an estimate of their sent number, as reports from German sources as to the immense number built e the war began, and from British sources as to the immense number sunk or tured, are too vague to warrant close estimation. From the best information ainable, it is probable that Germany and Austria combined have no less than 250 marines. As Germany's policy is understood to be to relieve her submarines on ion every two weeks for rest and overhaul, it is probable that the actual number lable at any one time is considerably less than one-half this number. Were the e of operations shifted to the American coast, the number that would be available would be enormously reduced, even though it is possible mobile submarine bases d be established.

ie German U-boats have a radius of at least 6,000 to 7,000 miles, have a surface d up to 18 knots, and a submerged speed of 10 to 12 knots.

nile the earlier boats are armed with lighter guns, their latest boats are armed guns up to 4-inch.

position.—At the present time it is probable that the submarine strength of any is concentrated in and about the "forbidden zone," the area decreed by any as surrounding England and France, and in the Mediterranean.

bable intentions.—Germany has officially announced her intentions of stopping very available weapon and without further notice all sea traffic in certain designated blockade zones around Great Britain, France, Italy, and in the eastern Mediterranean. While the sailing of regular American passenger vessels may be considered, they are permitted—by Germany's decree—to do so only under such obligations and limiting stipulations that no attention can be paid to them.

therefore Germany's probable intention to sink all vessels that enter this forbidden area.

ng to the expense of each torpedo and the submarine's limited carrying capacity weapon, it is probable the enemy will endeavor to accomplish, as far as possible her task by gunfire.

VN forces—strength, disposition, and courses of action open to us.

gth.—The guns that may be used for our purpose may be considered under two (*a*) Those guns of 6-inch caliber and below that are now available, i. e., unmounted and in reserve; (*b*) those of similar caliber that are now mounted on board ship which, owing to improved methods of fire control, are of little military value might be spared for our purpose.

nsidering the number of guns that are available for our purpose it must be mind that the problem before us is not an independent one, and that the two f guns above enumerated are already assigned to other necessary purposes ain contingency, in case we enter into a state of war. In this contingency

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the guns of class (a) have already been assigned under a mobilization plan, and the guns of class (b) would be urgently needed in providing batteries for patrol and other auxiliary vessels.

It can not therefore be assumed that the above reserve guns can be utilized entirely for our purpose, but our present problem must be coordinated with the necessities of the future, and it becomes a question of policy as to how far we may proceed in depleting our stock of reserve guns to accomplish our immediate purpose.

The guns of class (a) are reserved for batteries of merchant vessels that would be taken over as auxiliaries in case of war. These are assigned as per the attached list, a summary of which is as follows: 30 6-inch, 83 3-inch, 85 5-inch, 124 6-pdr., 159 4-inch, 160 3-pdr., or which may be summarized according to their present location, as follows:

	6-inch.	5-inch.	4-inch.	3-inch.	6-pounder.	3-pounder.
New York	22	36	81	57	16	4
Norfolk	8	16	44	16	.....	4
Boston	.....	4	4	.....	4	20
Philadelphia	.....	16	8	1	4	4
Washington, D. C	.....	5	.....	.....	48	.....
Charleston	.....	.....	4	.....	28	64
Portsmouth, N. H	.....	.....	4	.....	8	.....
Newport	.....	.....	.....	2	.....	.....
Mare Island	.....	8	14	8	1	44
Puget Sound	.....	.....	.....	.....	8	.....
Olongapo	.....	.....	.....	.....	8	.....
Total	30	85	159	83	124	160

Of the above, 4 6-inch, 9 5-inch, 23 4-inch, 50 6-pounder, and 53 3-pounder are at present unassigned.

The guns of class (b) are not immediately available and after it was decided what guns could be spared from the present ships' batteries it would probably be some time before they could be utilized.

Disposition.—The disposition of our available guns is given in the preceding table.

Courses of action.—If it appears to be impracticable to arm all American vessels, then the questions of what vessels to arm, and how to arm them, must be a compromise, giving precedence to those vessels that more urgently need this defense and to those that will best serve the interests of this country by having this defense. Primarily these vessels are to be armed for defense against German, and possibly Austrian, submarianes as a result of Germany's decree of establishing a forbidden zone around England and France. This then may be considered the area of greatest menance if not the only area in which for the moment American ships will need a defence. Ships then sailing for points in the forbidden zone or traveling through that area should be given precedence, omitting for the present and until more guns are available all others, though should the present broken relations with Germany develop into a state of war those vessels engaged in the coast trade and those sailing to West Indian and Gulf ports, would demand and would require equal consideration with those sailing for the forbidden zone.

A further factor that should govern in determining what vessels should be given precedence in arming for defense is a consideration of those vessels for which batteries have already been assigned in case of mobilization. If so now armed for defense with their assigned batteries for mobilization, or with a part of those batteries, less additional arming would entail when the further necessity arose.

It must further be considered as a question of policy as to what vessels would be immediately taken over in case of war. Many of the vessels now listed would, of course, not be taken over at once. The larger and faster vessels listed as suitable for fleet scouts and to which the heaver batteries have been assigned, would, by their nature and by the necessity of maintaining supplies to the Entente Powers, probably be maintained in their merchant capacity for as long a time as possible.

From an inspection of the mobilization sheets and the assignment of batteries in case of war it appears that the only regular trans-Atlantic carriers that are listed for assignment of batteries are the five large vessels of the International Mercantile Marine. All other vessels listed for batteries are those engaged in the coast trade or trade to Caribbean and Gulf ports. A great many not listed for batteries are engaged in cargo trade to such ports as will best serve their interests. It is to this class that our attention must be given, and our furnishing batteries to them—considering our present limited

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ly—must depend on their number, as they have no regular routes, decision must on their application.

would appear then that our estimate as to:

What vessels to arm, is:

Regular transatlantic carriers, those listed as suitable to be taken over in time r, and to which batteries have already been assigned.

Cargo carriers that apply for this defense, stating they intent to travel through orbidden zone.

be a real defense these vessels must be armed with a weapon of sufficient power range to cope with a vessel by which they are likely to be attacked. We know the latest German U-boats have guns of 4-inch caliber. A vessel equipped with tery only of lesser caliber and of sufficient speed would be powerless against a at carrying this weapon, which could stand off out of our range and sink at will. ust be borne in mind, however, that it is only their latest boats that carry heavier gun, and that which would not be a defense against their latest boats d be a defense against many that might be encountered. Further, it is known these boats approach, as a rule, to close range to avoid wasting any torpedo, and e their 4-inch gun may outrange a 3-inch or a 6-pounder, or a 3-pounder, the sub- ne is far more vulnerable to a lighter gun at short range than is the larger vessel heavier gun at the same range.

th our limited supply it will be advantageous therefore to utilize all the guns ave available, though it is not believed that guns of less than 3-pounder are able. The possibility of any efficiency of a lesser weapon is more than offset by eed of personnel that would be necessary to man it.

is probable that the latest German U-boats are assigned almost exclusively to the around Great Britain and France, leaving to the Austrian boats the attacks in the terranean, and on the presumption that the Austrian boats are less efficient and esser development, precedence in assigning the heavier batteries available should ven to those sailing through northern zones.

hile certain batteries have been assigned to vessels in case of mobilization, and lesirable to retain these batteries for this purpose, yet these batteries are in the case e larger vessels assigned for offensive rather than defensive purposes and for this purpose do not need the full battery assigned for the former. While a more ive defense would be to mount four guns on each vessel, one in the bow, one n, and one on each beam, owing to the limited supply it is believed a fairly effi- defense could be maintained by mounting two guns provided these can be ted so as to cover an arc from ahead or astern to abaft, or ahead of the beam, ially so in the case of any but the larger vessels.

r estimate, then, as to (*b*) "How to arm them," is:

Assign two guns to each vessel, except in the case of the larger vessels, where should be mounted, if the supply permits. (2) Assign, as far as practicable, guns to the same vessels to which they are already assigned under mobilization . (3) Give precedence in assigning the heavier calibers to those vessels whose l takes them through the northern zones in preference to those taking the Medi- ean routes.

e estimate as "How to man the guns" resolves itself into two questions:

Who are to man the guns? (*b*) What number should or can be assigned to gun?

e first of these, "Who is to man the guns?" brings forth a question of policy as to ner they should be manned by trained men of the Navy or whether by men ed by the steamship companies themselves, both of which considerations are enced by the lack of trained men.

uld it be decided to man these guns by regularly enlisted men of the Navy, tunity may be given to Germany to claim that these vessels are offensively l vessels and in the Government service, but this should have no weight in our on, for such a claim should insure them only greater immunity from attack as as there is no actual state of war, and in that case it is immaterial what their is as far as Germany's probable action would be. The present state of our national relations has reached such a point that it is incumbent upon us to for- e our own policy without fear of giving affront on a purely technical point , from our own point of view upheld by international law, is thoroughly justified. e question of policy as regards taking trained men from the fleet is, however, y of more consideration from the viewpoint of the shortage of these men that exists. The Navy is already seriously handicapped by the lack of personnel,

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On the other hand to make this defense effective requires trained men, and it has been demonstrated that the steamship companies have so far either been unable to or unwilling to obtain them. It is undoubtedly their right to demand protection from their Government.

It has been said that in time of war there would be no difficulty in recruiting men for the Navy. This is probably so, but in coming to this conclusion, while no doubt these men would be largely influenced by patriotism, were the psychology considered it would undoubtedly be found that this desire for excitement plays its part. Many men hesitate to enlist for a four-year enlistment with the prospect of four years' routine, but would willingly do so if they had the certain prospect of something doing. Were patriotism the only influence, these men would be enlisting in large numbers now when their services are urgently needed for the benefit of their country.

As this question of arming merchant ships now looms large before the public eye and this duty offers the possibilities of excitement and "fame" it is believed that many men could be immediately enlisted on short-term enlistment for this particular service. Many trained ex Navy men who are now awaiting developments would no doubt be immediately attracted.

As however trained men are immediately necessary, there is no other solution than to provide these men from the present enlisted force of the Navy. As it is however of the utmost importance to return these men to their present duties at the earliest moment, steps should be taken to immediately secure men to replace them. The first step in this direction would be to obtain legislation authorizing a short term (one year) enlistment for this particular service. As rapidly as men were recruited they would be given naval training in gun pointing and the service of the piece. Their entire time devoted solely to this particular training should qualify these men in a comparatively short time and as rapidly as they qualified they would be ordered to this duty; it will be noted as previously referred to, that it will be impracticable to arm all vessels immediately, and many will have to wait depending on the urgency of their needs, and until guns and personnel are available, so that this method has an additional advantage in that it will furnish a progressive system of supplying this personnel without the necessity of constantly calling away trained men of the fleet.

Should it be found less desirable to actually enlist these men in the Navy than to recruit them for the steamship companies, arrangements might be made with the companies to recruit their men for them, give them the proper training, and then turn them over to the companies. While this would be cheaper for the Government and would perhaps simplify the control of the master over these men, it is believed not to be as desirable as actually enlisting them.

The questions of furnishing officers to command detachments on these vessels is subject to the same remarks as above as regards the present shortage in the Navy with the less apparent necessity of supplying them.

As the repelling of a submarine attack will usually be at a comparatively short range, if not often at nearly point-blank range, if trained personnel mans the guns, the service of an officer to direct and control the fire is much less necessary than if longer range firing were anticipated.

If trained personnel are assigned to these guns it is not believed necessary to spare an officer to give them further training, and a realization of the menace to which they are exposed would be their best incentive to keep on the job.

Therefore, from the viewpoint of training, keeping the crews in shape or from directing and controlling the fire, it is believed it is not necessary to assign an officer to this duty.

Were sufficient officers available, it would appear desirable to assign an officer as the representative of the Government to avoid committing any unneutral or belligerent act or unwarrantably involving the country in international complications; but were an officer assigned for this purpose it must needs be an officer of some experience and well versed in international law, and considering the present great shortage of officers, it is not believed the situation warrants the taking away of officers from other urgent duty for this purpose.

Our estimate then as to who are to man the guns, is—

1. Immediately: Trained enlisted men of the Navy. 2. Specially enlisted short-term men, and when these are qualified, these men to replace the regularly enlisted men. 3. No officers to be assigned.

As the total number of ships that will be immediately armed can not for the moment be gauged, it will of course be impossible to estimate the total number of men required, but six is the minimum number that can effectively serve a gun of 6-inch, 5-inch, 4-inch, or 3-inch (these would include, pointer, trainer, sight setter, plugman, shellman, and powder man or extra shellman), and four is the minimum that can likewise serve a 6-pounder, or 3-pounder.

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On this basis, and considering solely the guns now available in reserve and unassigned, 668 men will be immediately necessary. Assuming that one petty officer will be assigned to each gun 149 of the above will be petty officers.

Our estimate, then, as to the number of men is—

(*a*) One petty officer and five men to be assigned to each gun of 6-inch, 5-inch, 4-inch, and 3-inch caliber; (*b*) one petty officer and three men to be assigned to each 6-pounder, and each 3-pounder; (*c*) immediate requirement 149 petty officers and 519 men; (*d*) additional men to be trained solely for this duty as rapidly as recruited.

PART II—RULES FOR CONDUCT OF MERCHANT SHIPS.

FOREWORD.

(Commander W. Pitt Scott, Mar. 3, 1917.)

The arming of merchant vessels with naval guns for defense being solely for the protection of those vessels while engaged in their legitimate commerce, this purpose must never be lost sight of and must be rigidly adhered to. For this reason all measures of an offensive nature must be refrained from unless actually attacked. But considering the circumstances under which this defense has become necessary it may be well to consider what may be construed as an actual attack.

Germany has developed her warfare to the point where she has practically abandoned the principle of visit and search and has inaugurated a policy of sinking all hips of her antagonists, often without even a warning, and has similarly sunk many f neutral nations.

Within the past month she has extended this policy by officially announcing her ıtentions of "stopping with every available weapon and without further notice all :a traffic" in certain designated zones, which extend for several hundred miles seaard of England and France. This then may be taken as sufficient notice of her tention to sink all vessels in that area.

It is to be expected that practically all ships that we are intending to arm for dense are engaged in carrying contraband. This, though within their legitimate hts, subjects them to condemnation if overhauled and subjected to a lawful visit d search. Owing to Germany's position and the nature of her warfare, condemnation a prize means her sinking.

n the eyes of international law armed resistance of a neutral merchant ship to one the belligerent armed vessels differs from the resistance of an enemy's merchant sel in that the former is an act of war, while the latter (the two countries being ady at war) merely subjects her to the consequences. Therefore, it can make le difference to us in the consequences whether we resist an attack after the subine has opened fire upon us or whether we make that resistance immediately.

herefore, when we arm these vessels for defense, knowing that they contemplate ying contraband, and, therefore, subject to being sunk if apprehended, we take position that we are arming these vessels for resistance against being sunk.

wing to Germany's methods and to her announced intention of sinking all vessels ıe forbidden zone, in order to make our resistance effective an "attack" must be rued literally. Therefore, a "threat" by a submarine, either by actually firing r vessel or by its approach and menacing attitude, must be considered an attack.

RULES.

Every effort should be made to avoid meeting hostile submarines.

f a submarine is sighted course should be changed so as to give it as wide a as possible. If sighted ahead, course should be changed 90°.

f a submarine approaches, change course to bring the boat astern and proceed speed.

the submarine is submerged fast ships can considerably reduce the chance of sful torpedo attack by zigzagging.

ave sharp lookouts kept at all times, particularly from ahead to abaft either

eed being one of the best defenses against submarine maximum speed should when passing through the forbidden zone.

ovisions will be made for darkening ships and when passing through the forzone, ships will be completely darkened, including all navigational lights.

vantage should be taken of the protection afforded by the Allied patrol fleet information of their protected lanes is communicated.

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9. Radio will not be used either to send or to acknowledge a call, except in the presence of a hostile submarine it becomes necessary to summon assistance.
10. Observe all signals of the English and French patrol boats.
11. American colors will be conspicuously displayed during the daylight.
12. Great care and judgment must be exercised in initiating an attack on submarines. Fire on a submarine will not be opened unless the submarine fires first or unless it is evident that she contemplates doing so either with gun or torpedo. In no case will fire be opened at a range exceeding 3,000 yards unless the submarine herself opens fire at a greater range.
13. Secrecy should be maintained as to the route to be taken.
14. All suspicious looking vessels should be given a wide berth. Instances have been noted where German submarines have been disguised as small steamers and converted merchantmen have been fitted with torpedoes.

RULES FOR OFFICERS AND MEN OF THE NAVAL SERVICE IF ASSIGNED TO DUTY ON MERCHANT VESSELS.

Policy.—If a naval officer and enlisted men of the Navy are assigned to a merchant vessel for its defense, it is necessary to so define the authority of both the master of the ship and of the naval officer that there can be no question of a conflict of authority.

By existing law the master of a merchant ship is supreme in his command on the high seas and no part of that authority or responsibility can be withheld from him except by legislative act, nor does it appear desirable to do so. If a naval officer is assigned to one of these vessels either to represent the Government or to maintain the efficiency of the gun battery and personnel, he must either be placed in full command of the vessel or be entirely subordinate to the master. From the viewpoint of the Government and from that of the company, the former is not desirable, though if we enter into a state of war it will doubtless later be found necessary or desirable to place each of these vessels under command of a naval officer or one sufficiently acquainted with naval plans and procedure as to be able to coordinate his movements with naval procedure. The naval officer therefore, if, under present laws, assigned to one of these merchant vessels, must be subordinate in all respects to the master, can have no independent authority, but will be charged with certain responsibilities in regard to the battery and naval personnel.

RULES.

1. The naval officer assigned to duty on merchant vessels armed for defense will be under the orders of the master of that vessel.
2. He will have direct supervision over the ship's battery and all appurtenances thereof, and will be directly responsible for its efficiency.
3. He will have direct supervision over the enlisted personnel of the Navy assigned to that vessel and will be responsible for its training and efficiency.
4. He will issue such orders as will insure the battery and personnel being ready to repel a submarine attack at a moment's notice.
5. The Navy personnel are not required for duties unconnected with the armament, except in case of emergency.
6. The naval officer will arrange with the master to detail additional men of the ship's company to assist in completing the gun's crew.
7. He will arrange with the master times when these additional men will be available for instruction and training.
8. He will make such reports as are necessary direct to the Navy Department.
9. He will consult with the master and advise him in all matters regarding the repelling of an attack and the procedure thereof.

RULES FOR MASTERS OF MERCHANT VESSELS TO WHICH NAVAL GUN CREWS HAVE BEEN ASSIGNED.

1. The master is in sole command of his vessel.
2. He will not interfere with the duties assigned to the personnel of the Navy assigned to his vessel for manning the defense guns.
3. He will be responsible for opening and ceasing fire upon a submarine, but he will consult with and be advised by the naval officer upon these actions.
4. After fire has been opened upon a submarine and until he gives the order to cease fire, he will in no way interfere with the management of the piece nor with the direction or control of the fire.
5. He will keep the naval officer fully informed as to the ship's movements and of his procedure when passing through menaced waters.
6. He will issue all orders to the naval personnel through the naval officer.

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(Confidential.)

REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE CONDUCT OF AMERICAN MERCHANT VESSELS ON WHICH ARMED GUARDS HAVE BEEN PLACED.

1. Armed guards on American merchant vessels are for the sole purpose of defense gainst the unlawful acts of the submarines of Germany or of any nation following the olicy announced by Germany in her note of January 31, 1917. Neither the armed iards nor their arms can be used for any other purpose.

2. The announced policy of Germany, in her note of January 31, 1917, to sink all essels that enter certain areas of the high seas, has led the Government of the United ates to authorize armed guards on merchant vessels to resist any and all attempts the submarines of Germany or of any nation following the policy announced by ermany in her note of January 31, to put that policy into practice.

3. It shall be lawful for the armed guard on any American merchant vessel to fire on any submarine of Germany or of any nation following the policy of Germany nounced in her note of January 31, 1917, that attempts to approach, or lies within 00 yards of the commercial route of the vessel sighting the submarine, if the sub- rine is sighted within the zone proscribed by Germany.

. No armed guard on any American merchant vessel shall fire at any submarine t lies more than 4,000 yards from the commercial route of the vessel sighting the marine, except that the submarine shall have fired first.

. No armed guard on any American merchant vessel shall take any offensive on against any submarine of Germany or of any nation following the policy of many announced in her note of January 31, 1917, on the high seas outside of the es proscribed by Germany, unless the submarine is guilty of an unlawful act that ardizes the vessel, her passengers, or crew, or unless the submarine is submerged.

No armed guard on an American merchant vessel shall attack a submarine that tiring or attempting to retire either within or without the zone proscribed by nany, unless it may be reasonably presumed to be maneuvering for renewal of k.

In all cases not herein specifically excepted the armed guard on American hant vessels shall be governed by the principles of established international nd the treaties and conventions to which the Government of the United States arty.

American merchant vessels are forbidden to pursue or search out the submarines y nation or to engage in any aggressive warfare against them.

American merchant vessels shall make every effort compatible with the safety merchant vessel to save the lives of the crew of any submarine that may be or that submits, or is in distress.

(This paragraph stricken out.)

(This paragraph stricken out.)

American merchant vessels should communicate with the commandant of the district before leaving a United States port to make sure of the latest informa-

The safety of American merchant vessels requires that they obey all instruc- f vessels of war of the United States.

ON SIGHTING A SUBMARINE IN THE PROSCRIBED ZONES.

f a submarine is sighted beyond torpedo range, bring submarine abaft the beam p her there. If submarine attempts to close, bring her astern and proceed at possible speed.

submarine is sighted close aboard forward of the beam, the greatest safety hanging course directly toward the submarine.

submarine is sighted close aboard abaft the beam, the greatest safety lies in away from the submarine and proceeding at highest speed.

ENING FIRE IN DEFENSE AGAINST THE UNLAWFUL ACTS OF SUBMARINES.

ist national colors before first shot is fired.

ce it has been decided to open fire, do not submit to the gunfire of a sub- o long as the armed guard can continue to fire.

d all persons except bridge force and the armed guard below decks while under fire.

tch out for torpedoes and maneuver to avoid them. If unable to avoid neuver so that they will strike a glancing blow.

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THE ARMED GUARD.

21. The armed guard is commanded by the Senior Naval Officer on board. He shall have exclusive control over the military functions of the armed guard and shall be responsible for the execution of all the regulations given herein governing the employment of the armed guard.

22. The military discipline of the armed guard shall be administered by the naval officer commanding the armed guard.

23. The armed guard shall be subject to the orders of the master of the merchant vessel as to matters of nonmilitary character, but the members of the armed guard shall not be required to perform any ship duties except their military duty, and these shall be performed invariably under the direction of the officer commanding the armed guard.

24. The decision as to opening fire or ceasing fire upon any submarine shall reside exclusively with the naval officer commanding the armed guard.

25. The enlisted personnel of the armed guard shall be quartered and messed together on board both in port and at sea, at the expense of the owners of the vessel on which the armed guard is serving, in a manner satisfactory to the naval officer commanding the armed guard.

26. The naval officer commanding the armed guard shall take precedence next after the master, except that he shall not be eligible for succession to the command of the ship. He shall be quartered and messed on board both at sea and in port, at the expense of the owners of the vessel on which he is serving, and in a manner appropriate to his precedence next after the master.

27. The master of the merchant vessel shall, on request of the commander of the armed guard, detail members of the crew to handle ammunition, clear decks, and otherwise supplement the service of the gun.

28. The naval officer commanding the armed guard shall be responsible for—

(*a*) The condition of the battery and its appurtenances.

(*b*) The training of the guns' crews and spotters, including members of the ship's force detailed by the master to assist in the service of the guns.

(*c*) The readiness of the ship's battery at night.

(*d*) The readiness of the armed guard to perform its duties at all times.

(*e*) The continuous lookout near each gun by a member of the armed guard.

(*f*) The making of all reports required by the Navy Department.

JOSEPHUS DANIELS,
Secretary of the Navy.

MARCH 13, 1917.

ARMING MERCHANT SHIPS—ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION.

PROBLEM.

General situation.—The present situation.

Special situation.—It has been decided to arm merchant vessels with naval guns for defense.

Required.—Estimate of the situation as to (*a*) what vessels to arm; (*b*) how to arm them; (*c*) how to man the guns; (*d*) rules for conduct of merchant ships; (*e*) rules for officers and men of naval service if assigned to duty on merchant vessels; (*f*) rules for masters of merchant vessels to which naval guns crews have been assigned.

Preliminary.—In considering the question of arming merchant vessels there are three directions which our effort may take: (1) arm merchant ships generally, irrespective of their prospective employment; (2) arm merchant ships that have been listed as naval auxiliaries in accordance with mobilization plans; (3) arm merchant ships that are to traverse the so-called forbidden zones.

The following facts must be considered as a preliminary to the solution of the problem of arming merchant vessels:

(*a*) The problem assumes that the policy of arming merchant vessels has been determined upon. It is, therefore, not made the subject of comment here.

(*b*) Merchant vessels can not be armed in any considerable number, or effectively, without Government aid. The Government can aid in one of two ways: (1) by selling guns to shipowners, or (2) by placing Government-owned guns at the disposal of shipowners. The difference in these two methods, so far as the international aspect is concerned, does not appear material to me. The Government, in either case, is an active party to the act, and thereby becomes measurably responsible for the subsequent use to which the guns are put.

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(c) The arming of merchant vessels by naval guns will probably result in the guns eing used against submarines, which in turn will probably lead to war.
(d) Although war may not result from the present situation, it appears so probable at all steps of a military nature, involving a distribution of our forces, or of our ilitary resources, must be taken in such a way as to harmonize with the require- ents of the kind of war that now seems most probable.
(e) A previous general estimate of the situation deduces that if war is declared r interests demand that our immediate mission shall be "To render the maximum ssible naval support now to the enemies of the Central Powers." In the exami- tion of the way to accomplish the above mission the following decisions relating to rchant vessels were arrived at: "To assist in arming merchant vessels and in train- ; gun crews for all merchant vessels engaged in the trans-Atlantic trade with the tente Powers." "To mobilize shipping by subsidy into the trans-Atlantic trade, ere necessary to increase traffic with cooperating powers." "To make the mini- m possible demands on cargo vessels of the merchant marine for military service."
(f) The total number of ocean-going merchant vessels (Great Lakes not included) he United States is about 550.
(g) The total number of sea-going yachts that might be available for arming and ch might have to be armed in war against submarines is over 100.
(h) The local patrol of the New York approaches will require a minimum of 100 ed vessels—yachts, tugs, and motor vessels.
(i) The total number of guns now available for mounting on vessels of all classes is: ch, 32; 5-inch, 84; 4-inch, 176; 3-inch, 88; 6-pounder, 136; 3-pounder, 188.
(j) the vessels to which batteries are assigned for general mobilization purposes are but five vessels engaged in the trans-Atlantic trade at present. These els are the *St. Louis*, *St. Paul*, *New York*, *Philadelphia*, *Kroonland*, and *Finland*. her words, of the entire number of guns available for mounting but 28 would be mediate active use in the defense of trans-Atlantic commerce if merchant vessels armed in accordance with present mobilization plans.
om an examination of the above facts we are led to the unavoidable conclusion f merchant vessels are to be armed with a view either to their own safety or with w to permitting their free use of the so-called forbidden zones, or with the view porting the Entente Powers, or with a view of furthering our national aims, we l arm first those merchant vessels which are to traverse the so-called forbidden

oon as we adopt the arming of merchant ships as a principle we have to realize ecial helplessness of unarmed vessels in the presence of submarines that are g war on us. Joining this consideration to the alarming shortage of ships and cessity of merchant ships for our success in the war, I conclude that American hould not thereafter be permitted to enter the areas of great danger until they ned.
erchant vessels are to be armed for defense the question is what constitutes l for defense." The reply must be adjusted to the ruling of the authorities in ts that the armed merchant vessels are to visit. So far as the Entente Powers cerned we can be certain that there will be no restriction on the number of guns d any vessel, nor on their position on board. As the essential element is the f the ship and as the military situation requires that we concentrate our effort ort of the Entente Powers, and as the Central Powers have announced that ll sink armed merchant vessels wherever encountered, the solution of the ques- to how arm merchant vessels is made entirely dependent on the method of hat will give the merchant vessel the greatest possible offensive power against king submarine.
marines may appear and may attack on any bearing, all-around-fire is im-
The number of guns per ship is dependent upon the supply available.
ove decision as to arming merchant vessels is based upon the principle that sive or defensive character of a vessel's battery depends upon the use to which en or is intended to be put.

DECISION.

ute guns to vessels and mount them so as to give the greatest degree of pro- each vessel, no matter what direction from which it is attacked.
ual assignment of guns to vessels can not be made until a list of vessels to trade in or near danger zones is obtained, and until the desires of owners are d.
re two methods of manning guns placed on merchant vessels: (1) By guns vn from the merchant crew of the vessel; (2) by naval guns crews.

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When the Government places its own guns on privately owned vessels it accepts a certain responsibility for the use to which the guns are placed. In the period preceding war it is of importance that these guns shall not be used imprudently, or contrary to governmental policy. I believe that there can be no sure control of the use of the guns except naval control. Naval control is open to two objections:

(*a*) That it tends to alter the status of merchant vessels.

(*b*) That it makes a demand for personnel that it is very difficult to meet.

These objections must be considered in the light of the following facts:

Four trained men per gun and one or two officers per ship will ensure sufficient service of the guns.

Guns are not effective without trained crews. The chance of the successful defense of the ship would probably be more than doubled by having guns controlled by officers and men of the Navy.

For these reasons and because of the great importance of preserving and defending our shipping I recommend that guns on merchant vessels shall be manned and officered by the Navy.

Rules for the Conduct of Merchant Vessels.

POLICY.

American merchant vessels are armed for the sole purpose of defense. Their armament can be used lawfully for no other purpose. The fact that a vessel sighted may be hostile or may have hostile intentions does not justify any hostile act on the part of a merchant vessel, but it does justify readiness to act. The merchant vessel may use its armament solely to resist attack, or to resist pursuit in a zone where it is the custom of vessels of the nationality of the pursuing vessel to sink American merchant vessels without warning. A vessel must discontinue the use of its armament as soon as the attacking vessel ceases to attack and to pursue.

INFORMATION.

Submarines have been known to disguise themselves as fishing vessels; disguise themselves as small steamers, showing smoke coming from their funnels; disguise themselves as sailing vessels; lay mines; lay mines that show a dummy periscope. The genuine periscope can be recognized by the fact that it does not bob about and wabble, and by the fact that it is in motion and leaves a frothy wake close aboard.

Submarines do not like to use their torpedoes, as they carry only a limited number. When these are exhausted they must lose time by returning for a new supply. They prefer the attack by gunfire. The arming of all merchant vessels and their unanimous determination to resist the surface attack of submarines will reduce losses by at least 80 per cent.

Submarines that attack at night are not submerged. A heavy rifle and machine-gun fire is very effective in beating off the attack.

Submarines are apt to operate near navigable channels from positions inside outlying shoals. They avoid shallow water.

Torpedoes can be set to float after a run; they then become mines.

Raiders are apt to be armed with torpedoes.

Shallow water by day is fairly safe except as to mines.

REGULATIONS.

1. Always communicate with commandant of naval district before leaving a United States port to make sure that you have the latest information and instructions.
2. Your safety requires that you obey all instructions from vessels of war of the United States or of friendly powers.
3. Keep your intended route secret but file it with your agent before sailing. Patrol vessels may prescribe your route to avoid new dangers, or to insure that too many vessels shall not follow the same route.
4. Sail near dusk or at hour designated by local authorities.
5. Make your landfalls at night.
6. Make port at dawn.
7. Lay your course through neutral water—within 3 miles of a neutral shore—wherever practicable.
8. Always proceed at highest possible speed when within 150 miles of land. Speed is an excellent protection against submarines.

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9. Make no entries in log concerning the sighting of any vessel of the United States or of friendly powers or concerning any communication received from such vessel.
10. Do not show navigational lights at night except to avoid collision. Keep ship thoroughly darkened.
11. Fly no colors or house flag at sea except in presence of ships of war of friendly powers unless you are about to use your armament, in which case you must show your proper national colors before firing.
12. If your vessel is armed, always fly your true colors in approaching and while passing through neutral waters.
13. You may use false colors at sea subject to the restrictions given in above paragraphs.
14. If you see a suspicious object in the water, do not watch it so hard that you will not see its possible mates near by.
15. Paint out names and other distinguishing marks.
16. Keep boats rigged out and ready for lowering.
17. Never go to the assistance of a vessel that is being attacked or has just been attacked. Leave this job for small vessels.
18. Sink all floating torpedoes found. Look out for the nose of a torpedo, as a moderate blow there will explode the torpedo. Never ram a torpedo, but sink it by rifle fire or by sending a small boat alongside to attach a heavy load to the tail.
19. Sink all mines sighted at sea, using rifle fire. High-velocity, small-bore rifles with steel bullets are best for this purpose.
20. Never assume that a mine is safe. It is not.
21. Report to the Navy Department, or nearest naval authorities, all mines, torpedoes, submarines, and suspicious objects that are encountered at sea. The report should give the following information:
(a) Exact position in which sighted.
(b) Date and hour.
(c) Distance at which seen and examined.
(d) Shape and general appearance.
(e) Whether floating or moored.
(f) What was done with object.
(g) What did ship do?
(h) Additional details and remarks.

Always do your utmost to escape hostile vessels under all conditions. You will be sunk if you do not escape.

Remember that submarines do not like to use their torpedoes, and that they are afraid of gunfire. So do not submit to the gunfire of submarines so long as you have your own guns.

Passengers and noncombatant members of the crew can not lawfully engage in offensive operations except under the orders of the master or the officer in charge of the guns.

When you sight a ship at sea, consider it as possibly hostile. Change course so as to insure that you will not close her unless she gives chase. In which case bring her astern and keep her there and send out calls for help.

If a submarine is seen at a distance, or on the surface, or if periscope is seen, change course to bring the submarine astern and keep it there and proceed at the highest practicable speed. Do not stop because of gunfire of the submarine, but reply to it as effectively as possible.

When your vessel is under fire, send all of the bridge force and the guns' crews below decks and be ready to stop leaks from shot holes. Always have in mind definite plans for listing the ship to bring holes near the water line out of the water.

If the submarine does not use gunfire to bring you to, it is probably because it has no gun or else no ammunition.

Always watch for torpedoes and maneuver to avoid them. The torpedo leaves a well-defined wake of bubbles and is slick, if the water is not too rough. If unable to see the torpedo, maneuver so that it will strike a glancing blow, as torpedoes sometimes fail when striking a glancing blow.

If the submarine attacks submerged from positions forward of the beam and close aboard, the greatest safety probably lies in changing course directly toward the submarine. If the attack is made from positions abaft the beam, the greatest safety lies in presenting the stern to the submarine.

Always carry steam ready for a spurt of speed.

Beware of decoy vessels making signals of distress.

Zigzagging in narrow waters is excellent protection against unseen submarines, submarine can not easily get into position for attack.

If capture is imminent destroy all documents, log books, papers, etc., by burning.

Look out for explosives in taking fuel and cargo.

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36. Inspect ship carefully before sailing to be sure that no job has been done surreptitiously that will make the ship unseaworthy.
37. Watch out for "accidental ramming" in neutral waters of vessels manned by enemy subjects.

FIRE-CONTROL RULES.

1. Hoist national colors before first shot is fired.
2. The master is responsible for opening fire, ceasing fire, and for the conduct of all persons engaged in the defense of the vessel.
3. The master must not fire on a vessel after she has indicated surrender.
4. The master is bound by the treaties and covenants to which the United States is a party.
5. Keep guns in constant readiness, with ammunition at the guns.
6. Do not fire at a vessel at night unless attacked by that vessel.
7. The point of aim should be the center of the water line.
8. The guns' crews should aim so as to keep one-half of the shots falling short. Shots that go over do no damage, while shorts, by throwing spray, interfere with the maneuvering of the submarine and its aim.

RADIO RULES.

9. If attacked, report broadcast in plain language, position and type of attacking vessel.
10. Arrange radio apparatus so that master will control absolutely the sending of messages.
11. Make sure of the loyalty of your radio operators.
12. Before leaving port, inquire specially for codes in which to report special information by radio.

REGULATIONS CONCERNING NAVAL DETACHMENT ON MERCHANT VESSELS.

1. The master of a merchant vessel commands the vessel, her passengers, and crew. The naval detachment is under the command of the master. They shall obey the orders of the master and the regulations of the ship.
2. The naval officer commanding the detachment shall rank as an officer of the ship next after the master, except that he shall not be eligible for succession to command of the ship.
3. The discipline of the naval detachment shall be administered through the naval officer commanding the detachment.
4. The members of the naval detachment shall perform no duties except those connected with the service of the guns and military lookout duty.
5. The enlisted personnel of the naval detachment shall be quartered and messed together in a manner satisfactory to the naval officer commanding the detachment.

Mobilization, present battery assignments.

Name of vessel.	Battery.	Terminal ports.
St. Louis	Four 6-inch, four 3-inch	New York-Liverpool.
Morro Castle	do	New York-Habana.
St. Paul	Four 6-inch	New York-Liverpool.
New York	do	Do.
Philadelphia	do	Do.
Unassigned	do	
Kroonland	do	New York-London
Northern Pacific	Four 5-inch, four 3-inch	San Francisco-Astoria.
Great Northern	do	Do.
El Occidente	do	New York-Galveston.
Advanced Base	Eight 5-inch	
Pastores	Four 5-inch, four 3-inch	New York-Panama.
Calamares	do	Do.
Medina	do	New York-Galveston.
Momus	do	New York-New Orleans.
El Mundo	do	New York-Galveston.
Creole	do	New York-New Orleans.
Antilles	do	Do.
Neches	do	New York-Galveston.
Tenadores	do	New York-Panama.
Lenape	do	New York-Jacksonville.
El Sol	do	New York-Galveston.

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Mobilization, present battery assignments—Continued.

Name of vessel.	Battery.	Terminal ports.
Unassigned	Four 5-inch	
Advanced Base	Eight 5-inch	
El Oriente	Four 5-inch, four 3-inch	New York-Galveston.
Unassigned	Four 4-inch	
Finland	Four 5-inch	New York-Liverpool.
Achilles	Four 4-inch	Norfolk-Colon.
Ulysses	do	Do.
Nereus	do	Navy.
Proteus	do	Do.
Cyclops	do	Do.
Unassigned	do	
Mars	do	Navy.
Orion	do	Do.
Jason	do	Do.
Vulcan	do	Do.
Almirante	do	New York-West Indies.
Esparta	do	Do.
Limon	do	Boston-Port Limon.
San Jose	do	New York-West Indies.
Munamar	do	New York-Cuba.
El Sud	do	New York-Galveston.
El Norte	do	Do.
Montanan	do	New York-Pacific ports.
Pennsylvanian	do	Do.
Ohioan	do	Do.
Ontario	do	Boston-Baltimore.
Santa Clara	do	New York-Cuba.
Hamilton	do	New York-Norfolk.
Carillo	do	New York-West Indies.
Sixaola	do	Do.
Santa Cecilia	do	New York-Seattle.
Carolina	do	New York-West Indies.
Jefferson	do	New York-Norfolk.
City of St. Louis	do	New York-Savannah.
Proteus	do	New York-New Orleans.
Comus	do	Do.
City of Montgomery	do	New York-Savannah.
Monterey	do	New York-Gulf.
Unassigned	Twenty 4-inch	
Brazos	Four 3-inch	New York-San Juan.
Apache	do	New York-Jacksonville.
Arapahoe	do	Do.
Torpedo station	do	

It was also necessary at this time to take into consideration what we should do at home to prepare ourselves for an adequate defense, and while the idea of defense was not a paramount idea, it had to be considered. The paramount conception of our naval districts was to so use our districts that they would be able to utilize to the full the facilities for repair and to coordinate these efforts with our fleet afloat, and particularly with the merchant ships which had to be taken over, which had to be repaired and supplied in order that the civil activities coming within the naval district could be coordinated with the needs of shipping. Our navy yards were supposed to look out particularly for the naval ships, but the civil industries within a naval district and the acts of taking over merchant ships had to be considered and operated through our naval districts. There is quite a plan here for organizing our naval districts, and attached to it I have the President's proclamation, called the commandeering act, allowing us to take over boats; also I have attached a list of ships in the naval districts, and also a list of ships which were commandeered for the purpose of sending abroad, and which were sent abroad, with the duties of selling and taking over, the price of them when taken, all quite complete.

The CHAIRMAN. Those were vessels all outside of the Navy?

Capt. PRATT. All outside of the Navy.

(These papers are as follows:)

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NAVAL DISTRICTS, INCLUDING EXTRACTS FROM COMMANDEERING ACT, JUNE 15, 1917.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, April 17, 1918.

From: Chief of Naval Operations.
To: Commandants first, second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth, eleventh, twelfth, thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth.
Subject: Circular letter to all districts, amplifying General Order 372 of February 28, 1918.

1. In districts having within their boundaries a navy yard, all the industrial activities of the district will be under the head of the industrial organization of the navy yard. In the first district they will be under the head of the industrial activities of the Charleston yard except as to the industrial activities in the Portsmouth yard, which will not be disturbed.

2. All officers detailed to the district whose duties include industrial activities will be, so far as those activities are concerned, under the industrial control of the head of the industrial activities of the district.

3. The military control of the submarine base at New London is under the commandant of the district. (See Operation's letter of Apr. 15, 1918, 24514–846.8.)

4. Chief of Naval Operations' letter to commandants first, second, third, fourth, fifth districts, and others of January 9, 1918, paragraph 3, provides:

"The Bureau of Navigation will designate an officer to perform the local duties of district supervisor of the 'Naval overseas transportation service' for the first, third, fourth, and fifth naval districts. This office shall, under the direction of the commandant of the district, be charged with the duties of taking over necessary alterations, repairs, upkeep, and supply of all vessels of the 'naval overseas transportation service' coming in that district and the movements of the vessels within that district." (For this purpose the waters of the second district are considered as coming within the jurisdiction of the third district.)

5. The activities at the naval operating base at Hampton Roads, Va., have been placed under the commandant of the fifth naval district and made the subject of separate order, General Order 363 of January 28, 1918.

6. The Washington Navy Yard and the activities located on the Severn and Potomac Rivers including the naval air station, Anacostia, D. C., are affected by orders subsequent to General Order 372 of February 28, 1918, as follows:

C. N. O. Jan. 19, 1918, Op-Air 078–3.
C. N. O. April (28905–560), Op–14 4/8.

7. In the twelfth district conditions are affected by the following orders:

Secretary of the Navy letter to commander patrol force Pacific Fleet, May 25, 1917, directing him to assume general supervision of the twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth districts. This supervision not to be constructed as displacing the organization of naval districts or supplanting the naval district commandants in the performance of duty within their districts. Chief of Naval Operations letter of July, 1917 (278383–127), placing above duties upon the commander division 2, Pacific Fleet.

8. Marine detachments stationed or quartered at the navy yards will be under the immediate military control of the commandants of the yard and through the commandant together with other district activities under the military control of the commandant of the district.

9. Marine detachments stationed and quartered elsewhere within district limits will be under the military control of the commandant of the district.

10. The advanced base force at Philadelphia will be under the military control of the commandant of the district.

11. Attention is invited particularly to the provision of General Order 372 of February 28, 1918, directing that the naval activities in each district shall be organized under four heads.

W. S. BENSON.

(Copies to Bureaus of Steam Engineering, Op. Mat. Construction & repair, Op. Air. Yards & Docks, Naval Intel. Supplies & Accounts, Armed Guard. Navigation, Naval Communications. Ordnance, Capt-Commandant Coast Guard. Medicine & Surgery, Commandant, U. S. Marine Corps.)

FEBRUARY 20, 1918.

From: Secretary of the Navy.
To: Commandants of all naval districts.
Subject: Powers and duties of naval district forces in regard to protection of private plants, wharves, and water fronts.

1. The powers and duties of the naval district forces on the water and on shore in respect to guarding wharves, piers, and vessels lying alongside; private plants, State

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and municipal property, and munitions and merchandise not on property under direct naval control, has been the subject of perplexity to the various district commandants and others having responsibilities in connection with these matters. The subject is a complicated one and the bearing and relative importance of the various elements involved subject to such sudden changes that it is not felt desirable, even if it were possible, to frame a series of definite rules to cover the various demands for such service. What is undertaken in this is rather to collect definite information as to what has been done, and how matters involving these questions have been handled and to point out a number of important considerations to be taken into account when dealing with such cases. It should always be kept in mind that the question of the power to act is to be considered in connection with the policy of the department as to how far and to what extent it is to be exercised, which is quite a different consideration. This policy is in a general way to become involved as little as possible with activities on land, or even within the harbors and inland waters, but to confine the activities of the district forces to duties which are primarily naval and, consequently, such as no other agencies are as well adapted to undertake—such as the patrol of the waters adjacent to the coast in watch for the activities of the enemy from the air, searching and sweeping for mines, guarding nets and mine fields, directing the movement of vessels of commerce through mine fields and the defensive sea areas as established, the routing of vessels and assembling of convoys, placing of guards on vessels when necessary in their passage in and out of harbors, as a matter of cooperation with the Treasury Department, collecting intelligence of attempts against the safety of vessels at sea, and, a service to be considered of first importance, the training of the enlisted force in these duties, and so as to fit them for service on transports and vessels carrying war material.

The Government has divided the duties in connection with the defensive sea areas, and the coastal waters and harbor entrances, the control of shipping in the harbors and of the crews of merchant ships, their passengers and cargoes while in port, and the protection of the various activities along the shores and harbors from vicious action on the part of alien enemies or others, between the Navy Department, Treasury Department, and the office of the Attorney General. The control of the anchorages and of merchant vessels and their crews, passengers, and cargoes while in harbor, is vested in charge of the Treasury Department, which will act through captains of the port in certain specified harbors, and elsewhere through the collector of customs; while the enforcement of the enemy alien act and the responsibility for seeing that its provisions are carried out, lies with the Attorney General, who acts primarily through the United States marshals and deputy marshals.

The Secretary of the Treasury is given control of vessels and their crews in harbors by the proclamation of December 3, 1917, which

Recites: "An act to punish acts of interference with the foreign relations, the neutrality, and the foreign commerce of the United States, to punish espionage and better enforce the criminal laws of the United States, and for other purposes," approved by the President June 15, 1917, and quotes:

Section 1, which provides that whenever the President by Executive order or proclamation declares a national emergency, the Secretary of the Treasury may make, subject to the approval of the President, rules and regulations governing the anchorage and movement of any vessel, foreign or domestic, in the territorial waters of the United States, inspect her, place guards on her, and, if necessary, in his opinion, to prevent damage to vessels or to harbors or waters of United States, or secure observance of rights and obligations of United States, take full possession and control by and with the consent of the President for such purposes, and remove all on board, including officers and crew.

Recites: Proclamation of April 6, 1917.

Recites: That it is now essential to exercise these powers.

Declaims: A national emergency accordingly and authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to make regulations governing the anchorage and movement of any vessel, foreign or domestic, in the territorial waters of the United States and to inspect, place guards on, etc., as above.

The Secretary of the Treasury has asked for the cooperation of the naval districts in carrying out these duties to the extent of the use of certain personnel and of patrol vessels which are to be detailed for boarding and transportation work, after conference between the district commandant and the officer in the particular port representing the Secretary of the Treasury in these matters. In agreeing to this cooperation the Navy Department has pointed out to the Treasury Department, and it is a matter of agreement and understanding between the two departments, that this cooperation is somewhat limited by force of circumstances, due to the scarcity of the supply of vessels of the type best adapted to this service, and that at any time some emergency may arise that would make superior demands upon and require the service of the vessel at the disposal of naval districts.

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4. The Attorney General is charged with the duty of enforcing the restrictions placed upon enemy aliens by the proclamations of April 6, 1917, and November 16, 1917. This latter

Recited: Section 4067 Revised Statutes: Whenever war is declared and the President makes proclamation, all natives, citizens, denizens, or subjects of the hostile nation within the United States and not naturalized shall be liable to be apprehended, restrained, secured, and removed as alien enemies. The President is authorized to direct the conduct to be observed by the United States toward them, restraint to which they shall be subjected, provide for removal, and establish any other regulations.

Recites: Sections 4068–4069–4070 Revised Statutes.

Recites: Proclamation of April 6, 1917, which gives rules for guidance of citizens in their intercourse with alien enemies and rules for guidance of alien enemies, and places enforcement as provided in sections 4069–4070, as above.

Proclaims: That an alien shall not be found within 100 yards of canal, of wharf, pier, or dock used directly or by means of lighter for vessel of over 500 tons, etc., or of warehouse at water, railroad, or other terminal, storage or transfer facilities in connection with dock, etc. That Attorney General, in his discretion, may exclude enemy aliens from other depots, warehouses, terminals, etc., not in above described class, etc.

Excludes enemy alien, except on public ferry, from ocean, bay, river, or other waters within three miles of shore line of the United States or its territorial possessions. This includes all inland waters connected with ocean and navigable by ocean-going vessels, including the Great Lakes, all of the District of Columbia, and the Panama Canal Zone. Forbids use of airplanes, balloons, etc. Alien enemies must register as decreed by Attorney General, and must comply with all regulations. Attorney General is authorized in accomplishment of this registration to utilize all agents, agencies, officers, and departments of the United States, and of States, Territories, municipalities, etc., and all such are granted full authority for all acts done in the premises when acting by direction of Attorney General. Alien enemy shall not change his abode or travel except as authorized by Attorney General, etc.

As stated, the duty of enforcing these limitations in respect to alien enemies lies with the Attorney General, and he has, of course, the right to call upon the Federal authorities, including the armed forces of the United States, and State, city, town, or village authorities, to assist.

Regulation 4 of the proclamation of April 6, 1917, has never been strictly and completely enforced, but to the extent and in the manner directed by the Attorney General. A circular was issued by the Attorney General, dated May 22, 1917, giving instructions as to the issue of permits under regulation 4 of the President's proclamation of April 6, 1917. It is understood that this is considered to be no longer active. Another set of instructions to United States attorneys and marshals for the enforcement of the supplemental proclamation of November 16, 1917, was issued by the Attorney General, dated December 17, 1917.

The Attorney General has by letter of November 30, 1917, called this proclamation to the attention of the Secretary of the Navy and asked his views as to the manner and extent of cooperation with a suggestion as to the form it should take, and the Secretary of the Navy has explained the limitations imposed by the necessities of the situation, and agreed to afford the full measure of cooperation possible under existing circumstances in the following letter:

"Answering your letter of November 30, requesting cooperation in establishing and maintaining a system of patrol over areas covered by supplemental proclamation recently promulgated regarding alien enemies, I have the honor to say that the area covered by the President's proclamation includes not only a portion of the entire coast and of all the harbors, but the banks of all navigable rivers and sounds and inland waters navigably connected with the high seas, including the Great Lakes and territorial possessions.

"The Navy Department has undertaken to regulate and otherwise safeguard shipping in portions of these areas, those defined as defensive sea areas in the President's several proclamations in respect to such areas, and to establish systems of defense as to various activities of the enemy which it has been thought could be reasonably anticipated, and which fall within the scope of naval operations to undertake.

"Whenever and to the extent that patrol service established by the Navy in connection with such activities covers any of the areas referred to in the proclamation, cooperation will gladly be furnished as far as practicable.

"The opinion appears to be very generally held that the best and most reliable protection can be afforded by armed guards or secret watchmen on the docks or piers and within the plants. It is understood that steps are being taken—are in fact well advanced—to place at the disposal of the Army an organized force to be used for this purpose.

"It is not within the scope of naval operations, however, to furnish protection to private plants, or patrol them, except as incidental to such service, and no attempt

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can be made to establish any general system of patrol covering all of the areas defined in the proclamation."

* * * * * * * *

5. Following are various rulings, given in brief, and observations on these matters by this department and others when dealing with various concrete cases where action has been required.

The Secretary of the Navy has said:

"Such acts as the destruction of bridges and the obstruction of channels by individuals or small civilian parties, are felonies or offenses against the law, whether occurring in peace or war. The National forces are not permitted of their own volition to assist the local authorities in the police duties which devolve upon these authorities, and in some States are very jealous of interference by the Federal forces in the enforcement of the police power. The law is very specific on this point, and the fact that the country is at war does not alter the rights of the local police in dealing with the civil offenses."

And again, upon a request to guard railway bridges and local piers:

"To guard the countless railway bridges, tunnels, piers, etc., by which the Navy is served, would overtax the strength of the entire Navy. Any naval force which might be assigned to such work would be liable to withdrawal should occasion demand their employment elsewhere. It would appear, therefore, that in the impossibility of furnishing guards from the Navy, each community must spply police protection for the utilities lying within its jurisdiction. Not the least of the advantages of such an arrangement would be the avoidance of these controversies between the civil and the military authorities, which would surely arise if the latter were to attempt to take over some of the duties of the former."

In the case of the Bremerton water works, it was stated that the navy yard at Puget Sound was "entirely and absolutely dependent upon this water system for its supply, and should it be cut off the yard could not run beyond three days." An extreme case, but although the Judge Advocate General allows the authority under such circumstances he qualifies it, as will be noted in the last part of the quotation.

It is certainly clear from the attached papers that the waterworks question, upon which the navy yard, Puget Sound, is "entirely and absolutely dependent" for its sustenance, is therefore to a limited extent an instrumentality of the Federal Government, the duty of protecting which devolves upon such Government in view of the circumstances disclosed by the attached papers. That the President has power to utilize the naval forces where their employment is necessary in order to protect the property and interests of the naval establishment of the United States is undoubted and needs no authorities in support of the proposition; and this would be true even in time of peace. It is accordingly my opinion that the necessary orders to effectually protect the water supply of the navy yard, Puget Sound, may be issued by the Secretary of the Navy acting for the commander in chief. It is needless to say that any action taken under this authority should, if practicable, be with the knowledge and consent of the local authorities where they are unable to cope with the situation. This appears to be the case shown by the attached papers—an implied, if not express, consent for the use of the naval forces—for the purpose mentioned is certainly contained in the letter from the mayor of Bremerton and the governor of Washington.

W. C. Watts,
Judge Advocate General.

The Navy Department did not approve this request.

Brig. Gen. L. McI. Carter, in charge of Division Militia Affairs of the Army:

"The desire to thrust the protection of private enterprises upon the Army should be checked, else the fighting forces in Europe will be affected. States, individuals, cities, and manufacturers should be impressed with the idea that the relation of the Government to State and individual is not changed by reason of the war in Europe, and States, municipalities, and corporations should then comply with these obligations of protecting life, liberty, and property."

The question of how best to furnish this protection has also been the subject of much thought and discussion, and some comments in this direction are qouted;

By direction of the Secretary of the Navy:

"Probably the best protection against criminal acts against your property is a properly organized secret service, as injuries likely to occur would probably be inflicted by individuals and not by an armed body of the enemy forces. It is the attack by armed forces that should be resisted or watched for by the Navy and not the act of an individual criminally inclined."

From Chief of Naval Operations:

"The guarding of the water supply is a function of the State and local military forces. It is directed that the necessary action be taken to bring the inadequate guard to the attention of the proper authorities."

C. N. C.

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"Requests for armed guards at private plants should not be considered by the commandant. Persons or corporations making such requests should be informed that it is the duty of the local authorities to furnish police protection, or of the State authorities to furnish protection by State troops. Where firms are making important material for the Navy Department, the department will forward requests for armed guards to the War Department for such action as may be practicable."

C. N. C.

"The department does not contemplate as a general proposition the establishment of patrols inside of harbors. It is realized, however, that in and near large seaports, there are certain private activities which are of great interest to the Government and to allied nations, which can not receive a full measure of protection from forces on shore. It is considered proper for commandants to establish such patrol of rivers and harbors leading to large cities as will insure keeping the channels open and will prevent possible attack from armed boats on shipping at wharves."

C. N. C.

Commandant of the district:

"In addition to the above the commandant should make arrangements to provide for armed guards on all pier ends as patrol boats alone can not furnish the necessary protection, but must have armed guards on shore to protect by means of arms as well as against danger of fire."

From report of chief of staff of naval district as to piers:

"The above is submitted, however, with the opinion that the most constant and careful watch, and the most reliable protection, can be given by armed guards equipped with searchlights on the pier ends and that reliable protection can not be given by patrol boats alone."

5. It should be noted that the authority resting upon the Secretary of the Treasury under the proclamation referred to is the making and enforcing of rules and regulations governing the anchorage and movements of vessels and their inspection, the authority to place guards on board if necessary to prevent injury to the vessels or to the harbors or waters of the United States, and in order to secure observance of rights and obligations of the United States, the authority to take full possession of vessels and to remove all on board, including officers and crew; and it should be noted that the authority of the Attorney General is with respect to alien enemies, and, when requested by the Attorney General in respect to an alien enemy, or by the Secretary of the Treasury, with respect to a merchant vessel or or its passengers or crew, the Naval Reserve Force become authorized to carry out the orders given by these officials or their representatives, and doubtless have all the power that the Attorney General or the Secretary of the Treasury might have under the circumstances. These powers, it should be noted, are to compel search and arrest.

Several inferences can safely be drawn from the foregoing with regard to the policy of the Navy Department as to how far the naval district forces should concern themselves with these activities. The question of cooperation between the Navy and Treasury Departments will be worked out under the direction of the district commandants, as indicated so far as the Navy is concerned; and the question and character of cooperation to be maintained with the Department of Justice will be seen from the letter given above. There is no question, of course, as to property or plants which are upon or form part of an inclosure under the exclusive control of the Navy Department, or of naval vessels. These are to be guarded at all times, and the obligation to do this falls on the naval and naval district forces. As to other wharves piers, vessels, State and municipal property, munitions and merchandise, if in the discharge of the regularly ordered duties of the naval districts patrolling or otherwise, any attempt to injue such property should be observed or suspected, on the part of an alien enemy or any other person, the force observing it should undoubtedly attempt to prevent such injury and to apprehend such offender and to turn him over, if an alien enemy, to the nearest United States marshal or his representative; if any other person, to either the State or the Federal or municipal authorities, whichever is not most advisable or convenient under the circumstances; that is, of course, if immediate action is required, otherwise the occurrence should be immediately reported to someone authorized to deal with it. Beyond this, no patrolling or guarding should be attempted. It is to be observed that the responsibility for guarding against such attempts, and of ascertaining suspects, does not rest with the district forces, but only when such incidents are encountered in the course of their regular work, and when in an emergency their aid is definitely sought by Federal State, or municipal authority A case in point would be a district vessel undergoing repairs at a private plant. In this case the crew should guard the vessel, and keep continuous sentry on guard to prohibit any unnecessary entry on the vessel, and the crew should, while in the yard, aid in apprehending any person suspected

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of intended injury to the plant, or other vessels there. But the guarding of private plants from attack, either by an alien enemy or by some other evilly disposed individual, can best be done on shore; is not primarily the duty of the naval districts' forces, and these forces are not the first or even the second, in point of precedence which would be invoked by the Attorney General

7. It is understood that many, if not most, of the private shipyards and plants, which are doing work for the Government under contract or agreement, have obligated themselves as part of their contract to maintain sufficient guard to protect the work from this very type of injury. This obligation should be insisted upon and made the subject of constant inquiry, and those in charge should be instructed how best to carry it out. The municipal authorities and the State authorities controlling the territory in which such plants are situated, are also bound to protect the property from any person attempting such acts, and such persons are in any event, common criminals, which it is the duty of the State and municipal authorities to apprehend and control. The Army has been authorized also to create a special force for this purpose and, in addition to this force, there is available to a greater or less extent, according to the locality, the State militia and various other organizations of home guards, etc.

8. If called upon directly to institute a water patrol in front of some particular plant by some one of the authorities above enumerated, even if unusual conditions seem to justify the service, care should be taken to see that the plant in question is adequately guarded on the shore side, and that the piers, if any, are patrolled by means of guards on the piers themselves, otherwise the patrol of the water front would not be sufficiently effective to justify the diversion of the district forces to that purpose. It is also hardly worth the diversion of the force to attempt to guard one point where other points in the same locality, equally worthy of protection, are not receiving it.

9. It seems to be generally agreed, and the reasons are obvious, that an armed guard on a pier with a searchlight is a much better protection than a patrol on the water; and such protection can, of course, be furnished without interfering with the patrol organization and duties.

10. It is considered that if good judgment is used in dealing with applications to the district forces for such protection, besides making the attitude of this department clear, and also the reasons and justification for it, the duties of the State and local authorities, and of the owners of the plants, can be pointed out and insisted upon.

JOSEPHUS DANIELS.

Extracts from "An act making appropriations to supply urgent deficiencies in appropriations for the Military and Naval Establishments, etc.," approved June 15, 1917:

(e) To purchase, requisition, or take over the title to, or the possession of, for use or operation by the United States any ship now constructed or in the process of construction or hereafter constructed, or any part thereof, or charter of such ship.

Compliance with all orders issued hereunder shall be obligatory on any person to whom such order is given, and such order shall take precedence over all other orders. * * * If any person owning any ship * * * shall refuse or fail to comply therewith or to give to the United States such preference in the execution of such order, or shall refuse to * * * supply * * * the ships * * * so ordered, at such reasonable price as shall be determined by the President, the President may take immediate possession of any ship, * * * and may use the same at such times and in such manner as he may consider necessary or expedient.

Whenever the United States shall cancel, modify, suspend, or requisition * * * any ship * * * in accordance with the provisions hereof, it shall make just compensation therefor, to be determined by the President; and if the amount thereof, so determined by the President, is unsatisfactory to the person entitled to receive the same, such person shall be paid seventy-five per centum of the amount so determined by the President and shall be entitled to sue the United States to recover such further sum as, added to said seventy-five per centum, will make up such amount as will be just compensation therefor, in the manner provided for by section twenty-four, paragraph twenty, and section one hundred and forty-five of the Judicial Code.

The President may exercise the power and authority hereby vested in him, and expend the money herein and hereafter appropriated through such agency or agencies as he shall determine from time to time: * * * All ships constructed, purchased, or requisitioned under authority herein, or heretofore or hereafter acquired by the United States, shall be managed, operated, and disposed of as the President may direct.

The word "person" as used herein shall include any individual, trustee, firm, association, company, corporation, or contractor.

The word "ship" shall include any boat, vessel, or submarine and the parts thereof.

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Vessels taken over and purchased by naval districts Dec. 13, 1918.

[Agreement A, Government owned. Agreement B, free lease, $1 per month plus cost of restoration and restoration only. Agreement C, chartered.]

WITH ATLANTIC AND PACIFIC FLEETS.

S. P. No.	Name.	Agreement.	Type.	Length.	Gross tons.	Date taken over.	Purchase price.
				Ft. in.			
1158	Arctic	C	Tug	111 5	197	Oct. 10, 1917	.....
418	Aramis	A	Yt	157 6	230	July 3, 1917	$240,000.00
651	Atlantic II	A	Yt	177 6	303	June 10, 1917	75,000.00
2640	Bay Ocean	A	M. B	130	148	June —, 1918	52,500.00
2302	Beaver	A	S. S	357 5	4,507	July 1, 1918	1,300,000.00
823	Broadbill	A	Yt	66	.....	June 27, 1918	21,000.00
1015	Challenge	A	Tug	122	255	June 24, 1918	150,000.00
68	Despatch	A	Yt	167 9	287	Aug. 6, 1917	112,000.00
1161	Hackett, F. B	A	Tug	106	194	Dec. 8, 1917	150,000.00
210	Helenita	B	Yt	187	304	Aug. 11, 1917	.....
1121	Osborne, Chase S	A	Tug	128 4	492	Feb. 16, 1918	113,727.33
3740	Surprise	A	Bge	.....	.....	June 1, 1918	22,000.00
617	Yacona	A	Yt	211	527	Sept. 29, 1917	197,055.00

USED BY INSPECTOR OF NAVAL DISTRICTS, EAST COAST.

317	Aloha	B	Yt	216	659	Apr. 28, 1917	.....

STATION SHIP, SAN DOMINGO.

1233	Kwasind	A	Yt	180	303	May 9, 1917	$140,000.00

USED BY FRENCH COMMANDER IN CHIEF CARIBBEAN PATROL.

136	Niagara	A	Yt	180	1,443	July 10, 1917	$175,000.00

TURNED OVER TO BRITISH.

1254	Old Colony	A	S. S	395	4,779	Nov. 12, 1917	$1,150,000.00

DESTROYER FORCE.

521	Isabel	A	Yt	245 3	.....	.....	$607,527.36

FLEET TENDERS.

609	Nokomis	A	Yt	243	872	Oct. 4, 1917	$501,000.00
543	Sialia	A	Yt	207	558	June 5, 1917	220,000.00

FOR DISTANT SERVICE, NOT IN COMMISSION.

2432	Blue Ridge (ex Va.)	A	S. S	269	.....	Apr. 19, 1918	$250,000.00
2527	City of South Haven	A	S. S	247 7	.....	Apr. 19, 1918	300,000.00
2222	Puritan	A	S. S	259	.....	Apr. 19, 1918	287,000.00
1478	Roosevelt, Theodore	A	S. S	287	.....	Apr. 22, 1918	315,000.00
560	Astrea	A	M. B	35	.....	June 21, 1917	2,500.00
135	Aphrodite	B	Yacht	302	1,147	May 3, 1917	.....
1286	Albany Bt. Corp. No. 132.	A	Speed boat	30	.....	Nov. 30, 1917	4,900.00
593	Arcturus	A	Yacht	177 6	456	Aug. 7, 1917	181,300.00
1256	Aroostook	A	S. S	375	4,779	Nov. 19, 1917	1,350,000.00
530	Anderton, R. J	A	Tug	139 6	290	June 18, 1917	95,000.00
1232	Barnegat	A	Tug	138 8	439	Oct. 12, 1917	245,455.00
2211	Bella	A	S. S	235 3	1,272	Feb. 22, 1918	263,775.00
53	Boy Scout	A	M. B	45	.....	Apr. 28, 1917	7,000.00
493	Cahill, Winfield	A	M. F	137	299	June 12, 1917	110,000.00

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Vessels taken over and purchased by naval districts Dec. 13, 1918—Continued.

FOR DISTANT SERVICE, NOT IN COMMISSION—Continued.

S. P. No.	Name.	Agreement.	Type.	Length.	Gross tons.	Date taken over.	Purchase price.
				Ft. in.			
812	Carola IV	A	Yacht	167		June 10, 1917	$25,000.00
1298	Charles	A	S. S.	407	3,731	May 28, 1918	1,420,000.00
162	Christobel	A	Yacht	164	248	Apr. 30, 1917	55,000.00
383	City of Lewes	A	M. F.	150	254	May 18, 1917	149,508.68
773	Concord	A	Tug	140	353	Sept. 22, 1917	250,000.00
1128	Conestoga	A	Tug	170	617	Sept. 14, 1917	315,000.00
813	Corona	A	Yacht			June 10, 1917	90,009.00
159	Corsair	B	Yacht	254	1,136	May 25, 1917	
375	Courtney, W. J.	A	M. F.	143	276	May 28, 1917	100,000.00
575	Cythera	B	Yacht	192 2	603	Oct. 20, 1917	
313	Douglas, Otis W.	A	M. F.	158	300	May 23, 1917	110,000.00
66	Dlonra	A	M. B.	46		May 17, 1917	8,500.00
1951	Dreadnaught	A	Tug	143	450	May 17, 1917	222,500.00
321	Druid	A	Yacht	217	539	June 2, 1917	90,000.00
175	Emeline	A	Yacht	196	407	June 10, 1917	92,500.00
1385	Favorite	A	Tug	196		Jan. 23, 1918	169,000.00
714	Galatea	A	Yacht	192	367	July 26, 1918	195,000.00
1116	Genesee	A	Tug	170	617	July 26, 1917	315,000.00
1494	Goliah	A	Tug	134 9	414	Dec. 4, 1917	273,500.00
566	Grosbeak	A	M. B.	38		Apr. 28, 1917	4,500.00
430	Gypsum Queen	A	Tug	135	361	Sept. 17, 1917	205,548.92
209	Harvard (ex Wacouta)	B	Yacht	243	804	Apr. 28, 1917	
485	John B. Hinton	A	M. F.	160	309	June 14, 1917	110,000.00
95	Katydid	A	M. B.	40		May 11, 1917	2,500.00
416	Hubbard, B. H. B.	A	F. B.	155	276	May 28, 1917	100,000.00
429	James, W. T.	A	M. F.	150	276	May 28, 1917	100,000.00
1963	Joanna	A	M. B.	40		Dec. 9, 1917	9,000.00
700	Lydonia	A	Yacht	214	497	Oct. 27, 1917	170,000.00
2	Lynx	A	M. B.	45		Apr. 21, 1917	13,000.00
333	McNeal, K. L.	A	M. F.	160	331	Aug. 10, 1917	117,500.00
51	Manatee	A	M. B.	35		Apr. 21, 1917	3,000.00
527	Margaret	A	Yacht	176	245	Aug. 14, 1917	104,500.00
164	May	A	Yacht	239	652	Aug. 11, 1917	180,000.00
1213	Montauk	A	Tug	134 5	434	Oct. 12, 1917	184,091.25
2140	Black Hawk (ex Santa Catalina)	A	S. S.	404 6		Dec. 14, 1917	1,900,000.00
1250	Nahant	A	Tug	134 7	405	Oct. 12, 1917	272,727.00
2196	Narragansett	A	S. S.	320 2	3,539	June 11, 1918	601,500.00
771	Nahma	B				June 21, 1917	
131	Noma	B	Yacht	262 5	763	May 10, 1917	
2195	Nopatin	A	S. S.	320 2		Jan. 13, 1918	601,500.00
982	Penobscot	A	Tug	121 5	289		84,091.00
130	Piqua (ex Kanawha)	B	Yacht	227	475	Apr. 28, 1917	
1687	Quinnebaug	C	S. S.	373 7	2,015	Dec. 2, 1917	
211	Rambler	A	Yacht	110		Nov. 17, 1917	99,000.00
157	Remlik	A	Yacht	200	432	June 10, 1917	95,000.00
1702	Saranac	C	S. S.	351 8	3,723	Dec. 6, 1917	
20	Scoter	A	M. B.	53		Apr. 21, 1917	15,000.00
1014	Sea Rover	A	Tug	121	199	Dec. 11, 1917	178,000.00
1255	Shawmut	A	S. S.	396	4,779	Nov. 9, 1917	1,350,000.00
134	Sultana	B	Yacht	186	390	Apr. 21, 1917	
3148	Thompson, Sara	A	Oil tanker	321			700,000.00
951	Utowana	A	Trawler	168 9	185	Aug. 16, 1917	235,103.10
1950	Undaunted	A	Tug	143	450	Jan. 30, 1918	222,500.00
163	Vedette	B	Yacht	198	441	May 25, 1917	
431	Venetia	C	Yacht	226	589	Aug. 4, 1917	2,000.00
158	Wadena	A	Yacht	176		May 25, 1917	20,000.00
132	Wanderer	A	Yacht	197	362	June 10, 1917	80,500.00
165	Wenonah	A	Yacht	163	290	Aug. 8, 1917	145,000.00
1672	Yale	A	S. S.	407	3,731	Mar. 13, 1918	1,420,000.00

NOTE.—All of the above-named vessels with the exception of the Bella and Nahma, which were taken over abroad, were taken over in the United States and sent abroad.

(Signed) W. V. PRATT.

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List of vessels in naval districts, Dec. 1, 1918.

[Vessels on our own coast: Agreement "A," Government owned; agreement "B," free lease; agreement "C," charter; character "*", vessels shown on lists other than ships movement.]

FIRST NAVAL DISTRICT.

S. P.	Name.	Type.	Length.	Agreement.	Remarks.
765	Adelante	Yt	125 feet	A	
967	Admiral II	Yt	138 feet	A	
541	Admiral	Smk	73 feet	A	
599	Akbar	M. B	75 feet	A	
206	Alacrity	Yt	118 feet	B	
	Androscoggin	C. G. C	210 feet		Coast Guard.
	Azelea	L. H. T	145 feet		Light house.
590	Aztec	Yt	260 feet	B	
	Arabia	F. sch	103 feet	A	
	Bainbridge	T. B	245 feet	A	
	Barry	T. B	245 feet	A	
1704	Billow	Traw	117 feet 8 inches	C	
540	Bonita	M. B	46 feet	A	
1707	Breaker	Traw	117 feet 8 inches	C	
542	Burns, E. M	Sch	60 feet	A	
2366	*Boston Fl. Hosp		160 feet	C	
632	Calypso	M. B	54 feet	A	
	C. D. *30-58-94	Traw	90 feet		Loaned from the Canadian Government.
	C. D. *31-59-96	Traw	90 feet		Do.
	C. D. *36-61-97	Traw	90 feet		Do.
	C. D. *41-65-98	Traw	90 feet		Do.
	C. D. *46-67-99	Traw	90 feet		Do.
	C. D. *50-78-100	Traw	90 feet		Do.
1104	Cherokee	Yt	115 feet	B	
	Coast Guard No. 25	H. Bt	80 feet		Coast Guard.
626	Cobra	M. B	53 feet	A	
344	Comber	Traw	144 feet	C	
633	Constance II	M. B	41 feet	A	
538	Content	M. B	74 feet	A	
339	Crest	Traw	114 feet	C	
3223	*Cullen, Katherine	W. brg	144 feet 8 inches	A	
	C. T. B. *2	T. B	160 feet	A	
1285	Daiquiri	M. B	62 feet	A	
3249	Derrick Ltr	Brg	77 feet	A	
625	Doris B. IV	M. B	67 feet	A	
573	Easthampton	Traw	163 feet	A	
624	Edithena	M. B	75 feet	A	
315	Edwards, W. A	Tug	165 feet	A	
677	Eleanor	M. B	58 feet	B	
708	Elsie III	M. B	52 feet	A	
707	Endion	Yt	100 feet	A	
537	Estella	M. B	52 feet	A	
539	Euphemia	M. B	50 feet	A	
	*Green, Wm. F	Sch	115 feet 7 inches	A	
600	Gurkha	M. B	61 feet	A	
	Halcyon (F. Com.)	Tug	108 feet		Fish Commission.
582	Halcyon II	Yt	140 feet	C	
3190	Hercules	S. Ltr	111 feet 8 inches	A	
	Hibiscus	L. H. T	174 feet		
654	Hippocampus	M. B	56 feet	B	
783	Hobo	M. B	72 feet	B	
650	Hupa	M. B	60 feet	A	
	Heron	M. S	187 feet 10 inches	A	
3051	Ibis	M. S	141 feet	C	
1144	Katrina	Yt	66 feet 5 inches	B	
1229	Liberty III	Aux. Sch	103 feet	B	
	Lilac	L. H. T	145 feet		Lighthouse.
572	Long Island	Traw	151 feet	A	
1230	Louise	Aux. Sch	104 feet	B	
	Lapwing	M. S	187 feet 10 inches	A	
1043	Machigonne II	Yt	136 feet 5 inches	C	
735	Maylay	Yt	150 feet	C	
522	Mann, Charles	Tug	77 feet	A	
737	Marold	M. B	100 feet	B	
	Mayflower	L. H. T	155 feet		Do.
567	Mist	M. B	59 feet	A	
	Nantucket	N. Tr. Shp			
1251	Natalia	M. B	49 feet	B	Ordered returned.
649	Needle	M. B	71 feet	A	
610	Nelansu	M. B	51 feet 5 inches	B	
726	Orca	M. B	85 feet	A	
533	Paloma	Yt	85 feet	A	
658	Pauline	M. B	42 feet	B	
622	Politesse	M. B	29 feet	B	Do.
596	*Pete	M. B	29 feet	B	Do.
	Relief (Pub. Health)	M. B	53 feet		Public Health.

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List of vessels in naval districts, Dec. 1, 1918—Continued.

FIRST NAVAL DISTRICT—Continued.

S. P.	Name.	Type.	Length.	Agreement.	Remark
63	Rivalen	M. B	43 feet	B	Ordered retur
738	Rockport	Yt	124 feet 6 inches	A	
736	Ross, Sadie	Tug	60 feet 5 inches	A	
	*Russell, Lillian	Barge	36 feet	A	
2000	Samoset	Str	103 feet	A	
687	Satilla	Yt	128 feet	A	
587	Sayonara II	M. B	74 feet	B	
551	Shad	M. B	43 feet 8 inches	A	
580	Shada	M. B	96 feet	B	
594	Snark	M. B	75 feet	A	
645	Shrimp	M. B	35 feet	B	
782	Shur	M. B	78 feet 7 inches	A	
605	Skink	M. B	50 feet	B	
2081	Starling	F. B	141 feet	C	
	Steamer No. 2225	S. L	30 feet		
1252	Stinger	M. B	80 feet 5 inches	A	
341	Surf	Traw	118 feet	C	
	S. P. No. 511	M. B	75 feet	B	
	S. P. No. 507	Yt	140 feet	A	
	S. P. No. 524	Yt	145 feet	A	
	S. P. No. 548	Smk	101 feet	A	
	S. P. No. 699	Yt	114 feet	A	
	S. P. No. 701	M. B	54 feet	B	
	S. P. No. 711	M. B	35 feet	B	
	S. P. No. 730	M. B	58 feet	A	
	S. P. No. 746	M. B	61 feet 5 inches	B	
	S. P. No. 1003	M. B	39 feet	B	Do.
	S. P. No. 1240	Barge	283 feet 7 inches	A	
	S. P. No. 1259	M. B	35 feet	B	
	S. P. No. 1919	Brg	135 feet	A	
	Tallapoosa	C. G. C	165 feet 10 inches		Coast Guard.
1016	Talofa	Yt	101 feet	B	
546	Thrasher	M. B	45 feet	A	
	*Tanager	M. S	187 feet 10 inches	A	
592	Valeda	M. B	59 feet 5 inches	A	
616	Venture	M. B	80 feet	B	
1187	Verna & Esther	M. B	45 feet	C	
342	Wasaka III	M. B	53 feet	B	
784	Whistler	M. B	50 feet	A	
852	Wissahickon	Yt	120 feet	B	
	Winnisimmet	Tug	96 feet 5 inches		Do.
	Wooley, James	Tug	80 feet 8 inches	A	
891	*Wild Goose II	M. B	33 feet 6 inches	A	(D. S.)
688	Zenda	M. B	44 feet	A	
	Zizania	L. H. T	150 feet		Lighthouse.

SECOND NAVAL DISTRICT.

1228	Acoma	M. B	60 feet	B	
	Acushnet	C. G. C	152 feet		C. G. (salvage
	Aileen	Conv. yt	138 feet 3 inches	A	
630	Alcalda	M. B	105 feet	B	
586	Alpha	M. B	56 feet	B	
	*Anemone	Lht	174 feet		Lighthouse.
577	Arcady	St. yt	145 feet	A	
680	Ardent	Fish	106 feet 2 inches	A	
	Arrow				
408	Artmar	M. B	63 feet	A	
704	Barbara	M. B	40 feet 8 inches	B	
1071	Belle of Boston	Sch	53 feet	B	
536	Beluga	M. B	73 feet	B	
665	Celeritas	M. B	60 feet	A	
663	Chanticleer	M. B	37 feet 5 inches	B	
696	Charmian II	M. B	58 feet	B	
1058	Christine	Barge	103 feet 6 inches	A	
	*C. T. B. 3	T. B	176 feet	A	
	*C. T. B. 13	T. B	176 feet	A	
	*Daisy	Lht	74 feet		Do.
43	Daraga	M. B	77 feet 6 inches	A	
002	Dauntless	M. B	45 feet	B	
88	Don Juan de Austria	G. B	210 feet	A	
733	Doris B. III	M. B	47 feet	B	
909	Eaglet	M. B	87 feet 9 inches	A	
14	Edamena II	M. B	45 feet	A	
578	Enaj	Str	89 feet	B	
790	Enterprise	M. B	66 feet	A	
642	Felicia	Conv. yt	199 feet	A	

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List of vessels in naval districts, Dec. 1, 1918—Continued.

SECOND NAVAL DISTRICT—Continued.

S. P.	Name.	Type.	Length.	Agreement.	Remarks.
	Fish Hawk	Str.	156 feet		Bureau of Fisheries.
742	Green Dragon	M. B.	60 feet	B	Ordered returned.
1215	Harvest Queen	Barge	153 feet	A	Prob. Ret.
1770	Hazelton	M. B.	40 feet	B	
585	Helianthus	M. B.	60 feet 6 inches	A	
1218	*Herreshoff 309	Yt.	87 feet	B	
2840	*Herreshoff 323	Str.	112 feet	A	
1221	Hildegarde	Sch.	150 feet	B	
	*Isla de Luzon	G. B.	192 feet 8 inches	A	Torpedo station.
643	Joy	M. B.	93 feet	B	
1031	Jolly Roger	M. B.	55 feet 2 inches	B	Ordered returned.
529	Kestrel	M. B.	107 feet	B	
661	Lady Betty	M. B.	48 feet	B	
212	Lady Mary	M. B.	96 feet 6 inches	B	
636	Lomado	M. B.	69 feet	A	
676	Lydia III	M. B.	51 feet 5 inches	A	
876	*Lykens	Tug.	157 feet	A	
980	Macomber, B. F.	Fish.	138 feet 6 inches	A	
143	Magistrate	M. B.	63 feet	B	
563	Magnet	M. B.	105 feet	A	
691	Mansfield & Sons	Oys. bt.	100 feet	A	
28	Mauna Loa	M. B.	55 feet	B	
1966	Morse, C, W.	Str.	411 feet 1 inch	C	
428	Mystery	M. B.	74 feet	B	
161	Narada	Conv. yt.	224 feet	B	
396	Natoya	M. B.	43 feet 5 inches	A	
523	Nightingale	M. B.	45 feet	A	
33	Niji	M. B.	56 feet	B	Do.
1163	*Narragansett	Fer. bt.	117 feet	A	
957	Ojen	M. B.	40 feet	B	
659	Owaissa	M. B.	79 feet 5 inches	B	
1227	Pachogue	S. S.	99 feet 8 inches	A	
671	Parthenia	Str.	131 feet	A	
8	Patrol No. 4	M. B.	40 feet	B	
29	Patrol No. 5	M. B.	40 feet	A	
54	Patrol No. 6	M. B.	63 feet	A	
31	Patrol No. 7	M. B.	40 feet	A	
56	Patrol No. 8	M. B.	72 feet	B	
85	Patrol No. 10	M. B.	60 feet	A	
1106	Patrol No. 11	M. B.	55 feet	B	
	Phalarope	Str.	89 feet		Bureau Fisheries.
690	Polly	M. B.	62 feet	A	
1048	Pollyana	M. B.	35 feet 10 inches	B	
702	Pomander	M. B.	43 feet	B	Ordered returned.
839	Price, E. F.	Fish.	121 feet 5 inches	A	
171	Quest	M. B.	60 feet	B	
508	Raazoo	M. B.	62 feet	B	
506	Raccoon	M. B.	50 feet	B	
588	Raeo	M. B.	73 feet	A	
2057	Raymond	Barge	102 feet 8 inches	A	
1195	Rhebal	M. B.	50 feet	B	
781	Sea Otter	M. B.	40 feet	A	
	*Snohomish	Tug.	152 feet		Coast Guard.
170	Sovereign	Yt.	166 feet	B	
	*S. P. 76	M. B.	60 feet	B	
	*S. P. 265	Fish.	115 feet	A	
	*S. P. 411	M. B.	76 feet	A	
	*S. P. 531	Sch. yt.	98 feet	A	
	*S. P. 598	M. B.	52 feet 9 inches	B	
	*S. P. 614	M. B.	49 feet 6 inches	B	
	*S. P. 728	M. B.	60 feet	B	
	*S. P. 838	Fish.	157 feet 8 inches	A	
391	Thetis	Yt.	127 feet	A	
743	Toxaway	M. B.	52 feet	B	
646	Tramp	Str.	79 feet	A	Ordered sold.
664	Tuna	M. B.	98 feet	B	
	Vesuvius	T. B.	252 feet 4 inches	A	
3246	Vincent	M. B.	49 feet	B	
238	Wacondah	St. yt.	177 feet	A	
89	Whippet	M. B.	72 feet	B	
340	Whitecap	Traw.	135 feet	C	
879	Wildcat	M. B.	63 feet 4 inches	A	
3297	Winthrop	S. tug.	80 feet	A	
156	Winchester	S. yt.	225 feet	A	
	Yank	M. B.	60 feet	B	
463	Yo-Ho	M. B.	47 feet	A	
907	*Yard 210	M. B.	60 feet	B	Sunk.

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List of vessels in naval districts, Dec. 1, 1918—Continued.

THIRD NAVAL DISTRICT.

S. P.	Name.	Type.	Length.	Agreement.	Remarks.
208	Abalone	M. yt	60 feet	B	
	Adams	G. b	189 feet	A	
1270	Adirondack	Str	288 feet 2 inches	A	Ordered returned.
2589	Ahdeek	M. yt	38 feet	A	
1793	Akela	S. yt	98 feet 7 inches	B	
367	Alice	M. yt	60 feet	A	
882	Amn. ltr. No. 28	Ltr	108 feet	A	
1933	Amn. ltr. No. 29	Ltr	107 feet	A	
455	Anado	M. b	70 feet	B	
	Aspinet (Ex-Apache)	Tug	141 feet 6 inches	A	
1721	Atlida	C. b	94 feet	C	
345	Aurora	Tug	110 feet	C	
1444	Auten, Helen	Cov. brg	100 feet	C	
	*Amphitrite	Montr	259 feet 3 inches	A	
	*Avalon	M. b	46 feet	B	
516	Actus	M. b	120 feet	A	Guantanamo.
845	Barracuda	M. b	60 feet	B	
444	Beaumere II	M. b	62 feet 6 inches	B	
1578	Berkshire	Str	266 feet	A	
2472	Bivalve	M. b	55 feet	A	
465	Bluebird	M. b	72 feet	B	
	Biesbosch	Str	160 feet	C	
1740	Bresnahan	Barge	100 feet 3 inches	C	
723	Calumet	S. yt	147 feet	B	
	*Cambridge	Str	245 feet	A	Awaiting sail.
	Cardinal	M. s	187 feet 10 inches	A	
2311	Caswell, H. H	Str	82 feet 8 inches	C	
	Caswell, Richard	Tug	84 feet 9 inches		Coast Guard.
	Catherine	Barge	130 feet	C	
	Cayuga	S. tug	99 feet	A	
	Chesapeak	Str	210 feet	A	
65	Chicota	S. yt	81 feet	B	
224	Chittenden, J. W	Barge	128 feet 2 inches	A	
1435	City of Yonkers	St. ltr	107 feet	C	
1238	Clarke, Carry	Sch. bg	194 feet	A	
1234	Cigarette	Yt	125 feet	A	
1247	Commander	M. yt	61 feet 2 inches	B	
2763	Commerce	Ltr	85 feet 1 inch	A	
	*Concrete brg. No. 1	Brg	112 feet	C	
	Comfort	Hosp. s			
346	Coney, F. F	Tug	102 feet	C	
	Coquette	Tug	58 feet		Do.
194	Coronet	M. yt	90 feet	A	
366	Crawford, C. P	Tug	100 feet 2 inches	C	
2183	Cullen, Dorothy	Tug	81 feet 2 inches	A	
	C. T. B. No. 8	T. B	205 feet	A	
	C. T. B. No. 10	T. B	157 feet	A	
	C. T. B. No. 15	T. B	175 feet	A	
	Dana	St. ltr	84 feet 7 inches	C	
46	Dodger II	M. yt	76 feet 2 inches	A	
1314	Dolphin	Barge	88 feet	C	
	Derby, John	Cov. brg	101 feet	C	
	*Daisy	L. H. T	74 feet		Lighthouse.
196	Edith M	M. yt	59 feet	A	
214	Edithia	M. yt	98 feet 8 inches	A	
15	Elithro II	M. yt	55 feet	B	
284	Ellen	M. yt	67 feet 10 inches	A	
755	Fashion	Brg	80 feet	A	
	Finch	M. S	187 feet 10 inches	A	
173	Florence	St. yt	124 feet	B	
2496	Foam	Traw	114 feet 3 inches	C	
347	Freehold	Tug	101 feet 1 inch	C	
830	Freelance	S. yt	137 feet	B	
	Gardenia	L. H. T	117 feet		Do.
2801	Gasoline Ltr. No. 23	Ltr	65 feet	A	
41	Gem	St. ltr	164 feet 6 inches	B	
459	Genevieve	Str	82 feet	A	
2284	General Putnam	Str	122 feet 6 inches	C	
579	Get There	M. yt	58 feet 6 inches	B	
2337	Gillen Bros	Ltr	105 feet 8 inches	C	
2513	Glenville	Str	120 feet 6 inches	C	
2172	Gordon	St. ltr	105 feet	A	
1184	Grayce	Cov. brg	90 feet	C	
3138	Griswold	Str	92 feet 2 inches	C	
	*Gloucester	Yt	204 feet	A	
	*Guide	M. B	70 feet		Coast Guard.
249	Hauoli	S. yt	211 feet	A	
986	Hebe	M. yt	52 feet	B	
2373	Hereshoff No. 322	M. B	82 feet 6 inches	A	

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List of vessels in naval districts, Dec. 1, 1918—Continued.

THIRD NAVAL DISTRICT—Continued.

S. P.	Name.	Type.	Length.	Agreement.	Remarks.
2892	Hiawatha	Tug	65 feet 5 inches	C	
947	High Ball	M. yt	45 feet	A	
191	Hopestill	M. yt	89 feet	A	
142	Hoqua	M. yt	71 feet	B	
.....	Hudson	Tug	96 feet 6 inches	.....	Coast Guard.
2584	Hydraulic	St. yt	83 feet 6 inches	C	
270	Idalis	M. yt	68 feet	B	
803	Itasca II	M. yt	99 feet 9 inches	B	
878	Jimetta	M. yt	65 feet	B	
390	Johnson, Catherine	S. ltr	110 feet	A	
3295	Josephine	M. B	60 feet	B	
3065	Josephus	Barge	213 feet	C	
72	Joyance	St. yt	134 feet	A	
415	Kemah	M. yt	146 feet	A	
479	Knickerbocker	Tug	110 feet	A	
1237	Knox, General	Brg	251 feet 1 inch	A	
1235	Kuper, Chas. P	Tug	62 feet 5 inches	C	
.....	*Larkspur	L. H. T	162 feet	.....	Lighthouse.
3250	cLagoda	M. B	85 feet	A	
.....	Lamberton	Destr	310 feet	A	
1397	Lee	Barge	103 feet	C	
921	Little Brothers	St. ltr	70 feet	C	
721	Linta	St. yt	108 feet	B	
2141	Logan, James	Ltr	90 feet 8 inches	A	
504	Lowell	Tug	119 feet 4 inches	C	
1396	Luna	C. brg	108 feet 6 inches	C	
.....	*Lilac	L. H. T	145 feet	.....	Lighthouse.
.....	*Mackinac	C. G. C	110 feet	.....	Coast Guard.
.....	Mannahatta	Str	220 feet	A	
2119	Margin	M. B	41 feet 6 inches	B	
100	Marie	M. yt	70 feet 3 inches	A	
.....	Marion	C. brg	122 feet 1 inch	C	
397	Marie Alice	St. yt	174 feet	A	Sunk.
2313	Merchant	Xtr	131 feet	C	
.....	Merritt, I. J	Str	163 feet	A	
425	Minerva	M. yt	80 feet	B	
49	Momo	M. yt	57 feet	B	
.....	Montgomery	Dest	310 feet	A	
.....	Morris	T. B	138 feet 3 inches	A	
36	Mustang	M. yt	65 feet	A	
.....	Mystery	S. tr	106 feet 6 inches	C	
428	.....do	M. B	71 feet	B	
	*Mistletoe	L. H. T	153 feet	B	Lighthouse.
	*Myrtle	L. H. T	130 feet	.....	Do.
666	Natoma	M. Yt	120 feet	A	
517	Naushon	S. Yt	153 feet 3 inches	A	
559	Nautilus II	M. Yt	66 feet	B	
298	Navajo II	M. Yt	67 feet	A	
343	Nemesis	M. Yt	41 feet 9 inches	B	
266	Newark	Tug	107 feet	C	
1222	New England	Ltr	130 feet	C	
	Newport	Nautical training ship.	.....	.....	
2147	North Pole	Brg	113 feet	A	
1208	Ocoee	M. Yt	68 feet	B	
928	Osprey II	M. Yt	80 feet	B	
1249	Ostrich	M. Yt	35 feet	A	
	*Pansy	L. H. T	147 feet	.....	Do.
	Patrol	M. B	68 feet 9 inches	.....	Coast Guard.
675	Pattina	M. Yt	60 feet	B	
	Pentucket	Tug	92 feet 6 inches	A	
86	Perfecto	M. Yt	60 feet	B	
	Perkins	Destr	289 feet	A	
	Portland	C. Brg	77 feet 1 inch	C	
2364	Postmaster Gnrl	Str	175 feet	C	
	Preble	T. B	245 feet	A	
179	Privateer	M. Yt	108 feet	A	
679	P. R. R. No. 9	Tug	92 feet	C	
	Progressive	Tug	75 feet	C	
9	Psyche V	M. Yt	75 feet	A	
	*Rogers, John	L. H. T	151 feet	.....	Lighthouse.
2009	Rood Laura	Aux	52 feet	B	
2170	Relief	Tug	184 feet 6 inches	A	
1309	Resolute	Tug	36 feet	A	
107	Riette	M. Yt	60 feet	A	
2439	Ripple	Traw	114 feet 3 inches	C	
	Robbins, R. D. U	St. Ltr	95 feet	A	
	Robin	M. S	187 feet 10 inches	A	

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List of vessels in naval districts, Dec. 1, 1918—Continued.

FOURTH NAVAL DISTRICT—Continued.

S. P.	Name.	Type.	Length.	Agreement.	Remarks.
	*High Ball	M. B.	31 feet	B	
125	Idealia	M. yt.	75 feet 8 inches	B	
	Iris	C. G. C.	150 feet 3 inches		Lighthouse.
	Itasca	C. G. C.	189 feet 6 inches		Coast Guard.
1188	Jane II	M. B.	35 feet	B	
602	Juniata	M. B.	139 feet 6 inches	B	Ordered returned.
USS	Kingfisher	M. S.	187 feet 10 inches	A	
594	Kuwana II	M. B.	55 feet	B	
683	McKeever Bros.	Fish	136 feet	A	
684	McKeever, E. J.	Fish	136 feet	A	
1169	McKeever, S. W.	Fish	136 feet	A	
870	Margo	M. B.	65 feet	B	
591	Miramar	M. yt.	115 feet	B	
	Modock	Tug.	101 feet 6 inches	A	
	Morrill	C. G. C.	145 feet		Coast Guard.
204	Nirvana	Cruiser	65 feet	B	
167	Owera	S. yt.	195 feet	B	
1072	Peggy	M. B.	30 feet	B	
648	Pierce, G. F.	S. S.	129 feet 8 inches	C	
	Samoset	Tug.	102 feet 7 inches	A	
1427	Sappho	S. S.	180 feet	C	
70	Shrewsbury	M. B.	98 feet	A	
2575	Springfield	S. S.	127 feet	C	
685	Sussex	Fish.	74 feet 2 inches	A	
510	Suzanne	Yt.	110 feet	B	
104	Sybilla III	Yt.	120 feet	B	
	Starboard Unit	M. B.	112 feet	B	
	S. P. No. 256	M. B.	60 feet	B	
	S. P. No. 406	M. B.	72 feet	B	
	S. P. No. 467	Fish.	140 feet	A	
	S. P. No. 544	M. B.	58 feet 6 inches	B	
	S. P. No. 545	M. B.	60 feet	B	
	S. P. No. 705	M. B.	65 feet 4 inches	B	
	S. P. No. 871	M. B.	53 feet	B	
5	Tacony	M. B.	82 feet	B	
USS	Teal	M. S.	187 feet 10 inches	A	
1113	Tinicum	S. S.	151 feet	C	
3312	Triton	Tug.	84 feet 8 inches	C	
686	Vester	Fish.	96 feet 4 inches	A	
1995	Victor	M. B.	74 feet	B	
2266	Visitor	Tug.	63 feet 6 inches	C	
1192	Vitesse	M. B.	60 feet	B	
	Woodbine	L. H. T.	95 feet		Lighthouse.
61	Zenith	M. B.	73 feet 3 inches	B	

FIFTH NAVAL DISTRICT.

3057	Advance	Tug.	107 feet 5 inches	A	
268	Almax II	M. B.	56 feet 9 inches	A	
693	Amagansett	Menhdn.	123 feet 6 inches	C	
1203	Anderson, M.	M. B.	36 feet	C	
1206	Anna Belle	M. B.	37 feet 9 inches	C	
	Arbutus	L. H. T.	145 feet		Lighthouse.
1283	Archer, Daisy	M. B.	50 feet	B	C. C. of Balt., Ord. R.
	Avocet	M. S.	187 feet 10 inches	A	
1182	*Atlantic	M. B.	49 feet 6 inches	B	F. C. B. of N. C., Ord. Ret.
484	Babette II	M. B.	52 feet	B	
	Bache	S. V.	153 feet 2 inches		Coast and Geodetic Survey.
963	Bagheera	M. B.	66 feet	B	
1292	Baughman	Sch.	55 feet	B	C. C. of Balt. returned.
323	Bellows	Men.	162 feet	A	
2817	Bie & Schiott	M. B.	64 feet	A	
	Bobby	M. B.	30 feet		
1513	Bobylu	M. B.	35 feet 10 inches	B	F. C. Bd. of N. C.
1708	Boothbay	S. S.	126 feet 6 inches	A	Washington Navy Yard.
	Bouker, No. 2	Tug.	103 feet	A	
327	Bradley, G. H.	Men.	104 feet	A	
	Briggs, Jerry	M. B.			
	Brant	M. S.	187 feet 10 inches	A	
	Blanche	Tug.	80 feet	C	Ord. returned.
2274	Calvert	M. B.	44 feet	B	C. C. of Balt., O. R.
703	Caprice	M. B.	45 feet 10 inches	B	
	Captain Dud	Ltr.	90 feet	A	
525	Chilhowee	Yt.	125 feet	A	

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List of vessels in naval districts, Dec. 1, 1918—Continued.

FIFTH NAVAL DISTRICT—Continued.

S. P.	Name.	Type.	Length.	Agreement.	Remarks.
1049	Chipper	M. B.	57 feet 9 inches	B	
1248	Clarke, J. A.	Tug.	90 feet	C	
1244	Clarke, Jos M.	Tug.	86 feet 2 inches	C	Returned Nov. 12,1918.
2279	Clio	Str.	120 feet	A	
	Columbine	L. H. T.	145 feet		Lighthouse.
	Conwell, F. G.	Tug.	50 feet	A	
556	Cozy	M. B.	50 feet	A	
	C. T. B., No. 11	T. B.	157 feet	A	
	C. T. B., No. 12	T. B.	157 feet	A	
	C. T. B., No. 4	T. B.	147 feet	A	
3278	*Credenda	Tug.	57 feet	A	
	Daisy	Lch.	60 feet		
314	Davis, M. M.	Men.	150 feet	A	
1231	Dempsey, L. A.	Tug.	62 feet 5 inches	C	
791	Dennis, E. B.	Menhdn.	110 feet	C	
786	Desire	M. B.	90 feet	B	
1509	Dorchester	Sch.	45 feet	B	C. C. of Balt., O. R.
1289	Dorothy	M. B.	41 feet	B	Do.
2405	Efee	M. B.	40 feet	German.	
972	Elizabeth	M. B.	53 feet 1 inch	A	
	Emily B.	Tug.	50 feet	C	
1223	Emma	M. B.	42 feet	C	
2298	Ericcson, A. H.	Tug.	68 feet	C	
403	Euphane, Helen	Menhdn.	120 feet	A	
71	Fantana	M. B.	72 feet	B	
550	Fli Hawk	M. B.	74 feet 7 inches	B	
1453	Folly	Sch.	64 feet	B	Do.
380	Froehlich, E. M.	Men.	138 feet	A	
1336	Frolic	Sch.	62 feet	B	Do.
184	Gladiola	M. B.	68 feet 6 inches	B	
	Gladiator	Tug.	90 feet	C	
2671	Gray, Carl R.	Tug.	88 feet 9 inches	A	
289	Grayling	M. B.	50 feet	B	
1181	Gretchen	M. B.	54 feet	B	F. C. of N. C. Ord. ret
	Gresham	C. G. C.	188 feet 6 inches		Coast Guard.
52	Grey Fox	M. B.	50 feet	A	
	Gratitude	Tug.	140 feet	C	
2200	*Green, Howard	Tug.	92 feet	A	Wash. Navy Yard.
2487	*Goucher, S. M.	Tug.	65 feet	C	Do.
USS	Gleam	Lch.	30 feet	A	
	Hampton	Tug.	90 feet	C	
1414	Hayward, Eliza	Sloop.	50 feet	B	C. E. of Balt., O. R.
1207	Hazel	M. B.	44 feet	C	
	Hercules	Tug.	105 feet	A	
183	Hiawatha	M. yt.	89 feet 8 inches	A	
	Holly	Lht.	167 feet		Lighthouse.
	Hopkins	Destr.	245 feet	A	
	Hull	Destr.	245 feet	A	
2384	Hurst, Floyd	M. B.	48 feet 8 inches	A	Wash. Navy Yard.
3294	*Hopkins	M. B.	62 feet 10 inches	A	
3156	*Hurst	M. B.	62 feet 7 inches	A	
119	Idylease	M. B.	65 feet	B	
	Iro (ex Iroquois)	Str.	200 feet	C	
1861	Isle of Surrey	M. B.	55 feet	C	
952	Itty E.	M. B.	25 feet	B	
1459	Jackson, Nellie	Sch.	55 feet	B	C. C. of Balt., O. R.
	Jessamine	L. H. T.	146 feet		Lighthouse.
1476	Jones, Bessie	Sch.	62 feet	B	C. C. of Balt., O. R.
	Jones, Paul	Destr.	249 feet	A	
	Juniper	L. H. T.	90 feet		Lighthouse.
429	*James, W. T.	Menhdn.	150 feet	A	D. S.
3182	* Joe Digger	Brg.	85 feet 6 inches	C	
389	Kajeruna	S. yt.	153 feet	B	
439	Kanised	M. yt.	100 feet	A	
200	Karibou	M. B.	66 feet	B	
	Laurel	L. H. T.	110 feet		Lighthouse.
399	Legonia	S. yt.	140 feet 4 inches	A	
732	Letter B.	M. B.	32 feet	B	
846	Luce Brothers	Menhdn.	122 feet	C	
1328	McLane	Str.	120 feet	B	C. C. of Balt., O. R.
312	McNeal, H. G.	Menhdn.	140 feet	A	
3061	Majestic	Str.	150 feet	C	
	Malvern	Tug.	65 feet	C	
	Maple	L. H. T.	155 feet		Lighthouse.
1225	Mason, Chas. B.	M. B.	45 feet	C	
	Massasoit	Tug.	89 feet	A	
1009	Maud	M. B.	50 feet	B	
	Mayrant	Destr.	293 feet 10 inches	A	
847	Menhaden	Menhdn.	100 feet	C	
	Moore	Tug.	95 feet	C	

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List of vessels in naval districts, Dec. 1, 1918—Continued.

FIFTH NAVAL DISTRICT—Continued.

S. P.	Name.	Type.	Length.	Agreement.	Remarks.
2047	Moosehead	S. S	185 feet 3 inches	A	Washington Navy Yard.
	Murray, J. W	Tug	60 feet	C	
1438	Murray	M. B	55 feet	B	C. C. of Balt., O. R.
1288	Music	M. B	41 feet	B	Do.
3289	Myrtle	M. B	40 feet 8 inches	B	
1202	*Maggie	Hs. bt	164 feet	A	
1305	*Mercy	S. S	429 feet 10 inches	A	
3028	Nerita	M. B	60 feet 6 inches	A	
570	Natick	M. B	35 feet	B	
1436	Nettie	M. B	41 feet	B	Do.
370	Nonpariel	Tug	101 feet	A	
2377	Olsen, John G	Tug	65 feet	C	
1224	Onset	M. B	14 feet	C	
311	Onward	S. yt	140 feet	A	
	Orchid	L. H. T	177 feet		Lighthouse.
	Owl	M. S	187 feet 10 inches	A	
319	Palmer	Fish	135 feet	A	
	Pamlico	C. G. C	158 feet		Coast Guard.
1219	Pearl	M. B	45 feet	B	
978	Phillips, D. K	Menhdn	135 feet	A	
1204	Pilgrim	M. B	100 feet	B	
	Pompano	M. B	60 feet	C	
1004	Qui Vive	M. B	45 feet	B	
	Rail	M. S	187 feet 10 inches	A	
1083	Regis II	M. B	45 feet	B	
869	Reynor & Sons	M. B	64 feet	A	
	Riverside	Str	174 feet	C	
	Rocket	Tug	95 feet	A	
3070	Rosedale	Str	150 feet	C	
1211	Ross Lucille	Tug	71 feet 7 inches	C	
712	Rush	M. B	36 feet 6 inches	A	Wrecked.
3209	*Rescue	Tug	160 feet	A	
1109	Sayona II	M. B	60 feet 6 inches	B	
	Scandinavia	M. B	61 feet	A	
1063	Secret	M. B	37 feet	B	
	Seminole	C. G. C	188 feet	B	Coast Guard.
1458	Smith, A. B	Sch	60 feet	B	C. C. of Balt., O. R.
1291	Snark	M. Yt	62 feet 4 inches	B	Do.
2162	Somerset	M. B	55 feet	B	
	S. P. No. 62	M. B	40 feet	A	
	S. P. No. 223	M. B	83 feet	A	
	S. P. No. 328	Menhdn	128 feet	A	
	S. P. No. 426	M. B	60 feet	C	
	S. P. No. 584	M. B	30 feet	B	
	S. P. No. 747	M. B	40 feet	A	
	S. P. No. 789	M. B	93 feet	B	
	S. P. No. 810	M. Lch	75 feet	B	
	S. P. No. 1182	M. B	49 feet 6 inches	B	
	S. P. No. 1209	M. B	50 feet	B	
	S. P. No. 1212	M. B	65 feet	B	
	S. P. No. 1260	M. B	63 feet	B	
	S. P. No. 1287	Sch	65 feet	B	
	S. P. No. 1355	M. B	35 feet 6 inches	B	
	S. P. No. 1764	M. B	35 feet 3 inches	B	
	S. P. No. 1965	M. B	61 feet	B	
	S. P. No. 2440	M. B	36 feet 6 inches	C	
3231	Sparrow II	M. B	51 feet	A	
336	Spartan	Tug	109 feet	C	
267	S. T. No. 7	Tug	98 feet	C	
1457	St. Marys	M. B	49 feet	B	Do.
332	Struven	Menhdn	152 feet	A	
	Sylvia	S. Yt	124 feet	A	
	*Severn	M. B	40 feet		C. C. of Md.
2684	*Swansboro	Brg	120 feet 5 inches	A	
2714	*Snapper	M. B	84 feet	A	
2079	*Shady Side	S. S	85 feet	A	Annapolis ferry.
933	Teaser	M. B	60 feet	A	
	Tioga	Tug	72 feet 7 inches	A	
	Toad	M. B	18 feet		
734	Vega	Syt	175 feet	A	At Annapolis.
	Virginia	Tug	107 feet	C	
3361	Vaud J	M. B	101 feet	A	
3314	Viking	M. B	42 feet	A	
	Wahneta	Tug	100 feet	A	
	Wasp	Conv. yt	180 feet	A	
562	Wild Goose I	M. B	60 feet	A	
2129	Willoughby	Str	115 feet	C	

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List of vessels in naval districts, Dec. 1, 1918—Continued.

SEVENTH NAVAL DISTRICT—Continued.

S. P.	Name.	Type.	Length.	Agreement.	Remarks.
1012	Satellite	M. B.	77 feet 6 inches	B	Owner refused return.
2365	Sea Hawk	M. B.	62 feet 4 inches	A	
102	Shadow III	M. B.	50 feet	A	
.....	Snowdrop	Lht	69 feet	.....	Lighthouse.
407	Speedway	M. B.	54 feet	B	
470	St. Sebastian	M. B.	50 feet	A	
.....	S. P. No. 24	M. B.	43 feet	A	
.....	S. P. No. 90	M. B.	50 feet	A	
.....	S. P. No. 103	M. B.	50 feet	A	
.....	S. P. No. 263	M. B.	45 feet	A	
.....	S. P. No. 471	M. B.	42 feet	A	
.....	S. P. No. 635	M. B.	53 feet 8 inches	B	
.....	S. P. No. 744	M. B.	45 feet	B	
122	*Traveler	M. B.	50 feet 3 inches	A	
126	Tanguingui	M. B.	63 feet 6 inches	B	
	Tuscarora	C. G. C.	178 feet	.....	Coast Guard.
1258	Velocipede	M. B.	60 feet	B	
1795	War Bug	M. B.	62 feet 4 inches	A	
106	Zigzag	M. B.	44 feet	A	
93	Zumbrota	M. B.	70 feet	A	

EIGHTH NAVAL DISTRICT.

	Alert	Sch	60 feet	.....	Coast Guard.
729	Apache	M. B.	62 feet 4 inches	A	
USS	Asp	M. B.	72 feet	A	
946	Augusta	Yt	98 feet	B	
1149	Barnette	Tug	111 feet	A	
	*Camellia	L. H. T.	106 feet	.....	Lighthouse.
	Commanche	C. G. C.	160 feet	.....	Coast Guard.
	Cometa	M. B.	24 feet	B	
1425	Commodore	M. B.	63 feet 3 inches	A	
933	Corinthia	Yt	80 feet	B	
USS	C. T. B. No. 9	T. B	153 feet	A	
3158	Dantzler, B. H	Tug	97 feet	A	
109	Elmasada	M. B.	67 feet	A	
292	Glendoveer	M. B.	65 feet	A	
3104	Hudson, Ashur J	Tug	104 feet	A	
1243	Josephine	M. B.	82 feet	B	
1284	Kangaroo	M. B.	62 feet	A	
	Lady Doris	M. B.	26 feet	B	
	May	M. B.	40 feet	B	
277	Najelda	M. B.	65 feet	A	
	Penrose	C. G. sch.	62 feet	.....	Do.
281	Quicksilver	M. B.	51 feet	A	
597	Rickwood	M. B.	70 feet	B	
1047	Roamer	Yt	83 feet	A	
915	Shirin	Yt	107 feet	A	
822	Sister	Sch	72 feet	A	
	Sunflower	L. H. T.	163 feet 6 inches	.....	Lighthouse.
	S. P. No. 672	M. B.	76 feet	B	
	S. P. No. 912	M. B.	75 feet	B	
	S. P. No. 1092	M. B.	54 feet	B	Sunk.
1390	Underwriter	Tug	112 feet	A	
1114	Vision	M. B.	67 feet 6 inches	B	
448	Wendy	M. B.	55 feet	B	
	Zillah	M. B.	54 feet	B	
	Davey	Tug	92 feet 6 inches	.....	Coast Guard.

NINTH, TENTH, AND ELEVENTH DISTRICTS.

	Active	C. G. C.	36 feet 3 inches	.....	Coast Guard.
	Advance	C. G. C.	50 feet 2 inches	.....	Do.
218	Althea	M. B.	69 feet	A	
	Amaranth	L. H. T.	166 feet	.....	Lighthouse.
197	Arroyo	M. B.	48 feet	A-F-3	Transferred to third district.
	Aspen	L. H. T.	126 feet	.....	Lighthouse.
40	Atlantis	M. B.	60 feet	A	Transferred to third district.
382	Avis	M. B.	52 feet	B	Do.
451	Andwin	M. B.	65 feet	A	Do.
1166	Bab	Lch	35 feet	A-F-3	
623	Betty M III	M. B.	60 feet	B	

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List of vessels in naval districts, Dec. 1, 1918—Continued.

NINTH, TENTH, AND ELEVENTH DISTRICTS—Continued.

S. P.	Name.	Type.	Length.	Agreement.	Remarks.
	Clover	L. H. T.	93 feet		Lighthouse.
232	Cleo	M. B.	50 feet	B	
84	Coyote	M. B.	70 feet	A	
	Crocus	L. H. T.	165 feet		Do.
231	Dickey	M. B.	46 feet	B	
1062	Doloma	M. B.	60 feet	B	
USS	Gopher	Sch.	175 feet	A	
	Ensign	M. B.	68 feet	B	Transferred to third district.
USS	Essex	G. B.	185 feet	A	
USS	Hawk	Yt.	147 feet	A	
216	Hyac	M. B.	75 feet	B	
	Hyacinth	L. H. T.	150 feet 8 inches		Lighthouse.
1011	Geraldine	M. B.	67 feet	B	
388	Ionita	M. B.	55 feet	A	
692	Jaydee III	M. B.	45 feet	B	
245	Josephine J. II	M. B.	65 feet	B	
219	Killarney	M. B.	65 feet	A	
	Marigold	L. H. T.	160 feet		Do.
1080	Marjorie M	Lch.	32 feet	B	
309	Mikawe	M. B.	55 feet	A	
202	Minnemac II	M. B.	78 feet	B	
1711	Miss Toledo	M. B.	60 feet	B	
	*Mona II	M. B.	40 feet	B	
	Motor Boat No. 752	C. G. Lch.	28 feet 8 inches		Coast Guard.
128	Ono	M. B.	45 feet	A	
310	Raboco	M. B.	65 feet	B	
USS	Sandoval	G. B.	110 feet	A	
505	Seatag	M. B.	50 feet	B	
	Search	C. G. C.	40 feet 9 inches		Coast Guard.
	Sentinel	C. G. C.	45 feet 7 inches		Do.
USS	Steamer No. 567	M. B.	34 feet	A	
	Sumac	L. H. T.	160 feet		Lighthouse.
	S. P. No. 246	M. B.	80 feet 6 inches	B	
	S. P. No. 269	M. B.	58 feet	A	
	S. P. No. 274	M. B.	98 feet	A	
	S. P. No. 438	M. B.	90 feet 3 inches	A	
	S. P. No. 706	M. B.	42 feet	A	Transferred to third district.
	S. P. No. 892	M. B.	40 feet	B	
960	Terrier	M. B.	40 feet	B	
979	Verdi	M. B.	75 feet	A-F-3	Transferred to third district for return to owner.
	Vigilant	C. G. C.	45 feet		Coast Guard.
361	Voyager	M. B.	52 feet	A	
450	Weepoose	M. B.	59 feet	A	Transferred to third district.
1175	Welcome	M. B.	40 feet	B	
221	Whirlwind	M. B.	117 feet	A	Do.
USS	Wolverine	G. B.	164 feet 11 inches	A	
USS	Yantic	G. B.	180 feet	A	
1010	Yarrow	M. B.	65 feet	B	

TWELFTH NAVAL DISTRICT.

751	Albacore	M. B.	50 feet 8 inches	B	
752	Arvilla	M. B.	46 feet	B	
	Azalea	Cruiser	61 feet		Immigration Service.
NYD	Admiral Glass	S. S.	85 feet	A	
1668	Barge	Brg.	40 feet	B	
3234	Browning, Ellen	M. B.	23 feet	A	
	*Bear	C. G. C.	195 feet		Coast Guard.
1105	Caroline	M. B.	42 feet 5 inches	B	
NYD	Castro	S. S.	79 feet	A	
1015	*Challenge	Tug	122 feet	A	
NYD	Dart	Ferry	71 feet 10 inches	A	
776	Ellington	M. B.	61 feet		Bureau Immigration.
	Golden Gate	S. S.	103 feet 8 inches		Coast Guard.
	Hartley	St. sch.	62 feet		Do.
1370	House-Boat A-1	Hse. bt.	23 feet	C	
	Intrepid	Sig. ves.	176 feet 5 inches	A	
NYD	Lively	Tug	107 feet	A	
	Lookout & Signal Sta. Breakwater.				
NYD	Leslie	Fire bt.	75 feet	A	

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List of vessels in naval districts, Dec. 1, 1918—Continued.

TWELFTH NAVAL DISTRICT—Continued.

S. P.	Name.	Type.	Length.	Agreement.	Remarks.
	Madrono	L. H. T.	164 feet		Lighthouse.
2225	Navigator	Tug	134 feet 3 inches	A	
756	Normannia	M. B.	42 feet	B	
NYD	Pinafore	Ferry	45 feet	A	
757	Rosa	M. B.	48 feet	B	
180	Sentinel	M. B.	64 feet	A	
	Sequoia	L. H. T.	174 feet		Do.
USS	Tillamook	Tug	122 feet 6 inches	A	
USS	Unadilla	Tug	110 feet	A	
	*Unalga	C. G. C.	190 feet		Coast Guard.
519	Vergana	S. yt.	125 feet 7 inches	A	
NYD	Vigilant	Tug	115 feet	A	
NYD	Wave	Mtr. dry	28 feet	?	

THIRTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT.

	Arcata	C. G. C.	85 feet		Coast Guard.
	C 7 B No. 7	T. B.	198 feet 5 inches	A	
	Explorer	C. & Geo. Ves.	138 feet		Coast and Geodetic Survey.
	Forward	C. & Geo. Ves.	163 feet		Do.
	Guard	C. G. C.	67 feet 5 inches		Coast Guard.
181	Helori	M. B.	98 feet	A	
260	Olympia	Conv. yt.	65 feet	A	
1138	Oneonta	Tug	118 feet	C	
	Rose	L. H. T.	127 feet 5 inches		Lighthouse.
	Roosevelt	Str.	160 feet		Bureau of Fisheries.
1352	San Juan	S. S.	128 feet	C	
301	San Souci II	M. B.	50 feet	B	
1351	Star No. 1	Whaler	116 feet	C	
	Scout	C. G. C.	62 feet 5 inches		Coast Guard.
	S. P. No. 1078	Tug	86 feet 5 inches	C	
	S. P. No. 1290	M. B.	127 feet	B	
	*Falcon	M. B.	85 feet	C	
	*Fern	L. H. T.	98 feet 4 inches		Lighthouse.
	*Heather	L. H. T.	165 feet		Do.
	*Manzanita	L. H. T.	174 feet		Do.

FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT.

	Fortune	Tug	137 feet	A	
	Hermes		97 feet 6 inches		Ex-German.
	Kukui	L. H. T.	190 feet		Lighthouse.
	Monterey	Montr.	256 feet	A	
	Navajo	Tug	141 feet 4 inches	A	
	Samoa				Ex-German.

FIFTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT.

	Chame	Tug	130 feet		Custody Rec. Pan.
	Clapet No. 4	Conv. scow	130 feet	A	
	C. B. T. No. 5	T. B.	213 feet 6 inches	A	
	DeLesseps	Tug	82 feet		Loaned by Pan. Can.
1841	Herreshoff No. 306	St. yt.	114 feet	A	
2232	Herreshoff No. 308	St. yt.	112 feet	A	
	*Goodwill	Sch.	35 feet		Pan. Can.
	Mariner	Tug	150 feet		Custody Rec. Pan. Can.
	Pequeni	Sch.	68 feet		Pan. Can.
	Vedette	Sch.	32 feet		Do.
	*St. Launch 2224	Sch.	40 feet	A	
	*M. B. 3437	M. B.	35 feet	A	
	*Mtr. dory 3004	M. B.	21 feet	A	
	*M. B. 2007	M. B.	35 feet	A	
	*M. B. 1302	M. B.	35 feet	A	

Capt. PRATT. We now come to a series of plans in the regulating of estimates that were made—you must remember we had very little time to work and commit ourselves much to writing. The

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real thing which was desired was the decision, and opportunity for the secretary and the chief of naval operations to look at decisions and not be involved in a mass of reasoning about the decisions, so that they could make quick decisions. I wrote these myself, but I am sorry to say that, being very careless, I have not placed dates on them.

I wish especially to invite your attention to that. I do know, however, that they took place between the time I went to the office in the first part of February, and when I became aid for operations in June, and I know very well, too, when most of them took place previous to the war or when we came in. Some of them were before and some of them after.

The CHAIRMAN. In each case will you give the estimate of the date as near as you can get at it?

Capt. PRATT. I will try to do it as near as I can. This plan is as follows [reading]:

PLAN—MISSION TO RENDER THE MAXIMUM POSSIBLE SUPPORT NOW TO THE ENEMIES OF THE CENTRAL POWERS.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF NAVAL AERONAUTICS,
Washington.

War being declared, the third general mission becomes the "immediate mission."

Third. Immediate mission: To render the maximum possible support now to the enemies of the Central Powers.

Reconciling the various decisions arrived at from the different estimates of the situation (general), the following "decisions" to the immediate mission are arrived at. These decisions serve as the "missions" to further estimates and more detailed "plans" for each decision of the "immediate mission."

Decisions to (third) immediate mission: Action taken.

1. Mobilize all naval districts.
2. Mobilize all naval vessels.
3. Organize for antisubmarine warfare.

(*a*) Organize, inaugurate policy and make plans for the operation and administration of the naval districts.

(*b*) Adopt the policy that our present mobile naval force shall be so distributed and used that they further the immediate mission and do not handicap it.

(*c*) Make estimate of the best methods for cooperating the present naval and military forces to meet the immediate needs caused by the antisubmarine war.

(*d*) Adopt the policy that our merchant shipping shall be protected against antisubmarine warfare to the utmost, and its aims directed toward furthering the immediate needs of our cooperating allies, and our own future needs.

(*e*) Inaugurate a naval building policy which will best meet our immediate needs.

(*f*) Inaugurate a financial policy with regard to the moneys already appropriated by Congress, and not yet specifically allotted, together with estimates of further moneys that may be needed.

(*g*) Make a survey of our general diplomatic situation, with special reference to naval and immediate needs.

(*h*) Make a survey of general financial and industrial situation with view to organizing same to meet immediate needs.

(*i*) Outline the general scheme whereby we may best cooperate with our allies.

(*j*) Make a general military survey and estimate of the immediate situation.

(*k*) Formulate a policy whereby the proper necessary news may reach the public, in order that its interest may be kept up, and morale stimulated, without disclosing important military secrets.

(*l*) Direct the policy of our naval bases as to reserve, repair, operating, and supply facilities to meet the following conditions (1) the needs of the immediate situation, (2) our future needs.

(*m*) Thoroughly organize the naval general staff for the purposes of advising, planning, communicating, supplying, repairing, and operating all naval facilities to meet (1) the immediate situation, (2) the future needs.

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(*n*) Take steps to overcome the present shortage in personnel of the Navy, in officers and enlisted men, and prepare plans to establish a reserve to fill casualties which might be caused (1) by the immediate situation, (2) by the most probable future situations.

(*o*) Inaugurate a system of training for our naval forces, active and reserve, to meet (1) the immediate situation, (2) the most probable future situation.

(*p*) Establish a policy with reference to the use of mines in the present emergency.

(*q*) Establish the policy to be adopted toward the German vessels now lying in our ports:

(*a*) As regards the vessels having a national character.

(*b*) As regards the interned merchant vessels.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that an operational plan?

Capt. PRATT. No; it is operational to a certain extent, but it is more basic than anything else.

The CHAIRMAN. That was drawn by you in the Bureau of Operations?

Capt. PRATT. Yes, sir; I wrote it myself. Here is another plan. [Reading:]

Plan. Mission: Make a general estimate of the character of service which will be required of our naval forces in order to serve best our own interests and to cooperate with our allies.

This, you must realize, was before we went into the war, but while the patrol system was so in vogue with Great Britain, and to establish a patrol, I wish to state now, is one of the best ways to get our various craft coming from all sources; the yachts we would take in from outside sources, and all the rest, thoroughly organized in the quickest way before they were sent abroad; so that just as soon as the idea germinated that we were to dr p the patrol and send forces abroad we had forces already organized and trained, ready to go abroad and do the work, which would not have been the case had we not had an organization of this sort established to conduct this particular section of work; and the coast patrol which was adopted on our coast was not a handicap to the vessels that went abroad. On the contrary, it served as very useful training for the vessels and the men, particularly those of the reserves who came in later, and it allowed them to know something of the work that they would be called upon to conduct abroad.

This plan is as follows. [Reading:]

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF NAVAL AERONAUTICS,
Washington, D. C.

Mission.—Make a general estimate of the character of service which will be required of our naval forces in order to serve best our own interstss and to cooperate with our allies.

Following an estimate of the situation, the below conclusions were reached:

CONCLUSIONS.

1. That there will be required of the Navy the following service tasks: (*a*) The service of security or defense, (*b*) the service of information, (*c*) an active offensive against the enemy, (*d*) a reserve of force ready to assume the offensive when the opportunity arrives, and (*e*) the service of logistics.

2. To meet the above service tasks the following forces are assigned or created: (*a*) District coast defense, (1) to protect the coast against all enemy efforts, (2) to protect logistics within the area of its jurisdiction, and (3) conducted by the water craft and land forces assigned for this purpose; (*b*) patrol and escort, (1) to assist logistics beyond the limits of the coast defense districts; (2) to patrol for information, (3) to operate actively against S. M. and their bases, and (4) conducted by yachts, destroyers,

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chasers, small Government vessels; (c) information forces, (1) to assist all services—offensive, reserve, logistics, defensive, and (2) conducted by communication service, O. N. I. service, appropriate patrol and escort force, district scouting force, and appropriate district coast defense force; (d) active offensive, (1) to operate against the enemy S. M. and bases and raiders, (2) conducted against S. M. and bases by appropriate district forces, patrol force, submarines, destroyers, and (3) conducted against raiders by cruisers; (e) reserve, (1) to train to be and to hold themselves in readiness to act offensively against the enemy; (2) conducted by battleships, major ships not in active use, any fleet auxiliaries needed to further fleet training, that portion of the train needed in the service of fleet logistics; (3) to be effected at such places as—(a) the fleet may be on the strategic offensive, and (b) the fleet may be mobile; (f) logistics, (1) to carry supplies to the Allies, (2) conducted by armed merchant ships, unarmed merchant ships, and national vessels; (3) to carry supplies to national forces, and (4) conducted by the train.

Here is another plan [reading extracts]:

Mission.—Adopt the policy that our present mobile naval forces shall be so distributed and used that they further the immediate mission and do not handicap it.

Decision..... (3)..... B..... immediate mission.

Adopt the policy that our present mobile naval forces shall be so distributed and used that they further the immediate mission and do not handicap it.

(3)..... B..... immediate mission.

Adopt the policy that our present mobile naval forces shall be so distributed and used that they further the immediate mission and do not handicap it.

Estimates of the general situation bearing on the above mission were submitted by the General Board, Commander Schofield, Capt. Magruder, Commander Sterling, Capt. Pratt, Capt. Plunkett. Estimates of local problems involving the Atlantic coast, the Caribbean area, the New York area were submitted by Commander Lanning and some of the above-mentioned officers. Reconciling the various estimates, the following decisions were reached.

I will tell you here was a case where the decision was countermanded by Admiral Benson directly.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not think you have given the date of that.

Capt. PRATT. I have not the date, but it was prior to the war.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you give the probable date?

Capt. PRATT. It was in February or March. It was a very serious oversight on my part not to date these plans, but not being a stenographer and typewriter I made that omission.

The CHAIRMAN. In each case I wish you would say whether it was prior to the war or not.

Capt. PRATT. This was prior to the war. [Reading:]

DECISIONS.

1. Send battleships and armored cruisers to Pacific in order to—

(a) Remove those types that can have no immediate military purpose as far from the submarine menace as possible.

(b) Place them where their potential as a fleet in being might be used to the best political advantage.

(c) Relieve vessels in the Pacific needed in the Atlantic to cope with the immediate situation.

(d) Allow battleships a free drill ground for bringing and keeping ships up to maximum efficiency.

(e) Remove the bad morale effect of practically interning our own battleships in the Atlantic seaports.

(f) Avoid the congestion at our navy yards consequent to preparing our coast defense districts, our gunboats and small cruisers, our patrol fleet, and destroyers for an active campaign in the Atlantic.

(g) Free certain auxiliary types, especially the destroyers and mining vessels, from their duty of guarding the fleet, and thus permitting them to operate actively against the enemy.

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2. Send the fleet train, or such portions of it as are necessary to subsist the battleships, to the Pacific.
3. Send the fleet submarines with the battleships to the Pacific.
4. Make the necessary arrangements for the navy yards on the west coast to undertake all the repairs to the battleships and armored cruisers it is possible for them to handle.
5. Retain all the other submarines in their present separate organization, and not under the coast defense districts.
6. Assign to the naval craft in the fitting out and repair work at the yards, necessary to put these craft in a position to cope with the immediate submarine warfare, the following order of precedence of work:
(*a*) Destroyers.
(*b*) Small craft, gunboats, cruisers.
(*c*) Submarines.
(*d*) Battleships.
(*e*) Fleet auxiliaries.
7. Send the fleet mining force to the coast defense districts to form the nucleus of the sweeping forces operating from there.
8. Distribute the Atlantic coast defense battleship division, to act as training ships for the naval personnel, mobilized in that district.
9. Organize the destroyer and remaining naval mobile forces into a patrol force to cooperate with the naval district forces in combatting the present submarine warfare.
10. Draw up a general plan of operations for this patrol force.
11. Issue to the patrol force the manual on submarine warfare prepared for the naval districts.
12. When the reserve battleship forces are put in condition in accordance with (d) or paragraph (6) to have them join the main fleet.
13. Keep the main forces of the marines where they are at present needed, but be prepared to supply the ships of the patrol force operating in the Gulf and Caribbean waters with marine guards.

The idea of not having that fleet sent to the Pacific was not because in a theoretical sense it was sound, but because there might be a lowering of the morale, and therefore, even though it might cause a certain amount of congestion at the navy yards, it was deemed wisest to have the fleet come north, and the decision was made by Admiral Benson, and it was undoubtedly a sound decision; to have done that would have relieved some of the congestion of the navy yard work on this side.

The next plan, which I have marked 7, was also before the war. It is as follows:

PLANS FOR—

Decision (9).—Organize the destroyer and remaining naval mobile forces into a patrol force to cooperate with the naval district forces in combating the present submarine warfare.
Decision (10).—Draw up a general plan of operations for this patrol force.
Missions.—No. (9). Organize the destroyer and remaining naval mobile forces into a patrol force to cooperate with the naval district forces in combating the present submarine warfare. No. (10). Draw up a general plan of operations for this patrol force.
From an estimate of the situation on No. (9), prepared by Commander Schofield, the following decisions are made:

DECISIONS TO (9). (ACTION TAKEN.)

(1) To base the organization of the patrol force upon the character of the work it may be called upon to do and upon an estimate of the probable localities of its operations.
(2) To keep in mind the apparent necessity for some sort of patrol and of escort for the merchant shipping entering and leaving our principal ports, a protection which will extend beyond the limits of efficient operation of the district forces.
(3) To base the assignment of ships to the organization upon the two most probable forms of duty a patrol force would be called upon to do: (a) Off shore or sea patrol, requiring a high degree of endurance, with normal low speeds; (b) escort duty, requiring a high degree of speed and mobility, but a lesser degree of sea endurance; and (c) a certain degree of immunity from submarine attack for each class.

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(4) That the principal areas of operation for the patrol force will be: (a) The Boston sea area; (b) the New York sea area; (c) the Delaware capes sea area; (d) the Chesapeake capes sea area; (e) the Key West sea area; and (f) the Canal Zone sea area.

(5) That the sea areas of minor importance are: (a) The Narragansett Bay sea area; (b) the Savannah and Charleston sea areas; (c) the New Orleans, Mobile, Pensacola, and Galveston sea areas; (d) the Mexican Gulf coast; (e) the Central American coast; (f) the Caribbean fringe of islands, and (g) the South American coast line to the Caribbean fringe.

(6). On the basis of the above requirements to organize the patrol force into six squadrons of three divisions each, with six vessels to a division. Total 111 craft when fully recruited.

(7) To assign to each squadron vessels of each type: (a) The low speed, high-endurance class; (b) the high speed, low-endurance class.

(8) To keep similar units together in divisions to facilitate their working in harmony and to interrupt to as slight a degree as possible the present fleet organizations, from which some of the units forming the patrol force are drawn.

(9) To assign competent leaders to each squadron.

(10) To assign a patrol force commander for the entire force.

(11) To enter the organization of the patrol force on the mobilization sheet.

From estimates of the situation based on the solution of the New York problem and the Caribbean area problem, the following decisions to (10) are arrived at:

DECISIONS TO (10). (ACTION TAKEN.)

(1) That the first best assignments of the patrol force would be as follows: (a) One squadron to the Boston sea area; (b) two squadrons to the New York sea area; (c) one squadron to Delaware Capes sea area; (d) one squadron to Chesapeake Capes sea area; (e) one squadron to Key West sea area.

(2) That the best normal position for the commander of the patrol force would be the New York sea area.

(3) That the normal line for the inshore patrol under the supervision of the coast defense districts, will extend to the 50-fathom curve.

(4) That where the water deepens to more than 50 fathoms after leaving the harbor entrances, the district patrols need not accompany, escort or patrol to a distance in excess of 45 miles, unless the waters to seaward of this limit are flanked by the mainland or are covered by a fringe of outlying islands.

(5) That the activities of the patrol forces begin where the jurisdiction of the coast defense districts cease.

(6) That the outer limits of escort and patrol, for the patrol force, will not at first extend beyond the longitude of the shoals on Georges Bank.

(7) That in the Caribbean problem, as it affects the Canal Zone, the outer limit of the most probable submarine efforts will not extend to the eastward of a line between Roncador Reef and Cartagena Harbor until the outer fringe of the Caribbean Islands is reached, when a second probable submarine area is liable to be encountered.

(8) That in the protection of shipping coming from and entering the Gulf of Mexico, a probable area of submarine operations lies in the Yucatan Channel, the Straits of Florida, and the waters between the Bahama Islands, the mainland, and Cuba.

(9) That the most probable basing spots for submarines are on the Cuban coast, the islands and reefs of the Caribbean and Gulf, the Central and South American coasts, and in the summer season the coasts of Maine and Nova Scotia.

(10) That the most probable areas of enemy submarine activities will always lie as close to the entrances and exits of the ports of shipping as the district patrol and sweeping operations render practicable.

(11) That the intensity of the submarine activities off any port will depend upon its maritime importance.

(12) That if its operations are discovered and its activities handicapped in any one area the submarine will transfer its activities to the nearest most likely area.

(13) That the probable number of enemy submarines now operating lies between 150 and 300, of which 200 is a fair probable estimate.

(14) That of this number probably not more than 75 will keep the sea at one time. That, of the 75 at sea, probably not more than 35 will ever be on this coast (including the Caribbean) at one time.

(15) For the purposes of training, and to familiarize officers with the probable situations that might arise, to submit problems to the commander of the patrol force and to his staff for solution.

The next plan, which I have marked 8, is a plan for organization of a patrol force. Admiral Wilson, before the war, organized the

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patrol force and put it into effect. (That is the organization showing the ships.) It flowed automatically from the preceding estimates we had made, and this put it into effect. I submit that plan.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the date of that?

Capt. PRATT. He joined sometime toward the end of March, and the plan was started sometime before he joined. It was before we entered the war. I do not know the date, but I know it was before the war and at the time he came up to take command.

(That plan is as follows:)

MEMORANDUM FOR CAPT. PRATT.

[Organization of patrol force, April 1, 1917: *Olympia*, flagship; *Panther*, destroyer tender; *Dixie*, destroyer tender.]

SQUADRON 1.

Division 1:
- Chester, flagship.
- Des Moines (special duty, Mediterranean).

Division 2:
- Smith.
- Flusser.
- Lamson.
- Preston.
- Reid.

SQUADRON 2.

Division 4:
- Birmingham, flagship.
- Sacramento (under repairs).

Division 5:
- Walke.
- Monaghan.
- Perkins.
- Roe.
- Sterett.
- Terry.

SQUADRON 3.

Division 7:
- Dolphin (Virgin Islands, temporary).
- Chattanooga.

Division 8:
- Warrington.
- Henley.
- Beale.
- Patterson.
- Mayrant (out of commission).

SQUADRON 4.

Division 10:
- Tacoma, flagship; Mexican patrol.
- Denver.

Division 11:
- Cummings.
- Ammen.
- Jarvis.
- Burrows.
- McCall.
- Fanning.

SQUADRON 5.

Division 13:
- Cleveland, flagship.
- Raleigh (under repairs, Mare Island).

Division 14:
- Cassin.
- Jouett.
- Trippe.
- Jenkins.
- Drayton.
- Paulding.

SQUADRON 6.

Division 16:
- Albany.
- New Orleans (under repairs, Puget Sound).

Division 17:
- Balch.
- Benham.
- Aylwin.
- Parker.
- Downes.
- Duncan.

MARCH 28, 1917.

To: Capt. Henry B. Wilson, United Stated Navy, commanding U. S. S. *Pennsylvania* (commander in chief, Atlantic Fleet).

Subject: Detached command of *Pennsylvania*; to command Patrol Force, Atlantic Fleet.

1. Upon the arrival of the *Pennsylvania* in American waters you will regard yourself detached from duty in command of that vessel; will proceed to Washington, D. C. and report Navy Department for temporary duty.

2. When so directed you will regard yourself relieved of this temporary duty, will proceed to such port in which the *Olympia* may be and assume command of the Patrol Force, Atlantic Fleet, *Olympia* flagship.

JOSEPHUS DANIELS.

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PATROL FORCE UNITED STATES FLEET,
U. S. S. "OLYMPIA," FLAGSHIP,
Fleet Base Three, April 9, 1917.

Campaign Order No. 1:
Forces:
(*a*) Northern Detachment, Capt. Jones, Squadron 1.
(*b*) Nantucket Detachment, Capt. Twining, Squadrons 2, 3.
(*c*) Delaware Detachment, Capt. Oman, Squadron 5.
(*d*) Chesapeake Detachment, Capt. Morgan, Squadron 6.
(*e*) Gulf Detachment, Capt. Johnson, Squadron 4.

1. No news regarding enemy forces.
2. This force will give maximum possible protection to trans-Atlantic commerce of the United States and to friendly powers in areas to seaward of and contiguous to areas guarded by naval district forces. Vessels shall on every occasion use all means within their power to capture or destroy every enemy submarine sighted.
3. (*a*) Northern Detachment: Guard area between lines bearing 135 through Cape Sable and Nantucket Shoal Lightship and Barnegat. Base, Boston and Portsmouth.
(*b*) Nantucket Detachment: Guard area between lines bearing 135 from Nantucket Shoal Lightship and Barnegat. Base, New York and Newport.
(*c*) Delaware Detachment: Guard area between lines bearing 135 from Barnegat and Assateague Light. Base, Hampton Roads.
(*d*) Chesapeake Detachment: Guard area between lines bearing 135 from Assateague Light. Base, Hampton Roads.
(*e*) Gulf Detachment: Guard area Florida Straits and Gulf of Mexico. Base, Key West and New Orleans.
(*x*) Proceed when ordered. Use 75 time.
4. Tenders: *Dixie*, base Key West; *Panther*, base Newport.
5. Cipher ROT.
Flag in *Olympia* bases vicinity of New York.

H. B. WILSON.

Subject: Instructions to vessels of patrol force.

1. Patrol commanders will patrol to the best advantage the areas assigned, with the view to safeguarding trans-Atlantic shipping and destroying enemy submarines sighted.
2. Make every effort to facilitate the passage of vessels through the patrolled area.
3. From sunset to sunrise ships to be darkened and lookouts stationed both aloft and on deck.
4. At all time of the day and night such portion of the battery to be manned and ready for use as is necessary to open fire instantly on a submarine sighted on any bearing.
5. The gun is the primary weapon against the submarine. but this is not to preclude the use of torpedoes when conditions warrant.
6. Visual signals will not be used at night except in cases of emergency, and then to be restricted to the use of blinker tube if possible.
7. Searchlights will not be used for search, but to illuminate a target already definitely located, and they should be turned off immediately when the target has disappeared.
8. Recognition signals as directed.
9. Radio: Every precaution shall be taken to ensure that unnecessary radio messages are not sent, and messages when sent should be as brief as possible. Use land lines and cable for communication rather than radio.
10. In case of reported contact with an enemy vessel, the two adjacent vessels will proceed to assist in hunting down the enemy, keeping lookout for possible mate.
11. The patrol force will cooperate with the commandants of the naval districts in every way.
12. Upon discovering a submarine by night a patrol boat may be able to get very close before being seen. An attempt to approach as close as possible shall be made before turning on a searchlight or firing guns. The submarine shall be stalked at night and surprised; wait until the patrol boat is nearly on top of the submarine before announcing the boat's presence by searchlight and gun. Care must be exercised that the object seen is certainly a submarine before making radio report, for this may tell the submarine that patrol boats are in its vicinity.
13. Consider any submarine hostile unless it is definitely known that our submarines are operating in the locality.
14. When a raider is reported the available vessels of the supports will be sent to sweep to the best advantage in the area under the supervision of the patrol force. If

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the raider is reported within a patrol area, the commander of the patrol will assist in the search within his own area, having due regard to his patrolling duties.

15. Vessels will continue the search until otherwise directed. When the officers conducting the search considers that further operations are not justified, he will request instructions for the force commander.

PATROL FORCE UNITED STATE FLEET,
U. S. S. Olympia, Flagship, April 17, 1917.

Campaign order No. 2.

Forces:

(*a*) Northern patrol, Capt. Jones, squadron 1.
(*b*) Nantucket patrol, Capt. Twining, squadron 2.
(*c*) Chesapeake patrol, Capt. Morgan, squadron 6.
(*d*) Southern patrol, Capt. Oman, squadron 5.
(*e*) Gulf patrol, Capt. Johnston, squadron 4.
(*f*) Caribbean patrol, Capt. Anderson, squadron 3.
(*g*) Supports, *Olympia*, *Columbia*, *Charleston*.

1. The area assigned to this force has been extended to include a portion of the Caribbean heretofore supervised by the French.

2. This force will furnish maximum possible protection to trans-Atlantic commerce of the United States and friendly powers in areas to seaward of and contiguous to areas guarded by naval district forces.

3. (*a*) Northern patrol: Guard area between lines bearing 90 from Cape Sable and 100 from Sankaty Head. Base, Boston and Portsmouth.

(*b*) Nantucket patrol: Guard area south of northern patrol to line bearing 110 from Absecon light. Base, New York and Newport.

(*c*) Chesapeake patrol: Guard area south of Nantucket patrol to line bearing 107 from Cape Canaveral. Base, Charleston.

(*d*) Southern patrol: Guard area south of Chesapeake patrol to line bearing 107 from Cape Canaveral. Base, Charleston.

(*e*) Gulf patrol: Guard area of the Bahamas south of Southern patrol north of latitude 23 and west of meridian 75, and the Gulf of Mexico. Base, Key West and New Orleans.

(*f*) Caribbean patrol: Guard area south of Gulf and Southern patrols, and the Caribbean west and north of a line from the Panama-Colombian boundary to the west point of Jamaica, thence along north coast of Jamaica, south coast of Haiti, Porto Rico, and Santa Cruz, through Anegada passage, and thence 84°. Base, Guantanamo, Canal Zone and St. Thomas.

(*g*) Supports: *Columbia* at Hampton Roads; *Charleston* at St. Thomas. Be prepared to operate at high speed on short notice as far as meridian 50. Keep full of fuel.

(*x*) Use every means to capture or destroy enemy submarines sighted.

Cooperate closely and constantly with the commandants of naval districts in adjustment of areas of operation, in exchange of information, and in routing outgoing and incoming merchant vessels. Tenders are available for repairs within their capacity. Effective noon, April 25. Proceed then. Use 75 time.

4. Tenders: *Dixie* at Key West; *Panther* at Newport.

5. Flag on *Olympia* vicinity New York.

Cipher as indicated.

H. B. WILSON.

Then here is a plan for making an estimate of the number and types of small craft necessary to obtain now, in addition to the naval craft already assigned, in order to put the coast-defense districts in a position to cope with the immediate situation, antisubmarine war. That plan is as follows:

PLAN FOR DECISION TO MAKE AN ESTIMATE OF THE NUMBERS AND TYPES OF SMALL CRAFT NECESSARY TO OBTAIN NOW, IN ADDITION TO THE NAVAL CRAFT ALREADY ASSIGNED, IN ORDER TO PUT THE COAST DEFENSE DISTRICTS IN A POSITION TO COPE WITH THE IMMEDIATE SITUATION, ANTISUBMARINE WAR.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF NAVAL AERONAUTICS,
Washington. D. C.

Action taken:

Mission.—To make an estimate of the numbers and types of small craft necessary to obtain now, in addition to the naval craft already assigned, in order to put the

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coast-defense districts in a position to cope with the immediate situation, antisubmarine war.

Following an estimate for the coast defense districts, from Eastport, Me., to Galveston, Tex., which involves not only (1) the establishing and protecting of lanes of trade from our principal shipping ports to the European Continent, but (2) takes into consideration some degree of protection for those ports not of the first importance, but still within the range of submarine activities, the following decisions to meet the immediate situation are made:

DECISIONS.

1. The most important duty is to protect the interests and shipping at the ports of Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and capes of the Chesapeake.

2. That a second but less important step is to protect the interests and shipping at the ports of, or sea areas in the vicinity of, Portland, Me., Narragansett Bay, Charleston, Savannah, Pensacola, Mobile, New Orleans, Port Arthur, and Galveston.

3. That certain harbor police (patrol) will be required for the four principal ports of shipping.

4. That some minor harbor police (patrol) will be required for the lesser important ports.

5. That in addition to the above port protection, and protection to the lanes of maritime travel (indicated as necessary for the four principal ports in decision (1) there will be required certain submarine base hunting operations, coming within the scope of activities of the Coast Defense districts, in the following areas: The coast of Maine; the Gulf of Mexico.

6. That to fulfill the duties outlined in the previous five paragraphs, there will be required in addition to the naval craft already available for use in the Coast Defense districts the following craft for the below-mentioned duties:

(*a*) Harbor entrance patrols (yachts, tugs preferable, or equivalent small craft, of good sea qualities, 50; (*b*) escort and patrol craft (for the four principal ports of shipping, fast sea keeping motor craft), 250; (*c*) sweepers and mine craft (for the four ports mentioned above, and for the east entrance of Long Island Sound—sea-going tugs only), 150; (*d*) harbor police patrol (for the four principal shipping ports, fast small motor craft), 60; (*e*) submarine base hunting craft (for the Gulf of Maine, 5 coast sections, 12 boats to a section, fast sea keeping motor craft or equivalent), 60; (*f*) submarine base hunting craft (for the Gulf of Mexico, from the west coast of Florida to Galveston, Tex., fast sea-keeping motor craft, or equivalent), 60; total, 630.

The plan which I have marked "10" was also some time before the war. It is as follows:

PLAN NO. 10.

MISSION—TO OUTLINE THE GENERAL SCHEME WHEREBY WE MAY FURNISH ASSISTANCE TO THE ALLIES IN THE SHAPE OF SMALL CRAFT WITHOUT INTERFERING TOO GREATLY WITH OUR OWN SIMILAR NEEDS AND WITHOUT DISRUPTING OUR OWN ORGANIZATIONS.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF NAVAL AERONAUTICS,
Washington.

CONCLUSIONS.

(1) A law to commandeer shipping should be enacted.

(2) Vessels are divided into the following general classes:
- (*a*) Purely naval.
- (*b*) Pleasure craft.
- (*c*) Merchant shipping necessary to the overseas traffic.
- (*d*) Commercial craft, more or less vital to home needs.

(3) The craft from which we may choose vessels to send to the Allies, outside of class (*a*), (purely naval), for patrol purposes, in conformity with the above mission, must come out of classes (*b*) and (*d*).

(4) All of class (*b*) not absolutely needed at home can be spared.

(5) Only so many of class (*d*), which includes tugs and trawlers, as can be spared, should be sent.

(6) Class (*b*) includes craft fit for deep-sea work and having good radius of action. It also includes those fit only for near-shore work, with short radius of action.

(7) To meet the present need:
- (*a*) Do not break up existing naval organizations.
- (*b*) Inspect all pleasure and merchant craft and classify.

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(7) To meet the present need—Continued.
(c) Commandeer all pleasure craft (class (b)), that will be needed to fill up the needs of naval districts, patrol force, and distant service.
(d) Take into naval districts all the pleasure craft (class (b)) that are not sea keeping, and have not a radius of 1,500 miles, that the districts may need; also take into the district forces as many of the tugs and trawlers (class (d)) as trade and fishing can spare.
(e) Draft into the patrol force all of class (b) having over 1,500 miles radius of endurance, and good sea keeping qualities.
(f) When necessary to send a patrol force abroad, take from the patrol force on this side, and augment it, with the maximum number of tugs (class (d)) the naval districts can spare.
(g) If practicable, do not attempt to form new forces, but first increase the present organizations. Utilize their efforts for perfecting the unit organizations now in existence. When needed, detail one or more complete units for special service abroad.
(h) Speed up the drafting into service of the small craft needed.
(i) Build tugs and trawlers.

Plan No. 11 was also before the war. Admiral McKean would know more about just when that would come than I would. That plan is as follows:

PLAN NO. 11.

MISSION—DIRECT THE POLICY OF OUR NAVAL BASES AS TO THEIR REPAIR, RESERVE OPERATING, AND SUPPLY FACILITIES TO MEET THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS (1) THE NEEDS OF THE IMMEDIATE SITUATION; (2) THE FUTURE NEEDS.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF NAVAL AERONAUTICS,
Washington.

Following general estimates of the situation, made by Capt. McKean, the Commission on Yards and Bases, and other officers, the following tentative decisions are reached:

DECISIONS—IMMEDIATE NEEDS.

(1) That the repair facilities of all our yards on the Atlantic coast will require expansion.
(2) To meet present needs, repair and supply, as navy-yard assets, are much more important factors than building.
(3) That in the conduct of any war the repair facilities of our navy yards will be so taxed as to leave little room for construction.
(4) That if the fleet is to be sent north and is to stay there, the repair facilities of the New York strategic area and of the Chesapeake Bay strategic area will have to be enlarged to meet the extra demands that will be made on them.
(5) That the navy yards should be used first for legitmiate naval needs, assigned in the order of present importance.
(6) To meet the needs of the naval districts, recourse should be had to civil repair facilities (as far as practicable) whenever the mobile repair facilities assigned to a district are not adequate.
(7) That if the major ships on the Atlantic coast which serve no particularly useful war purpose at present were removed to the Pacific, it would greatly facilitate the ability of the Atlantic yards to cope with the repair needs of ships that were useful in waging submarine warfare.
(8) That if the major ships are transferred to the Pacific immediate steps will have to be taken to put the Puget Sound area and the San Francisco area in a position to adequately care for them.
(9) That to meet the immediate situation, in addition to enlarging the repair facilities of the present yards, there will be required new bases, or a great expansion of the facilities of the old bases, as follows, in the order of their importance:
(a) New York—Long Island Sound area—Main reserve, repair, supply base—An enlargement or extension of present facilities, within area—First-class base.
(b) Chesapeake Bay area—Main reserve, repair, and supply base—An enlargement, or extension of present facilities within area—First-class base.

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(9) That to meet the immediate situation, etc.—Continued.
(c) Key West area—Operation base, with limited repair and supply facilities, for fleet and submarine operations—Second-class base.
(d) Aviation bases (at selected spots).
In addition to present facilities, and those mentioned above under Immediate Needs, there will be required at the place mentioned, bases of the character specified:
(e) New London—Main submarine base—First-class base.
(f) Charleston, S. C.—Main submarine base—First-class base.
(g) Culebra, St.—Advance fleet and submarine operating Thomas area. Base—Second-class base.
(h) Canal Zone—Main fleet and submarine operating base—First-class base.
(i) San Francisco—Main fleet base—First-class base.
(j) San Diego, San Pedro area—Main submarine base—First-class base.
(k) Guam—Advance fleet and submarine operating base—Second-class base.
(l) Aviation bases (at selected spots).
(m) Coast-type submarine bases—(For a limited local defense at certain straegic and advanced positions, beyond quick supporting distance of our coast and forces).

Senator PITTMAN. Captain, this was all prior to the war?

Capt. PRATT. Yes; all prior to the war.

The CHAIRMAN. And so were all the other plans that you have submitted?

Capt. PRATT. Yes; they followed logically up. I wrote these myself, and I am quite sure that I am correct.

Next is this plan which I have marked 12:

PLAN NO. 12.

MISSION—TO PLAN FOR THE EXPENDITURE OF THE NAVAL EMERGENCY FUND SO AS BEST TO SUPPLEMENT CURRENT APPROPRIATIONS FOR A PERIOD OF SIX MONTHS.

(1) Purchase patrol vessels and yachts for inshore and offshore patrol and fit them out	$25,000,000
(2) Build 250 110-foot, 18-knot patrol vessels and fit them out	25,000,000
(3) Provide additional guns and ammunition as circumstances indicate	5,000,000
(4) Purchase 100 pairs of mine sweepers and fit them out	10,000,000
(5) Rush work on present dirigibles and build 24 more	1,500,000
(6) Erect air patrol stations as per report of Joint Army and Navy Board	1,500,000
(7) Provide bases, floating or ashore, as circumstances require, for patrol forces	5,000,000
(8) Provide antisubmarine nets and torpedo nets	5,000,000
(9) Provide 1,000 buoys, anchors, and chains to make lanes and patrol areas	500,000
(10) Speed up construction of 3 battleships nearest completion, all authorized destroyers, and all authorized submarines	10,000,000
(11) Additional storehouses and depots	5,000,000
(12) Technical experts, draftsmen, clerks, and other necessary personnel	250,000
(13) Lay down immediately as many destroyers as shipyards can handle	10,750,000
(14) Balance available	10,500,000

The CHAIRMAN. These plans were all yours, were they not, Capt. Pratt?

Capt. PRATT. Not alone mine. I wrote them. They were worked up in conjunction with any officer who had any knowledge on that particular subject. They were worked mostly with Capt. Schofield, Capt. Scott, and myself.

The CHAIRMAN. But they were put in by you?

Capt. PRATT. They were put in by me; and one reason why I bring them up is because I was later called upon to execute the very plans that I had been drawing up, so that I knew something about what we were going to do.

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I present plan No. 13, mission to establish a policy with reference to the use of mines in the present emergency.

This also, I think, was a plan which was made before the war, because the preliminary discussions of the plans for the northern barrage began by conversations which took place between the officer who was later responsible for most of the work, Commander Fullenweider, in conference with the planning section in Operations.

This plan is as follows:

PLAN NO. 13.

MISSION—ESTABLISH A POLICY WITH REFERENCE TO THE USE OF MINES IN THE PRESENT EMERGENCY.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF NAVAL AERONAUTICS,
Washington.

(3)–P. Mission: Establish a policy with reference to the use of mines in the present emergency.

Following an estimate of the situation by Capt. Pratt, the following decisions are reached:

DECISIONS.

(1) That for the purposes of a pure defense, a passive defense can be made more certain than an active offense.

(2) That for the purposes of an efficient offense, a mobile offense is better than an immobile offense.

(3) Keeping the above doctrine in mind, that our objectives in mining are (*a*) to absolutely protect certain valuable floating and shore facilities lying within vulnerable seacoast areas; (*b*) not to handicap the ingress and egress of war and merchant vessels, of our own or of our allies, from certain important ports or sea areas; (*c*) to facilitate every offensive effort that can be made against the enemy submarine, without restricting the activities of any of our vessels participating in this work.

(4) That the best positions in which to employ offensive mining against submarines is directly off their permanent or home bases.

(5) That there are no sea areas on this side of the Atlantic answering the character of permanent or home hostile submarine bases, though there are probably sea areas which could well answer the purposes of temporary bases.

(6) To use only mines that can be controlled or removed at any time, for offensive mining.

(7) To use defensive mines to as limited an extent as possible, and then only when other means such as very heavy nets, gates, and obstructions are impracticable.

(8) That to be an adequate protection to a harbor (since the submarine can cut any wire net), a net must be exceedingly strong and made of other material than wire.

(9) That owing to the impracticability of establishing permanent or movable barriers at all the necessary ports or sea areas, defensive mining will have to be resorted to in certain localities.

(10) Be prepared to adopt the following policy at the below-named ports. In adopting this policy (*a*) the definite obstruction should be given the first consideration; (*b*) the mine field should be considered as an adjunct to the definite obstruction, and used only where it is impracticable to do otherwise.

(*a*) Kennebec River: Movable heavy gate of logs and chains, moved by tugs.

(*b*) Portland, Me: Same. Stop any entrances except one.

(*c*) Portsmouth, N. H.: Same.

(*d*) Boston, Mass.: Block two entrances permanently, use heavy gate across other. Mine flats where necessary.

(*e*) Narragansett and Buzzards Bay: Mine.

(*f*) Long Island Sound: Mine heavily, Race Rock to Little Gull. Obstruct all entrances to Fishers Island Sound except one. Gate that. Mine heavily, Little Gull to Gardiners Island, leaving heavy gate entrance off the old fort, on end of Gardiners Island. Use Plum Gut-Gardiners Island passage. Throw heavy gate net across East River near Throgs Neck.

(*g*) New York entrance south: Block Gedney and Swash Channels. Place heavy log and chain gate across Ambrose Channel. Mine the flats.

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(*h*) Delaware Bay entrance: Heavily mine across the entrance Cape May toward Cape Henlopen. Leave entrance and exit via a movable heavy log and chain gate near Henlopen.

(*i*) Philadelphia, Wilmington, Chesapeake and Delaware Canal entrance: Mine flats below canal and establish heavy log and chain movable barrier across narrowest part of channel adjacent to mine fields.

(*j*) Chesapeake Bay entrance: Mine heavily across from Cape Charles to Cape Henry. Establish entrance and exit near Cape Henry via a heavy movable log and chain gate. Net Hampton Roads.

(*k*) Baltimore: Mine across flats near North Point to channel. Gate the channel.

(*l*) Washington: Gate the Potomac near Sheridan Point.

(*m*) Charleston and Savannah: Heavy movable gate obstructions near the breakwaters.

(*n*) Key West, Mobile, Pensacola, Galveston: Establish heavy mobile gate obstructions to channel near entrances. Mine shoals and flats adjacent as necessary.

(*o*) New Orleans: Obstruct two entrances. Use heavy mobile gate for third channel.

(*p*) Port Arthur: Establish heavy mobile gate for channel.

(11) That the above-named ports should receive the first and immediate consideration, and arrangements be made locally, for putting the above or similar policy into effect.

(12) If it develops that other localities require defensive mining, arrangements should be made through the district commandant for same, but that it should be remembered, defensive mining and obstruction is adopted (*a*) to protect certain areas which are the logical submarine objectives; (*b*) that a measure of defensive mining and obstruction relieves the patrol forces, from a passable defensive patrol, and allows them, to a greater measure, to operate offensively and actively against the submarine; (*c*) that defensive mining in localities where there is no apparent submarine objective, other than temporary basing, is apt to be more harmful to our own forces than to the enemy; (*d*) that to attempt to adopt defensive mining in localities which might be used for temporary submarine bases, is too elusive an objective.

(13) That for the present the use of offensive mining against the submarine, by any except the most mobile and controlled of mines, is too passable an offensive, to give efficient results, in view of the great areas over which the submarine can operate.

(14) That the submarine is only a mobile mine, and that the principles involved in the destruction of a mine field (*a*) locating; (*b*) sweeping; (*c*) counter mining, though more difficult of execution, are nevertheless the correct principles to adopt against the submarine.

(15) That until more definite data on the subject is received, the antisubmarine efforts of all craft be as actively offensive in character as practicable, and that the efforts of all craft, except those used in safeguarding, shipping and port entrances, and police duties, be directed towards:

(*a*) Scouting for and marking down submarines, their bases and their mines. And to draw a cordon around said craft, by search-curve methods, in order to establish a limit within certain times, beyond which said submarine once marked, can not be.

(*b*) Day air reconnaissance: For locating submarines in conjunction with surface craft.

(*c*) Sweeping for submarines and for their mines with grapnels, anchors, sweeps, mines, or torpedoes, with the object (once the submarine is marked down) of (*a*) locating, (*b*) destroying either under water or on the surface.

(*d*) Trapping: By the use of indicator nets.

(*e*) Bombing: By the use of water bombs set for varying depths, and used abundantly in the suspected areas where a submarine is located.

(*f*) Gunning: For surface submarines.

(16) That our own submarines, being merely safe mobile mines, should not be used by us (in an active sea offensive) against the enemy submarines until their rôle can be proven to be more actively mobile and offensive, and less immobile and passive, than it is at present, since such use would serve to handicap the activities of our own craft, which can inaugurate a more active offensive at sea. That if our submarines are to be used offensively against the present enemy, their best use will be as an offensive mobile mine, close up against the enemy probable basing spots, effecting with their torpedoes what the allies are attempting to do with their policy of fixed mines in the neighborhood of and across the entrances to the submarine home and fixed bases.

(17) That at his bases, and perhaps on the open sea, the submarine, may be more likely to be caught off his guard, at night, than in the daytime.

Very rough sketch for use of towed mines or water bombs by destroyers or submarine chasers.

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That plan goes definitely into details more in relation to what we should do on our own coast. It is very general as to our operations abroad and only later do they come to a definite conclusion in the plan for the northern barrage, which is a separate proposition.

The CHAIRMAN. These are still plans that were submitted before the war?

Capt. PRATT. Yes; this was one, also. When I come to the others, I will tell you; because we started armed guards before we actually went into the war. But this plan, I think, is even preliminary to the details that Capt. Scott worked out, and which I submitted to you as the armed-guard plan.

The CHAIRMAN. And the same applies as to being all before the war, to all you have read heretofore?

Capt. PRATT. Yes; to all that I have read heretofore, as well as to these. This plan, No. 14, is as follows:

PLAN NO. 14.

MISSION—TO INDICATE THE STEPS TENDING TO MAKE LIFE, SHIPS, PROPERTY OF VESSELS CARRYING ARMED GUARDS SELF-PROTECTING.

CONCLUSIONS.

(1) That in addition to providing guns and efficient armed guards for merchant ships, in order for them to act offensively—defensively against submarines—it is also equally necessary to take purely defensive measures to safeguard (*a*) life; (*b*) property (including the ship itself), carried by these merchant vessels.

(2) The first steps taken must concern those vessels now actually engaged in commerce.

(3) Inspection of the reports and accounts of the sinkings of the *Astec*, *Vacuum*, *Rockingham* lead to two conclusions: (*a*) The armed guard was not efficient (shown in the case of the *Rockingham*, by not immediately attempting to avoid an unknown possible danger); (*b*) The life-saving apparatus is not efficient (indicated in reports of the *Astec* and in newspaper accounts of the lack of seaworthiness of the *Vacuum's* boats).

(4) The first step necessary after providing adequate guns and instructions, is to furnish a personnel capable of handling the guns and of understanding the instructions.

(5). The second step is to give the commander of the armed guard authority to carry the instructions out. This implies naval control of merchant shipping furnished with armed guards.

(6). The third step consists in making the merchant ships provide themselves, or to provide them with (*a*) efficient lifeboats; (*b*) excess life rafts in case the weather boats are stove in; (*c*) efficient life belts; (*d*) proper equipment for the lifeboats, especially in the matter of ration (such as the Navy emergency ration). In the case of lifeboats probably the most efficient type for the service required is the old type lifeboat used in the Life-Saving Service.

(7). The final step concerns (*a*) the new construction planned for; (*b*) the construction already built but under repair (such as the seized German ships). These ships must be made as unsinkable as human ingenuity can devise. This is essential.

I do not know whether this was before or after the war. The plan is to make an estimate of the number of merchant ships for such service that it might be necessary to commission as naval auxiliaries to cooperate with the Allies in protecting shipping from German raiders. It has nothing to do with the antisubmarine campaign. This plan is as follows:

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PLAN NO. 14.

ISSION—TO MAKE AN ESTIMATE OF THE NUMBER OF MERCHANT SHIPS FIT FOR SUCH SERVICE IT MIGHT BE NECESSARY TO COMMISSION AS NAVAL AUXILIARIES TO COOPERATE WITH THE ALLIES IN PROTECTING SHIPPING FROM GERMAN RAIDERS.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF NAVAL AERONAUTICS,
Washington.

CONCLUSIONS.

(1) In forming an estimate, to divide the ocean into the following areas which it night be considered advisable for the United States to guard, in addition to the present forces in Asiatic waters.

(*a*) North Atlantic to the Azores and to O. Lat.
(*b*) South Atlantic, O. Lat. to Cape Horn.
(*c*) North Pacific to Honolulu—Aleutian Islands to O. Lat.
(*d*) South Pacific to Tutuila—O. Lat. to Cape Horn.
(*e*) West Coast of Africa to reinforce allies.

(2) To estimate on the division of three ships as a working unit, and to determine upon the probable working bases within each area assigned, as follows:

(*a*) North Atlantic to the Azores and to O. Lat.
(1) 1 division to base—Halifax or Bermuda.
(2) 1 division to base—St. Thomas or Trinidad.
(3) 1 division to base at the Azores.
Total, 9 ships.

(*b*) South Atlantic—O. Lat. to Cape Horn.
(1) 1 division to base at Bahia or Rio, British or French Guiana.
(2) 1 division to base at the Falklands or River Platte.
Total, 6 ships.

(*c*) North Pacific to Honolulu—Aleutians to O. Lat.
(1) 1 division to base at San Francisco, Puget Sound, and Mexican coast.
(2) 1 division to base at Honolulu.
(3) 1 division to base at Panama.
Total, 9 ships.

(*d*) S. Pacific to Tutuila—0. Lat. to Cape Horn.
(1) 1 division to base at Tutuila, Fiji, New Zealand, and Australia.
(2) 1 division to base at Panama, Guayaquil, Callao, and other South America ports if possible.
Total, 6 ships.

(*e*) West Coast Africa to reinforce allies.
(1) 1 division base at Cape de Verdes.
(2) 1 division to base at Cape Town.
Total, 6 ships.
Grand total, 36 ships.

(3) That this work should be attempted by an offensive force additional to the patrol and escort force, whose work is in the nature of close in protection for our coasts and the shipping in its vicinity.

(4) That to meet the above demand there are at present the following classes of naval vessels available: Mobilization plan, scout force, divisions 1, 2, 3, 4, and the *Columbia*. In addition (if properly fitted with heavier battery) there are the 3 ships of the transport class (though it might be wiser to hold in reserve 2 of this class, as destroyer tenders, in view of the great increase in destroyer building). Total naval ships available, 16.

(5) That therefore there would be required 20 merchant ships to be fitted as naval auxiliaries in case the above plan in all its details were carried out.

(6) That therefore 20 to 23 merchant ships (preferably interned ships) of high speed, long endurance, capable of carrying a sufficiently powerful battery of 50-caliber 5-inch, be inspected, put in readiness, and taken over as naval auxiliaries.

(7) That until such time as these ships be actually required for active cruising work they be operated by the Navy in the service of logistics.

(8) That such vessels, when so armed and operated by naval forces in the service of logistics, are always their own protection against the ordinary raider.

Here is a very detailed plan of operations. This is after the war was declared.

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Senator PITTMAN. About what date, Captain? Could you approximate it?

Capt. PRATT. Some time in April, very early, because the immediate necessity showed itself of being able to place guns on a great many ships, and we therefore had to take secondary batteries from other ships, and that is the reason why, as Admiral Fullam has stated in his testimony, guns were taken from the Pacific ships, and it became necessary, and not only was it necessary but we found that that was a policy which was a good one, and it is being carried on at present, for the simple reason that those lower-deck guns were close to the sea, and it was found that in rough weather the lower ports of the ship were apt to be flooded. And not only did that policy meet the war needs, but that is carried on to-day in most ships, and those guns have never been replaced, because it is better to keep them off.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you mean by saying that the ports were flooded?

Capt. PRATT. In rough weather the sea would come in and sweep the lower deck and come down below; that is, if you had to fight. If you could go into action with all your ports closed and all your hatches battened down, you would not be flooded so much, although the guns would be useless from having the seas sweeping over. That was an error; or I will not say an error, because it was the thought of the day when those ships were built, and they were as good as or better than any of the ships like them in foreign navies that were built before we took to heart the lesson of the sinking of these vessels under Admiral Craddock off the coast of South America, and that was one of the principal reasons for their sinking, that they could not fight in a very heavy seaway, and we had to take that into consideration almost immediately.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you call the lower decks?

Capt. PRATT. What we mean by the lower decks are the main decks; below the turret guns. Our older battleships had that.

We had an estimate of 423 ships that would have to be armed. This plan is as follows:

PLAN NO. 15.

MISSION—TO OUTLINE THE GENERAL PLAN WHEREBY THE NAVAL VESSELS MAY BE REQUISITIONED FOR GUNS TO PLACE ON MERCHANT SHIPPING.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF NAVAL AERONAUTICS,
Washington.

Following an estimate of the situation, based on estimates by Capt. Plunkett, Commander Scott, and Lieut. Pickering, of the Bureau of Ordnance, the following general conclusions were reached.

CONCLUSIONS.

(1) To establish a general policy for the immediate requisitioning of naval guns.

(2) To base the requisitioning on the number of merchant ships that may have to be supplied.

(3) First to remove all the 6 and 3 pounder guns and hold them for the use of the small craft in the naval districts.

(4) In requisitioning guns from a ship, follow this plan: Call for a ship to supply a certain number of guns, and specify the caliber, but leave the decision of the guns to be selected to the individual ship.

(5) In taking or leaving guns, the following rules to be observed: (1) Take those guns of the medium calibers, which interfere most with the fire of guns better placed;

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(2) take those guns which can best be spared, having in mind the probable duty of the ship; (3) leave only the minimum number of the smallest caliber guns, that might be needed for a possible submarine defense.

(6) That the order of precedence in removing guns from classes of ships should be generally as follows:

(*a*) The guns held in reserve.

(*b*) The guns of the T. D. battery assigned to the new dreadnaughts.

(*c*) Guns from the ships of the Coast Defense Division, not likely to engage in active operations.

(*d*) Guns from the old battleships, A class.

(*e*) Guns from the scouts (armored and protected cruisers), certain ships in the destroyer flotilla, patrol forces, and train, when the ships are available, for the purpose of removing guns.

(*f*) Guns from the T. D. battery of the dreadnoughts, AA class.

(7) That naval auxiliaries (which is to include all merchant shipping taken into the naval service for naval uses) should be armed with no less than four high-powered guns (preferably of a standard type, such as the T. D. battery of the dreadnoughts).

(8) That armed merchant ships should carry, if possible, four guns and never less than two guns, adequate for the purpose assigned.

(9) A general estimate of the shipping (merchant) that might have to be considered in the arming problem, taken from Commander Scott's paper, is as follows:

Class (1). Those engaged in present Atlantic trade, 70.

Class (2). Those in other trades that might be diverted to the Atlantic, 175.

Class (3). Included in class 2.

Class (4). Vessels that might be taken over as naval auxiliaries:

(*a*) Merchant ships, 50.

(*b*) Yachts (for the patrol force), 50.

(*c*) Coast Guard, 12.

(*d*) Army transports, 14.

Class (5). Available German ships, 102.

Class (6). Vessels enrolled in naval districts.

Class (7). Vessels in the United States coast trade, 165.

Class (8). Vessels in the Pacific trade, 80.

Class (9). New building program (wooden ships), 1,000.

Total that may have to be provided for in the immediate future, classes (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), 423.

(10) Following the principles laid down in conclusion 5, the below guns in each class of ship indicated in conclusion 6 are believed to be available.

Class (*a*) Guns now in reserve (including *Memphis* and *Milwaukee*), 6-inch, 43; 5-inch, 68; 4-inch, 88; 3-inch, 88.

Class (*b*). Guns T. D. battery for dreadnoughts AA building.

In reserve, .50-caliber, 5-inch: *California* and *Tennessee*, 44; *New Mexico*, *Idaho*, and *Mississippi*, 66: total, 110.

Class (*c*). Guns from the Coast Defense Divisions:

Ship.	Take guns.	Leave guns.
Massachusetts	8 3-inch	4 3-inch.
Indiana	8 3-inch	4 3-inch.
Iowa	6 4-inch	4 4-inch.
Oregon	8 3-inch	4 3-inch.
Chicago	6 4-inch	6 4-inch.
Total	24 3-inch; 12 4-inch	12 3-inch; 10 4-inch.

Class (*d*). Guns from battleships A class:

DIVISION 1.

Ship.	Take guns.	Leave guns.
Alabama	6 6-inch	4 3-inch; 8 6-inch.
Illinois	6 6-inch	4 3-inch; 8 6-inch.
Kentucky	6 5-inch	10 5-inch.
Kearsarge	6 5-inch	10 5-inch.
Total	12 6-inch, 12 5-inch	8 3-inch.

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DIVISION 2.

Ship.	Take guns.	Leave guns.
Ohio	6 6-inch	6 3-inch, 10 6-inch.
Maine	6 6-inch	6 3-inch, 10 6-inch.
Missouri	6 6-inch	6 3-inch, 10 6-inch.
Wisconsin	6 6-inch	4 3-inch; 8 6-inch.
Total	24 6-inch	22 3-inch.

DIVISION 3.

New Jersey	4 3-inch	6 3-inch; 12 6-inch.
Virginia	4 3-inch	6 3-inch; 12 6-inch.
Rhode Island	4 3-inch	6 3-inch; 12 6-inch.
Nebraska	4 3-inch	6 3-inch; 12 6-inch.
Georgia	4 3-inch	6 3-inch; 12 6-inch.
Total	20 3-inch	24 3-inch.

DIVISION 4.

Minnesota	10 3-inch	6 3-inch; 12 7-inch.
Louisiana	10 3-inch	6 3-inch.
Kansas	10 3-inch	6 3-inch.
New Hampshire	10 3-inch	6 3-inch.
Total	40 3-inch	24 3-inch.

DIVISION 5.

Connecticut	10 3-inch	6 3-inch; 12 7-inch.
Vermont	10 3-inch	6 3-inch; 12 7-inch.
Michigan	10 3-inch	12 3-inch.
South Carolina	10 3-inch	12 3-inch.
Total	40 3-inch	36 3-inch.
Grand total, class (*d*)	36 6-inch; 12 5-inch; 100 3-inch	114 3-inch.

Class (*e*). Guns from the scouts (armored and protected cruisers), destroyer flotilla, patrol force, and train.

SCOUT FORCE, DIVISION 1.

Ship.	Take guns.	Leave guns.
Charleston	12 3-inch	6 3-inch.
St. Louis	12 3-inch	6 3-inch.
Total	24 3-inch	12 3-inch.

DIVISION 2.

San Diego	10 3-inch	6 3-inch.
South Dakota	10 3-inch	6 3-inch.
Frederick	10 3-inch	6 3-inch.
Total	30 3-inch	18 3-inch.

DIVISION 3.

Pueblo	10 3-inch	6 3-inch
Pittsburgh	10 3-inch	6 3-inch.
Huntington	10 2-inch	6 3-inch.
Total	30 3-inch	18 3-inch.

DIVISION 4.

Saratoga	8 3-inch	0 3-inch; 10 5-inch.
Montana	10 3-inch	8 3-inch.
North Carolina	12 3-inch	8 3-inch.
Total	30 3-inch	24 3-inch.

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PATROL FORCE.

Ship.	Take guns.	Leave guns.
Dixie	2 3-inch	8 3-inch, but at least 2 5-inch guns should be added to battery.
Salem	8 3-inch; 2 5-inch	0 3-inch and 5-inch.
Total	8 3-inch; 2 5-inch.	

DESTROYER FORCE.

Seattle	10 3-inch	8 3-inch.

TRAIN.

Prairie	2 3-inch	8 3-inch.
Hancock		6 3-inch.
Buffalo		6 4-inch.
		But at least 2 5-inch guns should be added to battery of all these ships on active duty.
Total	2 3-inch	
Grand total, class (*e*)	2 5-inch; 126 3-inch	72 3-inch available.

Class (*f*) guns from the T. D. Battery of the dreadnaught AA Class:

DIVISION 6.

Ship.	Take guns.	Leave guns.
Pennsylvania	8 5-inch	14 5-inch.
New York	8 5-inch	13 5-inch.
Texas	8 5-inch	13 5-inch.
Delaware	4 5-inch	10 5-inch.
Oklahoma	8 5-inch	13 5-inch.
Totals	36 5-inch	63 5-inch.

DIVISION 7.

Arkansas	8 5-inch	13 5-inch.
North Dakota	4 5-inch	10 5-inch.
Florida	6 5-inch	10 5-inch.
Utah	6 5-inch	10 5-inch.
Total	24 5-inch	43 5-inch.

DIVISION 8.

Wyoming	8 5-inch	13 5-inch.
Nevada	8 5-inch	13 5-inch.
Arizona	8 5-inch	13 5-inch.
Total	24 5-inch	39 5-inch.
Grand total, class (*f*)	84 5-inch	145 5-inch.

(11) The following is the approximate general total of guns available for use on the basis of the above policy:

	6-inch.	5-inch.	4-inch.	3-inch.
Class (*a*), reserve	43	68	88	88
Class (*b*), new dreadnoughts		110		
Class (*c*), Coast Defense			12	24
Class (*d*), battleships A	36	12		100
Class (*e*), scouts		2		126
Class (*f*), dreadnoughts AA		84		
Total	79	276	100	338

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Or a total of 793 guns of all classes which can be spared for merchant ships or auxiliaries in addition to the low-velocity 3-inch, which are adapted for the naval district craft and are not here considered.

(12) The following is the grand total of 3-inch and 4-inch guns left on the naval vessels above enumerated (those not enumerated not coming in the classes considered eligible for requisitioning for guns), which might at the expense of a portion of their submarine defense be spared if it were deemed advisable to draft all the 3-inch and 4-inch guns from the A, B, and C classes (battleships, armored cruisers, scouts, and cruisers), 3-inch, 198; 4-inch, 4.

(13) Experience, limited to the few armed American ships that have crossed the Atlantic, indicates that a smaller caliber gun, like a 3-inch, which can easily and quickly be handled in a seaway on a ship that rolls and pitches in any moderate seaway, is more useful than a more powerful larger caliber gun, but one more difficult to handle as an antisubmarine menace.

DECISION—(3)—D—IMMEDIATE MISSION.

Adopt the policy that our merchant marine shall be protected against antisubmarine warfare to the utmost and its aims directed toward furthering the immediate needs of our cooperating allies and our own future needs.

MEMORANDUM RE PAPER OF MR. F. H. FORD TO THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY—"IMPORTANCE OF NOW CONSTRUCTING THEREIN (UNITED STATES) A MODERN UNITED STATES MERCHANT MARINE."

The accompanying paper seems in the main thoroughly sound.

In particular is the premise on page 1, and the remarks on pages 8 and 11 concurred in.

On page 6, at the bottom of the page, the proposition to limit naval construction to 350,000 tons might be all that is absolutely required for the present needs, but this set figure should not be the basis for new naval construction.

Except for the battleships almost completed, which it is believed should be pushed to completion, the naval demands on construction should be limited to destroyers, chasers, submarines. The first two are indispensable in meeting the submarine menace, as they are the only types now known that the submarine has any fear of or which can conduct offensive operations against the submarine.

As for the submarine itself, this type is necessary for our reserve strength in case the present war ends unfavorably for the Allies. Were it an assured fact that we could (through satisfactory arrangements with our Allies) count on an adequate allied lump tonnage in submarines, turned over to the United States for her own use, in case the United States were left to push the present war through, we might dispense with submarine building, but the question is too uncertain, and in this one reserve of naval craft the United States must be in a position, if this war ends unfavorably for the Allies, to impose upon Germany, with our submarines, the same conditions she seeks to now impose upon the Allies. Hence, the need of the three naval types, destroyers, chasers, submarines, and the limits to tonnage, should be what the situation seems to demand—350,000 may be ample, for example:

100 destroyers, at 1,200 tons, is	120,000
34 submarines, at 850 tons, is	29,000
Total	149,000

leaving approximately 200,000 tons surplus, which represents over 235 850-ton submarines, or otherwise as needed.

It would seem unwise not to complete the almost completed battleships; of which there are only three. Besides having a reserve fighting value, these vessels have, at a pinch, carrying capacity either in a supply or transport sense, and it would seem unwise to waste the efforts already spent on them.

Apart from the above naval types, and with the exceptions above noted, the accompanying paper is thoroughly concurred in.

Not only should all construction effort be directed toward the construction of merchant tonnage, but the present facilities should be increased to the limit.

Last, but not least, every effort should be devoted to producing a merchant ship which, not only through inner compartmentation, but by outer torpedo exploders, such as blisters, outer-hung plates, lattice framing, etc., be made as nonsinkable as possible. The mission should be, speed in construction—nonsinkable construction.

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This effort would not only protect the merchant tonnage building, but would also tend to relieve the demands of naval ship construction in the matter of small anti-submarine craft.

W. V. P.

Next, I present the mobilization sheet of April 6, 1917.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you give the probable date on all of these?

Capt. PRATT. Plan 15, the last that I read, was after the war was declared.

This is the mobilization sheet of April 6, 1917. I happen to have that date. The order went out to mobilize on that date. It gives the assignment and location of each ship, with the name and type.

The CHAIRMAN. Does it give the material and personnel conditions of each ship at that type?

Capt. PRATT. No; it does not do that, because it is a mobilization sheet. The repair sheet Admiral McKean has, showing the exact condition on that date of each ship. Those five blue books that I gave you yesterday show, at the places where I put slips between the leaves, at each date, February 1, March 1, April 1, just the condition, and whether the ships were in condition, due to matériel and personnel, because it is a Bureau of Navigation pamphlet. That will show you exactly the material condition.

This memorandum is as follows:

PLAN No. 16.

Mobilization sheet, Apr. 6, 1917.

Name.	Type.	Assignment.	Location.
Pennsylvania [1]	Battleship	Battle force	York River.
Alabama [2]	do	do	York River (T. Sd.).
Illinois [2]	do	do	New York yard.
Kentucky [2]	do	do	Do.
Kearsarge [2]	do	do	Boston.
Ohio [2]	do	do	Philadelphia.
Maine [2]	do	do	New York.
Missouri [2]	do	do	Philadelphia.
Wisconsin [2]	do	do	Do.
New Jersey [2]	do	do	New York yard.
Virginia [2]	do	do	Boston.
Rhode Island [2]	do	do	Chesapeake Bay.
Nebraska	do	do	Boston.
Georgia [2]	do	do	Do.
Minnesota [2]	do	do	Tangier Sound.
Louisiana [2]	do	do	Chesapeake Bay.
Kansas [2]	do	do	Philadelphia.
New Hampshire [2]	do	do	Norfolk.
Connecticut [2]	do	do	York River.
Vermont [2]	do	do	Philadelphia.
Michigan	do	do	York River.
South Carolina [2]	do	do	Do.
New York [1]	do	do	Do.
Texas [1]	do	do	Do.
Delaware [1]	do	do	Do.
Oklahoma [1]	do	do	Do.
Arkansas [1]	do	do	Do.
North Dakota [1]	do	do	Chesapeake Bay.
Florida [1]	do	do	York River.
Utah [1]	do	do	Do.
Wyoming [1]	do	do	Do.
Nevada [1]	do	do	Do.
Arizona [1]	do	do	Do.
Charleston	Cruiser	Scout force	Balboa.
St. Louis	do	do	Honolulu.
Minneapolis	do	do	Philadelphia.
San Diego	do	do	Mare Island yard.
South Dakota	do	do	Puget Sound yard.
Frederick	do	do	En route Puget Sound to San Francisco.

[1] In readiness for battle.

[2] Training personnel and back up II, 1.

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Mobilization sheet, Apr. 6, 1917—Continued.

Name.	Type.	Assignment.	Location.
Pueblo	Cruiser	Scout force	Pichilinque.
Pittsburgh	do	do	San Diego.
Huntington	do	do	Mare Island yard.
Saratoga (Rochester)	do	do	Puget Sound yard.
Montana	do	do	Wynne, Md.
North Carolina	do	do	Portsmouth, N. H.
Olympia	do	Patrol force	Virgin Islands.
Panther	Destroyer tender	do	At sea.
Dixie	do	do	Hampton Roads.
Chester	Cruiser	do	Boston.
Des Moines	do	do	Mediterranean.
Smith	Destroyer	do	New York.
Flusser	do	do	New Orleans.
Lamson	do	do	Norfolk.
Preston	do	do	New York.
Reid	do	do	Key West.
Birmingham	Cruiser	do	New York.
Sacramento	Gunboat	do	New Orleans.
Walke	Destroyer	do	New York.
Monaghan	do	do	Key West.
Perkins	do	do	New London.
Roe	do	do	Savannah.
Sterett	do	do	Charleston.
Terry	do	do	Do.
Dolphin	Gunboat	do	En route, Norfolk to St. Thomas.
Chattanooga	Cruiser	do	Mare Island Yard.
Warrington	Destroyer	do	Boston.
Henley	do	do	Newport.
Beale	do	do	Philadelphia.
Patterson	do	do	Boston.
Mayrant	do	do	Not in commission.
Tacoma	Cruiser	do	Tampico.
Denver	do	do	Colon.
Cummings	Destroyer	do	York River.
Ammen	do	do	New York.
Jarvis	do	do	Philadelphia.
Burrows	do	do	New York.
McCall	do	do	Philadelphia.
Fanning	do	do	York River.
Cleveland	Cruiser	do	Hampton Roads.
Raleigh	do	do	Mare Island.
Cassin	Destroyer	do	Norfolk.
Jouett	do	do	Philadelphia.
Trippe	do	do	New York.
Jenkins	do	do	Do.
Drayton	do	do	Jacksonville.
Paulding	do	do	Boston.
Albany	Cruiser	do	Delaware Breakwater.
New Orleans	do	do	Puget Sound.
Balch	Destroyer	do	York River.
Benham	do	do	Do.
Aylwin	do	do	Charleston.
Parker	do	do	York River.
Downes	do	do	Philadelphia.
Duncan	do	do	Boston.
Seattle	Cruiser	Destroyer force	York River.
Melville	Destroyer tender	do	Do.
Ericsson [1]	Destroyer	do	York River.
O'Brien [1]	do	do	Do.
Cushing [1]	do	do	New York.
McDougal [1]	do	do	York River.
Nicholson [1]	do	do	Do.
Winslow [1]	do	do	Do.
Conyngham [1]	do	do	Norfolk.
Tucker [1]	do	do	At sea.
Wadsworth [1]	do	do	York River.
Jacob Jones [1]	do	do	Norfolk.
Wainwright [1]	do	do	York River.
Porter [1]	do	do	Do.
Rowan [1]	do	do	Do.
Samson [1]	do	do	Norfolk.
Davis [1]	do	do	New York.
Allen [1]	do	do	York River.
Wilkes [1]	do	do	Do.
Shaw [1]	do	do	Mare Island (not commissioned).
Columbia	Cruiser	Submarine force	Hampton Roads.
Bushnell	Submarine tender	do	Norfolk.
L-1	Submarine	do	Do.
L-2	do	do	Do.

[1] With fleet battleships.

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Mobilization sheet, Apr. 6, 1917—Continued.

Name.	Type.	Assignment.	Location.
L-3	Submarine	Submarine force	Norfolk.
L-4	do	do	Do.
L-9	do	do	Do.
L-10	do	do	Do.
L-11	do	do	Do.
Fulton	Submarine tender	do	
D-1	Submarine	do	New London.
D-2	do	do	New York.
Worden	Destroyer	do	At sea.
D-3	Submarine	do	New London.
E-1	do	do	At sea.
Macdonough	Destroyer	do	Do.
K-1	Submarine	do	Hampton Roads
K-2	do	do	Do.
K-5	do	do	Do.
K-6	do	do	Do.
Massachusetts	Battleship	Atlantic coast divisions	Philadelphia.
Indiana	do	do	Do.
Iowa	do	do	Do.
Brooklyn	Cruiser	Philippine division	Manila.
Cincinnati	do	do	Shanghai.
Galveston	do	do	Do.
Monterey	Monitor	do	Cavite.
Wilmington	Gunboat	do	Philippines.
Monocacy	do	do	Asiatic station.
Palos	do	do	Do.
Quiros	do	do	Do.
Samar	do	do	Do.
Villalobos	do	do	Do.
Helena	do	do	Do.
El Cano	do	do	Do.
Pampanga	do	do	Do.
Mohecan	Destroyer tender	do	Do.
Dale	Destroyer (coast)	do	Do.
Bainbridge	Destroyer	do	Do.
Barry	do	do	Do.
Chauncey	do	do	Do.
Decatur	do	do	Do.
Monadnock	Monitor	do	Do.
A-2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7	Submarines	do	Do.
B-1, 2, 3	do	do	Do.
Biddle	Torpedo boat	First district	Annapolis.
Paducah	Gunboat	do	Santiago, Cuba.
Rodgers	Torpedo boat	do	Boston.
Dupont	do	Second district	Newport.
Morris	do	do	Do.
Blakely	do	do	Do.
Bailey	do	Third district	Norfolk.
Barney	do	do	
Shubrick	do	do	Charleston.
Bagley	do	do	Do.
Chicago	Cruiser	Fourth district	Philadelphia yard.
Tingey	Torpedo boat	Fifth district	Charleston.
Thornton	do	do	Do.
DeLong	do	do	Do.
Dahlgren	do	do	Do.
Foote	do	Sixth district	Do.
Wheeling	Gunboat	Seventh district	En route Puerto, Mexico, to Vera Cruz.
Marietta	do	do	Boston yard.
Nashville	do	Eighth district	Tampico, Mexico.
Machias	do	do	Nipe Bay, Cuba.
Somers	Torpedo boat	do	
Oregon	Battleship	Twelfth district	San Francisco.
Annapolis	Gunboat	do	At sea.
Yorktown	do	do	Mare Island.
Farragut	Torpedo boat	do	San Pedro.
F-1, 2, 3	Submarines	do	Twelfth district.
Cheyenne	Monitor	Thirteenth district	San Pedro.
H-1, 2	Submarines	do	Do.
Goldsborough	Torpedo boat	do	Puget Sound.
Vicksburg	Gunboat	do	Do.
Marblehead	Cruiser	do	Do.
K-3, 4, 7, 8	Submarines	Fourteenth district	Pearl Harbor.
Castine	Gunboat	Canal Zone	Vera Cruz.
C-1, 2, 3, 4, 5	Submarines	do	Canal Zone.
Stewart	Destroyer (coast)	do	Do.
Whipple	Destroyer	do	Do.
Truxtun	do	do	Do.
Paul Jones	do	do	Mare Island.

NOTE.—Destroyers marked "coast" were old boats of 400 tons of time of Spanish War and not serviceable for duty abroad except with long fitting out.

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Mobilization sheet, Apr. 16, 1917—Continued.

Name.	Type.	Assignment.	Location.
Perry	Destroyer (coast)	Canal Zone	Puget Sound.
Preble	Destroyer	do	Mare Island.
Hull	do	do	Do.
Hopkins	do	do	San Pedro.
Lawrence	do	do	Mare Island.
Ozark	Monitor	Submarine force	Norfolk.
Tonopah	do	do	New York yard.
Tallahassee	do	do	Do.
San Francisco	Mine planter	Mine force	Hampton Roads.
Baltimore	do	do	York River.
Lebanon	Tender	do	Do.
Sonoma	Tug	do	Hampton Roads.
Ontario	do	do	Norfolk.
Patapsco	do	do	York River.
Patuxent	do	do	Hampton Roads.
Hannibal	Tender	do	Buppan Bluff, Canal Zone.
Leonidas	do	do	York River.
Osceola	Tug	do	Guantanamo.
Peoria	do	do	Key West.
Vestal	Repair	Train	York River.
Prometheus	do	do	Do.
Solace	Hospital	do	Do.
Celtic	Store	do	St. Thomas.
Culgoa	do	do	New York yard.
Glacier	do	do	San Diego.
Hancock	Transport	do	St. Thomas.
Prairie	do	do	Philadelphia.
Buffalo	do	do	San Jose del Cabo.
Jupiter	Collier	do	Norfolk.
Cyclops	do	do	Do.
Neptune	do	do	Norfolk yard.
Proteus	do	do	Guam.
Nereus	do	do	Hampton Roads.
Jason	do	do	Norfolk.
Orion	do	do	En route Honolulu to Canal Zone.
Mars	do	do	Norfolk.
Vulcan	do	do	En route Guantanamo to Philadelphia.
Nero	do	do	Pichilinque.
Brutus	do	do	San Diego.
Maumee	do	do	York River.
Arethusa	do	do	Charleston.
Kanawha	do	do	Hampton Roads.
Caesar	do	Atlantic coast division	Alexandria, Egypt.
Sterling	do	do	New York.
Nanshan	do	Pacific auxiliary	Mare Island yard.
Saturn	do	do	En route San Francisco to Cordova.
Rainbow	Tender	do	Mare Island.
Iroquois	Tug	do	San Diego.
Abarenda	Collier	Asiatic auxiliary	En route Cavite to Shanghai.
Ajax	do	do	Nagasaki.
Piscataqua	Tug	do	Guam.
Wompatuck	do	do	Olongapo.
Eagle	Gunboat	First district	Manati.
Vesuvius	Dynamite	Second district	Newport.
Amphitrite	Monitor	Third district	New Haven.
Newport	Gunboat	do	New York.
Gloucester	do	do	Brooklyn.
Wasp	do	do	Whitestone Landing.
Vixen	Tug	Fourth district	Philadelphia yard.
Montgomery	Gunboat	Fifth district	Norfolk.
Mayflower	do	do	Washington, D. C.
Sylvia	Yacht	do	Do.
Sylph	do	do	Do. (?)
Elfrida	do	Sixth district	Norfolk.
Dorothea	do	Great Lakes	Cleveland, Ohio (O. C.).
Alert	Tender	Fourteenth district	Pearl Harbor.
Navajo	Tug	do	Do.
Fortune	do	do	Do.
Supply	Supply	do	Guam.
Potomac	Tug	Fifteenth district	Guantanamo.
Dochra	Supply	Train	Philadelphia.
Rappahanock	do	do	Commissioned Dec. 8, 1917 (Philadelphia).
Kittery	do	do	New York yard.
Proteus	Collier	Collier	En route Montevideo to Rio de Janeiro.
Orion	do	do	Hampton Roads.
Mars	do	do	Boston.

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Mobilization Sheet, Apr. 16, 1917—Continued.

Name.	Type.	Assignment.	Location.
Vulcan	Collier	Collier	North River.
Maumee	Oilers	Oiler	En route Queenstown to Hampton Roads
Cuyama	Oiler	do	Portsmouth, England to Hampton Roads.
Gargoyle	do	do	Dover, England.
Gold Shell	do	do	Hampton Roads to Devonport, England.
Los Angeles	do	do	Sheerness, England, to Hampton Roads.
Rockefeller	do	do	Philadelphia.
Standard Arrow	do	do	Portsmouth, England, to Hampton Roads.
Topila	do	do	Philadelphia.
Pensacola	Cargo	Cargo	Do.
Bath	do	do	Brest.
Nero	do	do	Cardiff.
Houston	do	do	Tompkinsville (?).
Newport News	do	do	En route St. Nazaire to Philadelphia.
Astoria	do	do	Commissioned Nov. 15, 1917 (Charleston).
Beaufort	do	do	Thompkinsville.
Quincy	do	do	Commissioned Feb. 2, 1918 (New Orleans).
Long Beach	do	do	Commissioned Dec. 20, 1917 (Charleston).
Gulfport	do	do	San Pedro.
Sterling	do	do	Azores.
Ticonderoga	do	do	Commissioned Jan. 5, 1918 (Boston).
Teresa	do	do	Brest.
Sioux	do	do	Commissioned Dec. 1, 1917 (Norfolk).
Carib	do	do	New York.
Manta	do	do	En route Tampico to Key West.
Ozama	do	do	Norfolk.
Potomac	Tug	Santo Domingo	Port au Prince.
Nokomis I	Yacht	do	Commissioned Dec. 5, 1917 (New York).
Vixen	do	St. Thomas	St. Thomas.
Petrel	Gunboat	Guantanamo	Guantanamo.
Osceola	Tug	do	Do.
Brutus	Collier	Pacific Fleet	San Francisco.
Nanshan	do	do	San Diego.
Iroquois	Tug	do	Do.
Saturn	Radio repair	do	Cordova, Alaska.
Glacier	Supply	do	Rio de Janeiro.
Abarenda	Collier	Asiatic Fleet	Cavite.
Ajax	do	do	Nagasaki to Manilla.
Piscataqua	Tug	do	Guam.
Wompatuck	do	do	Olongapo.
Caesar	Collier	do	Rangoon to Singapore.

The first plan for cooperation with the Allies, which I have marked 17, was April 13, 1917. I have a copy of the dispatch which was sent from the commander in chief of the British naval forces, via the ambassador in Washington to his Admiralty in London. The date is April 13, 1917. This reads as follows:

PLAN No. 17.

FIRST PLAN FOR COOPERATION WITH ALLIES.

[From C. in C. A. & W. 1., via ambassador, Washington.]

APRIL 13, 1917.

Your 246: Following points of agreement have been arrived at with United States Navy Department, French admiral sending telegram to Paris. Begins questions raised by British Admiralty.

First. One squadron immediately ready to proceed from North Atlantic port on receipt of information of escape of raider. Operations of ships of this squadron will be

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coordinated with those of allied squadrons. Area of operations, from the parallel of Cape Sable to the longitude 50 west, thence south to the parallel of 20 north.

Second. Second squadron on the east coast of South America will be provided as soon as possible in the near future. Area of operations, from Brazilian coast along parallel 5 south to meridian 30 west, thence south to 15 south, then parallel with coast to the latitude of 35 south, then along that parallel to the coast.

Third. Six destroyers will be sent over in the immediate future; these will be based on British or French port, as may be considered most necessary.

Fourth. United States will look after west coast of North America from Canadian to Colombian boundaries.

Fifth. Relations with Chile, excellent. United States armed Government nitrate vessels will maintain continuous service for the present which will be utilized.

Sixth. United States China squadron will be maintained for the present.

Seventh. United States will supervise Gulf of Mexico and Central America as far as Colombian boundary, thence to west point of Jamaica along North coast of Jamaica to the east point of Virgin Islands, thence north to the southeastern limit of area referred to in first.

Eighth. If and when enemy submarine appear they will attempt to send several submarines to the Canadian coast, but this only possible if a parent ship or accommodations of men on shore provided.

Following points raised by French minister of marine:

First. Provision of small patrol for French coast not yet possible owing to requirements of home (?) (defense); when available, however, they will be supplied, France escorting them over and manning if necessary. Every possible effort will be made immediately to supply these; too much reliance should not be placed, however, in early success.

Second. Provision of armed naval transports for carrying (?) (railway material) to France: One will be furnished immediately, a second and third as soon as possible.

Further message transmitted in another cipher:

I will remain at Washington until I know whether you have any further instructions and to complete conference upon details on which I have been requested to advise Navy Department. H. M. S. *Leviathan* proceeds to Halifax. I shall return there by train.

That is signed by the British commander in our waters.

Senator PITTMAN. Captain, before you leave that plan, will you state in what conference this plan was worked out?

Capt. PRATT. I was not present, but it was between Vice Admiral Browning, Admiral Grasset, the General Board, the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations—I do not know whether Admiral Mayo was there or not—all our leading men and the leading men of France and England.

The CHAIRMAN. April 11, is it not?

Capt. PRATT. April 13 is the date I have on this.

Senator PITTMAN. I wanted to tie it in with other evidence. There was evidence of a conference occurring early in April with the British and French admirals and our operating department, and I wanted simply to see if this was the result of it.

Capt. PRATT. This is the result of it.

The CHAIRMAN. It is the result of the conference of April 11?

Capt. PRATT. Yes, sir; I wanted to say this in connection with that. This is a note of my own:

Admiral Sims's testimony following the agreement of April 13 contains the following passage:

"It will be noted that the agreements except in the third paragraph relate mainly to employment of forces elsewhere than in the war zone, but until I learned of this agreement by accident, I was totally unaware that any conference had been held. I learned from Admiral Jellicoe that he did not regard the agreement as embodying the full answer of cooperation needed from the American Navy, but that the specific arrangements provided for were intended to cover only the situation outside of the critical submarine zone. How it was regarded in Washington, I had no idea."

The CHAIRMAN. From whom is that quoted?

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Capt. PRATT. From Admiral Sims in his testimony:

If there were doubts in Admiral Jellicoe's mind on the subject, why didn't he make a direct request either through Admiral Sims to us, or via his own representatives here, as to the exact nature of the reinforcements required in European waters, beyond those asked for specifically by the commander in chief of the British forces in North Atlantic waters who had been directed by the Admiralty to confer with the department on this subject.

It was an oversight of operations not to have informed Admiral Sims, but would it not also have been better for the Admiralty to have reinforced Admiral Sims's pleas, in view of the agreement which they knew we had entered into.

I present this plan, which I have marked "18," to establish the policy to be adopted toward the German vessels now lying in our ports. This I think is after the war opened.

Senator PITTMAN. For the benefit of the record: When you say "after the war," you mean after our entry into the war?

Capt. PRATT. After our entry into the war; yes, sir.

Senator PITTMAN. We all understand it, of course.

Capt. PRATT. That was a very loose expression of mine.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you give the probable date of it?

Capt. PRATT. I think it was some time in April or the latter part of May; probably in April, because in May I was very busy executing some of the plans that I had been instrumental in drawing up. We were so short of men to really carry on things that you sometimes had to take up a plan and just walk away with it; in other words, you had to promote the very plan which you had drawn up, which in one case I did. And Capt. Scott picked up his armed-guard plan and walked away with it. He actually executed it.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you refer to that later when you come to it?

Capt. PRATT. Yes, sir; I will. This plan is as follows:

PLAN NO. 18.

MISSION—ESTABLISH THE POLICY TO BE ADOPTED TOWARD THE GERMAN VESSELS NOW LYING IN OUR PORTS.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF NAVAL AERONAUTICS,
Washington.

(*a*) As regards the vessels having a national character.

(*b*) As regards the interned merchant vessels.

Following estimates of the situation by Commander Schofield and Capt. Pratt, the below decisions were reached:

DECISIONS.

(1) That this country having, in the President's proclamation, set for itself certain standards whereby in the existing laws enemy property rights, the safety and freedom of enemy human life, is to be respected and safeguarded to the limit compatible with the public welfare, it can not with dignity maintain other than this steadfast course of conduct.

(2) That the laws of necessity and of might do not make right, when the actuating motive is aggression and not defense.

(3) That for reasons of public defense, caused by the enemy's aggressive actions, it is correct to invoke the fundamental law of self-protection, and that such law is good law, if special treaties be abrogated by us or be abrogated automatically by the enemy through his actions toward us.

(4) That cause for retaliation, due to the enemy's treatment of our ships and citizens, and due to his own hostile acts within our own ports, does exist, but that it would be more in keeping with our dignity if we acted lawfully, rather than in the spirit of retaliation.

(5) If it becomes necessary for the public good that the German vessels lying in our ports be seized by us, that such an act partake of a lawful act rather than as an act of retaliation.

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(6) That such necessity does exist now; that we take over the German ships lying in our ports (*a*) for our own public safety; (*b*) for our own use, due to the very fact that Germany, in disregard of all law, having sunk so many of our own ships, has rendered such a course necessary for the public good.

(7) That the German Government having shown an entire disregard for all law, we are entitled in self-defense to abrogate any special treaties we may have with her, and to turn to the fundamental law or self-protection, in our attitude toward her.

(8) That it is a physical impossibility, owing to the acts of the German officers and crews themselves, to invoke the 24-hour precedent (hithereto allowed by the rules of international law) in behalf of the German ships now lying in our ports.

(9) That therefore it would be policy to abrogate any special treaties we may have with Germany, provided she has not already abrogated the same by her own acts; and then to seize all the German ships under an Executive order.

(10) That having seized all the ships, they should be taken over by the Navy, manned, gunned, commissioned, and operated by the Navy to further the ends of the most pressing immediate need, which is (to preserve the line of supplies to our allies) in accordance with the following plan: First. Taken over: By Executive order. Second. Inspected: By naval men for the purpose of repair, fit and commission. Third. Distributed: To the various yards and repair shops for repair. Fourth. Repaired: This work to take precedence over all other work except that of building destroyers and submarine chasers. Fifth. Armed: With not less than four naval guns of caliber not less than 5 inches. Sixth. Commissioned: Commissioned and manned by naval crews and officers. Seventh. Operated: As munition and supply ships across the Atlantic, under the direction of the Navy Department, but in co-operation with the shipping authorities. Eighth. Reimburse: To seize and hold the vessels of purely national character; later on, as an act of policy and kindness, and consonant with our principles, the private owners of ships having a purely private character should be reimbursed.

APRIL 7, 1916.

Plan as to vessels of German Navy in United States ports:

1. Survey them, with a view to placing them in service.
2. Place the converted merchant vessels in service as naval auxiliaries, officered and manned by the Navy.

Plan as to refugee German ships in United States ports:

1. President to issue an Executive order (not to be published), placing all refugee German merchant vessels in custody of the Navy for service.
2. Continue present guards until Navy is ready to take over.
3. Navy survey, repair, and place in service all vessels as naval auxiliaries.
4. Determine order in which vessels will become available.
5. Navy to officer and man all vessels.
6. Assign to each vessel a minimum battery of four guns.
7. Arrange with existing trans-Atlantic shipping companies to handle the commercial shipments abroad, the Navy to operate the vessels.
8. Inventories and accounts of repairs to be kept, in order that the Government may be in a position to make such adjustments as policy may dictate later.

APRIL 7, 1917.

Memorandum:

I find no authority of treaty or law justifying seizure of vessels except by a general embargo, which, of course, can not be considered. This being the case, the decision must be founded on conditions that exist. These are:

(1) The vessels can not put to sea.

(2) Their crews are not on board, and the vessels are in the main disabled.

(3) It is well known that German crews would destroy these vessels if they had further opportunity.

(4) Success in the present war is dependent on shipping. Ninety enemy ships are in our power. It is impossible for them to return to their own country.

(5) Imperative military necessity requires that these vessels render service and that they shall be diverted into the service that, for the present at least, will be most effective—the trans-Atlantic trade. There is no certain way of putting them in this trade except by placing them under complete naval control.

(6) I consider it undesirable, for many reasons, for the Navy to do anything other than operate these vessels at sea.

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Nineteen is a plan for fuel oil for naval purposes.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you the probable date of that?

Capt. PRATT. It was some time in April, I should say.

The CHAIRMAN. After we had gone to war?

Capt. PRATT. Yes. It may have been earlier, but it is not a very material plan. It is as follows:

PLAN NO. 19.

MISSION—FUEL OIL FOR NAVAL PURPOSES.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF NAVAL AERONAUTICS,
Washington.

Subject: Fuel oil for naval purposes.

Reference: Paper from Rear Admiral J. R. Edwards, United States Navy, March 6, 1917.

A study of this very valuable and able paper leads, in summarizing the whole subject matter, to certain conclusions.

CONCLUSIONS.

(1) For fleet tactical purposes alone, the use of oil is superior to the use of coal.

(2) For economic reasons the use of coal for fleet purposes is probably now and in the future will be cheaper than the use of oil.

(3) The United States is in the position of favored nation, when balancing economic against strategic or tactical reasons, internally. She is in the same position, externally, when balancing her economic condition against that of any other nation in the world.

(4) In its control of the oil of the world, the United States is in the position of favored nation. As regards the rest of the world its control of oil is in a greater ratio than its control of coal.

(5) The use of oil alone for fleet purposes must be dependent upon several factors:

(*a*) Available supply at source (at home or controlled).

(*b*) Control of that supply for fleet purposes.

(*c*) Ability to receive supplies when operating away from source (at home or controlled).

(6) The use of coal for fleet purposes is dependent upon the same factors mentioned in (3).

(7) The statement on page 57, "The more thoughtful and conservative recognized authorities upon petroleum are practically in accord in the belief that the limit of production in the United States has substantially been reached," is an excellent exposition of competent opinion, but it is not a definite statement of the amount of oil in hand, or in sight, or if the amounts on hand or in sight will be ample for fleet uses for a number of years ahead.

(8) The statement on page 100, "The Navy should immediately obtain the permanent services, in an advisory capacity at least, of one eminent civilian petroleum technologist," seems sound.

(9) If, after expert investigation, the conclusion is or has been reached that the available oil supply under our control, at source, is sufficient for present fleet needs with a good outlook in the future, for a reasonable term of years, then this should be made the basis for decision, that the fighting fleet units be oil burning.

(10) If, after expert investigation, the conclusion is or has been reached that the available oil supply under our control, at source, will not be adequate for fleet needs for a reasonable number of years ahead, then this should be made the basis for a decision that our fleet revert either to (*a*) coal burning or (*b*) oil and coal burning.

(11) Because the above reason (aside from commercial reasons) is the only real controlling reason in the case, once (*a*) the tactical superiority of oil is established; (*b*) an understanding is reached that oil and coal alike must be treated as supplies, and that the matter of supply is a matter of logistics, incident to any operations, whether military or naval, conducted away from well-established base.

(12) If the condition outlined in paragraph (10) exists, then it will be necessary, first, to revert to condition (*b*), coal and oil burning; and, second, to condition (*a*), coal burning, for fleet fighting units.

(13) If it becomes necessary to revert to condition (*b*), oil and soft coal burning, then the two schemes offering the best solutions seem to be: (*a*) Boilers separately fitted for

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oil and coal, with the purpose of using both oil and coal separately but at the same time when necessary; (*b*) boilers built to use either coal or oil independently, but so fitted that if oil is being used, a transfer to coal burning can be effected with certain boiler changes, of a minor character, or vice versa.

(14) Of the two schemes outlined above and taken from the reference paper—

(*a*) No. (1) is more economical than No. (2)—for alteration in construction reasons—for ordinary steaming reasons, unless No. (2) scheme contemplates the constant use of coal.

(*b*) No. (1) gives practical training in the use of both oil and coal, which No. (2) does not.

(*c*) No. (1) requires no prewar changes, or only a partial prewar change, per each large fighting unit, to return entirely to oil, while No. (2) scheme requires entire prewar changes, per boiler per ship, unless oil had previously been used entirely, in which case we are back to our original proposition, now under consideration, of the inadvisability of using oil as a fuel for our fighting units entirely.

(15) Whatever we use, whether oil or coal, or both at the same time, the question of adequate advance preparation, in the matter of bases, reserve supplies, facility of transport, is vital and much the same, whatever propelling agent we use.

(16) If, through lack of adequate oil supply, it becomes necessary to revert to schemes similar to those outlined in paragraph 13, then it should be the constant aim (*a*) to keep certain reserve supplies of oil constantly on hand, on board ship; (*b*) be equipped with boilers, so fitted, that with the supplies carried on board, and in a minimum space of time the ship could, with her own resources, change from coal to oil burning.

The next is a plan to outline a general scheme for efficient cooperation in information, plans, and operation. This was made, I think, very early in April. Really, it was on the basis of this that the reorganization in the Office of Operations practically took place; partial reorganization, but more correctly and accurately stated, an expansion.

The CHAIRMAN. Was this after the declaration of war?

Capt. PRATT. I think it was very shortly afterwards. I carried it into effect myself after I became aid for Operations, to a very large extent; but it was gradually developing all the time, and there is no one man who is responsible for the increase in that office; the Plans Section, the Material Section, especially under Admiral McKean; such officers as Admiral McKean and Commander Carter, Admiral Benson's aid, and Admiral Belknap, who took up the whole merchant ship proposition and expanded it and created an office within our office; such men as Commander Ingersoll, who took up our communication system and expanded it to meet the needs of the war; Wilson Brown, Todd, Admiral Osterhaus, Capt. Marvell, Capt. Blakely, Capts. Schofield and McNamee, Yarnell, Evans, McCauley, Hart, Bristol, Gormhley, and Crenshaw in the Submarine Section, and particularly Capt. Gilpin, who really took the card index system and made a visible operation section so that we could conduct our operations visibly in the same way that a staff conducts its operations in the field. That is the base plan of it. That must have been very early in April. I made it out myself, and I carried it into effect.

The CHAIRMAN. Probably after war was declared?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, yes; the office was running. But of course it was on a peace basis before that time. We had to expand a great deal. This plan is as follows:

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PLAN NO. 20.

MISSION—TO OUTLINE A GENERAL SCHEME FOR THE EFFICIENT COOPERATION OF INFORMATION—PLANS—OPERATIONS.

Following an estimate of the situation the following conclusions were reached:

(1) That there shall be kept in the operating room a graphic record of operations, as follows: (*a*) A fleet-movement sheet. (*b*) The information sheet. (*c*) The district sheets. (*d*) A sheet showing the movements of merchant shipping. (*e*) Working sheets. (*f*) A card-index system of recording all movements, orders, information, and general instructions.

(2) (*a*) *Fleet-movement sheet.*—The fleet-movement sheet shall show in appropriate manner the general movements of our naval forces, and the enemy movements. When more detailed accuracy is needed, as in the specific direction of naval forces or of merchant shipping, the necessary details will be worked out on the working sheets, and the movements as they occur transferred to the fleet movements and movements of merchant-shipping sheets.

(3) (*b*) *Information sheet.*—The information sheet should give the following information: (1) Information of our own naval forces. (2) Information relating to enemy naval forces. (3) Information relating to naval defense districts and cooperate activities of a general character. (4) General information. (5) Information of a military character. (6) Information relating particularly to merchant shipping, general in character.

(4) The scene upon which the (*a*) fleet movement sheet and (*b*) the information sheet, should be laid, is an enlarged chart of the world, taking in all areas where movements of ships may occur and where information may be obtained. Upon this chart should be entered, in advance, all information liable to be constantly referred to, and the names of all the places liable to be used by vessels of our and the enemy fleets.

The working sheets, involving more detailed operations, will naturally be limited to that section of the world immediately under consideration.

(5) On the fleet-movement sheet it should be possible (under the system devised) to identify individual ships; also entire organizations and parts of organizations. The sight areas upon which the two forces are laid down should be broad enough to give an outline of the enemy's probable policy and strategic objective. The working sheets should be sufficiently detailed to permit of tactical deployment and the development of the enemy's tactical plans.

(6) The information sheet should be kept up in a graphic manner by daily additions and changes, so that at a glance the trained observer can immediately place: (1) The various kinds of information available. (2) The order of its importance. (3) The date when it occurs. (4) Where it occurs. (5) A brief outline of its character. (6) Where the information is filed. (7) Whether immediate action is necessary.

(7) Information is intimately connected with plan and movement, and can in no wise be separated with efficient results. It is the food which stimulates creative production, and it furnishes the guides to the roads movement should follow. The graphic representation of information and its cooperation with movement and plan: (1) Relieves the mental processes at times when those processes need relief. (2) Helps the mental faculties to concentrate when concentration becomes necessary. (3) Permits the entire picture to come into the vision, so that the broad outlook is not lost. (4) Permits of detailed inspection when detail is required. (5) Allows no detail to escape the memory. (6) And above all it preserves that continuity between the past, present, and future which is so essential to well-balanced, connected plans and to the efficient administration of them.

(8) (*c*) *The district sheets.*—The district sheets should be kept up in such a way that it is possible to obtain from them a fairly succinct synopsis of daily events at a glance. Owing to the variety of operations and the infinite number of movements within each district, due to the great number of small craft and their relative unimportance, it will probably be impossible to keep such a sheet up to date after the manner of a fleet-movement sheet. But if at the end of each day, week, or specified time a miniature chart of the district were submitted by the commandant, indicating—(1) the extent and character of operations; (2) the general plan of action and field of operation for each distinct force; (3) the positions of important events, with time, date, and forces involved; (4) the location of enemy forces; (5) the extent of cooperation with other forces; (6) an accurate account of entrance, exit, and control of merchant shipping; (7) any further pertinent remarks of importance—then a very fair graphic representation of naval activities within each district would be had, and such information would be of great value.

(9) (*d*) *Movements of merchant shipping sheet.*—There is at present kept up an administrative sheet showing the names of the merchant ships that have applied for

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armed guards, the guns assigned, etc., but there are no sheets which (*a*) keep track of the movements of merchant ships, or (*b*) furnish them with information of a military nature for their guidance, similar to the pilot charts furnished as navigational aids. In view of the fact that the submarine, mine, and raider are now greater menaces than any of the dangers depicted on the pilot charts, the value to the mariner of such a chart as (*b*) above is evident.

If later on naval control over the movements of merchant ships is introduced, the value of a merchant-ship movement sheet, such as indicated in (*a*) above is evident, and it will record in graphic form the directions issued to each merchant ship plying within the areas of naval control.

(10) (*e*) *Working sheets.*—There must be working sheets upon which are depicted in appropriate manner. (1) The fleet strategic plans. (2) The fleet tactical dispositions and events as they happen. (3) Sheets upon which can be worked out such directions as it may be necessary to give to merchant shipping in safeguarding it across the Atlantic.

There must be an intimate connection between the working sheets mentioned in (1) and (2) and the fleet operation orders, and any radio messages sent or received by the fleet or by operations. Appropriate means for temporary file near the working sheets must be provided, in order that no necessary information be lost or neglected, and to afford a check. But these files are merely for the purpose of conveniently handling the immediate work at hand, and do not replace the permanent card-index file. Sheet (3), for the merchant shipping bears an intimate relation to the "district sheets sent in by the district commandants" to operations and to the "Pilot chart of information sent out by the district commandants" for the benefit of merchant shipping.

(11) (*f*) *Card-inder file.*—For a permanent system extending over years, including peace-training maneuvers as well as actual war operations, some form of card-index system for readv reference is necessary.

NOTE.—The details for the fleet movement sheet, and for the information sheet have been worked out.

Then I have a plan, to outline the best general plan to get troops to the western front——

The CHAIRMAN. In each case I wish you would give the probable date.

Capt. PRATT. This was about the 1st of April.

Senator PITTMAN. In each case, when you speak of the 1st of April, you mean 1917?

Capt. PRATT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you mean before the war?

Capt. PRATT. Yes. I am merely showing you some of these plans to show you that we had some preparations.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to know whether it was before the war or after we entered the war, in each case.

Capt. PRATT. Well, I conceived of it before the war. I probably wrote it after the war. This is not particularly important. It did not go into effect during the war, but the gist of it was put into effect after the armistice, because they used these very ships that were indicated to bring our troops home. It was not a real operating plan. It is as follows:

PLAN NO. 21.

Mission.—To outline the best general plan to get troops to the western front.

Following an estimate of the situation, the following conclusions were reached:

(1) That the above order of precedence expresses the needs of the immediate situation, because—

(*a*) The efficient offensive is an offensive which must be directed solelv and whole-heartedly at the immediate threatening enemy menace, which is the submarine menace.

(*b*) The submarine menace threatens the life of logistics and the great supply arteries to the warring allies, both in their homes and at the front.

(*c*) In the ultimate issue, the deciding factor tending to end the war will be a favorable military decision on the western front.

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(1) That the above order of precedence expresses the needs of the immediate situation, because—Continued.

(*d*) Like supplies, the arrival of reinforcements must be as certain and as sure as the existing state of affairs will permit.

(*e*) The actual pressing needs of the immediate situation in offensive effort, supplies, and reinforcements must take precedent over any possible conjectural future contingency.

(2) That in viewing the problem of this war as a whole from the broadest naval and military points of view, with an eye to determining our part in it, the following facts stand out:

(*a*) The main arena of war is and will continue to be the western frontier of Europe, including the bordering oceans.

(*b*) In that arena there are: (1) Two offensive fighting lines, one furnished by the Army on land, the second composed of those naval units capable of conducting an offensive against the enemy water offensive (his submarine operations). (2) Two containing forces, composed of both naval and military units, the Army being in the nature of a tactical containing force, while the allied fleets form a strategic containing force. (3) A reserve which is composed of nations, armies, naval forces held in positions of readiness from which at the opportune time they may be launched most efficiently against the enemy. That our entry in this war has placed us primarily in the rôle of the reserve, until such time as efficient cooperation with the Allies demands that we assume some rôle in the offensive line. (4) A line of supply for reinforcements of men and supplies of food and munitions. This is the rôle (aside from a somewhat minor offensive), which our naval forces in the reserve can at first play an eminent part by (*a*) maintaining the food and munition supply line, by building, arming, and manning the merchant shipping available. (*b*) Furnishing offensive forces where offensive forces may be useful, such as against enemy submarines and raiders. (*c*) Safeguarding the transport of the military forces sent to the front.

(3) It is a fact that the submarine campaign has severely taxed and strained logistics in the matter of supplies. It is a further fact that the transport of military forces to the front will increase the present tax—

(*a*) By making the demands for supplies at the front greater.

(*b*) By making demands for transport service on the merchant shipping already strained by logistic demands.

(4) There then remains but one class of vessel, whose present services are not in demand, either for offensive work or for the service of logisitic, but which are held in reserve for a future contingency. This call may be—

(*a*) To conduct a legitimate offensive of their own before this war is ended.

(*b*) To assist in the service of supply and transport during this war.

(*c*) Caused by the unsuccessful termination of the present war.

(*d*) Caused by unforeseen or new complications arising or brought to a focus after this war.

The class of vessels referred to are the naval warships of the major type—battleships, armored cruisers.

(5) That of all the demands outlined in paragraph 4, (*a*), (*b*), (*c*), (*d*), the paragraph marked (*b*) will make the first demands and probably the most pressing demands. In fact, the nature of the demand will probably be so great that (even with regard to the major fighting ships) it will have to be removed from the class of future contingencies and placed in the immediate present. This then leaves (*a*), (*c*), (*d*) as future contingencies.

(6) That the future contingency does not warrant us in sparing any portion of our fleet from the immediate work at hand, or of withholding any of our major ships from (b) (4) the service in the line of supply, for

(*a*) It furnishes most excellent training, and morale to meet the (4) (*a*) situation, as reserves to the allied fleets.

(*b*) Were the present war to end unsuccessfully, our best reply to that condition is the submarine campaign, waged by our naval forces, on similar but humane lines and our Army well trained through universal service.

(*c*) If through complications arising after this war, with a fresh antagonist, we were forced to engage in a fresh war, the submarine and the universally trained Army are still the Nation's best defensive assets, leaving our country safe, even if at first forced to adopt a defensive instead of an offensive rôle.

(*d*) The reason that our whole-hearted participation in this war, now we are in it, is likely to leave us in a more favorable position, in regard to future wars, than any half-hearted cooperation could possibly do.

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(7) That therefore of all our naval forces now held in the reserve; the one which we must guard carefully and maintain for our own defense, as an offensive defense; the one we can least spare, and the one which must be built up trained to the minute and held for our own purposes, is our submarine force.

(8) That therefore if the demands of the supply line become so great that our merchant shipping can not be withdrawn from the service of supply to the service of transport of troops, then will the armed ships of the Navy with its major units have to undertake the service of the transport of troops.

(9) That for the purpose of safeguarding the passage of troops, the heavy armed, and fast naval vessels, are the safest carriers, and therefore the surest.

(10) That the same objections exist to transporting troops by the convoy method en masse, as exist in the transport of supplies.

(11) That the fast heavy armed ship is to some extent its own defensive convoy against such enemies as raiders, but to further insure its immunity against submarine attack it would be wise to escort such vessels (if practicable) by the craft that constitute the submarine greatest menace.

(12) Therefore the instant the demand is made to transport our military forces to the front, for offensive action, unless our own naval major ships can themselves, be used in offensive action, against their proper foes, that they should be used inoffensive action, against their proper foes, that they should be used in the service of the line of supply, to transport troops, in the following order of their naval effectiveness:

(*a*) The dreadnoughts.
(*b*) The armored cruisers.
(*c*) The older battleships.

(13) That in this service of transport, no attempt should be made to congregate at certain home points of embarkation, great numbers of troops and not to wait until this congregation of the military forces was an assured fact, in order to start the journey together, but that the most effective and surest means of getting the military forces across the water, also the quickest, is to observe the following rules:

(*a*) Select different points of embarkation.
(*b*) Collect only at the points of embarkation, such complete organizations as will make the immediate passage.
(*c*) Sail individually.
(*d*) Sail secretly.
(*e*) Make the passage at speed.
(*f*) Arrange for the grand assembly and final adjustment of organizations of troops to take place on the other side, not on this side.
(*g*) If destroyers or appropriate craft can be spared from the service of offense, escort the major transporting ships by units not to exceed 3 escorting small craft, for each major ship.

(14) While making passage, strip the naval vessels of such part of its crew:

(*a*) Not needed for running.
(*b*) Not absolutely needed for training.
(*c*) That due to the service of transport, with an eye to contingencies, it was felt might be spared for the particular voyage in question.

(15) Leave in the shore training camps, from each naval vessel, a sufficient personnel of officers, to insure the efficient training of the shore group, during the time of passage of the ship.

(16) Shift the ship and shore groups, whenever it is deemed necessary.

This was a plan which we started working on, I should think, about the first part of May or the last part of April. It took a great deal of time to get it through, to get the required approval from Mr. Denman, who was then on the Shipping Board, and to get the signatures of the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy. It was something which had to receive the cooperation of both the Army and the Shipping Board, as well as ourselves, and the details are not here, but the proclamation was itself signed (I handled this myself) in July 12, 1917, and the names of the ships taken over, the German ships, the troop transports, and that is the transport plan that we began to operate under [reading]:

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PLAN NO. 22.

[Joint letter.]

WAR DEPARTMENT—NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C.

From: Secretary of War and Secretary of the Navy.
To: The President.
Subject: Transports to be commissioned in the Navy.

1. After consultation, the War and Navy Departments jointly recommend that the following-named ex-German vessels be commissioned in the Navy for transporting troops and munitions during the continuance of the present war:

Leviathan—Vaterland.
Mount Vernon—Kronprinzessin Cecillie.
Agamemnon—Kaiser Wilhelm II.
George Washington—George Washington.
Amerika—America.
Powhatan—Hamburg.
Aeolus—Grosser Kurfurst.
Madawaska—Koenig Wilhelm II.
Neckar—Antigone.
Rhein—Susquehanna.
Princess Irene—Pocahontas.
President Grant—President Grant.
Cincinnati—Covington.
President Lincoln—President Lincoln.
Frederick der Grosse—Huron.
Barbarossa—Mercury.

2. The War and Navy Departments jointly recommend further that should it be found necessary to take over additional vessels for permanent employment as transports during the present war vessels so taken over shall be commissioned in the Navy.

W. S. BENSON
Chief of Naval Operations.

TASKER H. BLISS,
Chief of Staff.

JOSEPHUS DANIELS,
Secretary of the Navy.

NEWTON D. BAKER,
Secretary of War.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *July 12, 1917.*
Approved:

WOODROW WILSON.

I submit this plan, which I have marked 23. This was the first part of April. It did not have anything to do with the war, as it turned out.

The plan referred to is as follows:

PLAN NO. 23.

MISSION—THE NAVAL POSITION AND NEEDS IN THE MATTER ON PANAMA REPUBLIC, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE DEFENSE OF THE CANAL.

NAVY DEPARTMENT, *Washington.*

Memorandum prepared for State Department, May 19, 1917.

W. V. P.

OPERATIONS.

Memorandum for the State Department.

The naval position and needs in the matter of Panama, with special reference to the adequate defense of the canal:

(1) The primary position of the Navy with reference to the defense of the canal is largely a matter of strategy, and the first question is the proper location of the fleet, either in the Atlantic or the Pacific. To effect this the integrity of the canal must be assured.

(2) As a base of supply for the fleet, acting in accord with the above mission, the Panama area is of prime importance, and is centrally located, for certain naval activities. However, such a base will be in the Canal Zone itself, and within the present fixed fortifications.

(3) To effect the local defense of the canal there must be—

(*a*) An adequate local military and naval defense of the entire Panama area.

(*b*) Efficient cooperation between not only the military and naval forces of the United States stationed in the zone, but also between the United States forces in the zone and the inhabitants of the Republic of Panama, in order that their reserves of supplies and men may be thrown into the balance with the United States and

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against any probable enemy until such time, at least, as the United States may be able to send the necessary forces of its own.

(c) The absolute safeguarding of either one of the two routes of passage from the United States to Panama, via the Atlantic, via the Pacific, together with the complete security of the two terminal ports of disembarkation.

(4) The relations of Panama to the United States in a military and naval sense are comprised in paragraph (3).

(5) The first main essential in our relations with Panama, from a military and naval point of view, is hearty and efficient cooperation. To effect this much depends upon—

(a) The character of the heads—diplomatic, military, and naval—we send to this country. These people are extremely susceptible to courtesy, and without it we will not get far. They also have many quite able men conducting their affairs.

(b) The practical aid we give them in the matter of loans, etc.

(c) The extent and character of our efforts to win their support, and to make their efforts coincide with our own.

(6) The second essential from the military and naval point of view is the question of transportation of the troops locally stationed on the zone and their ability to move quickly from any point within the Canal Zone to any threatened point within the Republic whose integrity is vital to the integrity of the canal.

This is immediately a question of roads, and this is also the first purpose toward which any loans we may make should be directed. The two most necessary roads are roads paralleling the Pacific coast line—one toward Chepo, one toward Montijo Bay. A third road might parallel the northeastern Atlantic coast line toward Porto Bello or beyond. The northwestern Atlantic coast line toward Chiriqui is as yet too undeveloped to warrant the first expenditures for roads in this direction.

(7) The next essential is the development of the resources of Panama, to enable it to become a reservoir of supply for our forces stationed in the Canal Zone. Beyond the acquisition by the United States of the lands of Panama now under consideration (with perhaps a few minor exceptions), it is not believed that the policy of expropriation should extend further than it already has. The defense of the canal depends less upon the expropriation of Panama lands by the United States than it does upon a hearty and efficient cooperation with its people and their willingness to enter with us into any defense we consider necessary, extending even to the very borders of the Panama Republic itself. To effect this last purpose, we must have the right when the military necessity arises (a right we possess now under the terms of the treaty) to temporarily occupy with military forces any lands within the entire Republic, or any of its waters, with our naval forces.

To develop the resources of Panama, that they may become ample and available for our forces operating from the Canal Zone as a center, transportation to and from this center is a first requisite.

(8) Another essential to defense is the developmeet of the system of communications within the Republic. This includes radio telegraph, cable, and telephone systems.

(9) The prime essential to a protracted defense of the Canal Zone lies in the ability of the United States to control one ocean and the terminal facilities of the canal bordering on that ocean. A second equally important essential is the ability of the United States to furnish reinforcements of troops, ships, and supplies, delivered at the canal terminals within the time they are urgently needed. These are matters concerning principally the United States, with which Panama is little concerned except as to results.

(10) As far as the Navy itself is concerned, beyond the right to use the waters of Panama as it sees fit, when necessity arises involving any question of the defense of the Canal Zone (a right it now possesses, or, if not clear as to point of law, which it should possess), there is but one position of tactical and strategic value, which it would be specially advantageous for the United States to possess now—this is Saboga anchorage in the Pearl Islands, with those islands surrounding it.

Respectfully submitted.

W. V. PRATT,
Captain, United States Navy.

Approved.

I simply give that as an instance to show that we were not asleep as to what might happen.

I next submit a plan for outline of the policy for cooperating with the Emergency Fleet Corporation along the lines suggested by Gen. George Goethals. This is dated June 7, 1917. It is as follows:

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PLAN NO. 24.

MISSION—OUTLINE OF THE POLICY FOR COOPERATING WITH THE EMERGENCY FLEET CORPORATION ALONG THE LINES SUGGESTED BY GEN. G. W. GOETHALS.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, June 7, 1917.

From: Capt. W. V. Pratt, United States Navy.
To: Chief of Naval Operations.
Subject: Cooperation of the Navy with the Emergency Fleet Corporation in the matter of propositions submitted by Gen. G. W. Goethals, general manager of the Emergency Fleet Corporation.
Reference: (*a*) Letter of May 28, 1917, from United States Shipping Board to Secretary of the Navy.

1. The importance and seriousness of this subject, together with the necessity of arriving first of all at a correct naval policy which shall coordinate its efforts with the efforts of those engaged in supplying the tremendous wastage in cargo tonnage caused by the submarine campaign, leads me to submit this letter. Were all views thoroughly in accord there could be no discussion. There is, however, a decided difference of opinions in the matter of the naval policy to be pursued. This letter is not in accord with the general view of the office; but it is submitted as one view of what the policy should be.

2. Owing to the present emergency, the Navy Department recognizes the building of cargo vessels is a measure of importance commensurate with the building of warships itself. Since in the department's opinion the building of a wooden fleet is not an adequate or a permanent way of meeting the situation, which must be met by steel construction, the Navy Department is glad to cooperate with the Emergency Fleet Corporation in every way possible, in enabling it to put its building program into operation.

3. A statement of the department's policy as regards the order of importance of war ships to be laid down is as follows:

(1) Submarine chasers.
(2) Destroyers.
(3) Scout cruisers.
(4) Submarines, large and small.
(5) Battleships.
(6) Fuel ships.
(7) Destroyer tenders.
(8) Submarine tenders.
(9) Hospital ships.
(10) Ammunition ships.
(11) Repair ships.
(12) Transports.
(13) Gunboats.
(14) Battle cruisers.

4. The first five types, with the exception of (3) scout cruisers (of which only a limited number to serve as destroyer flotilla leaders should be laid down), are types of ships which are needed at present and the naval needs are such that all vessels of these types authorized should be begun at once.

5. Of equal importance to the above ships come the heavy merchant cargo carriers contemplated by the Emergency Fleet Corporation.

6. Naval ships coming under heads (6) to (12), inclusive, could, if necessity arose, be supplied out of the very types of ships to be built by the Emergency Fleet Corporation.

7. It therefore becomes evident that any cooperation of the Navy with the Emergency Fleet Corporation must be along lines represented by classes (3) and (14).

8. It is therefore believed that the first proposition submitted by Gen. Goethals is sound and that the Navy Department should cooperate to this extent. No new ships for the Navy of classes (6) to (12) inclusive, will be laid down on ways outside of Navy Yard ways without an adjustment first with the Emergency Fleet Corporation, so long as the present emergency exists. If, however, due to this policy the shortages in such types of naval auxiliaries severely handicap the Navy, it is agreed that the Emergency Fleet Corporation will meet this need out of its own vessels building.

9. It is also believed that the second proposition is sound, and that the Navy Department should cooperate to the extent of relieving any or all of the four building ways (not in a navy yard on the Atlantic coast) now under construction for the battle cruisers, in order that said ways may be used by the Emergency Fleet Corporation. This arrangement to hold good during the present emergency, or unless a new military necessity demands a new arrangement.

10. It is not the department's policy to allow cargo-carrying merchant ships to be laid down on any ways in the existing navy yards. Such construction cramps the

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yard facilities and handicaps the purpose for which these yadrs were originally established, viz, the repairs of naval ships already in service. But in view of the present emergency, it is believed that any battle cruisers' ways, laid down in a navy yard on the Pacific coast, could be temporarily loaned to the Emergency Fleet Corporation.

11. The above views are held because it is believed:

(*a*) A successful termination of this war will preclude the chance of another for some term of years.

(*b*) For the allied purposes, merchant ships are as essential to the successful termination of this war as battleships, and that their construction is even more important at present.

(*c*) The counter for the United States, in case of an unsuccessful termination of this war lies in: (1) In our naval submarine; (2) in conscription.

(*d*) Of new future possible opponents other than the present opponents: (1) The chances are remote, owing to present alliances; (2) We are already stronger than any other probable opponents; (3) It would be better to buy our battle cruisers from our present allies (in case they were needed) than to lay them down now in the present emergency, an emergency which must be met now.

(*e*) In case this war terminates successfully, the merchant ships laid down by us will be the most useful types in existence in furthering the ultimate good of the country.

12. Finally, we did not enter this war alone. We have allies, and their efforts against the now common enemy, have stood between us and possible aggressions for over two years. They have needs. Their needs are immediate amd imperative. Their cause is our cause now. The decision to the estimate of the situation as made in this office was as follows:

IMMEDIATE MISSION.

To render the maximum possible support now to the enemies of the Central Powers.

And a second important but future mission was:

Develop the full military and naval strength of the United States as far as possible.

In a paper of April 5, 1917, the general board writing on the subject "Assistance that United States can give Allies upon declaration of War" makes several pertinent suggestions of which one is as follows: "Keep constantly in view the possibility of the United States being in the not distant future compelled to conduct a war single-handed against some of the present belligerents and steadily increase the strength of the fighting line," etc., etc.

That remark is pertinent and sound, but it does not mean that one fraction of the strength of the effort we should put into the successful accomplishment of the immediate mission should be sacrificed to any possible future contingency. Moreover, the day that the conscription law passed, and universal training was assured to the peoples of our country, its future security was guaranteed in a manner past every future building program the Navy might attempt.

13. A hasty review of the international situation leads me to the conclusions that England's fleet will never be allowed to pass into German hands, nor can it be quiescent while Germany works her will on any of the present Allies. It is the death of England to allow it. If at the end of this war strained relations should arise with England (a proposition which seems to be untenable) no amount of feverish building of dreadnoughts or battle cruisers could hope to put us in a position to cope with her fleet on the high seas. In such a contingency our efforts should now be directed toward augmenting our submarine fleet, in both the offensive and information types.

14. It must have been noted that upon our entry into this war, a certain tension existing between this country and Japan was immediately relaxed. They immediately in certain press articles suggested a close cooperation with the United States. This close cooperation now with Japan is to my mind the key to the solution of what might have been a future problem.

15. Therefore, if we concentrate our present naval building efforts to:

(1) A standard type of destroyer to meet present needs;

(2) Submarines, large and small, to meet future needs.

(3) Battleships laid down and now on the ways.

(4) Certain types of small craft, such as tugs and sweepers.

(5) Cooperate with the Shipping Board to produce cargo carriers, we will have put forth the Navy's best efforts, not for the Navy alone, but for the country, and especially for the Allies, whose war is now our own.

16. For the above reasons I am obliged to differ with the consensus of opinion expressed in the Office of Operations, and implied in the general board's recommendations, and do concur in the opinion and propositions expressed in Gen. Goethal's letter of May 28, 1917, with the modification set forth in paragraphs 8, 9, and 10.

W. V. PRATT.

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Number 25 is a plan to inaugurate a naval building program which will best meet our immediate needs and which will not be inharmonious with any future policy we may be called upon to adopt. This was probably about the 1st of June. This plan is as follows:

PLAN No. 25.

MISSION—INAUGURATE A NAVAL BUILDING PROGRAM WHICH WILL BEST MEET OUR IMMEDIATE NEEDS AND WHICH WILL NOT BE INHARMONIOUS WITH ANY FUTURE POLICY WE MAY BE CALLED UPON TO ADOPT.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF NAVAL AERONAUTICS,
Washington.

Following estimates of the situation submitted by Commander Schofield, Commander Lanning, and other officers, the following decisions are reached:

NOW.

(1) That the immediate need is to speed up the naval building program.
(2) In building now, to lay special stress on those particular types which are needed now.
(3) That the destroyer, with its accompanying flotilla tender, is the type which is needed now.
(4) To lay down as many of these craft, at once as the various yards can accommodate, with the idea of bringing the grand total of destroyers to a number which shall be in the ratio of 4 to 1 with the battleships and battle cruisers, or a grand total of 232. Number to be laid down now, 124.
(5) To lay down immediately a flotilla of small fast patrol craft for the use of the Atlantic coast defenses. The basis of the policy in determining the numbers of these craft, to be as follows:
(*a*) They are bought or constructed because of the immediate need only and not for future needs; (*b*) that for future needs the present type of 110 foot craft may radically change; (*c*) that sufficient numbers to provide for the defense of the four principal Atlantic seaports and to patrol certain probable submarine basing localities be provided; (d) that to meet the immediate need it is unnecessary to estimate for the Pacific coast; (*e*) that the minimum of such craft, rather than the maximum, should be the basis of estimate; (*f*) that 250 such craft represent the minimum and that 500 should be an ample margin.

NOTE TO 4.—At the beginning of the war England had 245 destroyers. This did not begin to be enough, and she is supposed to have laid down many more. Germany was credited with 167. We are credited with 52 built and 108 total authorized.

(6) Push to completion our major naval craft now on the ways and over 50 per cent completed.
(7) That the next immediate need is an aircraft building program sufficient to provide for the adequate patrol of the entire Atlantic and Gulf coast defense districts.

NOTE.—Sir Douglas Haig is credited with saying that one trained pilot and machine, on the western front, was worth 2,000 men. The air patrol and bombing work of the heavier-than-air machines, in conjunction with the observation work of the lighter-than-air machines, both working in cooperation with the fast, small patrol craft, should be a good defensive measure against submarines, freeing the strictly naval craft from the many defensive demands that will certainly be made upon them. This would leave the purely naval types free to cooperate in the very best manner the demands of an allied campaign might make.

IMMEDIATE FUTURE.

(8) That the type which may be most urgently needed immediately following the present situation is the sea-keeping submarine.
(9) To lay down as many of these sea-keeping submarines as possible with the idea of bringing the total of submarine class to 300, or on a par with our possible trans-Atlantic opponent.

NOTE.—At the beginning of the war Germany was credited with 65. Various estimates put her submarines of different classes between 200 and 300 now.

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(10) That the approximate number of sea-keeping submarines we should lay down to provide for the immediate future following this war is approximately 150.

(11) That of the 150, approximate, submarines needed to bring our total to 300 the ratio of one-third for scouting and two-thirds for strictly offensive deep-sea work should be observed.

FUTURE NEEDS.

(12) That the future naval need may be to build major ships of the dreadnought and battle-cruiser type; and to provide suitable fleet accompanying aircraft.

(13) That in planning for our needs in battleships and in battle-cruisers, we should adopt some building policy.

(14) That the policy to adopt is as follows:

To build major ships, in numbers, so that the United States will have, as least—

(*a*) Naval equality, with a margin of safety, on our Atlantic frontier, to our most probable opponent.

(*b*) Marked naval superiority on our Pacific frontier—when the high-sea fleet is mobilized in those waters.

NOTE.—At the beginning of the war, Germany had 20 dreadnoughts, 6 battle cruisers, 26 scouts. Our present program calls for 29AA, 6BB, 10S. Unless Germany has increased her tonnage in major ships, during the war, our program would leave us short only in BB, and scouts. If the scouts of the future are the submarine and aircraft we could afford to be short in surface scout types, provided we were ahead in submarines, aircraft, and battle cruisers.

(15) That the minor naval craft, such as aircraft, destroyers, submarines, forming the fleet, should be proportioned so that the fleet will be properly balanced.

(16) That the probable scouting agents of the future may very likely be the sub marine and the aircraft.

(17) That the final future needs of the mobile fleet lie in adequate numbers of supply ships, hospital ships, fuel ships, mine layers, tugs, and parent ships to properly balance the fleet.

(18) That the fleet building program should be considered separately from the coast defense building or purchase program in order that undue emphasis should not be laid on the question, defense.

(19) That as far as is practicable, in view of the immediate situation, the fleet building program should be given the right of way over the purely coast defense program.

(20) That no fleet building program is well balanced or adequate which does not at the same time consider the necessity of enlarging the capacity of the necessary repair reserve and supply bases at home, and which does not contemplate the acquisition and proper fitting out of the necessary fleet and coast operation bases.

What I had marked as No. 26 has already been submitted in my plan of policy as the plan of the board on submarine detection. Its date is July 6, 1917.

Twenty-seven is policy for priorities of personnel. Its date is November 1, 1917. That is the plan that Admiral Palmer spoke of, when we switched and gave him a definite plan that he could operate under for his training purposes. It is as follows:

PLAN NO. 27.

POLICY FOR PRIORITIES OF PERSONNEL.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, November 1, 1917.

From: Chief of Naval Operations.
To: Bureau of Navigation and C in C.
Subject: Policy of operations re the readjustment of complements.
Reference: (*a*) Bureau of Navigation confidential letters Nos. N1, CMB, 1, MH, October 10, 1917; (*b*) C in C's letter of October 24, 1917.

1. Forwarded.

2. While the ultimate mission of every force which forms an integral part of the fleet is to fit itself to play its part most efficiently in battle, to expeditiously accomplish this ultimate mission for the good of the whole may require the assignment of

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immediate missions to parts of the organization. which missions must depend both on the immediate operation of war to be performed and the ultimate goal to be achieved.

3. The ultimate and immediate mission of the vessels of battleship force 2 shall be to maintain themselves in instant readiness for battle.

4. The ultimate mission of battleship force 1 is to fit itself for battle. To that and it shall maintain a permanent nucleus battle organization of both officers and men sufficient to keep the material in constant readiness for battle and permit rapid preparation for battle when battle complement is assigned.

The immediate mission of battleship force 1 is to train officers and men for service on other vessels.

5. The immediate mission of vessels of the cruiser force is to guard convoys.

6. The immediate mission of the destroyer force is to operate against the enemy vessels.

7. The immediate mission of the submarine force is twofold, (*a*) to operate against the enemy, (*b*) to train personnel for service in new vessels that may operate against the enemy. Ships not engaged in operating against the enemy should be engaged in training personnel.

8. The immediate mission of the train is the service of logistics, (*a*) for our military or naval forces at the fighting front, (*b*) for our fleet at home, (*c*) in any allied service abroad, (*d*) general service at home.

9. In all forces, when not incompatible with the immediate mission, additional personnel should be carried for training.

W. V. PRATT, *Acting*.

DEAR ADMIRAL: While I am morally sure this is in accord absolutely with your policy, I want to be sure. So, while it was signed and sent to Navigation, I told Palmer to hold it up pending your O. K. in the matter. Therefore, I am sending this to you, and if you agree cable me to that effect, please. We are in reality working along these lines, and it seems to be a necessity, but as yet while all agreements are verbal, I really want a policy on paper. Will you then cable, please?

PRATT.

Twenty-eight is the mobilization sheet of November 3, 1917, which is the end of the critical six months, or about the end of the critical six months spoken of, showing the position at that time, the duty, the location, and the assignment of our naval forces.

The CHAIRMAN. Of all of our naval forces?

Capt. PRATT. Yes, I think so. It is the mobilization sheet, and it should be.

The CHAIRMAN. Including all the ships we had taken over outside of the Navy?

Capt. PRATT. All that would be in commission at that time. No, there might be others taken over that might not appear in here.

The CHAIRMAN. But if they were in commission they would be here?

Capt. PRATT. They would be there; and the list taken over is in the naval districts' list. This sheet is as follows:

PLAN No. 28.

Mobilization sheet Nov. 3, 1917.

Name.	Type.	Assignment.	Location.
Pennsylvania	Battleship	Battleship force	York River.
Alabama	do	do	Do.
Illinois	do	do	Do.
Kentucky	do	do	Do.
Kearsarge	do	do	Do.
Missouri	do	do	Do.
Ohio	do	do	Norfolk.
Maine	do	do	York River.
Wisconsin	do	do	Hampton Roads.
New Jersey	do	do	Chesapeake Bay.
Virginia	do	do	Do.

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Mobilization sheet Nov. 3, 1917—Continued.

Name.	Type.	Assignment.	Location.
Rhode Island	Battleship	Battleship force	Chesapeake Bay.
Nebraska	do	do	Do.
Georgia	do	do	Do.
Minnesota	do	do	York River.
Louisiana	do	do	Do.
Kansas	do	do	Chesapeake Bay.
New Hampshire	do	do	Do.
Connecticut	do	do	Do.
Vermont	do	do	Do.
Michigan	do	do	York River.
South Carolina	do	do	Do.
New York	do	do	Do.
Delaware	do	do	Do.
Texas	do	do	New York yard.
Oklahoma	do	do	Philadelphia.
Arkansas	do	do	York River.
North Dakota	do	do	Chesapeake Bay.
Florida	do	do	York River.
Utah	do	do	Norfolk.
Wyoming	do	do	York River.
Nevada	do	do	Norfolk.
Arizona	do	do	New York yard.
Mississippi	do	do	Not in commission.
Charleston	Cruiser	Cruiser force	Boston.
St. Louis	do	do	At sea.
De Kalb	do	do	Do.
Von Steuben	do	do	Thompkinsville.
Minneapolis	do	do	Canal Zone.
Seattle	do	do	At sea.
North Carolina	do	do	New York.
Montana	do	do	Portsmouth, N. H.
Huntington	do	do	At sea.
San Diego	do	do	New York.
Saratoga (Rochester)	do	do	Mare Island.
South Dakota	do	do	At sea.
Cleveland	do	do	Charleston.
Tacoma	do	do	New York.
Chattanooga	do	do	Do.
Des Moines	do	do	Portsmouth, N. H.
Denver	do	do	Halifax.
Albany	do	do	At sea.
New Orleans	do	do	Do.
Columbia	do	do	Do.
Stewart	Destroyer	Destroyer force	Norfolk.
Whipple	do	do	Azores.
Truxton	do	do	Do.
Paul Jones	do	do	Norfolk.
Preble	do	do	Do.
Hopkins	do	do	Chesapeake Bay.
Hull	do	do	Norfolk.
Macdonald	do	do	Philadelphia.
Worden	do	do	Chesapeake Bay.
Barry	do	do	Gibraltar.
Decatur	do	do	Do.
Dale	do	do	Do.
Bainbridge	do	do	Do.
Chauncey	do	do	Do.
Panther	Destroyer tender	do	Brest.
Smith	Destroyer	do	Do.
Flusser	do	do	Queenstown.
Lamson	do	do	Brest.
Preston	do	do	Do.
Reid	do	do	Azores.
Prairie	Destroyer tender	do	
Monoghan	Destroyer	do	Boston.
Roe	do	do	Do.
Jewett	do	do	Norfolk.
Henley	do	do	Philadelphia.
McCall	do	do	York River.
Terry	do	do	New York yard.
Mayrant	do	do	Philadelphia.
Beale	do	do	At sea.
Balch	do	do	Do.
Lylwin	do	do	Charleston.
Downes	do	do	At sea.
Duncan	do	do	Do.
Dixie	Destroyer tender	do	Queenstown.
Drayton	Destroyer	do	Do.
Perkins	do	do	Do.
Sterett	do	do	Do.
Warrington	do	do	Do.
Walke	do	do	Do.

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Mobilization sheet Nov. 3, 1917—Continued.

Name.	Type.	Assignment.	Location.
Jenkins	Destroyer	Destroyer force	Queenstown.
Paulding	do	do	Do.
Burrows	do	do	Do.
Trippe	do	do	Do.
Ammen	do	do	Do.
Patterson	do	do	Do.
Fanning	do	do	Do.
Jarvis	do	do	Do.
Cassin	do	do	Do.
Cummings	do	do	Do.
Parker	do	do	Do.
Benham	do	do	Do.
Melville	Destroyer tender	do	Do.
O'Brien	Destroyer	do	Do.
Nicholson	do	do	Do.
Winslow	do	do	Do.
McDougal	do	do	Do.
Cushing	do	do	Do.
Ericsson	do	do	Do.
Tucker	do	do	Do.
Conyngham	do	do	Do.
Porter	do	do	Do.
Wadsworth	do	do	Do.
Jacob Jones	do	do	Do.
Wainwright	do	do	Do.
Sampson	do	do	Do.
Rowan	do	do	Do.
Davis	do	do	Do.
Allen	do	do	Do.
Wilkes	do	do	Do.
Shaw	do	do	Do.
Buffalo	Destroyer tender	do	Brest.
Stockton	Destroyer	do	Not commissioned.
Manley	do	do	New York.
Caldwell	do	do	Not commissioned.
Conner	do	do	Do.
Gwin	do	do	Do.
Chicago	Cruiser	Submarine force	New London.
Tallahasse	Monitor	do	Canal Zone.
C-1, 2, 3, 4, 5	Submarines	do	Do.
D-1, 2, 3	do	do	Philadelphia.
G-1, 2, 3, 4	do	do	New London.
Cheyenne	Monitor	do	At sea.
K-3, 4, 7, 8	Submarines	do	Do.
H-1, 2	do	do	Do.
Tonopah	Monitor	do	Boston.
Fulton	Submarine tender	do	Newport.
K-1, 2, 5, 6	Submarines	do	Azores.
E-1	do	do	Newport.
L-11	do	do	Do.
Bushnell	Submarine tender	do	At sea.
L-1, 2, 3, 4, 9, 10	Submarines	do	Philadelphia.
Savannah	Submarine tender	do	
L-5	Submarines	do	New York yard.
L-6, 7	do	do	Not commissioned.
L-8	do	do	Portsmouth.
M-1	do	do	Not commissioned.
N-1, 2, 3	do	do	Puget Sound.
N-4, 5, 6, 7	do	do	Not commissioned.
O-3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8	do	do	Do.
Camden	Submarine tender	do	
O-9, 10, 11, 12, 13	Submarines	do	D
Pittsburgh	Cruiser	Pacific fleet	Montevideo.
Raleigh	do	do	Thompkinsville.
Pueblo	do	do	Montevideo.
Frederick	do	do	Do.
Oregon	Battleship	do	San Diego.
Marblehead	Cruiser	do	Callao, Peru.
Yorktown	Gunboat	do	San Diego.
Vicksburg	do	do	Do.
H-3	Submarine		
F-1, 2, 3	Submarines	Pacific Fleet	Do.
Brooklyn	Cruiser	Asiatic Fleet	Manila.
Cincinnati	do	do	At sea.
Galveston	do	do	Manila.
Monterey	Monitor	do	Do.
Wilmington	Gunboat	do	Do.
Monocacy	do	do	Asiatic station.
Palos	do	do	Do.
Quiros	do	do	Do.
Samar	do	do	Do.
Villalobos	do	do	Do.

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Mobilization sheet, Nov. 5, 1919—Continued.

Name.	Type.	Assignment.	Location.
Helena	Gunboat	Asiatic fleet	Asiatic station.
Alcano	do	do	Do.
Pampanga	do	do	Do.
Mohican	do	do	Do.
Monadnock	Monitor	do	Do.
A-2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7	Submarines	do	Do.
B-1, 2, 3	do	do	Do.
Despatch	Yacht	Atlantic Fleet tender	York River.
Isis	do	Flag Squadron 2, Cruiser Force.	Do.
Ozark	Monitor	Patrol force	Tampico.
Annapolis	Gunboat	do	Do.
Dorothea	Yacht	do	Enroute Galveston to Tampico.
Schurz	Gunboat	do	Enroute Honolulu to San Diego.
Eagle	do	do	Havana.
Zara	Yacht	do	New York Yard.
Dolphin	Gunboat	do	Port au Prince.
Albatross	Bu. Fisheries boat	do	Key West.
Birmingham	Scout cruiser	do	Gibraltar.
Sacramento	Gunboat	do	Do.
Yankton	Yacht	do	Do.
Marietta	Gunboat	do	Do.
Wheeling	do	do	Ponta Delgada.
Nashville	do	do	Gibraltar.
Chester	Scout cruiser	do	Do.
Machias	Gunboat	do	Do.
Castine	do	do	Do.
Paducah	do	do	Do.
Salem	Scout cruiser	do	Boston.
Surveyor	C. and G. S.	do	Norfolk.
Seneca	C. G. C.	do	Gibraltar.
Tampa	do	do	Do.
Ossipee	do	do	Do.
Yamacraw	do	do	Do.
Manning	do	do	Do.
Algonquin	do	do	Do.
Corsair	Yacht	do	Brest.
Aphrodite	do	do	Do.
Sultana	do	do	Do.
Harvard	do	do	Do.
Kanawaha II	do	do	Do.
Vidette	do	do	Do.
Noma	do	do	Do.
Christabel	do	do	Do.
Carola IV	do	do	Do.
Wanderer	do	do	Do.
Emeline	do	do	Do.
Remlik	do	do	Do.
Alcedo	do	do	Do.
Guinevere	do	do	Do.
Corona	do	do	Do.
Druid	do	do	Newport.
Lydonia	do	do	Enroute Bermuda.
Wakiva	do	do	Brest.
Hinton	Tug	do	Do.
Edwards	M. S.	do	Boston.
Cahill	do	do	Brest.
Bauman	Steamer	do	Do.
Cythera	Yacht	do	En route Bermuda.
Hubbard	M. S.	do	Brest.
James	do	do	Do.
Douglas	do	do	Do.
Courtney	do	do	Do.
Anderton	do	do	Do.
City of Lewes	do	do	Do.
McNeal	do	do	Do.
Niagara	Yacht	do	San Juan.
Rambler	do	do	Newport.
Utowanah	do	do	Do.
Wenonah	do	do	Do.
Yacona	do	do	Boston.
May	do	do	Newport.
Artemis	do	do	New York yard.
Helenite	do	do	Newport.
Margaret	do	do	Do.
Lydonia	do	do	Commissioned Dec. 4, 1917 (Philadelphia).
Nokomis II	do	do	Commissioned Dec. 3, 1917 (Philadelphia).
Calates	do	do	Boston.

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Mobilization sheet, Nov. 5, 1919—Continued.

Name.	Type.	Assignment.	Location.
Venetia	Yacht	Patrol force	En route San Diego, Canal Zone.
Isabel	do	do	Commissioned Dec. 28, 1917 (Boston).
San Francisco	Mine placer	Mine force	York River.
Baltimore	do	do	Hampton Roads.
Dubuque	Gunboat	do	Annapolis.
Lebanon	Target repairer	do	York River.
Sonoma	Tug	do	Norfolk.
Ontario	do	do	Do.
Patapsco	do	do	Charleston.
Patuxent	do	do	Tangier Sound.
Uncas	do	do	Norfolk.
Wando	do	do	York River.
Chemung	do	do	Norfolk.
Tavernilla	do	do	Do.
Gorgone	do	do	Lynnhaven Roads.
Vestal	Repair ship	Train	York River.
Prometheus	do	do	Lynnhaven Roads.
Solace	Hospital ship	do	York River.
Comfort (ex Havana)	do	do	Commissioned Mar. 18, 1918 (New York).
Mercy	do	do	Commissioned Jan. 24, 1918 (New York).
Celtic	Supply	do	York River.
Culgoa	do	do	Do.
Bridge	do	do	Brest.
Jupiter	Collier	do	Norfolk.
Cyclops	do	do	New York yard.
Neptune	do	do	Tompkinsville.
Nereus	do	do	Norfolk.
Jason	do	do	York River.
Arethusa	do	do	On station in Altantic Ocean
Janawha	do	do	En route New York to Halifax.
Supply	Supply	do	Yokohama.
Dochra	do	do	Philadelphia.
Rappahanock	do	do	Commissioned Dec. 8, 1917 (Philadelphia).
Kittery	do	do	New York yard.
Proteus	Collier	Collier	En route Montevideo to Rio de Janeiro.
Orion	do	do	Hampton Roads.
Mars	do	do	Boston.
Vulcan	do	do	North River.
Maumee	Oiler	Oiler	En route Queenstown to Hampton Roads.
Cuyama	do	do	Portsmouth, England, to Hampton Roads.
Gargoyle	do	do	Dover, England.
Gold Shell	do	do	Hampton Roads to Devonport- England.
Los Angeles	do	do	Sheerness, England, to Hampton Roads.
Rockefeller	do	do	Philadelphia.
Standard Arrow	do	do	Portsmouth England, to Hampton Roads.
Topila	do	do	Philadelphia.
Pensacola	Cargo	Cargo	Do.
Bath	do	do	Brest.
Nero	do	do	Cardiff.
Houston	do	do	Tompkinsville (?).
Newport News	do	do	En route St. Nazaire to Philadelphia.
Astoria	do	do	Commissioned Nov. 15, 1917 (Charleston).
Beaufort	do	do	Tompkinsville.
Quincy	do	do	Commissioned Feb. 2, 1918 (New Orleans).
Long Beach	do	do	Comimssioned Dec. 20, 1917 (Charleston).
Gulfport	do	do	San Pedro.
Sterling	do	do	Azores.
Ticonderoga	do	do	Commissioned Jan. 5, 1918 (Boston).
Teresa	do	do	Brest.
Sioux	do	do	Commissioned Dec. 1, 1917 (Norfolk).
Carib	do	do	New York.
Manta	do	do	En route Tampico to Key West.
Ozama	do	do	Norfolk.

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Mobilization sheet Nov. 3, 1917—Continued.

Name.	Type.	Assignment.	Location.
Potomac	Tug	Santo Domingo	Port au Prince.
Nokomis I.	Yacht	do	Commissioned Dec. 5, [illegible] (New York).
Vixen	do	St. Thomas	St. Thomas.
Petrel	Gunboat	Guantanamo	Guantanamo.
Osceola	Tug	do	Do.
Brutus	Collier	Pacific Fleet	San Francisco.
Nanshan	do	do	San Diego.
Iroquois	Tug	do	Do.
Saturn	Radio repr	do	Cordova, Alaska.
Glacier	Supply	do	Rio de Janeiro.
Abarenda	Collier	Asiatic Fleet	Cavite.
Ajax	do	do	Nagaska to Manilla.
Piscatauqua	Tug	do	Guam.
Wompatuck	do	do	Olongapo.
Caesar	Collier	do	Rangoon to Singapore.

What I have marked 29 is a plan for district defenses. This has been already submitted, marked "I," in yesterday's testimony. Its date was about February 28, 1918.

Thirty is portions of a revised plan for coast defense; defense by submarine. There are a great many details of that that I have not submitted. I have them all in my head. The date was August 16, 1918. It became necessary to organize our coast defenses both for routing shipping, for mine sweeping, and for intelligence service, and a good deal of that work.

The CHAIRMAN. But the details do not appear in that plan?

Capt. PRATT. We operated mostly under a chart. For instance, you laid out an area where our submarines went out; and we had very definite plans, and for routing and handling our shipping under the district commandants. That is the general scheme. This plan is as follows:

PLAN No. 30.

REVISED PLAN FOR COAST DEFENSE—DEFENSE BY SUBMARINE.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, August 16, 1918.

To: Commandants first, second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh naval districts; commander in chief, Atlantic Fleet; commander cruiser force, Atlantic Fleet; commander submarine force, Atlantic Fleet; commander special antisubmarine force (U. S. S. *Jouett*); commander special antisubmarine force (U. S. S. *Salem*).

Subject: Plan for antisubmarine patrol by United States submarine, Atlantic Coast—General instructions pertaining thereto; correlating activities of special hunting groups.

1. Indications are that enemy submarine activities along Atlantic coast will continue at least until beginning of winter and in addition to gun and torpedo attack on shipping, will include mining and cable cutting.

In common with our other defenses against this form of attack, our submarine forces are very scant for the work in hand. It is no longer practicable to allocate our submarines to all districts, and they are being assembled into the regular divisional units in order that the improved basing thus afforded may increase the amount of offshore work that may be expected of the submarines and that they may be brought under the immediate command of the available officers who are best qualified to train them and direct the details of their operations and tactics.

2. The naval districts concerned and the available submarine divisions are being supplied with definitions of certain submarine patrol areas, chosen as not well or not easily covered by aircraft or district surface craft and as localities in which our submarines may most likely defend against enemy submarine operations by acting offen-

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sively against them. The department being best in touch with all information concerning enemy movements will for the present designate the areas to be occupied by available submarines.

3. There will be certain special submarine patrols which will be directly administrated from the Office of Naval Operations; naval districts concerned will be given all information concerning them which is needed in their own operations. Operation orders for ordinary submarine patrols will as heretofore be issued by the naval districts in which the submarines are based. Since all districts whose offshore waters may need submarine patrols are not manned by submarine divisions, and because advantageous patrol areas sometimes lap into two districts, it is essential that neighboring districts be informed of a prospective patrol in order that it may issue instructions to prevent danger to our submarines and joint interference between their operations and those of the district surface and aircraft.

Aircraft, surface hunting units and other surface patrol or scouting craft must not be sent on antisubmarine missions into areas known to be occupied by our own submarines; to do so would unnecessarily endanger our own submarines and the efforts of the air and surface craft might be nullified in hunting them. The naval district which issues the operating order to a submarine going on patrol will inform the commander in chief and commander cruiser force, Atlantic Fleet, the naval districts which include the area and also the districts next them, of the movement, including its duration; this information should be sent out as early as possible. These instructions are not to be understood as interfering with dispositions for rescue or escorting by air or surface craft—but the craft concerned in such a movement should be informed if our submarines are in the areas likely to be traversed. Hunting units are to be instructed to assume submarine patrol areas occupied unless informed to the contrary.

4. Ordinary submarine patrols will normally be one week, beginning and ending on Saturday. On Wednesday of each week, naval districts in which submarines are based will inform Office of Operations—or may direct the submarine organization of the district to do so—of the submarines which on the following Saturday will be available for patrol. If there is no reason for maintaining a patrol at the particular time, none will be directed and the available boats will exercise, but remain ready for patrol. Otherwise, directions will be given to occupy certain areas. It then devolves upon the districts concerned to prepare operation orders, arrange convoy in and out and inform other districts.

PATROL OPERATION ORDERS.

5. Under ordinary circumstances, submarines will not need to be convoyed during darkness and convoy effort may be saved by having them leave for patrol in the afternoon and return early in the morning; this shortens the run of the convoying vessel and reduces the danger of our submarines encountering each other. These advantages offset anything that is gained by having them actually relieve on station. Since, however, late arrivals may happen, it is advisable to lay down outbound and inbound submarine routes for the different ports in which submarines are based, and direct which routes to follow.

Patrol operating orders are to include information concerning the convoy and westbound routes that pass over the patrol area that will be in effect for the period of the patrol; this is in order that they may protect those routes in good weather and avoid them by night and in thick weather. When known, the probable sailing dates of convoys that concern them will also be given submarines going on patrol.

A submarine is not to enter any submarine area other than those to which it is assigned to patrol, unless said submarine knows such area to be unoccupied by submarines or hunting units. Such information as is necessary for this safeguard is to be supplied in patrol operation orders.

Patrol-operation orders should give schedules and wave lengths upon which information is likely to be broadcasted. When their important operations are not thereby nullified, they should listen on such schedules; since they can not always get a message, those containing important information or direction should be repeated on one or more subsequent schedules.

SURFACE HUNTING GROUPS.

6. The commandants of naval districts will formulate plans for using their submarine-chaser hunting groups and air forces to protect areas near the coast not occupied by submarine patrols.

In working out the details of these plans, it is advisable that submarine-chaser hunting groups be based as near as practicable to the areas in which they are expected to operate.

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In view of the lack of special equipment and special training of some submarine chasers assigned to naval districts, and the necessity of using these vessels at certain places for escort work, etc., it is not considered practicable at present for the naval districts to efficiently patrol all those areas adjacent to the coast, with the submarine chasers available for that purpose.

The department has therefore organized three special hunting squadrons of submarine chasers. Each squadron is composed of a certain number of submarine-chaser hunting groups and a vessel of the cruiser or destroyer type, with sufficient gunpower to back up the operations of the submarine chasers and maintain the control of the surface.

The operations of these special hunting squadrons will be under the control of the department, and they will be sent to infested areas to cooperate with the work of the district craft. The operations of these squadrons will be restricted to areas not occupied by submarine patrols, as follows:

The first squadron to operate on the Atlantic coast to the northward of latitude 40 north; the second squadron to operate on the Atlantic coast between the latitudes 30 north and 40 north; the third squadron to operate in waters to the southward of latitude 30 north.

W. S. BENSON.

Copy to commander Submarine Division 8, secret file room, Capt. Tompkins, U. S. Navy, Capt. Hart, U. S. Navy, Commander Woodson, U. S. Navy.

There was a comment made by Admiral Fiske in which he submitted the plan under which the Office of Operations was to be organized, and he rather inferred that we had no plan up to the time, and no real plans section in the Office of Operations up to the time, when he submits those papers, which, as a practical war measure, have no real value at all. He does not know anything about it. We were there, doing the work, and we know what we are talking about.

Now, in order to get a real operating plans section that worked, you have got to have something besides men that sit down and write paper things for somebody else to do. A real operating plans section has not only got to have the ability to draw up the original conceptions, but it must have men on that committee who have the power to execute the things that they have drawn up. No other plans section in war will operate and really get things done except a plans section of that sort. So that very early in the war, after I came in as Aid for Operations, seeing that that necessity existed, during the summer and fall of 1917, the following method of handling plans was evolved. I want to set at rest any doubt that may have arisen as to whether we had plans, as far as being capable of coping with the questions that came up.

The CHAIRMAN. For operations?

Capt. PRATT. For operations; yes, sir. Owing to the shortage of specially trained officers and of the need of all regular officers to form a nucleus for the various activities of the Navy, it was not possible to form a plans section entirely divorced from administrative duties, although its desirability is not questioned. Such a deliberative body is of inestimable value in presenting data and first plans to a more executive body. The crying need of the time was for an executive plans section which not only combined the deliberative assets of a pure plans section but the more practical features of the bureaus system, so that we not only got the plan but the backing of the bureaus to put it through. With this formulated plan ready for action it was then in shape to get the approval of the Chief of Naval Operations and of the Secretary. Therefore an executive plans section was formed in Operations, consisting of the heads of all the divisions of the office and including representatives from each of the

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bureaus and a representative from the general board. Every Tuesday morning an executive session was held. At the conference the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations presided and all officers of the grade of captain and admiral who might be on temporary duty in the office, for the purpose of getting in touch with the war situation preparatory to assignment to duty at the front, were invited to attend. The situation of the past week was rehearsed. All formulated plans ready were passed upon, signed, and made ready for final approval by the Secretary. All new plans were assigned to certain members of the committee, chosen by the chairman, and these members were instructed to report their finished plans by a certain date. This method worked very satisfactorily, except as noted in the failure to have the basic deliberative body, which at that time was not possible, as there were not the officers available. Every chief of division had to constitute himself the deliberative head for all work coming under his cognizance.

The CHAIRMAN. When was that plan submitted?

Capt. PRATT. This is not a plan. When did we first start this?

The CHAIRMAN. When did you commence doing this?

Capt. PRATT. We commenced as soon after June 25 as I possibly could.

The CHAIRMAN. June 25, 1917?

Capt. PRATT. 1917. That is the way I operated.

Now, I would like to discuss for a moment some of the plans which actually were in use in the war zone, which are not plans of preparation but are distinctly war plans of operation, one of those being the relations of armed guards and convoys. There has been a certain inference, I think, drawn that convoy and armed guard ran counter to each other. On the contrary, they did not run counter at all, and that very detailed plan of armed guard which we had in operation before the war flowed naturally and automatically into convoy operations, and really was conducive to a greater degree of efficiency than any system which the British had evolved up to the time we entered the war, or any time after we entered the war to its close. The points where convoy run counter are not to armed guard but to the system of patrol, which was in vogue in the British Navy when we entered the war, and according to the testimony of one of the destroyer captains whom I have talked to, existed for a period, he would say, of at least 6 weeks after our destroyers got across to the other side; so that not trying to find any fault with Admiral Sims's statements at all, I merely wish to explain the situation a trifle, and to show, as I think, that he had a rather mistaken idea of our convoy in relation to armed guard and convoy, and particularly where he cites that cable in which he states that he was ready to "jump overboard."

There was no statement made in that cable (I drew that part of it up myself); I drew the whole cable up myself, I think, and I know the purpose of my own mind. It was that there should be no misunderstanding of the value of armed guards, both within the convoy and without the convoy, because the convoy system as it was inaugurated, as it went into effect at the beginning of the war, and as it continued throughout the war, to the signing of the armistice, was never a whole and completely and thoroughly rounded project, because it was not possible for them to convoy ships in and out. There were not sufficient vessels to do it. Therefore convoy, while it protected the cargo

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100 per cent during its existence, into the ports throughout the barred zone or through the war zone, did not protect the ship on its way out, because that ship had to go alone. While it protected the cargo 100 per cent, it protected the tonnage about 50 per cent. But the arming of our ships and placing on board those ships a trained personnel was, as far as it was humanly possible, the most adequate protection which we could give that ship. A ship was all the better for going into convoy with an armed guard on board, far better than she was without it. The system of patrol which had been inaugurated on the other side was one of dividing the dangerous area into squares. Our destroyers were assigned duties in the squares. They picked up an incoming ship, carried it through to the next square, and it was carried through to the next and so on until it reached port. That was not an effective system. But there was really quite as much discussion on the other side—more, in fact, I imagine—as there was on our own, as to whether they should give up a system which they themselves had evolved, and go to convoy, or whether they should change in the middle of the war and adopt convoy.

It was for those very reasons, and for the fact that it was considered a very doubtful procedure as to whether untrained merchant captains in conditions of fog and bad weather, in winter or summer, could handle their ships with the precision necessary, the same precision with which you have to handle a naval vessel, and whether there would not be more sinkings, due to actual collisions, than there were due to submarines, that caused us on this side to weight the question—not to refuse it, but to weigh it—and it was ultimately decided upon——

The CHAIRMAN. For the information of the committee, will you explain how the convoy would protect the cargo 100 per cent and the tonnage 50 per cent?

Capt. PRATT. Yes; because the loaded ships were assembled, say at our ports. There were various convoy systems, some coming up from South Africa, some along the coast of Spain and France to British ports, and let us say from our own ports, the convoy was assembled off Halifax. It proceeded under the guard of a cruiser, and it was met outside of the dangerous area by destroyers, which escorted it into port. The vessels were discharged and they then proceeded on their own responsibility back to ports of loading.

The CHAIRMAN. With no convoy going back at all?

Capt. PRATT. No, sir; they wanted to do it, and toward the end of the war we discussed the problem, and not doubting its advisability at all, we wanted to do it if we could. There was also this further objection to convoy, which made it a matter of discussion, and that was a very important point. It was almost sure to, and it did slow up the transport of foodstuffs into allied countries. The actual amount that it slowed up was over 20 per cent—between 20 and 25 per cent.

The CHAIRMAN. That is, the time was taken to gather the ships up?

Capt. PRATT. To gather them up; and there was also one other serious feature, too, that caused numerous cablegrams to pass between Admiral Sims and us, and that was particularly the putting of fast ships into the convoy. We were running at that time the only trans-Atlantic line which could carry mails and passengers across, in our ships of the International Mercantile Marine, the New York and

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the St. Louis, fast 18-knot ships. They did not have the bunker capacity to go into Halifax and to go across, and in talking the matter over with Mr. Franklin, he said that he would far rather that these ships should run through without any protection at all; so that when the discussion came up as to whether those should go—and that was one of the main points of contest—we thought it far safer to let those vessels go on their own responsibility, rather than to put them into a slow merchant convoy of from 11 to 8 knots. What I wish to state is that it was not a refusal on that point, because as you will note, he states that the first convoy came through about May 31, I think; and even while we were discussing the details, one discussion being then—I will read it to you later—as to whether it would not be wiser to form a convoy this way, to let all the ships sail as fast as they could out of our own ports, and let them collect, say at any point that the Admiralty might desire, outside of the war zone, on certain days, there to herd together, and after having flocked in as fast as they could, from that point to be convoyed in; and that was one of the points of discussion which was being held at that time—one of our ideas.

But even while we were discussing that point, Admiral Jellicoe finally said, in his cable of about July 4 or 5, they wanted it done. We stopped immediately and acceded to it, because the British had finally said they wanted it, and whether we did not think it best, it was their plan and their ships were involved more than ours, and we yielded at once. But the point was, the point I wish to make is, that while it took Great Britain a number of years to find out that they really wanted convoy, we with discussion only between May 31 when it became an assured success and July 5 when we had practically accepted it in toto, and that appears to me to be rather a natural thing to do. But I wanted to clear up the point that there is no opposition between armed guard and convoy. The counter runs between patrol and convoy.

The CHAIRMAN. There would be an opposition between the two ideas if the armed guard were used exclusively to take the place of convoy, would there not?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, yes. We would then have to accept our own risks, as we did in the case of the American line ships. If we refuse to accept convoy, we accept the risks. It does not interfere with convoy at all. That was simply because, in this case, of the belief that the risk for the ship is greater in convoy than running alone. She then has to go on her own, and when she gets outside of the port she signals and gets routing instructions in; and that does not interfere with the convoy, because of keeping her out; unless we demand protection for her. Then it would. I have submitted a number of papers which further elaborate and go into comparisons between the two.

The CHAIRMAN. Are they papers that were submitted to the department during the war?

Capt. PRATT. No; it was done after the war. It was done the other day, to clarify the situation. It is more the summary of what has happened.

The CHAIRMAN. That is in regard to the convoy system?

Capt. PRATT. Yes; and what I will read will be to show some of the evidence of the figures we got from having such a system worked

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from the date we went into the war. It was of inestimable value to us. It may not have been to the British, because their system was different from ours. They only put two gunners on a ship while we put a full gun's crew. During the period during which we were at war, 384 merchant ships were armed and 1,832 trans-Atlantic trips were made by these ships.

Three hundred and forty-seven attacks by enemy submarines were reported.

The CHAIRMAN. Were these altogether American ships?

Capt. PRATT. American ships.

Two hundred and twenty-seven attacks by enemy submarines were classified as "actual."

Twenty-nine ships were sunk under classification "torpedoed."

Two ships were sunk by shell fire, one of which, a tanker, caught fire after a running fight of 2 hours' duration. The other was sunk only after all ammunition had been expended in a running fight of over 4 hours' duration.

One hundred and ninety-three attacks were successfully repulsed.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you read the names of those two ships?

Capt. PRATT. One was the *Morini*, I think.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you give the name of the other?

Capt. PRATT. I can get the names of those two ships. I will do so.

Thirty-four attacks resulted in probable damage to the enemy submarine.

Two million seven hundred and thirty-eight thousand and twenty-six tons of United States shipping were armed.

One hundred and sixty-six thousand four hundred and twenty-eight tons of United States armed shipping were sunk by enemy submarines.

As a result of attacks successfully repulsed, approximately 1,400,000 tons of United States shipping was saved.

In arming ships, of course the very first thing that is accomplished is to force the submarine to use the torpedo. Anyone who has seen that picture of the U–23 in which 21 vessels were sunk, and all except one were sunk with torpedoes, must realize what a tremendous saving to shipping these precautionary measures were of arming merchant ships. The point, as I said before that I wish to emphasize is that it assists convoys as soon as they adopt it, and is in nowise a measure against convoy.

This analysis and the accompanying memorandum I submit, as follows:

[Extract from Admiral Sims's article, December, 1919, World's Work.]

Our first division of destroyers reached Queenstown on Friday morning, May 4, 1917; the following Monday they put to sea on the business of hunting the submarine and protecting commerce. For the first month or six weeks they spent practically all their time on patrol duty in company with British destroyers, sloops, and other patrol vessels. Though the convoy system was formally adopted in the latter part of May, it was not operating completely and smoothly until August or September. Many troop and merchant convoys were formed in the intervening period and many were conducted through the submarine zone by American destroyers; but our ships spent much time sailing singly, hunting for such enemies as might betray their presence, or escorting individual cargoes. The early experiments had demonstrated the usefulness of the convoy system, yet a certain number of pessimists still refused to accept it as the best solution of the shipping problem; and to reorganize practically all the shipping of the world, scattered everywhere on the seven seas, necessarily took time.

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ANALYSIS OF ARMED-GUARD PLAN IN RELATION TO CONVOY.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
BUREAU OF NAVIGATION,
Washington, D. C., March 27, 1920.

1. Admiral Sims alleges that the Navy Department entered war unprepared, with no well considered policy or plans, and that the policy pursued was one of vacillation. Quite to the contrary there is presented herewith an estimate of the situation as prepared by the Navy Department on March 1, 1917. Considering the situation at that date, this is a clear-cut and well-defined estimate, which was almost immediately incorporated into a policy and put into effect. That this policy was not a vacillating one is borne out by the fact that it was fundamentally in existence and practice at the signing of the armistice (termination of hostilities). That the Navy Department acted promptly and effectively is shown by the sequence that on March 1 an estimate of the situation had been prepared; on March 13 this had been incorporated into a policy which embodied certain regulations for putting it into effect which policy and regulations were approved on that date by the President; on March 16 the promptness is still further shown by the sailing for the war zone of the first armed merchant ship; on April 19 the effectiveness is clearly shown when a hostile submarine was damaged by the first shot of the participation by the United States into the war—a 6-inch shell fired by the armed guard of the steamship *Mongolia*.

2. In referring to the records of the case at hand we find that the commander, United States naval forces operating in European waters arrived in England April 10, 1917. On April 19, he submits by letter to the Navy Department his estimate of the situation, N. B. It is reasonable to suppose that the Navy Department received this letter 10 days later.

3. Certain quotations are here made from the above letter relative to the subject in hand:

Paragraph 3. "The submarine campaign against merchant shipping of all nations has resolved itself into the real issue of the war and stated briefly the Governments have not been able to, and are not now, effectively meeting the situation present."

Paragraph 7. "The enemy really reckoned that the Allies would be defeated in two months through shortage of supplies."

Paragraph 14. "Considerable criticism has been, and still is, concentrated upon the admiralty for not taking more effective steps and for failing to produce more substantial and visible results. One of the principal demands is for convoys of merchant shipping, and more definite and real protection within the war zone."

Paragraph 15. "It is insistently asked (was asked by myself) why shipping is not directed to and concentrated at various rendezvous and from these convoyed through the dangerous areas. The answer is the same—the area is too large; the necessary vessels are not available."

Paragraph 17. "After trying various methods of controlling shipping, the admiralty now believes the best policy to be one of dispersion."

Paragraph 18. "The great difficulty in any method of shipping control is communication with the shipping itself and full cooperation by the merchant personnel. The moment a ship is captured the code either becomes dangerous or useless. The merchant code is being continually changed and at all times it can not be counted upon for more than a fortnight. The immense difficulty of changing the code and keeping shipping all over the world in touch with changes is apparent."

Paragraph 19. "Continual trouble is experienced with some merchant captains taking the law into their own hands and exhibiting contempt, or at least indifference, for admiralty instructions."

Paragraph 20. "The admiralty has had frequent conference with merchant masters and sought their advice. Their most unanimous demand is 'Give us a gun and let us look out for ourselves.' They are also insistent that it is impracticable for merchant vessels to proceed in formation, at least in any considerable numbers, due principally to difficulty in controlling their speed are to the inexperience of their subordinate officers. With this in view I do not personally agree, but believe that with a little experience merchant vessels could safely and sufficiently well steam in open formations."

Paragraph 21. "The best protection against the submarine menace for all classes of ships, merchant as well as naval, is speed and zigzagging."

Paragraph 22. "In the absence of adequate patrol craft, particularly destroyers, and until the enemy submarine morale is broken, there is but one sure method of meeting the submarine issue upon which there is also complete unanimity—increased number of merchant bottoms, preferably small:

"More ships! More ships! More ships! is heard on every hand."

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Paragraph 32. "All are agreed that the best protection against torpedoes is speed and zigzagging."

4. It is particularly desirous to bring out at this point that statements and recommendations submitted by Admiral Sims are accepted in their good faith for the welfare of the Navy in accomplishing its mission throughout the war; it is only the fallacies thereof which lead him to his allegation and bring him to his conclusions that are being brought out.

From the above quotations taken from the letter of April 19, 1917, the following military points of this case are presented:

First, the real issue of the war is the submarine campaign against merchant shipping.

Second, the Allied Governments have not been able to and are not now meeting the situation.

Third, the enemy expect to win in two months through cutting off of supplies.

Fourth, there is a demand through criticism for convoy.

Fifth, objections to convoy manifest themselves through: (1) lack of necessary vessels (probably meaning escorting or station vessels); (2) lack of cooperation from the merchant personnel in that lose codes and do not carry out instructions.

Sixth, that the most unanimous demand from merchant masters is "Give us a gun and let us look out for ourselves."

Seventh, that the best protection against submarine menace and torpedoes is speed and zigzag.

Eighth, that the admiralty after trying various methods of controlling shipping believes the best policy to be one of dispersion.

5. That the department was not only meeting the situation as outlined by the above points, but was even putting into effect an even more effective policy is brought out by the following:

(*a*) Great Britain as the greatest maritime nation and with the largest interest at stake in the protection of her mercantile marine against the enemy's submarine policy, and after nearly three years of war experience upon which to base its policy had taken the following measures: (1) Establishes patrols in the close proximity of her coasts as a weapon or protection against the submarine and as a means to transmit routing instructions to merchant ships arriving at their stations; (2) routes the merchant vessels to avoid vicinity of recently known submarine activities. This form of routing often takes the form of closing ports for several days at a time, thus completely holding up all shipping in that vicinity; (3) provides a single gun located aft with a trained personnel of two or three men to man it; (4) provides an apparatus to the merchant ships for the purpose of making smoke screens; (5) issue certain instructions to merchant ships covering speed, zigzag, darkening ship, handling ship in the presence of the enemy, to avoid certain known practices of the enemy in attempts to entice a merchant ship in contact with mines or to a position for torpedoing it, etc.

(*b*) That neither France nor Italy have put forward any effective policies.

(*c*) On the other hand we find that the Navy Department has previous to entering the war laid down and put into effect a policy which not only embraced all that was covered by the British policy after three years' experience, but for the following reasons was the more effective: (1) That it provided at least two guns as a protection for each vessel; (2) that it provided a commissioned officer or experienced chief petty officer of the Navy in charge with two leading petty officers as assistants and a complete trained gun crew from the battleship force for each gun; (3) to maintain its efficiency a rigid system of inspection coupled with special training was put into effect. Upon the establishment of convoy, signal and radio personnel of the Navy was added; (4) that it supplied personnel sufficient for a lookout system; (5) that it provided a military force to see that all rules and regulations prescribed or recommended were carried out; (6) that it presented the entering wedge whereby it was possible for the Navy Department later to assume a more direct control of the mercantile shipping.

To bring out this latter point which is most important, the following should be considered: (1) That the Navy Department either in peace or in war has no direct control over the privately owned shipping of the United States; (2) that such control as is exercised by this Government comes under the jurisdiction of the Department of Commerce; (3) that in Great Britain the admiralty has the right to control her shipping in time of war; (4) that even with this power the admiralty, after three years' experience, was having trouble in exercising its functions; (5) that the Navy Department by its foresight did, in a comparatively short time, considering our system of Government, eliminate these conditions.

6. The ultimate effectiveness of the department's policy will be shown further on in detail.

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Admiral Sims, as a result of this letter of April 19, 1917, draws certain conclusions in which he intimates that failure to adopt convoy system was largely responsible for great losses of tonnage and limited the number of troops which could be sent abroad during the first year.

The fallacies in this argument are:

1. Up to that time no specific recommendation for convoy had been made; in fact dispersion had been decided upon by the Admiralty.

2. The type of vessels being sunk were not suitable for transporting troops.

3. At that time all such ships as were suitable for troop transports were being rapidly converted and put into condition.

4. After the declaration of war the loss of tonnage to the United States shipping during April, 1917, was only 8,944 tons of which 2,551 tons represented an armed ship. This armed ship, the *Vacuum*, was torpedoed under conditions most favorable to the submarine in that the sea was rough, with whitecaps, making it difficult to see a periscope. Despite these conditions, however, the fact that the torpedo was sighted before it reached the ship was encouraging as it demonstrated the value of lookouts, and had weather conditions been more favorable, would doubtless have enabled the vessel to maneuver to avoid torpedo as happened in many instances later.

On April 30, 1917, it is to be noted that a cable from Admiral Sims to the department states that "Admiralty is making a study of convoy system for shipping," and "This advance information for department's consideration."

Again, on May 1: "Admiralty has decided to give trial to convoy scheme.

"I urgently recommend favorable action.

"Through British Naval representative at Washington details of plan will be communicated from time to time as necessary."

On May 25, he cables: "The principal of convoying merchant ships in accordance with general plans is approved by the Admiralty."

On May 31 a cable states that British convoy from Gibraltar arrived safely on May 20, 1917.

7. It is to be noted that May 1 the department is notified that Admiralty decides to give trial to convoy system and that it will be advised as to its progress. By May 31 it is informed that the first experiment is successful. In other words, no definite plan for operation has been submitted and the department has been requested only to furnish 14 ships for escort duty for New York service. This might readily be interpreted as meaning that the British having taken three years to reach the point of experiment, the Navy Department was expected to meet the situation overnight, and this when no established plan of operation has been submitted. In the meantime we find that the result of the department's policy has resulted from the declaration of war to June 1, 1917, in the loss of 26,765 tons of United States shipping, of which 2,551 tons still represent armed ships and 10,406 tons represent sailing ships, which naturally are to be considered in connection with convoy. At this time, noting the excessive loss to sailing vessels, the department armed a schooner sailing for Italy. The schooner later fought a successful fight with an enemy submarine in the Mediterranean, with probable damage to the submarine. Guns being required for the larger ships made it impracticable to arm sailing vessels as a class.

8. To avoid confusion in the separate subjects of convoys for troop ships and convoys for supply or cargo ships, it is here necessary to enter briefly into the subject of convoy of troop ships in order to bring out the proper sequence of Admiral Sims's correspondence with the department.

On June 6, 1917, the department notifies Admiral Sims of tentative sailing of first troop convoy.

On June 8 Admiral Sims's reply tends to show that there is no definite plan established in the submarine danger zone for the handling of even the troop ship convoys.

On June 10 the department evidently appreciating the lack of definite plan for handling convoys in submarine zone, requests a definite plan be submitted, and it is in reply to this specific request that Admiral Sims submits his letter of June 13 formulating a plan. It is further to be noted that the plan had been submitted principally with troop-ship convoy in mind, though it is used as an argument in presenting the allegation that the Navy Department was holding up cargo-ship convoys. Here it should again be noted that it would require about 10 days for this plan to reach the Navy Department.

On June 14 Admiral Sims cables the department that "there are now sufficient vessels available for escort duty to insure safety of all vital supplies and also prospective movements of our troops and their supplies." Here the department is informed for the first time that the situation, insofar as escort in submarine zone is concerned, is ready to be handled abroad.

On the following day, June 15, the first United States convoy sailed from the United States, or a convoy system for troops was effective.

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To return to the problem of establishment of convoys for supply ships, we find—

On June 15 Admiral Sims cables the department, "Strongly urge putting convoy system into effect immediately from Philadelphia, Boston, New York, and North Atlantic ports as previously recommended."

This appears as a rather large field to cover in view of the fact that New York alone had previously been mentioned (and the number of escorting vessels required would be entirely out of the question).

On June 18, the department cabled Admiral Sims as follows:

"Received: June 20, 1917, via Admiralty.
"To: Commander in chief, Queenstown.
"Following for Admiral Sims:

"There will be no additional movements before August of troops. You will be furnished fully with information as to sailing of Army supply ships as far as possible in advance and the actual sailing intended route and probable dates of arrival will be reported. We hope to sail four Army supply ships now fitting out in about 10 days' time. The 32 destroyers which are all that there are available have sailed; 110 fleet chasers which are to be sent to France should begin to deliver in August. Fishing vessels, 12 in number, will sail in August for France. There are no other small craft available at present although work on yachts is being pushed probably ready July 15. In regard to convoy I consider that American vessels having armed guards are safer when sailing independently."

On June 20 Admiral Sims replies:

"Sent: June 20, 1917.
"To: Secretary of Navy.
"Through: Admiralty.

"The immediate dispatch to this area of all possible destroyers and antisubmarine craft of any description is mandatory if the submarine issue is to be effectively met. During absence of destroyers for escort duty with troops transports the forces in this area reduced to only 10 destroyers and 10 sloops, only 6 of each in operation at a time. This requires 5 days at sea with 2 days in port, which can not be continued with reliability. Other areas are similarly short of sufficient forces to meet the situation. Yesterday the majority of these forces were engaged in escorting individual inward-bound valuable ships, thereby leaving all shipping following them unprotected. Ships sunk yesterday as far west as 17:30. It will seem suicidal if the convoy system as proposed by the British Admiralty is not put into immediate operation and applied to all shipping, thus forcing submarines to encounter antisubmarine craft in order to attack shipping. It is impossible to carry on partial convoy and partial patrol system. Both can not be done, the former much better than present system which is not succeeding.

"Urgently request information of department's action on this dispatch and upon previous similar dispatches. A decision is necessary before decisive action can be taken on this side.

"SIMS."

The records of the Navy Department show that this was received on June 21 through the British Embassy. It is important to note the dates of these cables and their intent.

The department in its cable has drawn lines between troop ships, Army cargo ships, and American vessels, and evidently had in mind Admiral Sims's cable of June 15.

In presenting his allegations, Admiral Sims, while dealing with the subject of "Antisubmarine craft in war zone," first quotes his cable of June 20 and the following remark, "In reply to the increasing urgent series of messages in June I finally received a message from the department on June 20 which I will now read to you." He then quotes the department's cable of June 18.

Considering his remarks which follow, a fallacy of his allegation is disclosed in the fact that he has misconstrued the times of dispatches quoted.

He says: "I would like to invite attention to that last paragraph, 'In regard to convoy I consider that having armed guards are safer when sailing independently,' and that was signed 'Daniels.' Well, I can assure you that I was about ready to jump overboard when I got that last message. After all the information that had been sent as to the nature of the antisubmarine campaign to be informed officially by the Navy Department, 'In regards to convoy I consider that American vessels having armed guards are safer when sailing independently.' When this message came I realized once more that the department did not appreciate the situation or such a message would have been impossible."

Admiral Sims further remarks, "I would have supposed that anyone who had even casually read the Sunday newspapers would have known that the arming of merchant

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ships would have the opposite result as it obliges the submarine to torpedo without warning instead of sinking a ship with its own gunfire."

On June 21 Admiral Sims cables:

"My recommendations concerning the convoy system were not based upon American vessels, but upon all allied shipping, for it is upon the preservation of the remainder of this shipping that our success against the enemy is entirely dependent. It is assumed here that the comparative immunity of American shipping from submarine attack is due to German hopes that such a policy will strengthen the peace propaganda in America. This is apparently clearly shown by the German press. Actual and extended experience has shown that arming merchantmen does not protect them from attack, but simply forces the submarine to attack without warning, thus obliging her to use up her torpedoes and shorten her cruise. Armed merchantmen are being sunk daily off this port." (That is Queenstown.) "The success of the convoys so far brought in shows that the system will defeat the submarine campaign if applied generally and in time. The system is merely a plan that obliges the submarine to fight antisubmarine craft in order to attack merchantmen. The present campaign is not succeeding."

On June 22 Admiral Sims cables:

"To: Secretary of the Navy.

"Sent: June 22.

"The British Admiralty have now adopted the convoy system and will put it into full effect as fast as ships can be obtained for high-sea convoy against raiders and destroyers for escort duty in submarine zone. As previously reported, convoys are in successful operation from Mediterranean and Hampton Roads. Plans are in hand for total of eight convoys a week as follows: Two from Gibraltar, two from Hampton Roads, two or three from New York, one from Canada, the latter prefereably being combined with the New York convoys. One a week from New York will be put into operation as soon as possible with British cruisers, in absence of our support. I again urgently advise our full support, assisting and cooperating in assembly of convoys, and furnishing one cruiser or reserve battleship a week for high-sea escort. Reserve battleships are admirably suited for this duty, which will not interfere with personnel training, for which I understand they are now being used."

9. On June 24 the department cables the following to Admiral Sims:

"The department is strongly of the opinion—based on recent experiences—that the question of supplying adequate guns and trained gun crews to merchant ships is one which can in no wise be treated as a minor issue. Coupled with a rigid system of inspection, this method is believed to constitute one of the most effective defensive submarine measures."

Here Admiral Sims remarks:

"There was the opinion formed in America, necessarily without the information that should have been considered in connection with it, which was holding up a convoy system, and which held up for two or three months, and which cost the loss of a number of hundreds of thousands of tons of shipping and some lives. It will be noted that, in this cable, the department reiterates the opinion expressed by the Secretary, four days before, that the arming of merchant ships constituted one of the most effective defensive submarine measures, and implying thereby that it merited more consideration than the convoy system, or, at least, that until it was further developed, it was unnecessary to take the convoy system very seriously. In any case it is difficult to construe these answers from the department, to my specific and urgent recommendations concerning the convoy system, as anything less than what they considered justifiable substitutes for the convoy system. The committee can perhaps imagine my state of mind when confronted with this situation."

On June 28 Admiral Sims cables as follows:

Sent: June 28, 1917.
To: Secretary of the Navy.
From: Queenstown.

Referring to department's opinion, reported in last two cables, to the effect that adequate armament and trained crews constitute one of the most effective defensive antisubmarine measures, I again submit with all possible stress, the following based on extended British war experience. The measures demanded if enemy defeat in time is to be assured, are not defensive but offensive-defensive. The merchantmen's inherent weakness is a lack of speed and protection. Guns are no defense against a torpedo attack against armed ships. In this area alone, during the last six weeks, 30 armed ships were sunk by torpedoes without submarine being seen, although 3 of these were escorted each by a single destroyer. The result would have been, of course, the same no matter how many guns these ships carried or what their caliber.

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Three mystery ships, heavily armed, manned by expert naval crews, with much previous experience with submarine attack, have recently been torpedoed without warning. Another case within the month of mystery ship engaging submarine with gunfire at 6,000 yards, but submarine submerged and approached unseen and torpedoed ship at close range. The ineffectiveness of heaviest batteries against submarine attack is conclusively shown by Admiralty's practice always sending destroyers to escort their men-of-war. The comparative immunity of the relatively small number of American ships, especially liners, is believed here to be due to the enemy hopes that the pacifist movement will succeed. Cases are on record of submarines making successful gun attacks, from advantageous sun position, against armed ships, without ship being able to see submarine. I submit that if submarine campaign is to be defeated, it must be by offensive measures. The enemy submarine mission must be of destruction of shipping and avoidance of antisubmarine craft. Enemy submarines are now using, for their final approach, an auxiliary periscope less than 2 inches in diameter. This information just acquired.

All of the experience in this submarine campaign to date demonstrated that it would be a seriously dangerous misapprehension to base our action on the assumption that any armament on merchantmen is any protection against submarines which are willing to use their torpedoes. The British have now definitely decided the adoption, to the maximum practicable extent, of convoys from 16 to 20 ships. This is an offensive measure against submarines, as the latter will be subject to the attack of our antisubmarine craft whenever they come within torpedoing distance of convoyed merchantmen. Moreover, it permits of concentrated attack by our forces, and obliges the enemy to disperse his forces to cover the various routes of approach.

Concerning department's reference to a scheme for protection of merchant shipping, which will not interfere with present escort duties, I submit that the time element alone prevents utilization of any new antisubmarine invention. The campaign may easily be lost before any such schemes can come into effective operation. The enemy is certainly counting on maximum effort being exerted before long nights and bad weather of autumn; that is, in the next three months. Heaviest effort may be anticipated in July and August. I again submit that protection of our coast lines and of allied shipping must necessarily be carried out in field of enemy activity if it is to be effective. The mission of the Allies must be to force submarines to give battle. Hence no operations in home waters should take precedence over, or be allowed to diminish the maximum effort we can exert in area in which enemy is operating, and must continue to operate in order to succeed.

SIMS.

10. On June 26 French cabled Washington as follows:

[Translation.]

"From: French Naval General Staff, first section, Paris.
"Date: June 26, 1917.
"To: French naval attaché, Washington.

"Replying to your telegram, at the request of Admiral Benson, we have considered, in concert with the British Admiralty, before the entrance of the United States into the war, the principle of the grouping in convoys of merchant ships across the Atlantic with protection by cruisers. The cruisers are intended to protect the ships against pirates and the new large submarines. They shall conduct the convoys to the approach entries, where destroyers will assure the escort to the port of discharge. Admiral Grasset has received instructions to make arrangements with the British admiral at the Bermudas, and have these cruisers perform escort duty.

"We are quite ready to consider, in concert with the American Admiralty, a new distribution of the allied cruisers for the protection of merchant ships and transports. We will, moreover, communicate to Capt. Jackson all the information we possess on the matter."

11. On July 1 Navy Department proposes shipping intelligence officers for shipping.
On July 3 Admiral Sims submits recommendation for same.
On July 2 Navy Department proposes routing system for convoy.
On July 3 Admiral Sims submits recommendation for same.
On July 11 Admiral Sims receives a letter from Admiral Jellicoe relative to convoy.
On July 12 Admiral Sims cables the department his recommendation relative Admiral Jellicoe's letter.
After presenting communications of July 11 and July 3, Admiral Sims remarks:
"I am going into this thing at some length because it is the most important measure that was taken during the war, and consequently the continuous resistance for a number of months to the introduction of that convoy system by the Navy Depart-

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ment is the most serious error that was committed. In spite of these recommendations the fact remains that it was found necessary to keep the British offices going throughout the war, and that the department set up an independent duplicate organization in the principal ports of the United States, thereby wasting both officers and money."

On July 14 Admiral Sims submits further recommendations for convoy, etc., and on later dates further correspondence relating to details and with attending criticisms. But the main point to be brought is that on July 14 a convoy of cargo ships, including United States armed merchant ships, sailed from New York under escort of United States cruiser with signalmen of the United States Navy in each ship to maintain communication. In other words, the convoy system as recommended has been put into effect.

To analyze the previous situation to determine whether the Navy Department was furnishing "continuous resistance for a number of months," we find—

(1) On April 19 by letter Admiral Sims states: "The best policy is one of dispersion." (This letter probably received Apr. 29.)

(2) On April 30 Admiral Sims cables, "Admiralty making study of convoy system."

(3) On May 1 Admiral Sims cables, "Admiralty has decided to give trial to convoy scheme."

(4) On May 25 Admiral Sims cables, "The principle of convoying merchant ships is approved by Admiralty."

(5) On June 6 Navy Department notifies Admiral Sims of tentative sailing of troop convoy.

(6) On June 8 Admiral Sims not ready to handle even troop-ship convoys.

(7) On June 10 department requests plan for handling convoys in submarine danger zone.

(8) On June 14 Admiral Sims reports ready for troop-ship convoys.

(9) On June 15 troop-ship convoy sail.

(10) On June 13 (by letter) Admiral Sims forwards plan, principally relating to troop-ship convoys.

(11) On June 22 Admiral Sims cables recommending one convoy a week from New York.

(12) On July 14 we find a convoy escorted by United States cruisers sailing from New York and thereafter at regular intervals, as shown by following dates:

July 14, July 22, July 28, August 7, August 14, August 22, August 30, September 7, September 15, September 23, etc.

Though further correspondence between Admiral Sims and the department would tend to show that, whereas the convoy system was in actual effect, the definite plans for its proper functioning had not been worked out. Here the convoy subject will be dropped, it having been clearly shown that the department had not resisted the convoy plan for several months, nor had the arming of merchant ships prevented its adoption. In fact, it could readily be said that the department inaugurated convoys before the escorting forces in the submarine danger zone were prepared to handle the situation.

12. As Admiral Sims has included several depreciative remarks which cast reflection upon the efficiency of the policy of arming United States merchant ships and would lead one to believe that such a policy was worthless, an analysis of the phase of the situation will follow:

There was a clearly defined policy, which policy was immediately put into effect, has been shown (see estimate of situation and regulations).

Further, this policy did not interfere with the introduction of the convoy system. In fact, rather than delay the convoy system, it actually did, through the establishment of military personnel in the merchant marine, greatly assist in making the convoy system effective.

That it developed into a major operation is shown through the figures that 384 merchant ships were armed and 30,000 of the Navy personnel were at one time or another engaged in this branch of service.

Before showing the actual effectiveness of this policy answer will be presented to various statements made by Admiral Sims.

After representing that he cabled on June 20, "It will seem suicidal if convoy system proposed by British Admiralty is not put into immediate operation and applied to all shipping," and that the department replied, "In regard to convoy we consider that American vessels having armed guards are safer when sailing independently" (the fallacy of this representation has been previously shown), Admiral Sims remarks, "When I got that last message I was about ready to jump overboard," and "I would have supposed that anyone who had even casually read the Sunday newspapers would have known that the arming of merchant ships would have the opposite result, as it obliges the submarine to torpedo without warning instead of sinking a ship with its own gunfire."

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Had these remarks been made at that date they might be overlooked, but they are evidently his views after nearly three years' consideration.

The general conditions at that time are but little changed from those brought forward previously to the date of May 30, 1917, but again special notice should be made of the difference between the arming of United States and British ships.

From May 30 to June 30, 1917, we find the following serious encounters between armed United States merchant ships and enemy submarine:

First. May 30, steamship *Silvershell.*
Second. June 1, steamship *Mongolia.*
Third. June 4, steamship *Norlina.*
Fourth. June 6, steamship *William O'Brien.*
Fifth. June 10, steamship *Virginian.*
Sixth. June 10, steamship *Petrolite.*
Seventh. June 12, steamship *Moreni.*
Eighth. June 14, schooner *Glynn.*
Ninth. June 16, steamship *Archbold.*
Tenth. June 23, steamship *Wico.*
Eleventh. June 25, steamship *St. Paul.*

To be brief, of the above-mentioned cases, three repulsed the submarine attack with probable damage to the submarine. Five successfully drove the attacking submarine away and two were torpedoed before submarine was sighted, but torpedo was sighted before striking ship. One ship was sunk by gunfire after an engagement lasting two hours and only after the ship (which was a tanker) was a mass of flames and all available ammunition expended. The records of these cases will show that the policy of arming ships was more effective than merely "obliging the submarine to torpedo without warning." Should a comparison be made of the effectiveness of the British policy to protect her merchant marine even "after extended British war experience," with the policy of the United States made effective almost over night, the results will most certainly favor the United States.

15. Admiral Sims in his cable of June 21, 1917, states, "The comparative immunity of American shipping from submarine attack is due to German hopes that such a policy will strengthen the peace propaganda in America." The above record of engagements for June, 1917, hardly bears out this statement.

Admiral Sims, in his cable of June 21, 1917, further states, "Armed ships are being sunk daily off this port (Queenstown)," and in his cable of June 28, 1917, "In this area alone during last six weeks 30 armed ships were sunk by torpedoes without submarine being seen although 3 were escorted each by a destroyer."

To that period, only two United States armed ships were torpedoed. As to the word "vicinity" it is not known just what is to be included, but the two ships mentioned were the steamship *Petrolite,* torpedoed June 10, 1917, 130 miles off Cape Spartel, Morocco, and the steamship *John D. Archbold,* torpedoed June 16, 1917, 85 miles southwest of Penmarch, France.

Though Admiral Sims distinctly states that his efforts were directed not only in the direction of the United States, but rather in the interest of the allied merchant marine, it could hardly be expected that the Navy Department could at such short notice be prepared to take immediate steps beyond the limits of the United States shipping. That it did this, and in an effective manner, has been shown. Had it accomplished only the purpose Admiral Sims lays down (that of forcing the enemy to use its torpedoes), it would have been of considerable value. In fact, Admiral Sims puts the value of a cruiser in the same general class.

So it must appear that Admiral Sims based his recommendations on the failures of other nations rather than on the United States.

16. Another point to be brought here deals with the mission of arming merchant ships.

Admiral Sims says in cable of June 21, "Actual and extended experience has shown that arming merchantmen does not protect them from attack without warning, but simply forces the submarine to attack without warning, thus obliging her to use up her torpedoes and shorten her cruise."

In cable of June 28, he says, "Guns are no defense against a torpedo attack without warning," and in the same cable, "It would be a seriously dangerous misapprehension to base our action on the assumption that any armament in merchantmen is any protection against submarines which are willing to use their torpedoes."

Here let us look at the mission for which the Navy Department armed the merchant ships.

(1) As a defensive measure against attack by enemy submarines.
(2) To provide a lookout system to prevent sudden attack.
(3) To provide communication between ships while sailing in convoy.

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(4) To provide military representatives on civilian-operated ships.

As a defensive measure against attack, it accomplished its mission when—

(*a*) It prevented successful attack made by gunfire.

(*b*) When by its gunfire it kept the submarine submerged and so disconcerted it that it could not take the proper reckonings or make approach for torpedo attack.

The lookout system accomplished its mission when—

(*a*) First sighted the enemy in time to prevent its making a successful attack. This was accomplished either by sighting the enemy in time to permit the vessel to maneuver to avoid a torpedo or in time to drive off the submarine by gunfire. Communication in convoy was accomplished by putting United States Navy signalmen and radiomen in all United States merchant ships.

Military representatives allowed the Navy Department to obtain first-hand information as to whether merchant ships were carrying out rules and regulations prescribed—this latter was of considerable importance, particularly in enforcing convoy and furnishing valuable information to the Department of Commerce and Bureau of War Risk Insurance.

Whereas many cases could be presented that each and all of its missions were most favorably accomplished, the following general résumé should speak for itself and demonstrate that the effectiveness of the Navy Department's policy far exceeded Admiral Sims's views on the subject.

During the period in which the United States was at war—

384 merchant ships were armed and 1,832 trans-Atlantic trips were made by these ships.

347 attacks by enemy submarines were reported.

227 attacks by enemy submarines were classified as "Actual."

29 ships were sunk under classification "Torpedoed."

2 ships were sunk by shell fire, one of which a tanker caught fire after a running fight of two hours' duration, the other was sunk only after all ammunition had been expended in a running fight of over four hours' duration.

193 attacks were successfully repulsed.

34 attacks resulted in probable damage to the enemy submarines.

2,738,026 tons of United States shipping were armed.

166,428 tons of United States armed shipping were sunk by enemy submarines.

As a result of attacks successfully repulsed, approximately 1,400,000 tons of United States shipping was saved.

The history of the engagements of the armed guards serving on board the ships of the United States merchant marine, furnishes one of the most interesting features of the participation by the United States in the World War and that it was not only interesting but one of the most effective measures undertaken by the Navy and one of which the Navy should be duly proud rather than criticized and condemned, it is believed has been clearly demonstrated.

(Secret.)

MARCH 6, 1918.

From: Chief of Naval Operations.

To: Chief of Debarkation Service, United States Army; chairman Shipping Board; Bureau of Navigation; Bureau of Ordance.

Subject: Merchant vessels in trans-Atlantic service to carry armed guard.

1. Latest reliable advices from abroad indicate that the Germans are putting into service from 8 to 12 large cruising submarines of 3,000 tons displacement, 18 knots surface speed, and armed with one or two 6-inch guns. These craft may be in service during March. As the Germans have from time to time extended the range of their submarine activities, it is fair to assume that the addition of these craft to their forces will enable them to still further extend the scope of their operations. These submarines, while not so effective as smaller craft when operating under water, are, from the character of their armament, dangerous to unarmed ships sailing without some form of protection.

2. While the escort system is, up to a certain degree, protection against the surface attack of submarines, if the escort be heavy and numerous enough, still its efficiency is to an extent dependent upon the guns of the convoyed vessels themselves, and were the convoy so numerous as to hamper the movements of the escort, a gun attack from the rear or flanks on the unarmed convoy does not seem an impossibility. On the return voyage, all vessels which are convoyed eastward sail direct and alone for their port of destination, once they are convoyed beyond the supposed danger zone. The possibility of the extension of the zone of submarine operations even to our

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coast has rendered it possible what these fast cruising submarines might find it profitable to attack single slow unarmed ships near our coast.

3. While the department has made every effort not to slow shipments, even stating that it felt a reasonable degree of safety was insured to unarmed ships while in convoy, this statement was only intended to apply to the ships while in convoy and for operations close to the European shores. For the reasons given above the department deems it wise, before the return of summer and good weather, to state that it believes that time ripe to return to its original policy of insisting that vessels engaged in the trans-Atlantic trade should be armed, and carry either an armed guard or be manned by a trained personnel.

W. S. BENSON.

Secret. NOVEMBER 11, 1918.

From: Chief of Naval Operations.
To: Embarkation Service, United States Army; chairman Shipping Board; Bureau of Navigation; Bureau of Ordnance.
Subject: Arming and manning merchant ships.
Reference: (*a*) Letter No. 28754–1:25/229, Op–28, Mar. 6, 1918; subject, Merchant vessels in trans-Atlantic service to carry armed guards.

1. In this war the foes of the merchant ship, which it may encounter and which partly through its own efforts it may defeat, if properly equipped and handled, are:
(*a*) Armed raiders.
(*b*) Cruising submarines, armed with heavy guns.
(*c*) Smaller submarines, relying on torpedo attack.
The first two classes rely upon gun attack largely. The last depends upon the torpedo and mine for its successes.

2. Broadly speaking, the Navy has two general aims, which are, tersely expressed:
(A) To win the war.
(B) To safeguard the future.
And of the two (A) naturally is paramount in importance.

3. Apart from the purely naval features which are not the concern of this letter, the Navy is, in its attitude toward merchant shipping, faced with the problem of adjusting its (A) and (B) of the merchant ship problem with the (*a*) (*b*) and (*c*) of paragraph 1, viz, the character of enemy our merchant ships do and may encounter and the localities where such enemies may operate.

4. To meet this situation stated in paragraph 3, the Navy has adopted the following policy:
(C) In those localities where the enemy operates or is libable to operate the merchant vessels to be efficient and to do its full quota toward helping win this war must in zones of danger be (1) properly handled; (2) properly armed; (3) adequately escorted where escort is needed.

5. Referring to paragraph 4, and confining this letter strictly to the water operations, a strict interpretation of (1), properly handled, must mean organized, administered, operated. To carry out (2), properly armed, the Navy has attempted to furnish the guns. To carry out (3), adequately escorted, the Navy has assigned its cruisers and destroyers.

6. To sum up, the Navy felt that in the zones of danger at sea, as on the firing line on land, military principles and practice should prevail, and to that end believes these three things should be put into effect on merchant ships to make these principles and practice effective.
(1) Merchant ships crossing the danger zones should be commissioned and manned with naval crews.
(2) Or else should be provided with an armed guard.
(3) Arm all ships crossing the danger zones.
The Navy did not concern itself with ships outside the zones of enemy operations. This is a general statement of the theoretical policy which it is believed the Navy ought to adopt toward merchant shipping in order to give it the individual protection, apart from escort, to which it is entitled.

7. The practical solution of a theoretical aim is, however, a matter of adjustment, and this statement applies with equal force to both the material and personnel factors.

8. As the matter stands to-day, the Navy does—
(*a*) Man all ships turned over for Navy use.
(*b*) By joint rules, approved by the President, man Army troop transports and cargo ships.
(*c*) Provide guns for all ships crossing the Atlantic, where the guns are available, and where installing guns does not too greatly interfere with the operations of the ship.

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9. While reaffirming the principles stated in paragraph 6 the Navy will, in the matter of manning, as a matter of adjustment between the Army and Ship Control Committee, whenever it is satisfactory to the Army, consider that the term transport means (1) all ships carrying troops; (2) any ships that regularly carry Army stores across the Atlantic, voyage in and voyage out; (3) all such ships shall be gunned.

10. In the policy of arming ships the Navy provides at present (*a*) four guns or more for all troop ships; (*b*) two guns for cargo ships; (*c*) it does not provide guns for ships not entering the present danger zones owing to scarcity of guns.

11. While reaffirming the principle that ships operating in the danger zones should be armed and manned with naval personnel, and while further asserting that the danger of submarine operations on our own coast is an ever increasing one, as a matter of adjustment the Navy will continue to attempt to furnish guns in the following order of importance:

(*a*) Four to all troop-carrying ships; (*b*) two to all regular Army cargo ships crossing the Atlantic; (*c*) two to all other cargo carriers of 5,000 tons or over crossing the Atlantic; (*d*) two to all other cargo carriers crossing the Atlantic, where the installation of guns would not so seriously interfere with the carrying of cargo as to greatly handicap the service of said craft as a cargo carrier, and where said armament is desired; (*e*) not to arm merchant ships engaged in coastwise traffic on the Atlantic until the other classes above mentioned are provided for, but to attempt to afford the necessary protection by the aid of escort furnished by the naval districts until such time as guns are available and their need is demonstrated; (*f*) not to arm ships engaged in the Pacific trade for the present, until the need is demonstrated.

12. To provide for suitable escort ships of the cruiser type, vessels which combine the qualities of troop and cargo carriers with those of escort, the department is of the opinion that immediate steps should be taken to fit out every tenth ship of the new ships building for the Emergency Fleet Corporation (type 16 to 18 knot, carrying 1,200 troops adopted as standard by the standard plans committee) with not less than eight 5-inch guns or better, instead of four, in order that the number of self-contained escort ships may be increased.

13. It is recommended, however, in all cases of new construction, or when alteration and repair allows the time, that gun emplacements be fitted for all ships, inclusive of the Pacific, except in the cases of ships engaged in the coastwise trade which are structurally unfit to carry guns, and which it would be manifestly uneconomical to attempt to arm.

14. Finally, as to the Navy's policy toward the merchant marine in the future. While the Navy standards may be high, it is believed that to make the merchant service atrractive for American sailors the former standards must be raised. The question of just compensation to owners, charterer, and crew should be one capable of fair adjustment. The Navy has no desire to control merchant shipping after this war is over. Its most earnest wish is to see developed a merchant marine which will be a pride to our country, and which will fly the American flag in every ocean, as did our ships before the Civil War.

OCTOBER 11, 1917.

[Taken from Admiral Mayo's report after visit to European waters.]

GENERAL NOTES ON THE CONVOY SYSTEM AND THE SHIPPING SITUATION.

[Paragraph 15.]

(*a*) (1) The principal antisubmarine effort is to-day being exerted in escorting convoys through the submarine-danger zones in the Atlantic and North Sea and Channel. A convoy system will soon be in operation in the Mediterranean.

(2) The reduction in the per cent of losses of vessels in convoy has given rise to hopes that the adoption of the convoy system by all ocean-going vessels will reduce the submarines' menace below the danger point.

(3) Such an assumption is dangerous without more experience than has been had as yet, and as the convoy system has only been in operation during the latter months of the fair weather of summer, the difficulties attendant upon operations in the gales of winter and the fogs of fall and spring must be carefully considered.

(4) The convoy system is strategically defensive though tactically offensive. This offensive is merely a counterattack. Such operations on land are never decisive, and unless coupled with strategically-offensive operations, are more than apt to fail on the sea. Convoy operations can not win the war. They may, if successful, prevent defeat. Unless the navies of the allied forces are satisfied to let the armies or political conditions settle the war, a more offensive plan is essential.

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(*b*) (1) From present prospects the decision on land is far-distant. The people of the European nations at war are war-weary; the losses on land are enormous. Unless the Navy can unmistakably check the submarine menace, the war is apt to be decided by political or labor conditions.

(2) National morale is to-day the vital point, and the effect on allied morale of a successful check to the submarine would be to raise it beyond any possibility of breaking. Likewise, this would so reduce the enemy's chances of winning the war that the morale of the Central Powers would be likely to break.

(*c*) The convoy system should be regarded merely as a defensive operation carried on while preparing for an offensive. Such an attitude does not prevent thoroughness in carrying out the operation and in order that it may be successful in its rôle, it requires careful study to anticipate the changed conditions of the winter and the possible operations which may be conducted by the Central Powers to break up the system.

(*d*) (1) The convoy system requires the assembly of from 15 to 20 vessels, most of which are run on a schedule of 1 every 8 days. Assuming that on the average there is a delay of 2 days in and 2 days out in a round trip, and that the average time for a round trip is 50 days, it will be seen at once that this is equivalent to a reduction in shipping of 8 per cent. In addition to this, there is the congestion of ports due to arrival and departure of large groups of ships practically simultaneously, which reduces the rapidity of discharge and loading.

(2) In order to make up for the loss in tonnage due to controlled sailings, it is necessary to attain the highest efficiency of employment of all ocean-going merchant tonnage. In order to accomplish this, it is essential that all merchant shipping be controlled as to route, ports, and cargo by the Government, and that the Government representatives coordinate their efforts with the corresponding representatives of the Allies.

(3) An instance will indicate where the savings can be made: There are about 40 ships a month trading from the southeast coast of South America direct to the United States. Most of these ships are American or neutrals operating on an American time charter. This trade is no doubt profitable, but it is doubtful if it is essential to the conduct of the war.

(4) The United States and the Allies must consider carefully what peace-time trade can be dispensed with to meet the very serious shipping situation now before us.

(5) The efficient employment of such shipping as is available, for the transportation of materials essential to the conduct of the war, offers one of the most promising fields for reducing the actual shortage of shipping.

(*e*) *Defense of convoys against raiders.*—(1) The means at the disposal of the enemy with which to attack the convoys are:

1. U-boats.
2. *Deutschland* type of submarine cruisers.
3. Raiders (armed merchant ships).
4. Cruisers.
5. Battle cruisers.

(2) It appears that the system of protection for convoys now in operation is efficient so far as the resources available permit. The losses of vessels in convoy to the losses of vessels not in convoy is at present about 1 to 20. Of course the greater safety of the submarine in attacking vessels not under escort leads to a pervalence of this form of attack and undoubtedly when all vessels are in convoy the proportion of ships sunk will not decrease in the above ratio.

(*f*) (1) The merchant captains state that in the bad weather of winter it will be impossible for ships in ballast to operate in convoys so it seems that the proportion of shipping in convoy can never (for the next few months) exceed 50 per cent.

(2) The dispersion of convoys and the difficulty of maintaining position in convoy during fogs and gales will seriously reduce the efficiency of this system during the winter.

(3) The bad weather and long nights will however seriously reduce the efficiency of the submarine and it is believed that the rate of sinkings from U-boats will remain practically constant.

(*g*) (1) The introduction of the cruising submarine with its long radius of action will move the submarine menace further from the coast of Europe and thus necessitate more extensive destroyer escort operations. At present the force available does not permit this extension but as the number of submarines of this type is limited (probably six) this disadvantage must be accepted.

(2) This type of submarine is fitted with one or two guns 5.9-inch in caliber and is designed to use this gun as its primary weapon. The system of ocean escort is a partial answer to this form of attack.

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(*h*) (1) The raider and cruiser menace are similar and can be considered together. It is quite possible that the raiders or cruisers so employed would have a battery of 6-inch guns and therefore the ocean escorts should be vessels with batteries not less than 6-inch.

(2) In view of the difficulty that would be experienced by one cruiser in guarding a convoy of 15 or 20 ships against a raider of equal speed, it seems that the enemy will use fast ships and those of merchant ship type with sufficient speed being rare, they probably will be cruisers.

(3) The enemy cruisers, however, have rather short radius of action and consequently could not operate long on the main trade routes unless they could obtain fuel from ships engaged in unneutral service. In view of this fact particular investigation of all ships not sailing in convoy should be made and coal cargoes should be traced to destination. Vessels with cargo of fuel should be made to travel in convoy.

(4) The threat from raiders or cruisers could best be met by increasing the number of ocean escorts with each convoy, but due to lack of suitable vessels this is an impossibility unless escort by battleships is adopted.

(*i*) (1) The most serious threat is that by enemy battle cruisers. If one of these vessels accompanied by a fast supply ship, and preceeded by a submarine scouting force, could get to sea the possible damage that could be done would be enormous.

(2) Very serious thought must be given to this possibility and the secret srevice of the Allies should be directed to ascertain information indicating that any such arrangements are in preparation or even contemplated.

(*j*) See details in reference (*f*) and inclosure F.

There were some points brought up the other day in Admiral Strauss's testimony about the northern barrage, and as you gentlemen said you were going to ask some questions and go into the matter a little more fully, I have here submitted the entire history, and I have put markers in at certain important points, one of the important points being the inception of the problem. As I said before, Capt. Fullenwider, who is practically the father of the idea, used to come over and talk with us in the plans section of operations almost every day, long before we went into the war, in February, the beginning.

He carried this idea so far that finally on April 15, 1917, he submitted the following paper, which I offer here:

CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM.

APRIL 15, 1917.

Subject: Antisubmarine warfare.

1. To consider adequately and properly the means and methods of overcoming the submarine menace, it is necessary to consider the various elements of the war situation, the questions involved being political, economic, and military as well as naval.

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS.

The European deadlock.

2. The military situation in Europe is practically a stalemate. In France the British-French forces appear to have a slight advantage, but at the recent rate of progress it will take years to force the Germans back to their frontier.

3. The Italians are holding their own, but without prospect of decisive victory.

4. In the Balkans the Allies have not sufficient force, apparently, to obtain a decision, and the submarine menace may be expected to interfere greatly with the transportation of reenforcements even if the Allies can spare men from other fronts.

5. The Russians are holding, but the staying power of the new Government is doubtful in view of possible internal dissensions. Russia apparently lacks cohesion and unity and can not be relied upon for increased effectiveness.

6. In Asiatic Turkey the Allies are making progress slowly, but even complete victory there would not materially affect conditions in Europe.

7. It is doubtful if the German forces have reached their maximum; but, assuming that they have, so also have those of Great Britain, while those of France have been on the decline for some time. The one remaining source of man power among the Allies in Europe is Russia, but it is doubtful whether that supply can be utilized

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without greatly increased assistance from without in the munitioning of the Russian armies.

8. In short, it does not appear that a decision can be expected except through the influence of sea power.

The naval situation.

9. Through her control of the surface of the seas, Great Britain has made the isolation of the Central Powers complete, and there can be but little doubt that Germany is in distress through want of certain supplies, but there is no assurance that she will reach her limit of endurance within the next two years. On the other hand, Germany by her submarine warfare on shipping is seriously curtailing Great Britain's imports. Great Britain being far more dependent than Germany upon importation of food can be more quickly starved into submission by an effective blockade. While starvation for Britain is doubtless far off, it is a fact that she is now keenly feeling her tremendous loss of shipping, and apparently she has thus far found no means of effectively combating the submarine peril.

10. The result of the war hangs upon the submarine issue. Germany will win the war if she can continue the rapid diminution of merchant shipping. The only hope of the Allies (including America) lies in finding means to curb the effectiveness of the submarine and replacing lost ships, and any further delay will be fatal.

11. If the submarine menace can be materially diminished, the war can be brought to a successful conclusion probably within a year.

HOW MERCHANT SHIPPING CAN BE PROTECTED.

12. The question as to how merchant ships can be protected divides itself into two parts; first, the destruction of hostile submarines; second, the means of making individual merchant ships comparatively safe from torpedo attack.

ANTISUBMARINE MEASURES.

24. There are three general lines of attack on submarines, viz:

(*a*) Destroy them at their home base.

(*b*) Prevent their egress from or ingress to their home port.

(*c*) Hunt them down and destroy them at sea.

25. Under existing conditions in Europe, attack upon submarines at their home base is practicable only from the air, and the difficulties attending this are unsurmountable. Given a large fleet of bomb-dropping Zepplins, with an overwhelming force of battleplanes to beat off hostile aircraft, it should be possible to seriously damage, if not destroy, any German naval base on the North Sea, though it might entail the sacrifice of a large number of aircraft.

26. If Dutch and Danish territory could be used as aeronautical bases, the problem would be much easier of solution, since the German naval stations are within a short flight from those territories; but Holland and Denmark will probably remain neutral because they lack the power to prevent German invasion.

27. The sealing up of German ports and denial to the submarines of access to the sea is a more promising line of attack but this also presents grave difficulties notwithstanding the Allies' superiority at sea. The means at hand are:

(*a*) Mines so placed that a submarine could not pass. This method entails the necessity of control of the surface waters to prevent mine-sweeping, counter-mining, etc.

(*b*) Submarine nets: Nets also require protection and are of doubtful value against large submarines which are now fitted with cutters.

(*c*) Entanglements: So placed as to foul submarine propellers. These can be so designed as to be fairly safe against the usual methods of dragging and sweeping, but are of doubtful value.

(*d*) Entanglements or nets with bombs: This is the same as above with the addition of small mines or bombs attached.

28. All measures for sealing ports or channels present the difficulty that the Germans have so extensively mined their waters and have such supervision and control thereof as to render such measures almost, if not, impracticable. It is possible, however, to establish mine barriers in zones at a distance from the German coasts, practically sealing up the North Sea. This will require between 500,000 and 1,000,000 mines.

29. The third line of attack, that is, the hunting down and destruction of submarines at sea, is impossible of complete success, but is the only one practicable at present. The means of attack are:

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(a) Surprise attack on the surface of destroyers or other fast light boats armed with at least 3-inch guns, but 3-inch guns are of doubtful value against most recent U-boats. Submarines will not often be surprised on the surface, since they can submerge in from one to three minutes, and have means of detecting the presence of a vessel at a considerable distance.

(b) Trap nets, fixed: These are invaluable in the rare event of a submarine attempting to enter a protected harbor or area. In such an event, a destroyer or patrol boat would drop depth mines or bombs on or near the U-boat.

(c) Towing nets: A light net, say, 1,000 feet in length towed by destroyers, trawlers, or other light craft with the object of trapping or entangling a submarine, which would be destroyed by depth mines as above.

(d) Indicator nets: Same type of net as the towing net, but buoyed in the open sea or elsewhere to foul a submarine, the resultant position of which would be indicated by the action of the buoys. Its position being indicated, it would be destroyed in the usual manner by depth bombs.

(e) Entanglements: These may be of various descriptions, depending upon material conditions, the object being to entangle the submarine or its screw in such a manner as to compel her to rise to the surface and expose herself to gun fire or to indicate her position so that she might be destroyed by depth bombs.

(f) Towing mines, or towing torpedoes: Designed to be towed by fast boats in such a manner that the towline, and eventually the mine, will foul the submarine and sink her. A properly designed towing mine apparatus would enable a destroyer or other boat to sweep a width of probably 500 feet and foul the submarine therein within, say, 60 feet of the surface, or other predetermined depth.

(g) Aeroplanes to locate the submerged submarines and to destroy them by dropping depth bombs.

(h) Flat-nosed, high-explosive, nonricochet shell for use in 3 to 6 inch guns; delayed-action fuse.

30. Other possible developments are:

(a) A small high-speed torpedo carrying a heavy charge with time or distance fuse for use against submerged submarines.

(b) A high-trajectory bomb thrower or howitzer bomb to carry at least 150 pounds of T. N. T. and to have a delayed-action fuse; range, 1,500 yards; mount to give long, easy recoil to permit of installation on merchantmen and other vessels capable of carrying them.

SUMMARY.

31. Two things must be done to win the war: First, stop the submarines at their source; second, build unsinkable merchant ships; and further delay will be fatal.

Barriers for the North Sea.

32. Unless by political arrangement Danish and Norwegian waters can be mined and patrolled by allied forces, it will become necessary to inclose the North Sea by mine barriers.

33. The northern barriers would extend from the mideastern coast of Scotland to the Norwegian coast, a distance of about 250 miles. In this case also the neutrality of Norway is involved, but it is unavoidable. The maximum depth on this line is 900 feet and the average depth about 240 feet.

34. The southern line would extend from the southeast coast of England to a point on the French coast near the Belgian frontier, a distance of about 40 miles. Maximum depth of water 150 feet; average depth, 60 feet.

35. In addition to the North Sea barriers, it would be necessary to close the Adriatic and the Dardanelles.

36. Assuming that a special form of mine is used carrying 50 pounds of T. N. T. and spaced 20 feet apart horizontally and vertically, there would be required for the North Sea barriers, the following:

	Mines.
Northern barrier	750,000
Southern barrier	24,000
Total	774,000

37. The barriers in the Adriatic and the eastern Mediterranean, and a reserve supply for replacements, would bring the total number of mines required to about 1,000,000.

38. By getting 20 factories to produce 1,000 per day each, these mines could be manufactured in 50 days.

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39. On the basis of 50 pounds of T. N. T. per mine, there would be required 50,000,000 pounds of T. N. T. or equivalent explosive.

40. There would be required at least 40,000,000 feet of steel wire rope for mooring the mines.

41. These figures are given to indicate the magnitude of the work of preparation if any such plan is to be adopted, and to show the necessity of immediate definition of policy. If an immediate decision should be made, the proposed barrier scheme could not be put into effect inside of six months.

S. P. FULLINWIDER.

NOTE.—The mines above referred to were a special new type of small and cheap mine under tentative design and consideration. The design was never finished owing to the development of the Mark VI mine which was regarded as more suitable for antisubmarine barrages.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the date of that?

Capt. PRATT. April 15, 1917.

The CHAIRMAN. That was before we had antennæ mines?

Capt. PRATT. Yes; before we had the antennæ mines.

When the antennæ mine became developed, it then became a feasible project, and was taken up. Commander Belknap was appointed to handle the work in the Office of Operations; the Secretary approved the plan as soon as it was presented to him, and as soon as the organization was drawn up. I know I handled it myself with him one night at 6 o'clock, in company with Capt. Belknap, and the work proceeded from then on. When the operation became one of greater magnitude, involving a flag command, Admiral Strauss was appointed to command the operation, and he took the force abroad and operated it. I submit the history of that northern barrage.

(The document referred to is here printed in full in the record, as follows:)

THE NORTHERN BARAGE.

CHAPTER I.—CONCEPTION AND INCEPTION OF THE NORTHERN BARRAGE [1] PROJECT.

The northern barrage was one of the most important naval projects carried out by the United States during the war. To appreciate the importance of the barrage as a factor in the prosecution and winning of the war, one must consider the general military situation as it existed in April, 1917, when the United States threw her weight into the scales with the Allies. There was every reason at that time for a pessimistic view of the situation. The military situation on the West Front was practically a stalemate. The French and British forces appeared to have a slight advantage over the enemy, having made small gains here and there; but they plainly had little or no prospect of obtaining an early military decision. The Italians were holding their own, but with no prospect of decisive victory.

On the east front, the Russians were holding for the time being; but there were ominous indications that the newly established revolutionary government would be unable to overcome internal dissensions and that the Russian power might crumble at any time.

In the Balkans the Allies had insufficient force, apparently, to prosecute an offensive campaign; and the growing submarine menace in the Mediterranean seriously threatened the lines of communication by which this force was sustained. In fact, there was grave danger, especially in view of the pro-German attitude of the then Greek Government, that the Allied Force based on Saloniki would have to be withdrawn and the entire Balkan peninsula given up to the Central Powers. In Asiatic Turkey the British were making slow progress in Mesopotamia; but it was doubtful whether victory there would have any material effect on conditions in Europe.

In short, at the time of the entrance of the United States into the war, there was no prospect of victory over the Central Powers unless and until heavy American forces could be sent to Europe to turn the scale. America was not ready, and could not be

[1] This barrage was known in the United States as the North Sea barrage; but, since it was termed by the British "Northern barrage," and since there were othre shorter and minor mine barrages planted in the North Sea by the British, the title "Northern barrage" will be used in this narrative.

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expected to create and equip an adequate army within at least one year, or probably two.

The sending of an American Army to France would necessitate the safeguarding of the lines of communication across the Atlantic; in other words, the result of the war was seen to hang upon whether or not the Allies and the United States could obtain and hold the mastery of the sea.

As in all wars in which maritime nations have been engaged, sea power was to prove the decisive factor. The British fleet and the naval forces of the United States and other associate powers were supreme on the surface of the sea, and had it not been for the submarine there would not have been the slightest occasion for doubt of a quick and satisfactory outcome of the war; but the surface fleets were, as a matter of fact, almost impotent in the face of the submarine menace. The German Government concentrated early in the war on the development of the submarine and built these vessels in large numbers, with the purpose, as it turned out, of waging a ruthless war on shipping and thereby bringing Great Britain and her Allies to terms. Generally speaking, the German high seas fleet was kept safe at home, while the British grand fleet and other allied heavy naval forces, having no enemy to meet on the high seas, were compelled to wait at their well-protected bases until the German fleet should put to sea. Thus there was little naval activity beyond the submarine warfare waged by the Germans against merchant shipping, and the allied antisubmarine campaign.

The Germans embarked on the policy of sinking merchant ships without warning in December, 1916; and in February, 1917, unrestricted submarine warfare on merchant shipping was formally announced. While the sinking of merchant tonnage had been very considerable up to this time, it rapidly increased until it reached a high point in April, 1917, of 800,000 tons a month. The average for the first six months of that year was 600,000 tons a month, or about 7,000,000 tons a year. It was a plain mathematical deduction that if this condition were permitted to continue, it would assure a victory for the Central Powers within a year, since the diminished merchant fleet of Great Britain and the Allies could not possibly stand the tremendous loss and meet the requirements of transportation necessary to the successful prosecution of the war.

Soon after the United States entered the war, it became a settled policy of our Government to send a large force of troops to reinforce the French and British on the west front. The increasing submarine menace gravely complicated the problem of transporting our troops and their supplies, and every known method of hunting out and destroying submarines was given careful consideration by the Navy Department. Aside from the possible heavy loss of life due to the sinking of American transports by enemy submarines, there was the moral effect of such sinking to be considered; it might react most unfavorably on the morale of the entire American nation and correspondingly cheer the German public.

It became the general policy of the Navy Department to employ every promising means of destroying enemy submarines, and not to be content to rely on any one means to the exclusion of others. The means which proved successful and which were developed, in cooperation with our Allies, to the utmost included the following:

(*a*) Arming of merchant vessels with guns manned by naval gun crews.

(*b*) Sending vessels in convoys through the danger zones protected by destroyers and other suitable naval vessels.

(*c*) "Hunting groups" of vessels of various types equipped with "listening apparatus."

(*d*) Aerial patrol by seaplanes and "blimps" armed with depth bombs.

(*e*) Arming of destroyers and other suitable craft with an unlimited supply of depth charges.

(*f*) Mining of waters habitually traversed by enemy submarines.

The first important antisubmarine plan to give encouraging results was the convoy system, adopted in July, 1917. This plan had the one serious defect of slowing down shipping, since in a convoy of, say, 20 or 30 vessels the speed of the convoy was reduced to that of the slowest ship; but following the adoption of this plan the average loss fell to about 450,000 tons a month. The losses were principally from slow convoys composed of relatively slow-speed cargo vessels. The losses from fast convoys made up of transports and other craft having a speed of more than 12 knots were comparatively small; and the effectiveness of the system was finally demonstrated by the fact that no troop ships in American convoys were lost during the war. However, the loss of 450,000 tons of shipping a month, or even a much smaller loss, would have proved fatal to the Allied cause if permitted to continue; and additional measures were imperatively necessary.

The allied powers were in a very difficult position and were not prepared to quickly put into effect adequate measures against the entirely novel and unexpected form of

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submarine warfare instituted by the enemy. So far as the United States was concerned whatever offensive or defensive measures were decided upon, the procurement of the necessary material therefor would take valuable time. In short, the Navy was not prepared for and could not perform its proper functions until after adequate numbers, or quantities, of destroyers, chasers, guns, mines, depth charges, etc., could be built or manufactured.

Taking the case of mines alone, there were on hand in April, 1917, approximately 5,000 mines of a type which was comparatively unsuitable for antisubmarine operations. To show the inadequacy of this supply, it may be stated that the British were using about 7,000 a month and were endeavoring to increase their output to 10,000 a month. Also, the British had found from their own experience that the type of mine possessed by the United States (the Vickers-Elia) was not well suited for the peculiar type of mining in hand and had changed to a new type, a horn mine resembling the German and Russian mines.

Not until after the United States entered the war did the British and other allied Governments furnish us with important military information; but, as soon as we were permitted to avail ourselves of their war experience, the Bureau of Ordnance decided that it would be desirable to provide at least 100,000 mines and that these must be of a type more suitable for antisubmarine operations than any then in existence. In other words, it devolved upon that bureau to develop a new design of mine and to arrange for its manufacture at the rate of approximately 1,000 a day, or four and two-tenths times the production that Great Britain had succeeded in reaching. The reasoning leading to this decision is given below at some length.

The Bureau of Ordnance, even before the United States entered the war, had made a close study of the general conditions, particularly with reference to possible measures to be taken to counteract the submarine peril. The mine section of the Bureau of Ordnance, as a result of many conferences on this all-important subject with the chief and assistant chief of bureau and also section chiefs,[1] suggested the measures that could be taken by the United States in a memorandum under date of April 15, 1917, a partial copy of which is appended. This memorandum dwelt upon two principal propositions: First, the protection of merchant vessels by means of cellular construction and "blisters"; and second, antisubmarine barrages inclosing the North Sea and the Adriatic. Obviously, it was impossible to consider seriously any proposition to close German harbors as long as the enemy had complete control of his own waters. The next best thing to "closing the holes" was, of course, to close the North Sea by means of a barrage restricting the operations of enemy submarines to the North Sea and preventing their getting into the Atlantic and interfering with the lines of communication between the United States and Great Britain and France. The proponents of this plan freely admitted that such a barrage probably could not be made completely effective, but insisted that even if it were only partially effective it would win the war.

The memorandum was written mainly with a view to crystallizing opinion within the bureau and furnishing a basis for discussion by officers of the bureau with others concerned in the design and procurement of material for increased naval activities.

Within the Bureau of Ordnance, practically all officers who would be concerned with such a project quite agreed on the principle that the enemy submarine should be contained by means of such a barrage, though the type of barrage and its location were for a considerable period matters of doubt. The consensus of opinion, however was that the barrage should extend from the east coast of Scotland to the Norwegian coast. This, together with a short barrage across the Dover Straits, would shut off access to the Atlantic, or at least make the continued operations of enemy submarine exceedingly hazardous and unprofitable.

The proposal to construct a barrage 250 miles long was so novel and unprecedented from every practical viewpoint that it was realized at the time that it would be difficult to obtain a prompt decision without considerable preliminary propaganda within the department. Time was regarded as the supreme factor in the situation, as every day saw the loss of many priceless ships and cargoes.

On April 17, the department cabled to Admiral (then Rear Admiral) W. S. Sims, in command of United States naval forces in European waters, directing him to report on the practicability of blockading the German coast efficiently in order to make the ingress and egress of submarines practically impossible. He, in answer, stated that this, of course, had been the object of repeated attempts by the British Navy with all possible means and found unfeasible. Failure to shut in the submarine by a close

[1] At this time, Rear Admiral Ralph Earle, United States Navy, was chief of bureau, Capt. T. A. Kearney United States Navy, the assistant chief of bureau, and Commander S. P. Fullinwider, United States Navy (retired), the chief of the mines and net section, while Lieut. Commander T. S. Wilkinson, jr., United States Navy, was chief of the experimental section.

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blockade using mines, nets, and patrols in the "Bight" and along the Flanders coast focused attention of the department upon plans for the alternative of restricting the enemy to the North Sea by closing to him the exits through the Channel and the northern end between Scotland and Norway, as proposed by the Bureau of Ordnance. These are outlined in a memorandum of the Office of Operations, dated May 9, 1917, which was to be submitted for the advice and comment of the British Admiralty with its valuable antisubmarine experience. It was noted that, in working up any plan, the whole field of operations was to be considered primarily with a view to attacking the submarine under water as well as on the surface. It was stated that the entrances to the North Sea, while very broad and presenting immense difficulties, came within the bounds of possibility of control. Estimating the cost of gaining this control and confining enemy submarines within the North Sea to be $200,000,000, or perhaps twice that sum, there was no doubt that the United States would devote whatever amount it was worth if the purpose was to be accomplished. This was proposed to be done by establishing a barrage of nets, anchored mines, and floating mines, to operate from 35 feet to 200 feet below the surface, which, while safe for surface craft, would bar a submerged submarine, while patrols could deal with those running on the surface.

Commenting on this, the Admiralty, who had apparently considered the United States proposals to particularly advocate the extensive use of nets, replied on May 13: "From all experience Admiralty considers project of attempting to close exit to North Sea * * * by method suggested to be quite unpracticable. Project has previously been considered and abandoned. The difficulty will be appreciated when total distance, depths, material, and patrols required and distance from base of operations are considered." It was the British experience that nets failed of their purpose on account of the possibility of cutting them; mine nets, when located, were avoided or run over; all were difficult to maintain in place and required too many patrol vessels to watch. Mine barrages were not considered wholly effective unless maintained by patrols at all points. Considering the use of such a barrage from Norway to Scotland, patrols could not be properly protected on such a long line, because the defense would be stretched out in a long and locally weak line and therefore subject to enemy raids in sufficient force to break through the patrol, cut nets, and sweep mines, and so clear a passage for the submarines. If protected with heavy vessels, these would be exposed to the German policy of attrition with torpedo attack. In short, as concluded by Admiral Sims in his report to the department on May 14, 1917: "Bitter and extensive experience has forced the abandonment of any serious attempt at blockading such passages."

It is noteworthy that the attitude of the British Admiralty and of Admiral Sims was not favorable to the further consideration of the North Sea barrage project; but, notwithstanding this, the proponents of the project, i. e., the officers of the Navy Bureau of Ordnance, redoubled their efforts to secure its adoption, feeling that the result of the war depended upon it more than upon any other possible measure.

From early in March until the latter part of July, 1917, the mine section of the Bureau of Ordnance made an intensive study of many types of barrage, among them the submarine trap and indicator nets which had been used by the British. Most of the plans considered were devised within the bureau; but in addition a very large number of inventions and suggestions from private sources were studied. Unfortunately, practically all inventions or ideas emanating from nonprofessional sources were based on incomplete knowledge of fundamental conditions and requirements. Their shortcomings may be expressed briefly by saying that they were based on millpond conditions, whereas the waters in which such a barrage as that under consideration had to be planted and maintained were subject not only to very adverse weather conditions but also to the activities of the enemy naval forces which, up to this time, had displayed great intitiative and resourcefulness.

The types of barrage studied were of three principal classes: First, nets and entanglements; second, nets in combination with mines or bombs; and, third, mines alone. The possibility of employing nets or entanglements alone was abandoned early, inasmuch as the war experience of the British indicated that it was exceedingly difficult to plant and maintain nets of sufficient weight and strength to be of any material value, and because the depth of water in which the proposed barrage must be laid was quite prohibitive. The quantity of wire rope required also was prohibitive in the time available.

Nets in combination with mines or bombs were open to the same criticism, with the additional point that such material would be very difficult and dangerous to handle and the planting would be too slow. It was finally decided that mines offered the only practicable solution; and, since no mine then in existence, either in America or abroad, was suitable for the project, mainly owning to the excessive number

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required, it became necessary for the bureau to design a mine especially adapted to the purpose. A discussion of the evolution of the mine which was finally adopted will follow. It is only necessary to say here that the novel principle of the firing gear of the new mine was discovered in April, 1917, but was not brought to a state of development warranting its adoption until the latter part of July, 1917.

While from the first the new firing mechanism showed great promise, the officers esponsible for its development felt that it would be unwise to place too great reliance on it before it has been thoroughly tested out; and, therefore, studies of other means of forming a barrage were continued without cessation up to the day that the new mine was adopted. As late as July 15, 1917, a memorandum prepared by the mine section was submitted to the Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance suggesting mines in combination with nets. The idea was to have a barrage of overlapping light steel wire nets about 200 feet square, each net carrying two mines, one attached at the top of the net, to be a mine with a hydrostatic firing mechanism, and a second, attached to the center of the net, to have a firing mechanism actuated by a propeller in such manner that a submarine carrying away the net would tow the mine and explode it after a short distance. The hydrostatic mine was intended to explode in the event that the submarine submerged it to a certain depth. It is needless to go into details regarding the construction of this net and the designs of the mines, since nothing ever came of it. The plan was submitted to a board, but during the board's consideration of the project, information was received of the latest test of the new mine-firing device, which was so favorable that further discussion of the plan before it seemed useless, and the matter was dropped with the understanding that the bureau would concentrate on the development of the new mine, which was thereafter to be known as the Mark VI (up to this time, during its experimental stage, it had been known as the type "X" mine).

In the early days of the mine-barrage project very little official correspondence took place in the matter, principally for the reason that it was desired to keep the matter a profound secret, since it was probable that any type of mine produced would sooner or later bring about methods of counteracting it. It was felt that if information concerning it could be kept until the material had been produced and placed in use, the enemy would not have time to devise protective methods against it.

A decision in the premises favorable to the mine-barrage project was daily becoming more imperative in order to accomplish the laying of the barrage during the best weather of 1918; and, therefore, the bureau had prepared by Commander S. P. Fullinwider, United States Navy, chief of the mines and net section, a second memorandum, dated June 1, 1917, which, bearing a strong favorable indorsement by the Chief of the Naval Bureau of Ordnance, was submitted to the Chief of Naval Operations, this memorandum recommending certain projects for the future conduct of the war and laying particular stress upon the necessity of the northern barrage as being a most promising offensive operation. In fact, the President had addressed the officers of the battle fleet and stated that, as it was nigh impossible to destroy hornets (i. e., German submarines) after they had escaped from their nests, these hornets must be confined to their nests or destroyed before reaching the vast wastes of the ocean.

Realizing that it is difficult to obtain quick action on a novel scheme of such magnitude as the one under discussion, and especially in view of the unfavorable attitude shown by the British, the chief of the mine section, as a representative of the bureau, departed from the policy of secrecy to the extent of discussing the as yet indefinite plan with several officers who were in a position to further the scheme, notably with a member of the General Board, with an officer close to the President, and with representatives of the Office of Naval Operations. He also discussed the matter with Commander C. D. C. Bridge, a British officer then officially visiting this country, who was snortly to return to London. While the type of mine to be used had not yet been developed, it was important to see to it that the idea of a northern barrage should be accepted as a sound and indispensable measure to defeat the enemy submarine. The Bureau of Ordnance, from the first, took the attitude that if the idea of such a barrage were only adopted, the project would be carried through in some way or other, as the only question then would be merely a choice of methods and material; and the bureau had no doubt that the material question could be solved in a satisfactory manner. It may be added that the measures above referred to bore fruit, since the project was adopted by the Navy Department without much loss of time after the Bureau of Ordnance reported that a suitable mine had been developed. Furthermore, the President's attitude was known in advance to be favorable, and the project, when adopted by the department, was promptly approved by him.

One of the earliest and most enthusiastic proponents of the northern barrage project was Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Franklin D. Roosevelt, to whom was given a copy of the memorandum of April 15, 1917, and with whom the matter was discussed

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in a general way. The Assistant Secretary's keen interest in the matter was very apparent throughout the early phases of the project; and it is understood that he took up with the Bureau of Yards and Docks the problem of a net barrage across the North Sea. While the details of this study are not known, it is assumed that effort along that line was stopped when it became known that the Bureau of Ordnance had a suitable type of mine, which, of course, was readily accepted as far preferable to any net plan.

In the month of May, 1917, the Department of Commerce became interested in a barrage proposed by certain officers of the Coast and Geodetic Survey; and the Secretary of Commerce took up the matter with the Navy Department and strongly urged that the two departments collaborate in designing and putting down such a barrage. It is needless to go into details regarding its design, and the mere statement will suffice that it was to be composed of nets in combination with mines, and that the net was composed in part of insulated wire, the breaking of which wire by a submarine would fire a mine. There were several conferences, one of them presided over by the Secretary of Commerce and attended by Assistant Secretary Roosevelt, Commander Fullinwider, and Lieut. Commander Castle. The Bureau of Commerce was not favorably disposed towards this plan, because it felt that, even if the necessary quantity of material could be obtained, which was doubtful, it would be a very difficult project to carry into execution, and furthermore, that it would be quite impossible to maintain it in waters such as the North Sea. Plans were adopted to carry out tests in deep water, but interest in this plan ceased when Mr. Roosevelt became convinced that the Bureau of Ordnance had developed a satisfactory mine for a barrage.

The foregoing is mentioned only to show the active and growing interest at that time in the idea of a barrage. It also became a favorite problem with inventors. In short, by the time the bureau had demonstrated to its satisfaction that the new mine would be effective, the closing of the North Sea was quite recognized in America as the best possible solution of the antisubmarine problem. It remained to convert the British naval authorities to this view.

The adoption of any plan for a barrage to close the North Sea was, of course, dependent upon the suitability and availability of the material, and so the development of the project was largely the development of the Mark VI mine. It should be stated in this connection, however, that the northern barrage would undoubtedly have been realized whether or not the Mark VI mine had been adopted for the purpose. There were other designs of mine available, but the Mark VI was deemed the most promising in sight at that time.

In April, 1917, Mr. Ralph C. Browne, a citizen of Salem, Mass., an inventor associated with the L. E. Knott Apparatus Co., Cambridge, Mass., brought to the department a description of an invention which he called the "Browne submerged gun." Assistant Secretary Roosevelt referred him to the Bureau of Ordnance, and the invention was duly considered by the chief of bureau and Commander Fullinwider and Lieut. Commander T. S. Wilkinson. The invention in the form offered may be briefly described as follows: A buoy or float carried, as an integral part, a so-called gun or short tube extending vertically downward. The buoy carried also a copper wire hanging vertically. A high-explosive shell was carried in the tube or gun. This shell contained in its base a propelling charge of slow-burning powder intended to give the projectile a velocity of about 50 feet per second through the water. The shell was provided with guides to restrict it to travel along the wire. The float carried also an electrical relay mechanism, all parts so related that the contact of a submarine or any steel vessel with the pendent wire would produce a sea-battery current of sufficient energy to actuate the electric relay, which in turn would ignite the propulsive charge in the base of the shell and send the shell along the wire into contact with the submarine, where the shell was expected to burst and rupture the hull. The design was very ingenious and novel as a whole; but in its then proposed form it was deemed by the bureau to be wholly impracticable for naval use. Commander Fullinwider saw, however, that the electric principle involved might be applied to a mine-firing device, and after making a study of the matter with Capt. S. J. Brown (Math.), United States Navy, and Lieut. Commander Wilkinson, and after reference of such study to the chief of bureau, he suggested to Mr. Browne that he collaborate with the bureau in applying the new principle to an antenna mine. This Mr. Browne was loath to do, as he felt that his invention would be more effective than would a mine. After about two weeks' investigation, including considerable pressure by the chief of bureau himself, however, Mr. Browne agreed that he would defer to the bureau's judgment in the matter and consented to collaborate with the bureau in the development of a mine-firing device based on the use of a sea battery.

Mr. Browne immediately took up the work, and on June 18, 1917, a crude model of a mine-firing device was tested with promising results at the submarine base, New

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London, Conn. Further tests were held on July 10; these tests were conducted by the experimental officer of the bureau. It was immediately subsequent to these tests that it was finally decided to adopt the new firing device, and the bureau proceeded to design and develop a mine in which this device could be used.

The bureau was convinced by the tests that the device, which was thereafter to be called the K-1 device, was correct in principle, but realized that in the short time available for development and experimentation, it could hardly be hoped to obtain reliability in the mechanical features of the design. However, since it was essential that mines for the barrage should be ready in large quantities by the following spring, it was decided to proceed with the manufacture of the devices and trust to making any necessary modifications after getting into production, and in the meantime to proceed with tests, so far as tests could be conducted without complete mines.

It may be stated here that, although the design of the complete mine had not yet been decided upon and could not be completed for several months, the mine section of the Bureau of Ordnance was sufficiently assured of the successful development of the mine to submit tentative plans to the chief of bureau, and he took the responsibility of formally committing the bureau to this method of closing the North Sea.

On July 18, 1917, the bureau addressed the following letter to the Chief of Naval Operations announcing the development of a new type of mine-firing gear which would be suitable for mines for a northern barrage:

Confidential. JULY 18, 1917.

To: Chief of Naval Operations.
Subject: Submarine mine barriers, material for.

1. The bureau has developed a new type of mine, at present referred to as Mark VI (Type X) which it is confidently believed will facilitate the establishment of submarine barriers. The mine is radically different from other mines in its firing gear, which has been tested out with excellent results, and the bureau is now proceeding with the design of the mine as a whole and expects to complete it within two weeks.

2. The new mine will be as easily planted as the ordinary types of naval defense mines, and therefore the time and the number of vessels required to establish a barrier will be reduced to a minimum. This mine can be rigged so as to be safe as regards surface vessels, but effective against craft operating below the surface.

3. The mine will be comparatively simple in design, and it is believed that it can be manufactured at a minimum rate of 1,000 per day, which means that the number required for about 300 miles of barrier can be produced within about three months from the beginning of deliveries or within four months from the placing of orders.

4. The bureau requests that a decision be reached at the earliest practicable moment as to the desirability of establishing complete barriers to prevent enemy submarines from gaining access to the Atlantic. The bureau assumes that such a project is desirable, as no other means of stopping the submarine peril appears to be in prospect, and, since it is going to take four months to obtain the necessary material, the bureau believes that it should be authorized to proceed immediately with arrangements for procuring the material.

5. Theoretically, only 72,000 mines will be required for 300 miles of barrier, but 100,000 should be provided to allow a reasonable excess for replacements, etc. In addition, a number, say 25,000, should be provided for our own coast defenses, it is believed, making a total of 125,000 mines, which, at an estimated cost of $320 each, gives a total cost of $40,000,000. This estimate is designedly liberal.

6. The bureau is of the opinion that the design, manufacture, and assembly of the new mine should be carried out with the utmost secrecy, and is taking the necessary precautions accordingly, since advance information of such a mine would be of the greatest aid to the enemy in devising means to counteract it.

7. The above estimate as to time is based upon our success in securing the necessary quantity of T. N. T. or other high explosive.

8. In considering this project the use of high-speed mine-laying vessels such as liners and merchantmen in addition to destroyers and light cruisers will be required, and such vessels must be provided. The mines can be dropped accurately at any speed by time devices. The whole barrier should be laid as one operation and be protected as far as possible. If isolated mines are planted it is probable that a device to defeat the mine-firing mechanism will be developed by Germany.

RALPH EARLE.

While awaiting the department's action, the bureau proceeded with the design of the mine, with a view to being prepared at the earliest possible date to undertake its manufacture.

On July 30, 1917, the bureau addressed a second communication to the Chief of Naval Operations, submitting more complete information regarding the new mine and

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proposing an American-British joint offensive operation in the form of a northern barrage. A copy of this letter follows:

JULY 30, 1917.

To: Chief of Naval Operations.
Subject: Proposed British-American joint offensive operations; submarine barriers; Mark VI mines.

1. In its letter No. 32957 of July 18, 1917, the bureau announced the development of a new type of mine that is peculiarly adaptable for use against submarines.

2. The firing mechanism of this mine is based on a very recent discovery in the electrical field and, although there has been little time for development, the tests which have been carried out with an experimental mine by a submarine leaves no doubt, in the bureau's opinion, of the success of this invention.

3. The mine will have the following characteristics:

(*a*) A spherical mine case carrying a charge of 300 pounds of T. N. T. having a destructive radius of about 100 feet against a submarine.

(*b*) The anchor may be either the automatic type such as that now in use or a simple mushroom type, depending upon the conditions under which mining operations shall be carried out.

(*c*) The firing mechanism comprises an electrical device carried within the mine case and an antenna of any desired length, the end of which will be supported by a small buoy as near the surface of the water as may be desired. A second antenna may be suspended from the mine where the depth of water renders this necessary.

(*d*) A steel vessel coming in contact with the antenna will fire the mine.

4. The mine has the following advantages over other types:

(*a*) In depths of less than 100 feet, it may be planted on the bottom where it is least affected by wave action and current. In this case a buoyant mine is not necessary or desirable and it can be made smaller and cheaper than a buoyant mine. In such circumstances there is no possibility of its getting adrift and it can not be swept up in the usual way. It can, however, be fired by a mine sweep.

(*b*) In depths greater than 100 feet, it is proposed to submerge the mine to a depth of 100 feet since 100 feet is about its destructive range against submarines. At this depth the mine itself is entirely protected from wave action and only the light float or buoy is exposed to such action.

(*c*) Where conditions permit, the antenna may take the form of a net; or the antenna of adjacent mines may be connected by horizontal wires forming an impassable barrier.

(*d*) If a floating mine be desired, this mine may be suspended from a buoy in such manner as to be harmless to surface craft but deadly to submarines submerged.

(*e*) It may be used as a towing mine with antenna to give it a very large danger space.

(*f*) It can almost entirely replace submarine nets of present types.

(*g*) It can be used for mining very deep water more easily than can other types.

5. The mine, with its anchor, antenna, and buoy will be assembled and launched as a unit, so that it can be launched at high speed from destroyers if desired.

6. The bureau believes that with this mine it becomes practicable to close the North Sea, Adriatic, and other exits of enemy submarines, and that it gives us our opportunity to cooperate in carrying into execution a major offensive operation of a decisive character. Even if the proposed barriers should prove to be only 50 per cent effective the enemy's submarine campaign would surely fail.

7. It is suggested that the North Sea barriers must extend from the coast of Scotland to Norway and across the English Channel. The proposed line from Scotland to Norway must, to be all effective, extend into into the territorial waters of Norway, thereby involving the question of Norway's neutra'ity. It would seem that if the German submarine is permitted by Norway to use her territorial waters, it becomes incumbent upon the Allies to take measures to prevent such use.

8. The proposed mine barrier scheme does not infringe upon the neutrality of Holland, Denmark and Sweden, except in the restricted sense that the vessels of those powers, as well as of Norway, would be required to pass through a gate in the barriers under the control of the allied forces. In effect, this would amount to the establishment of additional danger zones to be avoided by neutrals.

9. The bureau understands that the British Admiralty has objected to any barrier in the North Sea that would interfere with the freedom of the British Fleet. It is suggested that a gate should be left in the barrier at an appropriate place near the Scotch coast, not only for British naval vessels, but also for neutral merchant vessels. This gate would be, say, 8 miles long, with mines so planted that their antennae would not come within 40 feet of the surface at low water. In other words, the subsurface would be mined against submarines and the surface left open. This gate could be

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effectively patrolled with a very few vessels and submarines attempting to pass on the surface could be destroyed.

10. If a decision should be reached immediately to proceed with the assembling of the material for these barriers, it would require approximately six weeks to complete the designs, place the orders and start production on a large scale. After starting production mines could be obtained at a minimum rate of 5,000 a week, and if the project were given the importance due it, there is no doubt that the manufacturers could be depended upon to increase this figure. In this connection, it is assumed that the British Admiralty would be willing to cooperate to the extent of furnishing a portion, at least, of the mine anchors, but it is belived that we should supply all of the mines, with the exception of the anchors.

11. It would require approximately 72,000 mines to establish barriers around the North Sea, assuming that the barrier will be composed of four lines of mines, placed 100 feet apart in each line; in other words, a barrier would require a mine for every 25 feet. To this 72,000 should be added at least 28,000 for renewals and as a reserve. If it should be decided to place the barrier across the Adriatic and to close the Dardanelles about 50 miles of barrier, or about 15,000 additional mines would be required.

12. It is estimated that 125,000 mines can be manufactured at a cost of $40,000,000.

13. The bureau has made every effort to keep the discovery and development of this mine a military secret, and it is believed that this secrecy can be maintained by proper organization and administration until such time as it becomes necessary to assemble the completed mines to ship them to Europe. To this end, the various parts of the mine will be manufactured by different companies and no manufacturer need be informed as to the characteristics of the mine as a whole. The company which will manufacture the firing gear has taken such precautions that only three members of the company will know that the electrical apparatus used in the mine is intended for a mine.

14. In view of the importance of keeping this matter a military secret, it is considered desirable that the British Admiralty should not be informed as to the features of the mine until the mines shall have been manufactured and shipped. This view is taken because it is inevitable that information will leak out regarding the design if any considerable number of persons should become informed of it, and since it is proposed to manufacture the mines complete in this country, it would seem unnecessary to send any information regarding it abroad and would only invite the possibility of such a leak.

15. If the enemy should learn of this invention it would be easy for him to evolve a similar mine, which he could use to blockade the British ports. The principle of the firing mechanism is so simple that only the slightest clue would enable the enemy to duplicate it.

16. If this project should be carried out, the bureau is of the opinion that its execution will bring about a general engagement with the German fleet, which it is supposed is desirable.

17. The following is a summary of the cooperation deemed necessary to carry out this plan:

United States:

(*a*) Provide mines, except anchors.
(*b*) Send mines to England.
(*c*) Assist in assembling mines in England.
(*d*) Provide a number of mine layers.
(*e*) Assist in laying.

Great Britain:

(*a*) Provide anchors.
(*b*) Assemble mines on anchors.
(*c*) Organize and equip mine-laying force.
(*d*) Lay all mines with United States assistance.

18. In the above it is suggested that Great Britain provide the anchors, for the reason that about 30,000 tons would be required and that the transportation of this tonnage should be avoided if possible.

19. Regarding the mine-laying part of this project it is understood that Great Britain has about 18 regular mine layers and that the United States could probably furnish 4, giving a total of 22, not including destroyers. A number of British destroyers are fitted to carry 80 mines and probably some of ours could readily be fitted to carry 40 to 80 each, so it is assumed that 40 destroyers may be available. The mine-laying program may then be assumed to be approximately as follows:

(*a*) Twenty-two mine layers could lay 200 mines per day each. If they take one day to reload, they would lay an average of 100 per day each.
(*b*) Forty destroyers could average 50 per day each.

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(c) All combined could lay 4,200 per day.

(d) For the northern barrier about 60,000 mines are required. These, at the rate of 4,200 per day, could be laid in about 15 days.

(e) For the English Channel barriers assumed lengths 50 miles, 12,000 mines would be required. At the rate of 4,200 per day, these could be laid in three days. It is assumed that two barriers each 25 miles long would be required in the channel to fully protect the channel crossing.

20. Lacking definite information as to the mine-laying facilities in the Mediterranean, but assuming that 10 vessels could be made available, the Adriatic barrier, 40 miles, could be laid in about one week, and the Dardenelles barrier in a shorter time.

21. As the manufacture and assembling of the material will be an immense undertaking, and as time is precious at this juncture in the war, a decision should be reached at the earliest moment practicable.

22. If this plan be adopted, it will be necessary to expedite manufacture by giving this work priority over certain other Government work, particularly in the matter of obtaining a sufficient supply of T. N. T. This will be made the subject of special report if the general plan be adopted.

KEARNEY, *Acting.*

On August 15, 1917, Admiral Mayo, commander in chief Atlantic Fleet, who was about to proceed to England accompanied by certain members of his staff, conferred with the chief of bureau and officers of the mine section regarding the new mine and its value for the proposed northern barrage. This discussion covered not only the material questions but also matters of strategy and tactics involved in such an undertaking. The bureau furnished Admiral Mayo for his information and for use in discussing the matter with the British naval authorities a memorandum embodying the ideas of the Bureau of Ordnance concerning the adaptability of the Mark VI mine for a barrage. This memorandum is quoted below for the reason that it set forth with fair accuracy the possibilities and limitations involved in the use of the new mine and, in connection with the above quoted letters to the Chief of Naval Operations, supplied the information necessary for an intelligent consideration of the northern barrage project.

Confidential. AUGUST 15, 1917.

Memorandum for commander in chief Atlantic Fleet.

Subject: Mark VI mine.

Inclosure: (A) Copy of Bureau of Ordnance letter to Chief of Naval Operations, dated July 30, 1917.

1. The following notes are intended to amplify and supplement the information contained in the inclosed letter.

2. From the early stages of submarine warfare, trap nets have been used to a considerable extent, but it has been found to be extremely difficult to maintain nets of sufficient weight and strength to stop submarines, and it has lately become known that submarines are equipped with cutters which enable them to cut their way through. Inasmuch as the submarine is free to go to a depth of 200 feet, a heavy trap net in deep water necessarily becomes a serious problem, not only to manufacture and plant, but also to maintain against the wear and tear due to storms and currents, etc. The bureau early became convinced that a trap net designed to offer passive resistance to submarines is not a sure solution to the problem.

3. Indicator nets of various designs have been studied and much information regarding foreign types of such nets have been fully considered with the conclusion that this type of net also is not a satisfactory antisubmarine device. Such nets must be suspended from surface floats and cables, are subjected to extreme conditions of wear and have a short life. But the principal objection to such a net, when it is not combined with bombs or mines, is that it merely indicates the presence of a submarine and that it requires a very large number of patrol vessels to keep a close watch on the net in order that a vessel may be near at hand to destroy a submarine whose presence is indicated. With a view to reducing the number of attendant vessels, a radio buoy has been developed to send out a call automatically in the event of a submarine fouling an indicator net, but the defect of this scheme is principally that a submarine has an excellent chance to get clear of such a net by the time a patrol vessel could arrive on the scene.

4. Nets in combination with mines or bombs are better, on paper at least, than either the trap nets or the indicator nets; but here again the difficulty of planting and maintaining such nets on a large scale—for example, the proposed North Sea barrier—would be prohibitive. The bureau has examined and carefully considered hundreds of inventions and suggestions relative to nets of all descriptions, and has come to the

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conclusion that the only effective barrier that could be manufactured, planted, and maintained effectively is one of mines.

5. The German, British, and all other types of mines known to this bureau are unsuitable for the formation of barriers in deep water, mainly because of the great number of mines that would be required for any major operation, such as the North Sea barrier. Since submarines can go with safety to a depth of 200 feet and since the ordinary mine must be actually struck to be effective, one of the first ideas that occurred to the bureau was that pendant mines might be used, that is to say a number of small mines at intervals of, say, 25 feet, on a vertical pendant 200 feet long, but this was not seriously entertained because it is obviously clumsy and such mines would necessarily have to be supported from the surface by an elaborate system of buoys, cables, and moorings, and such a system would be difficult to fabricate, plant, and maintain.

6. It early became evident that what was needed was a mine that would give a very much larger danger area than any mine in existance, and fortunately the new firing principle embodied in the Mark VI mine was hit upon and proved on test to be entirely practicable.

7. By giving the mine a sufficiently heavy charge of high explosive, to disable a submarine at a distance of 100 feet, and by making the mine effective by mere contact of a submarine with its antenna 100 feet above and below it, it is apparent that a great advance has been made possible in antisubmarine mining operations.

8. The mine will be charged with 300 pounds of high explosive, probably T.N.T. or a combination thereof with some other substance. The British publications on the subject of depth charges allot a danger radius of 70 feet to a charge of 300 pounds of "amatol" (60 per cent T.N.T. and 40 per cent ammonium nitrate). From French information and from experimental data in possession of the bureau, it is concluded that the positive destruction area of such a charge is within a radius of 70 feet but that within a greater area of a 100 feet radius sufficient damage may be expected to force the submarine to come to the surface. Accordingly it is considered that the use of these mines with an antenna 100 feet above the mine and another 100 feet below the mine will permit the explosion of the mine upon the passage across its vertical plane, in contact with the wires, of any submarine within 100 feet above or below the mine. It will readily be seen that this increases the effective "contact area" in the ratio of the 200 feet length of the antenna to the 3 feet diameter of the present contact mine in use by the Allies. In other words one mine will cover all practicable depths for a submarine, as it is not probable that submarines will cruise below 200 feet depth. The contact area of the mine may be still further enlarged by transverse antennæ connected to adjacent mines forming a network, but owing to the difficulties of laying such a barrier in the open sea it is considered preferable to lay several parallel rows of unconnected mines.

9. Anchors will be of three different types, viz:

(*a*) Automatic anchor, similar to present British type, for use where automatic depth regulation is desired.

(*b*) Nonautomatic anchor for use in depth of less than 100 feet; fixed length of anchor cable to hold mine close to bottom where effects of wave action and current will be minimized.

(*c*) Modification of (*b*) nonautomatic anchor for depths exceeding 100 feet, but where depths are fairly uniform. Length of anchor cable to be set for predetermined depth to give mine submergence of 100 feet.

10. The third type of anchor (*c*) is desirable only to save time of manufacture, it being simpler than an automatic mine, but it would require more time and care to plant owing to the necessity of knowing the depth fairly accurately. Its principal use would be in home or controlled waters.

11. In view of the fact that the mine will be at a depth of 100 feet or on the bottom (in depths less than 100 feet) it will be affected by wave action and the effect of current will be less than with the usual type of mine, therefore the mine anchor can be lighter than that of other mines. It is proposed, however, to back the anchor with a small light anchor (in combination with the plummet or otherwise) to insure holding.

12. All anchors of whatever type will, of course, fit the standard mine track, and all mines regardlses of type of anchor, will be launched in the same manner.

13. The scheme of mine laying contemplates separating the mines in each line by a distance of 100 feet, and laying four separate lines, mutually distant 500 yards and whatever distance is found necessary for safety and convenience in laying. In this manner a barrier of practically one mine per 25 feet (since in all probability the several lines will be staggered with respect to each other) will be created. It is estimated that it would be well nigh impossible for a submarine to pass through the four lines without striking a mine in some one of the lines. This distance apart of 100 feet insures freedom of the mines from countermining each other.

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14. If the upper antenna is made of such length that it reaches the surface, the passage of surface craft coming in contact with the antenna will fire the mine. This may be prevented in cases where it is desired to leave "gates" open for the passage of the fleet by submerging an antenna to a depth of 50 feet. This will probably suffice to strike all submarines operating entirely submerged because it is understood that they cruise usually at a depth of 60 feet in order to avoid fouling the bottom of surface craft which they can not see. The surface of these gates must, of course, be thoroughly patrolled in order to prevent the passage of submarines on the surface, or submerged but with periscope showing. In case, however, of explosion of one of the mines by a surface vessel, serious damage would unquestionably result to a merchant vessel. War vessels, however, by reason of their superior strength and interior subdivision would be able to stand with comparatively little damage the explosion of the mine at a distance.

15. For a barrier to be completely effective against submarines, the entire depth of water from the surface to 200 feet should be mined; in other words, the buoy of this mine should reach almost to the surface in order that a submarine on the surface might be destroyed or seriously damaged. . With a barrier of this kind, great care would be necessary to keep friendly vessels away from the danger zone and to this end it would be necessary to put down navigational marks, either vessels or buoys, to mark the danger zone, and to facilitate the work of additional mine planting when such became necessary.

16. The use of a steel sweep metallically connected to the sweeping vessel with a steel underbody would explode the mines. This presents two advantages: (*a*) In case of sweeping by the enemy no mine can be picked up and the construction thereof examined. (*b*) After the war the mines may be readily removed by exploding them. If the recovery of the mines for stowage and use is desired, however, this can readily be done by using a parcelled sweep and insuring that the sweep is connected to the sweeping vessel by means of some nonmetallic joint. (*c*) The proposed plan of laying these mines contemplates their use in waters where enemy sweeping operations could not be carried out without driving off the patrol.

17. The mine is protected from premature firing by two breaks in the electric circuit. The first of these is closed by the hydrostatic pressure of the water after the mine is launched. The second is not closed until the contact of the submarine or other steel vessel with the antenna. The second break is further protected by a mechanical lock not liberated until hydrostatic pressure is applied on the mine on submergence, and by an electrical ground which is not connected until the mine is in the water and the buoy and antenna have paid out. The rugged character of this safety device and its efficiency has been amply demonstrated by tests. Still another safety device is an "extender" which forces the primer into firing position relative to the detonator only after submergence of the mine to a predetermined depth.

18. The firing element of the mine is a dry-cell battery completely sealed up. It is estimated that the life of this battery as thus sealed is at least two years with probably much longer life.

19. There are no insulated electrical parts outside the mine case. All electric circuits within the case are carefully insulated and in addition they carry such feeble currents that there is no difficulty to be anticipated from short circuits, grounds, or defective insulation. The lower antennæ wire must be metallically insulated from contact with the bare metal of the mine case or the mine cable. This can be accomplished by coating the mine with a nonmetallic bitumastic compound and by parceling the anchor or mooring cable. Electrical insulation is not necessary, simply mechanical insulation to prevent actual contact of the two bare metals.

20. The action of pronounced currents especially where the mine is laid in very deep water would be to deflect the mine from the vertical and consequently, since its mooring rope is of mixed length, to increase the submergence of the mine to some degree. This difficulty may be overcome by floating spare lengths of antennæ on the surface so that when by current action the mine is submerged the spare length then becomes an additional antenna buoy, now somewhat submerged. The tilting action on the mine will not prevent the operation of its mechanism. In addition the deep submergence of the mine will remove it to a large extent, from influence by surface currents and wave action and will subject it only to legitimate deep currents which do not, in the water in which it is proposed to lay these mines, reach any high value.

STRATEGICAL AND TACTICAL CONSIDERATION.

21. In order to present a fair chance of success, these mines must not be laid as surprise mines in waters wherein the enemy has control, but must be located at a distance from enemy bases sufficient to insure absolute control of the waters by the allied

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forces. This would then insure the maintenance of an adequate and continuous patrol and the prevention of sweeping operations.

22. In planning for the material required for the North Sea barrier, the line from Buchan Ness, on the east coast of Scotland, to the coast of Norway was assumed as a possible line. This line is an extreme example of a barrier because of its length and the depth of water traversed, though its currents are favorable.

23. It is evident that such a barrier would restrict freedom of action of the British fleet based on the coast of Scotland, inasmuch as it would not be free to cross the barrier line at any point except where a "gate" had been established. This gate could be any width desired, say 15 or 20 miles, and there could be more than one gate.

24. Assuming that the North Sea was inclosed by effective barriers and assuming that the enemy had 200 submarines in the North Sea and confined thereto, it is to be expected that the enemy would attempt to trap the allied forces. For example, suppose that a gate 20 miles wide were left in the barrier, near the coast of Scotland, and that this was the only means by which the allied fleet could pass in and out of the North Sea. It is to be expected that the enemy might dispose his submarines in appropriate positions in the neighborhood of such gate, that he would then send his main fleet into the North Sea to make a demonstration and try to draw the British and allied forces into an ambush. The important question arises, therefore, as to whether the British and allied fleets could reasonably expect to cope with such a situation. It seems reasonable to expect that by means of patrols and sweepers a large area of sea adjacent to the proposed gate could be kept under control and made fairly safe for the fleet. However, denial to the German submarines of access to the Atlantic would intensify submarine activities in the North Sea. The enemy would also be likely to attempt to raid and sweep or destroy parts of the barrier. This would necessitate constant and vigilant patrol by fast light cruisers and destroyers, and it is to be expected that this condition would bring on heavy engagements with the enemy, if not a main fleet action.

* * * * * * *

27. Further tests are about to be made of a number of mines to demonstrate their reliability under varying conditions of service, and their safety in handling, but as the firing gear is the only really novel feature of the mines, and as that has stood every test yet applied to it, there appears to be no possibility of failure.

28. The manufacture of 10,000 mines for our own service has been started. This initial lot of 10,000 will prepare manufacturers concerned for production of larger quantities.

T. A. KEARNEY, *Acting*.

As will be subsequently seen, the tentative design of the mine had to be modified as a result of experiments and more mature study of the project. Notably, the use of a lower antenna was decided to be impracticable or inadvisable; and the spacing of mines had to be increased to 300 feet to reduce the danger of countermining. It was found, too, that the Bureau of Ordnance had been too optimistic in its forecasts relative to early completion of design and early production, due principally to the lack of sufficient experienced personnel in the early stages of the project.

The foregoing carries the history of the northern barrage to the point of its formal submission to the British Admiralty by the Navy Department through Admiral Mayo.

CHAPTER IL—BRITISH CONSIDERATION OF PROJECT.

A British Admiralty "History of northern barrage" states that:

"Toward the end of August, 1917, Commander (Acting Captain) Alan M. Yeats-Brown, D. S. O., R. N., after having made various proposals during the preceding two months with regard to antisubmarine measures, produced a paper entitled 'Anti-submarine mining proposals.' This paper was referred to the plans division. This division had already been considering these matters for some time, and, after consulting with Capt. Yeats-Brown on several points which he had brought forward, suggested certain modifications to the proposals and wrote an appreciation on Capt. Yeats-Brown's paper. The conclusions arrived at were brought up for discussion at the next allied naval conference by the first sea lord, who, it is believed, had previously discussed the matter with Admiral Mayo, of United States Navy."

The northern barrage project was taken up at an allied naval conference, at London, September 4–5, 1917, attended by Admiral H. T. Mayo, United States Navy, where, as reported by him on September 8: "The British Admiralty put forward, as an alternative to a close offensive in German waters, the suggestion that the activity of enemy submarines might be restricted by the laying of an effective mine field or mine net

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barrage." The mine net barrage was considered impracticable, and "as to the proposal to put down a mine barrage in the northern part of the North Sea, while it could be guarded against enemy sweepers, certain difficulties exist, such as lack of freedom of movement of the Grand Fleet, so that a very promising degree of success should be indicated before such an undertaking was begun." Further, "The conference, after discussion, agreed that the distant mine barrage could not very well be undertaken until an adequate supply of mines of satisfactory type was assured."

The British Admiralty history, in reference to the proceedings at this conference states:

"Admiral Jellicoe put forward the suggestion of laying 'an efficient barrage so as to completely shut in the North Sea.' "

He computed that 100,000 mines would be required. He remarked (*a*) "I do not think we get many German submarines by mines;" (*b*) "It appears that the result of our mine fields (in the Bight) is to force the submarines, or a very large proportion, to go in and out of the German bases through territorial waters or Dutch territorial waters;" (*c*) "There is the alternative of laying a mine field in the North Sea, in a position where the enemy sweepers can not reach without running very considerable risk. In view of our present experience, I do not think that would have much more result than our present policy; but if a mine is produced which is more effective against submarines than our own mines, the matter, perhaps, becomes somewhat different. * * * We get our mines slowly. Our problem is then: Is it better to put them down as we get them, or is it better to wait until we get a very large number and lay a complete barrage across the North Sea? * * * It is obvious a mine field so laid would have to be at some considerable distance from German ports, because it would require to be watched. * * * A great deal depends upon whether the mine is a satisfactory one. If we get a satisfactory mine, it might be worth while laying a barrage when we get a sufficient number."

Admiral Mayo approved the idea of a mine barrage involving patrol by the allied fleet, provided always that we had confidence in the efficiency of the mine which would be laid. He thought that this promised really more in the way of results than the proposed operations in regard to the convoy of ships.

Vice Admiral Sims said: "It must be successful completely, or it is not successful at all. Either the barrage is successful absolutely or it fails absolutely."

Sir Eric Geddes said: "I do not understand from the remarks of the first sea lord that the barrage should take the place of other offensive measures. It is not considered that the barrage can be sufficiently relied upon to take the place entirely of other measures for hunting and destroying submarines."

As for Sir Eric Geddes's statement, he was in exact accord with the American proponents of the project, who from the first advocated it in addition to other useful antisubmarine measures.

The results of the conference may be summed up as indicating a favorable attitude, in principle, toward the Northern barrage project leavened with doubt of its practicability. The reasons for this doubt are surmised to have been the generally unfortunate experience of the British in the development and use of mines. At the outbreak of war in 1914 the British had practically no mines, and, for want of a better one, adopted the Vickers-Elia type, which soon proved unreliable and ineffective. This was superseded by one of British Admiralty design, essentially similar to the Russian and German horn mines, but with a distinctly British sinker (anchor). This British horn mine, while perhaps an improvement on the Vickers-Elia, was not entirely satisfactory, being comparatively dangerous to handle, too susceptible to countermining, unreliable in automatic depth taking, and not of a type lending itself to rapid and economical manufacture.

For some reason, perhaps their own rather slow and unsatisfactory progress in the development of mines, British officials apparently were skeptical of the ability of the United States to produce quickly a more satisfactory type. This attitude first became apparent to the Bureau of Ordnance on June 2, 1917, when Admiral Sims in a dispatch to the department reported: "* * * the British Admiralty have concentrated upon the construction of mines to such extent that they now anticipate that by August the output will reach 10,000 a month. They consider it unwise from their previous experience with mines similar to those which we now have on hand to attempt to utilize our present available supply. They now consider * * * as our output of a different type mine would not be available in sufficient time that we can more profitably concentrate on other work."

An immediate result of the conference was the production on September 14, 1917, by the Admiralty plans division of a paper for Admiral Mayo, entitled "General future policy, including future mining policy," with an appendix, "Mine barrage across the North Sea." The following extracts from this paper bearing on the barrage project are quoted:

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"The enemy submarine campaign now dominates and overshadows every other consideration, and any increase in the present rate of sinking might bring about an unsatisfactory peace.

"* * * It therefore appears that our future policy must be directed toward a more concentrated and effective control in the areas between the enemy's ports and our trade routes.

"Some form of barrage corresponding to that which was formerly established by the battle fleet * * * must be reconstituted in such a form that the enemy submarines can not venture into it without considerable risk to themselves.

"Broadly speaking, four forms of barrage may be considered:

"Firstly. A barrage of mines only * * *.

"Secondly. A combination of deep mines with surface and aircraft.

"Thirdly. Surface and aircraft patrolling a wide belt.

"Fourthly. Sealing the submarine exits * * *.

"The fourth form of barrage * * * is the only radical cure * * * but the difficulties * * * are so great that it is not recommended to attempt it.

"It is therefore proposed to use a combination of the first three.

"* * * The enemy submarine would thus be subject when on the surface to attack of one kind or another from shortly after leaving their bases until they cleared the Orkney-Shetland-Norway line, in addition to passing through a mine barrage. * * *."

The paper also dealt with the protection of the barrage, remarking, "* * * with our fleet based on Rosyth, we should be in a position to insure protection even to the area between the notified area and the Norwegian coast."

The use of neutral waters by enemy submarines was also dealt with: "* * *. This can only be overcome by converting the neutral into an ally or by ourselves preventing the enemy submarines from using these waters. * * * Should Norway come in on our side, Stavanger * * * could be used as a base for a fleet or for the light watching forces as desired. Should, however, the general situation render it undesirable to include Norway among the Allies, any development of the selective type mine would enable us to deal with the passage. * * *."

The appendix dealt with the details of the mine barrage, which it was proposed to establish on the Aberdeen-Ekersund line and was at that time of such importance to the further consideration of the project, particularly to the Navy Department, that it is quoted in full below:

APPENDIX I.—MINE BARRAGE ACROSS THE NORTH SEA.

The object of mining the North Sea is to prevent the enemy submarines from getting out, but it is most undesirable that any mine barrage should hinder the movements of our own fleet or lay our coasts open to attack, if it can be avoided.

Before considering the line to be selected, the requirements of an effective mine barrage will be considered.

The requirements are as follows:

(1) The mine field must be guarded; that is to say, it must either be—

(*a*) At such a distance from the enemy ports that he can not sweep it; or,

(*b*) We must watch it and drive off any sweeping vessels he sends out.

Obviously (*a*) is preferable. It is also an advantage to be far enough off the enemy aircraft bases to prevent interference to our patrols by seaplanes or aeroplanes. Zeppelins can be dealt with.

(2) The mine field should be as far from the enemy ports as other considerations will permit to enable our patrols to intercept any submarine damaged but not sunk outright by our mines.

(3) The barrage must consist of both deep mines and mines near the surface; or, if deep mines only are used, the barrage must be patrolled in order to force the submarine to dive to the level of the deep mines.

It is also an advantage if the barrage is in such a position that our main fleet can be based on the enemy side of it, as this will not only give freedom of movement to our own fleet, but in addition should enable us to intercept any enemy vessels which endeavor to interfere with our barrage or the vessels patrolling it.

Consideration of the line to be selected.—The line from Aberdeen to Norway is preferred for the following reasons:

(*a*) Its great distance from the enemy ports, which will render interference from the enemy difficult. Thus, every mine laid in this area will continue to be a menace to the enemy submarines until the end of the war.

(*b*) The line is shorter than any other, with the exception of the Orkney and Shetland-Norway line, which is considered impracticable owing to the depth of water and the strong tides in the Fair Island Channel.

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(c) The grand fleet, if based on Rosyth, is on the enemy side of the line.

(d) Any submarines damaged by mines will have a long way to get home and should be accounted for by our patrols.

(e) Whether Norway eventually comes in on the side of the Allies or not, the eastern end of the line will be far easier to guard than the northern end of the Goodwin-Jutland line, which has been suggested.

(f) It would be easier to bring pressure to bear on Norway to induce them to take steps to prevent submarines passing through their territorial waters than it would in the case of Denmark with their ever-present fear of invasion.

(g) The line Aberdeen-Norway deals with submarines using the Baltic exits as well as with those coming from North Sea ports.

Proposed mining policy.—The principles governing our policy to be:

(a) Never lay a mine which can be swept in such a position that the enemy can sweep it.

(b) Lay mines which can not be swept as close off the entrance to the enemy harbors as possible.

The practical application of this policy to take the following form:

1. Mine the Straits of Dover with deep mines and patrol the minefield to force the submarines down on to the mines.

2. Prescribe a mined area on the Aberdeen-Norway line.

3. Lay deep mines between the notified area and Aberdeen and patrol this line so as to force the submarines down.

4. Lay deep mines between the prescribed area and Norway when mines become available; in the meantime this area to be watched by hydrophone vessels.

5. Mine close to in the German harbors with destructor mines.

The British Navy to be responsible for mining the Straits of Dover and the entrances to the German rivers.

The American and British Navies to cooperate in mining the Aberdeen-Norway route.

It is absolutely essential that the whole of the mines laid in the Aberdeen-Norway barrage should be so constructed that they automatically become safe should they break away from their moorings.

Details of the Aberdeen-Norway mine barrage.—Reference: Chart No. 2182 B.

1. The total length of the barrage may be taken as 280 miles over the greater part of which the depth of water is less than 50 fathoms.

To mine any belt of water effectively there should be 3 lines of mines at each depth of 5 fathoms (e. g. the vertical distance between lines of mines will be 30 feet).

One line of mines at each depth will be referred to as a "system." Thus the complete barrage will consist of three systems.

It is not considered necessary, however, to lay mines at a greater depth than 200 feet (33 fathoms), as submarines will not willingly go below this depth.

2. The barrage is divided into three parts:

Area A, the Notified Area: This area has to be made dangerous from the surface to 200 feet below it.

Area A, B, and C: Deep mines with surface vessels and aircraft patrolling.

The above areas will be considered separately.

3. Area A: It is necessary to make this area impassible to submarines, whether diving or on the surface. Three systems of mines will be required. If British mines are used, each system will have lines of mines at seven different depths, whereas if American mines are used, each system will only require lines of mines at two different depths.

It is therefore proposed that American mines should be used for the area.

The barrage will consist of three systems of lines each, e. g., six lines of mines in all.

Suggested method of laying the mines.—(a) The northern edge of area A would be mined first in order to restrict the movements of our fleet to the southward as little as possible.

(b) The depth of area A is 56 miles, which will allow of the mine field being extended in a southerly direction without a further notification to neutrals.

(c) It is of great importance, however, to absorb as little of this space as possible on each occasion of laying mines, and for this purpose three lines of spar buoys will be laid in area A, as shown on Chart 2182 B.

(d) Only one line of buoys will be required for laying the first and second systems, the third system being laid to the north of the center line of buoys. The presence of three lines of buoys will confuse the enemy as to the actual position of the mines.

(e) The spar buoys will be laid at intervals of 10 miles and will be numbered so that the mine layers can ascertain where to commence laying on each occasion.

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(*f*) The operation of laying the mines might be carried out as follows:

Two mine layers to proceed to No. 2 buoy and lay lines A1, A2, as shown on chart. These lines would form part of the first system. The lines A1 and A2 would be 11 miles in length, the first mine being dropped when 2 miles from No. 2 buoy.

NOTE.—The object in not laying mines until 2 miles away from the buoy is twofold:

(1) It enables the buoys to be approached if it is desired to remove them later on.

(2) The buoys will give no information as to the exact position of the ends of the lines of mines.

On the next occasion the mine layers would proceed well to the eastward of No. 2 buoy, then steer south until they reached the line of buoys, shape course for No. 3 buoy and lay lines A 1, A 2.

The second system of mines (lines A 3, A 4) would be laid in a similar manner, but to the southward of the line of buoys.

Number of American mines required.—It is assumed mines will be laid 40 yards apart.

First system=length of the line by number of lines × number of mines to the mile.

$=(11 \times 11) \times 2 \times 50=12,100.$

Complete barrage=3 systems=3 × 12,100=36,300.

4. Area B: The barrage will consist of three systems. Each system will have a line of mines at each of the five following depths:

65, 95, 125, 155, 185 feet.

It is proposed that the mining of this area should be undertaken by the British. Each system will require 22,500 mines.

Therefore complete barrage=3 systems=67,500 mines.

5. Area C: It is desirable that American mines should be used for this area as the number of sinkers required is thereby reduced considerably. A decision on this point can only be arrived at when it is known what type of sinker can be used with the American mine.

Numbers required.

If American mines are used:

Complete barrage=3 systems=3 × 2 lines=6 lines.

Number of mines in each system=length of line by number of lines by number of mines to the mile.

$=60 \times 2 \times 50=6,000.$

Complete barrage=3 systems=3 × 6,000=18,000.

If British mines are used:

Complete barrage=3 systems=3×5 lines=15 lines.

Number of mines in each system=60×5×50=15,000.

Complete barrage=45,000.

NOTE.—This number would be considerably reduced if the X attachment is used.

The copy of the above-quoted Appendix I, which was given to Admiral Mayo for the Navy Department, bore the following notation on its face: "Admiralty would be glad to learn whether Navy Department concurs in the plans as shown."

The Admiralty "History of northern barrage" states that "As a result of this paper it was decided to proceed with preparations for laying a barrage on the Aberdeen-Norway line," and adds that "The date of this decision is not known."

It is important to note that at this period the British Admiralty was apparently quite in accord with the Navy Department in regard to major features of the project, but differed with respect to some of the details. Pending the return of Admiral Mayo to the United States about the middle of October, the development of the project was almost at a standstill for want of information as to British intentions, except in the matter of design and manufacture of the new mines; but the British Admiralty proceeded with the formulation of policies and plans based on the decision to lay the barrage on the Aberdeen-Norway line. These activities will be referred to in detail later.

The location of the proposed barrage, with the proposed area which should be notified (as it was to contain surface mines as well as deep mines), together with the suggested arrangement of the mine systems, is shown in the reproduced chart (fig. 4).

CHAPTER III.—AMERICAN CONSIDERATION AND ADOPTION OF PROJECT.

Upon the return of Admiral Mayo to the United States, a conference was held in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations on October 15, 1917. The following officers were present: Admiral Benson, Admiral Mayo, Rear Admiral Earle, Capt. F. H. Schofield, Capt. R. R. Belknap, Commander Fullinwider, and Commander King.

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At this conference Admiral Mayo produced for consideration the above-quoted Appendix I setting forth the British Admiralty version of the plan for the proposed barrage. There ensued a general examination and discussion of the plan; and, the consensus of opinion being favorable, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Benson, after consultation with the Secretary of the Navy, then and there directed the Chief of Bureau of Ordnance to proceed with the procurement of 100,000 Mark VI mines. This action, so far as the adoption of the project was concerned, was only tentative pending a careful study of the British version; but it was regarded by the Bureau of Ordnance as tantamount to a decision to carry out the project and to provide all necessary material therefor without further delay.

Following the conference, the planning section of the Office of Naval Operations and representatives of the Bureau of Ordnance conferred informally as to details of the plan, and the papers in the case were then referred to the general board for consideration.

On October 17, 1917, while the barrage project was under consideration by the general board, the Chief of Naval Staff, British Admiralty, addressed the following dispatch to the Chief of Naval Operations:

"It will be necessary to increase the number of lines of United States mines in each system in the North Sea barrage from two to three if there should be any difficulty in using the lower antennæ of United States mines for first supplies. Could you please state an approximate date when supply of complete mines and sinkers will begin, stating at what rate the supply will be maintained?

"As all British mine layers will be fully engaged in laying British portions of the barrage, will you please say how many United States mine layers will be available * * * and the output of United States mines? It is estimated that each ship could make five mine-laying trips a month. As a base for United States mines and mine layers, it is proposed to use Cromarty. The question of facilities for assembling ready for use, storage, and embarkation is being investigated on the spot. It is suggested that it is desirable that United States officers should confer with ours on this question and examine proposed arrangements as to suitability for dealing with United States mines and sinkers; also to ascertain as to whether our depot system will be suitable for application to United States mines. It is proposed that the necessary assembling and testing of United States mines and sinkers on receipt and before issue to mine layers should be dealt with by depot staffs provided by you, if possible. It is hoped that you will be able to agree with this. United States officers if sent over can report numbers required.

"I should be much obliged if you would inform me as soon as possible whether you can supply sinkers for United States mines."

On October 20, on the recommendation of the General Board, the Navy Department cabled Admiral Sims substantially as follows:

"The department requests to be informed whether the plan for the placing of a mine barrage across the North Sea on the Aberdeen-Ekersund line has the approval of the Admiralty. It is believed that the great experience of the British naval forces in North Sea operations and their experience in naval mining during the present war puts them in the best position to decide whether the proposed scheme is practicable in construction and maintenance, and whether in the opinion of the Admiralty it is the best scheme in sight for limiting the operations of enemy submarines, provided that the Straits of Dover can be efficiently closed to the passage of submarines which, if possible in the opinion of the department, should be done at the earliest possible date."

The following reply, in substance, was received on October 23 from the Admiralty

"The mine barrier has been approved by Admiralty and the Admiralty now confirms approval. The preparations are rapidly proceeding.

"Admiralty's cable of 17th indicates the assistance desired from the United States of America. This scheme is considered by the Admiralty to be best to be carried out at a distance from the bases of the enemy. The Admiralty are working on a supplemental scheme for operation close inshore, but any such inshore operation has the defect that a passage through for submarines can eventually be cleared by the enemy.

"No scheme yet tried has been effective in closing the Dover Straits to submarines, but measures are being constantly improved, and they are, at the least, always a considerable deterrent. Mining operations on an extensive scale against submarines in the Straits of Dover commence in November. Owing to the lack of effective anti-submarine mine, this has hitherto been delayed."

The general board completed its consideration of the project and submitted its report to the Secretary of the Navy on October 24, 1917. A complete copy of this report is appended, but a summary of its "conclusions" is quoted here:

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"* * * the general board is decidedly of the opinion that of the measures discussed * * * the scheme of closing the North Sea offers the best chances of success; that is, to close the North Sea by the Aberdeen-Ekersund barrier approved by the British Admiralty and to similarly close the Dover Strait.

"The general board does not underestimate the practical difficulties that must be overcome in providing the necessary material and transporting, placing, and maintaining it in the face of the determined efforts of the Germans to render the barrier abortive. Further, the barrier, even when placed, can not be effective without an adequate patrol. The general board is, however, encouraged to give its indorsement to this plan because it has the approval of the British Admiralty; it is proposed by it as the best practicable plan to meet present war conditions; the Chief of Bureau of Ordnance stated the material, mines, anchors, moorings, etc., can be surely supplied; and the accompanying memorandum of Capt. R. R. Belknap, United States Navy, who has been actively engaged in conducting mining operations, points the way to handling the details of transporting and planting.

"It is assumed that the British Admiralty in approving this plan, recognizes the vital importance of the necessary patrol; that is it clearly seen by it where the required number of vessels is to be obtained, and that the extent of the cooperation required of the United States in this regard will be communicated to the United States Navy Department.

"If it is decided to proceed with the construction of the Aberdeen-Ekersund barrier, the general board recommends that the preliminaries be arranged at once, and that suitable officers of experience in mining operations be sent to England to arrange for our participation in the work."

The report of the general board was approved by the Secretary of the Navy October 29, 1917; and on the following day the northern barrage project was favorably acted upon by the President at a Cabinet meeting.

On November 1, the Chief of Naval Operations cabled the Admiralty:

"Department concurs in project for mine barrier Scotland to Norway and has already taken steps to fit out eight such mine planters to sail February 1 * * *. Expect begin shipment of mines January 15. Will send officers to confer and arrange details n a few days."

CHAPTER IV.—STATUS OF BARRAGE PROJECT ON NOVEMBER 1, 1917.

The American and British authorities having formally adopted the northern barrage project, it is desirable to sum up its major features as understood by the Navy Department, and more particularly by the mine section of the Bureau of Ordnance, whose function it was to procure and provide the mines appropriate to the project.

Referring to the previously quoted Appendix I, which dealt with the details of the proposed barrage, which presumably was the basis of approval by the Admiralty as well as our Navy Department, and which was generally in accordance with the original proposition of the Bureau of Ordnance, the plan embraced the following features:

(*a*) "The British Navy to be responsible for mining the Straits of Dover" * * *

(*b*) "The American and British Navies to cooperate in mining the Aberdeen-Norway route."

(*c*) On the initiative of the British Admiralty, the northern barrage was divided into three parts:

Area A. The "Notified area." This area to be made dangerous from the surface to 200 feet below it.

Area B and Area C. Deep mines with surface vessels and aircraft patrolling.

(*d*) Area A. Middle area about 160 miles long. To be mined by United States with American mines (antenna type). Barrage to consist of three systems, each system to have a line of mines at each of two depths—100 and 200 feet. Total requirement, 36,300 mines.

(*e*) Area B. Western area, about 60 miles long. To be mined by British with British mines (Horn type). Barrage to consist of three "systems," each system to have a line of mines at each of five depths—65, 95, 125, 155, and 185 feet. Total equirement, 67,500 mines.

(*f*) Area C. Eastern area, about 60 miles long. The British plans paper, Appendix I stated: "It is desirable that American mines should be used for this area as the number of sinkers required is thereby reduced considerably. A decision on this point can only be arrived at when it is known what type of sinker can be used with the American mine." This, taken in connection with the British inquiry of October 17 as to whether the United States could supply sinkers for United States mines, which was answered in the affirmative, left no doubt in the minds of department and Bureau

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of Ordnance officers concerned that the United States would mine Area C. Required, 18,000 American mines.

The following additional points set forth in the above-mentioned British paper were taken at their face value by American officers, especially since these points were in accordance with the original American proposition:

(*g*) "The mine field must be guarded."

(*h*) "The mine field should be as far from the enemy ports as other considerations will permit to enable our patrols to intercept any submarines damaged but not sunk outright by our mines." This implies the maintenance of a patrol.

(*i*) "The barrage must consist of both deep mines and mines near the surface; or, if deep mines only are used, the barrage must be patrolled in order to force the submarine to dive to the level of the deep mines."

(*j*) "It is also an advantage if the barrage is in such a position that our main fleet can be based on the enemy side of it, as this will not only give freedom of movement to our own fleet, but in addition should enable us to intercept any enemy vessels which endeavor to interfere with our barrage or the vessels patrolling it."

(*k*) "The line from Aberdeen to Norway is preferred for the following reasons:

(*a*) "Its great distance from the enemy ports."

(*b*) "The line is shorter than any other, with the exception of the Orkney & Shetland-Norway line, which is considered impracticable owing to the depth of water and the strong tides in the Fair Island Channel."

(*c*) "The Grand Fleet, if based on Rosyth, is on the enemy side of the line."

(*d*) "Any submarines damaged by mines will have a long way to get home and should be accounted for by our patrols."

(*e*) "Whether Norway eventually comes in on the side of the Allies or not, the eastern end of the line will be far easier to guard than the northern end of the Goodwin-Jutland line, which has been suggested."

(*f*) "It would be easier to bring pressure to bear on Norway to induce them to take steps to prevent submarines passing through their territorial waters than it would in the case of Denmark with their ever-present fear of invasion."

(*g*) "The line Aberdeen-Norway deals with submarines using the Baltic exits as well as with those coming from North Sea ports."

The British version of the plan differed from the American proposition in one most important particular; namely, that the eastern part of the barrage, Area C, was to be deep mined only, leaving the surface safe for traffic and depending upon patrols to prevent the passage of enemy submarines. This part of the plan was foredoomed to failure, since it was obviously impossible for patrols to effectively guard such a large area, as had been demonstrated by British experience in the much smaller area of the Straight of Dover; but for the time being the plan was accepted by American officials, with the understanding that, in case this part of the plan should prove ineffective, surface mining could be extended through Area C later.

It was on the basis of the above understanding of the project that the Bureau of Ordnance proceeded with the design and procurement of the required mining material and that the Navy Department undertook all other necessary preparations for the project. The planting of the barrage was to begin as soon as possible in the following spring, 1918, to assume its completion during favorable weather of the summer or early fall. Therefore, there was little time in which to complete the details of design of the new mines, launch the huge manufacturing project, and obtain production in adequate quantities not later than February, which was necessary in order that the mines could be shipped abroad, assembled, and made ready for use by April, 1918.

Chapter V.—Coordination of Preparations.

To insure a proper coordination of all necessary preparations for the northern barrage project, Capt. R. R. Belknap of the Office of Naval Operations, was placed in immediate charge in that office of the plans for the entire operation, which involved in greater or less degree all bureaus of the department. The Bureau of Ordnance was to furnish the mines and mining material; the Bureau of Construction and Repair, was chiefly concerned in the structural conversion of certain merchant ships into mine layers; the Bureau of Navigation had to furnish the officers and men to man the new mine squadron; the Naval Overseas Transport Service was to allocate sufficient cargo tonnage to maintain adequate and regular shipments of mining material; the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts was to take measures to handle the shipments of mines and other material, and so on.

All the above and other preparations constituted only one of the major naval operations then in hand, and there was the possibility that some essential part of the preparation might not be given its due precedence, either within the department or at

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some navy yard, unless the various activities were carefully watched and their importance kept constantly to the fore. This was all the more necessary by reason of the fact that the new mine and its objective use were shrouded in mystery, very few officers being let into the secret, which it was hoped could be kept from the enemy until we were ready to begin actual mining operations in the North Sea.

Throughout these preparations, the project was mentioned in writing as little as possible, information and instructions to those concerned being communicated orally, so that secrecy might be assured.

It was principally by means of informal conference between officers concerned that the many bureaus and offices quickly and effectively solved the multitudinous problem incidental to such a project. "Red tape" and formal routine methods were for the time being abolished, and those officers immediately charged with the work of preparation were practically accorded carte blanche.

In this connection, it is pertinent to note that the Secretary of the Navy, at the time of the project's adoption, stated that it had the strong interest and approval of all in high authority; that he himself desired every effort made to expedite it; that all who might be called upon for assistance should be informed of his wishes in this regard so that they should cooperate to the fullest extent; and that he should be immediately resorted to in any case where his action or influence might be needed.

Chapter VI.—Design of the Mine.

The possibility of the northern barrage depended upon the successful design of the new mines to a far greater degree than is usual in such matters. Had nothing better than the ordinary type of mine, such as that used by the British, been available the northern barrage project would have been utterly impossible of execution within the time allowed by reason of the enormous number of mines required for a barrage 280 miles long. The combined resources of the United States and the Allies, especially in the matter of high explosives, could not have produced the required number of mines, nor could the combined mining forces have planted them in a single year. By the use of mines of the American (Antenna) type, the number required was reduced to approximately one-third, and the project became possible, provided always that the design of the new mine was right.

On November 1, 1917, after the barrage project had been finally and definitely adopted, the only parts of the Mark VI mine that had been completely designed were the firing mechanism and the mine case. However, the mine section of the Bureau of Ordnance, under the immediate direction of Commander Fullinwider, felt no doubt of its ability to complete a satisfactory development of the new mine and to get it into production in due time, its optimistic view of the situation being based on the facts that the only radically new element of the mine was the firing mechanism, which had been fairly well tested out; that the war experience of the British had evolved a satisfactory type of mine anchor which doubtless could be adapted to the American mine; and that the remaining features were matters of mechanical detail certainly susceptible of quick solution. In the circumstances, it was absolutely necessary to take chances, else the project would be delayed a full year and therefore be too late. It was fortunate that Rear Admiral Earle, the chief of bureau, was willing to accept the final responsibility in this matter and that he had sufficient confidence in the mine section to give it practically a free hand.

If the bureau had been at all conservative in the matter of developing the design and placing contracts for the mines, the northern barrage would never have been laid. It is a well know fact that no mechanism as complicated as a mine, or even a much simpler one, can be confidently expected to function as designed until complete models have been tested under service conditions and the usual minor defects have been discovered and remedied. Ordinarily, it requires at least a year to prove out such a design before it is considered wise to put it into production. Judged by ordinary standards, the action of the bureau in bringing about the adoption of this great project before there was any certainty of the efficiency of the new mine, thereby committing two Governments to very large expenditures, was, to say the least, hazardous. The bureau accepted the hazard advisedly, as the only thing to be done in the circumstances, and well knowing the odium that would attach in case of failure.

The problem confronting the bureau was to build a mine around an entirely new principle in mining, and around a firing gear outlined but not perfected. This mine must be efficient and yet must be capable of manufacture and assembly in great quantities, with as little expense of money as practicable, and necessarily with as little expenditure of time as absolutely possible. The bureau had departed from the usual, or contact, mine with its new firing gear, and had then proceeded to wipe the slate clean and make radical developments in the entire mine.

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Practically all mines, except the later German types, had been made, up to that time, with the explosive in separate charge chambers, which were, after loading, placed within the mine case proper. This presented the triple disadvantage of additional weight; cost of time and money in manufacture, loading, and assembly; and, most serious, the interposition of an air cushion surrounding the charge chamber between the first explosive force and the water, thereby greatly reducing the force of the water hammer below caused by the explosion, which blow was that relied upon to damage the submarine touching the antenna. These difficulties were all obviated by selecting an explosive, T. N. T., which could be readily cast and cooled, and casting this direct into the completed mine case, using no separate charge chamber.

In addition, similarly the practice of carrying the detonator fixed in the explosive was a source of great danger in case of accident or fire or in case the mine layers were engaged in action with the mines on board. The safety chamber device of service fuses was adopted, so that the detonator might not be in contact with the main explosive until after the mine had been launched and submerged.

The design of antenna gear presented a problem that had, as far as was known, no precedent in the military or commercial arts, and required considerable initial design ability and experimentation.

As a matter of fact, the officers responsible for the mine freely admitted, to themselves, the certainty that the design would have to be modified more or less after service tests, and therefore shaped the design so that any one of its features could be modified during production with little or no effect on the others. In other words, every possible precaution was taken against possible loss of time and money. The result was very satisfactory; very few changes were necessary after getting into production; and when the first complete mines were assembled and tested under service conditions in March, 1918, they functioned as designed, and only very minor improvements, involving no delay in the project, were found to be desirable or necessary.

During the initial plans for the mine, the mine section of the bureau consisted of Commander S. P. Fullinwider, Lieut. (subsequently commander) J. A. Schofield, U. S. N. R. F., and, acting as the experimental officer of that section by virtue of his experimental duties in the bureau, Lieut. T. S. Wilkinson, jr. As the project began to take shape and became approved, the bureau added to the mine section certain line and reserve officers, who who will be mentioned hereafter as their duties appear.

In the initial stages of design, Commander Fullinwider assumed cognizance of the mine case, anchor, and antenna gear, leaving Lieut. Wilkinson the firing gear, the extender, and the mine loading—that is, explosives and detonator. With the advent of other officers, these duties were further subdivided as follows: To Commander Schofield, the mine case; to Lieut. O. W. Bagby, United States Navy, and Lieut. S. W. Cook, United States Navy Reserve Force, the mine anchor, in conjunction with Lieut. Commander H. Isherwood, Royal Navy Volunteer Reserve (noted below); to Lieut. Commander W. A. Corley, United States Navy, the antenna gear; to Lieut. C. H. Wright, United States Navy, the firing gear and extender; to Lieut. B. W. Grimes, United States Navy Reserve Force, the explosives. This division of responsibilities held through the design stage and through the production of the parts of the mine, as described in the succeeding chapter of this history.

At various times during the period of design and experimentation the Bureau of Ordnance had the advantage of the advice and assistance of three experienced mining officers of the British Navy. On May 5, 1917, Lieut. Commander H. O. Mock, Royal Navy Volunteer Reserve, arrived in the bureau, having been thus assigned by the British Admiralty to assist and advise in matters pertaining to mines. This was in accordance with a plan adopted immediately upon the entrance of the United States into the war, whereunder each of the two naval departments undertook to furnish the other with information to their mutual advantage. Lieut. Commander Mock brought to the Bureau of Ordnance the latest information and experience regarding the British mines and mining, more particularly information concerning mine anchors.

During Lieut. Commander Mock's stay in the bureau the Mark VI mine-firing device (K–1 device) was evolved, and he was present during much of the experimental work in connection therewith, although he did not assist in the evolution of the design. He was an early convert to the value of the new device; and upon his return to England in October, 1917, a model of the new device was transmitted by him for the Admiralty's information, the question of whether or not the British would join the Americans in the barrage proje t being then under consideration. Lieut. Commander Mock considered the K–1 device of great promise, and looked upon the new mine then in process of evolution as being superior for purposes of antisubmarine warfare to any other then existing type.

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Lieut. De Salis, Royal Navy, arrived September 3, 1917, having been sent to this country to examine the Mark VI mine and report to the British Admiralty as to its probable value for the proposed North Sea barrage. He was sent to this country on the initiative of the British Admiralty and apparently with a view to satisfying the Admiralty that our Navy Department really had what it had previously stated it had—a mine superior to existing types and peculiarly adapted to antisubmarine warfare. In short, the British Admiralty took this means of confirming the Bureau of Ordnance opinion and estimate of its own design and product before agreeing to cooperate in the establishment of a barrage.

After Lieut. De Salis had reported to the chief of bureau on the above-mentioned date, the chief of the mine section explained to him the characteristics of the new mine-firing device, and accompanied him that evening to the naval torpedo station, Newport, R. I., to witness tests. These tests were carried out, with inadequate preparation and facilities, on the two following days, September 4 and 5. Lieut. De Salis was soon convinced that the new device had merit. On September 7 he cabled the Admiralty in part as follows:

"The mechanism is safe and simple. Still in trial stage.

"It has worked perfectly for safety and bumping. No vessel really suitable was present, so trials were rather crude. Trial of countermining was not very satisfactory, but the faults revealed can be remedied.

"Mine designed is 33-inch diameter, and could be used with B. E. or Mark VI sinker. A 38-inch diameter mine would be designed if desired. No sinker is yet designed, and it is intended to copy ours.

"United States officials state that delivery of a thousand mines and mechanisms per diem is anticipated to commence December 1.

"Proposals are that combined operations should be worked out for use of these mines. They would provide the mechanisms and mines, while the British provide minelayers and sinkers.

"They offer a hundred thousand. Details of strategical proposals are known to Admiral Mayo.

"It is recommended that American offer should be accepted, our own output not being decreased in consequence.

"The questions to be settled subsequently are manufacture of sinker, size of mine, and supply of explosive. They have sufficient crude T. N. T. and are willing to supply it.

"I still adhere to the opinions expressed September 3, but advantages to outweigh them are: Simplicity, certainty of firing, large danger zone, and the element of surprise if the secret is kept."

On September 10 the Admiralty cabled Lieut. De Salis:

"Greatly appreciate offer of United States. Fully recognize the value of the increased danger zone near mines, but fear is expressed that if antenna only can fire mine, life in this climate would be limited by durability of antenna, which is necessarily short.

"Reply forthwith if antenna principle can be applied to horned mines, whose plans are now in America; or, conversely, if American mines can be fitted with a firing arrangement thoroughly reliable, or with horns, so that effectiveness as complete mines would remain after antenna has parted."

Lieut. de Salis, after consulting the Bureau of Ordnance, replied, September 11:

"Americans propose to fit fixed insulated projections of copper on mine case in parallel to antenna, so that mine will remain effective on same principle if it is hit whether the antenna is in place or not. Firing battery will then determine life of mine. It is sealed up, and no current is taken from it until moment of firing."

On September 12 Lieut. de Salis again cabled the Admiralty in part as follows:

"United States officers are extremely confident as to life of battery. In addition, halfway down antenna a float will be fitted, in which case wave action should not much affect lower half.

"Acceptance of the offer as it stands is strongly recommended.

"Design could subsequently be altered for fitting horns, should endurance trials which are now in hand prove unsatisfactory.

"Admiral Benson wishes to be informed of the proposed strategical use which may be decided on if offer is accepted, and of the numbers required.

"The bureau are requesting that a mine designer may be lent them to cooperate and insure fitting of mine on sinker."

Lieut. de Salis, during his connection with the Bureau of Ordnance, was an observer for the British Admiralty, and probably had much to do with the Admiralty's favorable consideration of the proposed joint project. In addition, Lieut. de Salis furnished the Bureau information of a general nature regarding British mines, mining equipment,

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nd mining practice. He did not, however, have any influence on the design of the Mark VI mine. Lieut. de Salis spent much of his time at the Naval Torpedo Station, Newport, where he conducted some tests with floats and antennae. He returned to England in December, 1917.

In the original proposition for a joint American and British barrage operation, it was proposed by the Bureau of Ordnance that the British should furnish the anchors nd that the United States should supply all the mines. This proposition was put orth for several reasons: First, there was a shortage of tonnage available for the hipment of the material abroad, and this shortage was growing more and more serious rom day to day as the result of the great activity at that time of the enemy submarines. The deadweight of the anchors alone required for the barrage was estimated at about 0,000 tons. Second, the British had a quite satisfactory type of anchor, which had een proved out during the war, and which, with minor modifications, could be dapted to fit the American mine. Third, it was originally contemplated that British mine planters would assist the United States Mine Force in the planting of nines, and therefore the mine tracks and mining equipment in general should be tandardized in the two services. Fourth, it was considered only fair that, if the barage were to be a joint operation, the British should bear a share of the cost and proluction of material.

After much delay in arriving at an understanding, it was finally decided to produce ll the anchors as well as the mines in this country. To facilitate the design of the nchor, and particularly with a view to making it standard with British mine layers' quipment, the British Admiralty was requested to send an officer to the Bureau of Ordnance who was competent to modify the British design of anchor to adapt it to he Mark VI mine. The Admiralty promptly acceded to this request, and Lieut. ommander Isherwood, R. N. V. R., arrived in the bureau early in October, 1917. He brought with him the detailed design of the British Mark VIII sinker (mine nchor), and this was found upon examination to require very little modification o suit the Mark VI mine. Lieut. Commander Isherwood, with the assistance of Bureau of Ordnance draftsmen, completed the redesign of the British sinker, referred o hereafter as the anchor, Mark VI; and on November 10 the design was ready for ubmission to the prospective bidders.

While the Mark VI anchor was very similar to the British Mark VIII sinker, it liffered in detail sufficiently to have warranted thorough tests before its adoption, ad the time been available. However, as not a day could be lost without correspondingly delaying the execution of the project, it was decided after very careful tudy of the design that it would be reasonably safe to proceed with production; and ontracts were placed immediately with three prominent automobile concerns in Detroit, Mich. Lieut. Commander Isherwood remained in the United States until he anchors were well along in production and until after practical tests with comlete mines had been carried out by vessels of the mine force just prior to their deparature for the North Sea. The anchor proved most satisfactory in every respect, eing, it is now believed, superior in its functioning to the British Mark VIII sinker rom which it was adapted.

The mine case was entirely a Bureau of Ordnance design. It was formed of two emispheres of steel welded together at the equator. It had an opening in the top 7 nches in diameter to receive the firing gear, and a smaller opening in the bottom to ake the booster charge and the detonator extender mechanism. Built into the lower emisphere, in the axis of the case, was a steel tube which housed the booster charge nd extender mechanism. The charge of 300 pounds of grade B trinitrotoluol was ast directly into the lower hemisphere of the case, it being found by experiment that he charge was sufficiently anchored in place by the bond between it and the surface f the case and central tube and by four stay braces which supported the tube. This imple form of construction saved considerable weight and permitted of the mine case eing kept within comparatively small dimensions, 34 inches diameter. The British nine had a diameter of 48 inches. The buoyancy of the Mark VI mine was 285 pounds, which is ample for mines to be used where the current is not greater than 3 knots. The mine case had welded to it a lifting eye, also hooks for securing the antenna ystem and the anchor. Four small holes in the case about 2 inches above the equator were provided for attaching firing "horns" in parallel with the antenna.

The extender mechanism, which carried the detonator in a retracted, or safe, posiion relative to the booster charge, and which, under a hydrostatic pressure correponding to a depth of 25 feet, extended the detonator to its firing position in the axis f the booster charge, was a lazy-tongs device, which also was originated and designed n the mine section. This mechanism provided an excellent safety device, since a nine which floated or which was submerged to a depth less than 25 feet would be safe.

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A similar hydrostatic safety device was incorporated in the firing mechanism; and both of these devices would have to fail to make the mine dangerous on or near the surface.

The antenna floats, the fittings in connection therewith, and the means of assembling the antenna system with the mine, proved the most troublesome parts to design, though they appear very simple. Experiments were first made with floats of waterproofed wood, but without success, since it was found impracticable to guard against their water-logging when subjected to deep submergence for considerable periods. Ultimately, three different types of float were successfully produced and used. For mines of the upper level a thin walled spherical copper float was used; for mines submerged 150 to 300 feet a spherical-cylindrical steel float with a wall thickness of 0.1 inch was used. The third type, which finally replaced the copper floats, was made up of balsa and skillfully waterproofed to withstand hydrostatic pressure safely up to at least 100 feet submergence. For mines of the upper level, two floats were fitted on each antenna, the lower one being placed a little above the middle point of the antenna, so that, in the event of the upper float carrying away, no part of the antenna could possibly come into contact with the mine case and fire the mine.

The antennæ of the lower level mines were provided with a single steel float These mines were at such depths as to be entirely unaffected by wave motion, and one float could be depended upon for an indefinite life.

The mechanism by means of which the antenna and floats were secured to the mine case until the mine reached a predetermined depth and then permitted their release in such a way as to avoid fouling, gave much difficulty, but the problem was very satisfactorily solved with the assistance of the *Baltimore*.

Discussion of many of the items of design, including that of the K–1 device, or firing mechanism, is omitted here as unnecessary and because they are still regarded as confidential

One of the most important and indispensable of the preparations was the trying out of the new mine under service conditions. In the earlier stages, complete mines were not available; and they did not become available until March, 1918. In the meantime, however, the *Baltimore*, which had been designated to carry out tests, performed such experiments as could be had with improvised material, and assisted in the design of some parts of the gear, notably the means of assembling the antenna floats with the mine and their release gear. This work continued until about December 20, 1917, when it became necessary for the *Baltimore* to go to the yard for fitting out for service abroad. It had been intended that this vessel should resome experiments and practice with the completed mines in March, but before that time it becamse necessary to send her abroad to assist in British mining operation.

The mine trials were taken up by the *San Francisco* in March, when the first mines were ready. Trials were carried out in the lower Chesapeake, later in Narraganset Bay, and finally off Cape Anne. The results of these trials were all that could be expected. With the exception of a very few minor mechanical faults, which were readily corrected, the mine and anchor functioned as designed; and the action of the Bureau of Ordnance in having proceeded with the manufacture of 100,000 mines in advance of such tests was thus validated. A most important result of the trials was the confidence engendered in the personnel of the mine force in the value and safety of the new mine.

It may be remarked in passing that the result of the trials lifted a heavy load from the minds of those officers of the Bureau of Ordnance who had staked all on a "paper design" and proceeded with an enormous manufacturing program in advance of complete tests.

Chapter VII.—The Manufacturing Project.

The firing mechanism for the new mine was in quantity production before any other part of the mine had been designed. The mine section had made tentative sketches of the several principal features of the mine, but none of the details had been decided upon. One reason for this was the fact that until the firing mechanism had been conclusively tested and adopted, late in July, there was insufficient information and data on which to proceed with the other points of design. Another point was that until November, 1917, there was insufficient personnel in the mine section to perform the duties of the bureau pertaining to mines and mining, depth charges, submarine nets, etc.

The Bureau of Ordnance, having anticipated the favorable outcome of the mine barrage proposition, had placed a contract for 10,000 mine-firing mechanisms (K–1 devices) as early as August 9, 1917, and another contract for 90,000 additional devices on October 3, 1917, nearly a month before the barrage project was definitely adopted.

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In view of the fact that there were so many uncertainties entering into the design of the mine, it was decided that the only safe plan was to follow the practice which is quite common in the automobile industry—that is, to divide the mine into groups of parts, each group being quite a separate design problem, all so standardized that the several groups would assemble into a complete mine. Thus the mine was separated into the following groups: Firing mechanism, extender mechanism, mine case, anchor, antenna and floats, horn device, and release gear.

Each group was designed and tested out quite independently of the others, a very definite general plan for the mine, of course, being kept in view. This method permitted of modifications of any one group without detriment to the others.

Another reason for following this method of design was that it would facilitate manufacture. There was no plant in the United States that had had experience in the manufacture of mines except the Norfolk Navy Yard, which yard was overwhelmed with other work after the outbreak of the war and could not be depended upon for any considerable manufacture of mine material. By designing the mine as an assembly proposition, its many parts could be manufactured in commercial plants with great rapidity; and by carefully standardizing all parts, they could finally be brought together and satisfactorily assembled.

The general economic conditions of the country were such that at the time when it became necessary to manufacture the Mark VI mine the passenger-automobile industry became available for war work through a gradual decrease in output of automobiles. It is believed that the Bureau of Ordnance was the first of the war agencies to take advantage of the wonderful resources of the automobile factories; and no difficulty whatever was found in obtaining keen competition among these factories for the manufacture of parts. Generally speaking, the automobile plant is ideal for the production of mine material, with the exception of the firing mechanism, because the plant is organized for quantity production and the character of work and workmanship is practically the same for automobiles and mines.

Still another reason for pursuing this method of manufacture was that only by this means could secrecy regarding the characteristics of the mine be preserved. It is obvious that if 100 different parts of a mine are manufactured by as many different factories, most of which are kept in ignorance of the fact that they are producing mine material, no one would have sufficient information on which to visualize the complete mine, and therefore no one could possibly betray the secret to the enemy. This idea was carried still further. Even at the point of assembly of the material for transshipment abroad the parts were not assembled into a mine but were shipped in groups to the overseas assembly bases. In short, no mines were completely assembled in this country, with the exception of a few for test purposes on board vessels of the mine force in March, 1918. It is therefore believed that the enemy, notwithstanding his many sympathizers in the United States and his secret service, had no inkling of the character of the mine until long after it was placed in use in the North Sea. It was comparatively unimportant to maintain secrecy after the mines were once in use, for it was probable that the enemy could not devise any means of effectively counteracting or protecting himself against the mine within, say, a year after he gained knowledge of it, by which time it was expected that the war would be over. In this connection it may be stated that a number of American mines went adrift in the North Sea, as is usual in such operations, and were cast up on the coast of Norway, where they were recovered, disassembled, and examined by Norwegian officials, but assurances were obtained that information regarding these mines would be regarded as confidential.

The firing mechanism has been referred to above as a unit of the assembled mine; but as a matter of fact it was subdivided into its component parts and manufactured by more than a score of different factories, none of which was permitted to know that it was manufacturing mine material. Only certain officials of the private plant that assembled the firing mechanism knew that it was intended for a mine.

The Mark VI mine was designed to be very safe in handling; and that this object was attained is well demonstrated by the fact that 85,000 of these mines were loaded and shipped abroad and that about 57,000 of them were planted in the barrage without accident. This result is the more extraordinary for the following reasons:

(*a*) The mines had to be manufactured by quantity production methods, and rigid inspection was quite impossible under the then existing conditions.

(*b*) The inspection force was inadequate in numbers, and it was composed largely of inexperienced officers and men—inexperienced not only in mine material, but in inspection work in general.

(*c*) The manufacturers were inexperienced in munitions work, and almost every one of the hundreds of plants engaged in the work was an unknown quantity as to reliability, quality of product, possibility of sabotage, etc. Due investigation and

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careful "sizing up" of the managing personnel of each plant concerned reassured the bureau in almost every case.

(*d*) The mine had to be loaded, shipped, assembled, inspected, and tested by personnel almost entirely without previous experience with mines and explosives.

During the period of purchasing supplies, in the task of which there was a multitude of details, Lieut. (Junior Grade) A. B. Peacock, Supply Corps, United States Naval Reserve Force, handled the purchasing matters connected with this vast amount of divers materials, a duty that required his working in close operation with the mine section of the bureau.

It was owing to these adverse conditions, together with the fact that the mine was to be handled by the planters as "fixed ammunition," that it was designed to be as nearly fool-proof as possible.

The design and manufacture of the various elements of the mine was a work involving an immense amount of detail, which it is unnecessary to dwell upon here; but a few points are of special interest in their bearing on the success of the project.

It has been mentioned above that the new mine was designed to be issued to mine layers as "fixed ammunition." This was a radical departure from conventional practice, and British mining officers attached to the bureau apparently never became reconciled to the bureau's view that practically all necessary tests and inspection could and should be made prior to the receipt of mines on board. The new idea was adopted primarily because of the obvious necessity for rapid planting, the number of planters being limited. After having become committed to this plan, it was fairly easy for the bureau to design, manufacture, and inspect accordingly. For example, the mine case was designed to be as simple and fool-proof as possible, and it was given 100 per cent inspection at the factories for watertightness; so there was no good reason for subjecting the case to another such test at the overseas bases or after its receipt on board ship.

Another point to which the bureau gave careful attention was to insure that, in the event of a premature or accidental explosion of a mine, it would necessarily occur only after a safe interval after launching. As for taking mines aboard ship with the detonators in place the bureau adopted this plan only after conclusive tests had shown that a detonator in the "safe" position could not explode the charge.

The well-known fuel shortage in the winter of 1917–18, the almost unprecedented severity of the weather, the freight embargoes on the railroads and congestion of traffic generally, and labor troubles, all operated to delay the production of mine material and other essential preparations for the project. The situation was very critical for some weeks, largely because these conditions affected several hundred plants engaged, and the failure of any one of them to produce its share would have resulted in possibly disastrous delay to the whole project. Some delay did, in fact, result, but as there was a nearly corresponding delay in the completion of vessels of the mine force and of the overseas bases the failure to meet the manufacturing schedule proved of no particular consequence. It is estimated that the above-mentioned adverse conditions resulted in delaying the beginning of quantity production of complete mines about six weeks.

During the period of railroad freight congestion an immense quantity of mine material was handled by express shipments, in some cases whole trainloads being handled on passenger schedules from Detroit to the seaboard. It is believed that every known expedient was utilized to maintain production and expedite shipment; armed guards and traffic agents accompanied shipments; motor trucks were used when other service was unavailable; freight embargoes were lifted after great effort in special cases; tracing of missing shipments was a constant work; and shortage of fuel was met and overcome in many ways.

There was only one real failure of an important contractor to deliver material on time, and this resulted in a slight delay in mining operations. It was an almost invariable rule of the bureau to divide the order for any one part of mining material between at least two contractors in order to guard against a possible failure on the part of a contractor and consequent shortage of essential material. In the one case in which this rule was deviated from, the article being a comparatively simple one and the contractor being apparently more than able to meet his obligations, the contractor failed to deliver the specified production; and it then became necessary to tool up three other plants and cancel the original contract.

The bureau planned for a production of 1,000 mines a day, and it was found soon after getting into production that this rate could easily be exceeded if desired. In fact, it became difficult to hold the production of anchors and mine cases down to this figure. In other words, the bureau could have produced mines at any rate desired, except possibly in the matter of mooring cable, the wire-rope manufacturers being heavily burdened with orders for wire for aircraft, shipping, coal mines, etc.

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CHAPTER VIII.—MINE LOADING PLANT, ST. JULIENS CREEK, VA.

An important item of preparation for the barrage project was the creation of a complete mine loading plant capable of receiving, loading, and shipping 1,000 mine cases a day, there being no plant in the United States at that time capable of handling any considerable number of mines.

The design of a plant that could handle the situation had to be made by the Bureau of Ordnance and the Bureau of Yards and Docks in consultation. Many proposals were sent out in order to obtain ideas upon automatic machinery, and finally a plan, modified somewhat after a scheme suggested by Boyle-Robertson Construction Co., was accepted and completed. The plant was built by the Boyle-Robertson Construction Co. of Washington, D. C. Commander Kirby Smith, Civil Engineer Corps, United States Navy, was responsible for pushing to completion, in the midst of many difficulties, both in design and construction, this mine-loading plant.

It was decided to locate this plant near the Navy Yard, Norfolk, Va., the point selected for the assembly and shipment overseas of all barrage material; and the only immediately available site being at the Naval Ammunition Depot, that point was chosen. Ground for the plant was broken on October 25, 1917; but bad weather set in early in November and continued with unprecedented severity until spring, so construction work was carried on under most adverse conditions. Aggravating the situation, there was a labor shortage. However, the plant was ready for work in March, 1918, or practically as soon as needed, there having been delays in all parts of the project due to extreme weather conditions, freight embargoes, fuel shortages, labor troubles, changes of barrage plan, etc.

This plant, with its accompanying barracks for the housing of its operatives, covers an area approximately 3,000 feet by 800 feet, including the wharf; and consists of 22 buildings, including a mine case storage building, 600 by 100 feet, capable of storing 6,000 empty cases; a melting plant, capable of melting and pouring T. N. T. for at least 7,000 mines a day; a cooling building, where the loaded mines were permitted to cool preparatory to shipment; a T. N. T. ready storage building, capacity 4,000,000 pounds; a heating plant; and a wharf.

The entire plant was excellently equipped with conveyors and labor-saving facilities; and all parts were planned and constructed to give the utmost efficiency consistent with safety. The rated daily capacity of 1,000 was exceeded by about 50 per cent on one occasion; and a total of more than 73,000 mines, involving the melting and handling of over 22,000,000 pounds of T. N. T., were loaded here without accident. In addition, 17,000 mines loaded by contract at the Du Pont Co.'s works at Barksdale, Wis., were received here and shipped abroad.

The loading plant cost approximately $400,000, and its operating cost was at the rate of about $412,000 per annum. About 400 enlisted men were required to man the plant; and, in addition, from 200 to 400 were employed in the shipment of mines; that is, in loading them into mine-carrying vessels.

A loading plant of this type and scale had hitherto been unknown, not only in this country, but abroad. Difficulties were encountered in the construction thereof, and prohpecies of accident, fotunately unfulfilled, were made by visiting foreign experts skilled in amatol plants. The Bureau of Ordnance, however, took every precaution to insure that the operation of this plant should be attended with the minimum amount of danger. The chief of the bureau took upon himself the limiting of the steam pressure to a maximum which he considered, from his experience with explosives, would result in satisfactory melting of T. N. T., and thus loading the mines, but reduced the danger of detonation in the process to the minimum possible. Exact knowledge upon this point is not yet to be had, as experience with this explosive has been too short to permit real conclusions. This decision was one that was very serious, as he had before him the fact that, in the melting of high explosives abroad, a detonation that destroyed an entire plant together with every person in the same had occurred and that the proposed automatic operation of loading mines was in a nature exactly similar to the work under way in that plant.

Petty officers and enlisted men of the Naval Reserve Force were secured for the operating personnel of this mine-loading plant. They accepted the risk, which they knew was a great one, together with the discomforts, such as working in an atmosphere of T. N. T. dust, working nights, and living in poor quarters in a very bad locality, so far as health is concerned, cheerfully, and with most successful results in the completion of the material for the northern barrage.

Commander W. L. Pryor, United States Navy, was in command of this mine-loading plant in addition to his duties in charge of the ammunition depot at St. Juliens Creek. Much work in connection with loading of mines upon the mine carrier after the T. N. T. had been cast into the mines devolved upon Commander Pryor. The

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success and general efficiency of the plant was brought about mainly through the untiring efforts and care of Commander Pryor in dealing with the reserve personnel, making them acquainted with the necessity for care and the reasons they were called upon to bear so many discomforts and undergo the risks.

In order to prevent delay in delivery, which might have been caused by delay in completion of this Navy plant, the bureau arranged with the du Pont Co. to load mines direct at its T. N. T. plant at Barksdale, Wis., and some 17,000 mines were loaded there during the months of February and March, 1918.

The Army had plainly informed the Navy that it required all the toluol in the country for use in the manufacture of its own explosives, and for this reason it was imperative if the mine barrage was to be completed to secure some other explosive for use in the mines. The explosive effects of amatol, a substitute for T. N. T. in general use abroad, had been frequently criticized for lack of effectiveness. Amatol also required more toluol than the Navy could obtain without asking the Army to reduce its requirements. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. proposed to the bureau the use of trinitroxylol, which could be produced by the nitration of xylol, a by-product of coal-tar distillations at that time not widely used. Further investigation by Lieut. Commander T. S. Wilkinson, United States Navy, in collaboration with chemists of E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., finally developed the fact that trinitroxylol was an explosive substance which would serve very acceptably as a diluent for T. N. T., and that the use of a mixture of these two substances in mines would be practically as satisfactory as the use of T. N. T. alone (the mixture adopted consisted of 60 per cent trinitroxylol and 40 per cent of T. N. T.), although the mixture was not quite as convenient to handle as T. N. T. Trinitroxylol was subsequently known as T. N. X., and the mixture of T. N. T. with T. N. X. for mine charges was called toxyl.

CHAPTER IX.—ASSEMBLY AND SHIPMENT OF MINE MATERIAL.

Since the Mark VI mines were not to be assembled short of Bases 17 and 18 in Scotland, and since all component parts had to be at all times available at those bases, it was essential that the flow of all material from the many points of manufacture to the overseas shipping point, Norfolk, and thence to the bases abroad should be maintained at the proper rate. Failure in this respect would result either in a shortage of material and consequent delay of the planting operations or in a congestion of an undue amount of material which could not be stored and properly cared for.

At the inception of the movement it was decided between the Bureaus of Ordnance and Supplies and Accounts that it would be necessary to commandeer one of the large export terminal piers in the vicinity of the navy yard, Norfolk, for the handling of mine shipments; and after a survey of the situation, Southern Railway Pier No. 4, at Pinners Point, Va., was taken over by the Navy. This pier, which is 875 by 270 feet and which can accommodate seven cargo vessels of the Lake type at a time, was ideal for the purpose. It, of course, is roofed over and has adequate rail facilities. The rental of the pier was $81,000 a year and the annual cost of operation was about $350,000.

When the project was planned it was contemplated shipping all mine material, including the loaded mine cases, from this pier, but the local authorities protested against the handling of explosives at this point because of the danger to Norfolk and Portsmouth, and it became necessary to load the explosive elements into the mine-carrying vessels at the mine-loading plant at St. Juliens Creek, about 2 miles above the navy yard. To this end, considerable dredging had to be done at the mine plant; fixed moorings were put down, and the dock facilities at the mine plant were enlarged and improved to accommodate the carriers. Provision was made for working 24 hours a day at the mine plant and at the pier when necessary. Only Navy personnel was employed. It would have been quite impossible to operate satisfactorily at either the pier or the mine plant with civilian labor, owing to the irregularity of working hours, the frequent necessity of night work in order to get vessels loaded in time to join the weekly convoys, and also the necessity of good discipline, safety, and secrecy.

Pier 4 was used for storage as well as for shipments. It had a capacity of about 40,000 mine anchors and other nonexplosive parts. A naval force of about 400 men was continually employed at the pier.

The receipt and shipment of mine material at the pier was under the cognizance of a supply officer detailed by the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts to that exclusive duty; but the Bureau of Ordnance also had its representative there to act as liaison officer between the bureau and the supply officer. To this liaison officer were communicated by telephone complete detailed instructions daily as to shipments, not only from the pier but also the mine loading plant, such instructions being confirmed to the supply officer in writing. There was never the slightest delay or confusion in

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the handling of the business, this because of the excellent cooperative spirit and zeal existing among all concerned in the project.

In the mine section of the Bureau of Ordnance, Lieut. Commander H. E. Fischer had, as his principal duty, the maintenance of the flow of material from its source to its final destination. By means of telephone and telegraph he was in constant touch with the material situation from the hundreds of factories to the bases overseas, and his records at all times showed the exact condition of affairs. In all this, he acted in close cooperation with the traffic and other offices of the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts as well as with the officers of the mine section. He also was in close cooperation with the Office of Naval Operations regarding the loading and sailing of the mine carriers.

Weekly inventory sheets and monthly reports showing receipts and expenditures of mines and parts at bases 17 and 18 were received, but were not of much value, as they were about one month old when received. Therefore, in order to anticipate shipments, it was necessary to resort to speculation to a very considerable degree. The results were, however, quite satisfactory.

In the inception of the project, the Navy Department, secured the allocation of a fleet of 24 cargo vessels of the "Lake" class for exclusive use as mine carriers. These vessels, a list of which is appended, were armed for defense against submarines, were given Naval Reserve crews, and were handled by the Naval Overseas Transportation Service (operations). They were rather small, averaging about 3,000 tons dead-weight capacity, but by reason of their light craft were well suited to the purpose, since larger and deeper vessels could not have been so readily loaded or discharged at the terminals selected; in fact, the harbor of one of the discharging points designated by the British authorities could not accommodate ships drawing more than 20 feet. The carriers were selected also with a view to carrying a comparatively small number of mines in each hull, so as to minimize the effect on the whole project in the event of a vessel being lost. Among other preparations, requiring navy-yard work, was the fitting of these vessels with additional crew accommodations; the provision for additional cargo coal for themselves, as they were originally short-radius ships; and provision of facilities for carrying 300 to 500 tons of fuel oil cargo for naval vessels overseas.

In general, a cargo was made up of 2,000 mines with anchors and fittings complete and of about 500 tons of such miscellaneous naval supplies as were safe to handle in conjunction with high explosives, the remaining 1,000 tons of cargo space being assigned to extra bunker coal and fuel oil, the latter carried in the double bottoms. The mines were shipped disassembled to economize space; but it would have been undesirable in any event to ship them otherwise, in view of the fact that the work of handling, testing, and inspection at the overseas bases was facilitated by shipping them disassembled.

Sailings of the carriers averaged about two ships every seven or eight days, half in Norfolk convoys and half in Halifax convoys. It took a ship in a Norfolk convoy about 20 days to make the trip across, and in a Halifax convoy 21 days. From 65 to 70 days were required for a round trip or complete cycle.

Of the 24 carriers, only one, the *Lake Moor*, was lost, sunk by an enemy submarine off the coast of Ireland on April 11, 1918, unfortunately with the loss of most of her crew, and of about 1,500 tons of mine material, mostly anchors.

Chapter X.—Overseas Mine Bases 17 and 18.

On account of the great demand for shipping, it was early realized that in order to conserve cargo space, and for other reasons, it would be necessary to ship the mines for the North Sea barrage disassembled. In this manner it would be possible for a vessel to carry approximately three times as many mines as she would have been able to do had she been loaded with assembled units. On the other hand, this procedure necessitated the erection of elaborate assembly establishments in Great Britain; but this consideration was of secondary importance when compared with the great necessity for economizing shipping. It may be mentioned in this connection that there were no mine assembly facilities in the United States, since all ammunition depots were congested with other work, and new assembly plants would have had to be created in any event, either at home or abroad.

It will be remembered that in the early stages of the consideration of the barrage, one of the proposals made was that Great Britain should furnish the men necessary to assemble the American mines. Accordingly, a board was appointed by the Admiralty on October 6, 1917, which has generally been referred to as the Lockhart-Leith Committee, to investigate and report on the various suitable localities for mine depots for this project. The report of the committee, dated October 26, discussed in detail the possible locations for such bases, reviewed the transportation facilities, and

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gave as their decision that the most suitable locations were the Dalmore distillery at Dalmore, Alness, and the Glen Albyn distillery, at Inverness. The report went into considerable detail, outlining exactly what buildings would be required as well as the new construction and machinery, and estimated the personnel requirements. This report and its recommendations were approved by the Admiralty; and the distilleries at Dalmore and Glen Albyn were at once commandeered for use as mine bases.

Under date of October 26, 1917, the Bureau of Ordnance cabled Admiral Sims informing him that the bureau was preparing to manufacture mines in sufficient quantity for the operation contemplated, and that it was expected that the shipment of these mines would commence soon after the 1st of January, 1918. This cablegram further stated that the bureau desired to send Commander O. G. Murfin as its representative, under the force commander, to be placed in command of the mine depot which was to be established at Cromarty; also that several officers from the bureau were being trained in the assembling and handling of mines and would be sent to assist him. This cablegram was followed by a letter from the Bureau of Ordnance dated October 31, 1917, in which the subjects referred to in the cablegram were commented on at length.

On November 1, 1917, the Chief of Naval Operations cabled Admiral Sims to the effect that the department concurred in the project of the mine barrier from Scotland to Norway and was taking steps to outfit eight mine planters to sail about February 1, and that they were also expediting the completion of 12 mine sweepers. This cablegram further stated that it was expected that the shipment of mines would begin about January 15, and that officers would be sent to confer and to arrange details within a few days.

The report of the Lockhart-Leith Committee was transmitted by the Admiralty to Admiral Sims, in London, who, in order to give the department early information relative to the selection and requirements of the two bases, sent the following cable on November 2:

"Admiralty committee has investigated bases for northern mine barrage and Admiralty's full report on suggested organization of bases for assembling American mines is being forwarded. Plan calls for United States base at Invergordon, handling 2,000 mines per week and at Inverness, handling 1,500. Combined personnel required from United States approximately 182 mechanics, 620 skilled laborers, 690 laborers, 40 clerks, and for dock work parties, 45 boatswains mates, 25 coxswains, 400 seamen and ordinary seamen. Most important that all these be enlisted men to insure military discipline and control and to avoid labor complications here. Commanding officers at depots should have rank of commander and each should have five or six other officers as assistants. Large distillery buildings will be taken over, but there will be small amount of new construction required. Shops must be fitted up. Scarcity machinery, cranes, etc., in this country, would make very welcome arrangement of United States could furnish some of these. At least one of officers sent for conference mentioned, Opnav 925, should have had experience in manufacture mines in United States navy yards as Naval Constructor Knox has had. Some of depot staffs should come at same time as officers who return after conference, so they will be in touch with work from beginning. Intended ship some mines by Lock Alsh and rail via Dingwall, but ships for Kyle must not exceed 280 feet length nor 20 feet draught. Other mines will come via Fort William and by barge through Caledonian Canal. British Rear Admiral will be senior officer in general charge joint operations, these and British bases in Firth of Forth. Admiralty desires verify immediately understanding that sinkers as well as mines will be furnished from United States. Furnish information concerning general character eight mine layers sailing 1 February and whether any other craft will be used for mine laying. Would also like to learn approximate number and kind of mine carriers. Will reply concerning Old Colony later. For localities mentioned see B. A. charts 115, 2182B, 2167, 2635, 2676, 3547."

In reply to the questions contained in the above cablegram relative to the United States supplying enlisted men for assembling the mines at the bases instead of employing British civilians, the Chief of Naval Operations cabled on November 8 that drafts of approximately 200 enlisted men per week would be sent over as soon as the bases were ready to receive them. Upon receipt of this information the Third Sea Lord wrote Admiral Sims as follows:

"The Admiralty are most grateful and the decision of the Navy Department relieves us of very great anxiety. * * *"

In accordance with the requests of the Admiralty and the desires of the Bureau of Ordnance that American officers who would be associated with the establishment of the bases and their operation should be sent to Great Britain as soon as possible, Commander O. G. Murfin, United States Navy, accompanied by Commander T. L.

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ohnson, United States Navy, sailed from the United States on November 13, 1917. The Chief of Naval Operations cabled Admiral Sims on November 18:

"Commander O. G. Murfin under orders to proceed to England. Is authorized to peak for Bureau of Ordnance, discussing all details depot arrangements, machine-hop equipment, unloading and transportation arrangements with British Admiralty epresentatives, and make decisions in these matters. Commander Thomas Lee ohnson accompanies to assist Commander Murfin in plans and returns here with letailed information."

Commander Murfin and Commander Johnson arrived in London on November 23, 917, and reported to the commander United States naval forces operating in European vaters. The force commander issued orders to Commander Murfin assigning him to luty in charge of all matters relating to the establishment of United States naval mine lepots in Great Britain and to duty in charge of such depots upon their establishment; ie was further ordered to make his headquarters in London during the preliminary iegotiations in connection with the bases.

On November 26, 1917, Commander Murfin and Commander Johnson left London o inspect the sites selected for the United States mine bases. They were accom-nanied by Capt. Lockhart-Leith, Royal Navy, Engineer Capt. Gaisford, Royal Navy, Mr. Heap from the Admiralty's Controller's Office, and Surg. Thompson, United States Navy, from the United States naval headquarters. The party arrived in Inverness on November 27, spent four days inspecting the base sites at Invergordon and Inverness, and the two shipping points at Kyle of Loch Alsh and Corpach, and hen returned to London. Commander Johnson left England on December 6, 1917, or the United States.

At the time of this inspection whisky was being removed from the distillery build-ngs preparatory to proceeding with the work of establishing the bases. At Dalmore ground had been broken for a branch railroad line to connect the distillery with the Highland Railway. Other work was being held up, pending decisions to be made by Commander Murfin. These decisions having been given, plans for expediting he work of establishing and outfitting the bases were proceeded with.

Much of the material for these bases could not be procured in Great Britain, because of the drain upon that country's supplies made by the war, and at the bureau the nine section secured the assistance of Capt. (then Commander) G. C. Schafer, Supply Corps, United States Navy, in connection with providing cranes and equipment of all kinds, assembly of material, and assuring delivery to the mine bases abroad, remaining in Washington until, deliveries being assured, he proceeded overseas in March, 1918, and resumed this work at the mine bases as a member of the staff of Rear Admiral Joseph Strauss, United States Navy, the commander of the operation of laying the barrage.

The Navy Department designated the base at Inverness as base 18, and the one at Invergordon as base 17.

The work of preparing and outfitting the mine bases was done by contract through he Admiralty. The construction work was done under the immediate supervision of the superintending civil engineer. Invergordon Dockyard; and the tools and equip-nent were supplied through the controller's department of the Admiralty. Rear Admiral Clinton-Baker, Royal Navy, was the admiralty's representative in general charge of the work, and desired alterations or additions to buildings or equipment were ordered on his approval. The construction was somewhat delayed due to inclem-ent weather conditions and to lack of suitable labor; but in spite of these handicaps good progress was made from the beginning. Commander Murfin kept in direct touch with the work by correspondence, by frequent visits to Rear Admiral Clinton-Baker's office at the Admiralty, and by frequent visits to the bases themselves.

The first draft of men arrived in Liverpool on the steamship *Philadelphia* on Novem-ber 27, 1917. Lieut. Commander Edwin A. Wolleson, United States Navy, who arrived on the same vessel, was put in charge of the 37 rated men in this draft, and sent with them to the British mine depot at Portsmouth for instruction at the mining school at that place. The remainder of the men in the draft were sent to Queenstown for distribution to the destroyer flotilla, owing to the fact that the bases were not yet ready to receive them.

On December 3 the second draft arrived at Liverpool on the steamship *New York*. Twenty rated men from this draft were sent to Portsmouth to join the detachment there, and the nonrated men were sent to Queenstown, to be held until accommoda-tions could be provided at the mine bases. Lieut. Commander L. M. Stewart arrived in London and reported at headquarters on December 4, 1917, and was sent to Ports-mouth to assist with the instruction of the men already there.

Lieut. Thomas Newhall, United States Naval Reserve Force, reported at head-quarters in London on December 10, and was assigned to duty as assistant to Com-

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mander Murfin. On December 26 Lieut. Newhall was sent to the bases as Commander Murfin's representative for keeping in touch with the construction work.

On January 7, 1918, Lieut. Commander Stewart with 23 men was sent to base 18 and Lieut. Commander Wolleson with 22 men was sent to base 17. These parties arrived at their destination on January 8. These small forces were assigned to the bases to assist in the arrangements for housing the personnel at the bases and to form the nucleus upon which the organization could be started. As the men's living quarters at the two bases were in an unfinished state, the men at base 18 were quartered in the old Muirtown Hotel, which was one of the buildings taken over for base purposes and which was later made into the sick quarters. The men at base 17 were quartered in the residence of the manager of the distillery, which was one of the buildings taken over in the grounds and was subsequently converted into the sick quarters at that place.

Commander Murfin left London January 25, 1918, and arrived at Inverness on January 26, taking direct charge of the work at the bases and establishing his headquarters at base 18 and in the house which had formerly been the home of the manager of the Glen Albyn Distillery.

The United States national ensign was officially hoisted over the office at base 18 on February 9, 1918, and at base 17 on February 12. The raising of the flags at the two bases were made functions at which British civil and military officials, as well as the officers and men attached to the bases, were present and took part.

At the outset the question of transportation appeared to be the greatest problem that would be encountered. The estimated weekly output of mines required for the mine layers was 3,500. The railroad from Kyle to base 17 could only handle about 2,000 mines per week and the Caledonian Canal, running from Corpach to base 18, could transport approximately 1,500 mines per week. This made it necessary to use two bases instead of one large base, for Inverness Harbor could not accommodate the full mine-laying force, nor could the mines going through the Caledonian Canal readily be shipped to Invergordon. Although the bases were separated by a distance of 33 miles by rail and 25 miles by water, no difficulty was encountered in unifying the efforts of the two establishments and coordinating and directing the divided mine squadron anchored in the two harbors.

At Corpach mine carriers anchored in the stream opposite the entrance to the Caledonian Canal. Their cargoes were discharged into power lighters and dispatched to base 18. The work of discharging the cargoes of the carriers into the lighters was done by a detachment of 65 men from base 18 permanently stationed at Corpach. The lighters, owned by the British, were manned by British ratings and their movements were directed by the British senior naval officer at Inverness. After the lighters arrived at the canal quay at base 18 they were discharged by the United States forces at that base.

Vessels arriving at Kyle were taken alongside a small pier and their cargoes discharged directly into railroad cars, thence taken to base 17 via Dingwall. The work of discharging the cargo into the railroad cars and shunting them across to the main line from the pier was done entirely by the 65 men from base 17 who formed the detachment at Kyle. After being placed on the main line, the cars were delivered on the siding at base 17, from where they were again handled by the United States personnel.

The first stores forwarded from the United States were sent via Liverpool, and were received at the bases January 20, 1918: The first mine carrier, U. S. S. *Ozama*, arrived at Kyle of Loch Alsh on February 18, with stores and equipment but no mining material. The second carrier arrived at Kyle on March 21, with general stores and equipment; the third was also routed to Kyle, arriving there April 3, with mine anchors and other mining material. The first mine carrier routed to Corpach arrived April 5, 1918, with mine anchors and other mining material. The first carriers containing mine spheres were the U. S. S. *Ozama*, which arrived at Corpach on May 21, and the U. S. S. *Lake Superior*, which arrived at Kyle on the 29th.

Officers and men reported for duty at the two mine bases from time to time until, on March 30, 1918, there were 18 officers and 414 enlisted men on duty at base 17, and 23 officers and 359 men on duty at base 18.

On March 1, 1918, both bases had reached such a state of completion that mines could have been received and assembly work could have commenced, although operations at this time would have been somewhat handicapped by the fact that a considerable part of the work at the bases was still in an unfinished condition.

By April 1, 1918, the main construction work was practically completed and the bases ready in every respect for the purpose for which they were established. Actual assembly work did not begin until May 29, 1918, the date upon which the first mines were received.

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In general, the following work was done at Dalmore in establishing base 17: The Dalmore distillery was commandeered and taken over; some of the existing distillery buildings were refitted and made into barracks for the enlisted personnel, and others were refitted as storehouses for general stores and mine equipment; buildings were erected for work shops for mine assembly, for storage of mines and mine material, both in assembled units and in component parts; railroad tracks were laid in the base from the main line of the Highland Railway and from the base to the pier at the dockyard, Invergordon; wagon roads were built connecting various buildings within the base; fire mains were laid, water systems provided; wash rooms, bathrooms and other sanitary devices were installed; and commissary and messing facilities provided. An electric light and power plant was built, and other necessary equipment and adjuncts to a base of this nature were provided.

At base 18 the same provisions were made as at base 17, with the exception of the light and power plant—the lighting and power at base 18 being received from the city plant.

At Kyle four huts were erected as barracks, mess hall, galley, and storage spaces for the men of the detachment at that place.

At Corpach a large private residence was taken over and converted for use as barracks, mess hall, galley, and storehouse for that detachment.

After unloading the mine parts from the railroad cars at base 17 or the lighters at base 18, the various parts were sorted and placed in bulk store. These stores were, in general, adjacent to the assembly sheds, so that miscellaneous parts could be readily supplied as required.

The work of assembling the mines was a highly organized process developed in accordance with the present standards of manufacturing efficiency, wherein each man performs one specific task over and over again as the mines are moved along in front of him for the various stages of assembly.

As soon as the commanding officer of the bases was informed of the quantities and types of mines which would be required at each base for the mine layers, the work of assembly began. The various component parts for the mines began to pour into the assembly sheds from the bulk storage rooms. The two principal parts constituting the mine were the anchor and the mine sphere. As the anchors arrived they were placed upon assembly tracks extending across each bay. Along these tracks were stationed groups of men, each group making some special adjustment, testing the brake tension, release mechanism, etc., as the anchor was rolled along the track. By the time the anchor reached the end of the track the mine case, which had at the same time undergone preparation and testing while moving along a traveling table, was completed, and the two parts were ready to be married to each other. This done, a few final adjustments were made, and the mine was ready to be placed on board a mine layer. From here the completed mines were either rolled into ready-issue sheds directly opposite the assembly bays or else were loaded directly into railroad cars to be sent to the ships.

From the railroad cars the assembled mines were carried back to the canal siding at base 18 or to the dockyard at base 17, where they were loaded into barges. The barges carried from 50 to 60 assembled mines and were towed out to the ships and placed alongside while the ship's crew whipped the mines aboard and stowed them on the tracks ready for planting.

The original estimates prepared by the British as to the rate of transportation from Kyle to base 17 and from Corpach to base 18 were far below that actually accomplished. The rate of assembly and the possible rate of planting mines also much exceeded the original expectations. Therefore, the rate originally fixed for shipping 3,500 mines per week from the United States was increased to 6,000 per week. In spite of the greatly increased amount of work in assembly which developed on account of defects discovered in the actual mining, the rate of assembly at the two bases was increased from the original estimate of 500 mines per day to as high as 1,340 mines per day. Similarly, the time required for the mine layers to refuel, take on water, embark mines and necessary supplies had been so systemmatized that only two days in port were necessary before they were ready for the next excursion. This made it possible to carry out excursions every four or five days, depending upon the distance it was necessary for the vessels to proceed in order to lay their mines. As will be seen, delays almost heartbreaking occurred which kept the squadron in port from two to three weeks between excursions. While none of these delays could be foreseen, the mines from the United States continued to arrive until the storage facilities were most severely taxed. The original plan of the bases called for a total storage of 12,000 mines at both places. At one time as many as 20,500 had accumulated. Wise foresight, however, on the part of the commanding officer of the bases had made it possible to stow them all under cover, protected from the incessant rain of northern Scotland.

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The headquarters of Rear Admiral Joseph Strauss, commander mine force, and of Capt. Murfin were at base 18. The two mine bases were so organized that there were two executive officers, representatives of the commanding officer, in complete charge of all administrative and industrial activities at their respective bases. Each base was organized with military, industrial, supply, medical, and transportation departments.

The industrial officer was responsible for the assembly of mines, which work was organized along lines similar to those obtaining in automobile plants in the United States. The various component parts of the mines were received and stored and inspected preliminary to assembly separately. In the assembly process, the two major parts, the mine case and the anchor, moved along on small trucks on rails, the various minor parts being assembled progressively, to a point where the mine and anchor were "married" together, and thence placed in the "ready-for-issue" sheds or loaded into cars for delivery to the mine layers. This system, under which separate groups of men, highly specialized, performed the same function for each mine or mine anchor, proved most efficient and produced results never before attained in the rapid handling of mines.

Admiral Mayo, Commander in Chief Atlantic Fleet, inspected the bases September 25–27 and October 5–7, 1918, and reported most favorably on their condition. Quoting from his report: "The personnel throughout, both commissioned and enlisted, appeared to be satisfactory as to number and selection; their military appearance, bearing, and uniform made a favorable impression. The men are granted liberty freely and their relations with the natives of the towns and surrounding country appeared to be excellent." Quoting further: "Owing to the relatively late start of the operations, it has been necessary for the entire force, ashore and afloat, to work at high pressure in order to complete the original and later plans before bad weather sets in. The response of the personnel has been excellent and is considered indicative of a highly satisfactory state of morale."

Admiral Mayo concluded his report with the remarks:

(*a*) "The arrangements in force are remarkable for their conformity to the plans prepared at home before the mine force crossed the Atlantic."

(*b*) "The inspection of the mine force and bases and of the activities in connection with the work incident to mine laying in the North Sea, revealed a highly satisfactory condition and reflect great credit on the commander mine force and on his assistants."

CHAPTER XI.—ORGANIZATION OF MINE SQUADRON AND SELECTION OF NEW MINE PLANTERS.

Prior to the decision to proceed with the northern barrage project, the mine force of the United States Navy included only two mine layers fit for the project, the *San Francisco* and *Baltimore*. This force possessed very small mine-laying capacity, and it became necessary, as one of the first steps in preparation for the project, to greatly enlarge the force by taking over a sufficient number of merchant ships and converting them into mine layers; to obtain and train the officers and crews for these vessels, and to secure the requisite merchant tonnage for transporting the mines and other material to Europe.

On the basis of an estimated output of 5,000 mines a week and of one mine-planting operation a week, the department concluded that the mine force should have a capacity of at least 5,000 mines ready to plant, which, if all went well, would insure the planting of the northern barrage in three months.

The *San Francisco* and *Baltimore* had a combined capacity of only 350 mines. It was necessary, therefore, to create practically a complete new mine squadron to secure the requisite capacity. Vessels were desired of ample size, yet handy in tactical formation; serviceable condition as to engines, boilers, pumps, etc.; good cargo-handling equipment adaptable for handling mines; internal arrangement suitable for installation of mine tracks on two or three decks; speed of 14 to 20 knots, and generally seaworthy. From data on file in the Navy Department it was found that four vessels of the Morgan Line, running between New York, New Orleans, and Galveston, were generally satisfactory for the purpose. They had been built by the Newport News Shipbuilding Co. to replace vessels of the *Prairie* class, purchased by the United States Navy in the Spanish-American War, and were in good condition. They were 391 feet long, 48 feet beam, and 20 feet draft when loaded as mine planters. They were capable of a sustained sea speed of 14.5 knots and had ample bunker capacity. Their capacity was estimated at 800 to 850 mines each.

The Secretary of the Navy personally informed Mr. Hurley, president of the Shipping Board, about the projected barrage operation; and the department's request for the four Morgan liners was promptly granted, notwithstanding the prevailing dearth

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of shipping and despite the fast-mounting demands for tonnage. The vessels were delivered to the Navy as soon as they had discharged the cargoes then on board or loading. The first taken over, the steamship *El Dia*, renamed *Roanoke*, was delivered November 16, 1917, at Tietjan and Lang's shipyard, Hoboken, N. J., where the work of conversion into a mine planter was promptly undertaken. *El Rio*, renamed *Housatonic*, followed at the same yard November 25; and *El Siglo* and *El Cid*, becoming the *Canandaigua* and *Cononicus*, respectively, arrived at the Morse shipyard, South Brooklyn, November 22 and 24.

Some high-speed vessels were desired for the mine force, but there were few such vessels under the American flag. On the Atlantic coast there were only three of suitable size and build, one of which, the *Old Colony*, had been promised to the British Navy; The others were the *Massachusetts* and *Bunker Hill*. These last two were taken over by the Navy, were renamed the *Shawmut* and *Aroostook*, and were delivered at the navy yard, Boston, November 6 and 10, for conversion. These vessels could each carry about 300 mines on one deck. They had a speed of 20 knots but a very short steaming radius, about 2,300 miles at economical speed.

Two more vessels, the *Jefferson and Hamilton*, of the Old Dominion Line, plying between New York and Norfolk, were requisitioned by the Navy and taken over December 2 and 6, 1917. They were renamed the *Quinnebaug* and *Saranac*, respectively, and the work of conversion was undertaken at Robbins repair yard, Erie Basin, and James Shewan & Sons' repair yard, both in South Brooklyn. Their speed was about 16.5 to 17 knots and their capacity 600 mines each, carried on two decks.

Thus, a total of eight vessels were acquired for conversion into planters, which, with the *San Francisco* and *Baltimore*, formed a squadron of 10, with a total capacity of about 5,500 mines.

The conversion of the Morgan mine layers (*Roanoke, Housatonic, Canonicus and Canandaigua*) was an undertaking of extensive detail. It involved enlarging the forward or lop deck; making a reserve bunker in the hold forward of the boiler room, to replace the existing upper bunkers, which were cleared off the third deck; making a separate compartment in the hold for the elevator pumps, and rearranging smaller compartments for the dynamo room and machine shops; closing the cargo ports and providing chutes for coaling over all with mines on board; cutting stern ports for launching the mines through, and raising the rudder quadrant to give the needed clearance; repairing (largely renewing) and resheathing the second and third decks; enlarging the officers' quarters to accommodate the more numerous naval complement; providing commissary, messing, and berthing arrangements for a crew of about 400, including bakery, scullery, and a naval galley—no easy matter with the large amount of interior space to be reserved for the mines; building storerooms magazines, water tanks for storage and distribution, washrooms, and closets, installing a fire system and magazine sprinklers; replacing the anchor engine and windlass with one of more power to handle larger chain and heavier anchors, stowing on billboards; on deck, building gun platforms forward and aft, lookout stations, and navigating and signal bridges, together with speaking tubes and accessory apparatus for fire control and other communications; making and altering hatchways for crews' use and for mine handling; altering boat stowage and davits for heavier boats; and installing davits and booms for embarking mines. Watertight subdivision far below the ordinary naval standard had to be accepted, on account of the limited time available; but some improvement was effected by making existing bulkheads stronger and, with their openings, watertight where possible, and by building two new bulkheads one forward and one aft, to divide the largest compartments, so that the ships would have a chance of keeping afloat, if only one compartment were flooded.

On the main machinery, the work to be done was chiefly overhaul and repair but to the auxiliary machinery much had to be added. The electric plant was more than doubled. An evaporator and distiller for fresh water, special hydraulic pump installation for the mine elevators, refrigerating machinery, a larger radio-telegraphy plant, a considerable number of additional winches for embarking and handling the mines, a steam heating systen, and a machine shop were all new.

The provision of adequate ventilation was a problem. In these cargo ships it was entirely lacking where the crew were to be. In the region where the ships were to operate, keeping the large hatches constantly open for airing out below decks could not be counted upon. In the crowded condition that would obtain when the ships were at sea with mines on board, considerable supply of fresh air and exhaust for the foul was very important to ordinary comfort, as well as for the prevention of possible spread of respiratory infection. The principal difficulty encountered was to obtain ventilating blowers in number and capacity to meet the minimum requirements. In this respect the conversion of these ships was least satisfactory.

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The two Old Dominion liners (*Saranac* and *Quinnebaug*) required somewhat different treatment in conversion. Their state of preservation was comparatively poor, and their original construction, in general and in details, much inferior to that of the other ships taken. A considerable part of the light upper passenger decks had to be removed, the parts retained strengthened by extra side plating and interior stiffening. Their general arrangement as mine planters, however, differed from that of the Morgan Liners only in detail and in their carrying mines on two decks only, instead of three, with correspondingly fewer elevators. The extra space above the main deck made better provision possible for officers and chief petty officers, with consequently more room for the men below, and gave better ventilation generally; but the additional height above water was otherwise of no advantage. The single, low mast, which was all they had at first, was afterwards lengthened by a topmast, to give the necessary hoist for signals and radio.

In common with all other ship alterations in hand at the time, the original plans had to be based on what could be done within a reasonable time with material and labor scarce. There was no available data for mining installations on the scale we had undertaken. Some British mining memoranda were received, and later a few blue prints from some of their plans. Also, Lieut. De Salis, R. N., placed all his experience at our disposal. But as other nations had not made a success of mine elevators or gone in for mine carrying capacity to the same extent we had, little of their data proved applicable. The experience of the *San Francisco* and *Baltimore* during the past two years, however, was invaluable, enabling the decision of many questions of detail, both before and during the conversion, to be made with confidence that subsequent results confirmed as well founded.

The plan finally arrived at for the mining installation of the new ships consisted of two tracks for mines on each side of the second or launching decks, extending about three-fourths the length of that deck. On the deck below there were likewise four long tracks; and inboard, aft, four or more short stowage tracks. In addition to these, the four large minelayers—*Roanoke*, *Housatonic*, *Canonicus*, and *Canandaigua*—each had stowage tracks on the enlarged forward or lop deck. Cross tracks and turntables connected all tracks at points sufficiently distributed to insure against a breakdown at any point cutting of the mines beyond. Mines were transferred from the lower stowage decks to the launching deck by elevators. This was a unique and typically American feature of these vessels. Elevators had been abandoned by other nations as impracticable. After considering various possible methods of transferring mines from the lower decks to the upper decks so as to permit the whole cargo of mines to be launched in one continuous string, the elevators were chosen in preference to launching from two decks, or to installing inclined planes, conveyor machinery, or ordinary whips and trolleys. Rather than attempt to design a new elevator, the representatives of the Otis Elevator Co. were called in at the outset and informed of the requirements. These representatives stated that they would meet the necessary requirements, which was more than borne out in the actual installation. The elevators were of two types—electrical and hydraulic—with automatic stop and levelling devices, capable of carrying two mines and designed to make a round trip in one minute, including the time of loading and unloading the car. This rate was eventually doubled in use.

On the four large layers there was only room for one launching port on each side of the deck. It was therefore necessary to install a switch so that the mines on the two tracks on each side could be planted from their respective ports without using a turntable. This was also a novel feature which had been abandoned more or less as impracticable by the British, but which gave most excellent service as installed. On the other four new mines planters there was sufficient room aft to cut four launching ports—one for each track—thus eliminating the necessity of switches. The *San Francisco* and *Baltimore* had but one port each, and, due to the limited space, it was impossible to install another. All ports were closed by a substantial watertight door, the section of track in its wake being hinged back when the door was closed.

In the process of planting, the mines on the lower decks were brought forward to the elevators; hoisted to the launching deck; then hauled aft to the launching trap after those originally stowed on the launching deck had been planted. To haul the mines along the tracks, they were made up in "fleets" of 20 to 40 mines, and moved by means of a wire rope rove around a "bogie" attached to the end of the last mine anchor and thence led to a winch. To keep the mines moving at the necessary speed on all sections of the track required an installation of as many as 13 winches on the largest mine planters. As the mines arrived near the launching trap, the "bogies" were disconnected and the mines were run aft into the trap by hand. The trap consisted of a simple lever device, designed to release one mine at a time, allowing it to roll

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overboard along the slanting section of the track extending through the launching port.

The mines were embarked from the upper decks, using the regular cargo booms or davits specially placed for the purpose. Small hatches were cut for embarking the mines so they could be struck down one, two, or three decks, and landed on tracks from which they could be run to their stowage positions. By this method it was possible to embark mines simultaneously at four points with such speed as to load even the largest layers in less than five hours.

Shortly after the ships had been taken over and sent to the various shipbuilding yards for conversion, the commanding officers and executive officers were ordered to their ships to hasten the work by keeping in constant touch with the various items on which least progress was being made. About Christmas the *San Francisco* and the *Baltimore* were sent to the navy yard at New York for their final outfitting before sailing for Europe.

The *Shawmut* and *Aroostook* having been constructed mainly for navigation between Boston and New York by the inside route, there was doubt of their structural strength for the open seas. Thorough examination showed that their steel hulls, though of shallow depth, were well built, requiring no underwater strengthening, and that by doubling the main deck stringers and sheer strakes, running a light plate deck and stiffening the structure above the main deck, in order to secure longitudinal stiffness, they could be made thoroughly seaworthy. These ships, of 4,500 tons displacement, 375 feet long, 52 feet beam, 18 feet extreme draught, were twin screw, oil-burning, of 20 knots speed with possibilities under naval management and good fuel of making 21 or more. They could readily be given a fuel capacity of 4,000 miles at 10 knots and 1,000 miles at 20 knots. Through unremitting efforts, in view of the tactical value of these ships as a fast wing in general mining operations or for "repairing fences" after such operations, they were taken over November 6 and 10, purchased outright, and their alteration begun. The objection to the inclusion of these ships in the force was directed against their seagoing qualities and the extent of the work required to convert them. This conversion meant stripping them down to the main deck and rebuilding upward from that point, for, as passenger ships, their entire upper structure was of wood.

The *Shawmut* and *Aroostook* were placed in commission at Boston Navy Yard, December 7, 1917, and the assembling and organizing of their crews proceeded concurrently with their conversion. Upon removal of the superstructures, the crews were scattered to available spaces in yard shops, and subsisted temporarily on various ships. This continued during a most severe winter with the thermometer many degrees below zero while the work was in progress. The men were finally transferred to temporary quarters on a hospital barge moored nearby. The ship's officers were established in a part of the removed superstructure landed on the dock alongside. This included the pilot houses, in which the officer of the deck was located. The captains organized their crews in industrial gangs for structural work, as well as for their duties in the ships. These gangs were made up chiefly of members of the crews who had had previous experience in the industrial trades of riveters, caulkers, shipfitters, carpenters, and were placed in charge of officers who had a knowledge of structural steel working. They conformed strictly to yard hours, including overtime—a normal condition—except that for their overtime hours, the enlisted men received no additional pay.

Both ships were completed the same day, June 10, 1918, and in all respects so thoroughly that only six days later they sailed for Scotland.

CHAPTER XII.—TRAINING THE PERSONNEL AND COMMISSIONING THE SHIPS OF MINE SQUADRON ONE.

The sudden expansion of the mine force from 2 mine layers to 10 entailed a proportionate expansion of mining personnel, which offered considerable difficulty. In comparison with the projected Northern Barrage operation, the United States Navy had had very little experience in mining, and this experience was confined to a very few officers and men. It was partly for this reason that the Bureau of Ordnance designed the Mark VI mine in such a manner that it could be handled on board ship practically as "fixed ammunition", so that a minimum of experience and training of the ships' crews would be necessary to its successful use.

The officers and crews of the *San Francisco* and *Baltimore*, together with selected officers and men who had had previous experience in our small mine force, afforded a nucleus around which to build up, and with which to train, the new force, and this last most important work was promptly taken up.

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In October, 1917, when the Northern Barrage plan assumed definite form, the *Dubuque*, which had belonged to the force but which was too small to be of much use in extensive mining operations, was in use as a training ship at Annapolis; and the tugs were temporarily attached to the train, Atlantic Fleet, leaving only the *San Francisco* and *Baltimore* for work in connection with preparations for the barrage operation.

On the request of the Bureau of Ordnance, the *Baltimore* was detailed to carry out certain practical experiments involved in the evolution of design of the Mark VI mine. Thus the *San Francisco* was the only vessel wholly available for the training of men for the crews of the new mine planters.

One of the first measures taken to train the new personnel was the establishment by the Bureau of Navigation of a mine force training camp at Cloyne Field Barracks, Newport, R. I., a part of the cantonments provided for the second district Naval Reserves. Accommodations were provided here for 1,050 men, who were subsisted and carried for pay locally but were under the commander of the mine force in other respects. This camp was established on November 11.

The officers who were detailed to conduct the training at this camp had had duty in mine ships. The men for each of the new ships were grouped under officers of their respective ships. As the ships went into commission their crews were withdrawn from the training camp. Capt. Belknap, in his History of Mine Squadron One, gives the following account of the training of the crews and the commissioning of the new ships:

The training was general, including seamanship, mines, gunnery, signals, infantry, and boats. For five weeks the *San Francisco* and *Baltimore* were present, giving practical instruction and experience in mine handling. A part of their regular crews were transferred to the barracks and replaced by new men. These would be on board for a week or 10 days; then another lot would come. There was not time to cover all men in this fashion, but it was expected the information picked up would spread. During the summer of 1917 a detail of 150 reserves, later increased to 400, had been sent from Newport to New London, Conn., to work with the mine force on antisubmarine net making and planting. The work being completed, a considerable number of the first 150 were obtained for the new mine ships. Along with the net making they had been given a regular and systematic training by the *Dubuque's* officers, which was now to prove of direct benefit in the mine force. During this training-camp period at Newport the weather was at times biting cold, but the results were well worth while. The *Sonoma* and *Ontario* helped at this time in practical seamanship, signals, and quartermaster training until withdrawn to assist the Shipping Board to get vessels out of the St. Lawrence River ice. The *Patapsco* and *Patuxent* carried on the same work after completing repairs, about February 1 and March 1, 1918.

For radio instruction a class was established in mid-November on board the *San Francisco*, consisting of likely material from the training camp. When the *San Francisco* went to Shewan's yard, December 18, 1918, her radio force was largely augmented by the best men from this class, and instruction was continued during her overhaul. This included visits to shops and to the radio laboratory at the navy yard, Brooklyn. The remainder of the original class continued instruction under one of their own number at the training barracks. When the *San Francisco* was about to leave Shewan's yard early in March her excess radio men were distributed among ships fitting out in New York, to assist with the installation of their equipment and become familiar with it. Later, when the squadron assembled, training in British procedure was taken up, enabling the squadron radio force to adopt it within a day after arriving in Scotland.

For instruction in signals, especially British, flags, and procedure, a class was formed at Newport January 29, to which signal quartermasters and signalmen from all ships were sent for about a month's training. To these 50 more were added from the signal class at the Newport training station. All were divided into groups by ships and given an intensive course in all kinds of signaling and quartermaster duty. Capt. E. H. Campbell, commanding the Newport training station, placed all desired facilities at the disposal of the force, and for practice afloat first the *Patapsco* and then the *Patuxent* also were available. The value of this preliminary instruction was later demonstrated by the excellence of the signaling during the mining operations. Great credit is due to the leading chief quartermaster, William H. Kerens, of the *San Francisco*, and the other chiefs for the quick and accurate communication by signals which they made possible.

The importance of a well organized and trained lookout service was early given attention, resulting in an excellent arrangement of stations, communications, and procedure.

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For various reasons the full number of 1,050, for which training-camp accommodation had been provided, was at no one time complete, but the training was supplemented elsewhere, so that few if any wholly untrained men were received by any ship. As soon as she was ready for them, three gun crews trained in the battleship force were drafted to each ship. Similarly the engineer department personnel were assembled at Philadelphia and kept under training until wanted. The quotas of experienced petty officers, artificers, and lower ratings began to be assembled on board the receiving ship at New York in January, but the constant demands from other quarters interfered much here. Permanent association of men with ships on a satisfactory basis hardly began much before the ships went into commission.

For the officers similar measures were taken to put them in touch with the methods and the results of experience in the mine force. A conference of all new commanding officers and executives with Capt. Belknap and Commander Butler was held on board the *San Francisco* in Newport on December 3, at which the operation in hand was described, along with the doctrine and other matters peculiar to the force and to the particular service of the ships. The mine force training instructions were reprinted and issued. Matters pertaining to training and organization were taken up at the subsequent conferences held at New York and Boston, through the winter, and although the ships were as yet neither assigned to the mine force now in commission, the acting commander mine force, Capt. Butler, sent them for guidance copies of all letters and instructions likely to be of useful information. In addition, the mining officers were given practical instruction on board the *San Francisco* and *Baltimore* in late November, and during the mine experiments conducted by the *San Francisco* in the spring in Chesapeake Bay, at Newport and off Cape Ann.

The association of the new ships' officers at New York with one another and with those of the *San Francisco* and *Baltimore* during January and February made for good progress in working out the organization and future procedure on board the new ships during mine planting. Study of the blue-print plans made the officers fairly familiar with the ships' installations, so that by the time they moved aboard and began actual drills and try out, much of the preliminary work had already been done. To facilitate the early establishment of routine on a regular basis so that time might sooner become available for specially training, the *North Dakota's* routine book was revised so as to be suitable for the new mine planters, its adoption in whole or part, however, being optional with each commanding officer.

The first ships to be commissioned were the *Shawmut*, Capt. W. T. Cluverius, and *Aroostook*, Commander J. H. Tomb, at Boston December 7, 1917. Their crews had been built up and organized comparatively early, their own labor considerably hastening the completion of the ships, as told elsewhere. The popularity of their prospective service was a great stimulus. Many applicants of all ratings from ships visiting the Boston yard, keen to go across on the mine-planting expedition, volunteered to the captains of these two ships.

Next to commission were the *Roanoke*, Capt. C. D. Stearns, and *Housatonic*, Commander J. W. Greenslade, on the 25th of January, 1918. Conditions in the neighborhood of their shipyard and on board the ships made an earlier date impossible without retarding their conversion. Living conditions were extremely rough amid the dirt and disorder, made worse by the slush and mud in the unpaved shipyards; but the presence of officers and men on board exerted constant forward pressure on the work, while they at the same time were becoming acquainted with the details of their ships. At the Morse yard conditions were not favorable for commissioning until March 2. The decision of the appropriate time for commissioning was left to the respective commanding officers, who, watching the work's progress from day to day, were in the best position to choose. The *Canandaigua*, Commander W. H. Reynolds, and *Canonicus*, Commander T. L. Johnson, commissioned March 2; the *Quinnebaug*, Commander D. P. Mannix, not until March 23, but most of her crew had been assembled, organized, and accustomed to the ship from a much earlier date. Last to commission was the *Saranac*, Commander Sinclair Gannon, April 9, 1918.

Chapter XIII.—Completion and Sailing of Mine Squadron.

The date of departure of the mine squadron had been fixed tentatively at February 1, 1918, partly because it was believed originally that this program could be met if all went well and partly because it was feared that other work no more important might be given precedence. It was soon found, however, that the date for completion would have to be postponed because of unavoidable delays, and consequently February 24, March 15, and March 21 were successively worked for.

Throughout December to March crowding in the shipyards, scarcity of material, congested transportation, shortage of fuel, and severe weather made a combination

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of difficulties especially unfavorable for outside work on the mine planters, of which there was a good deal to be done. By constant urging, anticipating probable causes of delay, and persistently following up behindhand deliveries, the work as a whole was kept always progressing, if at times slowly. Work on the Morgan liners was undoubtedly helped by having them in pairs at two shipyards, a good arrangement for mutual assistance and emulation; and, as the time for completion drew near, some spirit of competition was aroused between the managers of the two yards. Of the other two ships at New York, which were placed singly, the *Saranac* at Shewan's yard was greatly delayed by some apparent disaffection among the shipyard employees and by partial strikes. Special measures had at last to be taken in her case, finally getting her to sea six weeks behind her sister, the *Quinnebaug*.

A great deal of the delay was undoubtedly due to lack of interest on the part of workmen. The subsequently successful campaign of addresses to the workmen by good speakers, explaining the need for the ships and the men's own interest in doing their best, did not begin until some time in February, and then only in a small way. Another serious retarding cause, constantly present, was insufficient supervision of the work. The contractors were new to Government work, the vessels were of a type for which no model existed, and plans were not forthcoming as fast as wanted, nor often in the logical order. Several delays or losses of material in transportation held up other work, and one of the trades—ship fitter—in which labor was shortest was the one on the completion of whose work much of the other work was dependent. Finally, by the end of the first week in April five ships had been sufficiently completed to leave the shipyards and go to sea. Yet these ships, which with the *San Francisco* and *Baltimore* represented three-fourths of the total mining capacity, late as they were, were not behind the time the mines were ready, the manufacture of these likewise having suffered from the prevailing unfavorable industrial conditions.

First away from the shipyard, April 4, 1918, was *Roanoke*. She had been the first of the Morgan liners taken over, but to get her away even then it was necessary to take her to the Brooklyn Navy Yard for a few days to concentrate on her electric wiring. Several items were incomplete, but a break had to be made away from the shipyards, and it did not become necessary to send her back. The *Housatonic* followed close afterwards, April 6, similarly incomplete; then *Canandaigua* April 8. The latter had a long list of unfinished or poorly finished items, including the ice machine and partial installation of the ventilation system. *Quinnebaug* and *Canonicus* on April 14 and 16, respectively, made a total of five ships ready about the same time. Among these, the shortest time under alteration was 4 months and 12 days; the longest 4 months and 24 days.

A tentative schedule prepared by the British Admiralty in the early part of December, 1917, named May 1 for the completion of one system of the mine barrage, allowing one month to do the mine planting. Subsequent events made that date impossible to meet, in spite of all efforts; but the ships' officers were doing all they could to advance their preparations for active service without retarding the work of the shipyards, so that when the vessels did leave, they should be coaled and stored as completely as the state of supply market permitted. A memorandum had been issued to them on February 28, outlining the tentative employment of time prior to going across, as follows:

(*a*) On leaving the yard, each ship was to drop down to Gravesend Bay to receive 50 Mark IV mines to be used for training; these to be turned in before departure for abroad.

(*b*) Each ship was to proceed to sea independently for one week, for a shakedown, general clean up, and preliminary ship drills, finishing the cruise at Hampton Roads. At discretion, ships were to go into Chesapeake Bay for part of the time, keeping clear of the rest of the fleet.

(*c*) One week was to be devoted mainly to training in mining, first taking half of the ship's capacity on board, for working out the handling of winches, parbuckles, fleets, elevators, and cross-overs. During the following week, enough more mines were to be taken to fill to capacity, less one track load on each side of the launching deck. This was afterwards changed to leave one deck clear of mines, to make room for extra men carried to fill the mine bases. At the end of two weeks, two to four days were to be spent in coaling, completing with stores, and other final preparations.

(*d*) On the passage across there were to be tactical and gunnery exercises and ample opportunity for moving mines about as desired for training on board.

The final aim was to arrive at destination ready, after loading with mines and coal, to begin planting. It was estimated that 45 days after leaving the shipyard would suffice for the completion of this whole program. The squadron was, therefore, working without a definite date but within a definite lapse of time. Its arrival at the mine bases in Scotland, during the night of May 25–26, was on the fortieth day

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from the time the last ship left the shipyard. On arrival all were ready, requiring only coal and mines.

Having completed her final fitting out and conducted successful experiments with the new mine in Chesapeake Bay, March 13–15, in Narragansett Bay March 21–21, and off Cape Ann April 1–5, the *San Francisco* returned to Hampton Roads: and there, on Wednesday, April 10, 1918, Capt. R. R. Belknap having been detached from the Office of Naval Operations, assumed command of the mine squadron, with additional duty as chief of staff to the commander of the mine force, Rear Admiral Joseph Strauss, who had already proceeded to the mine force headquarters at base 18, Inverness, Scotland.

On April 12, 1918, the first of the new mine planters, the *Roanoke*, stood into the Roads, followed the same day by the *Housatonic*, and the next day by the *Canandaigua*. Immediately upon arrival, these vessels proceeded to take their complement of mines from the mine carrier *Lake Superior* and Southern Railroad Pier No. 4 at Pinners Point.

So far, all had gone smoothly; but early Monday morning, the 15th, the *Housatonic* in getting under way from Pier 4 broke the side of her hot well casing, completely disabling the main engine beyond repair in less than 10 days. The work was taken in hand immediately by a force from the Norfolk Navy Yard, and at noon Tuesday she was towed to the yard, where every effort was made toward early completion. There was no choice but to wait and take advantage of the time in completing and improving such work as had not been done to satisfaction at the ship yards. In this respect the enforced delay was a benefit, as some navy yard help was given other ships too, which relieved the small repair gangs of the ships from a discouraging amount of pressing work, hopeless of accomplishment unaided.

It became evident by Thursday the 18th that the unfinished items on board *Canandaigua*, which was the worst of any vessel in this respect, could not be completed without navy yard help by the time the *Housatonic* would be ready. The commandant at the Norfolk yard was applied to that night by radio, and he and the officers of the industrial department, appreciating the urgency for getting this force off for the war zone, promptly took in hand every item of unfinished work that could be completed simultaneously with the work on the *Housatonic*.

On Wednesday afternoon the *Quinnebaug* stood in, and on Saturday, April 20, the *Canonicus*, both reporting themselves ready, making the squadron for the time complete. Except the *Roanoke*, no ship had taken advantage of a full week for preliminary shakedown. The last two ships took only three and four days. All of them, however, experienced bad weather which tested their seaworthiness rather severely for so early in their new career.

It has been planned to supplement the preliminary specialty training of these new ships by giving them the assistance of experienced petty officers and men from the *San Francisco* and *Baltimore* during the two weeks period before sailing for abroad.

An urgent request had come from the British Admiralty about March 1, however, for the services of one or two mine planters to help out in planting a field in the North Channel to the Irish Sea, using British mines. The *Baltimore* was sent in response to this, sailing March 7, via Halifax. Consequently a double burden fell upon *San Francisco* alone, of testing the completed mines and giving some assistance to new ships in their training. Beginning at Hampton Roads, two instruction parties, of experienced gunner's mates, with an officer, were transferred temporarily to the new ships in turn, for practice, instruction, and supervision of all the operations of testing, assembling, and preparing a mine for planting. This was supplemented on deck by sending to some of the new ships one or more experienced signalmen from *San Francisco* in temporary exchange for equal numbers.

A change in plan came about at this time in compliance with the wishes of the commander, mine force, for one or more platers to be sent in advance of the others to assist the *Baltimore*, so that they might together complete the mine field, on which *Baltimore* alone was engaged, in time to join the squadron from the northern barrage operations. For such an early departure the *Roanoke* was the only one that could be considered: Capt. Stearns declared his ship would be ready to proceed as soon as some practice had been given in actual mine planting. Inspection of the crew and ship by the squadron commander confirmed this. Held only 16 days after leaving the shipyard, the inspection showed that the time had been utilized to the best advantage, the crew and the ship throughout being in a state most creditable to Capt. Stearns and his officers and crew.

The following Monday *Roanoke* held some mine planting exercises off Cherrystone, Va. Returning that night, she transferred to other ships all but 160 mines, retaining these for drill, and at noon on Wednesday she sailed, the first of the new mine planters to proceed on active service. At Newport, R. I., she received a draft of 250 men for

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the mine bases in Scotland, proceeding thence via New York for the Clyde. As it turned out, all this was fruitless except for getting the men to the bases. The *Roanoke* was detained a few days in New York, waiting to join a convoy, and after arrival in the Clyde took no part in the *Baltimore's* mining operation, although prepared to do so. She arrived at naval base 17, Invergordon, Scotland, a week before the rest of the squadron.

By Friday, April 26, as promised, *Housatonic's* repairs were completed, and she went alongside the *Lake Superior* at the explosives anchorage to obtain her loaded mine cases. Next day at noon the *Canandaigua* did likewise; and by *Housatonic's* working all Saturday night the squadron was at last ready for its first cruise in formation at sea.

The four seagoing tugs, *Sonoma*, *Ontario*, *Patapsco*, and *Patuxent*, which had for some years past been performing the duties of fleet tenders, and for some months after the outbreak of war been engaged with the mine force in submarine net planting and in mining experiments, were fitted out to accompany the mine force abroad. The *Patuxent*, Lieut. J. B. Hupp, commanding, and the *Patapsco*, Lieut. W. S. Benson, were temporarily detached to escort a convoy of submarine chasers abroad via Bermuda and the Azores to Brest, but finally arrived at United States Naval Base 18, Inverness, Scotland, June 24, 1918, where they were subsequently employed for inspection and observation of mine fields and for communications between the mine bases. The *Sonoma* and *Ontario* remained with the mine planters until their departure for Europe. The *Sonoma*, Lieut. J. S. Trayer, accompanied the mine squadron on its trip across. The *Ontario*, Lieut. Edmund Delavy, accompanied a group of submarine chasers abroad and was then diverted to Queenstown for submarine patrol duty. Although it was originally intended to have 16 tugs, including the 4 above mentioned, attached to the mine squadron as mine sweepers, it developed that their services in this capacity were not needed. Two tugs were able to handle the miscellaneous work at the bases; and, in view of the valuable wrecking equipment on the *Sonoma*, she was released on July 11, 1918, and ordered to Queenstown, where she could be more profitably employed.

Sunday morning, April 28, Mine Squadron One, consisting of *San Francisco*, *Quinnebaug*, *Housatonic*, *Canonicus*, and *Canandaigua*, got under way for Provincetown, Mass., where standardization trials and mine tests were carried out. On Monday, May 6, the squadron proceeded to Boston, where Mark IV drill mines were landed and the quota of Mark IV mines intended for the *Shawmut*, *Aroostook*, and *Housatonic* were disembarked. That same night the squadron got under way for Newport, R. I., the point of final departure, conducting subcaliber practice and tactical exercises en route. The remainder of the week was spent in fueling and provisioning the ships and making final preparations for departure. A draft of 500 men destined for the mine bases in Scotland was distributed among the four large mine layers. The fuel ship *Jason* loaded with aviation stores destined for Killingholme, England, was ordered to cross in company with the mine squadron.

At midnight, May 11 and 12, the squadron, consisting of the *San Francisco*, flagship, *Housatonic*, *Canonicus*, *Canandaigua*, *Quinnebaug*, and *Sonoma*, got under way for bases 17 and 18. During the forenoon of May 12 the *Jason* joined the squadron. On the first two days out heavy fog was encountered. The succeeding days were used for gunnery exercises, training and tactical exercises. Wednesday morning, May 15, the *Quinnebaug* showed the breakdown flag. She was taken in tow by the *Sonoma*, the squadron slowing to 7 knots. At the end of 24 hours repairs were completed and the *Quinnebaug* stood on under her own power. May 16 gunnery practice was held on a target towed by the *San Francisco* in which all of the new ships were enabled to exercise their guns. On Friday the wind and sea increased until by 4 o'clock the *Jason* was unable to keep in formation, having to head off the course in long zigzags. Fortunately she had sufficient reserve speed to overtake the squadron when the weather moderated, regaining her position at about 7 p. m. the following day. She was again lost sight of on May 22 during another spell of bad weather. The steering gear of the *Housatonic* broke down on May 21, disabling her approximately for one hour, and again the following day, necessitating reducing the speed of the squadron while repairs were being made.

In the meantime the *Sonoma* was sent on independently. By the original plans she should not have been in company with the squadron but should have turned off several days before to the Azores; but on reaching the separating point, she had proved so seaworthy and useful that it was decided to keep her with the squadron in case of further emergency. In making this decision, the chance had to be taken of bad weather separating her from the other ships on account of her not being able to make the necessary speed or hold the course. She was, therefore, sent on ahead while the rest of the squadron remained with the *Housatonic*. Up to this time the services of the *Sonoma* had been most useful. In addition to towing the *Quinnebaug* while she

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was broken down, she was of great use in carrying guard mail between the ships while they were en route and in assisting in the gunnery exercises. On Thursday morning, May 23, the *Sonoma* was overtaken and again joined the squadron. On this day the weather was the worst of any experienced. The wind and sea on the quarter caused such heavy rolling that the *San Francisco* found it expedient to strike mines from the main to the second deck and fill her boiler and engine room double bottoms with salt water to improve her stability. There were no accidents, however, all ships standing the test very well. During the night and early morning the weather moderated, but fog had set in which continued until noon May 24. At daylight Saturday morning, the *Jason*, missing for four days, was sighted coming astern. Fifteen minutes before the squadron was due at the rendezvous she took her position in the formation, thus making the unit again complete. At 4.52 a. m. four British destroyers appeared out of the haze ahead, then two to the southward and a little later three more to the northward, nine in all with H. M. S. *Anzac*, half leader of the fourteenth flotilla, the flagship. This flotilla escorted the squadron past Cape Wrath, through Pentland Firth and down Moray Firth to Cromarty, where the squadron arrived at 12.40 a. m. Sunday, May 26. Pilots, charts, and mine force instructions were placed aboard the ships at the whistle buoy. The *San Francisco*, *Canandaigua*, *Canonicus*, and *Sonoma*, then proceeded to Inverness Firth and anchored off United States Naval base 18. The *Housatonic*, *Quinnebaug*, and *Jason* proceeded into Cromarty Firth, base 17, where the *Roanoke* was already lying. That forenoon, in reporting to the commander mine force, the squadron commander reported that all ships were ready for their intended duty.

The remainder of the squadron, consisting of the *Saranac*, *Shawmut*, and *Aroostook*, cleared the yards where converted on May 23 and June 10, respectively. They were not delayed by uncompleted work, as the others had been; but the standardizing runs over the Provincetown course proved that the *Shawmut's* and *Aroostook's* fuel consumption was much larger than had been reckoned, making their fuel capacity insufficient for the passage across. This threatened an indefinite delay, but the difficulty was solved by Capt. Cluverius and Commander Bulmer securing enough oil hose for the *Black Hawk* to fuel the ships at sea. By expeditious management, the three mine planters, together with *Black Hawk*, were able to sail in company on June 16. The only oil hose obtainable quickly was of 4-inch diameter, nearly twice as heavy as that ordinarily used for fueling at sea. The first fueling was done in a gale of wind, and it was a novel undertaking for all concerned. Yet it was successfully accomplished; the second time fueling was done, it was easier; and without further noteworthy incident, the detachment arrived at bases 17 and 18 in the evening of June 29. The *Baltimore*, having finished her mine planting off the north of Ireland under the direction of the British Admiralty, joined the others at base 18 on June 2, thus making the squadron of mine planters complete.

Chapter XIV.—Commander Mine Force—Appointment; Arrival in Europe; Preparations for Commencement of Mine Laying.

As preparations progressed it became apparent that our mining operations were developing into one of the major war activities of the United States Navy, and it was desirable that it should be commanded by an officer of appropriate flag rank. Accordingly Rear Admiral Joseph Strauss was appointed commander mine force, United States Atlantic Fleet, relieving Captain R. R. Belknap, the middle of February, 1918.

This appointment was particularly suited to the capabilities of Rear Admiral Strauss, who had spent a large part of his service in the development and design of ordnance, and had preceded Rear Admiral Ralph Earle as the chief of that bureau. The mine-laying program now in hand called for a vast expenditure of money for the production of mines which, as a type, were unknown and untested. Minor tests had, of course, been made of the constituent parts and were individually gratifying; but in any complex mechanism such as a mine, a torpedo, or a gun mount, an actual test of the completed unit under service conditions is the only true proof of its efficiency. At the outset it would seem that a mine should be extremely simple to design and construct. Such is far from the case. Prior to the development of this mine the United States Navy had never produced a really satisfactory mine. The demand for immediate antisubmarine measures was so urgent in order to prevent the loss of merchant ships from reducing the available tonnage below that required to successfully prosecute the war that, tried or untried, it was necessary to begin at once, on a large scale, the manufacture of this new American mine.

After receiving his appointment as commander mine force, Rear Admiral Strauss spent several weeks in Washington on temporary duty in the Office of Naval Operations, familiarizing himself with all information bearing on the operation and with the prep-

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arations then in hand, also reviewing the status of the work being done by the Bureau of Ordnance in connection with the production of the mines. Several days were spent in inspecting the new mine layers being fitted out at New York and Boston then arrangements were made to proceed to Great Britain to complete the preparations necessary to enable mine laying to begin immediately upon the arrival of the squadron.

After reviewing the correspondence in Washington relative to the nature of the proposed mine barrage as then agreed upon, which, in addition to leaving Pentland Firth open, left a clear passage nearly 10 miles wide between the Orkney Islands and the western end of the barrage, besides some 110 miles which were deep mines only, Admiral Strauss wrote to the Chief of Naval Operations on March 7:

"In considering the scheme to which the mine force's efforts are to be devoted, I desire to invite attention to the following necessary conditions to insure success:

"First, every outlet to the broad sea must be closed by mine barriers. This includes the outlets to the Atlantic provided for in the proximate plans, as well as those to the Mediterranean through the Dardanelles and the Adriatic. There must be no leaks anywhere. While it would afford a serious check to submarine attack were our enemies' submarine bases confined to the Mediterranean, nevertheless an enemy so enterprising must not be given even so restricted an opportunity.

"As to the means for accomplishing the end sought, (the Mark VI mine), I think it too soon to predict success for this factor of the problem. I believe that the Bureau of Ordnance has done its work carefully and with the greatest intelligence, and we can only hope for the best results. I am prevented from a feeling of assurance, however, by the fact that actual experience with the mine is very limited. Unfortunately faults develop in every new mechanism no matter how much skill and precision has been employed to close every avenue of failure. It would be to much to hope for the complete success of the new mine, and we must be prepared to make alterations in the mines at the operating bases, where the first reports of extensive tests will be received. At this date, as nearly as I can learn, no complete mines have yet been delivered for shipment, but parts have been delivered and complete mines are expected shortly."

On March 12, 1918, Rear Admiral Strauss accompanied by Lieut. Noel Davis, United States Navy, who had reported the previous day for duty as Aide, sailed from New York City on the Steamship New York. Arriving in Liverpool, England, March 23, he proceeded at once to London and reported that afternoon to Vice Admiral Wm. S. Sims, Commander, United States Naval forces, European waters.

The following five days were spent at London headquarters going over the recent developments in the status of the barrage and in calling on the various officials at the British Admiralty interested in the enterprise.

On March 28 Admiral Strauss with Lieut. Davis left London arriving at Grangemouth, Scotland, the same day to call on rear Admiral Clinton-Baker, R. N., who commanded the British Mine-laying Squadron which had been allotted to cooperate with us in the North Sea Barrage. Grangemouth, which is situated on the Firth of Forth about 18 miles west of Edinburgh, was the British Mining Depot from which their First Mine-laying Squadron operated. The afternoon was spent discussing the plans for mine laying and in inspecting the assembly plant.

The following morning, March 29, 1918, Admiral Strauss arrived at Inverness, where he was met by Capt. O. G. Murfin, United States Navy, commanding officer of United States naval bases 17 and 18, The day was spent inspecting base 18 and establishing the headquarters of the commander mine force in the office building at that base.

The following week was occupied by inspection of the various stations under the jurisdiction of the commander, mine force—base 17, Kyle of Lochalsh and Corpach—and this time the work of construction at the bases had progressed to such a point that it would have been possible to begin the assembly of mines had the necessary mines and mine layers been ready.

On April 10 Admiral Strauss visited the Grand Fleet at Scapa Flow and called upon Admiral Beatty, commander in chief, to discuss the contemplated mine barrier. It was apparent that the commander in chief was anything but enthusiastic about a mine barrier across the North Sea. British mine laying had begun in area B and skimming sweeps had showed that some of the mines had not taken the designed depth and would have been dangerous to surface vessels crossing the field. This undoubtedly alarmed the commander in chief, and, together with the restrictions on the freedom of movement of the fleet imposed by such a barrage, it is only natural that he was not enthusiastic. The main result of the visit, however, was to make definite arrangements for the escort of our mine layers while out at sea. No American destroyers were obtainable and the mine squadron was thus totally dependent on the Grand fleet for escort and could not leave the bases until such escort was provided. The number and type of escorting vessels was to depend upon the disposition of the German fleet at

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the time of the mining operations. If the enemy fleet was at sea, it would necessitate sending out a portion or possibly all of the Grand Fleet. The commander in chief, requested Admiral Strauss to telegraph him 48 hours before the squadron was ready to go out and escort would be arranged.

Capt. H. E. Mulleneux, R. N., was ordered to Inverness as liaison officer between the two services and as the representative of Rear Admiral Clinton-Baker at Grangemouth. Capt. R. E. Chilcott, R. N., was ordered to Invergordon in a similar capacity. While the bases were under construction (which was largely controlled by Admiral Clinton-Baker) these officers were of much assistance. However, as the construction drew to an end and the work of organization and administration became the predominant factors the usefulness of liaison officers was very much lessened. One of the fundamental stipulations in the agreements for the execution of the barrage was that we should have entire freedom as to the manner in which our mines were to be laid.

In our operations we were associated principally with the following British officials: Commander in chief, Grand Fleet; Rear Admiral, Invergordon, and the senior naval officer, Inverness. As we were supplied with all the various British secret and confidential publications, the question of communications, etc., became in a few weeks, equally as simple as our own, and to transmit all requests, communications, etc., via the liaison officer simply complicated matters and added an additional link to the chain. The result was, obviously, that there gradually became so little for them to do that they were finally ordered to more important duty. Just prior to the arrival of the minelayers the Admiralty, at the suggestion of the commander in chief, Grand Fleet, kindly offered to send one or two experienced officers to be attached to the staff of Admiral Strauss to assist with the administrative and communication work. Up to this time no difficulties of any kind had been encountered and their services were accordingly declined.

Much concern was caused when the U. S. S. *Lake Moor*, the fifth mine carrier dispatched to the bases was torpedoed and sunk in the North Channel to the Irish Sea on April 11, 1918. The vessel was attacked about 11 p. m. and sank very shortly after being struck. The night was dark and rescue work was difficult. Fifteen survivors were picked up. The cause of alarm, however, was from a totally unexpected source. When the torpedo exploded it opened up the hold in which the firing devices for the mines had been stowed. The success of the North Sea barrage depended in a large measure in maintaining the secrecy of this device and the most stringent measures had been followed from the place of their manufacture until the mines had actually been planted.

Each device was packed in a separate wooden box near the top of which handholes had been provided to facilitate handling. The top end of the firing device was heavier than the bottom and as soon as it fell into the water it toppled over with the heavy end down and the air trapped in the bottom of the case kept it afloat.

Four of these cases were picked up by a patrol vessel. As soon as this information was received arrangements were made to have the coasts in the vicinity searched and all cases found shipped to Base 18. Besides the possibility of an enemy submarine picking up some of these floating boxes, the accident occurred close to the Irish coast and just at a time when the Irish situation was most critical. Fortunately, however, it appears that none of these devices fell into improper hands. The Germans, at any rate, did not learn the secret of the American mines until possibly months later when it might have been obtained from mines washed ashore in Norway.

In response to a cabled request, Lieut. W. K. Harrill, United States Navy, reported at Inverness on May 8 for duty on the staff of Admiral Strauss as force radio officer. During the war the Grand Fleet had greatly developed radio telegraphy and established special rules for transmitting messages so as to prevent enemy stations from ascertaining by radio compasses the whereabouts of allied men of war. Lieut. Harrill was immediately sent to the Grand Fleet to familiarize himself with the current practice and the equipment which would be required for our vessels in order that they might be brought up to the necessary standards as soon as possible after their arrival. Special arrangements were made for immediately supplying them with radio buzzer sets and rejector circuits, etc. As soon as possible after the ships arrived each radio force including the communication officer was given one to two days thorough instruction by the force radio officer, assisted by Lieut. Grant, United States Navy, radio officer from the U. S. S. *Delaware*, with special attention to the numerous confidential publications and also the salient points in British radio procedure. This was supplemented by a school established at Base 18 for ships in the harbor. When the squadron sailed on its first excursion, June 7, all ships were equipped with the special apparatus, and on the next excursion the mine force conducted all radio communication in accordance with British procedure.

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The work of establishing a suitable organization to coordinate the bases with the vessels and the preparation of instructions for the force was the most important task of the commander mine force during the months of April and May. Mine parts were beginning to arrive and it then appeared that sufficient would be on hand by the time the squadron arrived to enable an excursion to go out immediately. It was mandatory, therefore, that no administrative oversight, such as insufficiency of provisions, supplies, current recognition apparatus, etc, should cause a delay in the operations.

The mine force instructions were drawn up to include not only the necessary instructions with regard to liberty, leave, patrols, repairs, routine reports, etc., which commonly comprise such a publication, but also specific instructions for passing the harbor defenses at Inverness and Invergordon, obtaining water, coal, and provisions, the proper means of obtaining miscellaneous supplies from Admiralty stores; special instructions for handling the various classes of mails; censorship regulations; train schedules; arrangements for handling liberty parties by British drifters allotted for this purpose; the various recreation facilities on shore for officers and men—in fact, effort was made to include in the one set of instructions all possible information, which were prepared in loose-leaf form, so that when it became necessary to make changes or additions it might readily be accomplished to maintain in one volume practically everything necessary for the operations of the force and to eliminate the necessity of hundreds of miscellaneous letters on equally as many subjects, which are always most confusing because they are so difficult to keep in touch with.

Special contracts were arranged by the force supply officer with local dealers for the supply of meats, vegetables, and other fresh provisions at fixed prices. A channel was dredged in Inverness Firth to permit mine layers to go farther up the firth to Beauly Basin which is adjacent to base 18. The Firth, which is shallow, was resurveyed and a new chart published. Moorings were laid to accommodate the mine layers in the more restricted anchorages.

Taut wire measuring gear was obtained for each vessel and held in readiness for installation on their arrival. This gear proved most valuable for navigational purposes. It consists essentially of a drum carrying 140 miles of fine piano wire. A suitable weight is secured to the end of the wire and dropped overboard. The wire as it is paid out is measured by a recorder which shows with a remarkable accuracy the actual distance traveled over the ground.

Arrangements were made for the commander mine force to act as the distributing authority for all United States and allied secret and confidential publications. British chart portfolios were obtained for each ship. Special apparatus required for making recognition signals was also procured and held ready for the ships.

By the time that the squadron was due to arrive all preliminary work had been completed. The mine-force instructions and necessary harbor charts were taken on board by the pilots sent out to meet the ships and bring them into Invergordon and Inverness upon their arrival.

Chapter XV.—Changes in Barrage Plan.

In view of the formal approval by the Navy Department and the British Admiralty of the northern barrage plan as it existed on November 1, 1917, the department, and more particularly the mine section of the Bureau of Ordnance, naturally assumed that such changes as might become necessary during the operation would be only of a minor character and that the major features, notably the location of the barrage on the Aberdeen-Ekersund line, could be regarded as definitely fixed, and on this assumption the manufacture of the immense quantity of material required was taken in hand and pushed to the utmost. This assumption soon proved, however, to be without foundation, and from December until the cessation of hostilities there were so many changes in plan and so much resultant confusion in the manufacturing and shipping projects that the whole operation was seriously delayed, its success gravely hazarded, and its effect undoubtedly much reduced below what was to have been expected from the execution of the original proposition.

A communication of December 6 from the Admiralty to Admiral Sims, written after the subject of the laying and patrol of the barrage had been discussed in consultation with the commander in chief, grand fleet, stated that: "It has become clear that there will be considerable difficulty in patrolling the eastern portion of the barrage as at present proposed, and in affording support by light cruisers, etc., if no Norwegian port is available as a base * * *. An alternative position for the barrage has accordingly been worked out on the line Orkney-Bergen in place of Aberdeen-Ekersund." The various advantages and disadvantages of this change were outlined and the suggested change submitted to the United States for approval. The question was referred by Admiral Sims to the Navy Department for decision as soon as the proposal

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of change was received (Dec. 7), which replied that: "Unless reasons for change are fundamental, advantage of new location would not offset loss and delay by derangement of plan for mine material."

In this connection the British "History of northern barrage" states that the Admiralty in its communications to the commander in chief, grand fleet, and to Admiral Sims, made the following points among other relative to the proposed change:

"The mine barrage is of no value unless the deep portions are patrolled, and the patrols must be adequately supported to be effective * * *.

"The provision of the 42 destroyers for the patrol of the eastern area would also prove extremely difficult without assistance from the grand fleet.

"The material will be equally suitable for the new line.

"The proposed alteration should not delay completion."

The last two points quoted were entirely in error so far as American mine material was concerned, since the proposed new location of the barrage in deeper water would necessitate increased lengths of mooring ropes and, as to manufacture of material was well along, delay was inevitable.

The proposed change was based on the broad strategical and tactical grounds, and the Navy Department was forced by circumstances to agree to it, though most reluctantly.

In reply to the Admiralty communication of December 6, a memorandum was prepared by the planning section of Admiral Sims' staff and issued January 1, 1918, which reviewed the entire situation and set forth the views of the United States in part as follows:

"The second position considered in this memorandum is the one now proposed by the British Admiralty and accepted in principle by the Navy Department. There are many factors pro and con that entered into a choice as between the two positions, but of these a single factor controlled, viz—that the new position is deemed best by the Grand Fleet upon which will rest the responsibility for the support and patrol of the barrage. The new position gives greater freedom of movement and greater ease of support to surface vessels, while it imposes corresponding difficulties upon the operations of enemy surprise vessels. The change in position accepts the handicap of an average increase in depth of water about 15 fathoms. This handicap might be considered serious were it not for the fact that the whole barrage is based on the assumption that an effective mine field can be laid in 1,000 feet of water. If this assumption be true, then whether a portion of the mine field be laid in 40 or in 60 fathoms of water in not material, except as the changes in plan introduce delay.

"It will be noted that the original line extended from mainland to mainland, while the new line extends from island to island, and has in it passages completely navigable to submarines. This condition is, in our opinion, undesirable:

"The proposed character of the barrage does not provide for the full accomplishment of the mission. The proposed barrage will not close the northern exit from the North Sea because—

"(*a*) The barrage is not complete in a vertical plane in areas B and C.

"(*b*) The barrage is not deep enough.

"(*c*) The Pentland Firth is open.

"(*d*) The waters of the Orkney Islands, for a distance of miles, are open.

"(*e*) Patrol vessels on the surface are not sufficiently effective in barring passages to submarines, as witness the Straits of Dover.

"The barrage is to be a great effort. It is our opinion that nothing short of a sound design will justify the effort.

"The requirements of a sound design are, the extension of the barrage complete in the vertical plane from coast to coast.

"The necessity for an opening in the surface barrage is recognized, but it is held that this opening should be in the surface barrage only, and that the deep barrage should be widened so that the difficulties of navigating the opening submerged may be practically prohibitive."

In conclusion it was tentatively decided (by United States planning section):

1. To accept the new position in barrage as outlined by the British Admiralty.
2. To urge that the barrage be completed in the vertical plane from coast to coast, except an opening in the surface barrage at the eastern end and in Norwegian territorial waters.
3. To carry the barrage to 295 feet (British plans 200 feet).
4. To have surface mines fitted with 70-foot and other mines with 100-foot antennæ.

As then proposed, the barrage was divided into three areas designated and located as follows:

Area B. A 20-mile wide section extending 50 miles to the eastward of the Orkney Islands.

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Area A. A section 50 miles wide extending 134 miles to the east-north-east end from eastern end of area B.

Area C. A 50-mile wide section extending from the east end of A 60 miles east-south-east to Norwegian territorial waters.

The United States was to furnish the mines and material for and lay both deep and surface fields in area A. Great Britain was to provide and lay deep mine fields in areas B and C and furnish trawlers and fast vessels to patrol these two areas.

The British Admiralty Plans Division answered the above memorandum with the opinion that:

"The stopping power of the mine barrage should not be over rated. It is the patrol craft armed with various antisubmarine devices on which we must rely to kill the submarines. It is on the mine fields that we rely to give us intensity of patrol. Until we have proved the efficacy of the American mine field, we must look on it as a bluff. We must not attempt to put the bluff too high by notifying an area up to the 3-imile limit of Norway. The navigation of Pentland Firth by submerged submarines is considered impracticable. As it is the patrol craft we rely on to destroy the submarine, it is not considered that leaving the approach to Pentland Firth uncovered is of vital importance."

It was further stated that it was not considered necessary to carry the barrage to a vertical depth of 300 feet, that there was no reason why the American portion should not be laid in accordance with the United States views but that the Admiralty would be prepared to extend their barrage to a greater depth, if found necessary, and to mine the surface if that should become desirable.

In view of these differences of opinion the United States planning section prepared a memorandum of January 12, containing its understanding of the status of the mine barrage and submitted it to the British planning section for confirmation in order to reconcile the various points and further unify the effort, by reducing to writing a concrete plan which would be acceptable to both navies. Further than the agreements regarding the supply of all mine-laying operations and the assignments of provision and laying of mines in the areas as previously noted, these efforts met with failure in so far as formal agreement on a written plan was concerned, the British apparently desiring to reserve the privilege of altering the plans when expediency so dictated while considerable skepticism existed as to the ability of the Americans to execute satisfactorily their part of the project. The above-mentioned characterization of the American mine field as a mere "bluff" was more or less indicative of the British attitude.

The Admiralty did, however, accept the principle of surface mining in areas "B" and "C" should experience indicate that the surface barrage be more effective in preventing the passage of submarine than the surface patrol.

After this discussion the planning section of the Admiralty not being in a position to enter into any definite signed agreement, nor to definitely recommend it to the Admiralty, Admiral Sims requested the status of the plans in so far as the Admiralty's agreement with them was concerned. This resulted in a statement of January 18 which included:

"United States to be responsible for provision of mines and mine layers for area A. Great Britain for areas B and C. Area A to be mined from 10 feet below surface to as near 300 feet as the American mines will permit.

"Areas B and C to be mined for 65 feet below the surface to 200 feet.

"When this belt is effectively mined the question of extending the mine fields to a greater depth will be considered.

"The desirability of extending the deep mine fields to the surface of areas B and C will be considered when the situation has developed further * * *."

Thus early in January the character of the proposed barrage became so modified as to bear little resemblance to the original plan and the original faith of its proponents in its effectiveness was no longer felt to be justified. It was felt in America, in view of the attitude of the Admiralty and the commander in chief of the Grand Fleet, that the British had no real faith in the American mine and were not whole-heartedly supporting the project. In particular, the allocation of both ends of the barrage to the British to be mined with an inferior mine in an incomplete manner, and the further decision that the American part of the barrage was not to be patrolled were most discouraging.

Not the least discouraging feature of the situation, to the Bureau of Ordnance, was the state of flux of the barrage plan and the obvious reluctance of the Admiralty to commit itself to definite plans. The British authorities had the appearance of not daring to give up the whole operation for fear of possible later criticism and at the same time of not being willing to cooperate to make it successful.

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In Admiral Sims's review of the activities of his command it is stated, in effect, that throughout the discussion of the barrage project it became apparent that the Admiralty was influenced by two considerations which may not clearly appear in the correspondence and records but which should not be underestimated in considering the mine field historically.

First, the proposed effort on the part of the United States Navy Department was such a handsome offer from an ally that, even if there were doubts of its success, it would be poor policy to put only discouragement in the way of those who were willing and anxious to go ahead with the project. The Admiralty naturally wanted to avoid any possibility of not having tried the mine barrage, and subjecting themselves to possible later criticism on the score that it was necessary and would have worked had it been tried. In other words, the Admiralty at first was very dubious of the success of the field but considered the proposals for the above reasons more seriously than they otherwise would have. As the details of the plans developed and the reports of Mark VI mines were received, there was very notable increase in the enthusiasm for the project. At the start there was no enthusiasm at all. Later there grew to be considerable.

The second consideration which should be mentioned in explaining the Admirality's policy toward the project was its effect on possible fleet actions. The Navy Department considered it almost entirely in the light of an antisubmarine measure. It was apparent that although nominally under the Admiralty in London, the planning for the Admiralty in such matters as would in our organization be dealt with by the Office of Naval Operations rested almost exclusively with the officers of the Grand Fleet, in spite of the existence of a plans division in the Admiralty. Naturally, they considered it largely from their own viewpoint, and in studying possibilities of the barrage they were influenced by the fact that even if it did not work it might be something which would force a general fleet action. If there were a serious attempt made by the Germans on the mine barrage itself, or raids on the vessels engaged in working on it, cruiser actions at least would be probable, and with the arrival of supporting units it was quite possible that the two fleets might meet. They thought that even if it did not work as a mine barrage it might be a bait for a fleet action. It would make it harder for raiders to get out. So long as the Grand Fleet did not have its freedom of movement restricted (and the fleet was by no means so thoroughly convinced of the safety of the British mines in the deep mine fields as the Admiralty was), they had no objection to it and were rather inclined to favor it for the reason that it might help them meet the German High Seas Fleet. These reasons were at times mentioned and were very apparent in discussions, but are hardly evident in the records and were certainly not emphasized by the Admiralty in the correspondence. It appears very essential, however, to a good historical understanding of the northern barrage that they should not be overlooked, but should be most particularly mentioned.

Another thing which might be mentioned in this connection is that later in the discussion when the policy of the extension of surface mines into the end areas was considered, this project was proposed and pushed by the United States planning section and was always fairly well considered by the planning section in the Admiralty, but an extremely large percentage of what opposition there was to it came from the Grand Fleet, and it was only very grudgingly that the Admiralty, considering the views not only of its own planning section, but also the recommendations from the fleet, consented to the modification of the mine barrage which later resulted in putting surface mines in areas which were at first intended to have deep mines only, although the United States had argued for surface mines as well in these areas.

The fundamental idea on which the mine section of the Bureau of Ordnance designed the new mine and proposed the northern barrage was that the barrage would be complete from coast to coast and that it would be patrolled so that enemy submarines would be forced by the presence of patrols either to turn back or to risk almost certain destruction by trying to pass the barrage submerged. Any departure from this principle meant ineffectiveness.

The following remarks quoted from a memorandum prepared by an officer of Admiral Sims's staff, at the time the change in plan was under discussion, are interesting:

"*Position.*—The more northern position accepts disadvantages as regards depth of water in order to obtain certain strategical advantages. This statement, however, is no more true now than it was when the southern line was previously decided upon by all concerned. If we are disinclined to admit that a mistake was made in the original instance by choosing the southern line, we must now show that the reasons for the shift to the northern position are new reasons or things which did not hold true at the time of the other conference. The only new conditions mentioned are that

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whereas previously it had been hoped to obtain a Norwegian base one is now no longer considered possible. The other reason is the increased activity of enemy surface craft. Taking the first of these reasons, I am inclined to suspect that there is not much to it. I think that a Norwegian base now is just as easily possible as one previously was. I base this on a recent conversation with Col. Breckinridge who is Naval Attaché in the Scandinavian countries and who had just been in Norway. There is probably no useful point, however, to trying to get behind this reason if the admiralty really sees fit to advance it. The second reason of the increased activity of enemy surface craft looks like an excellent one after the losses of the two Norwegian convoys recently. Steps have been taken to improve the Norwegian intelligence service as to information about the enemy craft coming out of Shaagerak but this will probably be offset by the increased incentive for the Germans to send our raiders.

"In looking over all the papers I can not help but believe that in the early conferences the fleet was not so very thoroughly represented, and there were people from the mining division who explained that sending the fleet over a deep British mine field was nothing to hesitate about. The fleet was in Rosyth, south of the proposed barrage, and was generally expected to stay there. Now with the fleet back in Scapa I believe that they are beginning to assert their views to a greater extent and that at least a large part of their insistence to move the southern end north to the Orkneys arises from their disinclination to navigate over British deep mine fields. This is not a reason which there is much point in emphasizing from the admiralty's standpoint, so it was really not presented but the argument was made along other lines. Except as a matter of being perfectly frank with us I do not think that it matters so very much whether the real reasons for the change in the position of the barrage are those which they mention or others, equally good ones, which they hesitate to talk about. For my part, I believe that the fact that Admiral Beatty, who is going to support this mine field, says that it must go in the northern position finished the whole discussion and is something that we need not go behind.

"*Character of barrage.*—I believe that the width of the C area along the Norwegian coast is much too great. Leaving it this wide seems to have been based upon the idea

"(*a*) It is not good policy to unnecessarily crowd the Norwegian coast with the notified area if it can be avoided.

"(*b*) They have an idea of wanting to do the whole project on a fifty-fifty basis and the deep mine fields of this width are symmetrically arranged. This is no reason at all.

"I can not help but doubt when I compare the width of this area with the Straits of Dover and consider all conditions existing in that locality, that the deep mine field, particularly on the Norwegian coast, will not be efficient and it will have to be later modified by strengthening with surface mines. I have met officers in the Admiralty who privately expressed the same opinion and stated that in the end they would be proved correct by the addition of surface mines in area C.

"*Length of antenna.*—Seventy feet for the top mines and 100 feet for the other rows. This is based on the hope that at greater depths 100 feet may be effective and that at any rate it will probably drive the boat to the surface, in which case the 70-foot antenna of the top row of mines, which should be nearest to the edges of the field, should get the boat and destroy it. Seventy feet all around would be better, perhaps, but submarines can now go so deep that it becomes a necessity to try to stretch out the barrage vertically, even at the expense of some other small advantages.

"*Character of mine fields on the Norwegian coast.*—The whole mine barrage scheme is more or less of a tentative nature, because it is so big an undertaking that it can not in all ways be perfectly designed to meet every conceivable counter measure. Also it would be uneconomical and inefficient to try to plan it with any such final ideas in mind. The final appearance of the barrage before the end of the war is something which one would have to be extremely rash to care to prophesy. There are a few things which our personal opinion leads us to believe will be the most urgent modifications and the ones which we will see first. In my case, I look to see the Norwegian end of this field protected on the south by perhaps one system of antenna mines before any great time has elapsed and the notified area appropriately extended. This will relieve patrol craft in the C area of part of their difficulty.

"The question of who takes the C area has not yet been decided. We have gone ahead and made mines with long lengths of specially small diameter mooring line which will do in this place. I foresee that we will eventually have to do something with mines of this nature and think it would be a very good thing to make a careful analysis of conditions in area C, even although it is not our own area, with the idea of seeing whether later on we may be able to use these mines additionally. Mines intended for deep water like these can be laid in shallow water, but mines with short lengths of wire (and the diameter of the wire is different) can not be used in deep

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water. Can we not compromise in our present disagreement as to who takes the Norwegian area by finding both kinds of mines are needed and helping to do that, too? In area B the necessity is by no means so great. The fleet does not want any surface mines to obstruct its passage, but after finding patrolling rather difficult it may look favorable upon a project of extending the surface mine area. The water is not deep in this place. We will need no surface mines here until after area C is taken care of. It is not safe to look beyond that point * * *."

In order to focus attention upon the various points still unsettled there was then prepared by Admiral Sims a paper dated February 19, setting forth the different items in parallel columns and this was submitted to the Admiralty. This was answered on February 26, but as stated in a letter from Admiral Sims to the Office of Operations on March 2, "It appears that although a number of the points have been cleared up * * * there still remains a decided difference of opinion in regard to certain important points."

"It is believed that the Admiralty's disinclination to extend Mark VI mines to the end areas until their efficiency has been demonstrated in area A is not based on sound reasoning, for with the efficiency of the mine in area A or in any other area the whole success of the barrage stands or falls * * *. If the more efficient mining of these end areas is delayed, until the inefficiency of patrols in these areas is demonstrated, it is believed that much valuable time will be lost in a case where time is a most vital element."

Anticipating the necessity for this end area surface mining Admiral Sims, on April 1, cabled to the Navy Department requesting preparation of mines for area C. Meanwhile deep mining had been commenced by the British in area B, but, owing to unexpected difficulties with the British mines themselves, the operations were suspended before one complete line had been run.

The commander in chief of the Grand Fleet was much disturbed by these unsatisfactory results and the Admiralty felt that they could not continue laying the barrage in area B until the faults had been discovered and removed.

Shortly after this in a letter of April 18, 1918, to the Office of Operations Admiral Sims stated:

"Owing to the apparent uncertainty in the Admiralty as to the further execution of the plans of the northern barrage, I caused the matter to be brought up at the staff meeting this morning, at which I proposed the following: We lay two single lines of surface mines over the southern portion of area C; British to lay one system of deep mines over the northern portion of area C; area B to be deep mined as already planned, except that the mines are to be carried close up to the coast (islands) without leaving the 7-mile channel now shown on the chart."

The proposal, in so far as it applied to area C only, was accepted by the Admiralty formally on April 20.

Thus it will be seen that the original contention of the United States authorities in regard to the need of a complete barrage, including surface mining in the end areas was not allowed to rest upon the proof of ineffectiveness of surface patrols, for this particular barrage, but the inefficiency of such patrols, as amply demonstrated in previous mining efforts was at last permitted by the Admiralty to outweigh their desire for wide passages for the Grand Fleet.

But this was still only a partial conversion to the idea, for area B still remained in question. Here all mining was stopped. The failure of the British deep mines was responsible for this, and although the necessity was still acknowledged, as noted in the Admiralty's letter of May 10 to Admiral Sims, it was said:

"The deep mine-field in area B can have no effect in restricting the areas through which the submarines can pass and should not therefore be considered an essential part of the scheme."

Although a verbal agreement was made that as soon as the defects of the deep mines could be remedied the laying of area B would proceed, the safety of ships passing over the field could never be guaranteed and in the memorandum of the deputy chief of naval staff (Admiralty) received by Admiral Sims on July 25, the conclusions were that either area B was to be swept and left clear or that it should be completed with deep and shallow mines. Also that if the latter were done "the channel between the western extremity of area B and the coast line would be so narrow that it would not be available for general purposes."

The width of this channel according to a report of the technical committee (Admiralty) "will be eventually decided with the commander in chief, Grand Fleet, but in view of experience at Dover and difficulty of antisubmarine patrolling without mines, it should not be unduly wide."

To further the desire to actually complete the barrage the Bureau of Ordnance was asked on July 31 to prepare American mines for area B. Then as a result of a

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consultation between the commander in chief, Grand Fleet, and Admiral Freemantle about August 25 a note was addressed to Admiral Sims including items to the effect that—

"It will be seen that the commander in chief is very averse to proceeding at a quicker rate than step by step, and that he considers that the next step should be mining up to the 10-mile limit" (10-mile channel east of Orkneys). "There is a natural reluctance to close the North Sea unless it can be actually guaranteed tight.

"It is suggested therefore that we commence on the 2d of September to mine area B up to the 10 miles without declaring the area, and that when we eventually do notify the area, it shall include right up to the coast. Moreover, the fact that the northern patrol force has failed as a killing force has altered the situation."

On September 9 surface and deep mines were actually laid in area B on a combined excursion of the British and American mine laying squadrons.

With the gradual closing of all areas, enemy submarines commenced to use Norwegian territorial waters to make the passage. On discovery of this fact, the Norwegian Government, after much negotiation and delay, announced September 29, its decision to mine Norwegian territorial waters, which had the effect of closing this gap.

Many minor changes in plan and material occurred from time to time, as will be noted in other chapters of this narrative, but the foregoing is sufficient to show the uncertainty and confusion prevailing throughout the operation.

CHAPTER XVI.—MINING OPERATIONS.

Early in March, 1918, the British were ready to begin mine laying in area B. Work started on March 2, and successive operations took place on the 11th, 19th, and 22d, laying a single row of mines in the southern part of the area at depths of 65, 95, and 125 feet.

On March 22, H. M. S. *Gailardia* was sunk in the vicinity of this field while engaged in the work of laying buoys to mark the North Sea barrage. Mine laying was stopped pending investigation. The loss of this vessel caused considerable alarm in the Grand Fleet, and on March 31 the commander in chief cabled to the admiralty "the chief point to settle is, Are these mines safe if within 45 feet of the surface? Unless this can be guaranteed the policy of laying mines in vicinity of principal fleet base is wrong."[1]

As a result of this the Admiralty wrote the commander in chief on April 24, 1918, that "it is not at present proposed to lay any more mines in area B."

From the United States point of view this was a most unsatisfactory development, for it was our firm conviction that to make the barrage a success it was absolutely necessary that the mines should extend completely across the North Sea, and that surface mines should be laid in areas B and C, as well as in area A. After repeated representations a partial concession was reached on April 20, when it was agreed that we should lay two rows of surface mines in area C to the southward of the contemplated lines of British deep mines. This eliminated the necessity of patrols in area C for the purpose of forcing submarines down into the deep mines, although a smaller patrol was still desirable in order that submarines which were only partially disabled by mines might be destroyed before they could reach an enemy base. The announcement of the Admiralty that no more mines were to be laid in area B was most serious. Admiral Strauss recommended that unless the British Government definitely agreed to carry out the plan of making the barrier at least as complete as had previously been agreed to, that the United States should withdraw from the operation entirely. Our views in regard to mining area B were presented to the Admiralty whenever occasion permitted, with the result that a verbal agreement was at last reached that as soon as the defects of the mines could be remedied the mining of this area would be resumed.

On April 26 notification was issued in Notices to Mariners that all shipping was to avoid the area bounded as follows: (1) Latitude 59° 12′ 5″ north, longitude 4° 49′ east; (2) latitude 59° 29′ north, longitude 3° 10′ east; (3) latitude 58° 25′ north, longitude 0° 50′ west; (4) latitude 59° 20′ north, longitude 0° 50′ west; (5) latitude 60° 21′ north, longitude 3° 10′ east; (6) latitude 60° 00′ north, longitude 4° 56′ east, and thence along the western limits of Norwegian territorial waters to position (1). The area above outlined included areas A and C, but as originally intended area B was not included.

Prior to the commencement of work on the North Sea barrage the British had been carrying out minor mine-laying operations in various localities. In the early spring of 1918 the enemy's submarines were very active in the Irish Channel and it was decided by the Admiralty to lay a deep mine field off the north coast of Ireland in the North Channel.

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As all British mine layers were constantly employed elsewhere, the Admiralty approached Vice Admiral Sims on the subject of lending a United States mine layer for this purpose. The U. S. S. *Baltimore*, Capt. A. W. Marshall, United States Navy, was promptly detailed and arrived at the Clyde on March 8, 1918, being the first American mine layer to arrive in British waters.

The *Baltimore* remained at the Clyde for about three weeks, during which time she was fitted out with paravanes and taut wire measuring gear and opportunity was taken to send parties of officers and men to Grangemouth for instruction at the mining depot and on board the British mine layer *Princess Margaret* in the British H–2 mine and Mark XII sinker.

During this period Capt. Marshall visited Grangemouth to discuss matters with Rear Admiral L. Clinton-Baker, C. B., R. N., who had been ordered by the British Admiralty to arrange all details in connection with laying the above-mentioned mine field.

Capt. Marshall, United States Navy, and Capt. Lockhart Leith, D. S. O., R. N., then visited Larne, Buncrana, Ardrossan, and Lamlash and discussed the procedure for carrying out the mining operations with the senior naval officers at those ports.

Lamlash was selected as the base from which the *Baltimore* should operate. Mines were supplied by train from the mine depot at Immingham. These mines were the British H–2 Star, with Mark XII sinkers (fixed moorings). They were fitted with deep switches and calibrated so as to be inoperative when planted nearer the surface than 50 feet. No sinking plugs were used.

The field was designed to consist of one line of mines at 65 feet, where the water was less than 20 fathoms; one line at 65 feet and one line at 95 feet in water between 20 and 30 fathoms; one line at 65 feet, one line at 95 feet, and one at 125 feet in water of 30 fathoms and above. The mines were to be laid in groups of four, spaced 100 feet between mines in each group, and groups to be 300 feet apart.

All operations were carried out at night, the *Baltimore* being screened by two destroyers. The operations consisted of the following:

April 13, 14, laid 179 mines 65 feet below L. W. O. S.

April 18, 19, laid 120 mines 95 feet below L. W. O. S., 60 mines 125 feet below L. W. O. S.

April 21, 22, laid 180 mines 65 feet below L. W. O. S.

April 27, 28, laid 180 mines 95 feet below L. W. O. S.

May 1, 2, laid 180 mines 125 feet below L. W. O. S.

The following extract from a report made by Rear Admiral Clinton-Baker, R. N., who was in general command of the *Baltimore's* operations, is quoted:

"It is considered that the *Baltimore* laid the lines of mines (as planned) with extreme accuracy; this reflects the greatest credit on Capt. Marshall and his navigating officer, having in view the strong cross tides (3 to 4 knots) that existed in that locality."

On May 6 mine-laying operations were discontinued by orders from the Admiralty on account of a skimming sweep of the mine field having disclosed several shallow mines at the northern end of the field, due in all probability to the very uneven nature of the bottom. This skimming sweep was made at a depth of 40 feet, giving from 30 to 33 feet at the cutters. Acteam sweeps were used. While the sweeping was in progress, one mine was swept up which had 60 fathoms of mooring cable attached. As all mines were planted in this field were set for fixed moorings of approximately 45 fathoms, tests were immediately carried out at Grangemouth to ascertain the reliability of the locking device in the Mark XII sinkers. The results of this test showed the possibility of the locking nut stripping the threads and allowing the full length of the cable on the reel to run out. These sweeping operations began on May 1 and continued until May 5, when a mine was exploded by the sweep in position latitude 55° 33′ 15″ north, longitude 6° 42′ 45″ west. Extensive countermining immediately took place in lines A, B, and C, lasting for a period of between 15 and 30 seconds, and apparently detonating all mines in these three rows. As described by the officer in command of the sweepers:

"There was a continuous series of explosions as rapid as the fire of a Maxim gun, with occasional pauses, in which separate and distinct reports could be heard, followed by a period of intensified sounds, in which separate explosions were indistinguishable."

Sweeping operations were resumed in the North Channel on the 20th of May, when the southwestern portion of D line was skim swept at a depth of 36 feet; nothing found. The following day sweeping continued, but again nothing was found. These sweeping operations continued until the 29th of May, when the entire North Channel deep mine field had been swept at a depth of approximately 36 feet. A few shallow mines were found in lines D and E, but not nearly so many as were found in the other lines. Soundings obtained by the vessels engaged in making the skimming sweep showed

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considerable irregularity in the bottom and much variation from the survey sounding which were used for setting the fixed moorings. This was particularly true of the northeastern part of the field.

Prior to the discontinuation of the planting operations by the *Baltimore*. it appeared as though it would be impossible for her to complete this mine field in time to join the mine squadron for the first operation in the North Sea barrage. Accordingly. the Navy Department was requested to send either one or two of the new mine layers which were most nearly completed to assist her in order that all vessels might be available as soon as operations could begin in the North Sea.

In response to this request the *Roanoke* sailed from the United States on May 3. Before her arrival, however, the *Baltimore's* operations in the North Channel had been discontinued. The *Roanoke* remained several days at Lamlash, then sailed for base 17, where she arrived a week ahead of the other mine layers.

The *Baltimore* remained on the West Coast for several weeks in order to perform experiments for the British in connection with mine laying and mine sweeping, then proceeded to base 18, where she arrived on June 2, 1918.

In the meantime preparations for the commencement of mine laying had been completed. Early Sunday morning, May 26, 1918, the *San Francisco*, flagship of the mine squadron 1, accompanied by the *Canonicus*, *Canandaigua*, *Housatonic*, and *Quinnebaug*, arrived at bases 17 and 18. The squadron commander reported that all vessels would be ready to commence mine laying as soon as they had been watered and refueled. The delivery of mine parts, however, had not come up to expectations and prevented the beginning of operations at once. All of the necessary mine parts were on hand except the antenna floats for mines planted at the lower levels, and it was necessary to wait until a mine carrier had arrived before sufficient of these floats were on hand to enable the necessary numbers of mines to be assembled for the first excursion.

The first excursion was to be a joint operation between the British mine laying squadron, which had been designated by the Admiralty as the first mine-laying squadron, and our vessels which they had named the second mine-laying squadron. We reported that our squadron would be ready to go out on June 6, but it was necessary to wait one day while the British completed the assembly of their mines. The United States squadron left the bases, rendezvoused outside Cromarty Firth with the British destroyers sent to escort them, then proceeded via the swept channels and across the North Sea until Udshire Light was sighted on the coast of Norway. This was used as the point of departure, being the nearest point of land to the position in which the mine laying was to commence.

No difficulties were encountered by any of the vessels with their mining installations or the lack of experience of their crews. The mines were laid with accuracy and precision and the ships, in spite of the various types which constituted the squadron, maneuvered well together.

When the mine field was first proposed it was intended to plant the mines at intervals of 150 feet, but tests conducted by the *San Francisco* while in the United States showed this distance to be impractical on account of the damage done to adjacent mines when one mine exploded. As a result of these experiments it was finally decided that 250 feet was the minimum distance at which mines could safely be planted, and this spacing was used on the first excursion.

Shortly after mine laying had commenced mines began to explode prematurely. This continued as long as the squadron was in touch with the mine field, but the frequency of the explosions decreased rapidly after the laying was completed. By counting the explosions it was estimated that between 3 and 4 per cent of the 3,385 mines laid had blown up. Some of these explosions took place almost immediately after the mines went overboard, severely shaking the vessels from which they were laid. Others did not explode until days after they had been in the water. These explosions, which occurred after each excursion, presented the most baffling problem which the mine force was called upon to solve. Although a loss of 4 per cent of the mines did not seriously reduce the efficiency of the barrage as a whole, such a condition, was, nevertheless, undesirable, and every effort was immediately applied to ascertain the cause.

There appeared to be some doubt as to whether the sperical cylindrical buoys, which were dropped upon completion of the mine laying to mark the end of the field so that the next excursion could commence as close as possible without danger, would survive the weather until the ships again went out. The commander in chief, Grand Fleet, was therefore asked to send two sloops or trawlers to stand by these buoys and assist the squadron in finding them when taking their departure on the following operation. These vessels while performing this duty were able to supply much valuable information to the commander, mine force, as most of them were fitted with listen-

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ing devices, which enabled them to hear and record the explosions occurring between successive operations. From 1 to 11 explosions were noted daily for seven days. By that time practically all explosions had ceased. This seemed to indicate that slow leakage was probably causing these later mines to fire.

Of the 12 marker buoys which were dropped at the end of the field only 3 broke adrift during the following three weeks. Their endurance was sufficient for the purpose intended, and the commander in chief was informed on July 27 that vessels would no longer be required to keep watch on the buoys.

The British mine-laying squadron proceeded separately to area C, where their mines were laid on the same date that ours were put down.

As a result of the joint studies of the American and British planning sections, a somewhat radical but beneficial change in the nature of the field in area A was adopted shortly after the commencement of active mine laying.

As originally agreed upon the American mine field in this area was to consist of three systems, each system comprising one line of mines at 80 feet, one at 160 feet, and one at 240 feet. This arrangement gave an equal density of mines from the surface to the bottom of the barrage. Since, however, there was to be no patrol in area A, submarines attempting to cross the field would undoubtedly do so on the surface, where the damage in case of striking a mine would be the least. Also, submarines being pursued by slow vessels would prefer to proceed on the surface where their chances of escape were best.

Accordingly it was decided that the third system, instead of consisting of one row of mines at each of the three depths, should consist of three rows of surface mines, i. e., 80 feet submergence.

Immediately following this alteration it was decided to double the number of rows of mines in area A. The original plan had called for mines to be laid 150 feet apart, but due to the damage caused by the explosions of neighboring mines and the possibility of countermining, this distance had been gradually increased until it had become 300 feet, just twice the original figure. It was therefore necessary to double the number of systems to give the field the same approximate effectiveness as originally planned.

After the above two changes the barrage in area A was to consist of 10 rows of mines at 80 feet submergence, 4 rows of mines at 160 feet submergence, and 4 rows of mines at 240 feet submergence. As the mooring ropes for the mine anchors were cut in different lengths to correspond with the three depths at which mines were laid, the above change necessitated supplying a great many more anchors for 80-foot mines and fewer for the deeper levels. Fortunately the Bureau of Ordnance was able to meet the new demands without causing delay in the operations.

Shortly after mine laying had begun in area C the Norwegian Government issued a decree to the effect that belligerent submarines equipped for use in warfare must not traverse or stay in Norwegian territorial waters except by reason of stress of weather or to save life. Breach of this prohibition would expose them to armed attack without warning. Norway also reduced the limits of her territorial waters from 4 to 3 miles, since the former figure was not recognized by the principal belligerent nations. This decree, rigidly enforced, would have had the same result as if British and American mines had been laid right up to the Norwegian coast instead of stopping at their territorial waters, but there was good reason to believe that the decree was not enforced against German submarines.

After the completion of the first excursion further mine laying by the United States mine force was temporarily prevented by the nonreceipt of mining material. The first excursion had used up all but three of the antenna floats for the lower level mines. Tests were conducted in Loch Ness to ascertain whether the antenna floats designed for the upper level mines would withstand the deeper immersion.

There were plenty of these floats on hand, and they could have been used and been suitable. They would not, however, hold up when submerged to the necessary depth. The only other possible alternative for continuing mine laying was to lay the two lines of surface mines in area C, which we had recently agreed to do, but here again we were delayed.* Although it was expected that the British would agree to our laying surface mines in this area and the mines had actually been ordered several weeks before the concession had been obtained, there had not been sufficient time for these special anchors to reach the mine bases.

In the meantime the British mine-laying squadron had completed its second and third operations on June 18 and June 30.

The necessary number of anchors for laying two rows of mines in area C finally arrived, and four of the mine layers got underway June 30, laying their cargoes of mines on the following day.

Again approximately 4 per cent of the mines exploded prematurely.

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After the first excursion the probable causes which were thought might be responsible for the premature explosions were gone into and at the same time it was believed that they were largely caused by inaccuracies in assembly and testing, due to the inexperience of the personnel at the bases. The problem was not, however, allowed to rest on this conclusion. Tests were undertaken in Loch Ness and Loch Lochy to determine the accuracy of the depth-taking mechanism and the ability of the mine cases to withstand the pressure when planted at the lower level (240 feet). The depth-taking performance was not particularly satisfactory, but the principal cause was discovered and remedied before the second excursion. Out of the 22 mines submerged to a depth of 300 feet in fresh water 6 of them were crushed and leaks were discovered in 7 others. At 240 feet in fresh water no mines out of 38 planted were crushed and a leak was discovered in only one. It is probable, however, that the factor of safety of the mine case was so small that leaks might be started in adjacent mines by an explosion. This consideration made it desirable to increase the distance between mines from 250 feet, which was used on the first excursion, to 300 feet, which was employed on all following excursions.

The possible causes of premature explosions were many. Soluble washers which were designed to dissolve about 20 minutes after the mine had been planted were found to be very erratic, some of them dissolving in less than a minute after the mine had been planted. The antenna release mechanisms were not entirely satisfactory. Sometimes the shock of the mine striking the water was sufficient to release the floats allowing the antenna coils to foul the mine and fire it as soon as the soluble washer had dissolved. Leaks in the mine case could cause short circuits, which would operate the firing mechanism. In the original design of the mine it had included a circuit breaker in the antennæ circuit which prevented the mine from firing in case the antennæ fouled the mine case or the antenna floats carried away. The production of the circuit breakers had, however, been delayed, and none had been on hand for the first and second excursions. After carefully going over all the probable causes of premature explosions it was impossible to attribute them to any specific cause, and it was hoped that by using the utmost care in the assembly, adjustment, and planting of the mines the percentage of explosions would be further reduced.

After the completion of the second operation it was again necessary to await th receipt of mining material before the succeeding operation could take place. The Bureau of Ordnance had been requested by cable to ship antenna floats by a fast steamer as soon as a sufficient number could be obtained from the manufacturers in order to allow the mining to continue with as little delay as possible. Thirty-five hundred of these floats were shipped on the *Justica*, which arrived on July 10.

On July 6 information was received that several groups of American mines had been found on the Norwegian coast in the vicinity of Bergen. As it was most important to learn the cause of their breaking adrift, arrangements were made to send Lieut. O. W. Bagby, United States Navy, to Norway to obtain all the particulars available. His efforts were fruitless. The Norwegian Government would not permit him to inspect the mines they had recovered, and, after waiting several days, he returned to Base 18. Later information received stated that about 30 mines had been washed ashore and there were no signs of any mooring arrangements. This indicated clearly enough that the moorings had parted at the mine cases. The British had experienced similar difficulties and had found it necessary to use a spring buffer between the mooring cable and the mine case to prolong the life of their mines. Such a device would at least not be detrimental and might materially reduce the percentage of mines which were breaking away from their moorings, so the Admiralty were asked to supply us with the necessary buffers, which was promptly done.

Some of the mines recovered by the Norwegians were disassembled and the principle of the firing mechanism obtained. The Germans probably obtained the secret of our mine shortly afterwards, but, as far as can be learned, they took no defensive measures to protect their submarines while passing over the barrage.

In order to ascertain if the explosions were still continuing and if mines which had broken adrift were floating in the vicinity of the mine field, the *Patapsco* and *Patuxent* were sent out on July 9. After picking up the western end of the first excursion, several additional marker buoys were dropped and the tugs then steamed along the southern side of the United States fields laid in areas A and C. No explosions were heard nor were any floating mines observed.

The fourth British operation was carried out on July 12, again in area C.

Preparations were made for our third operation to commence on July 14. On July 11 a cable was received from the commander in chief, Grand Fleet, that no mining was to be done to the westward of the Greenwich meridian. The excursion as originally planned was to extend from the leaving-off point to the first operation completely across area A, thus finishing the first system of mines. This change was

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not serious so long as it was only temporary, although it was, of course, desirable to complete one fence of mines all the way across the North Sea as soon as possible. The question was taken up with the Admiralty by Admiral Sims and, in view of the fact that it was intended only as a temporary measure, it was acceded to.

The assembly and loading arrangements were altered, and by working night shifts it was possible for the squadron to adhere to the original date of readiness, getting underway for the third excursion on July 14. The following day 5,395 mines were laid in 4 hours and 22 minutes, the largest number so far laid in a single operation. By this time the mining installations had proved most flexible and reliable. Each layer was able to lay its entire quota of mines in one continuous string at a speed of 12½ to 13 knots.

Approximately 5 per cent of the mines exploded prematurely—a slight increase over previous performances. This time it was definitely determined that part of the explosions were caused by countermining. On previous excursions groups had gone off almost simultaneously but it was generally thought to be more or less a freak occurrence of several mines individually exploding at practically the same time or due possibly to the reverberations of an explosion which sounded like several mines individually exploding at practically the same time when it really was but one. Now, however, it was proved beyond a doubt that one mine frequently was responsible for the detonation of several others. Curiously, mines sometimes as much as half a mile away were countermined, while the adjacent mines laid only 300 feet away remained intact. Upon completion of the operation, fog was encountered making it impossible for the ships to check their position while proceeding down the Scottish coast to Cromarty Firth. The swept channel was narrow and close inshore, which added to the difficulty by denying them the prerogative of keeping well clear of the coast. Unfortunately Capt. Belknap, commanding the mine squadron, had issued an order with respect to the danger of sounding, that caused three of the commanding officers not to sound. At 4.20 a. m., July 16, while just north of Cromarty Firth, one of the escorting destroyers sheered close in to the *San Francisco* and reported that they were too close inshore. The squadron turned out, stopped and backed but before headway had been checked the *Roanoke* and the *Canonicus*. had grounded. The *Canonicus* was able to back off but attempts to clear the *Roanoke*, were unsuccessful. She was lightened as much as possible and came off easily on the following high tide. No damage was sustained by either vessel. The commander of the mine force recommended no further proceedings and the matter was disposed of by Admiral Sims in a letter, in part as follows:

"The force commander is of the opinion that a court of inquiry should have investigated the causes for the grounding of the *Roanoke*, on July 16, 1918. It is, however, and has been, impracticable, to order officers of sufficeint rank, to compose such a court; it is noted that damage to the *Roanoke* and other vessels concerned, was slight, and that their availability for duty was not impaired.

"In view of the foregoing, no further action will be taken by the force commander, and the papers in the case will be forwarded to the Navy Department for such action as may be deemed expedient."

About this time the question of the length of antennæ again arose. It will be remembered that the original design of the mine called for antennæ 100 feet long. Early in 1918, however, data became available which showed that the mine charge was insufficient to do material damage to a submarine at this distance. The antennæ was then shortened to 70 feet. Later on further experiments showed even this distance to be too great to seriously cripple a submarine on the surface. It was therefore decided to reduce the length of the antennæ on the upper mine to 55 feet. This change had no sooner been decided on than actual experience showed it was desirable to still further reduce this length. The second week in July a German submarine while attempting to cross the mine field on the surface struck a mine, which exploded but did not do sufficient damage to prevent her reaching port. She reported her condition by radio, which was intercepted and deciphered. The Grand Fleet immediately dispatched fast vessels to attack her. She was able, however, to make sufficient speed to reach her base before this could be accomplished. Upon the representation of the commander in chief, Grand Fleet, and the desires of some of our own representatives, it was decided to further reduce the antennæ for surface mines to 35 feet, planting the mines 45 feet below the surface.

The fifth British operation was carried out on July 21 in area C.

Several days' delay was encountered before our fourth operation on account of again having to wait for mining material. The squadron was reported ready to sail July 25, but it was necessary to wait four days more for the escorting and supporting forces from the Grand Fleet. The British and American operations had recently been overlapping each other in such a manner that one squadron was out at sea while the

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other was loading in port. As this necessitated keeping a large part of the Grand Fleet at sea almost constantly, the commander in chief desired that we should wait until the British squadron had again loaded, so that it would only be necessary to send one force to support both squadrons.

The antennæ for the surface mines were not shortened on this excursion, since the mines had already been assembled and loaded on board the layers. The squadron sailed on July 29, laying 5,399 mines the following day. The premature explosions were much more numerous than on any of the previous excursions, approximately 14 per cent of the mines going off. This was most disconcerting. Instead of the explosions decreasing as experience was gained in the assembly and laying of the mines, the percentage had been gradually increasing, and then had suddenly jumped to 14 per cent on this excursion. Losses of 3 to 4 per cent could possibly be tolerated, but this latter figure was absolutely prohibitive, and the causes of the explosions had to be definitely determined and eliminated.

The same date the mine layers left their bases Admiral Strauss, accompanied by Lieut. Noel Davis, left base 18 to represent the United States at an allied naval conference to be held at Malta to consider mine laying operations in the Mediterranean

Due to the large number of premature explosions which occurred in the fourth operation, the force commander ordered the suspension of further mine laying operations until the cause of the explosions had been ascertained and corrected. All conceivable reasons which might be responsible were again gone over and further tests were conducted. Of these, two seemed to offer the only possibilities of solution. Circuit breakers had been used in the antennae circuits for the first time. This device consisted of a mercury cup which broke the circuit in case the antennae was not released from the mine, or if the floats were carried away allowing the antennae to drop down upon the case. In what adverse manner the circuit breaker might affect the firing device could not be imagined, still, there was a possibility that it was at least partially to blame. The other cause was believed to be due to difficulties in installing the horn bushings in the mine case. Unless this was most carefully done here was danger of grounding the circuit of the firing device on the mine case which would cause the mine to fire as soon as the soluble washer had dissolved.

Believing that the difficulties could be most quickly solved by actual planting, arrangements were made for the next excursion to begin on August 8. Mines were assembled with the electric circuits to the horns disconnected, but in all other respects the same as before.

This was again a joint excursion by the British and American squadrons, the British laying surface mines in area C to the southward of those laid by us on July 1. This was a departure from the original scheme by which the British were only to lay deep mines in this area, but it was in line with the recent change in policy that the surfaces should be more densely mined than the lower depths. Besides this, all our mines had been laid in area C had 70-foot antennae which were unquestionably too long to insure the destruction of submarines on the surface.

The efforts to cure the premature explosions on this excursion were found even less successful than before. After laying 1,596 mines the operation was discontinued and the squadron returned to the bases. Approximately 19 per cent of the mines had exploded.

Evidently the horn circuit could not be at fault and it must be something else. Numerous experiments were again carried out in hopes of discovering the secret of the explosions and another possible cause was developed. It was found that the rubber insulation between the copper plates on the firing device caused sulphates and sulphides to be formed with the copper which , when emmersed in salt water, set up a slight current in the firing circuit in the direction necessary to operate it. Although the current was in most cases small, there was a possibility that if it were eliminated, the mines would then have sufficient stability so as not to explode after they had been planted.

In order to carry out the practical part of the experiments after the theoretical tests had been completed at the bases, the *San Francisco* proceeded to the mine field on the 12th of August. The copper plates of the K71 devices were carefully cleaned and circuit breakers were fitted on half of the 166 mines which were to be planted. Seven of this number exploded prematurely, four of which were due to the antennæ fouling the mine cases. In order to obtain definite data in regard to countermining the mines were set to fire as soon as the soluble washers dissolved. Each of these caused one additional mine to explode. A depth charge was also dropped in the vicinity of the field which caused six mines to go off.

The improvement obtained in this test was sufficient to enable mine laying to be resumed after cleaning the copper plates on all mines. It was further decided to omit the circuit breakers as they were additional complications of unknown value. The

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copper horns of the mines were also shortened to mere points to reduce the possibility of the antennæ becoming hooked around them.

The squadron sailed on the sixth excursion on August 18 and the mine laying was completed on the 19th. The British squadron proceeded at the same time to complete their lines of surface mines in area C. Twelve per cent of our mines exploded prematurely. The majority of these were due to countermining. The real cause of the premature firing evidently had not yet been discovered, but the improvement obtained was sufficiently encouraging to permit another attempt to be made.

On August 5 the commander in chief Grand Fleet lifted restrictions he had placed on mining to the westward of the Greenwich meridian. The next excursion was correspondingly planned to complete the first fence of mines across area A.

Admiral Strauss returned from the Malta conference on 22d of August. After the excursion another probable cause of the premature firing was discovered which proved to be final solution of the difficultues. The first lots of firing devices shipped to the bases were adjusted to fire at a voltage between 25 and 40 millivolts. The Bureau of Ordnance decided, from experiments conducted in the United States, that this voltage was unnecessarily high and reduced it so that the mines would fire between 10 and 25 millivolts. It was not known when this later type of firing device first began to be installed. The original type was undoubtedly used on the first three excursions when a comparatively low percentage of the mines exploded. After that it was probable that the majority of the mines were assembled with the firing devices which had been adjusted to fire at the lower voltage.

It was therefore decided that on the seventh excursion the first 600 mines planted should be adjusted to fire between 20 and 35 millivolts; then, if the observations on this part of the field indicated sufficient improvement, this adjustment should be used on subsequent excursions.

The squadron got under way 26th of August and stood out toward the mine field. The *Saranac* broke down shortly after leaving the base and had to return to Inverness with her full cargo of mines. The remaining nine ships, however, continued and carried out the operation. Unfortunately dense fog was encountered practically throughout the operation, so thick at times that it was impossible for the vessels to see the next ship abeam, distant only 500 yards. These conditions made observations extremely difficult for the *Patapsco* and *Patuxent*, which were sent out with the squadron to follow astern while planting was in progress and count the explosions to determine the percentage which occurred. From the date obtained from the mine layers and the tugs it appeared that only about 3 per cent of the first mines exploded prematurely. In the remainder of the field, which had the low-voltage regulation, approximately 12 per cent went off.

The adjustment of the firing device was undoubtedly the solution we had sought for, but in order to test it further and to complete the deficiency in this field caused by the breakdown of the *Saranac*, the *Shawmut* and *Aroostook* were loaded with mines adjusted to fire between 20 and 35 millivolts and sent out on August 30. Of the 600 mines they planted, only 3 per cent exploded. This was the first opportunity we had had to use these two vessels for their originally intended purpose; that is, as a fast wing to the mining squadron. Both ships proceeded to the field and planted their full quotas at a speed of 17 knots with no difficulty. They could plant as easily at their maximum speed as they could at 12 knots.

This final solution of the premature explosions was a great relief. It explained, in addition, the probable reason for countermining. The tests conducted to ascertain the effect of the copper sulphate deposits on the plates of the firing device showed that as much as 10 millivolts could be generated. This was sufficient to rotate the armature of the firing device through a considerable portion of its arc so that a slight additional shock, which might readily be caused by the explosion of a nearby mine, would be sufficient to shake the firing ball from its cup and detonate the mine. By increasing the tension of the hair spring on the armature, the voltage necessary to fire a mine could be raised to the desired amount.

In the latter part of August information was received that another enemy submarine was damaged while attempting to cross our barrage, and had been compelled to return to its base on the surface. These repeated instances of submarines deprived of their principal means of defense pointed more strongly than ever to the necessity of having patrol vessels stationed at intervals along the barrage to attack submarines which had encountered mines but had not been completely destroyed.

The question of mining area B again came up and a decision was finally reached to mine it with both surface mines and deep mines. The commander in chief, grand fleet, however, objected to mining completely up to the Orkney Islands, and it was decided that a gate 10 miles in width would be left which should be closed later when conditions indicated this step to be necessary.

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The mines which had been laid in this area by the British in March, 1918, had in the meantime been swept up. The British had also placed a series of mine nets to the southward of area B, extending part of the way between the western end of area A and Duncansby Head. These had not proved successful and were also removed before the mining in area B was resumed.

The eighth excursion was intended as a surprise excursion. Neutral nations had not been notified that area B was dangerous to shipping, and with this knowledge, enemy submarines were constantly passing through it on their way to the Atlantic. It was accordingly decided not to notify the area but to secretly route all shipping so as to avoid it, with the hope that submarines might still attempt to use it after it had been mined. In order to prevent the enemy observing the mining while it was in progress, an elaborate patrol was arranged, beginning the day before the operation and continuing until after its completion.

British and American mining squadrons rendezvoused off the Orkney Islands on September the 7th and proceeded to carry out the operation. We laid six lines of surface mines across area B while the British laid one line of surface mines parallal to ours. This was really the first joint operation carried out by the British and American squadrons. On several previous occasions both squadrons had been at sea at the same time, but had not been working side by side, so as to necessitate appointing one officer to command the expedition. On this occasion Admiral Strauss was designated to take general charge of both squadrons while mining was in progress.

In spite of the high voltage adjustment of the firing devices, 13 per cent of the mines exploded. About five-sixths of this number were due to countermining, indicating that the mines were still too sensitive and that the voltage must be still further increased. Tests that had been made indicated that contact of the antennæ with the hull of the ship invariably gave voltages about 100 millivolts, and it was therefore considered entirely safe to further increase the adjustment of the firing device to operate between 30 and 45 millivolts. This was done for all subsequent excursions.

An interesting sidelight on the activities of the mine force were the tests and experiments which were almost constantly in progress. Besides the difficulties encountered in solving the problem of premature explosions, numerous other questions arose in connection with the new American mine. The facilities at hand were ideal for mining experiments. The chain of lakes forming the principal part of the Caledonian Canal, which terminated at base 18, offered smooth water with depths varying up to 800 feet, which corresponded to the maximum depth encountered in the North Sea barrage. The only drawback was that the water was fresh instead of salt. During July, the British had conducted a series of experiments to ascertain the accuracy with which their mines took their prescribed depth. The results were not entirely satisfactory, and since our mine anchor had been largely copied from the one they were using, it was also probable that ours were not behaving as designed. Tests were carried out in Loch Lochy during the first week in September when 50 mines were planted with anchors adjusted to moor the mine 45 feet below the surface. The average depth actually taken was 44.6 feet. The shallowest mine was 39.2 feet and the deepest one at 48.7 feet. The results were entirely satisfactory and were all that could be expected.

All the mines which had thus far been laid in area B were surface mines, and since this was still the weakest part of the barrage, it was decided that the following excursion should also be placed in this area, laying two rows of mines at each of the three standard depths.

A delay of nine days was occasioned waiting on the British mining squadron, since it was desired that both the British and American squadrons should lay their mines on the same date in order to reduce the possibility of the enemy observing mining operations in this area. Delays of this nature were most serious. It was realized that mine laying operations would be interfered with if not altogether stopped during the winter months on account of the severity and frequency of the storms in the North Sea. It was also extremely desirable to complete the barrage at the earliest possible date in order that operations in the Mediterranean might be undertaken.

The work of assembling mines at the bases, refueling the ships, and embarking new loads of mines had reached such a stage of efficiency that it was possible to reduce the length of time that it was necessary for the ships to remain in port to two days. The vessels were ordinarily away from the bases two or three days, thus making it possible to complete an operation every four or five days. At the same time mines were being shipped at a faster rate from the United States, in anticipation of the speed with which they could be laid. Delays therefore caused most serious complications at the bases on account of the difficulty of stowing the material in the limited spaces provided. Another phase which should not be overlooked was the effect on the morale

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of the personnel aboard the mine layers. It was always necessary to load the layers as soon as possible after their return to port since delays could seldom be foreseen. This resulted in the vessels remaining in harbor with cargoes of mines on board for a considerable period of time. This caused serious inconvenience to the personnel since practically all of the living space on board was occupied by mines, making it necessary for the men to sleep on deck between the tracks or wherever it was possible to find sufficient space to spread a hammock. Messing arrangements as well as nearly all of the other accommodations existing on board ship were badly interferred with. These delays became more frequent and of longer duration as the completion of the barrage drew near. Sometimes it was due to having to wait while the British squadron was being loaded, but more frequently was attributed to movements of the Grand Fleet making it impossible to supply the necessary destroyers to act as our escort. Had it been possible to obtain sufficient of our own destroyers for this purpose it would have enabled the barrage to have been completed by approximately the 1st of October.

In the early morning of September 20, while the United States mining squadron was on its way to the mine field to carry out the ninth excursion, a submarine was sighted off Stronsay Firth. She was immediately attacked with depth charges by the escorting destroyers and at the same time a smoke screen was put out by both the escort and the mine layers. Shortly afterwards she was again sighted just ahead of the *San Francisco* and was again attacked. The behavior of the submarine was most unusual. Although both times she was sighted she was in good position and at a comparatively close range no attempt was made to fire a torpedo. It is highly probable that she had been sent to this position to the southwestward of the lines of mines which had shortly before been laid in area B, in order that she might make observations of the positions in which mines were being laid in this area.

The squadron proceeded through Westray Firth and thence to a position about 6 miles to the northward of the western and of the field which was laid on the 7th of September, where the mining began. In this excursion, 5,520 mines were laid in 3 hours and 50 minutes—the record number that has ever been laid by a mine-laying force in a single operation. At the same time, the British squadron laid 1,300 mines in a single line parallel and to the northward of those laid by us. Rear Admiral Strauss was in command of the United States layers on board the *San Francisco*. Rear Admiral Clinton Baker commanded the whole expedition.

During the mine-laying, when about midway between the ends of the previous field which had been laid in area B, one of the escorting destroyers sighted the body of a dead sailor floating in the water. He was recognized to be a German by the type of life preserver he wore. Since no engagements with the enemy had occurred within miles of this position, it is extremely probable that an enemy submarine had been destroyed by one of the mines which had been laid on September 7.

The reduction of premature explosions on this excursion was a marked improvement, being between 5 and 6 per cent as compared with 13 per cent on the previous operation. The firing devices had been adjusted to operate between 30 and 45 millivolts, and this regulation could not readily be increased, on account of the construction of the mechanism. It was perhaps as well that it should not be further raised, as the mine might be possibly made too sensitive to operate when a poor contact was made by the antennæ.

After completing the ninth excursion, work was resumed in area A. On September 27, 5,450 mines were laid, slightly over 4 per cent of which exploded prematurely. Only nine of the mine layers took part in this operation.

On account of the great depths of water in which it would be necessary to lay mines in the Mediterranean, it was necessary to develop a special type of mine. A satisfactory design had been evolved by the Bureau of Ordnance, but it was essential to conduct a series of practical tests before beginning the manufacture. No vessel was available in the United States for this purpose, so the *Baltimore* was ordered home to carry out the required experiments. She proceeded as far as Pentland Firth in company with the squadron on their way to the mine field for the tenth excursion, where she was detached to Scapa Flow to obtain routing instructions across the Atlantic from the commander in chief grand fleet.

The eleventh operation was carried out on October 4, again in area A, and approximately 6 per cent of the mines exploded prematurely. Losses up to this amount had, however, come to be accepted as normal for this type of mine. The Bureau of Ordnance also considered this figure a reasonable loss on account of the various defects which are invariably encountered in the production of material in such vast quantities.

Since the operation in the Mediterranean would probably have kept the mine force engaged until well into the summer of 1919, it was considered advisable to have the mine layers docked prior to their departure for those waters, where such facilities would

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be extremely limited. After the completion of the eleventh excursion the *Shawn* and *Aroostook* were detached from the squadron and proceeded to Newcastle-on-Tyne for this purpose. It was intended to send two vessels there after each operation having them return in time to take part in the second following excursion. Permission was obtained for the ships' crews to do the work in connection with scraping and painting the ship's bottoms—an arrangement which had been found to very materially expedite the time required for docking.

With the mining of area B, the problem of enemy submarines gaining access to the Atlantic became serious. Several submarines had encountered mines in the barrage but had managed to reach their bases bearing material evidence of the existence of the barrier. It was only natural, therefore, that the enemy should look about for whatever means remained of reaching the Atlantic without risking passage across the mine fields. Small submarines occasionally successfully ran the blockade at the Dover Channel, but this was apparently not attempted by the larger boats. Pentland Firth and the 10-mile gate to the eastward of the Orkneys were heavily patrolled. Submarines evidently would not risk passage through Pentland Firth while submerged on account of the dangerous currents. The only remaining passage was through Norwegian territorial waters. Although Norway had issued a proclamation that belligerent submarines using her waters for this purpose would be fired upon, this risk seemed less than any of the others and there was no apparent hesitancy in using it. One enemy submarine while passing through these waters even went so far as to fire on a Norwegian vessel. These repeated violations resulted in a statement on September 29 by the Norwegian Government that mines would be laid in the vicinity of Udsire Island in order to prevent belligerent vessels using her territorial waters for purposes contrary to the provisions of international law. This mining is understood to have been completed by them about the 7th of October and had the effect of completing the barrage from the end of area C to the Norwegian coast.

On October 11 the British squadron laid two partial rows of surface mines in the southwestern portion of area B. These proved to be the last mines laid by them in the North Sea barrage prior to the armistice a month later.

The United States mining squadron completed the twelfth excursion on the 13th of October, losing 4 per cent by premature explosions. The *Roanoke* and *Canandaigua* proceeded to Newcastle for docking upon the completion of the operation.

Eight days' delay were encountered before the 13th and last operation could begin. On account of the sequence of the British and American operations in areas A and C, it had been impractical to extend the mine fields so as to overlap each other. This left a gap between the two areas approximately 6 miles wide. In order to close this the next excursion was planned to consist of six rows of surface mines to the southward of the gap, continuing with two rows into area C so as to complete the four rows which the United States had agreed to lay in this area.

The first of the winter weather was encountered in this operation, when it was necessary for the squadron to wait one day after having reached the mine field before the sea moderated sufficiently to enable the mines to be laid. Even then the ships were rolling as much as twenty to thirty degrees on each side of the vertical. This provided an excellent test of the mining installations with the result that no difficulties were encountered by any of the ships, either in the stowing of their mines or in the actual planting under such severe conditions. The operation was completed October 26, having laid 3,760 mines, of which slightly over 4 per cent were lost by premature explosions.

Although the United States mining squadron was again ready for the next excursion by October 30, it was necessary to wait until the British squadron had completed the operation which they had planned before escort could be furnished us. Reliable information indicated that enemy submarines were crossing the eastern portion of area A, and the British had decided to lay surface mines in this position to the southward of those laid on our first excursion so as to strengthen this part of the field which was the least effectively mined part of the area. Weather conditions, however, prevented them from going out for several days, and, in the meantime, the series of events during the latter part of October and 1st of November brought the end of the war so plainly in view that further mining would have been an unnecessary waste of time, effort, and material. The British squadron did not carry out their contemplated operation, nor likewise did we. With the signing of the armistice on November 11 with Germany—the perpetrator of ruthless submarine warfare against both allied and neutral commerce—came the end of building the North Sea mine barrage.

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CHAPTER XVII.—FINAL STATUS OF BARRAGE AND RESULTS OBTAINED.

On November 11, 1918, when hostilities ceased, upon the signing of the armistice, the status of the northern barrage, as set forth in an Allied Naval Council Annual Report, dated December 16, 1918, was as follows:

1. The northern barrage extends from Norwegian territorial waters to within 10 miles of the Orkney Islands, and lies in the area contained by the following positions:

60° N., 4° 54½′ E.
60° 21′ N., 3° 10′ E.
59° 20′ N., 50′ W.
59° 20′ N., 2° 5′ W.
58° 50′ N., 2° 27′ W.
58° 50′ N., 50′ W.
59° 29′ N., 3° 10′ E.
59° 12½′ N., 4° 49′ E.

2. The barrage has been divided into three areas, A, B, and C. Area C extends from Norwegian territorial waters to the meridian of 3° 10′ E. Area A extends from this meridian to 5′ W., and area B from the western extremity of area A to within 10 miles of the Orkneys.

3. Mine laying operations were commenced in March, 1918, by Great Britain, and in June, 1918, by the United States of American, British and American mines being used, and up to November 11 a total of 56,760 United States and 16,300 British mines have been laid.

4. The original intention was, that the United States mine layers should lay the mines in area A, and the British mine layers in areas B and C, and this arrangement has in the main been adhered to, but a certain number of United States mines have also been laid in areas B and C. This was done in order the more effectively to deal with the submarine situation at the moment, and to make the best use of the greater mine-laying capacity of the United States mine layers.

5. The completion of the barrage within Norwegian territorial waters has been effected by Norway herself.

In July, 1918, conclusive evidence was obtained that German submarines were habitually using Norwegian territorial waters. Representations were made by the British Government to the Norwegian Government that the only effectual way of securing the observance by Germany of the Norwegian Royal Decree was for Norway either to mine these waters herself, or to allow the allied and United States Governments. After protracted negotiations, during which evidence as to the identity of submarines reported on various dates to have been seen in Norwegian territorial waters was furnished to the Norwegian Government, a note was received from the Norwegian Government, by the allied and associated governments on the 28th September, protesting against the violation of Norwegian regulations by a British submarine (in a case which had been previously admitted by Great Britain) and stating that in view of the numerous cases of infringement of her territorial waters by submarines which had been established with certainty, it had been decided to lay mines in certain localities.

6. On 29th September, 1918, an official announcement appeared in the leading Norwegian Government organ to the effect that mines would be laid in Norwegian waters between latitudes 59° 8′ N. and 59° 25′ N., and to the westward of longitude 5° 10′ E., and that these waters would be closed for general traffic from 7th October, 1918.

AREA A.

7. The depth of water in this area is from 50 to 80 fathoms. The approved minefields in this area will, when completed, consist generally of:

Nine lines of United States mines, dangerous to surface craft and to submarines at periscope depth.

Three lines of United States mines, at a depth of 160 feet, the mines having a dangerous area (above the mines) of 70 feet.

Three lines of United States mines, at a depth of 240 feet, with a similar dangerous area.

Three more operations were required to complete the approved minelaying in this area. Any reinforcement of the minefields in area A would depend on the submarine situation at the time.

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AREA B.

8. The depth of water is from 40 to 75 fathoms. At the present time the following lines of mines have been laid across the area:
One line of British mines dangerous to surface craft.
One line of British mines at 95 feet deep.
Eight lines of United States mines dangerous to surface craft and to submarines at periscope depth.
Two lines of United States mines at 160 feet deep, having a dangerous area (above the mines) of 70 feet.
Two lines of United States mines, at a depth of 240 feet, with a similar dangerous area.
Two further lines of British mines have been commenced across the area. The submarine situation will determine any future action in this area.

AREA C.

9. The depth of water is from 65 to 160 fathoms. At the present time the following lines of mines have been laid across area C:
Two lines of British mines dangerous to surface craft.
Two lines of British mines at 65 feet deep.
Two lines of British mines at 95 feet deep.
Two lines of British mines at 125 feet deep.
Four lines of United States mines dangerous to surface craft and to submarines at periscope depth.
Six lines of United States mines dangerous to surface craft and to submarines at periscope depth have been laid across the junction line between areas A and C.
Any further mining in area C will depend upon the submarine situation at the time.

GATES.

10. There are no gates in the barrage, the only free passage through being the 10-mile gap at its western extremity which, however, is not used more than is absolutely necessary.

PATROL.

11. The barrage is not patrolled.
Rear Admiral Strauss has summoned up the final status of the operation and the results obtained from it is as follows:
Had it been possible to carry out mine-laying operations as fast as the necessary mining material was received and assembled, the American portion of the North Sea barrage could have been completed by the latter part of September, 1918. The frequent delays, especially during the latter part of the work, which were principally due to the necessity of awaiting for escort to be supplied by the Grand Fleet, or for the British mine squadron to complete its preparations so as to be able to go out at the same time, prevented the barrage from being completed prior to the signing of the armistice with Germany on November 11.
In all, 70,263 mines were laid, 56,611 being American mines, laid by the United States mining squadron, area A, which was originally allotted as the United States portion of the barrage, was completed except for 6,400 mines more, which could have been laid in approximately 10 days. Besides mining area A exclusively, the United States mining squadron had laid 10,440 mines in area B, and 5,980 mines in area C. Thus it will be seen that in addition to mining the part of the barrage originally assigned to the United States Government, we had in addition laid more mines in the British areas, B and C, than they themselves had put down. One more small excursion in area B by the United States mine force would have given it the same density of American mines as area A. Area C was the weakest portion of the barrage. The British had originally agreed to mine this area only to a depth of 200 feet but were only able to complete the work to a depth of 125 feet. This figure was just one-half the effective depth of the remainder of the barrage.
Until the animosity incident to warfare has disappeared and the freedom of discussion of war-time secrets can be attained, it will be impossible to accurately determine the actual results achieved by the North Sea barrage. Such information as has been possible to collect bears witness to its efficacy notwithstanding the short time the barrage was in operation.
After the first two American excursions had been completed, two enemy submarines were damaged in attempting to cross area C. The first, the U-86, was damaged

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on July 9 while passing homeward, reaching port successfully and bearing tangible proof that the North Sea barrage was a reality and not a threat. The other, the U–22, was to have passed, but nothing has been heard from her since. The enemy of course immediately routed his submarines through area B, which had not been proclaimed, or through Norwegian territorial waters. On August 10, U–115 was damaged in the barrage on an outward bound trip and was forced to turn back. The surprise mining in area B on September 7 obtained immediate results. It will be remembered that when it was decided to place mines in this area no notification was given to neutral nations that it would be dangerous to navigation. Instead a heavy patrol was placed around the area to guard it and keep down enemy submarines while mines were being laid. Just prior to the mining operations a large convoy was routed across this area in order to deceive enemy submarines which might possibly have seen the convoy and thus lead the enemy to believe that this area was to be maintained free of mines. On September 8, the day following that on which the mines were laid, the U–92 was sunk in this area while another submarine was so severely damaged that it was forced to return to its base immediately. This occurred while the submarine was outward bound. Rather than risk a passage again through the same waters, she proceeded to area A, recrossing the barrage in that position without further damage.

After this it appeared that passages were attempted directly across area A, which, due to the United States participating in the mining of areas C and B, was comparatively poorly mined. The tenth, eleventh, and twelfth excursions, however, during the latter part of September, and the first part of October, added a great deal to the effectiveness of area A, so that the loss of U–156 on September 25 and U–123 on October 18 can most certainly be attributed to this area.

With the information at present available, it appears that a total of 6 submarines were destroyed in the barrage and possibly an equal number were severely damaged. On account of the difficulty of obtaining accurate information, such a short time after the armistice was signed, it is highly probable that subsequent data will show even greater damage to have been done.

It is well to remember that a mine barrage of this nature can never be an absolute barrier possessing 100 per cent efficiency. On account of the necessity of laying the mines at a distance of approximately 300 feet apart in order to reduce the possibility of countermining, it would always be possible for a submarine with a beam of approximately 30 feet to successfully cross such a barrier no matter how many parallel lines of mines may be laid. The danger in crossing, of course, increases with the number of rows of mines but not in direct proportion. The object, then, in constructing a barrage must be to make the danger incurred by the passage of a vessel sufficiently great to prevent submarines from taking the risk involved. The American portion of the barrage was designed to offer the following resistances to the passage of submarines.

A vessel passing on the surface or submerged above a depth of 50 feet stood one chance in three of making a successful passage; submarines passing submerged between depths of 50 feet and 250 feet had approximately two chances out of three of passing the barrage without encountering a mine.

The object of making the passage across the surface barrage more dangerous than at the lower levels was largely psychological, for even though a submarine which was forced to cross the barrage might know that the danger on the surface was the greatest, the moral factors involved were usually sufficient to induce them to accept the greater hazard on the surface rather than face the danger of striking a mine while submerged.

In connection with the enemy's attitude toward antisubmarine measures taken by the Allies, it is interesting to note the statement of a captured German submarine commander who had had considerable experience on that particular type of vessel. He expressed the opinion that of all the antisubmarine measures which had been taken, mines were by far the most dreaded by the German submarine personnel, principally because there was nothing to indicate their presence. Also because the quality of allied mines had recently been improved in a most unpleasant manner; the former practice of fishing them up and taking them home for conversion into punch bowls for submarine messes had now been entirely abandoned, he said.

One feature of the barrage which offered several possibilities but was never more than partially put into operation was the question of patrols to guard the mine field to force submarines into the deep mines and destroy those which had not been completely disabled. This measure had been argued for from the very beginning, although no definite agreements were ever reached. The first arrangement was that areas B and C should be deep mined only and that the surface should be guarded with patrols. Area B was not mined, however, until comparatively late in the work on the barrage and during this time was only indifferently patrolled, thus affording a comparatively safe passage for enemy submarines through this area. The United States Government

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had been asked to lay two rows of surface mines in area C early in the history of active operations and this had been done on July 1. Two lines of mines, however, form a very ineffective barrier and patrols in this area would have been of the greatest assistance, not only in driving submarines into the lower level mines, which were more closely spaced but also in preventing submarines from using Norwegian territorial waters to get by the barrage. This latter measure could have been effected by hydrophone vessels lying outside the Norwegian territorial waters where enemy submarines could easily have been detected when attempting such a passage. The question of patrols, especially for catching crippled submarines after it became known that many of them were not disabled when exploding a mine at a distance of 70 feet, arose continuously but on account of the tremendous demands for such vessels both for anti-submarine work in other waters and for escorting coastwise convoys, it was impossible to obtain any vessels for this purpose.

Although the enemy undoubtedly obtained the secret of the American mine shortly after the first mines were washed ashore and recovered in Norway in the early part of July, it is interesting to note that apparently no attempt was made to fit their submarines with protective devises which would have enabled them to pass safely through the American mine fields. Such a device, although it was unknown until after the armistice, was readily devised when the necessity arose for protecting vessels which would be employed in clearing the North Sea of mines after the end of the war.

Information had also been received indicating that the Germans had built special vessels called mine barrier breakers of a practically unsinkable character, so that they could be used to clear passages through mine fields. Evidently none of these vessels attempted operations in the North Sea barrage.

The mine as a weapon of nautical warfare now presents greater possibilities than ever before. The United States in less than one year was able to construct a squadron of mine layers and produce sufficient mines to keep them constantly employed, laying on each excursion in less than four hours more mines than the United States had ever possesed prior to her entry into this great war. Too much credit can not be given to those who designed the mine. Clever, simple, and effective, this mine proved, perhaps, the most efficient single weapon against the enemy's submarines. Equally as remarkable as the invention of the mine itself was the development and production by the Bureau of Ordnance. Any complicated instrument of this nature ordinarily requires years of experiments and modifications before it finally becomes sufficiently satisfactory and reliable to allow it to be used. Time, however, was the supreme factor. Every minute counted in order to save the merchant shipping and the wise forethought and judgment of those to whom the production of the mine was intrusted should go down in history as one of the most worthy achievements of the war. Minor defects and difficulties, of course, were encountered in the actual operation and handling of the mines, but these were also met and solved on the spot by the United States mine force.

Mine laying, like the havoc wrought upon the battle fields by the destruction of property, leaves its effects to be felt after peace is obtained. Thousands upon thousands of mines have been laid in European waters, a major portion of the work being concentrated in the North Sea barrage. With the cessation of hostilities and the resumption of free shipping these mines constitute an ever present danger to the vessels on the seas. Many of them break adrift and, carried by the wind and tide, often appear in waters which were thought to be clear of mines. One of the first steps after the armistice was to divide the work of clearing the seas among the various nations involved. At an allied naval conference the United States volunteered to remove all mines which they had laid and arrangements were immediately taken in hand to carry out this work. A method of sweeping this peculiar mine, together with the development and the organization of the force required, had been completed and actual sweeping operations were commenced before the treaty of peace had been signed.

APPENDIXES.

APPENDIX B.

Confidential. JUNE 1, 1917.

From: Commander S. P. Fullinwider, United States Navy (retired).
To: The Secretary of the Navy (Chief of Naval Operations).
Via: Chief of Bureau of Ordnance.
Subject: Proposed plan of American operations in the war.

1. In accordance with article 1534 (4) United States Navy Regulations the following brief plan of operations is suggested for consideration.

2. From published information regarding prospective war measures of the United States, I gather that our Government intends to send an army of 500,000 or more men

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to reenforce the Franco-British lines in France. It is suggested that, while this is a natural and popular measure, its execution will involve very grave difficulties for the following reasons:

(*a*) There is little doubt that Germany is constructing submarines faster than they are being destroyed. If this be true, one is forced to the conclusion that, unless some more successful means is quickly found to curb the submarine menace, Great Britain and France will be defeated if Germany can prolong the war.

(*b*) Plans for bottling up the enemy's submarines by means of a mine barrier from Scotland to Norway and across the English Channel are under consideration, but the success of such a plan is problematical and can not be definitely relied upon. At any rate it could not be carried into full effect inside of six months. Therefore the difficulty of supplying Great Britain and France with munitions and food is bound to increase until next spring if not indefinitely.

(*c*) If in the next few months we send a half million men to the "west front," we will increase very greatly the heavy burden of the Atlantic transport systems since we would have to supply our Army with all the supplies and munitions it would require.

(*d*) The loss of some American transports with thousands of men might have a very grave effect on American public opinion and would correspondingly encourage the German people.

(*e*) If Russia should fail us and make a separate peace, Germany would be able to procure supplies from the east in abundance and would grow stronger actually and relatively.

3. If, instead of sending more than a division or so to France, we were to send 500,000 or 1,000,000 men to the "east front," say, to Galicia or Roumania, many of the above-mentioned difficulties would disappear and victory would be more assured for the following reasons:

(*a*) While our line of communications via Vladivostok to the east front would be very long, it would be absolutely safe, since it is not conceivable that Germany can extend her submarine warefare to the Pacific for lack of bases. The distance from Puget Sound to Vladivostok is only about 1,500 miles greater than from New York to England or France. The rail route from Vladivostok to the front presents a problem, but Russia in her war with Japan transported to Manchuria and supplied an army of a half million men on a single-track road, and that road is now double-tracked for the most part.

(*b*) By physical as well as moral and financial backing we would probably hold Russia firmly in line and prevent any possibility of a separate peace on her part.

(*c*) An American army in Russia, would obtain the greater part of its supplies, except munitions from Russia, thus relieving us of the necessity of shipping great quantities of provisions and other supplies from this country. It should be practicable also to establish American munition factories in Russia to help supply our Army, thus still further simplifying the transport problem.

(*d*) An American army in Russia would account for a greater German force than would the same army on the west front, owing to the difference in conditions in the two fronts, and thus the pressure on the French and British lines would be greatly reduced.

(*e*) A successful American-Russian campaign on the east front would give greater assurance of saving Roumania and Serbia.

(*f*) The post-bellum relations between Russia and the United States would be all that could be desired as a result of close cooperation in a victorious war.

(*g*) Russia and the world would be freed of the danger of a German ascendancy in her economic life.

(*h*) Japan would be forced "to show her hand," which might be desirable or not, according to the point of view. In all probability Japan would decide that it would be in her interest also to put an army in the field alongside ours.

(*i*) For transports in the Pacific we could utilize, of course, the *Vaterland* and other passenger ships. We could use for this service also wooden ships and others that are undesirable or unsafe for transport or freight service in the danger zones of the Atlantic.

Possibly also Japanese ships would be available as transports.

(*j*) Transports, instead of returning home empty, probably could bring cargoes of provisions from Russia, thereby reducing the drain on our food resources.

4. I think that we may assume without question that Great Britain and France could hold their present lines until such time as we could place a million men on the east front; then victory would come quickly, much quicker than if we try to fight it out on the west front, leaving Russia to "find herself" unaided.

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5. To summarize, I suggest that our plan for the further prosecution of the war should be:

(*a*) Send a large army to Russia.
(*b*) Close the North Sea by means of mine barriers.
(*c*) Continue and increase our operations against submarines in the open sea.
(*d*) Build as many cargo ships as possible.
(*e*) Give the Franco-British forces a decisive preponderance in air craft..
(*f*) Give the American-Russian forces on the east front supremacy in the air as well as on land.

S. P. FULLINWIDER.

APPENDIX C.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
GENERAL BOARD,
Washington, October 24, 1917.

Confidential.

From: Senior member General Board.
To: Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: Proposed measures to prevent German submarines from operating against allied commerce in the Atlantic.
Inclosures: (*a*) Memorandum dated October 23, 1917, by Capt. R. R. Belknap, United States Navy, re proposed mine barrage, Scotland to Norway; (*b*) General Board letter No. 425 (serial No. 776) of October 20, 1917, inquiry re mine barrier across North Sea; (*c*) memorandum of October 23, 1917, from British Embassy quoting Admiralty reply to reference (*b*). (*d*) Memorandum of October 18, 1917, from Chief of Naval Staff to Chief of Naval Operations re mines and cooperation of United States in mining operations. (*e*) General Board letter No. 425–5 (serial No. 777) of October 22, 1917, plans for opposing enemy submarine activity in Atlantic trade routes by mine barrage at entrances to North Sea.

1. The General Board has been requested by the Navy Department to consider the possible offensive operations against German submarines bases and to recommend that form of offensive which, in cooperation with the British naval focres, promises to most quickly and effectively limit submarine depredations upon allied commerce.

2. German submarines now operate from bases in three widely separated localities: Kiel Bay in the Baltic; Helgoland Island and the mouths of the rivers emptying into the North Sea; and from the Zeebrugge-Ostend region on the Belgian coast. Submarine operations are much facilitated by the safe passage afforded in neutral waters through the Kettegat and Skagerrack from bases on Kiel Bay; and boats leaving the Helgoland region or Belgian coast pass into the Atlantic through the Dover Strait or around Scotland. The situation is further complicated by the Kiel Canal, by which submarines may operate either from Helgoland Bight or Kiel Bay.

3. Obviously the most effective method of combating submarines is to stop them, if practicable, at their bases. Failing this, to take preventive measures as near these bases as possible before they have had an opportunity to scatter on the trade routes. If neither of these measures is practicable, submarines must be hunted down in the open sea by the methods now employed.

4. The offensive against submarine bases may take three forms: (1) An attack by heavy ships, smaller surface craft, submarines, and aircraft, with a view to the occupation or destruction of such bases; (2) closing outlets to them by channel obstructions, mines, and a close surface and submarine blockade; (3) by the construction and maintenance of more distant mine barriers which will prevent the passage of submarines into the North Sea or into the Atlantic.

5. Each of these operations has its distinctive advantages and disadvantage for each locality, and a choice and recommendation of the most practicable under the conditions of this war follows by a process of elimiation from a consideration of each on its merits and in the light of three years' war experience.

6. *Mission of the United States.*—In cooperation with allied forces to prevent German submarines from operating against allied commerce.

7. *Enemy strength, dispositions and probable intentions.*—(1) Submarines now operate from German bases on the Baltic, from bases in Helgoland Bight and from bases in the Zeebrugge-Ostend region, Belgium.

(2) Nothing is known of the batteries protecting Helgoland and the adjacent coast. From the heavy batteries, over 200 guns of 4-inch caliber and above on the Belgian coast about Ostend and Zeebrugge, which protect Zebrugge effectively against attack

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from the sea, it must be assumed that even heavier and more formidable batteries have been devoted to the defense of the vastly more important Helgoland region. It is known that the sea area of Helgoland Bight is extensively mined, and that it is further protected by a large number, probably in the neighborhood of 100 submarines, which might be utilized for this purpose.

(3) Egress via the Kattegat and Skagerrack is assured from German Baltic bases until such time as Norway, Denmark, and Norway, or Denmark, Norway, and Sweden may decide to cooperate with the Allies.

(4) To attempt to penetrate the Baltic with the allied fleet to attack the German bases in Kiel Bay is considered inadvisable while Denmark, Norway, and Sweden remain neutral.

(5) The probable intention of the enemy is to continue operations from the above localities, utilizing the Skagerrack and North Sea exits via either the Dover Strait or around Scotland, to reach the hunting grounds on trade routes in the Atlantic. If the Zeebrugge and the Helgoland vicinity were rendered untenable as bases for submarines, probably the Germans would take possession of the littoral of Holland or Denmark for such bases, and continue using the Skagerrack outlet from the Baltic bases.

8. *Our forces and courses open to us.*—The Allies have a great preponderance of surface force especially in the heavier types. Destroyer forces are about evenly balanced considering the dispersion of destroyer strength required to protect commerce; submarine preponderance is decidedly with the Germans.

We may attempt to—

(*a*) Reduce the Helgoland region and close exits for submarines.
(*b*) Reduce the Zeebrugge region and close exits for submarines.
(*c*) Enter the Baltic and close exits for submarines from the Baltic bases.
(*d*) Prevent Danish and Dutch territory being used for submarine bases.
(*e*) Construct and maintain mine barriers about the Helgoland region.
(*f*) Construct and maintain a mine barrier in the Skagerrack or Kattegat.
(*g*) Construct and maintain mine barriers in the Zeebrugge region.
(*h*) Construct and maintain a mine barrier across the North Sea.
(*i*) Close Dover Strait to submarines by a mine barrier and surface patrol.

9. To prevent submarine operations, (*a*), (*b*), (*c*), and (*d*), all are necessary; or (*d*), (*e*), (*f*), and (*g*), all are necessary; or (*h*) and (*i*) are necessary.

Of course, a combination is practicable of a mine barrier at one point, Zeebrugge for example, with a reduction of Helgoland fortifications and destruction of submarine bases in that region, or vice versa.

10. *As to* (*a*).—The proposition to reduce Helgoland and close exit for submarines has been under consideration by the British naval authorities for three years, and their experience leads them to the conclusion that, with the means now available, the attempt could not succeed. Failure is assumed to result from the following causes: (1) The British in their attacks against the Zeebrugge region have been able to make little or no impression upon the shore defenses. It is known that over 200 guns and mortars capable of inflicting damage on attacking ships are in place. Dangerous fire from some of these batteries against attacking vessels has been delivered at a range of about 36,000 yards. Monitors bombarding Zeebrugge, at a range of 26,000 yards, have to be concealed by a smoke barrage to prevent their destruction. Fire control is most difficult because of German control of the air, and smoke barrages employed on shore. After a year's operations the base is still in use, and no injury that has not been speedily repaired has apparently been inflicted. It is entirely probable that the superior importance of Helgoland region has resulted in even a more complete and comprehensive defense. (2) There is nothing known as to the changes that may have been made in the Helgoland region defenses, and no guide as to the force necessary to overcome them and no way of estimating the chances of success. (3) The Germans control the air in the Helgoland region, and without air reconnaissance, it is not possible to locate their batteries or control the fire against them. (4) There is a 12-foot rise and fall of the tide, with swift currents which would seriously interfere with mining operations or the placing of the hulks it would be necessary to sink to close the ports. (5) It is estimated that the Germans have about a hundred submarines available for operating in Helgoland Bight, and there is no method of protecting ships operating in narrow waters where they would have to alternately anchor and then maneuver when firing on land defenses. (6) The vulnerability of ships at battle ranges of heavy land guns and the difficulties of controlling fire against land batteries. (7) Operating so close to a German base, the difficulties of supply and communication and adequate protection against submarines and aircraft. (8) The certainty that even if Holgoland were taken, a greater problem would confront the naval forces in the necessary reduction of mainland batteries and the further certainty that submarines bottled up at the

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North Sea end of the Kiel Canal could continue operations from Baltic bases through the Skagerrack.

11. Closing Helgoland Bight would undoubtedly weaken the morale of the German forces and might incline Germany to peace, but the military disadvantages for Germany are not of such an overwhelming character, as the Baltic exit for submarines and the base at Zeebrugge would be still available.

12. While the united Navies of the Allies are greatly superior to the Navy of Germany in heavy ships, the loss of even predreadnoughts would bring the contending sea forces nearer to an equality. In a heavy ship attack on the land fortifications of Helgoland region, the Germans could withdraw their heavy ships into the Baltic if necessary.

13. *As to* (*b*).—The shallow coast prevents deep ships from getting close enough to Belgian shore batteries successfully to bombard them. Operations with monitors have only resulted in temporary damage. Control of the air is with the Germans. To silence batteries and approach the shore closely enough to cover a landing from the fleet is judged to be impossible with the German army in occupation. If Zeebrugge is taken, it must be from the rear by the allied armies.

14. *As to* (*c*).—With Norway, Sweden, and Denmark neutral, to operate on the Baltic coast so close to the Kiel Canal presents insuperable obstacles, in view of the mine defenses, land defenses, submarines, and a concentration of the entire German power at the Baltic end of the canal. It appears that the German fleet, operating in its own waters, among its own mine fields and assisted by shore batteries and submarines, is stronger than any fleet the Allies could send into the Baltic.

15. *As to* (*d*).—In case the Helgoland region and Zeebrugge-Ostend region were controlled by the Allies, Denmark and Holland must be prevented from falling under German influence sufficiently to use their ports as German submarine bases.

16. If the reduction of the German submarine bases is considered impracticable there remains the resort to mine barrier obstructions (*e*), (*f*), and (*g*), which contemplate efficient barrier constructions (1) from the Danish coast to the westward of Helgoland to German territory; (2) between neutral countries, Denmark and Norway, across the Skagerrack,or between Denmark and Sweden, across the Kattegat; (3) to the westward of Zeebrugge-Ostend, striking the Belgian coast to the northward and southward of these points.

17. *As to* (*e*).—British opinion after three years experience is that it is impracticable to maintain a mine barrier inclosing Helgoland and the mouths of the Elbe, Ems, and Weser, which would be effective against submarines, because (1) the proximity to the German bases and Kiel Canal outlet renders concentration against the patrol of mine fields so easy as to drive it off in places, and thus make practicable breaches in the barrier; (2) the distances from British bases make it very difficult to reenforce the patrol at any one point, in time to meet an attack; (3) it would be very difficult to maintain a strong enough force at the barrier to be everywhere equal to such attacks, because of the ease with which German heavy ships can reenforce the smaller surface craft, do their work and return to port; and therefore (4) to meet such attacks a force stronger than the German fleet must be constantly at the barrier; (5) this is considered inadvisable because of the certainty of attack by submarines; (6) the Germans control the air and the patrol would be constantly under fire from the air; (7) international complications sure to arise with Denmark over the effort to make the barrier off the Danish coast, within the 3-mile limit, effective; (8) the difficulty of maintaining a barrier off the Belgian coast, under fire of German guns.

18. *As to* (*f*).—A barrier across the Skagerrak or Kattegat has the following disadvantages: (1) Having both ends abutting on neutral territory; (2) the end of a barrier off the Danish coast would surely be brought under the fire of German guns erected on that coast; (3) the Skagerrack barrier, 60 miles long, would be exceedingly hard to protect against attacks delivered by submarines and surface craft through the Skagerrak and Kattegat from German Baltic bases; (4) the usefulness of the Skagerrack or Kattegat barrier, depends upon Helgoland region having been similarly inclosed, or the fortifications there reduced and exit to Kiel Canal closed.

19. *As to* (*g*).—The British after three years operations off the Belgian coast have been unable to construct and maintain an efficient barrier off Zeebrugge, in the face of the operations from nearby German bases of both submarines and surface craft. Both ends of the barrier must remain under the fire of German shore stations, or extend into Dutch waters. Effectively closing Zebrugge may result in German occupation of the Sheldt River, or other parts of the Holland littoral, for submarine bases.

20. The closing of the North Sea by barriers laid from Scotland to Norway, and in the vicinity of Dover Strait, should not interfere with local attempts in any of the above discussed fields of endeavor to limit German submarine operations. But these two barriers, if effective, would, so far as egress from the North Sea is concerned,

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make operations, either by attempts at occupation or by the laying of barriers at the Skagerrak, Helgoland Bight, or Belgian coast, unnecessary.

21. *As to* (*h*).—The further advantages are: (1) One end of the barrier rests on England, close to British naval bases; (2) the entire barrier is much nearer to British fleet bases than to any German submarine or surface craft base; (3) the discouragement of the Germans that will follow if the rate of tonnage destroyed decreases more rapidly than the allied merchant connage construction increases; (4) the corresponding encouragement to our allies.

22. The difficulties in the way of laying and maintaining an efficient barrier across the North Sea are such that the British have, until recently, considered them insurmountable. With the use of the American mine, and with full American cooperation, the barrier promises sufficient success to warrant undertaking it. The disadvantages are: (1) The difficulty of supplying the material on the spot and laying the barrier; (2) the constant danger of interruption by the enemy while in progress of construction and concentration of German effort upon the barrier when completed; (3) supplying the patrol craft necessary to protect the construction while in progress and patrol the barrier afterwards. If the barrier is pushed out in successive sections from the British coast, a small patrol will be required at first, then constantly increasing in numbers as the work progresses.

23. *As to* (*i*).—The necessity to close the Dover Strait is imperative. Whatever other measures to control submarines are employed, it is self-evident that no single measure would do as much to prevent merchant-ship destruction as to deny a passage for submarines to the Atlantic by this route. Closing this strait would compel the smaller submarines to pass around Scotland to the Atlantic, thus very materially reducing their season of active operations against commerce. In the heavy weather to be encountered on this route in the winter months probably none but large submarines would attempt to operate in the Atlantic.

24. *Conclusions.*—From the above considerations the General Board is decidedly of the opinion that of the measures discussed from (*a*) to (*i*), inclusive, the scheme included under (*h*) and (*i*) offers the best chances of success—that is, to close the North Sea by the Aberdeen-Egersund barrier approved by the British Admiralty, and to similarly close the Dover Strait.

25. The General Board does not underestimate the practical difficulties that must be overcome in providing the necessary material and transporting, placing, and maintaining it in the face of the determined efforts of the Germans to render the barrier abortive. Further, the barrier even when placed can not be effective without an adequate patrol. The General Board is, however, encouraged to give its indorsement to this plan because it has the approval of the British Admiralty; it is proposed by it as the best practicable plan to meet present war conditions; the Chief of Bureau of Ordnance stated the material, mines, anchors, moorings, etc., can be surely supplied; and the accompanying memorandum of Capt. R. R. Belknap, United States Navy, who has been actively engaged in conducting mining operations, points the way to handling the details of transporting and planting.

26. It is assumed that the British Admiralty, in approving this plan, recognizes the vital importance of the necessary patrol—that it is clearly seen by it where the required number of vessels is to be obtained, and that the extent of the cooperation required of the United States in this regard will be communicated to the United States Navy Department.

27. If it is decided to proceed with the construction of the Aberdeen-Egersund barrier, the General Board recommends that the preliminaries be arranged at once, and that suitable officers of experience in mining operations be sent to England to arrange for our participation in the work.

W. S. BENSON.

Approved:
JOSEPHUS DANIELS.

NOTE.—Memorandum from Capt. R. R. Belknap, United States Navy, to the General Board, dated October 23, 1917, was inclosed with the above letter.

[Inclosure B, accompanying general board letter No. 425-5 (serial 778), Oct. 24, 1917.]

OCTOBER 20, 1917.

From: Senior member present.
To: Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: Inquiry re mine barrier across North Sea.

The general board recommends that the following inquiry be cabled and that an early answer be requested:

"The department requests to be informed whether the plan for the placing of a mine barrier across the North Sea on the Aberdeen-Egersund line has the approval

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of the Admiralty. It is believed that the great experience of the British naval forces in North Sea operations and their experience in naval mining during the present war puts them in the best position to decide whether the proposed scheme is practicable in construction and maintenance and whether in the opinion of the Admiralty it is the best scheme in sight for limiting the operations of enemy submarines, provided that the Straits of Dover can be efficiently closed to the passage of submarines, which, if possible, in the opinion of the department should be done at the earliest possible date."

CHAS. J. BADGER.

[Inclosure C, accompanying general board letter No. 425-5 (serial 778), Oct. 24, 1917.]

From: Commodore Gaunt, Royal Navy, British Embassy, Washington, D. C.
To: Admiral Benson, United States Navy, Director of Naval Operations.
Date: October 23, 1917.

The following cable has been received from Chief of Staff for the Chief of Naval Operations (paraphrased):

"With reference to your cable No. 780 to Admiral Sims. The mine barrier has been approved by Admiralty and now confirms approval. The preparations are rapidly proceeding.

"My 513 (cable dispatched on 17th and received 18th October) indicates the assistance desired from the United States of America. This scheme is considered by the Admiralty to be best to be carried out at a distance from the bases of the enemy. The Admiralty are working on a supplemental scheme for operation close inshore, but any such inshore operation has the defect that a passage through for submarines can eventually be cleared by the enemy. Therefore North Sea passing northward also necessary.

"No scheme yet tried has been effective in closing the Dover Straits to submarines, but measures are being constantly improved, and they are at the last always a considerable deterrent. Mining operations on an extensive scale against submarines in the Straits of Dover commence in November. Owing to the lack of effective antisubmarine mine this has hitherto been delayed."

C. LANCELOT-GAUNT,
Lieutenant Commander, R. N. V. R.

[Inclosure D accompanying General Board letter No. 425-5 (Serial 778), Oct. 24, 1917.]

Paraphrase.] OCTOBER 10, 1917.

From: Chief of naval staff.
To: Chief of Naval Operations.

It will be necessary to increase the number of lines of United States mines in each system in the North Sea barrage from two to three if there should be any difficulty in using the lower antennæ of United States mines for first supplies. Could you please state an approximate date when supply of complete mines and sinkers will begin, stating at what rate the supply will be maintained?

As all British mine layers will be fully engaged in laying British portions of the barrage, will you please say how many United States mine layers will be available to naval transport officer, Brest, and the output of United States mines. It is estimated that each ship could make five mine-laying trips a month. As a base for United States mines and mine layers, it is proposed to use Cromarty. The question of facilities for assembling ready for use, storage, and embarkation is being investigated on the spot. It is suggested that it is desirable that United States officers should confer with ours on this question and examine proposed arrangements as to suitability for dealing with United States mines and sinkers; also to ascertain as to whether our depot system will be suitable for application to United States mines. It is proposed that the necessary assembling and testing of United States mines and sinkers on receipt and before issue to mine layers should be dealt with by depot staffs provided by you if possible. It is hoped that you will be able to agree with this. United States officers if sent over can report numbers required.

I should be much obliged if you would inform me as soon as possible whether you can supply sinkers for United States mines.

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[Inclosure E accompanying General Board letter No. 425-5 (Serial 778), October 24, 1517.]

OCTOBER 22, 1917.

From: Senior member present;
To: Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: Plans for limiting the activities of enemy's submarines in Atlantic trade routes by mine barrages established at the entrances to the North Sea area.

The General Board in its consideration of plans to prevent or at least substantially limit entrance and exit of enemysubmarines to and from the North Sea area, including the Baltic, has not yet reached a final conclusion but it has proceeded far enough in its investigation to convince it that the effective closing of the Straits of Dover against enemy submarines is an essential feature of any plan that may be adopted involving the establishment of mine barrages.

2. The General Board, therefore, urges that operations for the closing of the Straits of Dover entrance to the North Sea be commenced at once.

3. The General Board is of the opinion that the closing of the Straits will render it much more difficult for the enemy submarines to reach the Atlantic trade routes or the English Channel itself and will materially reduce the number of enemy submarines working in those areas because of the longer and more difficult routes they would be compelled to take around the north of Scotland to their present cruising grounds in the Atlantic or the English Channel.

4. As to the assistance which this Government can render the General Board is informed by the Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance that 5,000 Mark VI mines complete can be ready for shipment to England by December 15 next and 20,000 more by January 15.

5. The personnel and the number of mine planters and other craft desired by the Admiralty to assist in the operations would have to be subject to further arrangement between our Navy Department and the Admiralty. The General Board recommends that if this or other cooperative mining plan be decided upon, the personnel to arrange for the details be sent to England as soon as practicable.

6. The General Board believes that the experience of the British Navy in mining, gained through three years of war and its familiarity with local conditions and resources best fits it to make the decision as to the location of the barrage but the General Board suggests the consideration of a barrage from the vicinity of Harwich to the vicinity of Dunkerque. This line though longer than the one across the Straits of Dover seems to possess certain advantages over the shorter route—the holding ground is better, the tidal currents less swift, advantage could be taken of banks and shoals along the route, and London and other Thames ports would be left open to the sea as at present. The patrol of this route does not appear to offer greater difficulties than does the present patrol of this region.

7. The General Board recommends that the British Government be informed of the substance of this letter by cable.

CHAS. J. BADGER.

APPENDIX D.

MINE CARRIERS.

The 24 vessels named below were utilized by the Navy Department for transporting mines to the advanced bases in Scotland. Twenty-three of these were taken over for exclusive use as mine carriers. The *Mercurius* was not so taken over, but the shortage of ships made it necessary to use her for one trip.

Lake Side, Manta, Lake Worth, Ozama, Choctaw, Lake Ontario, Lake Bridge, Lake Port, Kiowa, Lake Superior, Lake Wood, Lake Champlain, Lake Forest, Lake Erie, Lake Michigan, Lake View, Lake Shore, Sioux, Lake Placid, Mercurius, Lake Huron, Lak Tahoe, Carib, and *Lake Moor.*

Capt. PRATT. There has been a point brought up in Admiral Sims's testimony about our attempting to establish routing officers, and the idea was conveyed that these routing officers were intended to displace or disrupt the existing organization and plan, which was a British organization and a British plan, and thereby cause a certain amount of confusion, which is necessarily so in case you start to overturn a plan which is running passably well during the war.

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The CHAIRMAN. That is, in connection with convoy?

Capt. PRATT. That is in connection with convoy. That was not our idea. I know about it. I had to father the plan. I had the details in my mind constantly. I wrote the cables that went across. The idea was this, that we were very glad, and later when the submarine came on our coast did accept in toto the general principle under which the British were working. We reserved to ourselves merely a right to say how these vessels should enter our own ports, and when and where; but the officer who gave us the above assistance in fact was the British routing officer sent from the other side.

The CHAIRMAN. Then, this plan had nothing to do with vessels going from our ports to the other side?

Capt. PRATT. No; they were handled entirely by the people on the other side. It would have been a great mistake, and we never interrupted to interfere with the plans or with how the vessels should be received on the other side. The establishment of routing even on this side was merely with the idea that later on, when we had become so thoroughly cognizant of their plans and so proficient in operating under the general joint scheme, we could relieve some of their officers for work abroad or in any place where they chose to put them, and thus take over and operate the offices which they had established in our own ports by our own people. And further, there was this idea: These offices were being established in South America, and it was a little point of pride with us that the South American countries, particularly Brazil, should be handled by our own people as soon as we knew enough about it.

The CHAIRMAN. There has been a second call for a quorum of the Senate, and I think we will adjourn now until to-morrow morning at 10 o'clock, Captain. You have finished that point?

Capt. PRATT. I have finished that point. There is no need of discussing it.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have a paper upon that?

Capt. PRATT. No; I was just talking about it.

(Thereupon, at 12.27 o'clock p. m., the subcommittee adjourned until to-morrow, Wednesday, April 21, 1920, at 10 o'clock a. m.)

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NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 21, 1920.

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE OF COMMITTEE ON NAVAL AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met pursuant to adjournment in room 235, Senate Office Building, at 10 o'clock a. m., Senator Frederick Hale presiding.

Present: Senators Hale (chairman), Ball, Pittman, and Trammell.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. Capt. Pratt, will you continue?

TESTIMONY OF CAPT. W. V. PRATT—Resumed.

Capt. PRATT. Before starting in, I would like to correct, if I may have given an impression yesterday in my statement in regard to convoy, I would like to make a further addition to what I said in order that I might clear up any doubts that may exist in the minds of you gentlemen in regard to convoy. I said that although the principle of convoy was established early in 1917, and we approved of it in July, 1917, convoy did not take effect for westbound ships crossing the Atlantic at all during the war, although it was discussed before the armistice came on, and we were endeavoring to meet the demands. There is a difference between convoy and escort. I know that our troopships on their return voyage from France were escorted by destroyers and the patrol vessels outside of the immediate submarine zone, although that did not protect them from the cruising submarine that operated as far west as the Azores, down to the Canaries, off the Cape de Verdes, and later as far west as the United States. They were armed, with guards, and I think as far as it was possible to give them protection, the British merchant ships and our own merchant ships from Great Britain were escorted westward beyond the immediate submarine zone as far as it was possible to give them escort. The details of that I do not know, but that would be, in general, what they would strive to do. I do know, however, that the protection which could be given to westbound shipping was not as great as that which was given to eastbound shipping. It was not, in the nature of things, possible to do it.

The CHAIRMAN. They never came home in convoy?

Capt. PRATT. No; they did not. They split anyhow; if they did not split from their ports they split immediately after they came outside of the close-in submarine zone. And that helped. It was desirable to do it. It speeded up the flow, and that was recognized probably on the other side of the water far more than by us.

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The CHAIRMAN. They split where the eastbound convoys would assemble, did they not?

Capt. PRATT. No; the eastbound convoys assembled in our own ports; but the ships returning to us always came in singly, having split at sea, or sailing from their own ports.

The CHAIRMAN. You were also to give us, I believe, the names of the ships which were sunk.

Capt. PRATT. Oh, yes. As I said, I have had them looked up, and they have given me the names as the *Campania* and the *Morini*. There was also a ship the name of which was not submitted yesterday, the *Vacuum*, which was sunk in April, when some people lost their lives.

The CHAIRMAN. There were others, also that were sunk?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, yes; a great number of them. I just happen to mention those two.

Now, I come to the discussion, in what is called operating plans, of the Azores situation. I am making this explanation in no criticism, at all, of the point of view which has been expressed on the other side, but rather to give you an expression also of our own point of view.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you mean by "the other side"?

Capt. PRATT. Well, Admiral Sims's point of view. When I speak of the other side of the water, I speak of our people that were over there—Admiral Sims and his staff. There were two distinct points of view about the Azores.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you consider Admiral Sims the other side, as far as you are concerned?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, no; not at all. I am speaking geographically. I was speaking of the other side of the water. I hope I am great friends with Admiral Sims, and always will be. There is no criticism one way or the other. I am trying to analyze it, and give you the Atlantic side, and he had, of course, the European point of view; and the only question is to adjust the two. We had from the very beginning made a study, and looked with a great deal of—it is difficult to get the right word. We appreciated, let us say, the position of the Azores for two distinct reasons. One was, for the small craft we were endeavoring to send across, even our 750-ton destroyers, there was the necessity of providing a place in mid-ocean from which these craft could refuel, and from there start farther east to the British and French waters. If Portugal had not been in this war, it would have been for us a tremendously difficult problem to have gotten any of the yachts, any of the subchasers, any of the tugs, and a large percentage of our destroyers across, for the simple reason that they did not have the steaming radius to cover the 3,000 miles of ocean lying between us and the British shores. For that reason it very early became a necessity for us to consider very definitely the value of a stopping place in mid-ocean. For that reason the Azores always possessed for us a very high strategic value.

Their practical importance was nil, except that it might offer a possible basing place for German submarines; and if, perchance, they were to gain possession of that spot, it would prevent us from using it and utilizing it to its full capacity, as we did later. I may say that had it not been for the Azores either on our eastward-bound expeditions in sending our small craft across, or westbound, when the armis-

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tice was completed and we were sending them home, it would have been a very difficult problem for us to have accomplished at all.

Naturally, the point of view of the forces operating in London was centered more in the efforts around the British Isles, and rightly so; while we, being farther removed, could not but be impressed, and perhaps overimpressed, by the value of this stopping place in the Atlantic.

Moreover, we knew that shortly our troop movement was going to start across, and we knew that if the German submarines for one instant could base upon the Azores, they would flank our troop-transporting movement at its vital point, the point where it crossed the thirtieth meridian, being nearly there, and the point where it passed from the control on the Atlantic side to the British side of the water, and we were afraid of it, and for that reason we always sent forces there; and while they may have been more numerous at times than it was tactically right to keep there (that I will not say) its importance never left our minds, and for that reason we did have forces there rather more than for their usefulness in hunting the submarine.

The forces we had there practically amounted to the following. I am giving it in very general terms. A German submarine appeared off Punta del Gada and bombarded the place before we ever got there with any real fighting forces. We happened to have a collier in there with a gun on board. It was the *Orion*. I think we were landing coal, anticipating our future movements. She held the submarine off.

From that time on, a little later we commenced sending our forces there. Every subchaser convoy that went across had to go via the Azores. Our submarines that went over went via the Azores. Our tugs went that way and several destroyers. Some of the older ones of only 2,000 miles' radius had to either stop at the Azores or, as we in the very beginning had to do, to be fueled at sea. We had to establish a mobile oil base at sea, using some of our oilers, moving them about in the ocean very secretly, at which points our destroyers had to oil before they could go across, and we had to change the position of these oilers constantly for fear the Germans might get wind of their position and attack them.

The CHAIRMAN. Were the 2,000-mile radius destroyers coal or oil burning?

Capt. PRATT. Some oil and some coal. One, for instance, would be the *Henley*. I know she is not a good boat. The *Mayrant* would be another one. I am not qualified to speak of them, ship for ship, but it is the older type of our 750-ton boats.

The CHAIRMAN. They are mainly coal burning, are they not?

Capt. PRATT. No, sir; there are only five 750-ton coal burners. There are quite a number of oil burners of 750 tons. I think that is about all that I want to speak of in regard to the Azores situation. I just wanted to say that, so as to clear up our point of view. It is a matter of adjustment more than anything else, I think.

Now, there is one other problem that has been mentioned in the course of Admiral Sims's testimony which, in the same way, I would like to clear up so that you gentlemen may get the point of view of operations on this side, and I would like to say, before going into the details of it, that I can not give too much praise to the planning section in London that Admiral Sims organized, after he got his men there.

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Without their assistance we could not have done the work we did over on this side and I personally depended upon it, and upon Capts. Schofield and Yarnell and others who were working in conjunction with the British Admiralty for them to send—and they did—just as complete plans as it was possible for any people to get out. Their cooperation was magnificent, and we tried to give them the same.

The battle cruiser raid plan did not in its inception start entirely with the first plan that Admiral Sims speaks of, of May 17, 1918. The idea that we all had all through 1917, and after the first German land drive in 1918, in March, was this: The main effort we shall have to protect our troops against will be a raiding effort, and they will use that type of light, fast ship which will serve best the purpose of raiding our troop convoys, and which also can be spared from the main fleet; because up to the time the Germans projected their land drive in March, 1918, I think we almost all of us felt that the land drive would come simultaneously with a fleet action, in this, that the Germans would make a united effort, not a disintegrated effort—one of sea and land—and that the submarine campaign was, in a way, a preparation for a united effort of great force. Therefore it would not have paid them, looking at the thing broadly, to have projected types into the ocean such as their battle cruisers, which would serve them a better purpose in the united sea drive of their total fleet.

So that Admiral Sims, I think, very wisely advocated, along with convoy operations, that we should send our older type battleships to go along with them. There was a difference of opinion there. Admiral Sims wanted the old battleships. Admiral Benson stuck to the idea that they should be held back as a reserve, and thought that sufficient protection would be given the troop convoys by sending the armored cruisers with them. The result was that the armored cruisers went, the old battleships did not, and we did not put the old battleships in until August of 1918. Whatever may be the theories regarding and the differences of opinion, the fact remains that Admiral Benson guessed right. They were not needed.

So we went on very much on the same line that we had been going until after the first land drive in March, 1918. That was a very critical time. But when that first wave was stopped on land, it began to be evident that the land wave, very much like the submarine wave of 1917 which culminated in April of 1917, was beginning to, or would very possibly, recede. In other words, exactly as they did in the first battle of the Marne, their first stroke was their great stroke, and it never went beyond that apex.

The same thing happened in April, 1917; the same thing happened in March of 1918; and that put a different complexion upon the problem which we had to study. That problem then became less one of two great fleet actions, and more the absolute necessity of Germany's stopping the land movement from our country across to France, and had she been wise I think, in my judgment, she would have used every effort of hers, even to sending her battleships out, to break that line; so that we began at once to feel that there must be a change of strategy necessary.

The London planning section had been thinking about that, too, and we had from them on May 17—which I will submit—a very excellent first plan, a basic plan. I will read you the decisions of that plan. It is not necessary to go into the details now, but you

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will see, gentlemen, from the explanation that I made to you yesterday of the difference between a basic plan upon which you can generally prepare or get ready and make an initial move, that there is a difference between that and a definite operating plan, and as I think I have said before, we here in Washington were, by definite agreement with the Admiralty in London, responsible for the sea west of longitude 30, straight through north and south, and the British looked out for everything east of longitude 30. Therefore, it was a situation which we had to face over here, as well as Admiral Sims in London, because, regardless of whether or not a troopship had been sunk east or west of longitude 30, the first demand would have been made upon the office in Washington to explain to the people, and we would have had to have called upon Admiral Sims for the explanation in case it occurred in the waters over which the British had jurisdiction. Therefore, it became of vital necessity to see that we had a definite operating plan, which we felt would cope with the situation we might be called upon to cope with.

The CHAIRMAN. About where does longitude 30 run?

Capt. PRATT. It runs very close to the Azores. The Azores are just east of longitude 30. It is almost along that line.

Our idea of a plan of some sort was to divide the ocean practically into three parts. The area east of longitude 20 was well within the covering power of the vessels based in British waters. The area west of longitude 45 was well within the covering spots—that is, points toward which ships could retreat in case of an enemy in mid-ocean. But the area which lay between longitude 20 and longitude 45 was the disputed area, and a very dangerous area it was. I have figured out, during the days of our greatest troop movements, the number of troops that daily were crossing that doubtful area—a sort of no man's land. That number averaged 100,000 a day, almost daily; 100,000 of our men crossing that disputed area; and it was a dangerous area, too.

This was the original base plan furnished to us by the London planning office. The date of this plan is May 17, 1918. I will submit the entire plan:

[*Memorandum No. 26.*]

PLANNING SECTION—PROBLEM No. 13.

Subject: Battle cruiser raid.
General situation: As at present.
Required: An estimate of the threat of a raid by a German battle cruiser in the Atlantic.

Our constant naval mission in the prosecution of this war is, so far as it is related to raiders:

(1) To destroy the raider.
(2) To maintain sea communications.

ENEMY FORCES, THEIR STRENGTH, DISPOSITION AND PROBABLE INTENTIONS.

Enemy strength in this problem is assumed to consist of one battle cruiser—latest type—plus submarines.

The mission of the battle cruiser would be "to destroy maximum amount of shipping possible with special reference to troop convoys, and to return to a home port."

NOTE.—The accelerated rate of delivery of American troops in France will soon have a very important bearing on the military situation in France; this fact can not but be known to the enemy and may therefore cause him to take extraordinary measures to interrupt the supply of men from America.

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The problem of the battle cruiser assigned to operate against shipping in the Atlantic naturally divides itself into three phases:

1. The escape from the North Sea.
2. The operations.
3. Return to a home port.

The battle cruiser in deciding upon the route by which to gain the Atlantic will consider the Dover Straits and the route north about.

Enemy knowledge of the barrage of the Dover Straits, the numerous mine fields in the narrow seas, the destroyers at Dover, Harwich, and in the Channel ports, of the monitors and other fighting vessels at Dover and in the Channel ports, will all serve to deter the battle cruiser from using the Dover Straits. In addition, his knowledge that all incoming transports and convoys are escorted by destroyers—that in the Channel there are numerous ports to which shipping can escape—that convoys outside the Channel would have about 24 hours' notice of his approach, that destroyers in the Channel could trail him, rendering secrecy of his movements impossible; that he would have to use high speed and thereby reduce his cruising radius; that it would be impossible for him to take fuel ships with him; that the probability of complete failure of the effort through loss in the Channel is great—are all arguments against the use of the Dover Straits route.

The north-about route has the advantages of:

(*a*) Secrecy.
(*b*) Moderate cruising speed until operating area is reached.
(*c*) Possibility of taking one or more fuel ships along.
(*d*) Possibility of using submarines as a scouting screen for the battle cruiser.
(*e*) Small risk of loss when outward bound.

For these reasons the battle cruiser will undoubtedly choose the north-about route.

The fuel requirements for the two routes to an operating ground in the vicinity of the west coast of Ireland are not materially different.

In deciding upon the operations, the enemy will undoubtedly consider that the hazard to the battle cruiser is great and that in order to justify the hazard he must make certain that the results will be at least commensurate with the hazard involved. The operations possible are very closely dependent on the available fuel and consequent cruising radius of the battle cruiser—

Cruising radius at 10 knots, about 8,800 miles.
Cruising radius at 15 knots, about 6,000 miles.
Cruising radius at 24 knots, about 3,600 miles.

In planning fuel expenditure preceding the operation the enemy would probably formulate a table somewhat like the following:

Percentage of fuel supply necessary to reach a point midway between Faero Islands and Iceland outward bound on basis of two-fifths power...per cent..	16¾
Percentage of fuel supply necessary as a reserve when returning by same route on basis of maximum speed.....per cent..	23½
Percentage of fuel available for operations south of Iceland, Faero Island line.....per cent..	60
All cruising speed of 15 knots and radius for full speed on short notice at a 15 per cent extra expenditure of fuel. Then available cruising south of Iceland, Faero line is.....miles..	3,130
If, however, provision is made for one day's steaming at 24 knots, the above cruising radius is reduced to about.....miles..	2,800
Nearest point to a probable convoy route—north-about to Irish Sea, from Iceland, Faero line is about.....miles..	600
The nearest point to a probable south-about route to Irish Sea is about...miles..	900
The distance to Cape Finisterre via direct route is about.....miles..	1,200

From the above it appears that under the most favorable circumstances for the battle cruiser, she might steam at 15 knots, a total of 1,600 miles in an area where convoys might be encountered. This is equivalent to a total of four days' operations in the Atlantic, south of Lat. 55° N.

In considering the foregoing tabular statement he would undoubtedly conclude that it was necessary to take fuel ships with him.

In making his exit from the North Sea he will probably be preceded by cruiser submarines acting as scouts to ensure the secrecy of his movements and may have in addition submarines posted in the general vicinity of our bases to observe movements that may indicate a knowledge on our part of his intentions.

Having made a safe exit the battle cruiser will probably re-fuel previous to beginning his operations, and will station his fuel ships at one or more points well clear of all traffic.

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THE OPERATIONS.

In order to make the battle cruiser fully effective in the execution of its missions, the enemy will undoubtedly arrange for scouting by the numerous submarines he is able to send to sea; these submarines in order to be free to operate and to get contract with convoys beyond the region of destroyer escort would be stationed somewhere in the vicinity of the 20th meridian W. Other submarines stationed near ports from which convoys issue might be directed to trail them on their westbound course to sea and to keep the battle cruiser informed of progress.

Similarly eastbound convoys which may cross the scouting line of submarines would probably be trailed by submarines who would keep the battle cruiser informed of progress.

The battle cruiser would endeavor to make its first attack an overwhelming one, because thereafter it would expect a lively pursuit which would interfere with its operations.

As a successful attack in any area will unavoidably drive shipping from that area the battle cruiser will foresee this effect and plan to shift its operations to a second area, either farther west or to the Gibraltar route, submarines being stationed in that area also to give information.

The battle cruiser will expect the return of many merchant ships to port and in order to make full use of the possible panic his operations may cause, will station submarines in the vicinity of those ports nearest to the attack in order that they may operate against returning vessels.

After the first attack by the battle cruiser it is possible that it may withdraw to again refuel and in order for its scouting submarines to take up new positions.

THE RETURN.

The longer the operations last the greater the tendency toward dispersal of allied fighting forces. When the operations of the battle cruiser are finally concluded the greatest chance of success in returning to a home port would be for it to delay several days in a region remote from sea traffic before making the attempt.

SUMMARY AS TO THE BATTLE CRUISER.

(1) Would use the north-about route.
(2) It will take one or more fuel ships, fitted for refueling at sea.
(3) Will operate against convoys outside of the zone of destroyer escorts.
(4) It will use submarines as scouts to assist it in gaining contact with convoys.
(5) It may remain at sea for many days, shifting its area of operations to suit conditions.
(6) It may delay its return to port in order to increase its chances of success.
(7) Increased submarine activity may be expected near ports nearest to the first attack by the battle cruiser.

OUR OWN FORCES, THEIR STRENGTH, DISPOSITION AND COURSES OF ACTION OPEN TO US.

No ocean escorts are now strong enough to oppose effectively an enemy battle cruiser. If we assume, as we have, that the battle cruiser can remain at sea for an indefinite period, fixed detours to avoid danger will not be effective, as the battle cruiser may estimate that just such detours will be made.

As to measure against the battle cruiser, two steps are necessary:

1. To get contact with one or more vessels, having speed equal to the speed of the battle cruiser.

2. To bring at least two battle cruisers against it.

The accomplishment of (1) should enable continous warnings to be sent out and should further enable our own battle cruisers to bring the enemy to action.

Destroyers are suitable for (1) and will probably be nearest to the battle cruiser when it is first heard of.

In order to make use of them it will be necessary to reduce temporarily the number used in escort work. Available destroyers should proceed in scouting formation at moderate speed toward incoming convoys and adjust their movements to reported positions of the battle cruiser. If contact is gained the sole missions of the destroyer should be—

1. To keep touch with the battle cruiser.
2. To send out warnings.
3. To report positions.

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Destroyers should exhaust their fuel and then drift rather than lose a contact once gained. Fuel ships and tugs can be sent in relief of them.

Destroyers, if unsupported, can not destroy a battle cruiser, except under fortunate conditions, so it is necessary to back up their scouting effort by battle cruisers to insure success of the operation. There are 10 battle cruisers available, but since a superiority over enemy battle cruisers are needed with the Grand Fleet, three battle cruisers should be assigned to proceed toward the last reported position of the enemy battle cruiser. Since the cruising radius of our battle cruisers is small, fuel ships should be sent to sea rendezvous for their use if required.

As to protection of convoys, there are three principal methods of protection:

1. Evasion by predetermined plan.
2. Evasion in response to warnings.
3. Local protection.

Evasion by predetermined plan may be successful if battle cruiser can not refuel and consequently is limited in its operations to four or five days in the area between latitude 55° N. and 43° N. In this case convoys might be sent to the southward of a circle 1,200 miles distant from the Faero-Iceland line. Eastbound convoys within this circle would in general shape their course for destination if east of battle cruiser making local detours as circumstances warranted. Westbound convoys that were east of battle cruiser position return to port—other convoys proceed, keeping stern to reported position of battle cruiser until outside of 1,200-mile circle—Gibraltar convoys to continue if north of 45° N. and to take refuge as necessary if south of 45° N.

Evasion by predetermined plan is not so apt to succeed as evasion by a system of reliable warnings, leaving the route to be determined by the senior officer with each convoy. In addition evasion to the extent of new destinations will congest shipping and cause great loss of time.

Evasion in response to warnings is applicable to all situations and is now in practice. It requires—

(*a*) Long distance radio equipment.
(*b*) Good operators.
(*c*) Continuous radio watch.

Two general principles should govern—

(1) Convoys to proceed to destination whenever reasonable safety is assured.

(2) If obliged to run, run directly away from last reported position of battle cruiser until a safe offing is made, then proceed according to circumstances, and if possible toward destination.

Local protection.—The only efficient local protection to convoys against battle cruisers is superior gun power in a battle cruiser or a battleship. No battle cruisers are available as escorts. The only battleships that are available are United States battleships. A modern battleship is a sufficient escort to a convoy, as the battle cruiser would have to accept battle in order to attack the convoy unless convoy dispersed, which of course it should not do. One predreadnought can be outranged by a battle cruiser, and therefore is not so good a reply, but two predreadnoughts are considered adequate to discourage an attack on a convoy by one battle cruiser.

An examination of this problem indicates the desirability, in fact, the very great desirability, of having additional battle cruisers conveniently situated for intercepting any enemy battle cruiser effort on our lines of communication with America.

This point is so important that it is recommended that an effort be made to have the battle cruiser division of Japan transferred to European waters.

NOTE.—The situation at the Dardanelles is another situation of the same general type as the one now under discussion, and one which could best be met by two or three battle cruisers supported by destroyers.

DECISIONS.

1. To scout for the battle cruisers by destroyers and other light vessels having sufficient speed that may be available.
2. To instruct the scouting vessels to trail the battle cruiser.
3. To support the scouting effort with two or three of our own battle cruisers, in order to destroy the enemy.
4. To send fuel ships to sea rendezvous for the use of our battle cruisers and scouting force.
5. To adopt the principle of evasion by convoys in response to warnings, rather than the principle of evasion by predetermined plan.
6. To protect important convoys by battleships of the United States fleet during the time when battle cruisers are out—or believed to be out.

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In regard to these decisions I would say in regard to the second, "To instruct the scouting vessels to trail the battle cruiser," of course, the battle cruiser was the real danger. It was a faster type of ship than anything we had and a very powerful type of ship, second only in power to our own dreadnoughts.

In regard to the third decision, "To support the scouting effort with two or three of our own battle cruisers in order to destroy the enemy," when he says "our own battle cruisers," that means in this case with joint convoys. It is the joint plan of our people in London working with the people of the Admiralty, so that "our own battle cruisers" means British battle cruisers, because we did not have any battle cruisers.

Now, you must realize that at this time we were not escorting any of our troop convoys by battleships—not by old battleships—and had we been escorting troop convoys by our old battleships, I think I shall have to disagree with the testimony of some one officer—I have forgotten who it was—who thought that they could beat off battle cruisers with one of our old battleships. I do not think they could. That is merely opinion, but I do not think that the old battleships were equal to the new battle cruisers of the Germans. For that reason it became very essential that we should hold at positions where they could most adequately strike in case of necessity our dreadnought types, being the only ships which could cope at all with the German battle cruisers. A point of difference was this: The London office rather wanted us to make an immediate disposition of force.

That, from a military point of view, I believed to be wrong. If you have in the army a line at the front and one flank is to be threatened, you send to that flank a covering force. You send it there as a reserve to use when the other man has taken the initiative and you know what you are up against. But if you deploy that force before he has made his deployment, he has the jump on you, and you do not have it on him. So that that is why we wanted to send our dreadnoughts to the best place in Europe, one division, and move another division up to the most available place in the United States, which was Halifax, to hold them contained until we got information of the jump by the Germans, and then we would not have to throw out one or two, but we could throw out that body united, and the German never knew what we were going to do until he made a move himself. That is the reason we held the dreadnoughts together, so as to be able to throw them out to the flanks; and in that cablegram to Admiral Sims that was really the determining idea, to draw our force to the two places where we believed we could use them in the method which we believed to be the most approved of in the Army.

Now, personally, I always felt that this decision, which was rendered by the London planning section and contemplated the return of the German battle cruiser, had one fault in it. In the past we knew of one case where a German submarine interned in Spain had violated the neutrality of that country and gone to sea. A German battle cruiser had, with her coaling capacity, just about four days' active work in that disputed area, between 45 west and 20 west, in which she could work havoc; and then if she did not want to go back, she could come down and intern in Spain, and possibly be ready for another move.

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I simply state that fact, which is well known, that a German submarine did, I believe, leave a Spanish port. A battle cruiser need not have gone out again, but might have interned there, which is a perfectly legitimate thing under international law. And on the basis of that two cables were drawn up. Admiral Benson sent the first cable indicating the danger of such a move, about July 25. A detailed plan was drawn up later and signed about July 30. That plan had no virtue in it at all—no virtue of necessity in it—except this, that we did insist that those covering vessels should go there.

The CHAIRMAN. You will put that in the record, will you?

Capt. PRATT. I have got them here, but they are in this secret dispatch book, and I have not had copies made.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you have copies made for the record?

Capt. PRATT. Yes; I will have copies made and put in the record. It gives you a general idea, possibly better than if I was to read it and discuss it. The disputed point was this: Considerable stress has been laid upon the foolishness of sending the ships to the Azores. I drew that plan up, and of course I know my own ideas. We did not care a straw whether they went to the Azores or anywhere else, just so long as they were diverted. The very sending of that cable started everybody on the jump, and that is really what we wanted, to get them on the jump and to get decisions which were more definite decisions, real operating decisions, than those that had been made in the abstract plan. An abstract first plan is a beautiful thing, but you can not operate with it. After that we discussed the matter back and forth, and a more definite plan was finally evolved, which was settled in the United States here, when Sir Eric Geddes and Capt. Fuller came over. The whole thing was approved here in Washington. They approved it in the admiralty, and they sent it back, and we were ready to operate. They made concessions and we made concessions. That is the way a plan must be made. I just wanted to clear up the atmosphere on that.

(The extracts from the document last referred to by Capt. Pratt were later furnished by him and are here printed in full in the record, as follows:)

JULY 1, 1918.

SIMBEN, *London. No. 3:*

Your 307 as a forlorn hope. German battle cruisers may be sent out to completely destroy one of our large troop convoys. We depend upon you to gain and give information on this point and grand fleet to take necessary action until United States could act.

BENSON.

JULY 25, 1918.

SIMBEN, *London:*

Department feels very apprehensive of at least one enemy battle cruiser getting out as a forlorn hope and attacking our troop convoys. It is proposed to send three oil-burning dreadnaughts to Berhaven or Queenstown to be in position to protect convoys, depending upon British to give us information immediatley of the exit of cruiser from German waters. Comments and recommendations requested as to the better of the two places to send them and have adequate protection against submarine attack. What do you think of our mine force extending at once at least on line of mines all the way across to Norway?

OPNAV.

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O—Simson—8.

Secret.

SIMSADUS:

Reference planning section, memorandum 26, battle cruiser raid. The department is of the opinion that raid by a battle cruiser against the supply lines to European ports, particularly against troop convoys, is a possibility, and that even if the chance be remote it should be guarded against. The department further notes that the decisions arrived at as modified by the action actually contemplated by the Admiralty, while safeguarding shipping leaving port after notice of the escape of an enemy battle cruiser has been promulgated, is in the nature of a negative decision and affords only partial relief to shipping then in transit between United States and European ports. The department therefore proposes the following definite plans for consideration and action: General note, plans to be applicable to United States troop convoys, cargo convoys to French bay ports, and convoys carrying United States troops, other convoys to utilize plan if considered desirable by the Admiralty. Plan drawn on line of battle cruiser escaping by way of the North Sea around north end of Scotland, though with slight modification it is applicable also to enemy battle cruiser escaping from Black Sea. Definite information of escape of enemy should be given to all forces before enemy has crossed Scotland to Ireland lines or has gotten clear of Aegean Sea. Plan applicable to both eastbound and westbound shipping. Special details: the Navy Department has asked the State Department to request of Japan that she detail four battle cruisers to base with the Atlantic Fleet at Hampton Roads. The North Atlantic to be divided into three areas, first west Atlantic 45 W. to United States Coast, and mid-Atlantic 20 W. to 45 W., east Atlantic 20 W. to east Atlantic destination. The United States to station division 6, consisting of the *Utah*, *Nevada*, *Oklahoma*, at Queenstown or Brest, preferably the former port or vicinity, to act as raider guard against battle cruiser in the mid-Atlantic and eastern section. To hold the eighth division, consisting of *Arizona*, *Mississippi*, *New Mexico*, *Pennsylvania*, to cover the west Atlantic section or to proceed where necessary. To use the Japanese battle cruisers, if they are detailed to work with our forces, for the purposes of direct pursuit. Eastbound convoys, all convoys between 45 and the United States return to the nearest United States or Canadian port, there to await for adequate escort. Furnish two old battleships as escort for each convoy carrying troops.

If practicable expend the same escort to cargo convoys, and where this is not practicable use two armored cruisers for escort to cargo convoys; all convoys east of meridian 20 proceed to destination at top speed; convoys between 45 W. and 30 W. divert immediately to Azores and make for an anchorage or lee under island San Miguel; convoys between 30 W. and 20 W. divert to San Miguel or proceed to destination or nearest port as circumstances demand, depending upon estimated position of enemy cruiser relative to position and speed of convoy. Westbound shipping: Shipping between 15 W. and European ports return to port to await adequate escort or divert to San Miguel, Azores, depending upon submarine situation; ships between 15 W. and 45 W. to Azores or to nearest United States or Canadian port, depending upon their proximity to those points. Ships to westward of 45 W. route to destination or to nearest port. Utilize the *Delaware* and *North Dakota* with divisions 2, 3, 4, 5, battleship force, to escort troop convoys; utilize cruiser force to escort cargo convoys; hold division 8, battleship force, with one division destroyer force instant readiness to proceed; dispatch division 6 with two divisions of destroyer force in European waters to proceed at top speed to Azores, San Miguel. Use Japanese battle cruisers as pursuit division if they are detailed to cooperate with United States forces and if such plan is agreeable to them.

Above plan to become effective immediately upon agreement and to be put into operation upon receipt of broadcasted radio and cable stating that enemy battle cruisers had escaped from North Sea. The Navy Department to maintain an adequate supply of coal and oil in European waters and Azores to meet the logistic needs of division 6, battleship force. This above plan is suggested a possible counter to any enemy battle cruiser or small force of enemy ships escaping from the North Sea and attempting to raid our lane communication before interning in some neutral port or escaping to other seas. Modification suggested for raiding force escaping from Adriatic or Dardanelles. Shipping east or west bound between meridians 20 and 45 and north of latitude 45 proceed to destination or to nearest port at top speed.

OPNAV.

Notation made by Capt. Pratt.
Sent 30 or 31 July, 1918.

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The CHAIRMAN. Will you explain the statement you made that 100,000 men crossed the line each day between 20 and 45 degrees of longitude? That would make something over 3,000,000 men in a month.

Capt. PRATT. No. Well, there were at that time 10,000 to 15,000 men, and sometimes even as many as 20,000 in a convoy, and I think the maximum number of ships in a convoy carrying troops, that I can remember, was somewhere between 30 and 40. Now, it takes a long time to go across. We used to work it out each day, and we kept in the office an absolute track of every troop convoy and every cargo that crossed, and at 8 o'clock each morning the positions of those vessels were corrected up to date. They sailed according to sealed orders, all of those United States convoys which were personally directed, and their speed was such that we could plot from day to day exactly the position of each one of them. Now, when I said 100,000, I should qualify that by saying at any one day during the months when we were sending the maximum number across.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you mean on specific days only?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, absolutely, on specific days.

The CHAIRMAN. I just wanted to get that straight.

Capt. PRATT. Not when we were sending only 25,000. It would have been only maximum months. I remember one day I plotted seven convoys in that zone during that congested month. Now, at an average of 15,000 men to each convoy, which is a fair average, because they run from 10,000 to 20,000, I gave it as a fairly low figure that during that time there might be 100,000 men in that zone.

The CHAIRMAN. And that might happen two or three times during the month?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, yes. It did not happen——

Senator PITTMAN. How long did it take them to cross that zone?

Capt. PRATT. The average speed would be about 12 knots. The distance between 20 west and 45 west would be about 1,500 miles, and I think probably 5 to 7 days they would be in that zone, depending upon the speed of that convoy.

Senator PITTMAN. Then that would be 5 to 7 days they were in that area, and during any one month others would be following them up?

Capt. PRATT. Yes.

Senator PITTMAN. That is not like crossing it in one day.

Capt. PRATT. No, sir.

Senator PITTMAN. You would count each one of those five to seven days that they were in there?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, yes; I thought that was perfectly clear. The lowest speed of a convoy that troops were ever sent in—and that was a concession that was made during the critical months of the spring of 1918—was 10 knots. Our standard which we tried to live up to was nothing less than 15 knots, because speed is one of the most important factors in meeting the submarine menace. Remember, I am not giving you this explanation in any spirit of criticism at all of the attitude that Admiral Sims has taken, because we did not think there was any criticism; just a matter of adjustment, that is all, and I wanted to explain, because the question had not been entirely thrashed out fully.

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I had down here for discussion certain other plans which we had drawn up in our office, but I do not think it is necessary to mention them, as they all concern matters on this side, certain matters of routing ships along our own waters in case of submarines coming, definite plans whereby we would use our submarines to combat the enemy submarines in case he came over; definite methods of using our submarine chasers for sweeping up and down the coast; certain submarine chasers, of course, were left on this side; certain methods to protect and see that the flow of oil was not stopped from source to the British Islands; the necessary protection which we had to give the Virgin Islands, and a few things like that. But they do not concern the letter under discussion, so that it is not necessary to go into the details. I now come to the summing up of paragraph 78 of the letter of Admiral Sims. Paragraph 78 is the concluding paragraph of the admiral's letter. Under 11 subheads the various errors of the department have been treated. I will not attempt to treat the paragraph in detail, as the purpose of the letter and the evidence submitted to substantiate same are at variance with each other. The purpose of the letter is:

Upon the conclusion of the war in which large naval forces have been engaged, and after a sufficient time has elapsed to permit of a careful estimate of the manner in which the war was conducted, it is of the first importance that the lessons to be derived from this experience be recorded in order that they may serve as a guide in future wars.

The charges in the testimony amount to:

(*a*) Interfering with his command and authority.

(*b*) Failure to support him.

(*c*) And the very grave one of jeopardizing the Allied cause by failing to throw our hearts and efforts into the war during the first six months of it.

The first point, however, in his paper to be noted is the fact that the lessons spoken of are criticisms; and the second point to be noted is that none of these criticisms are constructive. These criticisms are aimed directly at the office of operations, and at its chief, the Chief of Naval Operations who was the controlling and coordinating military head of all our naval operations during the war.

Admiral Sims in his office in London was not the commander in the field or afloat, in the sense indicated by Mahan. This was a war of logistics and the tactical operations of our naval forces at the front were the preliminaries to the great effort being carried on elsewhere. Nowhere had our great naval fleet been assembled in one mass ready to come to grips with the enemy. Admiral Sims was the commander of the divisions in the advance, but he was not the general who commanded the whole army. The similarity of his position to that of Gen. Pershing, which he has remarked upon in this testimony, only continued during such time as our Army was distributed amongst the Allies. When the Army united as an individual army under our own leaders, with Pershing in general command, then the positions of Pershing and Sims became different. He was the assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations at the front. He was not the Chief of Naval Operations, nor the Commander in Chief of the Fleet. It is necessary to consider these points, because many of Admiral Sims's contentions relative to the interference of the

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Chief of Naval Operations, which he complains of, seem to me to be based on a misconception of his position relative to that of the Chief of Naval Operations.

The office of Naval Operations—that office which is charged with the preparation and operation of the fleet and of all naval forces, committed errors, some of which were as stated in Admiral Sims's letter; but that we in particular, and the Navy Department in general did not enter whole-heartedly into the campaign, I can, with authority deny. How we could best get into the campaign in the shortest time was all we thought about. With all the foresight imaginable, with all the preparation possible, it takes time to get into a war in full force. The problems which confronted us were stupendous, and Admiral Sims seems to have overlooked these difficulties, or at least he has not mentioned them. His was the task of asking for things, ours the work of supplying them. There were not issued to Admiral Sims any instructions beyond the simple statement of July 3, 1917, above referred to, for the reason that the department did not, during the entire war change its general attitude toward the policy therein indicated, though it allowed itself the right from time to time to make such concessions as would best further the allied cause. It was best fitting that this broad outline of our naval policy should go to the State Department direct and that Admiral Sims should be furnished with a copy. The department relied on him, in close touch with the Allies, while guided by its fundamental principles, to formulate all general war plans within the area of his command and to send them back to us as the basis upon which we could begin our work. Plan after plan of his was handled that way. It is a proof of the cooperation we gave him that these matters were handled in this manner.

Admiral Sims himself says, in his statement of the case, that the department did accept all of his plans and policies some six months after they were first made, but he does not seem to realize that they were the basis upon which we worked from the start. As to the adequateness of plans made ahead of time to cope with the particular situation which confronted us upon entry into the war, it can be said that the general board, which was the father and custodian of plans, had in its files many of them made in peace. None fitted this particular case in war. And none could ever meet this situation efficiently until Admiral Sims, as he himself has told us, could get in touch with the Admiralty and with the naval departments of the Allies and find out from them the real needs of the war. And he does not know, or at least he does not state that upon the basis of this information, in the early part of June, the process of switching the entire building program of the Navy from its battleship construction to chasers, destroyers, tugs, aircraft, and supply ships was begun. More destroyers were added in an entirely new program and room made on the ways for merchant ships. To-day I can find nothing in the evidence presented which makes me change my mind as to the soundness, in the main, of the policies indicated as the department's policies. In war, the Secretary of the Navy must lean on his naval adviser, the Chief of Naval Operations, who with his aides must assume the responsibility of the general conduct of the naval operations of the war. Subject to instant removal from office by the Secretary, if he is derelict in his duties, or fails to have the broad

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rasp of the situation which the gravity of war necessitates, the naval ead must have military control in naval matters, and must accept he responsibility for the same.

This situation was accepted, the operations of war conducted along hese lines. To have interfered in military matters would have been olly, and this the Secretary of Navy (for he represents the Navy Department) did not do, so far as plans, policy, and operations are concerned, at any time when I was acting Chief of Naval Operations, while Admiral Benson was absent aboard. The competency of the military head to make decisions on military matters was not questioned. That there were delays, that there were mistakes, that it took time before we got into this war in full force, is fully and frankly admitted, but that the guiding and directing heads in Washington of our naval establishment had, in the main, any misconception of their mission, or lacked in their willingness to fully cooperate with the Allies, I deny. Some of the reasons why our Navy did not more quickly enter into the war in full force are perfectly natural reasons, and will happen in any war. With the knowledge gained in this war, some might be avoided in future. Some of those which I think might be avoided are, lack of material preparation in the ships commissioned, lack of adequate supplies, and supply and repair bases, lack of sufficient personnel and facilities to train same; a building program planned specifically to meet the needs of the war the country intends to engage in, modern methods of organization and administration, and the maintenance of these nucleus organizations in peace, a budget system, an adequate sum of money ready at hand to be used at once as necessity dictates, a sum not to be mortgaged for any other purpose than that of national defense. But behind all these details there must be the determination of a united people, expressed through the proper authorities, that they desire and will declare war within a certain specified limit of time, and that within this limit of time they will give, through the proper channels, to their military leaders the power and means to so prepare and organize, that at the appointed time these organizations may strike.

This practically presupposes a military and autocratic form of government, for in no purely democratic government do I believe this instant preparedness will ever exist. The two forms of preparedness, and the most efficient which it is thought a democratic government will ever sanction lies first in its fleet and second, in certain essential methods of training of the youth of our country. Behind the barricade of our fleet all other war preparations may ripen. The readiness to strike instantly has always been the military man's dream. This thought is aggressive. It savors of the motives that have impelled the great military nations of the world. It grips our naval and military men's minds, though they be thoroughly democratic at heart, because the habits of a life time and thought have tended to make them see more clearly along the straight road of mechanical efficiency, than down the more devious but natural paths that human nature treads. The truths of my assumption are, I believe, to be found in the history of Great Britain, one of the greatest democracies in the world. Especially would I point to her position at the time this great war broke. With an experience in European wars much greater than ours, with a warning of what might take place well ahead of time, the initial stroke found her un-

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prepared to wage an aggressive war. Behind her fleet she was forced to build up her military strength. Behind the bulwarks of the allied and of our own fleets, we built up our full military and naval strength. A democratic government will, in my opinion, never be prepared to wage aggressive war in full strength, at the start.

Admiral Sims has presented his evidence against the department and particularly against the Office of Operations, with a great array of facts. Facts are like bricks; properly assembled they form an imposing edifice, but if this structure is to be enduring, these facts must be united by the cement of sound reason. In making any just estimate of the situation which confronted our Navy, both at its entry into and during the progress of the war, no one man's opinion, however important be his post, can be given undue weight, but all of the conditions and influences here and abroad which acted on our naval war problem as a whole must be put in the balance and weighed. This problem was never localized. Our total naval effort had to be so adjusted that its weight was thrown to greatest advantage against the enemy forces as a whole. To this end it was necessary that we coordinate both abroad and at home our efforts with those of all our allies and with our own military and civil forces. This the Navy did successfully, as its record shows.

There is one charge, and only one, in this whole controversy which is grave, and this was not in the original letter. It is as follows:

I am convinced that our failure to give adequate support with the means at our disposal during these first six months seriously and unnecessarily jeopardized the outcome of the whole war. In my opinion, it undoubtedly resulted in lengthening the war by several months, through the increased losses in merchant shipping that resulted therefrom. I believe that this failure, combined with the equally grave one of neglecting to prepare adequately during the few months previous, and the few months subsequent, to our declaration of war, probably postponed victory four months. Since the average loss of life per day was about 3,000 and the total daily cost was more than $100,000,000, it can be appreciated what this delay meant to humanity, and how serious was any fault that resulted in materially prolonging hostilities.

I have told you of the Navy's struggle to prepare after war was declared. You have the figures showing the number of our destroyers, the best type of antisubmarine craft in the world, and other antisubmarine craft sent to Europe. You have been told of the plans made to build more destroyers. You have had testimony as to our willingness to cooperate in every way possible. What does Admiral Sims mean by the words, "I believe that this failure, considered with the equally grave one of neglecting to prepare adequately during the few months previous, and the few months subsequent, to our declaration of war, probably postponed victory four months." What does he mean? Can we, a nation at peace, and bound by the laws of neutrality, can we, no matter what our inclinations may be, perform those overt acts of preparation, which are only justified as acts of war? A mass of figures, cables, and data have been submitted to substantiate the assumption made that our delay put victory four months behind, and cost humanity the price stated. This I deny. I wish to introduce a bit of evidence which controverts Admiral Sims's assumption that the few remaining craft we had on this side of the ocean could have been an influencing factor upon the early termination of the war. That power did not lie in the relative

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distribution of our forces but in the relative distribution of the forces of the British Navy.

I have here a plan of January 21, 1918, from the London planning section, of which I wish to submit only extracts. I will hand this manuscript to you genetlmen so that you may read it. You will see there are certain statements made in that plan which it would not be wise to publish. You can read the figures that I have taken and put in this memorandum so as to see that I have made no mistake about the figures.

The CHAIRMAN. You cover everything in the memorandum that you wish to submit?

Capt. PRATT. Yes; I think so; but I hand this to you because I would like to have you see the reasons, down there, why I would prefer not to submit it as a whole. [Reading:]

Memorandum showing the relative proportions of destroyers with the Grand Fleet and engaged in antisubmarine warfare exclusively. Date, January 21, 1918.

When I make this statement in regard to the destroyers with the Grand Fleet, remember that I do not say they were not used to a certain extent on convoy operations. They were. I have inquired of Admiral Rodman as to exactly the operations that they participated in. But I do state that this was a minor function of theirs, and that their major function was the screening and operating with the Grand Fleet; so that their antisubmarine operations, therefore, were not of as great importance as those of the craft that were detailed exclusively for antisubmarine work. [Continuing reading:]

This data is taken from the plan furnished by Admiral Sims's planning section in London. The figures are, therefore, their own. The problem is known as Problem 2. It was worked out on January 21, 1918, and the figures fairly well represent the conditions that existed throughout the summer, spring, and fall of 1917. In the solution of this problem it was decided that the basic naval mission was "To further a successful decision on land."

The general mission was, "To obtain command of the sea."

The immediate mission was, "To obtain subsurface command of the sea, while retaining command of the seas."

Translated into ordinary language it meant just what Admiral Sims meant, "Get everything after the submarine you can, and get after him as hard as you can, provided that in so doing you do not jeopardize your chances of control of the surface of the sea." To maintain surface control the Grand Fleet had to be held ready at instant notice and it had to be guarded by destroyers, the best antisubmarine craft known. It is all granted. However, the interesting feature in this as bearing very distinctly on the antisubmarine efforts going on around the British Isles lies in the distribution the British themselves made of their destroyers. I will quote the figures:

With the Grand Fleet, 111 destroyers.

In British Isles, apart from Grand Fleet, 213 destroyers, of which 37 were United States destroyers.

NOTE.—The above vessels are engaged in escort duty and antisubmarine work.

The CHAIRMAN. That is taken from this manuscript of this memorandum?

Capt. PRATT. Yes. The 213 vessels were engaged in escort duty, in antisubmarine work. I will submit another paper bearing on the same subject.

The CHAIRMAN. Would there be any objection to putting this complete manuscript in with the paragraphs to which you have referred deleted?

Capt. PRATT. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The British would have no objection to that being done?

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Capt. PRATT. I do not think they would.

Senator PITTMAN. Then, we will put that in, following your discussion of this subject?

Capt. PRATT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. There is nothing else objectionable except the paragraphs you have marked?

Capt. PRATT. I would like to scan that a little more closely, Mr. Chairman, and then I will just put red marks through what should be left out.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

The memorandum referred to, and the plan of the London office, with necessary omissions, are here printed in the record as follows:

RELATIVE PROPORTIONS OF DESTROYERS WITH THE GRAND FLEET AND ENGAGED IN ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE EXCLUSIVELY.

JANUARY 21, 1918.

This data is taken from the plan furnished by Admiral Sims's planning section in London. The figures are therefore their own. The problem is known as problem 2. It was worked out on January 21, 1918, and the figures probably fairly well represent the conditions that existed throughout the summer, spring, and fall of 1917. In the solution of this problem it was decided that the basic naval mission was "to further a successful decision on land."

The general mission was, "to obtain command of the sea."

The immediate mission was, "to obtain subsurface command of the sea, while retaining command of the seas."

Translated into ordinary language it meant just what Admiral Sims meant, "Get everything after the submarine you can, and get after him as hard as you can, provided that in doing so you do not jeopardize your chances of control of the surface of the sea." To maintain surface control the Grand Fleet had to be held ready at instant notice and it had to be guarded by destroyers, the best antisubmarine craft known. It is all granted. However, the interesting feature in this as bearing very distinctly on the antisubmarine efforts going on around the British Isles lies in the distribution the British themselves made of their destroyers. I will quote the figures: With the Grand Fleet, 111 destroyers; in British Isles apart from Grand Fleet, 213 destroyers of which 37 were United States destroyers.

NOTE. The above vessels are engaged in escort duty and antisubmarine work.

[Memorandum No. 8.]

LONDON PLANNING SECTION—*Problem No. 2.*

JANUARY 21, 1918.

General situation: As at present.

Special situation: The Allies and the United States have decided to continue the war to a victorious peace.

Required: Estimate of the general naval situation in relation to the war as a whole.

CONCLUSION REACHED.

General: (1) To provide for united action of allied naval efforts in conformity with the naval missions and irrespective of local situations and special interests; (2) to unify commands where desirable in certain areas, such as the English Channel and the Adriatic; (4) to reinforce the Grand Fleet with United States battleships if the barrage operations require it, or, if thereby troops in Great Britain can be released for service in France; (5) to develop plans for concentrated air attacks on enemy submarine bases in the North Sea and the Adriatic; (6) to develop plans for attacks with surface vessels against enemy Adriatic bases; (7) to prepare to destroy Russian Baltic ships should their capture by the enemy become imminent; (8) to give special study to the matter of mine barrages in the English Channel and the Adriatic and Agean Seas.

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Antisubmarine: (1) To devote the maximum possible antisubmarine force to offensive operations; (2) to develop with the greatest possible rapidity hunting groups equipped with listening devices and manned by the best trained personnel available from all sources; (3) to equip vessels engaged in antisubmarine warfare with adequate means for taking the maximum tactical advantage of every contact with an enemy submarine; (4) to arm heavily (with full gun's crews for each gun) about 1 merchant ship in 10, of each general class, in the North and South Atlantic; and as far as practicable to escort convoys with such heavily armed merchant ships.

DISCUSSION OF PROBLEM.

The following discussion of the problem was set down by the planning section in order to clear up their understanding of the problem and thereby facilitate its solution.

The problem proposed is the most general of all naval problems of the war now in progress.

From the standpoint of joint naval action the statement of the special situation and of what is required in the solution must be accepted as sound. If we aim at anything less than a victorious peace, we are led to put forth less than our maximum effort and we commit ourselves to a military policy which can never support properly the aims of belligerents. War has for its object to impose our will upon the will of the enemy. The surest method of achieving this object is by victory, for then the enemy is compelled to submit and the maximum degree of permanency is given our achievement.

If we determine upon lines of procedure that are not in proper support of the war as a whole, we thereby favor special interests and introduce friction among Allies that may create dangers of the first magnitude.

METHOD OF SOLUTION.

The solution of a problem so general as this one is the first step in the formulation of a general plan of action. The first step in the solution is to determine a statement in concise form of that which the conditions of the problem require should be accomplished. This statement in the first instance takes a sufficiently inclusive form to cover the entire task to be undertaken. A further examination of the task thus determined in connection with special circumstances may enable us to determine upon a more concrete statement of the task. When the most thoroughly concrete, and at the same time, inclusive statement of the task is determined, we thereafter investigate the ways of accomplishing the task determined upon and finally decide upon a definite way for its accomplishment. Thereafter, whenever any related question arises for decision, we must examine it in the light of the task to be accomplished and decide the question in the way best calculated to support the effort to accomplish that task. If the most concrete statement of the task is not sufficiently general to guide us in our decision, we must refer our question to the next more general statement of the task, or, as we call it, the mission.

In the problem under consideration, we approach the determination of our naval mission as follows:

DETERMINATION OF OUR NAVAL MISSIONS.

The fundamental end in view, of sea power is the support of land power. Success on the sea alone can not force peace terms as favorable as those to be gained by corresponding success ashore. The effectiveness of sea power is, therefore, to be measured by the degree of success with which it fulfills its rôle as the support of land power.

From these considerations are deduced the basic naval mission in this war: "To further a successful decision on land."

The best general means of bringing about sea conditions favorable to shore success, lie in the establishment of command of the sea. Such command is useful only insofar as it furthers command of the land, and is not, therefore, within itself an ultimate objective, but merely one of the preliminary means essential to that end. When it is accomplished, the resources of the friendly and neutral world are made available for the logistical support of our Army and people, and we gain the strategic freedom offered by the sea to strike with, or at, shore power in otherwise inaccessible places, while the enemy is at the same time correspondingly restricted.

The general naval mission is therefore: "To obtain command of the sea."

Command of the sea may be established either by destroying enemy naval forces, by effectually containing them, or by so nullifying the effect of their activities as to reduce it to negligible proportions.

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At the present time, partial command of the sea has been established by the forces of the Allies and the United States. The enemy's surface craft are effectually contained by an overwhelming force within the immediate vicinity of his home waters—the Adriatic and the Baltic. The enemy fleet commands the Baltic and is free to enter the North Sea, but no movement on its part in these waters can have a serious influence upon our land operations.

The high seas fleet is rendered practically impotent by the mere presence of the Grand Fleet covering the exits of the North Sea. On the other hand, the subsurface command of the sea has not been even approximately established. The enemy submarines enter freely the Atlantic and prey upon commerce with the avowed object of impairing the supply and morale of allied civil populace and armies in the field. In other words, submarine warfare is directed against land power, upon which sea power rests and for the maintenance of which it exists solely.

The enemy is making of submarine warfare his principal naval effort, thus conforming directly with his basic naval mission of "furthering a successful decision on land." We are concentrating our major effort on maintaining surface command of the sea, which is doubly assured, while by virtue of his command of the subsea the enemy is placing our land power in serious jeopardy.

Our tonnage losses, with corresponding shortages of fuel, food, and munitions, are already having a great influence on the morale of the civil populations, elevating the enemy's morale, depressing our own. These losses and shortages are already affecting seriously the main land strategy in Italy and France. They have already made it impossible for the United States to develop quickly its full strength on the western front.

Sinkage of and damage to shipping due to torpedoes, mines, and accidents attributable to the submarine warfare, continue greatly in excess of repairs and new construction and at a rate which is alarming when viewed from the standpoint of that support to the land power that is essential to prevent defeat.

Our special and immediate mission therefore becomes: "To obtain subsurface command of the sea, while still retaining command of the surface of the sea."

Enemy forces—their strength, disposition, and probable intentions.

ALLIED NAVAL FORCES.

British Isles (British and United States).

(*a*) Grand Fleet (6 Jan.):
- 41 dreadnaughts.
- 11 battle cruisers.
- 31 light cruisers.
- 7 cruisers.
- 13 flotilla leaders.
- 111 destroyers.
- 12 T. S. mine sweepers.
- 36 trawlers.
- 18 sloops.
- 38 submarines.
- 5 hydrophone ships.
- 3 seaplane carriers.

ENEMY NAVAL FORCES.

North Sea.

(*a*) High Sea Fleet:
- 19 dreadnaughts.
- 5 battle cruisers.
- 10 light cruisers.
- 2 mine-laying cruisers.
- 88 destroyers.
- 50 torpedo boats.
- 30 M. boats.
- 45 trawlers.

(*b*) Harbor flotillas:
- 13 destroyers.
- 24 trawlers.

(*c*) Naval forces in Flanders:
- 15 destroyers.
- 16 torpedo boats.

(*d*) Naval forces in Baltic:
- 3 light cruisers.
- 42 destroyers.
- 8 torpedo boats.
- 6 M. boats.
- 116 trawlers.

(*e*) Submarine force (including Flanders force:
- 5 light cruisers (old).
- 9 destroyers.
- 16 torpedo boats.
- 6 U. cruisers.
- 54 U. type.
- 50 U. B. type.
- 20 U. C. type.

(*f*) Training center:
- 8 old battleships.
- 3 light cruisers.
- 12 destroyers.
- 5 torpedo boats.
- 20 submarines.

(*g*) Vessels not embodied in regular formation:
- 10 old battleships.
- 6 coast-defense ships.
- 3 cruisers.
- 13 light cruisers.
- 2 mine-laying cruisers.
- 33 mining vessels.
- 21 destroyers.
- 51 torpedo boats.
- 50 armed merchant vessels.
- 6 auxiliary mine layers.

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Summary of British (and United States) forces available for fleet engagement.

Assuming that forces (*b*), (*c*), and (*f*) are available, also local defense destroyers at Scapa Flow, there can be assembled to meet the enemy force—

41 dreadnaughts.
11 battle cruisers.
43 light cruisers.
7 cruisers.
22 flotilla leaders.
184 destroyers.
Submarines.

If the above assumption shall not hold, the Grand Fleet will have—

31 light cruisers.
13 flotilla leaders.
111 destroyers.

Probable additions by July 1, 1918.

4 dreadnaughts (United States).

Summary of North Sea Forces.

The following summary gives the maximum number of vessels that Germany could bring to bear in a general fleet engagement:

19 dreadnaughts.
5 battle cruisers.
34 light cruisers.
4 mine-laying cruisers.
196 destroyers.
146 torpedo boats.
18 old battleships.
3 old cruisers.
6 auxiliary mine layers.
150 submarines.

The torpedo boats are of no value except perhaps in an engagement near the German coast. Probably not more than 8 or 10 of the old battleships are in condition for sea.

Probable additions by July 1, 1918.

2 dreadnaughts.
2 battle cruisers.
2 light cruisers.
2 mine-laying cruisers.
12 destroyers.
Torpedo boats.
70 submarines.

Total forces in British waters apart from Grand Fleet (a).

13 light cruisers.
213 destroyers.
9 flotilla leaders.
15 monitors.
68 submarines.
64 torpdeo boats.
23 sloops.

The above vessels are engaged in escort duty and antisubmarine work. (Does not include trawlers or small patrol boats.)

Possible addition of Russian Baltic Fleet.

It is possible that the following units may be captured or turned over to Germany:

4 dreadnaughts.
3 predreadnaughts.
9 cruisers.
60 destroyers (approximately).

French forces in Atlantic.

24 destroyers.
59 torpedo boats.
25 submarines.
92 trawlers.
40 sweepers.
100 patrol boats.
10 gunboats.

These vessels are distributed in the channel and Bay of Biscay ports.

United States naval forces in French Atlantic.

30 armed yachts and trawlers.
7 destroyers.

French forces in Mediterranean.

7 dreadnaughts.
8 predreadnaughts.
4 armored cruisers.
6 old cruisers.
75 destroyers.
48 torpedo boats.
37 submarines.
17 gunboats.
160 trawlers.
250 vessels (miscellaneous).

British forces in Mediterranean.

3 predreadnaughts.
4 cruisers.
12 light cruisers.
14 monitors.
28 sloops.
45 destroyers.
18 torpedo boats.
12 submarines.

Austrian Fleet (Mediterranean).

4 dreadnaughts.
6 predreadnaughts.
4 old predreadnaughts.
2 cruisers.
10 light cruisers.
16 destroyers.
42 H. S. torpedo boats.
2 mine layers.
54 submarines (including German).

Probable additions by July 1, 1918.

2 dreadnaughts.
3 light cruisers.
A few destroyers and submarines.

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Turkish Fleet.

1 old battleship.
1 battle cruiser.
2 light cruisers.
8 destroyers.
8 torpedo boats.
? submarines (German).

Italian forces in Mediterranean.

5 dreadnaughts.
4 predreadnaughts.
5 old predreadnaughts.
7 cruisers.
10 light cruisers.
7 flotilla leaders.
43 destroyers.
26 H. S. torpedo boats.
50 submarines.

Japanese forces in Mediterranean.

14 destroyers.

United States forces in Mediterranean (Gib.).

4 destroyers.
20 other craft.

Summary of Mediterranean forces.

12 dreadnaughts.
20 predreadnaughts.
23 cruisers.
22 light cruisers.
7 flotilla leaders.
181 destroyers.
92 torpedo boats.
100 submarines.

Summary of Mediterranean forces.

4 dreadnaughts.
11 predreadnaughts.
1 battle cruiser.
2 cruisers.
12 light cruisers.
24 destroyers.
50 torpedo boats.
60 submarines.

From an examination of the above disposition of enemy forces we see that they are divided into three general groups:

(1) The North Sea group.
(2) The Adriatic group.
(3) The Sea of Marmora group.

In every case the surface craft are contained and the submarine have exit to the high seas.

Political considerations.—The entire subordination of the military and naval strategy of the enemy to his State policies requires that we have in mind his state policies and his present condition.

Military policy.—The only guide to the future policy of the German Army which we can follow is the presumption that the policy it has pursued in the past will be continued. We may assume that Germany plans to hold the western front and to direct her military offensive first against the remaining weak points of her enemies, the Palestine front, the Salonika front, and the Italian front, unless—

(1) Conditions in Germany are such as to demand an immediate decision on land, or—

(2) The Germans believe that their reinforcements on the western front, together with some recently developed surprise weapon, may give them reasonable assurance of victory.

In examining the probable intentions of the enemy, we have first of all to consider the mission imposed upon his naval forces by his situation and aims.

The war that the enemy is waging is a land war. He must succeed on land if he is to dictate the terms of peace. In order to dictate the terms of peace, he must break down the will of his strongest enemies. His strongest enemies are on the western and on the Italian fronts. If he succeeds on both of these fronts, he will win the war. His strategy to date has been to strike on the weaker fronts, while holding the stronger fronts. He has endeavored to deprive one front after another of the ability to take the offensive. He has been successful in this on all important fronts, except the western front. He has utilized his successes to strengthen his forces on the more important fronts.

From the beginning of the war, he has realized that the great effort of his enemies on the western and on the Italian fronts had to be supported by way of the sea. He has organized the support of his own forces and directed his own land strategy so that he could do without sea communications outside the Baltic. His basic naval mission has, therefore, been to give the maximum support to his land forces in obtaining a successful decision on land.

The special features of his strategic position have caused him to conclude that he could best support his land forces by naval effort if he concentrated that effort on—

The maximum possible sustained attack on the sea communications of the Allies.

There can be no question but that this is the governing mission of his active naval forces to-day and that it will continue to be their governing mission. Knowing this

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fact, we must not lose sight of its importance nor fail to avail ourselves of the opportunities that the knowledge gives us. The enemy thinks and acts according to his training. He has been taught the doctrine of concentration of effort so long that now it is a part of his nature. He first determines his mission and then devotes all his energy to the accomplishment of that mission. He never loses sight of his mission. Offside effort is no part of his plan, except it promises more toward the accomplishment of his mission than direct effort. He sees his goal and goes toward it with all the power at his disposal.

The enemy has found that his high seas fleet can not attack the sea communications of the Allies. He has found that his submarines alone are capable of a sustained attack on the sea communications of the Allies. These facts compel him to assign the principal active rôle in the accomplishment of his naval mission to his submarines. Such assignment appears to leave his high seas fleet without a clearly defined mission. This, however, is not the case. His submarines can not do their work unless they have access to the high seas. His submarines are incapable of maintaining for themselves a freedom of exit to the high seas, but must depend for this upon the high seas fleet.

The mission of the high seas fleet is therefore so far as their principal activity is concerned—

To further the submarine campaign to the maximum degree.

This mission includes as an immediate and continuous mission to maintain freedom of passage to and from the high seas for submarines.

Enemy surface craft in the Helgoland Bight, in the Adriatic, the Kattegat, and the Straits of Dover, have always striven to keep clear the way for his submarines to the open sea. Their activities have not indicated any other definite intention—any other mission than that given above. We do not refer here to isolated instances of raids and raiders.

The high seas fleet serves other and very important purposes for the enemy. Without the high seas fleet, Germany could not even dream of an invasion of England; with the high seas fleet the threat of invasion is sufficient to immobilize a large number of troops in England that might otherwise be on the western front. Further, the high seas fleet, by its mere existence in readiness, compels the immobilization of a superior naval force that must be held ready to meet any move the high seas fleet may make, which force might, except for the existence of the high seas fleet, be used in antisubmarine effort. It would obviously be unsound for the high seas fleet to engage in any enterprise that would greatly impair its threat or its holding power, unless that enterprise gave promise of a favorable decision of the war.

The enemy's strategy on land is closely associated with his strategy on the sea. The enemy attack on the communications of our armies is not for enemy naval forces alone. Enemy armies participate in this attack. The defeat at the Dardanelles was a distinct blow to our communications. It denied to us the war treasures of the Black Sea, and equally denied to the Russians a channel of reinforcement. The enemy advance in Belgium to the coast was a distinct attack on the communications of our armies on the western front. It opened the Belgian ports to his submarines and gave them the great advantage of proximity to areas congested with our shipping.

We are now in a position to examine the probable intentions of the enemy and then to make use of these in determining upon our own courses of action.

In striving to accomplish his missions, we may expect the enemy to:

(1) Continue his present submarine campaign.

(2) To enlarge the theater of submarine activity as fast as our antisubmarine measures become effective in congested waters.

(3) To operate his cruiser submarines in distant waters to encourage a dispersal of our forces and to give his cruiser submarines greater tactical freedom. The locality in which a vessel is sunk is no longer of great importance. Quantity of tonnage sunk is what the enemy desires first.

(4) To continue to control the Heligoland Bight, the Kattegat and the Baltic with his high seas fleet.

(5) To concentrate his air activity in support of his land forces except in so far as aircraft may be required for the protection of naval vessels near their bases.

(6) To intensify his submarine campaign in support of his military offensive—wherever that may be.

(7) There is one possible intention of the enemy that needs careful consideration. We must assume that he knows of the proposed barrage. He must know that we expect to make that barrage effective. He will surely see that we would not make so great an effort without at the same time closing the Straights of Dover. The two efforts, if successful, mean the blocking of his submarines. The mission of his high

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seas fleet is to prevent such a blockade. How will that fleet accomplish that mission? On account of his numerical inferiority in surface vessels. the enemy will foresee the necessity for a base nearer to the barrage than any base that we possess. He will not hesitate to secure the great advantage such a base would give him.

OUR OWN FORCES—STRENGTH, DISPOSITION, COURSES OF ACTION OPEN TO US.

Strength and disposition: As shown above.

COURSES OPEN TO US.

It is well to repeat the mission of the allied naval forces:

"To obtain subsurface command of the sea, while still retaining command of the surface of the sea."

The attainment of the subsurface command of the sea is to-day of paramount importance to the allied forces. Victory or defeat depends upon an immediate solution of this problem. Submarines have sunk 12,000,000 tons of merchant shipping since the beginning of the war, and the sinkings continue at an average rate of 500,000 or 600,000 tons per month. The effect of the shortage of shipping is apparent on the whole allied front from the North Sea to Mesopotamia.

CONCENTRATION OF EFFORT AND UNITY OF ACTION.

These conditions are necessary for the successful prosecution of war, and are especially so in the antisubmarine campaign, where the maximum effort of all the Allies is essential and where escort requirements have let to a great dispersal of force.

Greater results can probably be obtained with our air forces and with inshore forces by placing all operations in certain areas, such as the English Channel or the Adriatic, under one command.

The Allies and the United States are handicapped by the lack of central direction to political, military and naval effort, and by the difficulties of coordination, due to differences of language, ruse, and political aims, as well as to lack of common doctrines of war.

Individually we are handicapped by a less perfect system than that employed by the enemy to harmonize military effort, naval effort and state policy, and to organize and use the entire resource of the state for war. The success or failure of the present military and naval councils will depend on the extent to which they can harmonize and coordinate the allied efforts and bring about unity of action for the purpose of winning the war.

COMMAND OF THE SEA.

"Command of the sea" includes two distinct ideas:

(1) The free use of the sea for one's own forces and commerce.

(2) The denial of such use of the sea to the enemy. Both of these advantages may be obtained by driving all enemy fighting craft from the sea. During the period when the command of the sea is not complete, we require two forms of military effort

(1) Offensive effort directed against all enemy vessels and where possible against their bases.

(2) Defensive effort, which in general gives local protection to vessels at sea.

SURFACE COMMAND OF THE SEA.

The Allies have retained surface command of the sea since the beginning of the war. Isolated raiders have escaped from the North Sea, and attacks have been made on the English coast, and Norwegian and Ditch convoys, but such enemy action can not be entirely prevented, and has but a small influence on the course of the war.

The Grand Fleet has superiority of nearly 2 to 1 over the high sea fleet in all units except destroyers.

The mission of the high-seas fleet is "To further the submarine campaign to the maximum degree."

We are reasonably certain that the high-seas fleet will never seek decisive action, nor place itself in serious jeopardy, unless it is necessary to secure the free passage of the submarines to the open sea.

The following present and future features of the North Sea situation may render an increase of the Grand Fleet necessary

(1) The possible addition of the Russian Navy to the enemy forces—4 dreadnoughts, and about 60 destroyers.

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(2) The added sense of security that the Grand Fleet reinforcements will give to Great Britain against any fear of invasion.

(3) Future developments in connection with the North Sea barrage which may require considerable detachments from the Grand Fleet.

(4) The escape to the Atlantic of enemy battle cruisers and commerce destroyers.

The addition of Russian battleships to enemy forces can be met by the transfer of United States battleships to European waters. The Russian destroyers may be met by new construction, the transfer of destroyers from antisubmarine operations, or the addition of Japanese destroyers.

Our submarines in the Baltic may destroy Russian ships when danger of the enemy taking them over becomes imminent. It is important that the enemy be prevented from getting many Russian destroyers, if possible.

In detachments for the protection of the North Sea barrage, or for running down enemy battle cruisers in the Atlantic, battle cruisers are of great value.

In the Adriatic, surface command is held in great force by the Allies over the Austrian and Turkish fleets. Even the withdrawal of Italy would still leave a sufficient excess of force.

Owing to future probable difficulties of maintenance of capital ships in the Mediterranean, the destruction of the Austrian fleet is of importance. Of greater importance is the destruction of enemy submarine bases, which may be undertaken by our surface and air forces.

ATTACK ON ENEMY BASES.

The destruction of the submarine bases would be an effective method of solving the submarine problem.

The enemy North Sea bases may, however, be considered as impregnable. Apart from fortifications, the physical features of the coast, with the extensive banks and reefs, low land, and narrow and tortuous channels, leading up to the principal naval bases, render a combined naval and military expedition against them a desperate undertaking with practically no chance of success.

The destruction of these bases depends upon the future development of air craft. Present machines have insufficient radius to attack Wilhelmshaven or Kiel.

Zeebrugge, however, is within easy air distance of England or France. Numerous raids have been made on this place, but owing to the provisions made to protect submarines from air attack, and to the advantage offered by the Bruges Canal to disperse and hide submarines, it is probable that the results have been small.

Zeebrugge appears to be of sufficient importance to warrant the concentration of adequate air power to maintain a permanent air superiority, and to continue bombing until it becomes untenable as a submarine base. Such an effort will also undoubtedly have a direct result on the military campaign in France.

The Adriatic bases are all within easy air distance of the Italian coast, and an intensive attack on all these bases should be considered. The additional destruction of the Austrian surface fleet would have a valuable effect in releasing the colliers and supply vessels required for the Allied containing force.

Such a campaign on a large scale against submarine bases in both the North Sea and Adriatic will involve withdrawal of many air planes from present patrol work, and will require a reconsideration of the present pals of widely distributing air stations along the coasts.

During the month of December, British air craft covered 140,000 miles in antisubmarine work; 23 submarines were sighted, 20 attacked, and none were sunk. The effort seems out of proportion to the results achieved. Beyond any doubt, a concentration of this effort on a known base, easy of access, would have yielded greater results.

Concentrated offensive air power in Flanders and southeast England will not only accomplish greater results against submarines, but it will also relieve the air threat against London, definitely give us command of the air at a great strategic point, and directly assist the armies in the field—the ultimate object of all our naval and air effort.

MINING IN SUBMARINE BASES.

This has been tried, both off Zeebrugge and off Heligoland, during the war. While it may have resulted in the losses of some submarines, the general result has been a failure, as the enemy soon clears a passage. In such future operations it may be assumed that to be effective the barrage must be patrolled. The laying of mine barrages in the Adriatic and Aegean Seas should receive consideration.

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DOVER AND NORTH SEA BARRAGES.

At present there is under way the placing of the Dover and North Sea barrage in an effort to contain submarines in the North Sea.

As this effort is on as great a scale, certain features which involve its success or failure should be discussed in full.

We have recently had an example of a barrage patrol in the Strait of Otranto. The supporting bases were near. The weather conditions better than in the North Sea. Capital ships in comparatively great strength were in the near vicinity, and yet it was not practicable to maintain a patrol barrage. The attacking force could attack and get away without serious danger of being cut off because it occupied an interior position. Information of its movements always came too late to permit any action by allied forces that were not at sea on the line of retreat. The patrol had to be abandoned.

We may expect similar action and similar results in the North Sea unless we station our supporting forces in advance of the barrage. Manifestly it is impracticable to hold supporting forces of large vessels continuously at sea in advance of the barrage. The Scotland-Norway patrol was abandoned because of submarine activity. The problem then is to find a way of holding strong forces in readiness between the enemy naval bases and the barrage. We see no way of doing this except by occupying a harbor on the Norwegian coast. Fanciful schemes of mined-in areas at sea might be discussed, but the conclusion would still be the same.

In considering harbors that may be available, we should give preference to those harbors having the greatest capacity that are capable of secure temporary defense. As the war progresses and the passive features of the barrage become more effective we must expect increased effort to break the barrage so that the attacking defense of the barrage may become a matter of fleets.

There is an advantage in selecting a base some distance south of the barrage, for the following reasons:

(1) Increased probability that a movement toward the barrage will be detected in time to give warning.

(2) Increased opportunity to intercept any force that raids the barrage patrol.

(3) Denial to the enemy of all positions north of the base selected.

The mission of the force will be "to intercept and destroy any enemy force of surface vessels that may approach the barrage."

Enemy forces that have operated so far from base as the barrage are of three classes—submarines, merchant-ship raiders, and light cruisers. If greater strength is needed in the raiding force, the next step would be to send battle cruisers.

Whatever is sent on these expeditions will have high speed. The mission of the expedition will be the destruction of patrol craft, since these are the vessels that block the way of the submarine. Having destroyed the patrol craft, the next mission of the expedition will be to get home. If it is pursued by slow vessels—battleships, for instance—it will experience no difficulty in getting home. We are, therefore, compelled to assign powerful high-speed vessels to operate from the proposed base. The number of these vessels should exceed the number of similar vessels likely to be sent against the barrage. They should be reinforced by an information service of light cruisers and of listening vessels capable of giving timely warning.

It is of course desirable that the base for patrol craft should be near the area they patrol.

We have now arrived at the following conclusions:

(1) The base for supporting vessels should be between the barrage and the enemy bases.

(2) The supporting vessels should be battle cruisers. Battleships may be used in addition, but would be of small use unsupported by battle cruisers.

(3) The supporting force should include an information service of light cruisers and listening vessels.

CONVOY OF SHIPPING.

This has greatly reduced the loss from enemy action, and must be adhered to until losses have been considerably reduced from the present rate. Convoy has serious disadvantages, however, among which are:

Reduction of efficiency of shipping (estimated to be about 50 per cent).

Losses by collision.

The loss of efficiency can be decreased by:

Better utilization of speed.

Convoys to make the best possible speed from port to port.

Thorough instruction of merchant officers in rules for convoy.

Placing all merchant vessels and personnel of the allied countries under Government control.

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ENEMY ANSWER TO A CLOSE INSHORE OPERATION.

When operations inshore become too dangerous the enemy submarines will naturally move further offshore. Forcing them to this will be decided gain, as shipping will be harder to find and the maintenance of submarines on station more difficult. On the other hand, the greater number of patrol vessels are unsuited for deep-sea work, and the greater immunity of submarines will partially counterbalance the difficulty in finding shipping, and the disadvantage of the necessarily reduced number of submarines on station.

It is probable that the development of antisubmarine methods on the European coast will result in an attack in force on shipping along the United States Atlantic coast, Gulf of Mexico, and Caribbean. Submarine fuel carriers will permit of submarines remaining for a considerable period in the western Atlantic.

SUBSURFACE COMMAND OF THE SEA.

As has been stated, this is the greatest and most vital problem that confronts the Allies to-day. It must be solved, and solved quickly. The outcome of the war depends upon it. In its achievement the line of action will be guided by the following principles:

1. The offensive should be followed in every possible case.
2. Greater results are promised by action close to enemy bases.
3. A pure defensive leading to the dispersal of units over great areas has practically no hope of success. The effort involved is prohibitive as compared with that of the enemy.
4. Every contact with a submarine should be followed by the maximum tactical offensive effort for its destruction.

The present surface command of the sea is largely a passive effort governed by the idea of an offensive whenever the opportunity presents itself. Subsurface can be obtained only through offensive effort. All other effort is palliative. The conclusive effort must be offensive, even in its palliative measures. The offensive idea in antisubmarine warfare is of specially great importance. The submarine navigates in three dimensions. Every time it is forced to submerge it enters a danger zone disturbing to morale. Every time it is forced to submerge off soundings it enters a zone of special danger where any outward event may mean disaster. When we limit our antisubmarine measures to escort duties, we do the thing most calculated to favor the morale of the submarine personnel. The crews lead a comparatively placid life except when they are about to attack; then all hands are called and they go about their duties deliberately according to plan. If, however, we can convert this feeling of comparative security to one of constant tension, the effect will show immediately in increased submarine losses. Greater strain, more frequent emergencies, and the consequent general feeling of insecurity incident to being the chased instead of the chaser, can not but have a marked effect.

We, therefore, adopt as a principle that "The maximum possible antisubmarine force shall be devoted to offensive operations." Offensive operations against submarines finally culminate in tactical situations where one or more submarines are pitted against one or more submarines or surface vessels. The entire submarine problem as it exists to-day is nothing but the assemblage of a multitude of tactical situations of the above nature. The successful solution of two or three typical situations would mean the ultimate solution of the entire problem. The ultimate solution to the submarine menace is tactical and not strategic.

We understand that the enemy intrusts his submarines to skilled officers specially trained to perform their specific duties. If we are to detect an effort in which initiative clearly lies with the enemy, we must oppose skill with greater skill; we must make of our antisubmarine effort a major effort that claims the best brains and the best tactical skill of the naval services. We must assure ourselves on every occasion of contact with a submarine the maximum tactical use shall be made of that contact. To realize this aim, we must prepare both vessels and personnel for their mission.

As to personnel, the solution is to be found in the best available personnel thoroughly trained in the best known methods. We feel that every branch of the United States and allied naval services is fully justified in giving large numbers of its best people to the antisubmarine service. The recent rapid development of submarine detection devices is of such a nature as greatly modify the tactics of submarine search and attack. It is, therefore, necessary to train personnel in the new tactics as fast as possible. It is suggested that conferences at the Admiralty of the best qualified officers actually operating at sea in antisubmarine work would be useful in determining, improving and disseminating tactical methods.

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As to vessels and their equipment, they must be ready to deliver the maximum possible attack. We may assume readiness as to the gun attack. The depth charge attack is still in an unsatisfactory condition, but rapidly being improved.

In reports from American destroyers there have been several instances of depth charges failing when, if they had not failed, the submarine would have been put down. Such instances indicate the desirability of adopting the rule of always dropping at least two depth charges simultaneously. Experience has demonstrated that the position of a submerged submarine is known with more accuracy immediately upon the arrival of the attacking vessel near the point of submergence than it is at any later time. This fact indicates the desirability of making the first depth charge attack a maximum effort. Vessels should therefore be provided with means for projecting depth charges from the stern and from the beams so that a large area of water—say, two or three hundred yards in diameter—may be covered by the simultaneous discharges and dropping of depth charges. Dropping gear for two depth charges with projectors for two depth charges located near the stern and three or four on each beam or quarter is suggested. In addition, as many depth charges as can be carried aft should be in readiness for running over the stern (mine-laying style), so that they may be laid on retiring curves. It should be a principle of action that—

The first contact with an enemy submarine shall justify the expenditure of all depth charges on board but two.

The after gun and torpedo tubes of destroyers used in antisubmarine work can be landed to make way for more depth charges, and the gear necessary for using them expeditiously.

To summarize our antisubmarine effort:

(1) Emphasize the offensive as much as possible.

(2) Put the best brains and skill available into the antisubmarine service.

(3) Develop group tactics and organization by conference and otherwise. Disseminate results.

(4) Make maximum possible use of each contact with a submarine.

(5) Always drop at least two depth charges in first salvo, and as many more as possible. Expend all but two depth charges on first contact with a submarine.

(6) Fit vessels to carry maximum possible number of depth charges in readiness for laying expeditiously. Remove after gun and torpedo tube on destroyers, if necessary.

The question of the cruiser-submarine is one very difficult of solution, because of its extensive field of operations. Tactically it is less efficient than the small submarine, except for the increased range of its guns. The tendency of our answer to the cruiser-submarine attack will be toward a further diversion of forces to defensive arrangements, and a further slowing up of shipping through extension of the convoy system. Even were it sound policy, it is impossible to guard shipping in distant waters against the torpedo attack of cruiser-submarines.

Greater zigzag areas, increased armament of merchant ships, increased numbers and skill of armed guards, increased vigilance regarding lights, radio signals, smoke, etc., all palliative measures, is the best reply available at present to the cruiser submarine. In connection with the increased armament of merchant vessels as a reply to the gunfire of the cruiser submarine, we suggest the special arming of about 1 merchant ship in 10 of each class with a battery of at least four 5-inch or better guns, and the assignment to these ships of a full gun's crew for each gun. As the convoy system becomes more fully organized, it will then be possible to place one specially armed ship in each convoy and thus be sure that in the absence of an ocean escort we will still have sufficient gun power with each convoy to reply to the gun fire of a cruiser submarine.

The Mediterranean situation is entirely satisfactory as to the containing of enemy capital ships, but the submarine situation is very unsatisfactory. Submarines cruise at will and safely throughout the Adriatic and Mediterranean, basing chiefly on Adriatic ports. The principal obstacle to patrol operations in the Adriatic has been the activity of enemy light cruisers and destroyers. We recommend no withdrawal of forces from the Mediterranean, but that closer study of the Adriatic situation be made with a view of a greater concentration of offensive effort against enemy naval forces. We consider the entire naval problem of the Mediterranean and Adriatic a major problem in which the United States and the Allies are all greatly interested. The successful solution of this problem might well mark the turning point in the war.

5. To arm heavily (with full gun's crews for each gun) about 1 merchant ship in 10, of each general class, in the North and South Atlantic, and as far as practicable to escort convoys with such heavily armed merchant ships.

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DECISIONS.

General:

1. To provide for united action of allied naval efforts; in conformity with the naval missions and irrespetcive of local situations and special interests.
2. To unify commands where desirable in certain areas; such as the English Channel and the Adriatic.
4. To reinforce the grand fleet with United States battleships if the barrage operations require it, or, if thereby troops on Great Britain can be released for service in France.
5. To develop plans for concentrated air attacks on enemy submarine bases in the North Sea and the Adriatic.
6. To develop plans for attacks with surface vessels against enemy Adriatic bases.
7. To prepare to destroy Russian Baltic ships should their capture by the enemy become imminent.
8. To give special study to the matter of mine barrage in the English Channel and the Adriatic and Aegean Seas.

Antisubmarine:

1. To devote the maximum possible antisubmarine force to offensive operations.
2. To develop with the greatest possible rapidity hunting groups equipped with listening devices, and manned by the best trained personnel available from all sources.
3. To equip vessels engaged in antisubmarine warfare with adequate means for taking the maximum tactical advantage of every contact with an enemy submarine.

U. S. NAVAL FORCES OPERATING IN EUROPEAN WATERS,
May 31, 1918.

From: Force Commander.
To: Secretary of the Navy (Operations).
Subject: Correction to Planning Section memorandum No. 8.
Inclosures: Two.

1. Inclosed herewith are corrected pages 17 and 18 for Planning Section memorandum No. 8, a copy of which was forwarded to the department on February 22.
2. The changes from the pages 17 and 18 previously forwarded are such as to eliminate from the memorandum all reference to the seizure of a base in Norway.
3. All copies of this memorandum which were furnished to the allied naval council and to the British Admiralty were altered in accordance with the inclosed corrected sheets.

SIMS.

Capt. PRATT. I will submit this plan, also, because there is nothing in this that I think is in the least degree objectionable. It is dated 28th of March, 1918, and is by the London planning section.

PLANNING SECTION—MEMORANDUM NO. 18—PROBLEM NO. 10—ANTISUBMARINE POLICY.

General situation.—As at present. The shipping situation is becoming more and more critical. Unless a check is placed on the enemy's submarines, it may become necessary to cease the transport of United States Army troops and stores to France in order to meet the urgent requirements of the Allies as regards food and raw material.

Special situation.—The British and United States Army planning divisions decide to review the antisubmarine policy of the immediate future, bearing in mind that the northern barrage can not be moderately effective before July.

Required.—Estimate of the situation and decisions as to antisubmarine measures that should be taken now.

ANTISUBMARINE POLICY IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE—JOINT APPRECIATION BY THE BRITISH AND AMERICAN PLANNING DIVISIONS.

SUMMARY OF CONTENTS.

Present policy.—Present submarine policy mainly a system of local trade protection. No concentrated attack on submarines except in the Dover area. Convoy escorts have the great advantage of getting in touch with the submarines, but their tactics are generally defensive, and they seldom kill. Lack of cooperation characteristic of the present system.

Suggested modifications.—Immediate policy, a concentrated offensive in North Sea exists combined with a modified system of local protection. An intensive patrol of the Fair Island Channel approaches. The functions of the Grand Fleet the crucial

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question. The idea of inveigling the High Sea Fleet into a fleet action should be abandoned in favor of an antisubmarine blockade of the northern exit. The leadership and organizing power of the Grand Fleet higher command and staff as well as a small proportion of its destroyers are essential to effective antisubmarine measures. The ocean escort destroyers and the coastal trawler patrols reduced by 30 and 50 per cent, respectively, to obtain the remainder of the required forces; probable effect of these reductions. Offensive measures on a small scale recommended in other areas to be brought about by a reorganization and consolidation of the coastal commands. Summarized conclusions.

PRESENT POLICY.

1. The forces directly employed fighting the submarine are to be found in two organizations: Convoy escort vessels and auxiliary patrol craft, the former escorting ships through the submarine zone, the latter being distributed round the coast.

2. These forces are given in the following table under the heading "escort duty," "patrols," and "minesweeping."

[Sl.—Sloop. D1.—Modern destroyer, F. class and later. D2.—Older destroyer. P.—P. boat. S.—Submarine. T.—Trawler. W.—Whaler.]

Nature of work.	Sl.	D1.	D2.	P.	S.	T.	W.
Ocean escorts	24	[1] 110		13			
Cross channel escorts		1	12	31		246	
Coastal escorts			24				
Total escorts	24	111	36	44		246	
Coastal patrols						248	6
Submarine patrols					38		
Mine sweeping						410	

In addition to the above, a force of about 21 trawlers is being prepared, fitted with fish hydrophones for submarine hunting.

[1] Includes 38 United States Army destroyers at Queenstown and 6 destroyers at Granton for Scandinavian convoys. Does not include any of Harwich force, which nevertheless is employed as Dutch convoy escorts.

3. In addition to the forces in foregoing table, there are the Grand Fleet and the Harwich and Dover forces. The task allotted to the Grand Fleet and its accepted policy is to be ready to engage the High Sea Fleet at any time and anywhere in the North Sea.

4. The number of destroyers allocated to the Grand Fleet is only sufficient for battle purposes, and this policy, therefore, immobilizes them from any extensive or continuous antisubmarine operations.

5. In the South, on the other hand, the primary task is to bar the Dover Straits, and the primary function of the Dover and Harwich forces is to support the barrage Dover, therefore, is the only area in which any concentrated attack is being made on the submarine. The results are seen in Appendix 1, which shows the soundness of this policy.

6. It is clear that the vast majority of the antisubmarine forces in the vicinity of the United Kingdom are spread over a wide field, and are not concentrated to attack submarines. We try to be strong everywhere, and are strong nowhere.

7. Part of the protective system, viz, the escort of convoys by fast vessels, has, however, the great advantage of forcing the submarine to attack in the vicinity of the escort, and gives it a chance of counter attack. In practice, however, only a few submarines are destroyed under these circumstances. This may be due to the fact that the forces on the spot are insufficient to bring about results.

8. It may also be due to faulty tactics, and in order that full advantage may be taken of these contacts, it appears essential that the escorting destroyers should drop the defensive rôle and assume a vigorous offensive, which should not only include an immediate depth charge attack, but also a persistent hunt during the remainder of the day by a large proportion of the escort. The question whether any destroyers should remain with the convoy would depend on the locality and probability of further attacks.

9. So far as trawlers are concerned, they have little offensive value, except in cooperation with faster vessels, and this emphasizes the necessity of coordinating the work of all craft and weapons. Each type possesses a certain degree of offensive power, but unless these powers are used in combination, successful results can not be ex-

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pected. The deep mine field is dependent upon surface patrols. Hydrophone trawlers are practically useless without faster vessels, and aircraft greatly increase the hunting power of destroyers.

PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS TO PRESENT POLICY.

10. Instead of the above system of dispersion of force, it is urged that we should eventurally aim at closing the northern exit by a great offensive effort in that area.

11. Decisive results will not be obtained until a very strong mine barrage is completed, and it would be inexpedient to abandon the local protection of trade until the hydrophone is more fully developed. It is urged, however, that a concentrated offensive effort, covering the reported track of submarines, be instituted in the northern area as soon as possible.

12. In February, about 70 per cent of the submarines operating outside the North Sea passed north about, and the number will tend to increase. Also, a certain number were probably damaged or defective on reaching this area, homeward bound.

13. At the present time, submarines passing north about confine themselves almost exclusively to the Fair Island Channel, the passages averaging one a day during February, 1918. The approximate times of passing through the channel are shown graphically in Appendix II.

14. An intensive patrol in this area could be quickly moved to another track, and would be flexible in its dispositions, enabling the utmost use to be made of any information available, which, at present, is certainly not utilized to its fullest extent.

15. It is most strongly urged that the success of the above policy rests on allotting certain definite antisubmarine functions to the Grand Fleet, for unless its present functions are modified, neither sufficient destroyers nor the necessary standard of organization will be forthcoming.

16. So long as the movements and dispositions of the Grand Fleet are based on the idea that the High Sea Fleet is likely to be inveigled into action by any other means than the defeat of the submarine, the most efficient part of the British Navy must play a comparatively minor part in defeating the enemy's primary line of attack. It must stand aside and leave the real battle to the militia of the sea—the trawlers, mercantile marine, etc.

17. On the other hand, if the primary function of the Grand Fleet during the summer months is defined as the barrage of the northern exit to submarines, the High Sea Fleet will only become an object of immediate attack if it threatens the barrage.

18. The proposed policy amounts to exercising an intensive and immediate control over the northern area, while the control over the rest of the North Sea will be less immediate and less intensive. It involves certain minor risks such as exposure to bombardment, etc. These risks, which have been referred to in other papers, should be accepted and the necessary precautions taken. (Vide P. D. papers 049,37 and 053; also American P. D. Problem No. 2.)

19. By assembling the whole Grand Fleet at one base, and freeing it from the responsibility of dashing after the High Sea Fleet at short notice, except in support of antisubmarine operatings, a flotilla of destroyers could probably be released for hunting submarines, but the commander in chief might allocate more or less according to circumstances.

20. In order to provide the remainder of the antisubmarine destroyers and patrol craft, it is proposed to reduce the escort destroyers, sloops and P. boats by approximately 30 per cent and the trawlers round the coast on patrol duties by about 50 per cent.

21. The withdrawal of trawlers from coastal patrol will probably not influence the shipping losses one way or the other. The effect of reducing the convoy destroyers can not be exactly foreseen, but no appreciable increase in sinkings is expected. The great initial success of the convoy system was due more to the concentration of shipping in a comparatively small space, and the consequent difficulty of locating it than to the protective power of the escort. This is illustrated by Appendix III, which shows how the enemy attempted to meet the convoy system by transferring his attack to the coastal and terminal areas, where his submarines would have a better chance of finding the convoys; also by the fact that, out of 57 attacks in which torpedoes were fired on ocean convoys between July, 1917, and March, 1918, in only two cases did the escort sight the submarine before the torpedoes were fired.

22. The proposed reduction in a destroyer escorts might be compensated by increasing the destroyers in the dangerous zones at the expense of the comparatively safe areas. For example, whilst the submarine campaign is mainly confined to the coastal areas of the United Kingdom, escorts to the westward of say 10° W. might be greatly reduced.

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23. In addition to the proposed operations in the northern area, it is suggested that yachts, older destroyers, and the remaining trawlers employed on coastal patrols should carry out similar operations on the east coast, channel, and Irish Sea, in conjunction with drifters and mined nets, and that the coastal commands be consolidated into a few groups, so as to obtain greater flexibility and more economical employment of the available forces. The following grouping is suggested:

(1) *Commander in chief.*—Grand Fleet; North Sea and antisubmarine operations from Firth of Forth north about to Hebrides, inclusive, with particular regard to the blockade of the northern exit.

(2) *East coast command.*—Coastal antisubmarine work from Firth of Forth to Yarmouth.

(3) *Narrow-seas command.*—Yarmouth to Dover, inclusive, with particular regard to the blockade of Dover Straits.

(4) *Channel command.*—English Channel (exclusive of Dover); including French Channel forces.

(5) *Ireland command.*—Coasts of Ireland and approaches, including Irish Sea.

(6) *Biscay command.*—French west coast.

Under the present system of scattered coastal commands it is most noticeable that submarines frequently operate for days in very limited areas without any large forces being brought to the spot, although they might be concentrated in a comparatively short time.

24. The foregoing may be summarized by saying that the principal factor in the solution of the submarine problem is a new orientation of the functions of the Grand Fleet, and that if the commander in chief is allotted the primary task of preventing submarines passing north about and is freed from responsibilities which interfere with that duty, everything else will follow in due course. A consolidation and reorganization of the coastal commands are also required.

NOTE.—The British plans division has endeavored to reduce the proposals for an intensive antisubmarine patrol in the north to a concrete form in Appendixes IV, V, VI, VII, and VIII.

APPENDIX I.

[From information supplied by I. D. Section 25.]

Comparison of passage (submarines) through Dover Straits and North about.

	North about.	Dover.
December:		
Out	10	25
Home	13	13
January:		
Out	12	3
Home	7	9
February:		
Out	18	5
Home	11	7
March 1–15:		
Out	7	3
Home	14	2

Comparison of passages (large submarines only).

	Boats.	Passages.	North about.	Dover
December	21	12	17	19
January	13	26	18	5
February	21	42	39	1

No large submarines are believed to have passed through Dover Straits since the 18th of February.

Capt. PRATT. The above figures are the London Planning Section's and the note refers to the destroyers apart from the Grand Fleet. There is no attempt made to criticise this distribution. The British Navy knows its business. Nobody admires it and its magnificent work more than I do, but please note this—111 with fleet, 213 on

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antisubmarine work. All this time we had only 9 to 10 left available on our own coast, and they were convoying ships when they could. Does it seem reasonable on this item to make out such a grave case against our Navy as "failure to give adequate support with means at our disposal during the first six months seriously and unnecessarily jeopardized the outcome of the whole war," and "I believe that this failure combined with the equally grave one of neglecting to prepare adequately during the few months previous, and the few months subsequent to our declaration of war, probably postponed victory four months." Isn't this straining a point to make a case against our Navy? I grant you that everything within reason should go over to Europe to combat the submarine, but at a pinch could not nine destroyers leave the Grand Fleet and join the antisubmarine forces working around the British Isles? Are we as black as Admiral Sims paints? I leave it to your judgment to decide. No, gentlemen; the balance of power to decide the submarine campaign never passed out of British hands during the critical months in question. We came in as soon as we could, but the submarine's fate was settled—although we did not know it at the time—before it was possible, within the limits of reason, for us to get into the game in force.

In this connection I wish to refer to Admiral Mayo's testimony, page 45.

The British destroyers at Queenstown were withdrawn after the arrival of our destroyers, notwithstanding that the area of operations there was repeatedly spoken of as being the critical one. If British destroyers had been kept there and the number increased, some of our destroyers could have been assigned with our battleship squadron and our mining force instead of depending on the British destroyers as pointed out by Admiral Sims. Furthermore, the experience of our destroyers in all phases of their work would have been beneficial and this certainly was desirable.

This evidence, coupled with the distribution of destroyers to Grand Fleet, is fairly conclusive proof that the British thought they held the balance of power in their own hands.

In April of 1917 (the month we entered) the total ships sunk by submarine were 423; tonnage loss, 846,863 tons. This was the month we entered the war, before our ships could get across and operate efficiently. Yet note this was the apex of the submarine campaign. In May, the losses were 320 ships; tonnage 551,778. In June the losses were 314 ships; tonnage 628,249; in July 240 ships, tonnage 502,048; in August 185 ships, tonnage 488,072. The following months throughout the war showed a steady decrease in tonnage losses; while in the first quarter of 1918 the building program we had inaugurated began to make its weight felt. No, gentlemen, as much as I would like to believe that we could have played a major rôle in putting down the submarine, and that therefore the major responsibility was ours, facts and figures tell a different story. The British themselves got it under control in May, 1917, before we could have gotten into the war, even with wings, and thereafter we were a very essential but only a contributing cause to the defeat of the submarine. I submit the data for the above statement. I will submit the tonnage figures. These are complete data, and there is a paper prepared by the British admiralty and furnished by the Allied Maritime Transport Committee, which gives you the whole status from the beginning of war and all the tonnage sunk.

The CHAIRMAN. Month by month?

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Capt. PRATT. For the whole year; yes, sir; month by month. These papers are as follows:

HISTORICAL SECTION, *March 16, 1920.*

Table showing the total number and gross tonnage of all allied and neutral ships, schooners, and fishing vessels sunk by submarines only.

[Does not include vessels sunk by cruisers, raiders, mines or other causes. Arranged to show, by month to month and year by year, from August, 1914, to November, 1918, but inclusive. Also showing same from August, 1914, to Nov. 30, 1917. Source: British Admiralty Reports on file in Historical Section.]

Year and month.	Number of ships.	Gross tonnage.	Total ships.	Total ton-year.
1914.				
August				
September				
October	1	886		
November	2	2,084		
December			3	2,970
1915.				
January	7	17,126		
February	11	18,123		
March	27	72,602		
April	33	40,345		
May	55	107,934		
June	113	117,484		
July	86	98,594		
August	102	169,222		
September	50	121,240		
October	17	63,004		
November	42	138,196		
December	25	99,761	568	1063,731
1916.				
January	13	28,363		
February	17	36,286		
March	48	145,976		
April	66	161,103		
May	57	103,602		
June	49	89,573		
July	85	102,298		
August	127	154,524		
September	160	205,928		
October	174	311,919		
November	156	235,365		
December	167	269,470	1,119	1,844,407
1917.				
January	181	298,188		
February	259	467,751		
March	325	500,699		
April	423	846,863		
May	320	551,778		
June	314	628,249		
July	240	502,058		
August	185	488,072		
September	174	332,254		
October	160	452,108		
November	105	200,903	2,686	5,268,923
December	151	354,374	2,837	5,623,297
1918.				
January	140	300,283		
February	121	309,839		
March	170	326,263		
April	115	267,809		
May	135	291,438		
June	107	241,907		
July	100	260,865		
August	148	280,689		
September	86	187,385		
October	60	109,876		
November	2	10,195	1,184	2,506,549
Total ships and gross tonnage by submarines only:				
1914	3	2,970		
1915	568	1,063,731		
1916	1,119	1,844,407		
1917	2,837	5,623,297		
1918	1,184	2,506,549		
Five years	5,711	11,120,954		

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World tonnage position, August, 1914.

[Data prepared by British Admiralty and furnished by Allied Maritime Transport Committee.]

ited Kingdom and colonies	18,393,000
ance	2,120,000
an	1,023,000
ly	1,589,000
ssia	670,000
eece	564,000
rway	2,595,000
lland	976,000
eden	899,000
ain	806,000
nmark	761,000
her countries	1,207,000
Total (not including United States)	31,603,000
ited States of America (including Lakes)	3,284,000

United States of America lake tonnage amounts to slightly more than 2,000,000 ons.

ible showing gross tonnage of world vessels lost through enemy action during each month since the outbreak of the war in 1914 to the armistice, Nov. 11, 1918, also showing totals to May, 1918.

Year and month.	All vessels except British.	British steamships.	British fishing vessels.	Total for months.
1914.				
ugust	18,075	40,254	4,438	62,767
otember	9,127	88,219	1,032	98,378
tober	9,829	77,805	283	87,917
ovember	10,065	8,888	460	19,413
ecember	17,382	26,035	780	44,197
Total	64,478	241,201	6,993	312,672
1915.				
nuary	15,705	32,054	222	47,981
ebruary	23,549	36,372	.....	59,921
arch	9,007	71,479	289	80,775
pril	31,342	27,453	1,930	55,725
ay	30,385	84,025	5,648	120,058
ne	40,113	83,198	8,117	131,428
ly	52,366	52,847	4,427	109,640
ugust	34,512	148,464	2,890	185,866
eptember	49,749	101,690	445	151,884
ctober	34,378	54,156	.....	88,534
ovember	58,388	94,493	162	153,043
ecember	48,651	74,490	.....	123,141
Total	428,145	855,721	24,130	1,307,996
1916.				
anuary	18,614	62,288	357	81,259
ebruary	41,619	75,860	68	117,547
larch	67,401	99,089	607	167,097
pril	50,258	141,193	216	191,667
lay	64,453	64,521	201	129,175
une	71,879	36,976	.....	108,855
uly	32,987	82,432	2,796	118,215
ugust	117,718	43,354	1,672	162,744
eptember	121,077	104,572	4,811	230,460
ctober	176,274	176,248	1,138	353,660
lovember	141,099	168,809	1,600	311,508
ecember	172,411	182,292	436	355,139
Total	1,075,790	1,237,634	13,902	2,327,326
1917.				
anuary	212,835	153,666	2,020	368,521
ebruary	223,042	313,486	3,478	540,006
larch	236,777	353,478	3,586	593,841
pril	329,825	545,282	5,920	881,027
lay	242,892	352,289	1,448	596,629
une	268,240	417,925	1,342	687,507
uly	190,394	364,858	2,736	557,988
ugust	181,678	329,810	242	511,730
eptember	155,291	196,212	245	351,748
ctober	182,199	276,132	227	458,558
lovember	115,565	173,560	87	289,212
ecember	145,611	253,087	413	399,111
Total	2,484,349	3,729,785	21,744	6,235,878

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Total tonnage lost by all nations, by years, from August, 1914, to Nov. 11, 1918

Year.	All vessels except British.	British steamships.	British fishing vessels.	Total
1914	64,478	241,201	6,993	[illegible]
1915	428,145	855,721	24,120	[illegible]
1916	1,075,782	1,237,634	13,902	[illegible]
1917	2,484,349	3,729,785	21,744	[illegible]
1918	967,197	1,694,749	4,996	[illegible]
Total	5,019,951	7,759,090	71,765	[illegible]

Total losses, all nations, by years, from August, 1914, to Nov. 30, 1918.

	Ton-
1914	312,[illegible]
1915	1,307,[illegible]
1916	2,327,[illegible]
1917	6,235,[illegible]
1918	2,666,[illegible]
Total August, 1914, to Nov. 30, 1918	12,850,[illegible]

Total losses, all nations, by years, August, 1914, to May 1, 1918.

1914	312,[illegible]
1915	1,307,[illegible]
1916	2,327,[illegible]
1917	6,235,[illegible]
1918	1,246,[illegible]
Total to May 1, 1918	11,430,[illegible]

Year and month.	All vessels except British.	British ships.	British sailing vessels.	Total [illegible] months.
1918.				
January	126,310	179,973	375	[illegible]
February	91,375	226,896	686	[illegible]
March	142,846	199,458	293	[illegible]
April	62,935	215,543	241	[illegible]
Total, Apr. 20, 1918	423,466	821,870	1,595	[illegible]
May	102,580	192,436	504	[illegible]
June	91,958	162,990	639	[illegible]
July	94,963	165,449	555	[illegible]
August	136,558	145,721	1,536	[illegible]
September	50,880	136,859	142	[illegible]
October	59,330	59,229	.....	[illegible]
November	7,462	10,195	25	[illegible]
Total, 1918	967,197	1,694,749	4,996	[illegible]

Admiral Sims gives tonnage available to Allies May 1, 1918, not including Americans..... 31,500,[illegible]
Total tonnage lost, all nations, to May 1, 1918..... 11,430,[illegible]

Tonnage available May 1, 1918, not including new construction or vessels captured..... 20,069,[illegible]

Allied maritime transport committee.

Total tonnage available to Allies, not including America (1914)..... 31,603,[illegible]
Total tonnage lost, all nations, to May 1, 1918..... 11,430,[illegible]

Tonnage available May 1, 1918, not including new construction or vessels captured..... 20,172,[illegible]

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Comparison of allied and neutral tonnage gains and losses, from August, 1914, to June 30, 1918.

Period.	Tonnage losses.	New construction.	Captured for enemy.	Resultant (+ −).	Net loss (−), net gain (+).
1914	312,672	1,012,920	1,178,500	+1,878,748	+1,878,748
1915	1,307,996	1,202,000	19,000	− 86,996	+1,791,752
1916	2,327,326	1,688,000	300,000	− 339,326	+1,452,426
1917	6,235,878	2,703,355	1,080,500	−3,783,855	−999,597
To May 1, 1918	1,246,931	[1] 870,317			
May, 1918	295,520	[2] 1,242,274			
June, 1918	255,587			314,553	685,044

[1] First quarter. [2] Second quarter.

Table showing construction of merchant shipping, gross tonnage, complete since the beginning of the war for the United Kingdom, United States, and for other allied and neutral nations, 1914 to October, 1918, inclusive.

Period.	Quarter.	United Kingdom.	United States.	Other allied and neutral nations.	World totals.
1914		675,610	[1] 120,000	217,310	1,012,920
1915		650,919	225,122	325,959	1,202,000
1916		541,552	325,413	821,036	1,688,000
1917		1,163,474	1,034,296	505,585	2,703,355
1918	First	320,280	328,541	220,496	870,317
1918	Second	442,966	558,939	240,369	1,242,274
1918	Third	411,395	834,250	232,127	1,477,772
1918	October	136,100	357,532	50,000	534,632
1918	10 months	1,310,741	2,080,262	742,992	4,133,995

[1] Estimated.

Statement by British Admiralty showing British and world's merchant tonnage lost through enemy action and marine risks since the outbreak of the war to Oct. 31, 1918.

[Received by O. N. I. Dec. 28, 1918. Historical section, Mar. 20, 1920.]

Period.	British.	Other nations.	Total for world.
1914.			
August and September	341,824	85,947	427,771
Fourth quarter	154,728	126,688	281,416
1915.			
First quarter	215,905	104,542	320,447
Second quarter	223,676	156,743	380,419
Third quarter	356,659	172,822	529,481
Fourth quarter	307,139	187,234	494,373
1916.			
First quarter	325,237	198,958	524,195
Second quarter	270,690	251,599	522,289
Third quarter	294,358	307,681	592,039
Fourth quarter	617,563	541,780	1,159,343
1917.			
First quarter	911,840	707,553	1,619,370
Second quarter	1,361,870	875,064	2,236,934
Third quarter	952,938	541,535	1,494,473
Fourth quarter	782,889	489,954	1,272,843
1918.			
First quarter	697,668	445,668	1,143,336
Second quarter	630,862	331,145	962,007
Third quarter	512,030	403,483	915,513
October	83,952	93,582	177,534
Total	9,031,828	6,021,958	15,053,786

This figure includes 210,653 gross tonnage interned in enemy ports.

NOTE.—Tonnage lost by enemy action and October 31, 1918.

Total to November 11, 1918, British, 9,043,744; other nations, 6,024,117; for world, 15,067,861.

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Capt. PRATT. I am comparing the two drives, one a sea drive and the other a land drive. There are points of contact between the German submarine drive in the spring of 1917 and the land drive started in March, 1918. In April, 1917, we entered the war, and that month showed the greatest losses from submarine sinkings. This in itself is worthy of note, for it would indicate that the purpose of the campaign was not alone directed at the sinking of ships, but was also a campaign of propaganda directed at striking terror into the hearts of our people, in an effort to frustrate our troop movement across the Atlantic. Without the additional man power on the western front which the United States alone could furnish, there was danger of a stalemate and of an indecisive peace. The campaign opened against the United States in 1917, with the Germans using the same tactics and the same methods of propaganda that they had used earlier in the war, and also did later. Just as in March, 1918, the first land drive was the worst, so in April, 1917, the first submarine offensive was the worst and the succeeding months saw the submarine efforts spending themselves with receding force. The course run by the submarine campaign was not alone determined by the countertactics of the Allies, but was to a great degree influenced by the strategy of the great German General Staff. In the spring of 1918, the building curve of tonnage replacements crossed the curve of submarine sinkings. From that date it became merely a question of how long before our Army could cross the Atlantic and participate in the land operations of the western front. The final outcome of the war was certain, once the Allies held firm on land. Had it been possible to do so, it might not have been bad policy for the Germans to have launched this land drive, with the warning of the submarine effort, before the psychological effects following failure were felt.

I should like to submit another paper on the question of available ship tonnage, for the lack of protection of which we have been so severely criticized by Admiral Sims. If one were to rely entirely upon his statements, you would come to the conclusion that our so-called reprehensible delay had driven British shipping to such straits that they could neither take care of their own supply needs nor assist in handling our troops to an extent which promised failure for the allied land campaign. The following paper which I will read was submitted by Admiral Sims's plans section in London, January 10, 1918. This paper refers to the employment of British merchant ships as auxiliary cruisers in their naval service. [Reading:]

PLANNING SECTION, MEMORANDUM NO. 5, JANUARY 10, 1918, EMPLOYMENT OF AUXILIARY CRUISERS.

One of the most urgent problems of the hour is the immediate increase of tonnage to augment the supply of food and munitions. Actual sinkings by submarines do not give a true indication of actual losses in carrying capacity incident to submarine warfare. To the sinkings must be added:

(1) Vessels damages by submarines.

(2) Vessels damaged in collisions incident to convoy operations and to running without lights.

(3) Losses in ton-miles per day due to convoy operations.

(4) Delays in port due to inadequate port facilities.

(5) Employment of merchant tonnage in naval operations.

All of these factors are cumulative and of such a serious nature as to demand the closest scrutiny to determine if it is not possible to reduce their unfavorable effect

We have considered especially the employment of merchant tonnage as auxiliary cruisers. It is used for patrol and escort duties. It is in no sense at any time a reply

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to the submarine but rather an additional target in each instance. The principal usefulness of merchant vessels as auxiliary cruisers is protection of convoys against raiders. There are no known raiders at sea now. The present situation requires that no move in the game be lost and that some risk be accepted if we are to continue the war. We therefore recommend the immediate acceptance as a principle of action:

"The maximum possible employment of all auxiliary cruisers in the ocean transport of food and munitions for the support of the war."

The following-named vessels of the Royal Navy appear to be employed in a manner not in harmony with its above principle:

Name.	Gross tonnage.	Name.	Gross tonnage.
Teutonic	9,984	Marmora	10,509
Columbella	8,292	Andea	15,620
Alsatian	18,485	Arlanza	15,044
Hildebrand	6,991	Avoca	11,073
Orotava	5,980	Ebro	8,480
Mantua	10,885	Almanzora	16,034
Patia	6,103	Orcoma	11,571
Patuca	6,103	Moldavia	9,500
Virginian	10,757	Himalaya	6,929
Motagua	5,977	Gloucestershire	8,124
Changuinola	5,978	City of London	8,917
Edinburgh Castle	13,326	Princess Morea	8,684
Armadale Castle	12,973	Knight Templar	10,890
Kildonan Castle	9,692	Mechanician	7,175
Otranto	12,124	Wyncote	.....
Orvieto	12,130	Currigan Head	.....
Ophir	6,942	Coronado	.....
Calgarian	17,515	Bayano	.....
Victorian	10,635	Discoverer	.....
Macedonia	10,512	41 vessels	[1] 400,000

[1] Approximate.

While we are being so severely criticized for failure to protect shipping, Admiral Sims's own plans section is criticizing the British Navy for improper allocation of their own shipping. This list does not include the *Aquitania* and *Mauretania* for which the War Department was bargaining, and which did not get actively into troop transporting until 1918. Economy in the use of shipping, proper allocation, speed in turn around, are all quite as important factors as protection, and the fate of our troop movement depended on all. It might be interesting for you to know, as reflecting on the efficiency of our Navy, that the troops carried by our transports average 7.19 men per 1,000 tons per day, while in the British ships they averaged 3.71 per 1,000 tons per day. Finally, it was not the submarine which decided this war or delayed victory, it was the land forces of the allies, side by side with our soldiers who won this war on land, as everybody knows. That has been stated a number of times.

These soldiers were transported during the critical spring and summer months of 1918 when the total world tonnage available was less than during the same critical months in 1917.

The world's output of shipping crossed the world's losses and began to show gains in the first quarter of 1918. To substantiate same I submit sheet "Transport and escort duty," which I have marked "P."

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Report by months of transport and escort duty performed by U. S. and foreign navies up to signing of the armistice.

Month.	Carried by U. S. N. transports.	Number of U. S. N. transports sailed.	Carried by British ships.	Number of British ships sailed.	Carried by British leased Italian ships.	Number of British leased Italian ships sailed.	Carried by other U. S. ships.	Number of other U. S. ships sailed.	Carried by other ships, French, Italian, etc.
1917.									
May			508	2			1,035	3	
June	8,855	9	1,080	1			5,156	8	
July	5,281	8	7,299	6					[illegible]
August	4,310	6	11,890	7			1,109	2	2,[illegible]
September	13,917	15	19,671	12					
October	25,098	14	13,013	9					1,[illegible]
November	9,988	9	10,669	7			1,235	2	1,[illegible]
December	37,445	16	11,370	9					
1918.									
January	25,662	16	20,514	9					1,[illegible]
February	39,977	17	9,259	4					[illegible]
March	58,278	26	27,626	14			1	1	1,[illegible]
April	67,553	27	47,362	20	2,626	2	737	11	1,[illegible]
May	96,273	33	133,795	75	12,127	6	3,288	22	2,[illegible]
June	115,256	36	140,172	70	14,465	7	6,003	11	4,[illegible]
July	108,445	33	175,526	89	11,502	7	4,020	13	11,[illegible]
August	116,401	36	137,745	74	9,376	6	8,495	15	14,[illegible]
September	107,025	35	134,576	69	7,052	4	5,511	18	5,[illegible]
October	72,092	43	94,214	57	11,098	7	4,709	17	1,[illegible]
To November 11	1,191	9	10,698	12			235	3	
Grand total	911,047	388	1,006,987	546	68,246	39	41,534	126	52,[illegible]

Month.	Number of other ships sailed.	Carried by U. S. Navy transports and by other U. S. ships.	Number of U. S. N. transports and other U. S. ships sailed.	Total transported by all ships.	Total ships sailed.	Per cent carried by U. S. N. transports.	Per cent carried by British.	Per cent carried by British leased Italian ships.	Per cent carried by other U. S. ships.
1917.									
May		1,035	3	1,543	5	67	33		
June		14,011	17	15,091	18	59	6.5		34.5
July	1	5,281	8	12,776	15	41	57		
August	2	5,419	8	19,403	17	22	61		6
September		13,917	15	33,588	27	41	59		
October	1	25,098	14	40,027	24	62.5	32.5		
November	1	11,223	11	23,722	19	41.5	46		4.5
December		37,445	16	48,815	25	77	23		
1918.									
January	1	25,662	16	48,055	26	53	42.5		
February	1	39,977	17	49,239	22	81.5	18.5		
March	4	56,279	27	85,710	45	65	33		
April	5	68,290	38	120,072	63	56	39.5	2	1
May	5	99,561	55	247,714	141	39	53.5	5	1.5
June	4	121,259	47	280,434	128	41.25	50	5	2.25
July	5	112,465	46	311,359	147	35	56.5	3.5	1
August	9	124,896	51	286,375	140	41	48	3	3
September	3	112,536	53	259,670	129	41	52	3	2
October	3	76,801	60	184,063	127	39	51	6	3
To November 11		1,426	12	12,124	24	10	88		2
Grand total	43	952,581	514	2,079,880	1,142	43.75	48.25	3	2.5

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Report by months of transport and escort duty performed by U. S. and foreign navies up to signing of the armistice—Continued.

Month.	Per cent carried by other ships, French, Italian, etc.	Per cent carried by U. S. N. transports and other U. S. ships.	Under U. S. escort.	Under British escort.	Under French escort.	Per cent under U. S. escort.	Per cent under British escort.	Per cent under French escort.
1917.								
May	.....	67	258	1,285	.....	17	83	.....
June	.....	93.5	15,032	59	.....	99	1	.....
July	2	41	10,063	2,566	247	78.5	20	1.5
August	11	28	12,259	4,129	3,015	63	21	16
September	.....	41	17,432	12,898	3,258	51.5	39	9.5
October	5	62.5	36,893	3,134	.....	92.5	7.5	.....
November	8	46	13,246	10,476	.....	56.5	43.5	.....
December	.....	77	42,783	6,032	.....	87.5	12.5	.....
1918.								
January	4.5	53	35,827	12,228	.....	75	25	.....
February	.....	81.5	48,795	444	.....	99	1	.....
March	2	65	73,095	12,615	.....	85	15	.....
April	1.5	57	91,308	28,764	.....	75.5	24.5	.....
May	1	40.5	220,463	26,652	599	88.5	11	.5
June	1.5	43.5	244,631	30,912	4,891	87.5	11	1.5
July	4	36	258,332	46,329	6,608	83	15	2
August	5	44	237,920	22,572	25,883	83	8	9
September	2	43	224,298	20,681	14,691	86	8	6
October	1	42	130,274	51,454	2,335	70.5	28.5	1
To November 11	.....	12	7,451	4,673	.....	61.75	38.25	.....
Grand total	2.5	46.25	1,720,360	297,903	61,617	82.75	14.125	3.125

Report by months of transport duty performed by U. S. Navy and all other ships, United States and foreign, in returning troops and other passengers to United States prior to signing of armistice.

Month.	Carried by cruiser and transport force.	Carried by all other ships, United States and foreign.	Total carried, all ships.	Per cent carried by cruiser and transport force.	Per cent carried by all other ships.
1917.					
May	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
June	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
July	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
August	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
September	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
October	41	6	47	87.3	12.7
November	37	.....	37	100	.....
December	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
1918.					
January	66	1	67	98.6	1.4
February	274	86	360	76	24
March	402	86	488	82.3	17.7
April	508	46	554	91.7	8.3
May	544	39	583	93.3	6.7
June	368	101	469	78.4	21.6
July	946	23	969	97.6	2.4
August	1,920	67	1,987	96.6	3.4
September	1,710	56	1,766	97	3
October	3,436	306	3,742	91.8	8.2
To November 11	959	183	1,142	84	16
Total	11,211	1,000	12,211	91.8	8.2

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Report by months of transport duty performed by U. S. Navy and all other ships, United States and foreign, in returning troops and other passengers to United States since signing of armistice.

Month.	Carried by cruiser and transport force.	Carried by all other ships, United States and foreign.	Total carried, all ships.	Per cent carried by cruiser and transport force.	Per cent carried by all other ships.
1918.					
From November 11	7,689	508	8,197	93.9	6.1
December	47,228	22,861	70,089	67.2	32.8
1919.					
January	97,039	23,097	120,136	80.8	19.2
February	96,368	44,463	140,831	68.3	31.7
March	165,312	42,049	207,361	79.7	20.3
April	243,697	30,806	274,503	88.8	11.2
May	278,600	34,610	313,210	89.0	11.0
June	314,167	26,779	340,946	92.0	8.0
July	268,049	27,162	295,211	90.8	9.2
August	112,694	2,127	114,821	98.0	2.0
September	44,890	2,961	47,851	93.8	6.2
Total	1,675,733	257,423	1,933,156	86.7	13.3

Then I present a diagram marked "Q," which shows the monthly tonnage situation.

(The diagram referred to is as follows:)

U. S. NAVAL FORCES OPERATING IN EUROPEAN WATERS,

U. S. S. "MELVILLE," FLAGSHIP.
30 GROSVENOR GARDENS, LONDON, S. W. J., *June 28, 1918.*

From: Force Commander.
To: Secretary of the Navy (Office of Naval Intelligence).
Subject: Forwarding of chart showing tonnage situation.
Inclosure: One.

1. The force commander is forwarding you herewith copy of a chart, which has been prepared by the intelligence section of the force commander's staff. The chart is designed to show both the tonnage situation and the German submarine situation from the beginning of the war to the 1st of June, 1918.

2. The top curve shows the amount of tonnage available for the use of the Allies month by month with indications as to the tonnage added and lost.

3. The second curve is designed to show the number of submarines available to the enemy each month with indications as to the number added and lost during the month. Attention is called to the fact that the information contained in this second curve is considered by the Admiralty to be highly secret.

W. M. KITTRIDGE.
By direction.

KEY TO CURVE CHART.

The following explanation will assist in reading the accompanying curve chart. Let the indicated sketch represent any section of the upper or lower curve.



Then for the lower curve, the line *a–b* indicates the number of submarines available for any given month; the distance *b–c* shows the number of submarines added during the month (where the smallest unit of the vertical scale represents one submarine)

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and the distance *c–d* shows the number lost during that month. The line *d–e* then indicates the resultant or new figure of submarines available for the following month.

For the upper curve, the smallest unit of the vertical scale represents 50,000 gross tons. The line *a–b* indicates the total tonnage available to the Allies at the end of given month; the distance *b–c* shows the tonnage added during the month by construction and otherwise. The distance *c–d* would be the tonnage lost through enemy action and marine risk, leaving the list *d–e* as the total tonnage available for the following month.

Diagram Q.



Capt. PRATT. The memorandum and attached diagram R give a graphic representation of the point where the building curve crossed the sinking curve.

Senator PITTMAN. What was that date, Captain?

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Capt. PRATT. In the first months of 1918, somewhere in January to March, according to this. The figures vary a little bit from the curve.

(The diagram referred to is as follows:)

Diagram R.


GRAPH SHEWING LOSSES BY ENEMY ACTION & MARINE RISKS & SHIPBUILDING OUTPUT OF THE WORLD, AUG. 1914 - SEPT. 1918.
GROSS TONNAGE.
WORLD'S LOSSES
WORLD'S OUTPUT
1916
1917
1918

MEMORANDUM FOR CAPT. PRATT— MERCHANT TONNAGE AND THE SUBMARINE.

In March last a memorandum was issued with relative tables on the merchant tonnage and submarine situation. The figures of this memorandum have been revised and brought up to date by the addition of the figures for the first 10 months of 1918.

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Three statements are attached, showing for the United Kingdom and for the world, for the period August, 1914, to October, 1918:

1. Losses by enemy action and marine risk.
2. Merchant shipbuilding output.
3. Enemy tonnage captured and brought into service.

Since the issue of the previous memorandum, the output of the merchant tonnage of the world has overtaken the losses, and during the seven months, April to October, new construction has exceeded losses by more than a million tons.

The rate of output of merchant tonnage in the United Kingdom has not yet overtaken the rate of British losses in any completed quarter; but if the tonnage purchased abroad is taken into account, the losses during the five months, June to October, are balanced by the gains.

The following table summarizes the position of world tonnage on October 31:

		Gross tons.
Losses		15,053,786
Gains:		
New construction	10,849,527	
Enemy tonnage captured	2,392,675	
		13,242,202
Net loss		1,811,584

Source and date: British Admiralty; August, 1914, to December, 1917–1918. Copied from pamphlet in O. N. I., Navy Department.

W. V. PRATT.

I present for the use of the committee, not to be reproduced, the War Department annual report of the Chief of Transportation Service for 1919, with special references to pages 7, 15, 28, 36, 73, 74 to 87, inclusive, 118, 119, 120, 142, 149, 154, 160, and 161. Pages 73 and 74 to 87 are the most important to read. It shows where the original plan of the War Department to send a certain number of troops was changed. They submitted A, B, C, and D plans, and while there was a very grave question in their minds as to the ability to furnish the supply of tonnage necessary they did meet it, and the figures are there, and the number of tons I do not recollect, but it is just down there in the War Department's report, and they did meet the necessities both in troop transport ships and in supply ships for a very much increased program over what they had originally intended, so much so that we were able to increase the transportation during the very decisive months of the spring and summer of 1918. I have put slips in at those places in the book, and I submit the report for the use of the committee, those pages, 73 to 87, showing the increase in the War Department's program.

The grave charge made has not been substantiated by the mass of data presented, and this imputation remains to-day as unproved as the day it was made. Mr. Hoover, though admitting the gravity of the situation, refused to be drawn into the controversy or to make one charge against our Navy. The submarine campaign came like a disease, ran its course. None regret the loss of life and ships entailed more than we brother followers of the sea; but the statement made that our failure to contribute antisubmarine forces in quantity immediately upon our entry into this war jeopardized the ultimate success of the war can not be substantiated.

It must be evident that the Office of Operations could take no local view of this war. However important the viewpoint of its representative in England might be, the office could not be unduly influenced by local color. In his letter and in the testimony submitted Admiral Sims evidently regards the submarine campaign as

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the main issue to be considered. From them you glean the conception that it fairly overshadowed the other issues of this war. We admitted the gravity of the situation and made every effort to meet it, but can not admit it was the only issue to consider, or even the main issue. Our first and prime naval mission was to so organize the service of supply and transportation in conjunction with the Army that every resource of this great country could be thrown into the balance to aid most efficiently the allied cause. This was the broader viewpoint to take. We believe that we had a correct conception of our mission, which you may infer from the extracts read from the plans formulated before our entry into and during the early stages of the war. The Office of Operations was formed to exercise the very functions it exercised during the war. It coordinated the bureau's efforts in furnishing the sinews of war, and it held a general directing hand over all naval operations on all fronts. There can be no thinker on naval warfare who would gainsay the right of the office to perform these functions, nor one who would state that they should be exercised away from the seat of our Government. In viewing the general conduct of the war after we entered, starting with exactly the same forces at our disposal that we had in April, 1917, it is difficult to see wherein the plan of campaign would be changed if we had to do it all over again.

That, gentlemen, gives the viewpoint of the Office of Operations, or at least my viewpoint as a member of the Office of Operations, at this date, April, 1920. But what is of particular importance for you gentlemen, of course, is to get our viewpoint at the dates mentioned, because we are all liable to change our points of view from time to time, unintentionally but perhaps unavoidably.

I have here a report from the Chief of Naval Operations of November 15, 1918, a paper which shows the viewpoint of the Chief of Operations at the time of the armistice. The secretary asked verbally for this report in order that he might make this yearly report. I think it has nowhere come into print. I drew it up and Admiral Benson approved it when I took it over to Paris. I was Acting Chief of Naval Operations at the time. It really stands as sanctioning the views of the Office of Operations.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it would be well to read it.

Capt. PRATT. It is very long and I do not want to tire you gentlemen.

The CHAIRMAN. You might read it.

Capt. PRATT (Reading):

NOVEMBER 15, 1918.

From: Chief of Naval Operations.
To: Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: General character of the operations of our naval forces during present war.

1. In reply to your verbal request for an outline of the operations engaged in by our naval forces during the present war, I beg leave to submit the following summary:

GENERAL CHARACTER OF THE WAR.

2. The present war had been going on for so long before we entered it that it was possible for the department to make a fairly accurate estimate of the exact part we should take in it were we called upon to enter the conflict. It was therefore realized that the part we were to play differed very materially from the part we would play had we gone into this war sooner or had we not been given time to make adequate preparations before being attacked by the enemy. That most essential feature, namely, control of the sea, or at least control of the surface of the sea upon which

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Mahan lays so much stress, was assured to us. For from the very beginning the allied fleets, due principally to the preponderance of sea power vested in Great Britain, had so assured the security of the sea that we were able to make our preparations with a comparative degree of security. Therefore, that prime essential, security of the sea, being assured us, it no longer became part of our province to attempt to further augment that preponderance, but it became our principal mission to throw the whole of our naval forces into those operations which would tend to strengthen the points in which the Allies were weakest. In most previous wars, the dual mission of the Navy had been, first, either to force offensive fleet action or to seek defensive action on the best terms, and to build up reserves during the period while we were combating for the balance of sea power. Now, however, being relieved from the first phase of sea activities, this war took on for us a special character. The Navy's problem was principally one of protecting the line of sea communications and of building up its reserves to the maximum required.

GENERAL POLICY.

3. Having definitely decided upon the character of the naval war, it became necessary to outline our general policy. Briefly speaking, the naval mission of the Allies was this, while maintaining control of the surface of the sea to make every effort to obtain control of the subsurface of the sea. This mission applied to the fighting forces which we were to send to operate against the enemy. Likewise, the problem of building up our reserve forces, and of expanding the present organization to meet the growth, was a matter which had to be carefully considered. It was then decided that the present departmental organizations, if expended in an intensive but progressive manner, would meet all demands made upon it. It was further decided that those units of the fleet which could not be actively engaged against the enemy, should be used to full capacity to develop the upbuilding of our reserves. In the meantime, while so engaged, they should be placed where they could be moved or used to best advantage for the allied cause.

ARMING OF OUR MERCHANT SHIPS.

4. Almost the first problem which faced the Navy was to secure, as far as possible, the safety of our merchant fleet engaged in carrying food, munitions, and supplies to the military forces at the front. Germany, in attempting her submarine war, in the beginning naturally chose to use her submarines in the way that would net her the best and quickest returns. She, therefore, instead of using torpedoes attempted to sink by gunfire or by bombs all the merchant ships that fell in the path of her submarines. The department quickly realized that an answer to this, which would immediately reduce submarine efficiency, and confine its activityies to underwater activities, was to arm our merchant ships. In so doing, we were forced to make use of the means at hand rather than do what we desired to do, but immediately plans went forward to anticipate Germany's next move, which afterwards appeared in the form of her cruiser submarines. The cruiser submarine was Germany's counter to the arming of our merchant ships, but by the time those submarines were in operation the best of our merchant fleet had been armed with a caliber of gun which was able to cope with the heaviest gun of the cruiser submarine. In the first part of this war some of the most interesting encounters were those between our armed merchant ships and single enemy submarines, and there are cases on record where our armed guards have fought until the ship under them went down or they were forced to abandon the ship in flames.

SENDING OF DESTROYERS.

5. Immediately upon our entrance into the war, there was a demand for us to send destroyers abroad. To some extent the request was sentimental, it being thought necessary that our flag should be seen on the other side, and our destroyers being the ships most readily available for this purpose. Therefore, a division of destroyers was dispatched abroad and proceeded to base at Berehaven, Ireland, where they were soon busily engaged in convoying ships and in antisubmarine operations. However, it was soon discovered that these little hornets of the sea had a very distinct use apart from any sentimental value, and almost immediately we were requested to augment our force of destroyers abroad to the maximum. Admiral Sims, in his many reports to the department, dwelt upon the extreme necessity of sending all antisubmarine craft abroad, and it was then that the department determined that every craft which was capable of being used in antisubmarine operations should be dispatched to the other side. This policy has been strictly adhered to throughout the war, despite the efforts of the enemy, who later made every effort to divert us from strict adherence to this rule by carrying submarine warfare to our shores.

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SENDING CHASERS ABROAD.

6. The submarine chaser, a 110-foot boat, was created especially for the present war. The first object in building this type was that we should have a craft which might defend our own shores in case our other ships, more purely fighting craft, were dispatched to other waters. But it soon became evident that if these little craft could go abroad they should be sent abroad, and the same policy was adopted toward them as had been with our destroyers, namely, all that could possibly be spared should be sent abroad. It was late in the summer of 1917, and in the fall, before our chaser flotillas were constructed, organized, and trained sufficiently to be able to undertake the difficult task of getting these small craft across the water during the winter months. At first it was believed that they would have to be towed, and this was first attempted, but later they were sent over in flotillas under the protection of heavier escorting ships and with a mother ship to take care of their material needs. It became a matter of concern to get them across materially fit and with the personnel in fighting trim, so it was decided to route these ships via the Bermudas and the Azores. Having formulated the general plan of getting our chasers across, it was necessary to secure for them certain base facilities on the way over. To that end, negotiations were entered into with the Portuguese whereby we received from them the use of a temporary base at Ponta del Gada in the Azores. This base was built up to such an extent that we were able to care for the needs of our small and other craft that might require the use of a base while passing to and fro across the Atlantic.

SENDING OF BATTLESHIPS.

7. In order that there might be no question as to the preponderance of sea power in favor of the Allies, it was decided that a division of our dreadnought force should be sent abroad to cooperate with the Grand Fleet. This step was taken in the late fall of 1917, and Rear Admiral Rodman, in command of Division 9 of our fleet, was sent abroad and joined the naval forces operating in the North Sea. This division has been there ever since, has taken part in the various activities of the Grand Fleet, and, as one of the units of it, has stood ready to engage in any major operation in which this North Sea Fleet might be called upon to engage.

SENDING OF AIRCRAFT.

8. One of the problems which we were called upon to undertake was the establishment of various air stations on the coast of France and Ireland, from which, operating with seaplanes, dirigibles and kite balloons, we might operate offensively against the submarine and afford protection to the shipping converging in those waters. Likewise, steps were taken to provide the necessary aircraft to operate from these bases, as well as to provide for the necessary aircraft which would operate from our own shores, in case hostile submarine operations extended to our coast. There were, therefore, established abroad a matter of some 26 air stations from which our air forces operated, or were to operate from. Coincident with the establishment of these stations, the building of our aircraft was undertaken and as fast as these craft came along the same policy of sending them abroad, as had been adopted with our destroyers, was adopted with them.

SENDING OF SUBMARINES.

9. The principal antisubmarine efforts were at first carried on by surface craft, but it was later realized from the lessons learned by our Allies, that the submarine itself is the enemy of the submarine, especially when enemy submarines are forced to work upon the surface, as they sometimes are. Therefore, it was decided to send certain numbers of our submarines to the Azores, to keep that base clear and also to the coast of Ireland to operate from that general strategic area. In the late fall of 1917, and winter of 1918, two groups of our submarines were dispatched across the water and after a hard winter passage made their ports and have been operating from those localities ever since. Before our submarines had been dispatched abroad, the process of concentrating our reserves in these craft on our Atlantic coast, there to prepare for future contingencies, had been undertaken.

GENERAL POLICY IN REGARD TO SENDING SHIPS AND SUPPLIES.

10. Besides the specific types mentioned, there were various other smaller ships which could and were made available at the beginning of the war, such as yachts, Coast Guard ships, lighthouse craft, tugs, and tenders. These were armed and dispatched abroad as fast as they could be made ready for service. At the same time

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the general policy went into effect of withdrawing from all parts of the world all of our fighting ships which could in any way aid in the present war and concentrated them either in European waters or on the Atlantic coast. Those dispatched to European waters engaged in antisubmarine operations. Those concentrated on the Atlantic coast stood ready to go abroad or engaged actively in convoy operations, which formed so great a part of the naval work in this war.

ESCORTING OF TROOP AND CARGO SHIPS—CONVOYS.

11. In the summer of 1917, the submarine problem having become acute and the losses to merchant ships great, it became necessary to definitely revise the methods of handling merchant shipping, in order that a greater degree of safety should be afforded. The solution of adopting the convoy of ships was first broached by the Admiralty. The problem to us was a new one, but they had had the experience of nearly four years ahead of them and finally decided that the method of convoys was the only solution to the problem. At the very beginning the department was not inclined to look with favor upon this solution. It slowed up shipping fully 20 per cent and the dangers of collision and the difficulties attendant upon carrying through this scheme successfully were very great. But in view of their greater experience the department yielded to the wishes of the Admiralty, and the convoy system of protection against the submarine was adopted. This system was applied to both cargo and troop ships and its success was almost immediately apparent. It consisted in gathering together certain numbers of vessels, sailing at regular intervals along established lanes, under the guard of heavier ships to protect against raiders, and of smaller destroyers to protect against submarines. This system went into effect with the first of our troop convoys which crossed in June, 1917, and has continued ever since to the day the armistice was signed. It is probably one of the operations which succeeded in breaking the back of the submarine operation, for it deprived the submarine of the benefit he derived from attacking individual unprotected ships and forced him to devote his efforts, for the most part, to ships which were protected by destroyers.

To engage with a convoy, the submarine was forced to enter the danger zone and frequently, it was he and not our ships which became the victim. In these convoy efforts, all of our destroyers, our armed cruisers, our smaller cruisers, and later the old battleships of our fleet have been engaged, and this work had been conducted winter and summer from June ,1917, until November, 1918. It has been a hard, grinding work, but that it was well done is attested to by the fact that some two million tropps have been sent abroad, with not the loss of a single ship carrying troops under the protection of our forces on her eastbound voyage, due to the action of an enemy submarine. The history of the convoy operations in which our naval forces have taken part, due to which we have been able to so successfully transport such a large number of our military forces abroad, and so many supplies for the Army, is a chapter in itself. Suffice to say, it is probably our major operation in this war and will, in the future, stand as a monument to both the Army and the Navy, in what is probably the greatest troop transporting effort which has ever been conducted across the seas. The work is not finished. The problem of bringing our forces back is still a naval problem and it will be undertaken with the same spirit which characterized the convoy of our troops to Europe.

OPERATION OF OUR VARIOUS FORCES ABROAD.

12. This is, indeed, a chapter in itself and when, at a later period, it is possible to make a history out of numerous reports which have been submitted by the naval officers in charge of our various forces abroad, it will make a very interesting addition to the history of the United States Navy. Without, at this stage, attempting to go too much into detail, it is sufficient to say that our naval forces have operated in European water from the Mediterranean to the White Sea. At Corfu, Gibraltar, along the French Bay of Biscay ports, at the English Channel ports on the Irish coast, in the North Sea, at Mourmansk and Archangel, our naval forces have been stationed and have done creditable work. Their work will probably form the most interesting and exciting portion of the naval history of this war, and it is the work which has been most eargerly sought by all of the personnel, but owing to the character of the operations which our Navy has been called upon to take part in, it has been not possible for all of our naval forces, much as they desired it, to engage in operations at the front, and a large part of our work has been carried on quietly at the rear, This work, while not so brilliant, has still been necessary, and without it our forces at the front could not have carried on the successful campaign that they did.

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THE WORK OF OUR NAVAL FORCES IN THE RESERVE.

13. Generally speaking, the work of the naval forces in reserve—that is, our ships afloat—is divided into several classes. The mission of the battleship fleet became twofold. The dreadnaughts were drilled and trained to the minute, holding themselves as a reserve force, ready to be thrown into any strategic area where their presence might be needed, to reinforce any fighting force at the front, and to guard our lines of communications in the rear. This force was held strictly in readiness for battle. The mission of the older battleships became primarily one of training. Due to the enormous expansion in naval personnel, and the fact that our country had long ceased to produce seafaring men in great numbers, it became immediately necessary for the Navy to provide for the trained personnel to man not only its naval ships but the auxiliaries and merchant ships, which it was later called upon to man. Our old battleship force, held in reserve for this purpose and operating from a centrally located base on the Atlantic coast, served as a nucleus for this training effort. It was a dull, grinding work, with none of the brilliancy attending the operations at the front; it was a work which required the utmost determination on the part of the naval personnel engaged in it, but it was one of the essential war works. And the men and officers engaged in this work are entitled to the same consideration as are their more fortunate brothers who took a more brilliant part. The cruiser force, while to an extent engaged in training, led a more active life, in that they were the first ships to go in to undertake the work of convoy, for in so far as the services of heavier ships were not absolutely needed in convoy work, it was unwise to put them in to an extent which would interfere with the training of personnel. It at all times was a balance between what had to be done and the policies the department desired carried out. In this work of convoy there were engaged, not only the armored and heavier cruisers, but cruisers of all classes down to the very smallest.

ORGANIZATION OF OUR SHORE FORCES.

14. At the very outset it became apparent that should our purely naval forces be dispatched abroad, it would be necessary to organize along the lines which would give us an amount of naval protection for our own coast adequate to meet the forces likely to be sent against us. The chances of any raid on our coast by heavy surface craft could be discounted. It would not have been good policy for the German to have so scattered his efforts, and the amount of military good accomplished by the enemy in such an effort would have been nil. Such an attempt on the part of Germany was therefore discounted, and, moreover, we held a mobile force in reserve for that purpose quite sufficient to cope with any such effort. There was, however, the likelihood of the Central Powers attempting submarine efforts against us largely directed against our convoys, and possibly against our own coast. In order to afford adequate coastal protection, to develop an organization fitted to undertake the handling of the mining, sweeping, antisubmarine operations, the routing of merchant ships, and the convoy work, it was necessary to organize what were called naval districts.

These districts extended the entire stretch of our coast, both on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, and the Great Lakes. The various military activities were centered in the commandant of the district, who had at his disposal the various Naval forces attached to that district. Associated with the more purely military operations were those which pertained to the repair, supply, and handling of the merchant ships which were either directly taken over in the Navy, or were operated by the Navy for the Army. These activities also came under the commandant of the naval districts. Within each district but set apart for more purely Naval work, were our navy yards. These yards were under the general supervision of the commandant of the district yet had a mission of their own which was entirely apart from any purely military operations. The enormous expansion of our repair facilities and the increasing demand made upon these yards rendered it necessary that these organizations should be disturbed as little as possible from continuing the very necessary industrial activities without which our Navy would not receive its proper share of material nourishment. Therefore, a clear line of demarkation was drawn between the purely industrial activities centering in our navy yards, and the military activitities centered under the commandant. There was however, one section of our coast, or waters adjacent thereto, which had to be treated in a somewhat different manner. The problem of the Gulf and the Caribbean did not lend itself to the same manner of treatment as did our coast from Cape Cod to Key West. To forestall enemy submarine operations in the Gulf and Caribbean, a force was established called the American Patrol Force, and its headquarters was in the vicinity of Key West. While the coastwise shipping could be adequately pro-

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tected by routing close along our coast, the problem became a different one the instant it entered the Gulf and Caribbean areas, and it was this problem and the problem of antisubmarine operations which the American patrol detachment had to undertake. As was foreseen, the protection of the oil supplies from the Gulf to our own coast and then abroad were quite vital to the success of the general campaign, and these supplies the patrol detachment were prepared to safeguard by adopting at once the convoy system the instant they were threatened.

OPERATIONS DIRECTED AGAINST US.

15. The wisdom of making a clean-cut line of demarkation between the military and industrial activities on our coast and of foreseeing the character of hostile operations against which we should make preparation, was clearly shown when the enemy first directed his operations against our coast. About the middle of May, 1918, the enemy evidently decided that he must make an effort to stop us from sending more military forces abroad, if possible to do so, or at least to so distract our efforts that we should be more concerned with protecting our own coast than we were in sending these forces abroad. About the 2d of June, evidences of the operations of enemy submarines began to appear. It had been determined before by the department that the logical military objective would be our troop and cargo convoys, but these were so well guarded that the submarine evidently preferred not to engage with them, but devoted his efforts against our coastwise trade, and principally against our unarmed sailing vessels. Along with this campaign of destruction, which had no military value whatsoever, the enemy adopted the practice of strewing our coast with mines. This feature of his campaign had been anticipated and our sweepers had been actively engaged in clearing the channels through which our convoys regularly sail. It was natural, however, with the long expanse of sea coast which we had to protect that the enemy should succeed in laying detached mine fields which more than once proved destructive to our coastwise shipping. Up to the time that an enemy submarine appeared off our coast, it had been the practice to allow coastwise ships to sail direct, and as far as practicable lights were burned and the ordinary aids to navigation were kept going. Immediately upon their arrival on our coast, without the slightest degree allowing his efforts to diminish the rate of flow of troops and supplies abroad, all coastwise shipping was hauled in under the protection of our district forces and a series of routings, escort, and air patrols were started, which rendered reasonably secure the vessels that plied up and down our coast. In order to further render our shores secure, and to force the submarine to operate further afield, there were immediately sent out against him our own submarines. Hunting groups of destroyers and chasers, which had been formed and were in readiness, were sent out against him. The net result was that very soon, from a military point of view, the hostile submarine's efforts became practically nil and he was forced to operate further afield, that is well out into the Atlantic, where his principal prey became the single unarmed ships returning home on their westbound voyages. This move on the part of the German submarine had been anticipated and for the greater part westbound ships rarely returned home singly, but usually in company with another craft which carried a gun sufficiently large to cope with that of the submarine. On the whole, the operations of the enemy submarine against our coast can be spoken of as merely one of the very minor incidents of the war, and had he chosen to carry his operations into the Gulf, or even to the coast of Brazil, he would have found that preparations had been made to anticipate them.

ORGANIZATION WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT ITSELF.

16. At the outstart it was necessary to take stock of the existing organizations to see whether they would best function along their present lines or whether it would be necessary to radically reorganize for war. It was found that the bureau organizations were capable of expansion within themselves, and all that was needed to make an efficient war machine was the closest cooperation between the various bureaus and of the various bureaus with the Office of Operations. A close-knit organization of this sort having the power of decision in its own hands, acting upon established policies and in touch with the active operations of our naval forces, appeared to be the most efficient. The weak point in such a link must necessarily be the cooperation between the various departments, and that the Office of Operations set itself out to remedy. There was consequently first of all established an efficient information and communication service, for it was realized that without these two prime essentials all of the various bureaus and operations itself would be groping in the dark. To that end the office of Naval Intelligence was enlarged and expanded until it reached a point of efficiency. Important work was handled immediately by the

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cable and radio. There was established within the Office of Operations itself a central organization wherein was gathered all information known as operating information, so that it could be immediately accessible not only to the Office of Operations, but to all bureaus, to the fleet, and to all other naval forces. However, efficiency would not have been realized had not Admiral Sims, commanding our European Forces, fully realized the immense importance and the power that full information gave, for he established a similar system in London which was in complete touch with all information on the other side and which he immediately routed to our central office. It thus became possible through the centralization of information and by means of the channels of communication which have been highly developed to largely decentralize in the matter of detailed instructions to our forces, and thus to confer the initiative to a large extent upon those leaders who were handling independent operations. It was thus possible to convey ideas and to give general instructions which would be thoroughly understood with a minimum of confusion.

The result is shown in the fact that during the entire course of the war there has been remarkably little confusion and very few changes from established plans. In addition to the service of information and communication it was necessary to establish an efficient inspection service of all sorts, particularly in relation to merchant shipping. This was efficiently handled under the direction of the Office of Naval Intelligence. It was also necessary to establish strict censorship over the cables and radio and this was most efficiently handled by the Office of Naval Communications. It was likewise necessary that the public be properly informed as to the aims, motives, and operations or our Navy, and this was most efficiently done through the committee on publicity, who acted in the closest cooperation with the Office of Naval Operations.

COOPERATION WITH ALL DEPARTMENTS.

17. Not only was it necessary to secure the closest cooperation within our own department, but it was also most important that the closest harmony and accord should exist between the Navy Department and the various other departments of the Government, particularly with the State and War Departments. There were consequently detailed for this work special officers whose duties were to cooperate our activities with those of the various war organizations which had sprung into being. During the entire course of this war there has been the closest accord between the Office of Naval Operations and the State Department, War Department, Treasury Department, Department of Justice, Post Office Department, War Industries Board, War Trades Board, the Shipping Board, and the Alien Enemy Custodian. Even such organizations as the Fuel Administration, Food Administration, and the Red Cross came constantly in touch with the Navy Department. It was also necessary that the closest cooperation should be manintained between the various naval representatives of the different nations with whom we were united in fighting the war. During the entire course of the war there has been the closest harmony and cooperation between all of the various allied nations and ourselves. We have been furnished with all information that they themselves possess and we in turn furnished them with all the information we had. At the suggestion of the Navy Department the British commander in chief moved his headquarters to Washington where he was in constant touch with the Office of Operations. Had not this close liaison been established it would have been exceedingly difficult to have coordinated the various naval movements which had to be carried out jointly and which covered a great many fields of activity.

THE CHANGE IN THE NAVAL BUILDING PROGRAM.

18. As soon as we entered the war it became evident that unless we radically changed the naval building program then in process, it would be impossible to wage the most efficient war against the hostile submarine. Having determined that the war against the submarine, the service of supply, and the guarding of the lines of communications were our principal missions, it was immediately apparent that a switch in our naval program was needed. Therefore the department almost immediately decided that construction on our battleships, battle cruisers, and scouts, except in cases of ships nearly completed, should practically cease, and every effort was devoted to the construction of destroyers, chasers, and later of Eagle boats. In addition to the numbers of destroyers laid down, a new plan was prepared for additional destroyers, which was approved, and the work of construction continued until late in the summer of 1918, when, it being apparent that the hostile submarine was being controlled, it became evident that plans should be laid looking to a resumption of our former building program, in order that we might regain the ground lost in the previous year and a half.

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THE NAVAL PART IN THE UPBUILDING OF OUR MERCHANT MARINE.

19. The Navy has always had very much at heart the upbuilding of a merchant marine, for from this source it must largely draw its supply of seafaring men needed to man our Naval craft. Therefore it very early became a matter of extreme importance to the Navy as to the best way in which this large merchant fleet which was being built by the Emergency Fleet Corporation, and which had been requisitioned by the Shipping Board, could be put to efficient war work. Plans were worked out in cooperation with the Shipping Board and with the Army whereby all of the ships turned over for Navy purposes, the cargo ships turned to over the War Department for supplying their Army abroad, and vessels of a certain size running through the war zone, should be manned by naval crews. Had the war been of a different character, it is possible that merchant shipping might not have been dislocated to the extent it was, but the character of the war was such that practically every commercial interest disappeared and all interests became military in their character. The needs of the Army alone, both in troops and supplies, were so great as to practically demand the turning over to their use, not only all of our own available tonnage, but such allied tonnage as could be chartered. It therefore appeared wuite necessary that this tonnage operating for a military purpose should be under strict military control, which in so far as transporting across sea was concerned was a naval matter.

Above all, the character of the warfare waged by enemy submarines was such that at no time could the seas be called free and there was the constant menace to crew and cargo which required the highest technical skill to combat. For these reasons it became necessary to man those vessels that crossed the war zone with naval crews and in this matter the Shipping Board and War Department heartily concurred. The troop transports were, from the very beginning, manned with naval crews, as it was recognized that the lives of our soldiers could only, on the seas, be entrusted to those whose experience fitted them to give the maximum amount of safety. The wisdom of this policy is shown by the results, in the number of troops and cargo safely transported across the Atlantic. With the end of this war, another problem will face the Navy. If it is considered to be the policy that the feeding of the Central Powers and Russia still remain a Government problem, to be administered by us as a Nation, rather than as a commercial enterprise, then it seems probable that the feeding of these starving millions may have to be handled by the various Government organizations best fitted now to cope with the problem. If this be the case, the military problems of the past year and a half merely merge themselves into economic problems similar to those which we as a Nation have just successfully coped with. Then it may be that the Army organizations which have so successfully administered to our forces in France will be called upon to supply food for the starving millions. If that be so, then, it seems likely that our Navy will be called upon to man the ships used by the Army for this purpose and while the process of demoblization will go on, in so far as our lesser purely military units are concerned, it may be necessary, for a number of years to come, for the Navy to take a very active part in the administration of our merchant marine.

THE WORK OF THE PLANNING SECTIONS.

20. It was early realized that no naval operations or successful campaign against the enemy could be inaugurated and systematically carried out without the aid of officers specially trained to do the planning. Apart from the major plans of campaign, which it has been the province of the General Board to formulate, there was constantly occuring opportunities for local operations, and even for operations of a major character which it is very necessary that officers who are not engrossed with administrative details should give their attention to. At first the department was swamped with a mass of administrative detail. This was quite natural and was inevitably due to the sudden transition from a peace to a war footing. But eventually it became possible to pick out and assign certain officers specially qualified whose mission it was to devote themselves to the work of planning.

In the late fall of 1917 it became possible to augment Admiral Sims' staff with officers who had no other duties except to work upon various plans. A similar planning section was also formed in the Office of Naval Operations. Both of these planning sections were in the closest touch with the Admiralty Planning Section and jointly considered the various subjects which arose in the course of the war. In cooperation with the General Board and with the various bureaus, such plans as the northern barrage plan, the Adriatic mine barrage, the Aegean mine barrage, the plan for operating our great guns in Europe, the northern bombing project, the general policy of our aviation efforts, the systematic hunting of submarines, and numerous other plans were

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worked out. The department had at all times a good working knowledge of the best things to do in the emergencies, and in addition it was also able to some extent forecast the trend of enemy operations, and to a degree to plan a counter. Without such organizations it is very doubtful if a clean-cut, well-thought-out plan of campaign can be conducted, and the value of these planning sections has shown itself many times over. Had the war continued longer their value would have been doubly increased. The existence of these two organizations working in close harmony with each other, one across the water and one here, is making far simpler the process of a systematic demobilization.

ACTIVITIES AND POLICY ON OTHER STATIONS.

21. The process of reduction of forces on our stations, except the North Atlantic and in the war zone, went into effect immediately at the beginning of the war. There were, however, reasons apart from military reasons, where it was not desirable to strip the Asiatic, South Atlantic, and other stations of all the vessels that were there. On the Pacific coast there was left a bare modicum of ships to attend to purely local needs. In South America, under Admiral Caperton, there were at least four armored cruisers stationed there at the time when a few hostile raiders were at large. But the danger from raiders having passed and the convoy needs growing greater, the admiral on this station was left with only sufficient force to enable him to successfully carry out his mission, which was largely one of cooperation with the Brazilians. This he most successfully did. At the Brazilian war college to-day there are representative United States naval officers, who are closely in touch with the activities of this college, and there are other officers who are working in harmony with the Brazilians and establishing friendly relations between their Navy and ours.

The cruises of our ships in the South Atlantic took them as far afield as Valparaiso on the west coast and to Liberia on the coast of Africa. In Asiatic waters the center of effort naturally was around the Siberian ports. Admiral Knight, on the *Brooklyn*, has been a student of the situation there and has kept the department constantly informed of the varying changes in the Siberian situation. At Mourmansk, in Russia, one of our ships was dispatched to act in cooperation with the Allies, and was instructed to particularly carry out the policies of the State Department. Since the armistice had been signed the *Scorpion*, which was interned at Constantinople, has been recommissioned and is now showing our flag in the Dardanelles and Black Sea. In the Adriatic one of our cruisers, with several destroyers, has been recently dispatched in order that our forces may be represented in the activities taking place within that area. In Canada we were requested to establish seaplane stations to aid in hunting the submarine, and this was done.

NAVAL POLICY TOWARD THOSE ALLIES WITH WHOM WE WERE ASSOCIATED.

22. It was realized that one of the reasons for causing this war to drag along as it did for a number of years was the lack of close cooperation between the Allies engaged in it fighting against the United Central Powers. Therefore, our position being a particularly unique one, and it being evident to all concerned that the United States could have no ulterior motives, it was fitting that the policy of the Navy Department toward those with whom it was associated should be one of the utmost frankness and straight dealing. We never expected to receive anything but the most open and fair treatment and in return we gave the same. It is a pleasure to state that so thoroughly have the Allies responded to our attitude, or even anticipated it, that there has never arisen an occasion where we felt that there existed the slightest ulterior motive. This office has received at all times fully and freely all information, no matter how secret its character, which has aided us in our planning and in our operations particularly. We are especially indebted to the free access which we have had to the information obtained by the British Admiralty intelligence service.

RESPECT FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW.

23. Since it is the province of the Office of Operations in outlining any campaign of war not only to take cognizance of immediate operations but to determine upon the policies to be carried out and to initiate plans and campaigns, it was of importance that the character of warfare which we waged should at the end of the war be open to inspection. For that reason, in every operation that was planned the tenets of international law were strictly regarded and the motto was adopted which was scrupulously adhered to, not "that the end justified the means" but that "the end must be justified by the means."

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24. The Office of Operations takes pleasure in expressing its deep appreciation to all the various branches of the Government, of the naval shore establishment, and of the naval forces afloat, without whose close cooperation and assistance it could in no wise have accomplished any of the problems with which it was confronted.

W. V. PRATT,
Acting Chief of Naval Operations.

I have here the report of Admiral Mayo to the Navy Department of requests for assistance to the United States following the international naval conference in London, September 4 and 5, 1917, with notes made on the original in my handwriting. I submit that to show that when Admiral Mayo made his report, exactly what we were doing with it and the steps we were taking. He went over, you will remember, in August, 1917, and so it seemed essential that this should go in to show that we were not asleep, and that we were trying to do the things he asked for, and on looking over the original letter files I found this. We were very busy in those days, and there was not very much time for writing, and we would often take the original letter and write upon it, saying "Yes; doing it," or something of that sort; so that I submit this original copy of that report of Admiral Mayo, showing what was being done in certain cases.

The CHAIRMAN. With your notes on it?

Capt. PRATT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. So that the notes can go in as well as the report?

Capt. PRATT. Yes, sir. This report is as follows:

REPORT OF ADMIRAL MAYO TO THE NAVY DEPARTMENT OF REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE FROM THE UNITED STATES FOLLOWING INTERNATIONAL NAVAL CONFERENCE IN LONDON, SEPTEMBER 4 AND 5, 1917.

[Notes (printed in brackets) made on original in handwriting of Capt. Pratt.]

PASSAGE, LIVERPOOL TO NEW YORK,
File 8012, confidential. *S. S. St. Louis, October 11, 1917.*

From: Commander in Chief, United States Atlantic Fleet.
To: Secretary of the Navy (Operations).
Subject: Specific requests for assistance from the several allied powers.
References: (*a*) Report of international naval conference in London on September 4 and 5, 1917—extracts; (*b*) memorandum from first sea lord of British Admiralty, dated September 22, 1917; (*c*) memorandum of requests from France; (*d*) memorandum of requests from Italy; (*e*) memorandum of requests from Russia.

1. The following summary of specific requests for assistance from the United States made by the several allied powers is assembled from the references and from notes made in interviews with Government representatives.

2. It is recommended that immediate and careful consideration be given to these requests and that decision or views in the premises be communicated to the several Governments concerned as soon as possible, in order that the necessary arrangements for cooperation and coordination of assistance to be rendered may be made, as in practically all cases the time element is of very great importance.

3. Not only should there be the least possible delay in replying to the several requests in order that the Governments concerned may plan accordingly, but where material assistance is involved, care should be taken to concentrate effort on the production of material already found even fairly satisfactory for the purpose intended, rather than to institute research and experimental work for development of new apparatus, or for the improvement of existing apparatus, thus causing delays in production which would operate to markedly reduce, and perhaps even to nullify, the value of the assistance rendered.

4. The summary of requests is arranged as follows: (*a*) Requests made during international naval conference in London September 4 and 5, 1917, inclosure A; (*b*) requests made by Great Britain, inclosure B; (*c*) requests made by France, inclosure C; (*d*) requests made by Italy, inclosure D; (*e*) requests made by Russia, inclosure E.

5. The commander in chief has made no written recommendation regarding these several requests but is prepared to discuss them and to explain the points that were presented in connection with them when they were made.

H. T. MAYO.

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REQUESTS MADE BY ALLIES DURING NAVAL CONFERENCE.

The following points for consideration by the Navy Department came up during the International Naval Conference in London, September 4 and 5, 1917:

1. The question of a close offensive in German waters.

(*a*) "The conference agreed that the question should be carefully considered by the Allies, and that they should indicate in due course to the British Admiralty the contribution of old warships (for sinking in blocking German channels) which they would be prepared to provide" if such operation was considered practicable.

(*b*) The suggested contribution from the United States Navy was 12 battleships and 8 cruisers. [No.]

2. (*a*) In considering the question of a mine barrage it was stated that the British shortage of skilled personal (especially fitters) required for the assembly of mines, limited their output. [Yes.]

(*b*) The United States and Italian representatives undertook to ascertain how far their respective countries could assist in supplying the deficiency.

3. The conference agreed that the convoy of all craft, including neutrals in the service of the Allies, would require additional ocean escort vessels and the various representatives agreed to ascertain what further cruisers or old battleships their respecrive nations could assign to this service. [Assign anything we have.]

4. (*a*) The questions of (1) concerted measures for preventing the establishment of enemy submarine bases overseas and (2) the development of a wireless warning system and intelligence center in the Azores were referred to a committee formed from representatives present.

(*b*) The report of the committee, adopted by the conference, was as follows:

(i) That the respective admiralties and ministries of marine should communicate with their colonial ministers and ask for instructions to be given to their colonies and oversea possessions to keep supervision over all harbors and anchorages to gain intelligence of German submarines or suspicious vessels. [Doing it.]

(ii) That steps should be taken to insure close cooperation between allied ministers in neutral countries to make such representations as will insure adequate action to prevent submarines or suspicious vessels being succored or allowed to make use of territorial waters.

(iii) That the question of fitting certain ships in convoys with powerful W/T to pass messages should receive consideration whenever convoys should be established, having particular regard to the difficulty of receiving W/T intelligence from vessels attacked off the coast of South America and in the South Atlantic generally.

(iv) That, with the permission of the Portuguese Government (*a*) a United States naval force should be based in the Azores [doing it]; (*b*) a British intelligence center should be established in the Azores; (*c*) British directional W/T stations should be established in the Azores [O. K.]; (*d*) a British long distance W/T station should be established in the Azores for the war [O. K.].

NOTE.—Any British units would work under the general direction of the United States senior naval officer. [We should appoint an admiral there; O. K.]

5. Vice Admiral Cusani read a statement from which the following is a quotation:

(*a*) "Besides the various active cooperation by armed forces, there is another field in which the United States can bring to us a welcome, a precious, and I would say a most needed contribution: that is in giving us those supplies and materials of which we and our other Allies are short for making ships, machinery, and munitions of war."

(*b*) "We would welcome any declaration from the American delegation to that effect, and we would then be on a firmer ground, so far as Italy is concerned, to bring this conference to useful conclusions."

(*c*) He had before him a list of the material required, and emphasized the delay which his Government experienced in obtaining the delivery of important orders already placed in the United States.

(*d*) Admiral Mayo undertook to make representations to his Government with a view to securing an expeditious delivery of the orders referred to. As regards further material help, he professed himself unable to give any undertaking, and suggested that the correct procedure would be for the Italian Government to make representations to the United States Government through the usual channel.

6. Previous to the conference, the First Lord of the Admiralty in conversation with Admiral Mayo, invited attention to the fact that Great Britain had not commandeered any shipping under construction for any of the Allies, and intimated that he hoped the United States would not commandeer any shipping building in the United States for Great Britain.

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REQUESTS MADE BY GREAT BRITAIN—FURTHER ASSISTANCE DESIRED FROM THE UNITED STATES.

[Memorandum from first sea lord.]

The further assistance desired from the United States from available forces or resources is as follows:

(1) Four coal-burning battleships of the dreadnought type to replace three or four Grand Fleet dreadnought battleships which it is desired to send to foreign waters to relieve older battleships which are being paid off for want of personnel. [Yes.]

(2) An increase in the number of destroyers, in order to enlarge the convoy system and to provide better protection for each convoy. [Yes; when we get them.]

(3) An increase in the number of convoy cruisers for the same reason. [We can exchange, but have not the ships available.]

(4) An increase in the number of patrol craft, tugs, etc., for antisubmarine work. [Yes; doing it.]

(5) The rapid building of merchant ships. [Doing it.]

(6) The supply of a large number of mines for the proposed barrage between Scotland and Norway, and assistance toward laying them by the provision of United States mine-laying vessels. [Yes; doing it, but the vessels to lay them should be commandeered now.]

As regards (1) the increase in the number of destroyers during the war has forced us to pay off the older capital ships to provide trained personnel for the light cruisers, flotilla leaders, and destroyers. This policy must still continue, as officers and crews will be required during the next 18 months for the 19 light cruisers, 12 flotilla leaders, and 119 destroyers now in various stages of construction.

Should the United States Government see fit to send over four coal-burning dreadnoughts, they would be attached to the Grand Fleet and form an integral portion of it, working together as a division of a battle squadron.

(2) The United States destroyers are more suitable for convoy work on the western approaches to Great Britain than British destroyers, owing to their size and greater radius of action. Any increase possible in this direction would enable more British destroyers to be used in the North Sea to operate offensively against enemy submarines.

(3) An increase in the number of convoy cruisers would enable the number of convoys to be increased, or, alternatively, the number of merchant ships in each convoy could be reduced and better control and protection be assured.

(4) The proposed barrage of mines between Scotland and Norway will entail the provision of large numbers of patrol vessels. Any assistance from the United States in this respect will be most welcome, either to cooperate in patrolling the barrage, or, alternatively, to release British patrol vessels for this purpose.

From naval staff (D. C. N. S.), September 22, 1917.

(7) Note with regard to mines: (*a*) It is considered essential that mines used in a barrage where patrol craft are numerous should become inoperative upon breaking away from their moorings.

(*b*) The British Admiralty desires to know what type of sinker can be used with the United States mines.

(8) Fuel-oil situation: (*a*) The situation with regard to fuel oil is still unsatisfactory. The amount on hand for naval use is approximately 600,000 tons. Of this possibly as much as 150,000 tons will not be available at the particular point where it is required. This leaves a real available supply of approximately 450,000 tons. [Foley; to be taken under consideration.]

(*b*) The normal monthly consumption under the present conditions of operation (the fleet practically immobilized) is 225,000 tons. [We need three more tankers now.]

(*c*) The amount on hand available is therefore approximately two months' supply.

(*d*) The greatest efficiency in oil supply can only be obtained by pooling the tonnage of the large oil companies and controlling their sailings by a joint committee representing the United States and Great Britain.

REQUESTS MADE BY FRANCE.

1. During the time the commander in chief was in France conferences were held with Maj.-Gen. Pershing, United States Army, Vice Admiral DuBon, chief of staff of the French Army, and with officers of the United States Navy on duty in France.

2. At the suggestion of Lord Derby and Gen. Murry, Gen. Pershing had already cabled to the United States suggesting that he proceed to London for a conference with British authorities and Admiral Mayo, to fully consider all of the demands which will be made upon shipping in order to supply the United States Army and the necessities of the allied nations. He had received an answer to the effect that the President did

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not consider such conference advisable as the United States Shipping Board was confident that they would be able to supply the United States Army with United States ships only.

3. In view of the above, after general conversation in regard to the great demands that would be made to support the Army, and in the belief that it is quite possible that the magnitude of these demands now, and in the future, may not be fully realized at home, it was agreed that both Gen. Pershing and Admiral Mayo would recommend early and serious consideration, and that the question of supplying United States colliers, either naval or otherwise, for transporting English coal to France for the use of the United States Army would be taken up at once. The amount of coal required by the United States Army is estimated at 80,000 tons per month. [Two assigned.]

4. During a conference at the Hotel Crillon, Paris, Admiral DuBon submitted the following points for consideration:

(*a*) That Gen. Pershing confer with Admiral Mayo and arrive at a definite conclusion as to the ports to be used in connection with the transportation of troops, and the proportion of troops to be sent to each port; and that Admiral Mayo should take back the general scheme to the United States.

(*b*) He further recommended that as the larger ships can not go to French ports for landing troops without great difficulty, that the utilization of Liverpool and Southampton be considered, and further that the troops be transported from the above places to Cherbourg so as not to interfere with the British cross-channel transportation.

(*c*) He requested that the ships that are being constructed in the United States for the French and have been commandeered by the United States be released for the use of the French Government for military purposes.

(*d*) The question of transportation of coal from England for the French fleet at Corfu is most important, as the general shortage of coal is most marked.

(*e*) The French navy is very short of enlisted personnel. The French have some cruisers laid up in ordinary for want of men and the French Government is willing to turn these cruisers over to the Allies for any purpose desired, if men can be provided. [It is suggested that France turn over to the United States to officer and man any cruiser laid up. We to guarantee their use in European waters or for convoy purposes. W. V. P.]

(*f*) It was suggested that several French battleships could be replaced by predreadnoughts of the United States fleet and the crews of the French battleships thus relieved could be used to man these cruisers.

(*g*) The question of aviation assistance was mentioned, but full reports on this subject have been submitted by the officers detailed for this special branch.

(*h*) Admiral DuBon presented a memorandum concerning assistance desired in adding to the efficiency of the ports of debarkation of the Army. The principal points are:

(1) The French marine has bought in the United States, some three months ago, 15 patrol and tug boats, and with these boats expects to strengthen the services of dredging the ports of Brest, St. Nazaire, and Pauillac.

(2) For eight of these vessels the transfer of flag and the ratification of sale has been obtained, but they are kept in America for repairs.

(3) For the seven others the transfer of flag and the ratification of sale are not yet realized.

(4) Assistance in lessening the delay caused by the necessary formalities and in hastening the repairs would be very much appreciated.

(5) Even with this reenforcement the means at the disposal of the French will not permit the gathering in each of the three ports the necessary dredging apparatus.

(6) In order to maintain each of these ports at its maximum efficiency, dredging vessels from the United States are required in each port.

5. (*a*) The French Government is much concerned lest the necessary arrangements for the transport, disembarkation, and upkeep of the United States troops should be underestimated in any degree with the result that the number of United States troops available for service in France in the spring and summer of 1918 might fall materially below the estimates.

(*b*) At numerous interviews both French and British representatives repeatedly referred to and emphasized the seriousness of the situation that might ensue if, for any reason, the United States should be unable to forward troops to France in the numbers now expected, and especially if the necessary supplies for United States troops in France should be insufficient whether on account of underestimates, lack of shipping, or of shipping losses, thus throwing even for a time the burden of supply on the limited resources of France.

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(c) It is very apparent that real fear exists lest the shortage of coal in France during the coming winter should have an injurious effect on the morale of the country. In this connection attention is invited to the advisability, and even necessity, that the needs of the United States troops in coal shall not be allowed to increase the embarrassment which the coal shortage in France may bring about. [If, as appears possible, this shortage of coal in France may be real, it may be necessary to put more of our colliers into coal carrying trade between France and England. It may also be necessary to run some of our fleet colliers from this country over to France. To safeguard these vessels, it may be necessary to run them over a selected route. W. V. P.]

(d) Powerful tugs of seagoing type are needed at the ports of debarkation of United States troops and supplies in France. These tugs should be armed, and when not engaged in debarkation work could be usefully employed in salvage work or even on patrol. Two such tugs should be sent to St. Nazaire as soon as possible, to be followed by others for Brest and Pauillac as rapidly as they become available. [We are now commandeering over 12 seagoing tugs for duty abroad.]

REQUESTS MADE BY ITALY.

CARLETON HOTEL,
London, England, September 8, 1917.

From: Commander in chief.
To: Secretary of the Navy (Operations).
Subject: Italian Government; request for expeditious delivery of material.
Reference: (a) Letter from Rear Admiral Cusani-Visconti, Italian naval representative at international naval conference.
Inclosure: (1).

1. The reference (inclosure) is forwarded for consideration.

2. The Italian naval representative at the international naval conference desired to bring up the question of material to Italy. It was deemed advisable not to discuss this matter in conference, and it was promised that a request of the Italian Government would be duly presented to the Navy Department. The reference (inclosure) is the Italian presentation of the matter in question.

H. T. MAYO.

I will also submit a memorandum of June 2, 1917, signed by Admiral Benson, showing exactly the steps taken, a memorandum for the Secretary of the Navy showing exactly what steps he was taking, at that date. I submit that.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Captain PRATT (reading):

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, June 2, 1917.

Memorandum for the Secretary of the Navy.

In compliance with your memorandum of May 31, 1917, I submit the following summary of the work in the Office of Naval Operations since the declaration of war.

OPERATIONS.

On April 1 all naval vessels were mobilized and immediate steps taken to fit them for war service as fast as their crews for full commissioning could be supplied. All naval districts were mobilized and their skeleton organizations are being filled as rapidly as personnel becomes available.

The Coast Guard, transferred to the Navy, have been operated by the Navy Department and all vessels belonging to that service have been repaired and refitted.

German refugee ships have been seized in cooperation with the Treasury Department, and the interned German vessels have been taken over for naval service and are being rapidly put in shape for active service. Refugee German vessels in Samoa, Honolulu and Porto Rico are being towed to the United States for overhaul and fitting out for service.

There has been organized and put in operation a patrol force with the Atlantic Fleet, under the command of Capt. H. B. Wilson, which patrols the offshore waters of the Atlantic and Gulf coasts from Eastport, Me., to the Rio Grande. Suitable vessels of this force are held in readiness to operate against enemy raiders that may be reported in the North Atlantic.

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There has been established in European waters a destroyer force under the command of Vice Admiral W. S. Sims, and 28 destroyers have been despatched abroad for this service, together with 2 destroyer tenders. Two supply ships, under destroyer escort have been despatched to France, carrying cargoes of much needed material for the country.

By agreement with the allied powers definite areas of patrol in the North Atlantic and off the east coast of Brazil have been taken over by the United States Navy and a scout force has been despatched to cover the area assigned our forces in the South Atlantic, under the command of Admiral W. B. Caperton.

There has been established in the Pacific a patrol of the Pacific Coast, including Mexico and Central America as far south as Panama Canal, under Rear Admiral W. F. Fullam.

There has been organized a force of small craft designated for patrol service in waters adjacent to the coast of France, and Captain W. B. Fletcher has been placed in command of the first contingent of this force, which will complete its fitting out in a few days and start for its field of operations.

There has been organized a system of convoy service under general charge of Rear Admiral Albert Gleaves, in readiness for the convoy of any troops which may be dispatched to France.

In addition to the foregoing, armed guards have been or are in process of being placed on all vessels, about 150 in number, plying between the United States and Europe, and the Atlantic Fleet has been given the duty of training the crews for the armed guards of merchantmen and transports.

The organization of the several forces, the regulations for convoy service, the instructions for the operation of merchant vessels supplied with armed guards, and war instructions for United States merchant vessels have all been prepared and issued by the planning section of the office of operations.

A board, of which Capt. Pratt of the office of operations is chairman, has been appointed to consider plans and devices connected with submarine warfare, and is in almost daily session and conference with the research committee of the Council of National Defense.

Definite and effective steps have been taken toward the organization of machinery to take over the control of the routing of all merchant vessels leaving United States ports. At present this function is being exercised by representatives of the British Admiralty stationed in our ports.

Preparation and distribution of various publications and ciphers for use in communication between merchant vessels and men-of-war of the United States and of the allied powers is well advanced. The communication office has been greatly enlarged to meet the demands of the increased work brought about by the state of war, the taking over of all radio service, and the establishment of the censorship over cables. It is contemplated to establish a service of officer-messengers for the distribution of secret orders, confidential publications, and ciphers.

NAVAL DISTRICTS.

The work of the naval districts has been extremely active, especially in districts 1 to 5 inclusive, because of their greater strategic importance and because of the great trans-Atlantic traffic passing to and from the ports within their limits. The sixth, seventh, and eighth districts are filling up their organization, but are not developed to the same extent. Those districts on the Pacific coast and in Hawaii have not yet been fully organized. Defensive sea areas have been declared and have been enforced in Boston, Newport, New York, Philadelphia, Cape Henry, Hampton Roads and Charleston, as fast as the number of patrol boats become available efficiently to enforce control over the areas. Other areas will be enforced as the organizations grow.

Six hundred and twelve small vessels have been inspected and found suitable for naval use; 152 have been taken into the naval service and assigned to scout patrol service and as mine sweepers; 138 have been ordered taken over but have not yet been delivered. Those accepted are now actively at work patrolling and mine sweeping or are being fitted out as rapidly as possible for work. All the small craft acquired by the naval district commandants have been manned by enrollment of Naval Reserves within the districts, and the personnel by active employment are rapidly being trained and accustomed to the line of work which the defense of the district demands. Mine sweeping is being carried out at Boston, New York, Delaware Bay, and in the Chesapeake.

The obligations under the emergency appropriation of $115,000,000 incurred in equipping the naval districts is indicated in the attached table.

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OPERATIONS ON SHORE.

The naval government of the Virgin Islands of the United States has been established under the governorship of Rear Admiral J. H. Oliver, and steps have been taken to supply at least a partial land defense of the islands by mounting eight 5-inch guns distributed between the islands of St. Thomas and St. Croix. Steps have been taken having in view the establishment of quarantine services, medical research services, and agricultural services in the islands.

Affairs in the island of Haiti, involving the peace of the Republics of Santo Domingo and Haiti, have progressed satisfactorily, and the authority of the established governments of these Republics has been maintained. In the two Republics there are now forces of marines aggregating 2,000. In Santo Domingo a guardo nacional under the military government and under the direction of United States marines has been formed and is undergoing a course of training, while in the island of Haiti the gendarmerie is reported to be in a very efficient condition. A small coast-guard service has been established in Haiti and vessels repaired in ports of the United States assigned to this service have recently been delivered under United States naval escort.

In addition, there have been employed in the disturbed districts of Cuba, caused by the recent revolution in that country, a varying force of marines for the protection of American interests there. There are at present about 450 marines maintained in the island. An information service throughout the island has been organized.

We have maintained constantly in Mexican ports and along the coast a patrol by our vessels, giving especial interest to the port of Tampico, in the vicinity of which are vast oil fields constituting a large and important source of the world's supply of oil. From two to four vessels have been maintained continuously at this port.

MATERIAL.

The vast work of equipping and repairing the fleet has brought upon our various navy yards and shore establishments demands which have taxed their utmost capacity. Not only has it been necessary to complete the overhaul and repairs of our regular naval vessels but repairs to the seized German merchant vessels and the fitting out and equipping of ships taken over for service have multiplied the work required to be done.

Repair work on the battleships left unfinished before the movement of the fleet south has been taken up and practically all naval vessels have been made materially ready and put in service. The fitting out of vessels for distant service is nearly completed, 15 German ships badly damaged by their crews before seizure by this Government are being fitted out for naval purposes, and 8 German ships are being repaired for the Shipping Board.

AERONAUTICS.

The naval aeronautic program was considerably accelerated upon the severance of diplomatic relations February 3, 1917, and the present program of naval aeronautic expansion may be considered to have begun on that date.

Enrollments in the Naval Reserve Flying Corps were begun under definite standards supplied to commandants of the various naval districts, and arrangements for accelerating the training of personnel at Pensacola and for establishing various other schools of training were made. There are five such schools now in operation.

Contracts were authorized for such aircraft as could be turned out for the Navy by July 1, including in this number 16 coastal dirgibles, and contracts are being made for additional aircraft as fast as they can be accepted by the manufacturers. Two hundred and eight aircraft have been ordered but not yet delivered. There are under construction at Pensacola 12 temporary hangars, a dirigible shed, and a large hydrogen plant.

In accordance with the recommendation of the Joint Army and Navy Board on Aeronautic Cognizance, sites for coastal air stations were examined and selected, and complete plans for the development of such stations were drawn up. Money for the acquisition of these stations is not available, but is included in an appropriation now pending. One site, however, has been obtained through permission of the use of land from the city of New York, and the contsruction of an air station there is now under way.

An allotment from the emergency fund of $3,000,000 was made to aeronautics. Of this sum $1,025,000 has been obligated and the expenditure of a further sum for the purchase of air craft equipment costing approximately $1,244,000 has been authorized. The balance of approximately $731,000 remains available.

W. S. BENSON.

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Expenditures for patrol vessels, mine sweepers, etc., in naval districts.

Vessels taken over:	
Patrols	$1,821,868
Sweepers	3,064,260
Vessels ordered taken over	1,555,001
Vessels taken over by special board	1,475,500
Total	7,916,629

I have here a personal letter, or a letter written in a personal vein by me dated July 2, 1917, to Admiral Sims. I got this out of the official files of the department. I found it when I came back. This is a letter which expresses very clearly our attitude at that time, and the way we felt in the matter. I shall read this letter, and this gives you the original, straight from the files of the department.

The CHAIRMAN. Who wrote that letter?

Capt. PRATT. I did. It was made official by having Admiral Benson's sanction to it. The letter is as follows. [Reading:]

JULY 2, 1917.

DEAR SIMS: Will try to get a letter off to the cheer-up admiral.

Did you see the article of Reuterdahl in the Saturday Evening Post? A peach. As a matter of policy I shall try to get you off a news budget from time to time, in order to keep you in touch with the situation. Don't get down on your luck—I know you won't. You are the man for the job and constantly we over here hear the nicest sort of news about you. If the cables are not answered on time, cheer up. We will do our best, rotten as that is. Here goes for a spiel on policy as I see it.

OUR POLICY IN BUILDING.

Through efforts on the part of Schofield and all of us, crystallized into definite shape, we have presented a clean cut outline of the policy which we deem is absolutely necessary to follow if this affair is to be brought to a successful conclusion.

Briefly speaking, it is this. To push the immediate construction of destroyers, submarines, and merchant ships, not only push what is contracted for but to devote every building energy to those ends and to the building up of the ship-producing facilities.

To carry out the design above outlined, we have recommended the abandonment for the present of all dreadnought battle cruiser and scout cruisers, except the three dreadnoughts almost completed.

To further these plans the Navy is cooperating to its utmost with Gen. Goethals, who, as the head of the merchant-ship building program, is a tower of strength. He has asked for a naval board of advisors and it has been appointed. Admiral Benson is strong for it and every effort of his will be directed toward getting the Secretary to make a decision.

We all feel that this must be done, though we realize that such a policy may leave us with our guard down in the case of future complications. There, however, is where you come in, and we must trust to your good offices, in your diplomatic way, to make the situation safe for the future. That is the happy solution, and it is a solution which I hope from the bottom of my heart may be accomplished for the future well-being of the entire Anglo-Saxon race. Whatever might be the outcome, even were a forced peace to result, England's fleet must never go elsewhere except to join our own, and such portions of it as we might need in future contingencies ought to be at our disposal. There must be no mistake about that. But willy-nilly, we of us here who may have an iota of say in directing our policies are turning every effort in the direction of a successful solution of this problem, leaving the future to take care of itself.

MINES.

In one of your earlier cables you expressed the desire that we should undertake the construction of great numbers of mines. Later, you cabled our mine was not so satisfactory and that the Admiralty did not desire it. You are by now in receipt of our later cable requesting a definite statement of policy. We, as I understand it, stand ready to undertake the construction of very excellent mines in great quantities, without interfering with our other efforts. The Admiralty expert, Commander Mock (I think), has, so I am told, expressed his satisfaction with the mine. Personally I think the mine will play a great part in the ultimate solution of the war, and in the mine class I put the torpedo, the depth bomb, and the aerial bomb (the greatest of all) as well as the mine true. About 30,000 tons of steel are being held up on the mine situation pending an ultimate decision.

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STRATEGIC FIGHTING AREAS.

(1) The North Sea, (2) the Adriatic, (3) other areas.

It has always seemed to me, and in this I am not alone, that areas (1) and (2) were the offensive areas, and that, outside of these, the (3) class, other areas, were largely defensive in a broad strategic sense.

England and the Allies have tried everything in (1) and (2) from the fleet to a patrol of the surface and, as you said in your cables, a limited mines operation. If I may be pardoned for saying so, and though she has learned through hard experience, I think the cart has been put ahead of the horse. Two years ago when the fleet contained the German High Sea Fleet, everyone said Mahan was vindicated, the silent pressure of the fleet was to save the situation. That is just as true to-day as it was then—the silent pressure of the fleet is there, but it is the conception of the strategic area in which it must operate to be effective, that is gumming the game. It has been borne home to me more and more when I compare the similar attitude of mind which exists in our own fleet. To be effective, the powers that control the movements of our fleet decided that it must come north on our own coast. There were several of us who said "No" to that proposition, "the best results will be gained by sending it to the Pacific" or where it can drill fit to the minute at sea. The other side thought that a reasonable proximity to the scene of possible action was the first requisite. What I am trying to drive at is this—the fleet, Admiralty's or ours, is a strategic proposition. Its effect will be felt even if it does not attempt the physical control of the North Sea with its component members. If it in any way hampers the tactical utilities of those fighting agencies which can do a better local work in that region, then the local agencies must not be sacrificed to the fleet, but the fleet must adjust itself to the immediate need. The immediate need—the mission—is the strongest possible offensive in the North Sea and the Adriatic against the submarine.

As it seems to be working out, the strongest offensive agency capable of effectively working against the submarine is the mine in some form—whether it be projected from a submarine, a destroyer, an aircraft, or whether it be planted in the water. Therefore when the Admiralty decides that certain areas can not be mined because it will interfere with the operation of the High Sea Fleet, I say the Admiralty, or whoever makes the decision, decides wrong, and I am going to stick to it like a stubborn mule. The North Sea and the Adriatic must be offensive mine areas, and the tactical disposition of the forces concerned must be such that the most mobility of action along the lines indicated be gained. With the barrage of mines by the thousands, with the areas inside that barrage filled with the friendly submarines operating in areas under orders, with the friendly aircraft operating against the land inside the barrage and against the sea outside the barrage, with the patrol and escort outside the barrage, with the fleet in general support outside, there is a general strategic plan. I do not accept as a valid excuse the statement that the fleet must be in readiness to repel an attempt by major ships of the enemy to raid the east coast. It is not sound under the circumstances, and the answer to it lies in your own submarines, or else you admit at once that the enemy submarines can do more than you can. It is a great mistake to attempt to make a tactical issue of the fleet when its rôle will, at the beginning at least, be strategical, and only when the local issue is forced by the minor units can you hope to draw the enemy to an action. I have talked to a great many men like Chase, Schofield, McKean, and they are in the main in agreement as to the soundness of the general strategy and in the insistence that local tactics should never be allowed to cloud correct strategic conceptions.

I don't care whether you call me a fool or not. I have studied a thousand or more plans and schemes, as I must from the nature of the duty of the board of which I am head, and more and more do I see that the aim of every good solution lies along the lines I have indicated. It is not my scheme. It, like the conference, represents the consensus of opinion on the subject, and the sounder the character of the men making the solutions, the nearer do they seem to approach to something like what I have tried to indicate above.

PERSONNEL.

You are all right in asking for all the officers and men. They ought to go and would were it a physical possibility to give them. There are many great demands—the yachts going abroad, the drifters, the number of Army transports which are coming under direct and complete Navy control, the necessity of preserving intact the skeleton of the structure of the fleet so that it shall in no wise lose in efficiency, the putting into commission the huge number of small craft, and the reserve battleships (to be used to train up new personnel), the great increase in the numbers of officers

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needed in positions of responsibility on shore and the impossibility of turning some of these duties over to untrained inexperienced men, all make the greatest demand upon the trained personnel. We must not and can not make the mistake England did in her first expeditionary army. You know it is sound just as will as I. But the spirit is with you, to give you all that can be spared, and if the staff asks for more, remember we are trying to do our best. After reading over all you had to say, and Emmet's letter, I prepared the cable which put the number of reserves at one-fifth (Naval Reserves, untrained, but let us hope bright, useful men). You can whip them into shape. I hope the admiral signed it. He said he would. I believe it is the best that can be done now. But remember the will is to give you all that can be spared, not only for your own use, but on the principle, which we all hold here, that a man gets the best training at the front. I have personally wanted to go with you the worst way. Chase and the others insist that this is my job, that I am giving a greater equivalent to the Government, and as you know that is out War College training.

ESTABLISHMENT OF STATIONS FOR UNITED STATES FORCES ABROAD.

As you know, if this war is going to last, and it looks now as though it would some time longer, we have only just begun to bite into the apple. It appears to me that there is a crying need for more of our forces of the antisubmarine patrol type, not only for the British areas, but for the French coast, and the Mediterranean as well.

We have established a nucleus now on the Irish coast. It is only a beginning I hope. We are all in accord on that. It should and will be increased, compatible to our home needs, and to the supply abroad of our forces at other points.

As to our home needs, don't for a moment get the idea, or let any of those around you get it, that we are here asleep at the switch, or are being fooled by Fritz. We feel that Fritz sent the U-53 over here deliberately to impress us with what he intended to do to us, and would do to us, if we went into the war. He also might, at the very beginning, had that warning not been sufficient, sent over a few subs to strafe us. Undoubtedly there was a big war party that advocated it. But, and this is a big but, Fritz has learned that perhaps it won't pay to stir a hornet's nest up too much. He feels that if we are allowed to plod along without too much personal contact with this war, we will be slow getting under way, and moreover he dearly needs a future trade haven, when this war is over. Fritz is in a quandary, he hates us and would dearly love to strafe us. He hates us even more than he does England if that be possible, but unless it be in the last final burst of rage, it hardly seems possible that there will ever be many subs sent to this side. If they do come, our answer is a dragging one, for mines, off our principal ports, and a close search for possible bases with our coast guard in certain localities. These precautions, coupled with sufficient antisubmarine craft, of the general chaser or destroyer type, to give shipping an offing, is all we need on this side. I think every one on this side appreciates the situation.

Now, as to other needs abroad. We have sent Fletcher with seven yachts to a French port. A division of nine more yachts is fitting out to join him as soon as they can be made ready. They ought to be in shape very soon, perhaps by the end of this month. In addition, 12 menhaden fishermen are being fitted for service abroad. They are good boats. They ought to be ready soon. Orders are also out to get 12 submarines in shape for distant service. There is no question of the necessity of establishing an escort service on the coast of France, through the danger zone.

It has been decided to send the five destroyers in the Philippines to European waters. They will be ready to start on August 1. The 12 destroyers ordered to get ready for distant service are having their difficulties. It is doubtful if they could be gotten ready. It would be wise for you to lay down certain general requisites in the matter of type and armament for submarines which we ought to consider in any building program. As you are on the spot such recommendations would be of extreme value. About 40 more yachts will become available for distant service through the commandeering bill which has just been passed. It would be some little time before they could get across owing, to a large extent, to a lack of guns. It is the intention to push them for distant service.

There is also another locality where our efforts may be needed, that is in safeguarding shipping into the entrance of the Mediterranean. This may require a station at Gibraltar. Now, whether we should undertake operations in the Mediterranean is another question. I don't know, but it might well be discussed. However, it appears to me that the three positions outlined above come well within the scope of our future operations. If the ideas outlined above under strategic areas were considered favorably I am inclined to believe that our submarines could do good work in the North Sea area, assisting the British submarines, but I think it would be the greatest mistake to splash them around indiscriminately.

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ARMED GUARDS.

This is the general name we have given to the class of operations comprised under the head individual ship protection self-contained. It has been gone into very thoroughly on this side, probably because it was the best effort we could make immediately. Schofield fathered it, and with his usual thoroughness it has been beautifully done, as far as our resources would permit. The secret of the recent successes has been the fact that it was considered a major objective, and not one of the minor considerations. I am not blaming the English—they had so many other things to think about. It has, with them, not received the proper consideration it should as one of the best defensive antisubmarine defenses. The opinion I have formed from talks with British officers seems to be this—their attitude toward the subject is this: "Oh, any old gun will do to keep the submarines under." That is not enough. You have got to make the submarine realize that he runs a very considerable danger in attacking a ship, even if he be submerged, provided he can be detected.

This requires the most painstaking efforts along the following lines: Lookouts, guns, care of guns, adequate guns' crews, competent petty officers for each crew, an efficient control for each armed guard on each ship, a central control at the department which regulates the assignment of guns and crews, the proper decentralizing of this central control through the district commandants in order to secure efficient administration, and last, but not least, a proper supervision and inspection system. This supervision system requires a report from the armed guard commander for each voyage. This report is sent to Washington. The officer brings it himself. If there are glaring faults discovered, a board of investigation is ordered. At certain times the ship and armed guards are inspected by a competent officer. Plunkett does the inspection, and you can bet it is done. His inspection and the reports submitted do not stop at the armed guards. They go intimately into company methods, ship discipline, loading, discharge, and a thousand things all having a bearing on getting cargoes across safely and at speed. He is just in, and I will give you a little extract from his report. One of the ships just ready to sail (our own), the passengers coming on board over the gangway. Near them a gun—at the gun working over the mechanism right in the midst of the bustle one of our gun crews, oiling and adjusting the mechanism, getting ready for target practice next day after clearing New York.

Near by lay the *Cretic* and *Cedric*, both of them much better and more valuable ships belonging to the White Star Line. This is what Plunkett reports: One 4-inch gun of the vintage of 1896, mounted aft, manned by two nice be-whiskered old gentlemen. This tells the story. He recommends that some of the guns on one of our liners be immediately put on the *Cedric* and *Cretic* in the general aid of shipping across.

You can't beat it. You can't dodge it. There are the facts. These cargoes are going across for the benefit of England and the Allies. They must improve on their system. There is no use saying it can't be done. It can; but to be successful it must be treated as a major objective—conservation of shipping—just as important. More, in fact, than building new shipping.

One of the inside secrets of getting results is this: Our central office in the dep rtment is in constant touch with the War Risk Bureau, under the Treasury Department. They have agreed not to give insurance, to cancel insurance, at the call of this central office. What is the result? One of the companies, say, does not want to incur a certain expense, which we consider necessary for the safety of the ship. Our agent wires to Washington. We call up Treasury, stating case and requesting cancellation of insurance. Done. Owners get busy and come through. Another case, and this is authentic: Armed guard commander reports captain as inefficient. Result: Communicate to Commerce and Labor. License canceled, after we have refused to furnish guns or guards to any ship employing that man as captain. Get me. That is the stuff that gets results.

Another thing. The petty officer of the *Silver Shell* sinks a submarine. The petty officer of the *Moreni* puts up as pretty a fight as one wants to see. Result: If these facts are authenticated these men will probably be recommended for commissions.

Schofield is the father of the scheme and he deserves an unlimited amount of credit. It is not perfect, but it is systematically done, and it is bringing home the results. I do not see the same attention to these details on the part of British ships. I am not blaming anybody. I understand perfectly why all this should appear to be of minor importance to the Allies. It was up to the 1st of February last, but it must be taken seriously now. Push it.

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BOARD ON ANTISUBMARINE DEVICES.

This is a board of which Grant is at the head. It has the practical test of all sorts of devices which the other boards pass upon and consider worthy of a practical test. There are other boards, one of which I am the head of, "Devices and plans for antisubmarine war." We are in close touch with Grant, the Physical Research Council, and the Naval Advisory Council. I am telling you this because possibly you may wonder why so many schemes which on the face appear unsound, are sent over to you I am largely responsible for it, and the idea and policy of it is this. The face value of the article presented is frequently nil, but in every case there has appeared to me to be an underlying principle which would bear scrutiny, and for that reason it has been sent over. Incidentally, I feel sure that in the course of time there will be developed on this side some form of detector which will go far to neutralize if not exterminate submarine warfare. I am not given to over exaggeration as a rule, and when I say that we may feel very hopeful, I think I am expressing what the results of recent experiments give us the right to hope for. If entirely successful, it is only a small matter and a question of short time before these detectors will be installed in great numbers. All types of craft will have them. They should be a great improvement on anything you have now.

COOPERATING OFFICERS (ESPECIALLY GENERAL STAFF).

In some of your cables and in Emmet's letter, the need for liason officers is touched upon. That is granted. I believe the bureaus have sent representatives over to get in touch. Of course this does not fully comply with the object of your cables, but if the increase in your personnel is actually given you, then you will have a force to work with composed of some very fit men, even if taken from the Naval Reserves.

The various naval attachés from the Allied countries while the best of that particular type, do not quite fill the position which, I think, should be filled by some representative from the other side, especially from England. It does seem to me that we would get closer in touch if we had over here in this office a representative of the Admiralty General Staff. We ought to be able to talk to him every day. He is to fill us with their point of view and we to fill him with ours. He should be a man able to speak with certainty as to the point of view which is held in the Admiralty. If we are at fault, he can correct it. If we have any ideas that are worth considering he will glean them. You on that side of the water represent us, but the Admiralty is now represented over here in the way I mean. This country represents a great military reserve which is marshaling its powers to take the offensive. As your history will tell you, Wellington laid great stress in his reserves, and Wellington was one of the few men of history who, in addition to being a master tactician, was also a master of policy and strategy. Those are rare qualities to combine in one man. I feel that we do not get enough of the point of view over there, and moreover I want to know what the point of view of the man from over there will be when he comes over here.

You can not in cables give an altogether clear conception of the big point of view. We know when you want a thing, because you ask, but the underlying motives and the reasons why, and especially the British point of view which actuated you, we lose. And that has a big influence on the results of the individual requests you make. It may be all wrong, if so we want to find it out, but there has been done a vast amount of thinking on the general plan of campaign, right in this office, and many general decisions which we believe are being made we would like very much to have presented at close range. You know the American characteristic, which is, "Show me," and you know it well enough to realize that it is not sufficient, much as we regard and highly as we respect the Admiralty decisions, to absolutely accept them without close scrutiny. Neither is it a wise thing to do it, for the point of view of the man somewhat removed from the scene of strife, while it may not be of great value, is still a point of view, and it may contain food for much thought. Especially is this apt to be true in the consideration of the broader schemes. And it must be definitely realized that while we may have very little actual contact at present on a big scale at sea, yet as a reserve force of power in the future we may have a weighty part to play, and the general decisions and schemes concern us vastly. Therefor, I say, we must be in touch with the Admiralty's policy, not after the manner of a man who has something to show to an inquisitive child, but after the manner of two men respecting each other's ability, and wishing each to give and to learn from the other. They get our point of view through you, and in every way, even to gossipy correspondence, we try to keep you in touch. In your cables you do us, to the Queen's taste, undoubtedly better than it has ever been done before, but there is still that

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eak in the complete circuit. If you had time (and I have heard this comment fore) I would write home here some of your newsy, gossipy letters. There is no cessity of censoring your letters to us. It would be the height of absurdity to do it, cause the facts, the cold facts, are what we need. The only thing to do is to safe-ard their transit.

I have heard the admiral, time after time, say practically the same thing. We are ore than willing to cooperate in every sense of the word. This office does not have be scared into sending ships because we do not realize the seriousness of the situa-on. We do. Every man jack in the plans department has laid awake nights. The lmiral is willing to recommend anything, any forces, so long as he knows, and he ants to know, not in any critical spirit, but in the spirit of utmost cooperation, what ie Admiralty's strategical and tactical conceptions are. Just what is their major lan? Is its fundamental conception offensive or defensive? What are the tactical etails in general by which this plan is to be solved? Those are the things we want know, and these are the things we have a right to know, especially as we are direct-ig every effort, building, conserving, of shipping to arrive at a successful conclusion this war, even to the possible sacrifice of our own individual good later. We could ork so much more intelligently toward the same united ends if we knew a little iore. And there is where a big Admiralty Staff man comes in. The liaison on little ings is all right, but this war won't be won so much by the collection of details roperly arranged as it will by the correct conceptions of the proper strategy and olicy to pursue. It will be won all right, England can do it herself, but we can horten the process. There are many problems, present and future, which can't go own in black and white on paper, but which might be much more satisfactorily pproached had we a man on the spot in the full confidence of the Admiralty and epresenting them.

TRANSPORT SERVICE.

After dint of working on the subject, in conjunction with the General Staff of the Army, the conclusion has been arrived at that the transport service of the Army must e under complete naval control. So, to that end, there has been a big effort to get nto the transport service some of the interned German orphans we fell heir to. That s going through, I believe. Through the insistence of Secretary Baker, who, by the way, is one very big man, this bill will be signed by the President, we have every eason to believe. This immediately puts a strain on the naval personnel, but it is ne we believe we should assume. It also helps to explain why it is so difficult to neet your demands in the way of trained personnel. As our transport and convoy system stands to-day it is a cumbersome affair, and the putting of the right ships under naval control is going to vastly simplify the situation, to say nothing of safe-guarding it. The ships we have taken over will be able, without strain, to put the entire Army raised over on to the shores of France in something less than a year. Submarines or no submarines, you can rest assured that army will be there in less than one year, and with it from 5,000 to 10,000 trained aviators.

People abroad do not fully realize that America has found herself and come into her own. We are slow, we are not thoroughly awake yet, but the spirit is there, and those that are directing affairs are, in the main, in this fight to the finish. I have time and again heard the possibilities discussed, of the United States being the sole one in at the finish. Of course that is overdrawn, but it means just this, if Russia quits, if France is forced to quit, if Italy is knocked out, still with England and the United States in the ring, there will be no end until the Kaiser is on his knees and on his way with his whole family to St. Helena. You have only to think of how we swallowed conscription, lock, stock, and barrel, to see how America is taking the matter. With conscription, we know nobody can touch us. It can't be done. On this continent there is a stronghold for Anglo-Saxon freedom and democracy, if everything else fails. The Army, too, understands that. There is no effort to underestimate or to hang back. It is a grim determined lot. Its one desire is to be fit and then get there. It is slow, but this time it is a sure hunch. All the Allies need to do is to hang on and one more spring, I believe, will see Fritz break. I don't care how much grub and supplies he gets then, he is going to break, and the God he profanes every day of his life won't stop him. I am constantly thrown with earnest-faced men, professors, intellectuals, scientists, all representing the best of this country, who are giving their time and talents without hope of a return except to serve in some small way. It has been a revelation, and if there are any doubts on that score, in England, you can tell them to the contrary.

The German ships we are taking into the Navy for transport service are the *Vaterland* down, 14 to 16 of their best, and we are going to see that the troops get across.

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ESCORT AND CONVOY.

In your cables you have insisted upon the necessity of adopting what you call convoy. Your assumption that merchant shipping should be escorted through the danger zone is absolutely correct. There has been no dissent there. Also what you insist upon the impracticability of escorting individual ships through is correct. The only difference lies in the details of the scheme. As I understand it, the Admiralty favors a convoy across all the way. Why? There are no raiders; if so, then the high sea patrol ought to settle that. If it is to control the merchant ship across, and see to it that he arrives at the proper rendezvous, that of course is another matter. but it does seem to me that this matter ought to be arranged in a simpler manner and in away which ought not to interfere with the ability of the individual ship to make its best time to the point of rendezvous. You also eliminate the waste effort of assembling the different parts of the convoy, if the steady stream of shipping is kept up. What you are trying to arrive at is escort through the danger zone, in bulk and in toto, in a manner which will interfere least with the other duties falling to the lot of the vessels used for escort purposes.

I think that can be arranged in another way. If the Admiralty were to appoint a certain number of days a week during which, at certain hours, they would guarantee the escort through the danger zone in bulk of merchant shipping, and if in addition they would predict for, say, a week ahead the different rendezvous shipping bound for certain ports should arrive at, together with the hour of arrival, then the matter is in their hands. If long on escort ships, they could make the arrivals three times a week. If short, they could cut it in two. The method of procedure would be as follows: Admiralty cables to their head men here, Gaunt, that all transatlantic shipping will be escorted in on the following days for the week ending ———. That gives them the liberty to change the days for every week, if they choose. Then they cable Gaunt that the following rendezvous are appointed for the ports indicated for that same week. ships to arrive at rendezvous at such and such a time. You are likewise informed, as a check, and you inform us. Gaunt informs his shipping officers and we inform the district commandant, who is in touch with our head shipping officer at each port and has an office in the customhouse. He or they inform all shipping leaving that they must arrive at certain rendezvous at such and such a date on the hour named. The individual ship then makes the best of his way to the spot. The penalty for failure to arrive is easily arranged for our ships, being merely cancellation of war insurance unless good explanations are given. This puts the company on its metal and does not throw the onus on the conveying craft, and it does not slow up the stream. If now the Admiralty deemed it wise, just before the time of arrival at the different rendezvous, to change these rendezvous, it is an easy matter to arrange for that, and broadcast signals as at present would settle it. The matter of forming the convoy at the rendezvous is not specially difficult, if the United States officers cable to London from each office the probable dates of arrival and the numbers arriving at those dates. If one or two less turn up on the first date set, you know they will be along on the second. The inspectors for the armed guards have merely to classify the ships according to speed and have a joint agreement—A class, 8 to 10 knots, say, and mark A on her side—B 10 to 12 knots, say. Give each individual ship, a number, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, etc., and let the escort gather the A ships in one group, lowest numbers leading, the B group, lowest numbers leading, etc., and there you are. It is exceedingly simple in our case, because we have competent trained officers or petty officers on board in our armed guards. Just now we are more concerned with getting the cargoes bound for the allied countries in the war zone hustled along with safety. I can not see anything the matter with that scheme, and it beats the convoy a mile, and then some. If the raider is the trouble, that can be attended to when that bridge is reached. It might necessitate periodic sailings of one of our cruisers, or it might mean the far-flung scouting line. With this scheme as a starter it is always possible for us at this end to hold up sailing days and make one sailing day, taking all vessels leaving on that day under one cruiser escort. But the crux of the matter is that the Admiralty must fix dates and points of arrival for arrivals on the other side, and that we must fix them for arrivals on this side, if the necessity ever arrives for so doing, due to a transfer of submarine operations to this side, and that is the very point which the Admiralty scheme never touched upon, though to us it seems the heart of the solution.

INCREASE OF FORCES ABROAD.

It ought to be definitely understood, that as a matter of policy on the part of the Admiral, there is never any objections on his part to furnishing any of the forces that may be considered necessary for the successful conclusion of this war. And he is also positive in the assertion that whatever he may say in his cables to you or to

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e Admiralty, or whatever he may allow to pass his censorship in the matter of letters, thing must be considered in the light of criticism. When the matter was taken up ith Gaunt, of sometimes directly communicating with the Admiralty, for the express irpose of getting in touch and cooperating fully, he insisted upon that point. In ie matter of sending forces abroad, he wants to send the kinds that are wanted, and e wants to send them where it is thought they will do the most good. In all these atters, we must be guided by your judgment, after the frankest and freest expression general policy and plan on the part of the Admiralty. The forces which I have ientioned as available soon have already been listed under the head Establishment stations abroad. In addition to those spoken of we have placed contracts for me 360 of the 110-foot chaser type. This does not mean that all those ships will e sent abroad, but it is well for you to know what we are doing in the matter of trying accelerate things, and if the urgent needs are presented clearly and frankly enough, e stand ready to do everything in our power to help the united cause. The deliveries f the 110-foot chasers should be coming along shortly, perhaps in another month.

OUR FLEET—TRAINING AND READINESS.

The policy in regard to this unit has been as follows: It has been thought wise to ut every fighting unit in commission. There are several reasons for that. In the first lace nobody can entirely foretell future eventualities. There might be a sudden call or parts of it to do service in any quarter of the world; in the second place we ourelves must be in a position to forestall any policies or plans which might be inimical o us or to the United interests; in the third place, with the tremendous increase in ersonnel (amounting already to over 120,000 men, and in the near future to perhaps 150,000 men) there must be facilities afforded where we can train the new men and fficers thus suddenly enrolled. It can not be done efficiently at the shore stations lone, and the fleet is the reservoir which must be used for the purpose of gradually bsorbing these units and welding them into a compact fighting force.

Moreover, aside from the uses these new men can be put to in the fleet, there is a growing demand for trained guns' crews and officers to put on the merchant ships to which we assign armed guards. And in this connection, before I forget it, the admiral has talked with Gaunt, has gone over the situation with Navigation and Ordnance, as to the advisability of furnishing armed guards for those ships of the Allies, or those in their service, which the Admiralty might desire us to furnish armed guards for. It only requires an expression of their desires and policy for us to take the matter under advisement. And in that connection, wherever request has been made in the past an endeavor has been made to meet the wishes expressed.

As far as the fleet itself is concerned, the first objective has been to put it in material readiness throughout. After that is accomplished it is the admiral's desire to see it trained to the minute as a fighting unit, especially in the matter of gunnery. The Admiralty expert who was here made a searching inspection of it in order to develop any of the weaknesses which the British experience at Jutland showed might exist. It has been of tremendous advantage to us to have the benefit of such candid judgment, and we feel that the Admiralty is to be heartily thanked for so freely giving us the benefit of its experiences. The necessary changes will be undertaken at once. In the matter of training, the admiral feels that a fleet to be efficient as a fighting unit must be a mobile unit and trained at sea. It can not efficiently train in too inclosed waters, and it must develop the sea habit.

Not only must the fleet be trained to the minute as a compact fighting unit, but those who are concerned with the intimate direction of its affairs must constantly have the broadest point of view and the most unlimited information, in order that at any moment it may be able to adjust itself to changed conditions or to increased activities. For that reason, while the entire freedom of initiative was given in your instructions to meet any situation which might arise abroad, it was thought that the commander in chief of the fleet should be kept informed of so much of the situation as he might need in order to formulate any plans which might at some future time contemplate the use of our entire fighting force as one unit.

In order that the fleet may be in closest touch at all times with every phase of the situation, not only on this side of the water but also abroad, the admiral has endeavored to establish the closest sort of cooperation and information service between the fleet and this office, and I feel sure that he would view with favor any effort on their part to establish permanent relations, even to a desk here, between this office and the grand staff of the commander in chief. Such a move on their part I feel sure would tend to broaden the point of view of the fleet—get them more away from local issues, which can easily be attended to by the battleship and other staffs, and at once put them au courant with affairs abroad.

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There is a question pending of sending the commander in chief with a part of his staff and a representative of this office to discuss questions with the Admiralty, and get first-hand information and impressions. An ultimate decision has not been reached.

A general statement of naval policy along certain lines concerning the Allies has been prepared, and when it stands approved, will be cabled to you. It is the intention to keep you posted by cable with whatever policies are decided upon as being the policies to be adopted.

AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS.

A cable was sent you the other day as you remember, asking you to outline the character and extent of operations in the air which our naval air forces might at some near time be called upon to undertake in the service of the allied operations. It is necessary to know this in order to make the proper estimates of numbers of craft and personnel to ask Congress to appropriate for. These aircraft abroad must be additional to the units considered necessary to retain in the United States and with the fleet.

As you perhaps know from seeing it in our papers, there is being made by the Army a very decided drive at a huge increase in the flying force for the land. There are some 600,000,000 of dollars being asked for. I am personally heartily in favor of an intensive drive in this direction by the land forces, for to me it seems the line of least resistance their efforts can take. Moreover, it is the one effort which can be intensified most rapidly and it is essentially adaptible to the qualities of our newly enrolled personnel.

It is, however, essential that we know the relations which are supposed to exist abroad, between the sea flyers and the land flyers, and the scope of their individual efforts. Would our sea flyers be asked to undertake land operations, perhaps against naval bases, or would their efforts be confined to the antisubmarine and patrol efforts at sea? This is asked because the papers print news from time to time of the efforts the British sea flyers are making on land, and if such an effort were to be asked of us it would be well to be prepared in the matter of machines and instruction of personnel.

Moreover, with such a concentrated drive on the part of the Army for material, it behooves the Navy to have its plans laid else it will be driven out of the market. There is also an effort on the part of certain forces in this country to establish an entirely separate air service, one which is a function by itself and apart from either the Army or the Navy. I can not speak for the Army, but it appears to me than an air service working at sea in conjunction with the Navy must be an intergral part of the Navy in order to give efficient service. Still those are matters of which we have had no practical experience in war, and any information bearing on that subject, especially the Admiralty's policy toward their flying units, would be of value. The technical information in the matter of machines, engines, etc., we are getting, notes on the training of flyers, are coming in, but the underlying policy is somewhat hazy and we would be glad to get anything you might have to tell.

FUTURE EVENTUALITIES.

Those are difficult to foretell. Personally, I feel strongly that if we do our best to cope with and surmount the present situation, the future will take care of itself. Nevertheless, we on this side of the water ought to have the absolute assurance that our future interests will be safeguarded. It is much like the wife who says to her husband "I know you love me, but it would be awfully nice if you would tell me so once in a while."

FINALLY.

I met Arthur Pollen for a moment the other day. He said, "That man Sims has simply taken the country by storm; besides, he is so preposterously good looking, over 6 feet 3." There speaks the Englishman, and we realize the pith of your statements when you say that whoever we send over must have good presence. He said, as an example, and it takes one who knows the English character to appreciate the foothold you have gained, "I say, do you realize Sims is the only foreigner that has commanded a fleet practically entirely made up of British units for over 400 years?" That tells the story as nothing else could do it. It shows, and I think everybody here realizes, that you are essentially the man for the job. So I beg of you when you read my amateurish attempts to say something, you will have patience and much forbearance. Though ignorant, I am willing and always trying to be cheerful. I am going to ask the admiral to censor this, as I do not want to be guilty of expressing opinions, however innocently, that are incorrect wherever I refer to any expressed policy of his or the department's.

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Poor old Chase dies last Sunday night (June 24) suddenly. His heart gave out. He went to sleep in his bed and never awoke. I feel his loss keenly, as I have always regarded him as one of the brightest thinkers this Navy has ever produced. He had the faculty of the broad gauge of being able to vizualize events. Moreover, I was personally very fond of him, for his kindliness of nature and charity toward others was a lesson to all of us. He can not be replaced. The admiral has directed me to temporarily look out for his desk until he chooses his successor.

Your two letters just received. They clear matters more than anything I have heard yet. Also pardon the amateur strategist. Some day, if I live long enough, I may learn, but I have my doubts. Give my best to Babby and Daniels. They are towers of strength. Your weekly mail just in. I am noting the lack of information which ought to go to you directly and will hunt up the source of the trouble. Did you get the cable about appointing rendezvous for *Celtic*? I tried the direct method in this case, instead of routing through Gaunt, which I find has been the method of procedure. There is a screw loose somewhere, probably, and we will try to hunt it up. That is my hobby, learned from destroyer experience, that and cooperation. I remember with much pleasure the system established by Babcock with the able assistance of Daniels and Sparks.

Pardon the intricacy of expression. I can not use a typewriter, think, and spell at the same time, even with one finger.

Yours,

PRATT.

P. S.—H. H. Ward, you know him, wants to get in the game. He has had a lot of naval experience, is a very keen man, and would like to serve abroad. I told him I would suggest his name to you if he had no objection, and he said very glad if I would.

Finally presuming that I may be asked the direct question (1) "Were we prepared for war April 6, 1917?" and rather than answer offhand, I prefer to give an answer after making a study of the situation as it existed at the above date. This is a difficult question to answer honestly without unintentionally giving wrong impressions on one side or the other. If this question means (2) "Were we on the above date, April 6, 1917, with the forces we had at our command, materially fit and adequately manned ready to cope with Germany alone?" the answer must be emphatically "No." A comparison of the naval forces available for a fleet engagement at that date would read approximately as follows:

German high seas fleet, April 6, 1917:

19 dreadnoughts.	150 submarines, of which only a certain number would be available if the engagement took place in the western Atlantic. The number of destroyers would also be reduced probably. This represents the maximum German force.
5 battle cruisers.	
34 light cruisers.	
4 mine-laying cruisers.	
196 destroyers.	
18 old battleships.	
3 old cruisers.	
6 auxiliary mine layers.	

United States forces fit and ready to fight, April 6, 1917:

13 Dreadnoughts (*North Dakota* not ready).	0 cruisers, first class.
0 battle cruisers.	1 cruiser, second class.
2 old battleships.	2 light cruisers.
2 armored cruisers.	0 submarines.
	23 destroyers.

The answer to such a comparison of forces named must naturally be "No," although I still believe that, ship for ship, our dreadnoughts could more than take care of an equal number of the enemy dreadnoughts, and were in splendid shape as those admirals who were in the fleet certainly know.

If the original question means (3) "In case every available unit of the United States were mobilized in one spot and were in every respect ready to fight, would we be prepared on April 6, 1917 to meet

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Germany alone?" this question requires a still further estimate of forces.

German high seas fleet, April 6, 1917: Same as outlined above.

United States forces prepared under hypothetical assumption made above:

14 dreadnoughts.
0 battle cruisers.
19 old battleships, excluding *Iowa*, *Massachusetts*, *Oregon*, *Indiana*.
9 armored cruisers.
4 first class cruisers.
8 light cruisers.
51 destroyers.
17 submarines (of the H class and later types which might be used in an engagement in the western Atlantic).

This force comprised our total fighting Navy which could be considered as in any way useful for fleet action. Making a comparison of forces and allowing for the long Atlantic trip on the one hand (that of Germany) and of our new personnel on the armored cruisers and old battleships, I am of the opinion that the answer is still "No," owing to the disparity in dreadnoughts and battle-cruiser types more than to any other reason, though I do believe it would have been a wonderful battle and the German fleet would not have been worth much after it was over.

In order to further accentuate this hypothetical condition, I wish to ask myself another question: (4) "Suppose that on April 6, 1917, the United States fleet had been forced, in the state of preparedness it then was, to meet single-handed the German high seas fleet, in the state of readiness the high seas fleet was supposed to be in on that date, what would be your opinion of the state of preparedness we were in?" My answer to this question would be, "I would consider such a state of affairs to be criminal."

However, these are hypothetical conditions. They are not the conditions which confronted us April 6, 1917, and I only consider them because the committee has chosen to ask so many questions along this line, that I wish to give correct and accurate opinions in so far as I am able to do so. The real situation was this: The German fleet was contained in their home waters, had been so contained for a long time, and to meet our fleet would have to fight its way past the British grand fleet, a force consisting of the following:

British grand fleet:

36 dreadnoughts.
11 battle cruisers.
43 light cruisers.
7 cruisers.
22 flotilla leaders.
184 destroyers.
Some submarines.

Therefore in the light of hard cold facts, and we naval men must fight facing facts and not hypothetical conditions, let us ask ourselves another question: (5) "On or about April 6, 1917, if the high seas fleet had forced itself past the British grand fleet, would the United States fleet, just as it stood on that date under the conditions stated in question (2), would it have been prepared to meet the German high seas fleet?" The answer must be emphatically "Yes," and that was the opinion of every naval man I know at that time.

Let us once more facing the actual conditions ask another question: (6) "Suppose that on April 6, 1917, our entire naval forces had been ready and mobilized and had sailed on that date for Europe, would we then have been prepared to wage war under the actual

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conditions existing at that date?" This requires still another estimate of our forces that have sufficient capacity to cross the Atlantic.

Estimate of United States forces under condition (6):

14 dreadnoughts.	*3 converted yachts.
0 battle cruisers.	7 tenders.
9 armored cruisers.	About 12 tugs and special service ships (repair ships, etc.).
19 battleships.	22 fuel ships.
0 scouts.	5 supply ships.
4 cruisers, first class.	4 transports.
3 cruisers, second class.	*10 gunboats.
15 cruisers, third class.	Perhaps 15 submarines (very doubtful).
*51 destroyers (750 tons and greater).	*About 4 coast guard ships.
*16 coast torpedo vessels (420 tons).	

This would represent 100 per cent of efficiency if everything worked like clockwork. Of all these ships the only ones which can be called real submarine fighters are the 51 destroyers of 750 tons. The 16 coast torpedo vessels are of very doubtful value, old and not good sea-keeping craft of small radius of action; the 3 converted yachts, the 10 gunboats, and the 4 coast guard ships are not fighters, but might be useful for escort and patrol. The other types, except the cruisers for convoy, are not wanted on the other side. Therefore absolutely disregarding our own needs, our own patrol and our own fleet needs, are we still prepared to wage efficient war against the submarines, if every one of the craft enumerated, valuable for antisubmarine work April 6, 1917, sail at once. The total at utmost is 99, counting submarines. Let us make a comparison of this effort with the antisubmarine effort the Allies were making, as nearly as I can estimate:

Total British and French antisubmarine forces around British Isles and in Atlantic	967
French, British, and Italian forces in Mediterranean	736
Total	1,708

In other words, our total effort in that line, if we could have executed it instantly, could not have exceeded a ratio of 1 to 17, provided we neglected everything else and everything worked like clockwork, or between the 5 and 6 per cent stated by Admiral Sims (my conclusions being worked out independently). Therefore, if we could have instantly applied our forces, with its good, indifferent, and its bad antisubmarine factors in it, to the aid of the Allies during the month of April, and taken to ourselves our proportionate share of the April losses in merchant tonnage, what would have been our share? It ought to be in proportion to the relative force we might have applied; that is, we might have had a maximum 1 to 17, or 5 per cent interest in it. The April sinkings were by long odds the greatest, amounting to 846,863 tons for that month as against 558,712 tons average, if we take the six very worst months, including April, and so on. So on the 5 per cent proportion of our interest of the worst month, April, we had to our discredit a maximum of 42,343 tons of shipping, or a total of 254,058 tons for the next six months, provided we had not done a thing, and the submarine had been able to sink his 846,000 tons, month by month, which, of course, we know he did not do. On the average six months' loss, 558,212 tons basis, our monthly discredit share is 27,910 tons, and our total six months' discredit share 167,460 tons. Two things stand out now with some emphasis, (*a*) the statement that we are responsible for two and one-half million

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tons shipping loss is not so, looking at it in the light of cold figures: (*b*) the somewhat novel point of view that we would not have been prepared for this war had we been prepared for war as under assumption (6).

Let us make another assumption (7): Suppose the Navy Department had so advanced its program of preparedness that on April 6, 1915, its naval force consisted of all the craft available for use April 6, 1917, plus all of the five year program of 1915 additional, every ship thoroughly manned and fit to sail immediately on April 6, 1917, would we then have been adequately prepared to enter this war as it existed April 6, 1917?

Statement of United States forces April 6, 1917 under assumption (7):

24 dreadnoughts.
6 battle cruisers.
9 armoured cruisers.
10 scouts.
*101 destroyers.
9 fleet submarines.
4 cruisers, first class.
3 cruisers, second class.
15 cruisers, third class.
*16 coast torpedo vessels.
*3 converted yachts.
Over 40 fuel ships, transports, supply ships.
About 10 gunboats.
*About 4 coast guard ships.
*Perhaps 15 smaller submarines (doubtful value).

To have maintained this fleet for two years including personnel alone, including first cost, would at the very lowest figure come to over five hundred and thirty millions. Would we still have been adequately prepared?

Our actual effective antisubmarine increase would have been in 50 destroyers approximately, making our total effective antisubmarine force approximately 150 under assumption (7) as against about 100 under assumption (6). The ratio to allied antisubmarine effort would now be 150:1700 or about as 1:11. Whereas the total pool to that date consisted of five nations, United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, or 1:5. Our antisubmarine effort was 1:11 or about one-half of what as a nation we ought to contribute on a 50-50 basis for all, even taking into consideration our wealth, the expenditure of over five hundred and thirty millions and our evident eagerness for preparedness on a great scale. What would have been our gain? (*a*) The ability to whip Germany alone on any sea; (*b*) the trained personnel we would have. What would be our loss. (*c*) Still unprepared to enter this war as it opened up April 6, 1917; (*d*) the expenditure of at least five hundred and thirty millions, which represents approximately 260 destroyers. The answer to assumption (7) would have to be, "No; still not prepared for this war." A vital question now is, this, (8) To what extent did the shortage of personnel, did the lack of preparedness in personnel, affect our efforts in this war? This is the guage by which efficiency or inefficiency is measured in this respect, and it is the last test.

To answer this a résumé of our war operations is necessary.

WAR OPERATIONS.

(1) Fleet action or operations: No action probable; does not operate in face of the enemy.
(2) Raiding: Yes, probable; to be met by cruisers, escort ships.
(3) Antisubmarine tactics, escort: Yes, very important; to be met by destroyers, yachts, gunboats and all antisubmarine craft.

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(4) Transportation of troops: Yes, necessary; to be met by manning troop transports with naval crews.
(5) Supplying troops: Yes, necessary; to be met by manning merchant supply-ships with naval crews.
(6) District or coast defense: None probable except for mine sweeping.
(7) Armed guard: Yes, necessary; for ships operating in war zone and not fully manned by naval crews.
(9) Patrol: Not necessary; in vogue at time we entered war; advised by British in April, 1917; abandoned by them when convoy was adopted; abandoned by us the instant its uselessness was seen.
(10) Submarine efforts: A limited necessity; to be met by manning submarines.
(11) Submarine hunting by sound: Very doubtful value; met by manning sub-chasers.
(12) Aircraft efforts: Yes, valuable; to be met by organizing Air Service.
(13) Offensive mining northern barrage: Yes, important; to be met by manning mine craft.
(14) Great naval guns on western front: Of value; met by organizing great gun forces.
(15) Shore bases and other shore activities: Important; met by manning shore bases.
(16) Create personnel: Most important; met by enlisting and training.

This represents probably a résumé of our operations. Of these, the operations which stand out in importance at once April 6, 1917, and must be attended to are (2), (3), (7), (9), and above all (16). Hence every effort as it came up had to make way for those mentioned above, and especially for (16). Our reserve lay in (1). (3) particularly had to be attended to at once, and we were particularly fortunate and prepared in having our gunboats, most small cruisers and most destroyers, manned. They were, therefore, except for certain material repairs which constantly occur, ready for operating at once. (7) was the next immediate necessity and that was handled by adjustments among our regular personnel. (4) and (5) came along simultaneously, but later, because the troops were not ready at once in appreciable numbers, consequently time was at hand for manning troop and supply ships. (15) could be handled with a nucleus and was used in conjunction with (16), so that (1) and (15) became great centers for developing (16). (2) had to be considered immediately, and as most of the larger cruisers were not adequately manned this had to be undertaken at once. This was the work of the Bureau of Navigation, and it was accomplished.

I was in charge of operations, personally in touch with them all from the date I became aid, and I can not recall now where our operations were held up for lack of personnel. We operated, and that is the final test. Do not get the impression that I, as a naval man, and always looking for the 100 per cent efficiency mark in our naval operations, subscribe to a policy of insufficient personnel. I do not believe it is the proper policy to have an inadequate personnel equipment. All I say is that the responsible heads had sized up the situation, or, say, the situation so adjusted itself that our Navy was equal to meeting its operating obligations, great as they were, with a degree of efficiency which placed it in the satisfactory class so far as accomplishment was concerned.

Let us again consider this problem from still another angle. (9) "If now, in spite of our great preparations as enumerated in (7) we are still not prepared to enter this war, what must we do to make us prepared for this particular war?" A recapitulation of (7) shows us that building a fleet sufficient to wipe Germany off the seas at an expenditure of half a billion dollars, will not do it.

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What else can the Navy do to aid? Is there anything? Yes: (a) More destroyers could have been built earlier. We could have laid down a program in 1915 of 200, similar to that asked for in July, 1917. Was any man wise enough to see it, or, seeing it, could our Government have started such a program without committing an overt act; for, unlike a program for a balanced fleet, under the conditions then existing, the building of 200 destroyers could be directed at but one object—a counter to the submarines, Germany's sole operating sea force.

However, for the sake of argument, let us admit the point and say it could be justified. What other acts could the Navy do? (b) We could have started taking over and manning troop and supply ships. This would have been an overt act. But this would have availed the Navy no more than its great fleet of assumption (7) availed it, unless two other acts, entirely outside of naval jurisdiction, had happened at the same time. (c) One was the mobilization of our civil industries on a war basis and (d) the other was the mobilization of our man power on a military basis. Gentlemen, these last two acts are overt acts of war and were so regarded by at least one nation, Germany. The contributing effort of the Navy toward its greates military achievement in this war—the safe transport of troops—could not be accomplished, however, without the actual accomplishment by other forces than the Navy of (c) and (d). Yet, on lesser ground than these, the whole question of our naval preparedness seems to be revolving. Had it been possible even for us to have concealed our gigantic efforts from Germany, would it have been worthy the dignity of a great nation to have deviated one hair's breadth from that straight path of neutrality, on which we had staked our national word of honor until the day when, exasperated beyond endurance, the Nation, through its representative heads, declared war?

Was the Navy on April 6, 1917, prepared for war—that is, as prepared as human effort working under a democratic form of governmant could make us fit? That is what our country wants to know, and that, to my mind, is what you gentlemen have a right to know.

The above analysis is relative to our fighting forces, their strength and disposition; but is that all? No; there are certain basic principles upon which sound organization and administration must rest. The Navy exists for a purpose. It is the will of our country that its Navy should be the first barrier which the enemy must smash before it reaches our shores. It is, further, the right arm of this united people in maintaining right and justice. Therefore, this Navy must be sound from top to toe. But no organization is sound unless you give the power where it rightly belongs and fix the responsibility for its proper administration. The law on the subject of the organization of the Navy Department is as follows:

NAVY REGULATIONS.

SECTION 1.—*Organization.*

101. There shall be at the seat of government an executive department, to be known as the Department of the Navy, and a Secretary of the Navy, who shall be the head thereof. (Sec. 415, R. S.)

102. (1) An Assistant Secretary of the Navy is authorized by law, who shall perform such duties as may be prescribed by the Secretary of the Navy or required by

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law. (Acts of July 11, 1890, and Mar. 3, 1891.) All orders issued by the Assistant Secretary in conducting the duties assigned him shall be considered as emnanting from the Secretary and shall have full force and effect as such.

(2) In case of the absence of the Secretary of the Navy his duties shall be performed by the Assistant Secretary of the Navy. (Sec. 177, R. S.)

103. (1) There shall be a Chief of Naval Operations, who shall be an officer on the active list of the Navy appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, from among the officers of the line of the Navy, not below the grade of captain, for a period of four years, who shall, under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy, be charged with the operations of the fleet and with the preparation and readiness of plans for its use in war. (Act. Mar. 3, 1915.)

(2) Hereafter the Chief of Naval Operations, while so serving as such Chief of Naval Operations, shall have the rank and title of admiral, to take rank next after the Admiral of the Navy, and shall, while serving as Chief of Naval Operations, receive the pay of $10,000 per annum and no allowances. All orders issued by the Chief of Naval Operations in performing the duties assigned him shall be performed under the authority of the Secretary of the Navy, and his orders shall be considered as emanting from the Secretary, and shall have full force and effect as such. To assist the Chief of Naval Operations in performing the duties of his office there shall be assigned for this exclusive duty not less than 15 officers of and above the rank of lieutenant commander of the Navy or major of the Marine Corps: *Provided*, That if an officer of the grade of captain be appointed Chief of Naval Operations he shall have the rank and title of admiral, as above provided, while holding that position: *Provided further*, That should an officer while serving as Chief of Naval Operations, be retired from active service he shall be retired with the lineal rank and the retired pay to which he would be entitled had he not been serving as Chief of Naval Operations. (Act Aug. 29, 1916.)

(3) During the temporary absence of the Secretary and the Assistant Secretary of the Navy the Chief of Naval Operations shall be next in succession to act as Secretary of the Navy. (Act. Mar. 3, 1915.)

104. (1) The business of the Department of the Navy shall be distributed in such manner as the Secretary of the Navy shall judge to be expedient and proper among the following bureaus:

First, a Bureau of Yards and Docks.
Second, a Bureau of Equipment.
Third, a Bureau of Navigation.
Fourth, a Bureau of Ordnance.
Fifth, a Bureau of Construction and Repair.
Sixth, a Bureau of Steam Engineering.
Seventh, a Bureau of Supplies and Accounts.
Eighth, a Bureau of Medicine and Surgery. (Sec. 419, R. S.)

(2) The several bureaus shall retain the charge and custody of the books of records and accounts pertaining to their respective duties, and all of the duties of the bureaus shall be performed under the authority of the Secretary of the Navy, and their orders shall be considered as emanating from him and shall have full force and effect as such. (Sec. 420, R. S.)

(3) The Judge Advocate General of the Navy shall perform such duties as may lawfully be required. (Act June 8, 1880.)

You have by law appointed a head, but have not definitely placed responsibility. As the head of an organization, there is the perfectly natural inclination to perform such acts as in his judgment he deems wise, but upon these acts depends the entire present and future of our Naval Establishment, its development, maintenance, and operation. To efficiently effect this requires the most intimate knowledge of the Navy and the power to coordinate its many activities. As its development, maintenance, and operation is conducted, so fares the fate of the country's first line of defense.

To administer the duties of chief executive of this department there is called a civilian. Gentlemen, please do not misunderstand me. Under no circumstances should the supervisory head be other than a civilian, who in this capacity is best able to coordinate the Navy's activities with Congress, and who in his person is the strongest connecting link between us and the people. He comes to the office

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as an individual, a splendid man, able, efficient, highly trained in some subject, but not technically trained in the activities of the Navy nor a student of the art of war. This system functions after a fashion in peace, but it does not function when preparation for war becomes necessary nor does it function in war. It is necessary that at the outbreak of hostilities the military head should assume the direction of and responsibility for the conduct of military operations, for whose preparation he has had, by law, no direct control nor authority to coordinate in peace. Such is the system we work under to-day and did at the outbreak of war. Thanks to the voluntary and hearty cooperation of every distinct departmental organization, including the Secretary, the Navy was able to pull itself together and to work exceedingly well in war.

If any lack of preparation existed within the naval service prior to our entry into the war, if any lack of harmony existed then or exists now within our Navy, it can be laid more justly to the system of organization the department labors under than upon the shoulders of any individual.

That completes my statement.

The CHAIRMAN. The subcommittee will adjourn until to-morrow morning at 11 o'clock.

(Thereupon, at 1.25 o'clock p. m., the subcommittee adjourned until to-morrow, Thursday, April 22, 1920, at 11 o'clock a. m.)

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NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

THURSDAY, APRIL 22, 1920.

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NAVAL AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 11.30 o'clock a. m. in room 235, Senate Office Building, Senator Frederick Hale presiding.

Present: Senators Hale (chairman), Ball, Keyes, Pittman, and Trammell.

TESTIMONY OF CAPT. W. V. PRATT—Resumed.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Capt. Pratt, the committee looks on you as a source from which much valuable information can be drawn, so that we shall probably ask you quite a number of questions.

Capt. PRATT. Aye, aye, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What were your duties at the outbreak of the war, April 6?

Capt. PRATT. I was in the Office of Operations, in a subordinate capacity, as one of the members of the planning section, having been ordered exclusively to duty in operations from the Army War College. Previous to that duty I had had additional duty in the Office of Operations, beginning about the 1st of February, 1917.

The CHAIRMAN. Until April 6?

Capt. PRATT. Until April 6, when I went on duty in operations exclusively.

The CHAIRMAN. What was your duty from the 1st of February until the 1st of April in the Office of Operations?

Capt. PRATT. In the plans section, doing the same work that I was doing exclusively from April 6 until June 25.

The CHAIRMAN. And your work was exclusively that of working in the plans section?

Capt. PRATT. Absolutely.

The CHAIRMAN. When were you definitely assigned to duty as assistant to the Chief of Operations?

Capt. PRATT. I was assigned duty as aide for operations or assistant for operations—I do not know exactly what the legal expression is—on June 25. The office of Assistant Chief of Naval Operations had not been created—has not been created by law. I was appointed some time later, by an order from the Secretary, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations. I practically assumed that duty when Acting Chief of Naval Operations immediately upon Admiral Benson's first trip to Europe, in the fall of 1917. The aide for operations was recognized as the policy aide, and he was the officer who automatically succeeded to the chief's functions whenever the chief was absent.

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The CHAIRMAN. Then you were in the planning section from February 1 to April 6?

Capt. PRATT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And from April 6 to June 25——

Capt. PRATT. I was still in the planning section.

The CHAIRMAN. You were still in the planning section?

Capt. PRATT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. No change in your duties was made from February 6 until April 6?

Capt. PRATT. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. January 25 you were made——

Capt. PRATT. Aide or assistant.

The CHAIRMAN. Aide or assistant in Operations?

Capt. PRATT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. This is all 1917, of course?

Capt. PRATT. 1917; all these dates.

The CHAIRMAN. Did Admiral Sims make request for your services on his staff?

Capt. PRATT. Yes; and it was a very sore point with me that I could not go.

The CHAIRMAN. What reason was given for not sending you abroad?

Capt. PRATT. Well, I was not given any very definite reason, except that I supposed that I was wanted for duty there in the office of operations, and they were employing me there to full capacity in the position I was working at.

The CHAIRMAN. When you entered the planning section of the office of operations, what general plan for naval warfare existed in the department?

Capt. PRATT. That I can not tell you, sir. I knew that there was a general plan in the General Board. From my studies of the general situation, made entirely independently, I had some idea of the situation. I had thought of it a great deal, studied it, and then had come to the conclusion that Germany would not make the initial break until 1920, unless she were forced to do it by economic conditions.

I did not see the General Board's plan because it was a very general one. I realized, however, that whatever plans and conditions Operations would be forced to adopt would have to be made largely upon the various situations as they arose. A study of the original base plan would not have availed me so much as it would probably the bureau chiefs, because the general plan such as the General Board would prepare is very basic in character. It goes into those preparations which require money and material, and must be prepared some time ahead.

The conditions which actually confronted us in the early part of February were quite different from those which we would have worked under in working under the basic plan, because it is my impression—I do not know—that that basic plan was conceived with the idea that we might be forced to compete with Germany alone. We called it "black." That is the technical name we speak of.

The CHAIRMAN. I think some of the witnesses have testified that the idea of a basic plan was to have a general plan which from time to time was added to, and which was always viewed as the basic plan of the department.

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Capt. PRATT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, Capt. Pratt, you say you do not know—you did not see any such plan when you went into the department. Did you at any subsequent time run across, in the course of your duty, any such plan; that is, the basic plan that the General Board developed up to date?

Capt. PRATT. Well, no; I do not think I needed it——

The CHAIRMAN. I know; but I want an answer to my question.

Capt. PRATT. No, sir; I did not. But I will just explain a little further. A base plan is not an operating plan.

Except for the first projected movement there is quite a line of demarcation drawn, or should be drawn, between this basic plan and the operating plan. The base plan makes a strategic review of the situation as they see it at the day the plan is laid down, and the additions that are placed into this plan are the additions which should be placed as the ideas change.

The CHAIRMAN. You have explained that very clearly in your testimony heretofore.

Capt. PRATT. Might I also put it in here, in order that I might not make any confusing answer. I want to state the thing as clearly as possible, if you do not object, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Capt. PRATT. So that any base plan which would contemplate projecting operations beyond the first movement, that basic plan must be absolutely sound in its strategic conception. If it is not, everything else goes wrong, and the leaders in the department and the leaders in the field are committed to a false strategy which no amount of brilliant tactics will ever overcome. That is, to my mind, my idea of the fault with the Germans' operations entirely from base.

Therefore the work I had to do was to take into consideration the situation as it existed, the German submarine menace, which broke upon us very suddenly, and therefore it consisted in a series of moves to meet that situation, a series of plan moves, we will say.

The CHAIRMAN. Were there any definite plans in existence when you went into the office of operations drawn up to meet the kind of warfare in which the Navy might be engaged?

Capt. PRATT. The one that I told you of, which was that one of February 10.

The CHAIRMAN. Which was afterwards lost?

Capt. PRATT. Which was afterwards lost; and I did not see it.

The CHAIRMAN. That was not a general basic plan, then?

Capt. PRATT. No.

The CHAIRMAN. It was an operational plan, was it?

Capt. PRATT. No; it was intended to modify the original base plan of the General Board to meet the situation that had arisen. But let me explain just a little bit further about that. Sometimes men who work a great deal on these particular subjects are like a little band of brothers, united together in their thoughts and in their studies, so that in a way they speak a common language. We were very fortunate in having in the plans section at that time Capt. Chase, who although he was an administrator and was the aid for operations, really was our guiding and directing head; and associated with him and with me were Capt. Schofield and Capt. Scott. I was the

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third man. We had all been students of the Naval War College, as was Admiral Sims also; and so in talking things over we had rather a definite idea of what we thought should be done.

The CHAIRMAN. You say, then, that the plan of February 10 is the only one you recollect which was drawn up to meet the plan of warfare in which the Navy might be engaged, and that that was lost? Now, did you make any effort to prepare plans for that purpose?

Capt. PRATT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I think your testimony shows that you did.

Capt. PRATT. Yes, sir; I think most of those that I submitted I wrote myself.

The CHAIRMAN. Those were definite plans?

Capt. PRATT. It is very difficult, sir, to quite draw the line where policy melts into plan and where plan passes from its general aspect into definite action. Those plans that I outlined looked behind, looked at the time we were in, and tried to look ahead; and a great many of them passed from the atmosphere of policy into definite action.

The CHAIRMAN. But how did they so pass?

Capt. PRATT. They passed because I afterward became the operator.

The CHAIRMAN. Until you became the operator did they so pass?

Capt. PRATT. I think a great many of them did. Every one of these that I made out I laid on Capt. Chase's desk, and he took them home with him and studied them, and we used to talk over the subject a great deal, and while of course, as the executive, he knows exactly what he did and I do not——

The CHAIRMAN. Capt. Chase was aide or assistant for operations?

Capt. PRATT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. The position you afterwards filled?

Capt. PRATT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Then your plans were more or less in the nature of suggestions and memoranda for him?

Capt. PRATT. That is exactly what they were intended to be.

The CHAIRMAN. And they did not have to be specifically approved by the Secretary of the Navy?

Capt. PRATT. No—yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Not as coming from you but as coming from Capt. Chase?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, yes; my suggestions would not have weight with him at that time. Anything from me would have to pass through my more immediate head, Capt. Chase. I did not see the Secretary at that stage of my existence.

The CHAIRMAN. And you have no knowledge that they were used officially as the plans of the department, officially approved by the Secretary in any case?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, no sir. We can only judge of that by the events, and the data which I have submitted. Those can only be passed upon in the light of the cold facts which I have presented, dates of sailing of ships, and so on.

The CHAIRMAN. Others were also making suggestions at the same time.

Capt. PRATT. Yes; Capt. Schofield——

The CHAIRMAN. Others in the planning section?

Capt. PRATT. Yes; Capt. Schofield and Capt. Scott.

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The CHAIRMAN. But you do not know of any general plan that was adopted officially prior to the declaration of war or immediately thereafter?

Capt. PRATT. I am afraid, sir, that a general plan such as I understand you to mean would not work other than to fit us and to project the first movement. I found frequently—I found once—that leaving the department for two days and not being in touch with movements that happened during that time, I lost touch.

A general plan such as I think you mean would soon have been so far behind in the race that it would never have caught up.

The CHAIRMAN. Then do you know of any special plans that were prepared and put into operation at that date, officially approved.

Capt. PRATT. Why, the sending of ships is the actual result of a special plan.

The CHAIRMAN. But not a previously prepared, written out plan that was understood to be a policy of the Navy Department.

Capt. PRATT. That as I told you, sir, I do not know about.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know about whether Capt. Chase approved of all of your suggestions?

Capt. PRATT. No, sir; I do not.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know what became of them, except as they were put into operation by you when you succeeded Capt. Chase?

Capt. PRATT. I do not. He died, and I was not in touch with his papers to that extent. I do know definitely of two plans that he told me to go ahead on, and push through. One of them was that plan which I told you had been worked out in great detail, the taking of guns off our cruisers and old battleships to arm merchant ships. I took that plan along with me and executed it.

Also there was a plan for getting the German ships into our service and manned.

The CHAIRMAN. You were given the execution of those two plans yourself?

Capt. PRATT. I executed those plans myself.

The CHAIRMAN. Prior to your appointment as head of the Bureau of Operations?

Capt. PRATT. Yes; and I also submitted that plan which I submitted here in full, the plan of the board of antisubmarine devices, in which we went a trifle beyond our province and recommended 200 destroyers; I was the head of that. I do know about that.

The CHAIRMAN. The time between April 6 and June 25, when you became aid or assistant for Operations, do you know what procedure was followed in handling dispatches from Admiral Sims?

Capt. PRATT. Yes; I know that. The method was somewhat as follows: It was very poor. The communication between us and any officers we might have abroad followed a system which had been in vogue for a long time. It was this: It was more of a diplomatic way of doing things than what I should consider a practical way. Admiral Sims's cables came to the Office of Naval Intelligence. They were translated there—decoded—sent to the Office of Operations and there the reply was written out. This reply was then sent to the Office of Naval Intelligence, there coded, and if our codes, which at that time were not good, were not adequate, the reply was put into the P or Q code, which were British codes, and sent through the British officials,

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from the embassy here to the foreign office, and there given to Admiral Sims—a very roundabout way. That was our system of communication as it existed when we went into the war. It was not efficient, and it was changed.

The CHAIRMAN. Were these dispatches from Admiral Sims circulated through all the bureaus and divisions concerned?

Capt. PRATT. That I can not say, sir. I managed to get hold of some of them, and I endeavored, whenever they were not given to me, to get in touch with every one of those cables that I could. I have since found—since we have reorganized the office—that some of those cables that Admiral Sims sent are missing. Previous to the time when we changed the system there seemed to be a lack of definite filing system, or something of that sort, so that I have been unable to get the consecutive numbers down to the A, B, C, the beginning of things, and to get a complete record.

The CHAIRMAN. When did you change the system?

Capt. PRATT. That date is a pretty hard thing to fix, but the idea of that really is due to Commander Ingersoll and Commander Carter. Very shortly after I came in they showed me the necessity of a more business-like way of doing things.

The CHAIRMAN. That is, after you came in as aide?

Capt. PRATT. And I asquiesced very readily, and the system was changed and developed. The exact date I can not say.

Senator BALL. Was it gradually put in?

Capt. PRATT. Gradually, as we could get the men. You can not disrupt an existing system at once; or, it is difficult to do it. But we established it, and it grew and expanded.

The CHAIRMAN. These dispatches were shown to you personally in all cases?

Capt. PRATT. I could not say whether I saw them in all cases not, but I saw a great many of them.

The CHAIRMAN. To assist you in your work of planning?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, yes; oh, yes. I may say I was in touch with the situation, and I had ways of getting in touch which were outside of official channels.

The CHAIRMAN. But officially your duties were purely planning, until June 25?

Capt. PRATT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And in executing the plans also, in certain cases?

Capt. PRATT. Only those which were definitely given me to carry out; and, as I have said, I know three which I did carry out.

The CHAIRMAN. So that your duties were not exclusively planning, but also the carrying out of the plans?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, yes; so far as I would be assigned to that duty by Capt. Chase.

The CHAIRMAN. I asked you about that. I believe in the original plan, the planning division was provided for and the duties of those who were in that planning section were purely to draw plans?

Capt. PRATT. Yes, sir; and I think everybody was in agreement on that, in theory. Practically, however, we were very short of men, so much so that it was almost impossible—in fact, I think it was impossible—during the war, to set aside anybody of men whose functions or duty it was to deliberate alone. The only body that I know of that preserved that capacity was the General Board.

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The CHAIRMAN. Purely the capacity of planning?

Capt. PRATT. Yes; of planning.

The CHAIRMAN. And their plans were lost. Do you know whether any special effort was made to take prompt and favorable action on these recommendations of Admiral Sims?

Capt. PRATT. I do not know what luck we might have. I tried personally very frequently, and would go with these cables, acting myself as a sort of nuisance, possibly, on the subject, to get this done. I have no doubt that we were all doing this. I think we were thoroughly impressed with the necessity of doing it; but not being the actual executive, I should hate to make a flat-footed statement, and say that I know that every one of these was carried out as strictly as a machine would operate.

The CHAIRMAN. But you do not recall any instances where you personally were in favor of holding up any of these recommendations of Admiral Sims?

Capt. PRATT. In favor of holding up? No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. On the contrary, in every instance you were in favor, personally, of going ahead and following them out?

Capt. PRATT. I did not see anything to it except that the war was over there.

The CHAIRMAN. After you became aide for naval operations, you made a change in the method of handling Admiral Sims's dispatches?

Capt. PRATT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What was that change, substantially?

Capt. PRATT. The change may be spoken of as a double change. To my mind, the two most important things to successfully operate are, first the collection of information and its proper reception and distribution, which comes under the part you are speaking of now; but in order to be able to collect and distribute properly, the man who does the operating must constantly have before him either information tabulated, or graphically expressed, and must also have the means at his right hand whereby he can translate the information instantly. So there was taken over from the office of Naval Intelligence that portion of its information which they had previously held in their files and which I called operating information. It was immediately taken over into the office of operations, and instead of being worked on the card-index system it was projected graphically into a visual system. Having this visual system before you, you then must be in a position to instantly project it out through your cables, in your communication system. So that, when we established the communication system, by taking over the communications from intelligence, we were likewise at the same time forced to develop the information system, let us say, and get that operating system right where we were in touch with it. So that is why I say it was a dual change. It would not have been complete by handling the cables alone, if you did not have immediate access to the information about which those cables referred.

The CHAIRMAN. Then, before you became aide or assistant for operations, these cables and messages came from Admiral Sims to the Chief of Operations, did they not?

Capt. PRATT. Not directly to him.

The CHAIRMAN. Were they not addressed to him, or to the Secretary?

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Capt. PRATT. Oh, they might be; but they would not go that way. I told you the system of communicating was a roundabout one. They might be addressed to the chief, but they came through what we called our more or less attaché system. They came by the foreign office. That is the way our foreign cables were handled, I think. Then, after being decoded, they came into Naval Operations and to the Secretary of the Navy by that rather roundabout way.

The CHAIRMAN. But no action could be taken on them in any case until they came to the Chief of Operations and the Secretary of the Navy?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, no, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And I assume, as far as you practically could work in that roundabout way, they came as soon as possible to their notice?

Capt. PRATT. Yes; I think that is probably true.

The CHAIRMAN. At that period was any delay that you know of in answering those messages from Admiral Sims?

Capt. PRATT. I do not know definitely. In general, I would say that there would be bound to be delay in a cumbersome system.

The CHAIRMAN. What would be the system of answering them?

Capt. PRATT. That dispatch—say a dispatch from Admiral Sims—after having gone to Naval Intelligence and been translated, would come to Capt. Chase, I think. He would take it in to Admiral Benson. They would discuss it. Admiral Benson would come to whatever conclusion he chose to arrive at, and he would discuss it with the Secretary. The dispatch, whatever its nature might be, would be drawn up. It would be given to Capt. Chase, who would send it to Intelligence, and then it would go to Admiral Sims.

The CHAIRMAN. So that it would go back immediately after Admiral Benson gave it to Capt. Chase, or at least as immediately as would be possible under that system?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, I think so; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. So that if there were any delay more than the reasonable delay that would occur under that system, it would be on account of the action taken by Admiral Benson and the Secretary of the Navy?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, yes, sir; if you will also add to that any reasonable delay which might be due to discussion of the subject.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, yes; that would all be part of it. But I mean, it would be in their handling of the matter?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. After you went in, you provided for a shorter way of getting the cables and messages to Admiral Benson, and a shorter way of returning them after they had taken action, did you not?

Capt. PRATT. The shorter way lay in the communication system. I handled dispatches this way: Every morning before we opened business hours I had all the dispatches collected in the various books and laid out before me in the communication office. I went over each one of those personally, initialing them, indicating the line of action I wished taken, and then had them distributed immediately to the heads of the different business organizations we had there for their work.

Then the dispatches concerning policy and movements of ships I made notes on as to the action I advised, whether we could do it or

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not: and all important ones I immediately took in myself to Admiral Benson, or, in his absence, to the Secretary of the Navy, advising immediate action or not, whatever the case might be. Now, all the work I did was almost entirely done through dispatches in order to get quick action.

The CHAIRMAN. Before June 25 do you recall any specific delays in answering the dispatches of Admiral Sims—the cables or messages of Admiral Sims?

Capt. PRATT. I would not be in a position to remember right now. There might be and there might not be. I should hesitate to say right at present, as I recollect to-day.

The CHAIRMAN. If I should later call your attention to some specific cases, you could identify them?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. After June 25th do you recall any specific instances of delays?

Capt. PRATT. I recall specific instances of delay and certain instances of disagreement. I know one. For instance, take the dispatch of the four battleships abroad. I think I prepared a favorable reply immediately, recommending that they be sent. That reply was not immediately sent, because the matter was under advisement between Admiral Benson and the Secretary of the Navy, but later——

The CHAIRMAN. Was any reply sent?

Capt. PRATT. Yes, sir; a reply was sent later, and it was not favorable.

The CHAIRMAN. But at that time no reply of any sort was sent to the recommendation?

Capt. PRATT. I think not.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you take up with the Secretary of the Navy personally any of these recommendations of Admiral Sims?

Capt. PRATT. Never, in the beginning.

The CHAIRMAN. Never prior to June 25?

Capt. PRATT. No; and after that I do not recollect of having personal dealings with the Secretary until Admiral Benson went abroad, in the fall. Those matters would naturally be conducted between Admiral Benson and the Secretary. There may have been cases, but I do not recall them. After the Admiral went abroad I did. I had occasion many times to take these dispatches into the Secretary personally. But before that, if I recollect correctly, my dealings were entirely with Admiral Benson, and he dealt with the Secretary.

The CHAIRMAN. And you never personally dealt with the Secretary of the Navy before you were made acting chief of Operations in the absence of Admiral Benson on his trip abroad.

Capt. PRATT. I can not remember when I ever did. I may have but I do not recollect it now.

The CHAIRMAN. You stated, I think, in your testimony that while you were acting chief of Operations there was no delay on the part of the Secretary in approving any plans.

Capt. PRATT. I know that.

The CHAIRMAN. Was there at any time, to your knowledge, any such delay?

Capt. PRATT. Why, that, sir, I think could better be answered by Admiral Benson himself.

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The CHAIRMAN. I am talking about as far as you were concerned. I am asking as far as you were concerned.

Capt. PRATT. You mean a delay in my doing my part of the job?

The CHAIRMAN. No; delay on the Secretary's part in not hurrying matters along.

Capt. PRATT. I am not exactly qualified to speak about that, I think.

The CHAIRMAN. There were none, then, that came under your personal observation? I ask you this because a number of witnesses have testified that they found it very difficult to get the Secretary to take action on important matters that were placed before him.

Senator PITTMAN. Mr. Chairman; I protest against this character of statement on your part. I do not think it is necessary to state that, that there are a number of witnesses that protested against the difficulty of getting action from the Secretary, because that is a conclusion which I positively deny, and which there may be considerable debate on. You have a habit of doing that, and you will pardon me for calling attention to it, but when it appears in the record in that way and goes undenied, it appears as an admission that such testimony does exist; which I deny to be the fact.

The CHAIRMAN. It is very easy to determine from the testimony. All I said was that it is contained in the testimony.

Senator PITTMAN. If the witness does not question the fact that there is that in the testimony, it goes as an admission that it is there.

The CHAIRMAN. I think the testimony bears that out.

Senator PITTMAN. I differ with you on that question; and that is entirely a matter of conclusion.

Capt. PRATT. What is the question that you want me to answer?

The CHAIRMAN. With regard to that particular point; I have asked you whether any specific instances came to your attention of a lack of promptness on the part of the Secretary in dealing with matters of importance that came before him.

Capt. PRATT. I do not know what difficulties, if any, Admiral Benson may have had. I am only qualified to speak of my dealing with the Secretary directly. I had heard all sorts of rumors, but when I came definitely to deal with him on certain specific plans I got an immediate decision. I can tell you one case, specifically. This is while I was acting Chief of Naval Operations. There were two cases in fact. Admiral Benson was abroad, and he sent a cable over recommending that the battleships be sent over. I handled it directly with the Secretary, and he approved it right off, and directed that Admiral Mayo be sent up in conference, in order to settle the details. I got a decision right off.

Another case was the case of the northern mine barrage. Capt. Belknap, who had worked the organization of the forces up very definitely, had reached a conclusion where it was necessary to have a final decision in the matter before we could proceed to carrying it into operation, because that meant projecting this body of ships and men abroad into European waters, and naturally, being a joint agreement, we had to get the Admiralty's approval to it. I went in with Capt. Belknap about 6 o'clock one evening, Admiral Benson being

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then abroad, and laid the question before him, and he approved it right off.

The CHAIRMAN. I will put in the record here some testimony that was given by Admiral Palmer to substantiate what I said a few minutes ago.

Senator PITTMAN. I will state that I have no objection to that; I think it is perfectly proper in laying the foundation for such a question as you asked, to call attention to any evidence of that character by any particular witness, because that is a fact; but the general statement that a great number of witnesses have testified to a certain fact, I think, is hardly the correct way of putting it.

The CHAIRMAN. I did not say "a great number of witnesses." I said some of the witnesses had so testified.

Senator PITTMAN. I think you said a number of witnesses.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; a number of witnesses.

Senator PITTMAN. The only one you are putting in the record now is Admiral Palmer.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, no; I am also going to put in Capt. Laning.

Senator PITTMAN. There is no objection to calling attention to any testimony that you want the witness to comment on so long as it is specified. I only objected to your making a statement which possibly was a conclusion and not a statement of fact.

The CHAIRMAN. Capt. Palmer's statement appears on page 1084 of the typewritten record. It was in regard to the recruiting of men for the Navy. Here is what he said [reading]:

The chief of naval operations frequently said, "It is probable you will have to man so many ships of this kind, and you had better get the men for them." The important thing for me to know was when those men would be required; and in each case operations replied, "We want them as soon as we can get them. We would like to have them now, or within a few weeks." Of course, I knew we could not recruit men and train them and get barracks for them in a few weeks. So that after one or two orders of that kind in regard to things that operations could not have foreseen the need of, I decided that it was up to me to be prepared for any operation they might have, and to take the responsibility of going ahead and working this organization into a production plant, keeping it up to peak load all the time, so that I would be prepared for anything that happened.

The CHAIRMAN. And you took matters in your own hands and went ahead?

Capt. PALMER. Yes; I did. I did not do that, however, until after I had exhausted every other means to get the thing done.

The CHAIRMAN. On the part of the Secretary?

Capt. PALMER. Yes, sir; I was forced——

The CHAIRMAN. Did the Secretary give you any reasons for delaying the carrying out of the plan?

Capt. PALMER. Well, no reasons, of course, that appealed to me or appealed to our people that were charged with personnel; but he would say, "We have too many reserves now. We don't want any more."

Capt. Laning, on page 962 of the typewritten record, stated as follows [reading]:

Passing on now to the fifth particular, it would be impossible to explain the situation I have just described without touching on a matter that I speak of only with great reluctance and hesitation. I would not introduce it were it not essential to a clear understanding of the reasons why plans were not approved and why delays occurred in getting action on many important matters. But as the personal characteristics of executives often have profound effect on the organizations they direct, an understanding of those characteristics is essential to an understanding of the workings of that organization. In this case it was the personal characteristics of the Secretary of the

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Navy that often made it impossible to get approval of the really important policies. I found this myself, and many others found it. If more information is desired on this point, I can give you the names of such officers.

Senator PITTMAN. I think that is very fair. It seems that there is a difference of opinion between the present witness and those other two.

The CHAIRMAN. It seems to me those quotations from the record bear out my statement.

Senator PITTMAN. Oh, your question stated that there were a number. I doubt if that means a number.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me read you what Admiral Plunkett says. Here is what Admiral Fiske says [reading]:

The officers try continually to make the enlisted man think we are his friends and not his overlords to too great a degree. Any question along that line, any personal question, the Secretary was always glad to talk about, but he seemed to me to have a curious characteristic of not looking at the Navy as a whole. That impressed me all the time. For instance, for a long while after he first came into the Department the question of chaplains occupied him a great deal. But even that was not so much in regard to their connection with the Navy as the chaplains themselves and the effect of their teachings on the enlisted men, which, of course, was fine. But he never seemed to think about the Navy as a whole, and as far as I could make it out it has always seemed to me that he was always absolutely convinced in his own mind that there never would be any war. I found after a while that it was not a good thing to say anything to him about war. He did not seem to be ready to start on any subject connected with war at all.

Senator PITTMAN. He procrastinated about chaplains, as I understand it. That is a very serious matter.

The CHAIRMAN. The record speaks for itself. I think we will let it go at that. I think that shows that a number of officers did testify about the delay or inaction on the part of the Secretary.

Senator PITTMAN. Wherever he decided against them, apparently they called it procrastination.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not think the record will bear that out.

Capt. Pratt, after June 25, you consider that Admiral Sims's recommendations were answered promptly?

Capt. PRATT. Of course I did not always get a "yes."

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, no; but I am referring to attention being paid to his communications.

Capt. PRATT. Yes; I tried to—I paid attention to every one of his dispatches.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not think, Captain, that this question refers to you, at all.

Capt. PRATT. I know that it does not, but of course I have to think of what my part in it was, because I had to sort of outline it or did outline it, and sketch it out to my chief. So that I have to find out, myself, whether I have not been negligent in some way, and I have been trying to see wherein my negligence might lie, if such existed. That is, possibly, why I think it over a bit.

The CHAIRMAN. But I do not assume there was any delay, as soon as you received the communications, in submitting them to your chief?

Capt. PRATT. I suppose you want to know, when a specific thing came up, whether it was replied to immediately or not. I do not think I can tell you that, sir, with the great many dispatches that we had before us. I can give you far better my intent in the matter than I can a definite statement, with the thousand and one dispatches

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hat we had. Most of Admiral Sims's dispatches concerned his material needs which had to do with the bureaus. They were routed immediately to the bureaus, and I could not say after they passed out of my hands whether they were acted upon or not. It went to them immediately, though.

Now, with regard to the plans that I had to do with myself, or the dispatches that I had to do with myself, it is difficult for me to say at this date, whether every one of those was answered. I know one thing, I can speak for myself, I did not keep Admiral Sims as fully in touch as I ought, and he used to kick at it a good deal, and I told him I just did not have time.

The CHAIRMAN. But that is a question of outside communication to him, is it not?

Capt. PRATT. Yes, it is; but we were trying to work together, hand in glove, to get things done, and so something may have slipped up.

The CHAIRMAN. As far as my recollection of the testimony goes—and I apologize to the Senator from Nevada for alluding again to the testimony—you did try in every way in your power to hasten along with the following out of the recommendations of Admiral Sims's?

Capt. PRATT. Yes; I wanted it done.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Palmer stated in his testimony that he knew nothing of Admiral Sims's early requests for personnel. Do you know whether these requests were ever referred to the Bureau of Navigation?

Capt. PRATT. No, sir; I do not.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know?

Capt. PRATT. No, sir. What date does that refer to?

The CHAIRMAN. I think, to the first month of the war.

Capt. PRATT. I could not tell that. Some of those dispatches may have been lost, and they may have gone through.

The CHAIRMAN. Repeatedly, throughout the early months of the war, Admiral Sims was making requests for addidional personnel on his staff in Europe?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, yes; he did that. It was not sent to him.

The CHAIRMAN. And it was not sent to the Bureau of Navigation?

Capt. PRATT. I do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. According to Admiral Palmer's testimony.

Capt. PRATT. I do not know that.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Palmer was Chief of Navigation?

Capt. PRATT. He would know. I do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. What general recommendations about matters on the other side, aside from Admiral Sims's recommendations, were received by the department?

Capt. PRATT. In the first month, I know nothing except through hearsay and the testimony that has come up. Admiral Badger has testified, I think, that it was Admiral de Chair who was over here and made representations; but I did not see Admiral de Chair and had nothing to do with that conference. You see, it pretty much depends on how we got started right at the very beginning, because the war never took on, as far as the naval forces are concerned, any more than the general phase that it had at first—that is, the suppression of the submarine—and then for us on this side our more impor-

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tant problems at home, the building up of our reserves, the getting everything ready to launch this huge army over in France; and in the main we relied on suggestions from Admiral Sims. When Admiral Grant, of the Royal Navy, was here in Washington——

The CHAIRMAN. That was at a much later period, though, was it not?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, much later. We used to talk things over nearly every day.

The CHAIRMAN. But prior to Admiral Grant's coming over, aside from what you got from Admiral Grasset and Admiral Browning when they were over here——

Capt. PRATT. Oh, we relied on Sims.

The CHAIRMAN. You relied entirely on Admiral Sims?

Capt. PRATT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And Admiral Grasset and Admiral Browning did not go very definitely into the submarine situation, did they?

Capt. PRATT. No; their point of view would be apt to be colored a good deal by conditions outside the war zone. Very frankly, I would consider that after a man had been outside of the scene of operations for any length of time his opinion would not be as good as that of a man who was sitting right on the job day by day.

The CHAIRMAN. However, Admiral Browning did speak in his statement he made at the conference of April 11 about the importance of the submarine situation?

Capt. PRATT. Yes; he may have had some direct instructions from the Admiralty which possibly he did not show to us.

The CHAIRMAN. But in his statement he did refer to the criticalness of the submarine situation, did he not? Were you at that meeting?

Capt. PRATT. No, sir; I have submitted a copy of the dispatch he sent, but I was not at that meeting. And, as I understand, at that meeting, and also, as Admiral Badger has testified, at the later meeting, that was talked over. I have not seen any minutes of it and am not conversant with it.

The CHAIRMAN. So that your principal knowledge about matters on the other side was clearly gotten practically exclusively from Admiral Sims?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, absolutely; almost entirely. He was our representative there and was sent there for that purpose, and I would like to say in addition there is no man I know of in the Navy who appreciates the value of information and its proper distribution to the extent that Admiral Sims does. He had had a tremendous experience once before, in the Spanish War, when he was sent over to Paris in very much the same capacity, and that, with his War College training, enabled him to appreciate to a degree that I really think no other leading officer in our Navy did, the value of information and its proper distribution. He built up a wonderful service, and I have often said myself that if Admiral Sims had not been there in London handling that service I do not know what we would have done. I have said it to myself, if I have not said it to others, many a time. It was a very wonderful information service which he created. Not only that, but he started other lines at work. For instance, the Admiralty began later automatically sending us all of their reports. Their letters call it their foreign office. They began sending us in

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their pamphlets regarding the political situation throughout Europe. and, in fact, all over the world. Of course, those things were directed—or Admiral Sims had been instrumental in starting the flow of information. In fact, after that system began working we became the center of information collected from all over the world, and it was a very wonderful system that he created. Naturally we depended on him. We might from time to time receive direct information from the Admiralty, but it would be more of a specific nature—something that they wanted done. But, as the source of information, he was the head and shoulders of it. There is no question about that.

The CHAIRMAN. When he was sent over, he was not given any very specific plans to follow, was he?

Capt. PRATT. No, sir; and judging from myself, knowing the way we have worked together in the past, I should say he would not want to be handicapped.

The CHAIRMAN. That it was better for him not to be given specific instructions?

Capt. PRATT. That it was better for him not to have them?

The CHAIRMAN. But I assume when he was sent over he was informed of all the department's plans up to that date.

Capt. PRATT. That I do not know. That took place very quietly between himself and Admiral Benson. In fact, his going was absolutely secret. He dined with me the night before he left for New York, and he had a very broad smile on his face, and I knew that something was up, but he let me guess, and he would not tell me; so that what his instructions may have been I could not for the life of me say.

The CHAIRMAN. After he had gotten over on the other side and was performing his duties over there, if the department inaugurated any plans, it would have been proper to have kept him in touch, would it not?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, yes; yes, indeed.

The CHAIRMAN (continuing). With practically all the plans of the Navy that might in any way conflict with himself, over on the other side?

The CHAIRMAN. Was he in any way so informed?

Capt. PRATT. No; I do not think he was; and in that way I hold myself rather, very negligible, if I may say so. I did not keep Sims up to date the way I should, and he used to jump on me for it, and I would tell him, except as I would write a letter somewhat of the character of the one I submitted yesterday—he had to guess. But we were all brought up in the same school, all thinking along the same lines, and I always felt that Sims knew more about what we were thinking of than perhaps we did about what he was thinking about.

The CHAIRMAN. For instance, the Azores plan; he was not given any information of that?

Capt. PRATT. Well, that was not the plan——

The CHAIRMAN. About putting it into effect?

Capt. PRATT. He was supposed, just as any War College man would, to look at the chart. I will show it to you right here. He had one of these charts. We usually travel around with one. It is rather illuminating. (Exhibiting chart.) It helps to give you a good perspective of things. No War College man would have to

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look at that more than about a minute to appreciate at once the strategic importance of the Azores; so that I do not believe it would ever occur to me to say to Sims—to try to impress upon him the strategic importance. I knew that he knew about it; knew about it better than I did.

The CHAIRMAN. But at least you would let him know if you were sending ships over, would you not?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, he knew we could not get those chasers and other things across that we were trying, without going to the Azores in the wintertime. As a sailor man, he would know that. They did not have the capacity.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, but I do not think he was informed, if I recollect rightly, when the Azores proposition was first established.

Capt. PRATT. You mean we did not tell him in time?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Capt. PRATT. I dare say I did not. It would not surprise me at all if I forgot it.

The CHAIRMAN. You think it would have been better to have informed him?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, much; much! I omitted so many things of that sort. If I had just had more people to sort of help out, I would have done it in a minute. There was no intention to omit it, but I think there were many omissions of that sort, without doubt, which I hold myself very responsible for, and remiss in the matter.

The CHAIRMAN. In Admiral Sims' testimony it appears that prior to the end of June he received very few replies to his cables and messages, but that after that time he received replies much more promptly, and that, I take it, was due to the change that was made when you went in as aid or as assistant for operations.

Capt. PRATT. Well, I hope so.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you give any particular reason why the department failed before that time to answer to Admiral Sims' messages?

Senator PITTMAN. I object again. That is assuming that they failed to answer Admiral Sims' cablegrams.

The CHAIRMAN. If they did fail? Can you give any reason why they failed if they did fail?

Senator PITTMAN. That is better.

Capt. PRATT. You see, I am here testifying under oath, and I would like to testify to facts. I may, when I am not under oath, express a great many opinions, as most of us do; but I would rather you would ask that question of people that know. I do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you do not know any reason why the department failed to act upon Admiral Sims' dispatches or to reply to them?

Senator PITTMAN. Do you know that they failed, in the first place?

The CHAIRMAN. If they so failed?

Capt. PRATT. I do not know, either way; either one way or the other.

Senator PITTMAN. That is absolutely essential to fairness of the question.

The CHAIRMAN. I am very willing to put it in, "if they did so fail."

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Senator PITTMAN. All right.

The CHAIRMAN. You have read Admiral Sims' testimony, I take it?

Capt. PRATT. He knows. If he did not get answers, he knows whether he did not get them or not. If Admiral Sims says, "I did not get an answer to this," why, that stands; he did not get it.

The CHAIRMAN. And in cases where he says he did not get answers, do you know anything about the circumstances why he did not get an answer, or action?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, I may have guessed, yes, and I may have had opinions; but you are asking me now to state definite facts, and I do not like to state opinions where I should state facts. I think it is better for you to ask the people that actually handled those dispatches.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you give me the names, please, of the people who would know?

Capt. PRATT. Yes, sir; Admiral Benson would know; and Capt. Chase would know, but he is dead. Admiral Benson would know all about it; and I might guess a good deal about it, but I do not like to state guesses when I am under oath.

The CHAIRMAN. You prefer to leave the answer to that question to Admiral Benson?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, yes, sir; I would much prefer to leave it to him.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Sims and Mr. Hoover have both testified as to the seriousness of the submarine menace during the early months of the war. Was that seriousness realized by the department from April to July, 1917?

Capt. PRATT. I realized it. I do not know whether anybody else realized it the same way that I did. It was realized after I came in as aid for Operations, because then I could talk to my chief, and I knew he realized it then. And he is really the responsible man, and he can tell you how he realized it and what his attitude toward it was. I can tell you what my attitude was, and of course can tell you the absolute facts and truth in the matter. I thought it was so serious that, personally, I would have sent everything. I never had any other attitude than that.

The CHAIRMAN. Was that the general attitude in the department?

Capt. PRATT. Why, yes; it was from the time I came in, in an executive capacity; yes, I can say so.

The CHAIRMAN. No; that was June 25. I am referring to April and May.

Capt. PRATT. I can not say that.

The CHAIRMAN. It was talked over, was it not?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, it was discussed.

The CHAIRMAN. By all the officers?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, yes; by all of the officers.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Hoover returned early in April to this country and made a report of the seriousness of the situation?

Capt. PRATT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Were the officers of the Navy familiar with the fact that he had made such a report? Was that generally known?

Capt. PRATT. I think so. I will not say then, but later, I think Mr. Hoover and also the various members of different organizations that we had in this country, the various members who went abroad, used our communication system for the purpose of sending their

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reports. I recall seeing a great many of what we called ship mission cables, and I think Mr. Hoover used that system later, and in a general way, I think we were all very familiar with Mr. Hoover's opinion in the matter. I know one officer, I can say quite definitely, who had exactly the same idea that I had on the subject, and that is my associate in the planning section, Capt. Schofield, because I was constantly in touch with him; we were working side by side; and we were very much impressed, from our studies, with the seriousness of the submarine menace.

The CHAIRMAN. We will suspend now until 10 o'clock to-morrow morning, Captain, and will you be here at that time?

Capt. PRATT. Yes, sir.

(At 1 o'clock p. m., the subcommittee adjourned until to-morrow, Friday, April 23, 1920, at 10 o'clock a. m.)

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NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

FRIDAY, APRIL 23, 1920.

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE OF COMMITTEE ON NAVAL AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 o'clock a. m., in room 235, Senate Office Building, Senator Frederick Hale presiding.

Present: Senators Hale (chairman), Ball, Keyes, and Trammell.

TESTIMONY OF CAPT. W. V. PRATT—Resumed.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. Capt. Pratt, yesterday I referred to Mr. Hoover's report of the seriousness of the submarine menace and asked you whether the fact that he had made such a report was generally known in the department, and in general whether the seriousness of the submarine menace was realized in the department, and you stated that you thought that the fact that Mr. Hoover had made such a report was known in the department.

Capt. PRATT. I think so, from general knowledge.

The CHAIRMAN. And the general seriousness of the situation was known at that time?

Capt. PRATT. I think it was known after Admiral Sims sent his report in to us. I very much doubt if we fully realized the seriousness of the situation until his original cables were received, because while I was not at that time in an executive capacity, yet I knew that the British were not telling us all they knew until after we came into the war; so, therefore, the information that we might get at the very beginning from them on that subject, would be most guarded. But I can not see how anyone would fail to realize the seriousness of the submarine situation after the first cables from Admiral Sims were received.

The CHAIRMAN. And the first cable was April 14, was it not?

Capt. PRATT. Yes. I have not my personal files with me, but I had sent to me later that cable complete, and I have a very distinct recollection now that I was very fully impressed with the seriousness of that situation very soon after we entered the war.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Sims's cable of April 14 deals with this question?

Capt. PRATT. Yes. I have a personal copy of that; not an official copy.

The CHAIRMAN. Then, if the seriousness of the situation was realized even as early as April 14, why was there such a delay as there was in sending antisubmarine craft to the other side?

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Capt. PRATT. That I can not tell you definitely, sir, if there was a delay. The best I can state on that subject is this: I have submitted in my original testimony the numbers of destroyers that were in Europe, and in that table of April 6, 1918, the exact date of sailing of every ship that went over, so that that is all I can speak of as to facts. I do know, however, from my knowledge of the condition of ships—that is, antisubmarine craft—that there were only three yachts at that time with real capacity for going—that is, the *Yankton*, the *Scorpion*, which was interned at Constantinople, and the *Mayflower*, the President's yacht. The dates when the destroyers sailed speak for themselves. Those are facts. Anything else I could give would be merely a matter of opinion.

The CHAIRMAN. You have not stated in your testimony, as I recollect it, that there were no delays in answering Admiral Sims's cablegrams.

Capt. PRATT. Oh, no; I have not said that. I do not know. Every way that I could possibly take, myself, I endeavored to have expedited; but I could not say after they passed out of my hands what happened.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Sims stated in his testimony that all of the vessels sent to European waters up to March 1, 1918, should have been available in April, 1917.

Capt. PRATT. No, sir; that——

The CHAIRMAN. For what reasons were they not sent? Were they available?

Capt. PRATT. No, sir; that is a mistake. If I had that list before me I could even point out one by one, almost, why they were not; but, generally speaking, we had to get a lot of yachts, and at the very beginning, before the commandeering bill was passed, we had to depend very largely, to a certain extent, on gifts—people gave outright, and they sold, and those craft were fitted out as soon as it was possible for them to go. We could not get any tugs given to us, and when the commandeering bill was passed, I think it was June 15, that put more power in the hands of the Navy Department, and they were able to get many more smaller craft, which were not available at first.

The CHAIRMAN. But if all the vessels that were sent to Europe by March 1, 1918, had been thoroughly equipped, thoroughly ready in personnel and in material on April 6, could not those vessels have been sent over during the month of April?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, if we had foreseen to the extent of commandeering them and getting them ready.

The CHAIRMAN. Aside from commandeering? I am referring to the vessels of the Navy now.

Capt. PRATT. Let me get that list out and look over them one by one, and then I can just point out the vessels that we had to take. [Examining list of April 6, 1918.] Now, apart from the material condition and personnel condition, which I will assume has been rectified before April 6, 1917——

The CHAIRMAN. Apart from what?

Capt. PRATT. Apart from the material and personnel conditions, which I assume, according to your statement have been perfected, and that they are all ready to sail, I will try to point out those vessels

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outside of the Navy which we would not have been able to get unless some act had been passed. Running down the list——

The CHAIRMAN. I am asking you more especially, Captain, about the vessels of the Navy.

Capt. PRATT. That is just what I am trying to answer, but in order to do it I have to take the list of April 6 and go right down and scan, in my mind, and sort them right out, in order to give you a total; don't you see, sir? There should have been, providing we could have withdrawn from the neutrality duty which some of our destroyers were on—the exact number I do not know, but I think about 20, this duty having been continuous for some time in and around the port of New York and the principal ports, inspecting all vessels and following them out to see that our neutrality laws were not violated—I say that if they had been available to go immediately across and had been removed from this neutrality duty, then we should have had about 51 destroyers, about 6 tenders for the destroyers, about 7 gunboats, 2 cruisers, and about 12 submarines.

The CHAIRMAN. These are all of the vessels that went over before March, 1918, which would have been available on April 6, 1917, if they had been all ready?

Capt. PRATT. If they had been put in shape; oh, yes. They belonged to us.

There also would have been available 5 coast guard cutters. Now, there are a number of ships mentioned on this list which would not have been available because we took them into service from outside sources; yachts, fishing craft, and so forth. That number foots up to about 27 yachts, about 12 tugs, and about 4 mine sweepers that would not have been available.

The CHAIRMAN. Those were vessels that were not in the Navy?

Capt. PRATT. No, sir; not in the Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. But of the vessels that were in the Navy at that time, how many could we have had over in April, 1917, had they been prepared in material and personnel, and ready to go at once?

Capt. PRATT. I gave you the list, sir; I gave them. I specified the types and the numbers; 5 coast guard cutters, 12 submarines, 7 gunboats, 6 tenders for destroyers, and 51 destroyers.

Senator KEYES. Did you not mention 2 cruisers, in your first statement?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, yes; I did; the *Birmingham* and the *Chester*.

The CHAIRMAN. Why were those vessels not sent in April?

Capt. PRATT. That, sir, I do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. Those of the regular Navy?

Capt. PRATT. That I do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. But they were not?

Capt. PRATT. They were only sent as I specified in the list, which shows the numbers that were sent, the dates of sailing on this list, the date for each ship being given, when it left, and when it arrived.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Capt. PRATT. So that the record is perfectly clear. That is fact. That, of course, I can testify to. But why they were not sent, I do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that the record shows, does it not, that of the 51 destroyers only 6 were sent over in April?

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Capt. PRATT. Yes, sir. You can, of course, pick them from this record, but there is a more definite record still which shows when the first six were sent, and when they arrived.

The CHAIRMAN. And as you recall it, only six were sent in April, 1917?

Capt. PRATT. Yes, that is all.

The CHAIRMAN. And none of the other vessels.

Capt. PRATT. That is so.

The CHAIRMAN. Were those vessels in all respects, as to personnel and material, ready on April 6, 1917, so that they could have been sent over?

Capt. PRATT. No. Admiral McKean is more qualified to speak of the material. As to the personnel I have another table, which I submitted to you, which shows the actual material condition of every one of those destroyers in January and on March 31, 1917. That table is in the record. That is as to personnel; that is in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Does that table show that every one of those ships, as regards personnel, was ready at that time, on April 6, 1917?

Capt. PRATT. I will look it up. [After examining table on p. 2935-b of typewritten record.] No, sir. In January, 1917, there were about 20 to 23 with reserve complement. Those complements had been increased on March 31, 1917, so that they were in most cases nearly up to full complement.

The CHAIRMAN. War or peace?

Capt. PRATT. With regard to the complement, I think that I had better explain a little. There was established at one time what was called a peace complement for destroyers. That peace complement was supposed to allow the boats to run in active condition, but it was not a real war complement. It was below. As I recall in flotilla days, when I used to serve with Admiral Sims, my recollection is that it was below the complement which we would have to have in war; but the complement which we afterwards found when we got into war it would be wise to put on the craft, was a complement in excess of what was supposed to be our real war complement assigned by navigation. Now, this complement in most cases, this so-called war complement of about 95, I think, had been nearly filled, but there are some cases, I note here, where it had not been completely filled. Putting an average for our destroyers at about 95, a running average, I note that in several cases the complement had not been filled, but in almost all cases it had been.

The CHAIRMAN. On all of the boats or on the 23 referred to?

Capt. PRATT. On all the boats. On the 23, their complement had been raised.

The CHAIRMAN. Had been raised to what?

Capt. PRATT. Had been raised to, roughly, 94. That varied for different boats. Each boat varies a little bit. But they had been raised to the war complement, with some exceptions.

The CHAIRMAN. And the remaining 28 that were not in the reserve were all ready as to personnel, were they?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, they had been ready right along. They were ready in January. No; their complements had been raised, too, from January. They were evidently on what they called the peace complement basis in January, and were raised from that to the war complement basis, so that on March 31, 1917, most of them were on

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the war complement basis. But I do note a few exceptions to that, even where they had not been on March 31 raised to the war complement basis. For instance, one boat here I note right away is the *Beale*, a 750-ton oil burning destroyer, having a complement on March 31 of 60. She should have about 94.

The CHAIRMAN. How many of them, then, were not in condition so far as personnel was concerned, on April 6, 1917?

Capt. PRATT. I will count the number up. My table does not state on April 6 but on March 31, which is pretty close to it.

According to the figures, when I go over it in detail, I should say about 20 were not up to full complement. Their complements had been raised from what they were on January 17, but about 20 were not up to full complement, to my mind.

The CHAIRMAN. Leaving, then, how many that were in full commission as to personnel?

Capt. PRATT. Well, the difference between 20 and 51.

The CHAIRMAN. Thirty-one?

Capt. PRATT. I should say, roughly.

The CHAIRMAN. Those were all destroyers of 750 tons?

Capt. PRATT. Or greater.

The CHAIRMAN. Or over?

Capt. PRATT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. There were also a few smaller ones, were there not?

Capt. PRATT. Yes, sir; there were about 16 of 400 tons. They were old craft, and we never did get more than those that came—some that came around by Asia got in, and later, I think, we got two as far as the Azores.

The CHAIRMAN. So that there were substantially 31 destroyers ready at the the beginning of the war that could have been sent over during the month of April, 1917, if it had been deemed advisable to send them?

Capt. PRATT. That is the way it appears to me.

The CHAIRMAN. And how long would it have taken to put the others that were not fully filled up as to personnel into commission, as far as personnel was concerned?

Capt. PRATT. I do not quite understand you. Which others do you mean?

The CHAIRMAN. Those vessels that did not have the full complement on them—the destroyers that did not have the full complement.

Capt. PRATT. Why, it seems to me that if I had wanted to get them ready and have them, I should have had the whole 51 ready to go within that time.

The CHAIRMAN. Within a few days?

Capt. PRATT. As far as personnel was concerned.

The CHAIRMAN. As far as personnel was concerned?

Capt. PRATT. I would have found it.

The CHAIRMAN. What?

Capt. PRATT. I would have found it. I would have gotten it.

The CHAIRMAN. So that, so far as personnel is concerned, the 51 of the boats that were over by March 1, 1918, could have been sent over in April, 1917, if it had been deemed advisable by the department to send them over?

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Capt. PRATT. I can only tell you, sir, what I would do myself if I had wanted to get those boats——

The CHAIRMAN. I am not asking you that. I am asking you if they were ready, if they were available at that time, so far as personnel is concerned.

Capt. PRATT. But I have got to make a little bit of an analysis in order to answer your question honestly. That is what I am trying to do. If I had wanted to send those boats over then, I would have gotten them fit, and I would have taken men off the battleships and put them on and sent them. Yes, we could get personnel and cut down something else; put them on the boats. It is a question of adjustment.

The CHAIRMAN. As long as you are saying what you would have done, in that case if you had wanted to send them over, what do you think——

Capt. PRATT. Do I think it could have been done?

The CHAIRMAN. Would you have sent them over?

Capt. PRATT. I would.

The CHAIRMAN. In April?

Capt. PRATT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the policy of the department in the early months of 1917—January, February, and March—with regard to the dreadnoughts and the main fighting forces of the Navy?

Capt. PRATT. I do not know, sir. That is before I came in. I can not tell you.

The CHAIRMAN. Part of that time you were in the planning section?

Capt. PRATT. I was in the planning section a part of that time. I was also in the War Department—in the Army War College. I did not go to the Navy Department until 1917, until about February. I was out of it altogether.

The CHAIRMAN. So that in January you were in the War College?

Capt. PRATT. I was in the Army War College.

The CHAIRMAN. So that you have no knowledge as to the policy of the department at that particular time, as to the dreadnoughts and the main fighting force?

Capt. PRATT. No, sir. I think Admiral McKean can answer that far better than I can.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know at that time whether there was a plan to use these ships in case we went into war, to defeat the Germans, or whether we were contemplating holding them back in case we had to meet the Germans after they had met the British fleet?

Capt. PRATT. Why, I know what the policy was which we wrote in a letter, because I wrote that letter. But in my own mind, I discounted the question of our fleet having to engage the Germans.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the date of that letter you refer to?

Capt. PRATT. July 3. That is the fixed-policy letter in which we stated——

The CHAIRMAN. No; I was asking you about the policy during January, February, and March, before we had gone into the war.

Capt. PRATT. Oh; and I said, sir, I can not tell you.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know anything about it?

Capt. PRATT. I do not know anything about that.

The CHAIRMAN. Then, I am not referring in any way to your letter that you wrote at a subsequent date. That had nothing to do with it.

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Capt. PRATT. Oh, well, then, I misunderstood you.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the gist of that letter to which you refer, of July?

Capt. PRATT. That is the letter that Admiral Sims speaks of when he says that was the first communication that he had of the department's policy. That outlined a policy for the use of our antisubmarine craft, and also the policy which would obtain with regard to our battleships, and also our policy with relation to cooperation with the Allies.

The CHAIRMAN. That was the letter that Admiral Sims referred to as showing the first plan he received?

Capt. PRATT. The first policy.

The CHAIRMAN. The first policy, yes?

Capt. PRATT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the date of that?

Capt. PRATT. It was signed July 3. Admiral Sims speaks of it as the letter of July 9, I believe. That is his date of receipt, I think. It was signed July 3.

The CHAIRMAN. In April, Admiral Sims sent over a request for battleships to be based on Brest.

Capt. PRATT. I do not know anything about that.

The CHAIRMAN. You know nothing about that matter?

Capt. PRATT. No, sir; I do not remember ever seeing it until it came up in—I do not remember it. I do not know what was decided then.

The CHAIRMAN. That was before you became the assistant in operations?

Capt. PRATT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And that matter was never brought to your attention?

Capt. PRATT. I think that was settled—it must have been settled—before I came into an executive capacity.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; but you stated, I think, yesterday, that you were informed about the messages that Admiral Sims sent over, and the recommendations that he made, did you not?

Capt. PRATT. Yes; I used to hunt for them and look them up as much as I could. But that Brest matter, I testified I knew nothing about.

The CHAIRMAN. When you hunted for them and looked them up, as a rule where did you find them?

Capt. PRATT. Why, I think—my impression is—that these messages used to be sent around by the leading officers to read in order to make them familiar with the situation. I must say, though, right here, that one reason why I may have been a little more in touch with the situation than other men were was because I had other sources of information, which I relied upon a good deal, directly from Admiral Sims. He kept me very well in touch, as far as he could, and I tried to familiarize myself with the situation through information that I would receive from him.

The CHAIRMAN. That is, you kept up a private correspondence with Admiral Sims?

Capt. PRATT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. After you were aid for operations, in July and August, what was the reason for the department refusing to send a division of coal-burning dreadnoughts to reinforce the Grand Fleet?

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Capt. PRATT. That matter, sir, lies between the Chief of Naval Operations and the Secretary. The cable was handled immediately. That is, a favorable answer was prepared, as I think I stated in my testimony. It was held up for discussion between Admiral Benson and the Secretary, and between them they made the decision not to send them.

The CHAIRMAN. I think you stated in your testimony that in all cases where cables came over, as far as you were concerned, there was no delay in transmitting them to the Chief of Operations and to the Secretary?

Capt. PRATT. No, sir; as far as I can remember, I do not know of a delay.

The CHAIRMAN. And when the reply came from the Chief of Operations and the Secretary, there was no delay then in sending the reply back to Admiral Sims?

Capt. PRATT. No, sir; I know that, because I frequently wrote the replies, and if I got an O. K. on it I shot it out immediately.

The CHAIRMAN. And the delay, if there was any, therefore, would have been either on the part of the Chief of Operations or on the part of the Secretary?

Capt. PRATT. If you call it a delay, sir, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I say, if there was any delay.

Capt. PRATT. If there was any delay, it is there.

The CHAIRMAN. Or any trouble in not answering letters.

Capt. PRATT. Well—

The CHAIRMAN. You could not answer the letters yourself, could you Captain?

Capt. PRATT. I would have answered them.

The CHAIRMAN. No, no; I say these messages that came from Admiral Sims to the Chief of Operations or to the Secretary had to be answered by them? It was not within your province to answer them?

Capt. PRATT. Only to write them.

The CHAIRMAN. Only to write them after you received orders to do so.

Capt. PRATT. Yes, but let me clear that up a little further. We did not do much business by letter. Things moved too fast.

The CHAIRMAN. The same applies to the cables?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, yes. It was almost all transacted by cable; and as I explained my method of doing business, yesterday, those cables were indorsed, recommending action to be taken, and those things were settled before business hours of each current day, and they went in immediately.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, but there were many requests made by Admiral Sims where there were no replies made to them, and no attention paid to them, as far as he knew.

Capt. PRATT. The admiral has not made a very clear distinction, when he says "requests," as to what he means. Now, some of those requests, if they concerned material things, would go directly to the bureaus for action. If, in his requests, he means plans and policies and operations, they went directly to the Chief of Naval Operations and then to the Secretary; so that is a fairly large blanket statement. We have got to make a distinction between the two.

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The CHAIRMAN. For instance, Admiral Sims wrote on April 14th—wrote or cabled——

Capt. PRATT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Cabled, I think, and again on April 23rd, on April 29th, and on May 8th, and on May 24th, in each case asking for tugs to be used on the other side. No answer was received from the Department until August 8th. That would look like somewhat of a delay, would it not?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, yes; that would be a delay in answering. But about tugs along—

The CHAIRMAN. I am not asking about the merits of sending them over; I am asking now about the question of delay in attending to the request, or giving information about sending them.

Capt. PRATT. Some of those cases, of course, when it comes to details, I hold myself responsible for not giving Admiral Sims as full information as he gave us. I tried to do what was humanly possible in keeping him informed, but I have no doubt that I made many slip-ups.

The CHAIRMAN. But, Captain, I do not think that you had anything to do with it. It looks to me as though he made requests for certain things and it rested with the department as to whether they would grant these requests, and the department, of course, would act through the Chief of Operations and through the Secretary?

Capt. PRATT. Certainly.

The CHAIRMAN. And until they acted you would have no authority to follow out the admiral's recommendations, would you?

Capt. PRATT. Well, I had a good deal to do with advice; and I can tell you about the tugs. I advised not sending the tugs.

The CHAIRMAN. My point is the lack of information to Admiral Sims, the lack of answer to what he asked for, whether it was a favorable or an unfavorable answer.

Capt. PRATT. Yes; of course. Speaking theoretically, and as we would be able to handle business to-day in times of peace, yes, he ought to get it; but those were pretty strenuous times, and no doubt a lot of the information he wanted and should have had he did not get; even though we wanted to give it to him and meant to give it to him.

The CHAIRMAN. I asked you about the refusal or delay as to sending a division of coal burning dreadnoughts to reinforce the Grand Fleet.

Capt. PRATT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you explain that?

Capt. PRATT. No, sir; I can not explain it other than to state what I already have stated, that that matter rests between the Secretary and the Chief of Naval Operations.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know what led to the department's change of attitude in this matter in November?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, yes; the admiral went over himself, and when he got there he saw what the situation was, himself, and then he sent a cable over. On receipt of that cable I took it in to the Secretary. He approved it and the ships were made ready and sent.

The CHAIRMAN. Thus bearing out the advice Admiral Sims had sent over many months previously?

Capt. PRATT. Absolutely.

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The CHAIRMAN. Do you know what was the cause of the delay in taking the advice sent over by Admiral Sims?

Capt. PRATT. I can not read Admiral Benson's mind, sir. I do not know. He did not discuss that point with me.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Sims has referred to many other cases in his testimony of delays by the department in putting into effect plans which they ultimately approved. Do you know about the delays in these matters?

Capt. PRATT. What plans are they?

The CHAIRMAN. The whole question of the convoy plan, the sending over of destroyers, the increase of personnel on the other side, the enrollment of reserve officers, the promotion of reserve officers, and a number of other plans.

Capt. PRATT. I have treated in my testimony, I think, of each one of those articles. I went over Admiral Sims's letter, article by article, in my testimony, and treated of it there.

The CHAIRMAN. In nearly every case the recommendations made by Admiral Sims were approved at a date somewhat later than that on which the recommendations were sent—a considerable period later—were they not?

Capt. PRATT. Why, I do not think they ever approved of the personnel matter—the recommendations that he made about personnel.

The CHAIRMAN. His recommendations were that he be sent over additional personnel.

Capt. PRATT. I know, but with regard to the promotions, did not that come out, too?

The CHAIRMAN. That was one of the matters he spoke of, I do not think that was approved.

Capt. PRATT. I do not think that was approved, no.

The CHAIRMAN. I think they did allow him to enroll certain reserve officers on the other side.

Capt. PRATT. Yes; he was given an increase in personnel. I remember, speaking of personnel for the plans section, that when Admiral Benson went over to the London office he cabled back and took the best man that I had right out of the office. Just stripped us bare—took Capt. Schofield and sent him right over to London immediately. He sent Capt. Knox, I think, about that time, too.

The CHAIRMAN. But Admiral Sims had been asking for these men from the very start?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, yes. Well, perhaps not specifically for those men, but he had been asking for a great many from the start.

The CHAIRMAN. For a great many. For you, amongst others?

Capt. PRATT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Was it necessary to wait until Admiral Benson could go over, to find out the need for these men—for sending these men over?

Capt. PRATT. I can only give you what I think of the necessity. No, I would have sent them over as soon as I could lay my hands on that. But the power of decision was not mine. I can only give you my estimate of the situation, that is all.

The CHAIRMAN. When you went in there as aid for Operations, what was the policy of the department in regard to the cooperation of the Allies?

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Capt. PRATT. Just what do you mean by that? That is a pretty big question. Cooperation in what way and along what lines?

The CHAIRMAN. Did the department desire fully to cooperate in every respect with the Allies as early as the 1st of July?

Capt. PRATT. Yes; I feel that the spirit was there right straight through.

The CHAIRMAN. From the 1st of July on?

Capt. PRATT. From the time when I can speak knowingly, I have never met a man who did not want to do his best to help the Allies to the utmost. Whatever delays or mistakes we may have made, I think I can say for everybody that so far as I know the spirit was willing. I felt so.

The CHAIRMAN. And was the policy to act in conjunction with the Allies on all matters that came up, or to act somewhat independently?

Capt. PRATT. You know, that is a pretty difficult question to answer. I think that there was not a man with a responsible head who did not want to do his utmost to help the Allies to the limit; and yet I think that every man, as an American, felt that at the same time, if it were necessary at all to safeguard American interests, you always had to have a wee bit of that thought in the back of your head. That is about the best way that I can express it.

The CHAIRMAN. A wee bit of thought, you mean, of independence?

Capt. PRATT. That you had to have back of you the knowledge that you are an American, and if you might have to hold the bag alone, or something of that sort. You have got to think of those things in conjunction with whatever else you may do for the Allies. It is a joint proposition. I could not feel that anybody was holding back and not wanting to get into this war, no. I felt just the other way.

The CHAIRMAN. That we wanted to go in and throw in all of our forces.

Capt. PRATT. Yes, the spirit was there.

The CHAIRMAN. And you found that spirit all through the department, in every respect.

Capt. PRATT. I was thrown with the bureau chiefs when I became aid for Operations. Later I became acting chief of Naval Operations, in touch with the Secretary. Of course I would talk to my own chief, and it seemed to me that the spirit was right there.

The CHAIRMAN. All officers and officials?

Capt. PRATT. Yes, I think so.

The CHAIRMAN. From the time you became aid for Operations?

Capt. PRATT. Yes, I think so.

The CHAIRMAN. Did the department have faith in Admiral Sims's recommendations?

Capt. PRATT. Oh yes, Admiral Benson had. When I got to a position where I could talk to him, when I was aid for Operations, he stated to me, as I think I have testified before, that he could not find a man to take Sims's place.

The CHAIRMAN. As a rule, when he made a plan did the department insist on having all the details of the plan before they would make a decision?

Capt. PRATT. No; he was given a very free foot.

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The CHAIRMAN. They did not insist on getting all the details before they made their decision in any cases that you recall?

Capt. PRATT. No—well, yes; I may have to modify that a bit. He was given a free foot in the execution of it; but explanations were asked. Really, until the Plans Section was established over in London I do not remember of a single what you call a clean-cut plan, that Admiral Sims ever sent over to us. I knew thoroughly what he meant. It was just as good, for my own purposes, as though he had written the most theoretical plan in the world. I knew that he wanted ships, I knew he wanted a particular kind of ship; and it was our idea to send them over to him, and when they went over to him he should use them where it was best. I think a great many explanations probably were asked of him.

The CHAIRMAN. Before the decision was made. Now, take the convoy question. The Allies decided on adopting the convoy plan on May 1, 1917. Admiral Sims's cables reads as follows. [Reading:]

Sent: May 1st, 1917.
To: Secretary of the Navy.

British admiralty has decided to give trial to the convoy scheme described in my last dispatch. Instead of present plan of naval forces operating independently against raiders, there will be a high sea convoy against raiders, such convoy to be established as quickly as possible on all main trade routes, and on approach to dangerous areas on this side, will be met by destroyers and escorted into port. Hampton Roads and New York have been proposed as assembly ports for eastbound vessels on our coast and gulf, with convoys sailing every fourth day. Plan decided on after long consideration by Admiralty and War Council, and is considered absolutely necessary. It will strain British resources of personnel and ships to the limit, and we must assist by taking one route, at least, if the plan is to be carried out. Admiralty desire to be informed whether we can provide escorts for convoys sailing from the rendezvous at New York. British estimate about 14 ships will be required for New York service, and larger numbers for other routes, including Mediterranean and South America. Escorts should have sustained sea speed of at least 12 knots and six inch guns. I very urgently recommend favorable action. Through British Naval representative at Washington details of plan will be communicated from time to time as necessary.

SIMS.

The Admiral then said:

"I received no answer to the message I had sent on the 1st of May, and in fact no communication whatsoever from the Navy Department with regard to the convoy proposal until June 20th, nearly two months later."

In this letter of June 20 the Secretary stated:

In regard to convoy, I consider that merchant vessels having armed guards are safer when sailing independently.

Now, can you tell me why the Department delayed so long in putting the convoy system in operation in cooperation with the Allies?

Capt. PRATT. I think it was because they thought they had a perfectly legitimate right to discuss a question of that magnitude, in which the whole plan of operations was being changed from one system, that of patrol, to another, that of convoy, especially as our movement later on across the ocean was bound to be a very large one. I think it was largely a question of discussion. I know that at the very beginning we looked upon convoy rather askance until the British had proven it—we had a definite system. After, I think it was, May 31st, if I remember the cables, when they reported the first convoy arrived safely (I think Admiral Sims has reported so), it was definitely accepted, I said July 5th, but I think it was about

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July 2d. Anyhow, it was along in the first part of July; and during that time the department was balancing the problem. It was not, to be a British problem alone. It was more or less of a combined one.

The CHAIRMAN. That is, they were studying the details before making the decision?

Capt. PRATT. I think so.

The CHAIRMAN. And they were not ready to accept the decision made by the forces on the other side or by the Allied Council?

Capt. PRATT. Why, I think that is a sensible view to take, sir, on a joint movement of that sort.

The CHAIRMAN. Did not the convoy system have a good deal to do with meeting the submarine menace?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, yes; it was a success. But, like many things which proved to be successful, hindsight is a great deal better than foresight.

The CHAIRMAN. But would it not have been a good thing if we could have adopted it earlier than we did?

Capt. PRATT. Yes; it would have been a good thing.

The CHAIRMAN. That is also true of the question of sending destroyers over to the other side, is it not?

Capt. PRATT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. t is also true of the question of sending officers over to assist Admiral Sims?

Capt. PRATT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. f that is true, and it would have been a good thing to comply with these recommendations of Admiral Sims when he made them, instead of several months later, as the department did do, would not that have had a material effect in checking the submarine menace earlier than it was checked?

Capt. PRATT. Well, I have made a calculation of figures as well as I could. It would have helped, but I do not believe that we were prepared at that time to have had as much effect on the submarine menace as perhaps we thought we had. The spirit should have been there though to help all we could, but the actual material advantages or disadvantages I do not believe are as great as we thought.

The CHAIRMAN. That is, you do not believe that it would have shortened the war by four months?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, no, sir; I feel perfectly satisfied it would not.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think it would have shortened it three months?

Capt. PRATT. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Or two months?

Capt. PRATT. No, sir; I do not.

The CHAIRMAN. Or a week?

Capt. PRATT. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Or a day?

Capt. PRATT. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Therefore you say that what we did over there in relation to the submarine menace had nothing to do with shortening the war?

Capt. PRATT. That is what I mean to say.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, our Navy took an active part in the war, did they not?

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Capt. PRATT. Yes; we took an active part.

The CHAIRMAN. What did they do?

Capt. PRATT. We sent craft over to operate against the submarine, and we sent our battleships over, and our shore activities, before we finished, were quite great.

The CHAIRMAN. That is, the big 14-inch guns?

Capt. PRATT. Yes; and we built a radio station over there, as Admiral McKean can tell you; we put up some oil tanks, and we ran an oil-pipe line across Scotland for the use of the Grand Fleet.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you give that as the main activity of the Navy during the war?

Capt. PRATT. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The shore work?

Capt. PRATT. No, sir. Our main activities were in two things: the transporting of troops across, I believe, stands as the major naval effort of the war. That is my opinion.

The CHAIRMAN. The transporting of ships across?

Capt. PRATT. Of troops across.

The CHAIRMAN. Of troops across?

Capt. PRATT. Yes, sir; I believe that is the major effort.

The CHAIRMAN. Including the transport of cargoes to feed them?

Capt. PRATT. We had not gotten into that in force yet. We were only beginning to arrive when the armistice was signed. The major effort was in troops, and during the critical months of 1918—this is my recollection—I used to attend some of the conferences in the War Department, and the British officers seemed to be quite insistent that we should get the troops across and they would look out for the supplying of them for a limited period of time if it were necessary to do so.

The CHAIRMAN. They could not have supplied them, with the food conditions as they were in Europe, for any material length of time without our assistance?

Capt. PRATT. I do not think they planned for any material length of time, but what they wanted was men, right then and there.

The CHAIRMAN. I know, but men have got to be fed.

Capt. PRATT. So they have, but in 1918——

The CHAIRMAN. And were not the Allies sending over largely for troop supplies when they got over there?

Capt. PRATT. Naturally, of course, they were. But you can pull your belt in a notch.

The CHAIRMAN. Then the feeding of those men was all a part of the general submarine situation, was it not?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, yes; but all I am trying to say is that, at a pinch, you can do a little less, and the first concern was men.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; but is not the transportation of troops directly connected with the handling of the submarine menace?

Capt. PRATT. Just what do you mean?

The CHAIRMAN. Why, these troop transports, I suppose, were liable to attack by submarines, were they not?

Capt. PRATT. Yes; they were.

The CHAIRMAN. And the sending of ships over to that side to assist in the putting down of the submarine menace was also an assistance in the sending of troops over, was it not?

Capt. PRATT. Of course, it was an assistance. I have never for one minute tried to say that it was not of assistance.

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The CHAIRMAN. It was of material assistance, was it not?

Capt. PRATT. Well, it was in proportion exactly as the ratio of the numbers we could send to the total numbers on the spot. We can not claim more than our share. I would like to claim it all if I could, but I can not do more than the figures show me is there.

The CHAIRMAN. After the 1st of July we had 31 destroyers over there, did we not?

Capt. PRATT. If you want the exact number I will have to get down to my papers.

The CHAIRMAN. That can be verified from the record. I thought it was 31.

Capt. PRATT. I will assume that that was exactly what we had, 31, if that was what it was, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I think on June 11, 36 destroyers had arrived on the other side.

Capt. PRATT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. The testimony has shown that there were a large number of vessels used against submarines?

Capt. PRATT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. That includes in that list something like 1,400 by all of the Allies?

Capt. PRATT. I figured it out as about 1,700. Well, say 1,400.

The CHAIRMAN. Fourteen hundred or more?

Capt. PRATT. Fourteen hundred or more, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, those were not all destroyers. That included vessels of all kinds?

Capt. PRATT. Yes; of course it did.

The CHAIRMAN. But the destroyers were the most effective in the submarine operations, were they not?

Capt. PRATT. Yes, absolutely; but the number of destroyers we had compared to the number that Great Britain could bring to bear, and the French plus the Italians, was not very great. They had 111 with their grand fleet alone.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; but those were not used against the submarines?

Capt. PRATT. That is just exactly it. You have hit the nail right on the head, there. If it was as strenuous as all that, why did they not use them against the submarine?

The CHAIRMAN. Because, I suppose, they had to keep the German fleet cooped up, and without those destroyers their fleet would have been in the same condition as our fleet would have been in if we had gone over in 1917 against the German fleet.

Capt. PRATT. There is the hitch, right there. The British grand fleet thought one thing, and they held a lot of destroyers up above there, that we always felt and believed they ought to have shot down and used in antisubmarine work.

The CHAIRMAN. They could not do it. They had to protect their fleet.

Capt. PRATT. I would have done it if I had had the doing of it.

The CHAIRMAN. And you would have left your fleet without protection?

Capt. PRATT. If it was as dangerous as all that—the submarine. But, they, in sizing the situation up, did that. That is what makes

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me think that the British Admiralty—they are pretty wise old birds—knew what they were doing. They wanted us to come in and do all we could.

The CHAIRMAN. Was it not to their interest to keep the British fleet in the best possible fighting condition in case the German fleet came out?

Capt. PRATT. Yes, but a little later on an idea began to crop out, and I know it got into our plans department, that the British were a little too apprehensive of that fleet coming out; and in the light of events, of what did happen, they were altogether too apprehensive. They scared the Germans pretty thoroughly in the Battle of Jutland, together with the demoralization which set in of the German navy, they had them whipped before they knew it.

The CHAIRMAN. But if the German fleet had known the British fleet was lacking in some of its principal component parts, it might have attacked?

Capt. PRATT. I do not know whether they would have taken the chance.

The CHAIRMAN. What I wanted to say was in regard to the submarine, that in proportion, the assistance we gave in putting down the submarine menace was far greater than the proportion of 36 to 1,400?

Capt. PRATT. If that is what you mean, I have got enough pride in our own boats to say that I will make the proportion, destroyer to destroyer alone; I mean our destroyers to the total destroyers of the Allies on the other side.

The CHAIRMAN. And even at that, our destroyers were probably in better shape than the destroyers of the French and the other allies.

Capt. PRATT. They were, and for this reason, I think. Great Britain and the French and Italians were war weary, and they had lost a lot of their men, and they had to cut down the crews of their boats, and we came over with our destroyers, with our picked men on them. You could not find a better lot. And boat for boat, they did just as much as the other man, and I believe a little more.

The CHAIRMAN. So that our forces over there were really of material help in putting down the submarine menace, whether or not they had anything to do with shortening the war, were they not?

Capt. PRATT. Yes; they contributed.

The CHAIRMAN. And you say that our greatest naval effort was the protection of troops going over?

Capt. PRATT. Transporting troops. That is my opinion, merely alone. If I was asked for an opinion, I would say that that was our greatest achievement.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not include the provisioning of the troops?

Capt. PRATT. We had not gotten into that, in full force. The Navy had not gotten hold of the supply ships in the numbers that were beginning to flock in when the armistice came.

Senator KEYES. It was necessary?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, absolutely necessary.

The CHAIRMAN. But we were sending large amounts of supplies abroad at that time?

Capt. PRATT. Yes; and many of those supplies, as I think the records will show, went in British bottoms—in British ships.

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The CHAIRMAN. So that you do not give us any particular credit for that?

Capt. PRATT. Well, I wish I could. I wish our merchant marine had been built up there, so that we could have done it all. We were coming, but we had not yet arrived.

The CHAIRMAN. But at least we did our part in protecting those British ships that were sent over with supplies?

Capt. PRATT. Yes; trying to.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; and the Navy did that?

Capt. PRATT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And you think that was an important part of taking care of the armies on the other side?

Capt. PRATT. Yes; an important part.

The CHAIRMAN. And that we did?

Capt. PRATT. Protecting——

The CHAIRMAN. We contributed largely to that by putting our antisubmarine forces at work? We contributed largely to the sending over of supplies by sending our antisubmarine forces to the other side?

Capt. PRATT. No, sir; the antisubmarine forces, unless I misunderstand you, did not contribute to getting the supplies across.

The CHAIRMAN. To the sending of them over safely?

Capt. PRATT. They helped to protect the supplies.

The CHAIRMAN. That is contributing to getting them over, is it not?

Capt. PRATT. Looking at it that way; yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I asked you about the convoy system. When was serious consideration first given by the department to the convoy system?

Capt. PRATT. I think that the question was taken under discussion immediately Admiral Sims' telegram was received.

The CHAIRMAN. Of May 1?

Capt. PRATT. Yes; I think it was being discussed right along, and the pros and cons of the matter weighed.

The CHAIRMAN. And when was it first put fully into effect, requiring all ships sailing from American Atlantic ports to establish and join convoys?

Capt. PRATT. That did not lie within our province. The part we took was to furnish the cruisers they asked for. The system was entirely of British inception, handled by their own methods and by their own people, and they had their own officers in our ports. What they wanted from us was the contribution of a certain number of cruisers so that no convoy would leave a port without having a cruiser to guard it.

The CHAIRMAN. Did they not also want us to agree to have our ships go according to the convoy plan?

Capt. PRATT. Yes; they wanted to; and, in general, we were willing to do that, but——

The CHAIRMAN. What I want to know is when we decided to do that?

Capt. PRATT. We acceded on July 5.

The CHAIRMAN. July 5?

Capt. PRATT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And when did we send cruisers there?

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Capt. PRATT. That is the time. We put them right into the first convoy that they were asked for. We simply would tell the British authorities, "We have so many cruisers. Take them when you want them and put them in." Now, let me explain one thing about the holding of a ship out from a convoy. That does not break it up. That does not hurt it. Suppose, for instance, you take the St. Paul, an 18-knot ship, with Americans on board and a valuable cargo of material. They want to put her in an 11-knot or 8-knot convoy touching at Halifax. She has not got the coal to do it. It breaks the line up right away. All we would say is, "Agree to convoy, but run that ship separately. They will take a chance on that." All they have to know is on a certain day to avoid certain areas; submarines in there; and they cable when they arrive. That does not break up a convoy because a certain ship does not sail in it.

The CHAIRMAN. Did those ships that did not sail in the convoy get any protection?

Capt. PRATT. They asked for it if it could be granted.

The CHAIRMAN. Were they asked to join a convoy on the other side at an assembling point?

Capt. PRATT. Not if they went separately.

The CHAIRMAN. That was separate from the convoy—a separate movement?

Capt. PRATT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it was on June 20 that Secretary Daniels said he believed that merchant ships having armed guards were safer when sailing independently. When was that idea given up?

Capt. PRATT. I think that is just one of the points referred to. I think he possibly referred to some of our own ships. In fact, he must have referred to our own ships, because they were really the only ones that had armed guards on board.

The CHAIRMAN. It was about 2 weeks after that that we subscribed, as you have said, on July 5, to the convoy plan?

Capt. PRATT. Yes, sir. That is, the British could always put that convoy plan in, any time that they wanted it. We contributed at first not so many ships to the convoys, because we did not have them. What they wanted from us was our cruisers to help to piece out their own.

The CHAIRMAN. Later, on July 5, we practically subscribed to the whole plan?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Sims's first messages were fully borne out by later developments, were they not, about the convoy plan?

Capt. PRATT. You might call those the Admiralty messages, really, because the Admiralty, they were the ones that put that scheme through.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, but the Admiral particularly asked that it be acceded to—the plan?

Capt. PRATT. Yes, he asked for it.

The CHAIRMAN. He made such a recommendation?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, yes; he made it. I merely state that I think a subject of that importance was worthy of a little discussion, that is all.

The CHAIRMAN. And that would be your reason for the delay in adopting the convoy?

Capt. PRATT. I think that would be a reason, yes.

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The CHAIRMAN. In the case of tugs, what effort was made by the department to accede to the requests of the Allies and the recommendations of Admiral Sims?

Capt. PRATT. No; I can not agree with him there.

The CHAIRMAN. No; I say, what was done to accede to the requests of the Allies?

Capt. PRATT. The main thing that was done was to collect together the wrecking companies, coordinate them, and detach as many of them as were not needed on this coast; organize them and get them abroad to help the British raise some of their ships. Now, with regard to the tugs, because Admiral Sims happens to ask for tugs, that is not any reason you should send them, really. I was against sending tugs over there. If we had broken up towing our coal barges the winter we had that—you remember that very severe winter. Those tugs had to take our transports as they came in, sometimes six to eight to a transport, turn them around, run the coal barges, do all that sort of thing—our supply at the rear would have broken down. The tug is really a commercial proposition, and I think those tugs were needed over here first. That, of course, is a matter of judgment.

The CHAIRMAN. So that the reason for the delay in sending tugs over was because there were no available ocean-going tugs at that time to send over when the request was made?

Capt. PRATT. That we could get, and take away from our tremendous industries which were being built up here.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Capt. PRATT. I think they were needed over here more than they were over there.

The CHAIRMAN. When did the department first begin the construction of additional ocean-going tugs?

Capt. PRATT. I think I will have to refer you to Admiral McKean for that particular date. That is within his province, more—the construction. I know that we advised with the Shipping Board immediately, or early in the year, and advised them very strongly to start in building tugs.

The CHAIRMAN. Were there any delays in getting the necessary approval of the authorities for building new antisubmarine craft, and particularly destroyers?

Capt. PRATT. Of course I do not know what conferences may have taken place between the secretary and the bureau chiefs and the secretary and the Chief of Naval Operations. I do know this, that as the head of a board of which I have already submitted the plan, we worked up that scheme, and then went outside of our own province and recommended 200 destroyers and wrote out the sheet whereby the secretary was to put his approval, making it effective.

The CHAIRMAN. When did you do that?

Capt. PRATT. It was signed July 6, the same time it was handed in. He approved it right off.

The CHAIRMAN. Was it not proposed before that time?

Capt. PRATT. It may have been. As I said, I can not tell you what discussions he had with his bureau chiefs.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you not know, though, of a plan that was proposed in April for the construction of new destroyers?

Capt. PRATT. Destroyers or submarine chasers?

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The CHAIRMAN. Well, both?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, I do not know that; no.

The CHAIRMAN. Which, destroyers or submarine chasers?

Capt. PRATT. Submarine chasers. I have been told by Admiral McKean—this is within his province, you know, to know all that, and I am not supposed to know about these things definitely. Besides, in April I was not in the office in an executive capacity, and what I would tell you about this would be only hearsay. I could not tell you about that. You had better ask him.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral McKean can answer those questions?

Capt. PRATT. Yes; I told you about this, about that particular recommendation of 200 destroyers. I know definitely about that. But I like to confine myself to facts, if I can.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that the testimony shows that Admiral Sims was not consulted concerning the first convoy of troops abroad until after all the plans had been made. Can you explain that?

Capt. PRATT. Yes; I think I can explain it a bit. The Army wanted to send over these troops, and they wanted to do it very quietly—very secretly. It was necessary to get our men over into France, if for nothing more, to cheer them up by the presence of our soldiers. Admiral Sims at that time had submitted no definite plan for getting our troops across, so Admiral Gleaves, who was in charge of troop transportation on this side, came to Washington and made his plan out. He sailed with his ships about June 14. The plan was made entirely by Admiral Gleaves. And further, let me say, about all the details of arranging for troop transportation that all had to be done on this side. The only plan that Admiral Sims had anything to do with was what is called the routing plan, and his routing plan, which, of course, involved the point or longitude where the authority shifts from this side to the other, and the point or the place where his escort should take on, that is his province. That is the only part of the transport plan that he ever had anything to do with at all.

Now, where the trouble comes in is here. In arranging details of the plan, Admiral Gleaves, instead of putting them all over and crossing a certain meridian at a certain date, thought that it would be wise to split them up into four parts. That made added escort necessary, and took more destroyers to protect those troops than was really economical. That was the first move. Admiral Sims protested against that, and suggested different routing and method of routing, which came after Admiral Gleaves had sailed. There was no question about that, it was accepted immediately; but the Army wanted us to get those ships off as soon as they could go, and they just went.

The CHAIRMAN. Should not Admiral Sims have been notified of it——

Capt. PRATT. He was notified when they sailed.

The CHAIRMAN (continuing). Before the plan was made, so that he could take part in the plan?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, no, sir; he would not really have any more part in going into the details of that sort of thing than we would in interfering in a lot of work over on his side.

The CHAIRMAN. Did he not have anything to do on the other side when the troops arrived in the war zone?

Capt. PRATT. He escorted us. His was the duty of escort.

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The CHAIRMAN. And that, of course, was an important duty?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, very important.

The CHAIRMAN. Should not that matter have been a part of the general plan, and in making the general plan should not Admiral Sims, who was familiar with all matters on the other side, have been consulted?

Capt. PRATT. Why did he not get his plan over to us a little earlier, that is all? He has got some part in this to play. It is not all one-sided.

The CHAIRMAN. Was he asked to get his plan over earlier?

Capt. PRATT. He knew, as any sane man, that we would——

The CHAIRMAN. Was he told when the troops were to be sent over so that he could get his plan here?

Capt. PRATT. He has got to be a little forehanded, like everybody else.

The CHAIRMAN. But he was not asked to do so, was he?

Capt. PRATT. I would not ask him any more than I would ask any other officer to think about these things. He had his plan. He did not get it over quick enough with his routing instructions. They came after we left.

The CHAIRMAN. But he was not asked to do so as commander of those forces?

Capt. PRATT. No, sir; but as commander of the forces in European waters I think he was wise enough and big enough to send it over himself. I am not criticising him at all, but just trying to look at it fairly.

The CHAIRMAN. Upon what information were these plans based?

Capt. PRATT. Just what do you mean, sir? I do not quite——

The CHAIRMAN. Information about the general situation on the other side?

Capt. PRATT. Why, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not mean about troops, but about the general naval situation.

Capt. PRATT. That was when Joffre came over here and that was taken up. He impressed upon us the need of getting troops there just as soon as we could.

The CHAIRMAN. That is not what I mean. I am referring to the general naval situation on the other side, as to matters of escorts, and things of that sort.

Capt. PRATT. I am still a little at sea. Will you straighten me out on that again?

The CHAIRMAN. I ask from whom you got information about conditions in the war zone in regard to what escort would be needed and at what particular places the escort should meet the troops, and matters of that sort?

Capt. PRATT. Oh. When we wanted to route a ship we would cable to Admiral Sims and say, "Such and such due to sail a certain date. Please appoint rendezvous and furnish adequate escort." He did the rest. He cabled back to say where those ships should be, the point they should proceed to, and then he would cable back the number of escort he would furnish, and then we informed the ships sailing.

The CHAIRMAN. To what extent was he responsible for the safety of the transports in the war zone?

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Capt. PRATT. He was responsible for them. I think his jurisdiction, we may say, was from longitude 30, where our agreement was made with the Admiralty. I put longitude 30. He did not meet them at longitude 30 necessarily. He met them wherever he thought was the right place.

The CHAIRMAN. He was responsible for them after they had crossed that longitude?

Capt. PRATT. Yes. We left that entirely to his own judgment, as to where he would meet them. He knew more about that than we did. We never interfered with him in matters of that sort. It was up to him.

The CHAIRMAN. So that he was responsible for them during a number of days during the latter part of the trip over?

Capt. PRATT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And yet he was not consulted about plans of sending them over?

Capt. PRATT. No. Just what do you mean by that? I do not quite get you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. He was not consulted?

Capt. PRATT. He was told about routing.

The CHAIRMAN. About the number of vessels that would go at a certain time?

Capt. PRATT. He furnished the routing instructions for those ships.

The CHAIRMAN. I say he was not consulted about the plans, just how many were to go at a certain time?

Capt. PRATT. No; but it was not——

The CHAIRMAN. The number of ships that were to go?

Capt. PRATT. No; and it was not necessary. That was not a part of his job.

The CHAIRMAN. When was he notified of the sailing of the first ship convoy?

Capt. PRATT. I do not recall; but if it followed our usual custom, he would be informed at about the date of sailing, which would be about six or seven days, probably, before they had arrived at rendezvous. You see, they had quite a time, five or six days, say, before they would arrive at the rendezvous.

The CHAIRMAN. How long did it take him to have his escort ready at longitude 30, if he decided to send the escort out?

Capt. PRATT. I do not know the details of that. Admiral Bayly arranged all that. Admiral Sims did not.

The CHAIRMAN. About how long would it take for the ships to sail from Queenstown out there to meet the troop convoy?

Capt. PRATT. It takes about half an hour for them to get up steam on the oil burners, and they are always lying there ready; and there were always a certain number on duty.

The CHAIRMAN. And then they could get out to longitude 30 in what time?

Capt. PRATT. They never went out as far as longitude 30; 19 to 20 was about the place. Admiral Sims or Admiral Bayly varied it himself whenever he wanted to. We never bothered them in that respect, at all.

The CHAIRMAN. What I wanted to find out is—it may or may not be material——

Capt. PRATT. Yes.

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The CHAIRMAN (continuing). How long did it take the Admiral to get his ships out to meet the convoys? You say it would take the ships about six or seven days to get to the place where he would meet them.

Capt. PRATT. You are asking me questions I have got to do a little figuring on. Let me get my map out. [After making calculation.] About two days to get out there.

The CHAIRMAN. About two days, which would give him four or five days after his plan for the escort in the war zone was accepted?

Capt. PRATT. His routing instructions did that, absolutely.

The CHAIRMAN. From the start?

Capt. PRATT. After that first convoy.

The CHAIRMAN. After the first convoy?

Capt. PRATT. There was only one time after that when there was any question of going against a recommendation which he made in that respect, and after some discussion he accepted it, and that was when the German submarines were working pretty extensively on the northern lanes that he had laid out, he prescribed the crossing between certain latitudes. We suggested moving down 5 degrees further south, and adding that into the routing instructions, as being a little safer. There was some discussion over that in three or four cables, but he agreed to that, and we included that area, and I believe it helped some.

The CHAIRMAN. Was the department's action in the case of the first convoy based on the belief that full information regarding all details of sending it was available in Washington?

Capt. PRATT. No, the War Department did not know anything about it. Their sending of troops was based entirely on the information, I imagine, that Joffre gave them here.

The CHAIRMAN. No, I did not say the War Department. I said the Navy Department's action.

Capt. PRATT. Oh, I thought you said the War Department. Will you let me have that again?

The CHAIRMAN. Was the department's action in the case of the first convoy based on the belief that full information regarding all details of sending it was available in Washington?

Capt. PRATT. I do not believe I know what that means.

The CHAIRMAN. You have stated that you did not have Admiral Sims' plan for the convoying escort for the first convoy?

Capt. PRATT. No.

The CHAIRMAN. You had them after that?

Capt. PRATT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And did the department feel that it had information enough on which to send it over without such a plan, when the first convoy was sent over?

Capt. PRATT. Yes, it did. It got it over.

The CHAIRMAN. And afterwards it changed its plan?

Capt. PRATT. It changed it because it was an uneconomical distribution of force, which we recognized immediately after Admiral Sims protested. But as far as available knowledge went, why, yes.

Just let me explain a little further, so that you will see how fully conversant we were with the situation. There was not a submarine on the other side that moved that Sims did not give us information of constantly, as nearly as the British could give it to him. We plotted on an enormous sheet which we kept day by day, the actual position

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of every submarine that was known to be operating around the British Isles, on the Bay of Biscay coast, and off the Straits of Gibraltar. Those markers were moved daily, and sinkings were put down opposite them, and at the end of every 15 days we took a tracing of that sheet and put it away for future reference; so that we had exactly the same information as to the submarines and times of sailing as they had, because the British themselves kept us very well informed.

The CHAIRMAN. It seems to me, if after the first convoy was sent over Admiral Sims sent you new plans for a convoy and escort and those plans were immediately adopted by the department, it would have been just as well to have consulted Admiral Sims before the first one was sent, and to have gotten his plan of escort.

Capt. PRATT. I am perfectly willing to grant the point.

The CHAIRMAN. Was there ever any difficulty in getting the Navy Department to take action in taking over the troop transports?

Capt. PRATT. Any difficulty in getting the Navy Department?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Capt. PRATT. My recollection of the way that was handled is this: We very early saw the necessity of taking the transports under complete naval control. The first group of ships that went over were manned under the auspices of the Shipping Board in which the crews were not under strict military jurisdiction, that is rather a dangerous procedure when you get into the submarine waters, because if a fireman wants to work under the eight-hour law, and stops firing, steam is likely to go down. The General Staff of the Army recognized that it would be a good thing—I am not speaking of naval officers alone—and were very anxious to have them under naval jurisdiction. But then there was a third party, the Shipping Board, who were interested in these ships. That had to be adjusted. So that after we picked out the number that we wanted, it became a question of getting the signatures of the Secretary of the Navy and of the Secretary of War and of Mr. Denman of the Shipping Board. When the original plan was drawn up, I think through an oversight, the place for Mr. Denman's name was omitted, it was forgotten that he had really an interest in these ships, and a very active one. I think Secretary Baker was the first one to sign it. I think Secretary Daniels signed it next, and then the question came up of Mr. Denman's signature before it could go into effect. Like all plans of considerable magnitude of that sort, it takes time to get them going. Whether the Secretary signed immediately or whether he delayed a day or two, if that is what you mean, or something of that sort, I can not say, but it does not appear to me—I think Mr. Denman delayed a day or two in signing.

The CHAIRMAN. Capt. Laning testifies that there was a considerable delay in getting the department to put through this question of having the Navy Department have charge of the transports for troops. Do you recall any delay?

Capt. PRATT. I do not just exactly know what he means. You see, it is a joint operation, to begin with, and it involves shifting over from the Army to the Navy. Really, the Army quartermasters run the transport system. We have always wanted to get it under naval control, and they have always been a little loath to give it up. Then in comes a third party, the Shipping Board, with a very good claim, as they think, upon these ships; so that we are laboring under

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three forces, and the Navy always wanted—at least, the naval officers always wanted—to get absolute control of the transports so that we would know from the start to the finish of the voyage that they would be given the best protection that was possible. All these were matters of discussion and adjustment, and it is very possible that is what he means.

The CHAIRMAN. I read from the testimony of Capt. Laning at page 980–q, of the typewritten record [reading]:

There is perhaps no achievement of the Navy that has been as favorably commented on as its work in transporting troops across the ocean during the war. I will now point out how hard it was to get the Navy Department to take any action that would enable the Navy to get control of and operate the transports.

In connection with my duties in regard to Navy material, early in May, 1917, after carefully studying the situation, I prepared a memorandum on the subject of the Navy manning and handling the transports that would be utilized in carrying troops abroad. Unfortunately I did not save a copy of that memorandum. However, about May 24, 1917, no action having been taken on the matter and a letter having been received concerning the use of the *Vaterland* for transport duty, I took the occasion to prepare a department letter to the Secretary of the Treasury, who at that time had possession of the seized German ships, setting forth the necessity of having troop transports manned and operated by the Navy and requesting that 16 of the largest, fastest, and most suitable of the seized German ships be turned over to the Navy to be fitted out for that purpose. The letter followed closely the lines of the memorandum I had previously prepared. It reads as follows:

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington (penciled), May 25.

SIR: I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of May 22, forwarding a copy of the letter from the collector of customs of New York, in which he recommends that the *Vaterland*, not being suitable for a cargo ship and being especially suitable for a transport, should not be intrusted to a merchant crew but should be under the command of an officer of the department that would operate her in the transportation of troops.

I most heartily concur in the collector's view and recommend that not only the *Vaterland* but also such other of the seized German ships that are required for use as troop transports be turned over to the Navy Department to be prepared, fitted out, manned, and operated by the Navy in that service.

In this connection I invite your attention to the necessity of the Navy operating all vessels used in the transport of troops during war and especially of these vessels operating in waters where the enemy may be encountered. Unless such ships are manned and operated by the Navy the chances of their loss will be tremendously increased; and, since their destruction will cause enormous loss of life and may jeopardize the campaign, we must take every possible step beforehand to reduce the chance of such a loss to a minimum.

The first consideration in the transporting of troops is their safety. It must be remembered that while on troop ships the troops can not fight. A torpedo or even one lucky shot from a gun may sink a transport with practically all its precious freight of munitions and lives. It follows then that every plan for transporting troops must contain every possible safety precaution. The mere presence of a naval convoy is not in itself sufficient protection, and especially so against submarine attack.

The ships carrying troops must maneuver and operate defensively under command of the convoy commander. It is evident that the haphazard gathering of ships to transport troops, with personnel untrained to maneuvers or even to communication with the leader of the force, is merely inviting colossal disaster. The country stands to lose all and gain nothing by such a method of handling troops. It may be justly likened to detailing an untrained industrial force to go into the fighting line on land. Such a plan would have no chance against a powerful and resourceful enemy. Even to a less extent would an industrial Navy have any chance against the enemy's fighting Navy, and to carry thousands of troops into the waters of the fighting front in industrial shipping places them in the greatest possible danger.

While there are a multitude of details in connection with the transportation of troops there are two points of vital importance to be considered in assigning transports. These are:

(1) The selection of vessels of suitable type, with sufficient capacity and speed.

(2) The personnel and operations of the vessels.

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The selection of ships for transport service requires care. Ships suitable must have accommodations for a great number of men and cargo capacity for the equipment and supplies of the men carried. Speed enters into the selection for several reasons. First comes the question of safety, for the greater the speed the more immune is a ship from attack.

Next comes the question of grouping the transports according to speed. If we mix ships of various speeds in one group of transports, the speed for all of the group at once becomes that of the slowest ship. If we put the *Vaterland*, with 24 knots speed, in a group containing one ship of, say, 15 knots speed, the *Vaterland* becomes for that trip a 15-knot ship and at once loses the value of her great speed. It follows then that in selecting and arranging ships for transport service we must select ships of similar speeds for each group and sufficient groups to carry out our task.

From a study of the possible requirements of our overseas operation it would seem that four groups of ships should be provided. If of sufficient speed each group can make a round trip about once each month and this would give us a constant and steady flow of troops and supplies to the front. After a careful study of the ships most suitable for the purpose, the Navy Department is convinced that the best ships available are certain of the seized German ships. They were especially designed to carry troops and can be put in service in the shortest possible time. It is advisable to use them, since by so doing the regularly established shipping routes will be least interfered with. These ships are at once the best and most available for the purpose, and of them those listed below will answer the immediate requirements. They are grouped as to speed and each group would form one unit of the transport service, probably as large a unit as could be safely convoyed with the submarine situation as it is. These groups are as follows, the estimated troop capacity being based on an allowance of 4 tons per man carried:

	Estimated troop capacity.	Speed.
		Knots.
First group:		
Vaterland	10,000	24
Kronprinzessin Cecelie	3,000	23.5
Kaiser Wilhelm II	3,000	23.5
Von Steuben	2,500	23
Second group:		
George Washington	8,000	19
America	7,000	17.5
Martha Washington (Austrian)	3,000	17
Third group:		
Hamburg	3,300	16
Grosser Kurfurst	4,000	15.5
Konig Wilhelm II	3,000	15.5
Princess Alice	3,300	15.5
Princess Irene	3,300	15.5
Fourth group:		
Cincinnati	5,000	15
President Grant	6,000	14.5
President Lincoln	6,000	14.5
Frederick der Grosse	3,300	14.5

With a fleet of transports operating in groups as above we could handle about 70,000 men a month, with all their equipment except animals.

To handle these ships safely, they must have the personnel trained to operate in naval methods. This applies not only to the actual maneuvering of the ship but also to the specially trained men to man and operate the guns, the signaling outfit, and the radio outfit. Men untrained in naval methods can not operate any of these things and yet on them depends the ship's safety.

Also we must not overlook the fact that each of these ships must be specially equipped with naval outfits of signal books, radio, etc. These things can not be entrusted to any but naval men. They are most secret, and to allow them to pass into other hands endangers not alone the ships of the expedition but the whole Navy that uses them.

Again we must bear in mind that these ships, carrying the most precious and essential part of our war forces, must be entirely manned by men tried and true. The methods of signing up crews for merchant shipping, if used in obtaining crews for vessels in our transport service, leaves an open way for enemy agents or sympathisers to work into the crews of these vessels, and they can carry out any nefarious design they might wish. We must man transports from captain to coal passer with the most dependable men available, so that there may be the minimum danger from enemy agents.

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From the above it is evident that there can be no division of authority on the ships engaged in carrying troops. If the Navy is to be responsible for the safety of the convoy after sailing, it can not permit any but its own representatives, trained to the requirements of the duty, to operate any part of it. Even then, only by close coordination between every unit of the expedition, can success be expected, and with the utmost coordination the duty is fraught with danger. We can not permit added dangers by putting any phase of the troop transportation in the hands of untrained and unorganized assistants, or in the hands of anyone of whose loyalty and fidelity there can be doubt.

I therefore strongly urge that this matter be given careful attention, and that not only the *Vaterland* but all the other vessels listed above as necessary for transport duty and that are not now assigned the Navy, be assigned to the Navy at once in order that they may be properly fitted and equipped for the work and manned and put in service as troop transports at the earliest possible time. As not only the safety of the expedition but also the success of our whole campaign in the war depends on this matter, it should be decided on now and not wait for terrible disaster to show us the error of adopting any other plan.

Sincerely, yours,

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

The honorable the SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

Capt. PRATT. What date is that; early in May?

The CHAIRMAN. May 25.

Capt. PRATT. Well, I do not know about that. I know that when Capt. Chase——

The CHAIRMAN. After reading that letter, Capt. Laning continued as follows [reading]:

Four days later I prepared a letter to the Secretary of War asking the War Department's assistance toward getting the troop transport service turned over to the Navy and the service established on a sound basis. This letter, which was returned to me some days later from Admiral Benson's office unsigned and marked "hold," reads as follows:

NAVY DEPARTMENT, *Washington*.

(Penciled note: "Hold, Capt. McKean.")

SIR: There is forwarded herewith a copy of a letter I am this day sending the Secretary of the Treasury, suggesting that certain seized German ships be turned over to the Navy to be fitted out, manned, and operated by the Navy as troop transports.

While the Navy Department does not desire to change the arrangements already made with the War Department concerning the immediate transportation of troops across the Atlantic, it feels that the ultimate problem is so essentially naval that it would be derelict in its duty if it did not point out what it believes to be the most practicable and safe method of cerrying out its part of the general mission.

The Navy is concerned in transportation of troops only from the time they go on board the troop ships until they leave the ships, but during that time it is entirely responsible for the expedition. The points of embarkation and debarkation mark the beginning and end of the Navy's responsibility, and in view of that responsibility it recommends a well-planned and carefully organized service.

The Navy Department is of the opinion that the transportation of troops should interfere as little as possible with shipping now engaged in transporting supplies across the Atlantic, and to that end proposes that certain seized German ships, especially designed for use as transports in war, be fitted up for the purpose. The ships can not be used immediately, but when repaired, equipped, and properly manned will be the best ships possible for the work. The ships named in the letter will give excellent service and will probably handle the transport question fully, enabling this country to deliver in the neighborhood of 70,000 troops per month on the western front. It is not proposed that all supplies for troops be sent on these transports, though they will, of course, carry all that their capacity permits. Munitions, animals, etc., will, as a general rule, be transported by merchant ships, while fresh troops with their equipment will go forward on transports.

The reasons for the Navy handling this service are set forth in general terms in my letter to the Secretary of the Treasury, and in view of the necessity of at once establishing the service on the best possible basis, I request that the War Department, if it concurs with the views set fourth, assist in every possible way to establish the service as recommended at the earliest possible time.

Sincerely yours,

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

The honorable the SECRETARY OF WAR.

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Then he says:

As I said before, that letter was not signed, and was returned to me marked "Hold."

Even as late as July 3, 1917, I was still hammering away the little I could to get the transports turned over to the Navy. This is evidenced by a memorandum submitted by me to the Chief of Naval Operations on July 3, 1917, and which I will place in the record.

I will ask the stenographer to put this also in the record at this time.

The memorandum referred to is here printed in the record as follows:

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, July 3, 1917.

MEMORANDUM.

Attached hereto is a copy of a letter addressed to the President by the Chairman of the Shipping Board, in which it is requested that all seized ships not already turned over to the Navy be transferred to the Shipping Board.

It is noted from the letter that while the Shipping Board is apparently averse to turning over to the Navy or Army any of the seized ships that are to be used as transports, they suggest that the President give the matter consideration and that a decision as to what branch of the Government shall operate troop ships should be reached only after the arguments of all concerned are heard.

It is further noted from the letter that the board states that there is abundant time to make this decision before the ships are ready to load. This statement would be true if a merchant ships were ready for use as a transport whenever she is ready to load, but such is not the case. A very considerable change must be made in merchant ships before they are suitable for transport use and to delay making these changes will merely delay the readiness of the ships for the service. The decision should be made at the earliest possible time and the fitting-out work started.

From conversation with Shipping Board representatives it is understood that they agree that some of the German ships must be used as transports, but they are of the opinion that such ships should be officered, manned, and operated by the Shipping Board and taken by the Army on "time charter" whenever it becomes necessary to transport troops. They apparently fail to grasp the idea that if we are to transport a large number of troops to France it will require a special service of large, fast ships, and that the ships engaged in that service will be worked to capacity and can not do any cargo carrying other than to bring such cargo from their ports of call in Europe as may be ready when the ship is about to return. Inasmuch as the transports can not engage in commercial work at all, it hardly seems proper that the board should insist that they be officered, manned, and operated by civilian complements.

To operate troopships in the submarine danger zone with any but the best disciplined and most loyal crew available is merely inviting colossal disaster. The Shipping Board plans to officer and man its ships as all merchant ships are officered and manned. One has but to read the reports of the officers in charge of our armed guards to realize the absolute menace to any ship by employing that method; yet it is the Shipping Board's plan to apply it to ships carrying invaluable munitions and thousands of men on whom our success in war depends.

Unless troopships are manned and operated under the trained and loyal men of the Navy the chances of their loss will be tremendously increased, and since their destruction will cause enormous loss of life and may jeopardize the campaign, we must take every possible step beforehand to reduce the chance of such loss to a minimum.

The first consideration in the transporting of troops is their safety. It must be remembered that while on troopshisp the troops can not fight. A torpedo or even one lucky shot from a gun may sink a transport with practically all its precious freight of munition and lives. It follows that every plan for transporting troops must contain every possible safety precaution. The mere presence of a naval convoy is not in itself sufficient protection to troopships, especially against submarine attack. When attacked, the ships carrying troops must maneuver and operate defensively under the command of the convoy commander. It is evident that the haphazard gathering of ships to transport troops, with personnel untrained to maneuvers or even to communication with the leader of the force, is merely inviting colossal disaster. The country stands to lose all and gain nothing by such a method of handling troops. It may be just likened to detailing an untrained industrial force to go into the fighting line on land. Such a plan would have no chance against a powerful and resourceful enemy. Even to a less extent would an industrial navy have any chance against the enemy's fighting navy, and to carry thousands of troops into the waters of the fighting front in industrial shipping places them in the greatest possible danger.

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While there are a multitude of details in connection with the transportation of troops, there are two points of vital importance to be considered in assigning transports. These are:

(1) The selection of vessels of suitable type, with sufficient capacity and speed.

(2) The personnel and operation of the vessels.

The selection of ships for transport service requires care. Ships suitable must have accommodations for a great number of men and cargo capacity for the equipment and supplies of the men carried. Speed enters into the selection for several reasons: First comes the question of safety, for the greater the speed the more immune is a ship from submarine attack. Next comes the question of grouping the transports according to speed. If we mix ships of various speeds in one group of transport, the speed for all of the group at once becomes that of the slowest ship. If we put the *Vaterland*, with 24 knots speed, in a group containing one ship of say 15 knots speed, the *Vaterland* becomes for that trip a 15-knot ship and at once loses the value of her great speed. It follows then that in selecting and arranging ships for transport service we must select ships of similar speed for each group and sufficient groups to carry out our task.

From a study of the possible requirements of our overseas operation it would seem that four groups of ships should be provided. If of sufficient speed, each group can make a round trip about once each month, and this would give us a constant and steady flow of troops and supplies to the front. After a careful study of the ships most suitable for the purpose, the Chief of Operations is convinced that the best ships available are certain of the seized German ships. They were especially designed to carry troops and can be put in service in the shortest possible time. It is advisable to use them, since by so doing the regularly established shipping routes will be least interfered with. These ships are at once the best and most available for the purpose, and of them those listed below will answer the immediate requirements. They are grouped as to speed and each group would form one unit of the transport service, probably as large a unit as could be safely convoyed with the submarine situation as it is. These groups are as follows, the estimated troop capacity being based on an allowance of 4 tons per man carried:

	Estimated troop capacity.	Speed, knots.
First group:		
Vaterland	10,000	24
Kronprinzessin Cecelie	3,000	23½
Kaiser Wilhelm II	3,000	23½
Second group:		
George Washington	8,000	19
America	7,000	17.5
Third group:		
Hamburg	3,300	16
Grosser Kurfurst	4,000	15.5
Konig Wilhelm II	3,000	15.5
Princess Alice	3,300	15.5
Princess Irene	3,300	15.5
Fourth group:		
Cincinnati	5,000	15
President Grant	6,000	14.5
President Lincoln	6,000	14.5
Frederick Der Grosse	3,300	14.5
Barbarossa	3,000	14

With a fleet of transports operating in groups as above we could handle about 70,000 men a month, with all their equipment except animals.

To handle these ships safely, they must have a personnel trained to operate in naval methods. This applies not only to the actual maneuvering of the ship, but also the specially trained men to man and operate the guns, the signaling outfit, and the radio outfit. Men untrained in naval methods can not operate any of these things and yet on them depends the ships' safety.

Also we must not overlook the fact that each of these ships must be specially equipped with naval outfits of signal books, radio, etc. These things can not be intrusted to any but naval men. They are most secret and to allow them to pass into other hands endangers not alone the ships of the expedition, but the whole Navy that uses them.

Again we must bear in mind that these ships carrying the most precious and essentialpart of our war forces must be entirely manned by men tried and true. The methods of signing up crews for merchant shipping if used in obtaining crews for

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vessels in our transport service leaves an open way for enemy agents or sympathizers to work into the crews of these vessels and they can carry out any nefarious design they might wish. We must man transports from captain to coal passer with the most dependable men available, so that there may be the minimum danger from enemy agents.

From the above it is evident that there can be no division of authority on the ships engaged in carrying troops. If the Navy is to be responsible for the safety of the convoy after sailing it can not permit any but its own representatives, trained to the requirements of the duty, to operate any part of it. Even then, only by close coordination between every unit of the expedition can success be expected and with the utmost coordination the duty is fraught with danger. We can not permit added dangers by putting any phase of the troop transportation in the hands of untrained and unorganized assistants, or in the hands of anyone of whose loyalty and fidelity there can be any doubt.

This matter should be given careful attention and all the vessels listed above as necessary for transport duty, be assigned to the Navy at once in order that they may be properly fitted and equipped for the work and manned and put in service as troop transports at the earliest possible time. As not only the safety of the expeditions but also the success of our whole campaign in the war depends on this matter, the correct decision should be reached without waiting for terrible disaster to show us the error of adopting any other plan. The best service possible is none too good for taking our troops across the sea and that best service is the service of the Navy.

It is not contemplated to use these vessels as naval auxiliaries, but only to take them under complete naval control during such time as they are employed in carrying troops for the Army. The Navy Department does not wish these ships to remain permanently in the Navy, but to have them revert to the Shipping Board when the transportation of troops has been completed.

Capt. PRATT. It looks as though Capt. Laning had a little hard luck.

The CHAIRMAN. Apparently the letter he had prepared for the Secretary to send was held. It was marked "hold." Do you know anything about those circumstances?

Capt. PRATT. I do not know anything about that letter, but I do know—I can not say the time—but some time before June 25 Capt. Chase turned over to me and said, "Get those transports;" or something like that. I went to work at it, and I got them. The President signed the proclamation July 6, I think. That necessitated getting the Secretary's signature and Mr. Denman's signature and the signature of the Secretary of War. I do not know anything about Capt. Laning's letter.

The CHAIRMAN. It shows that the transports turned over about July 10 were the very ones suggested in the first memorandum.

Capt. PRATT. Admiral McKean, I think, knows more about that than I do. I was only planning, along about that time; but I know that when they turned that job over to me, we got them after a while, and the President signed it about July 6. Admiral McKean can supply the details.

The CHAIRMAN. I am afraid we shall have to adjourn now, Captain. There is a matter upon the floor of the Senate in which we are all interested and we must be there. We will adjourn until Monday morning at 10 o'clock.

(Thereupon, at 12 o'clock m., the subcommittee adjourned until Monday, April 26, 1920, at 10 o'clock a. m.)

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NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

MONDAY, APRIL 26, 1920.

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON NAVAL AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 o'clock a. m., in room 235, Senate Office Building, Senator Frederick Hale presiding.

Present, Senators Hale (chairman), Ball, Pittman, and Trammell.

TESTIMONY OF CAPT. W. V. PRATT—Resumed.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. Capt. Pratt, I have a number of questions to ask you this morning, and I hope that as far as possible you will make your answers as short as you can. I do not want to suppress any information, at all, but I think we would like to get along as fast as we can with the hearing.

Capt. PRATT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Capt. Pratt, I have been impressed with the great amount of work that you and your brother officers of the Bureau of Operations have had to do during the war. Now, I want you to tell me what the Navy Department would have done if there had been no Bureau of Operations.

Capt. PRATT. I think, sir, it would have fallen to pieces, not because the bureaus were not thoroughly efficient and headed by men who thoroughly understood their own duties, but because it was necessary to have a coordinating head, some one who looked at the plan and policy alone, in order that each bureau should play its appointed part.

The CHAIRMAN. Who is responsible for the creation of the Office of Operations?

Capt. PRATT. I do not know that, sir. Admiral Benson knows more than I do.

The CHAIRMAN. Was not that included in the Fiske plan?

Capt. PRATT. Yes, I think he broached the idea first.

The CHAIRMAN. You think that Fiske did?

Capt. PRATT. I think so, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did not the Secretary use his influence to strike out of the original bill the word "responsible," the one word which would have given the Chief of Operations authority over the bureaus and authority to coordinate them under that section?

Capt. PRATT. I think you had better ask Admiral Benson that question, because I do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. You believe that the word "responsibility" should be there?

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Capt. PRATT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You believe that the Chief of Operations should have the responsibility of preparing the Navy for war, and authority under the supreme authority of the Secretary?

Capt. PRATT. Yes, sir; I think that he should have the same authority, practically, that the Chief of Staff of the Army has; that is, military authority only, under the supervision of the Secretary of the Navy, under the President.

The CHAIRMAN. With the responsibility?

Capt. PRATT. With the responsibility; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And with that responsibility the chief of operations should have the power to bring his views before Congress?

Capt. PRATT. I think he should, sir; and if he then does what he ought not to do, the Secretary can replace him by another man, and should replace him. If, on the other hand, he finds that he is not being supported by the Secretary, he can bring his opinions directly before the proper authorities.

I further believe, however, that the general board should be created by law and not be a board appointed by the will of any person, because the general board acts in the capacity of the "elder statesman," you might say, within the Navy Department; and they, if created by law, would have a great check upon the Chief of Naval Operations in case he overstepped his authority, and they would also be in a position to write up documents which would clear the whole situation. It would be a check both ways.

The CHAIRMAN. I am going to ask you, Capt. Pratt, later on to submit any suggestions that you might have that have been derived from your experience during the war in the Bureau of Operations, for any changes that might be profitable in the organization of the department.

Capt. PRATT. Yes, sir; I can answer that question right now. I have already drawn up such a paper, and have also submitted it to the Chief of Naval Operations, with the request that he call a conference—ask the Secretary to have a conference between himself and all bureau chiefs and everyone else concerned in order that there would be no dissenting opinion when it came up. I have done that.

The CHAIRMAN. With a view of giving that to the committee?

Capt. PRATT. I did not mention the committee, sir. It passes out of my hands.

The CHAIRMAN. That is for the department?

Capt. PRATT. That is for the department.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you give the committee a copy of that plan?

Capt. PRATT. I can, sir, at any time you wish it.

The CHAIRMAN. I will write you about that.

Capt. PRATT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What would have happened during the war if there had been no division of material and no planning section in the Division of Naval Operations with plans for carrying on the war?

Capt. PRATT. Without a division of material we would have fared badly. Without the planning section, once we got into the war, we would have had to depend largely on Sims's planning section, and as a matter of fact that is what we did do except for matters that occurred in the United States. We used the papers that Sims's planning section sent over to us, and they did a wonderful work.

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The CHAIRMAN. Would not your labors in the office of operations have been eased had it been the policy of the Secretary of the Navy Department to gradually and intelligently prepare our Navy for war as it became evident that we were to be drawn into the war?

Capt. PRATT. I would have liked nothing better than to have had a thoroughly organized plan for the department. It would have made the work very much easier.

The CHAIRMAN. After the sinking of the *Lusitania* it looked to you as though we might or probably would be drawn into the war, did it not?

Capt. PRATT. It is difficult to draw a distinction, some times, between your own personal leaning and what you think is going to happen. I thought we were going in when the *Lusitania* was sunk.

The CHAIRMAN. And continually thereafter?

Capt. PRATT. No, sir; I veered and hauled in my opinion. I was not definitely certain of anything.

The CHAIRMAN. But at least at that time it looked very possible that we would be drawn into the war?

Capt. PRATT. It did to me.

The CHAIRMAN. And after that time there was never any question as to who our opponent would be if we were drawn in?

Capt. PRATT. Not to my mind; not the slightest doubt.

The CHAIRMAN. Would not your difficulties have been greatly lessened if sufficient material and men had been prepared between 1914 and 1917 to man the vessels of the reserve fleet?

Capt. PRATT. Yes, sir; I think they would have been considerably lessened.

The CHAIRMAN. Was not the need of vessels and men called to the attention of the Secretary of the Navy during those years?

Capt. PRATT. I do not know of that—first-hand knowledge.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know whether the Secretary approved or directed any active preparations for war and additions to personnel between 1914 and 1917?

Capt. PRATT. That I would not be able to state as fact. Admiral Benson would know that.

The CHAIRMAN. If all ships, cruisers, and destroyers of our Navy had been gradually prepared and made ready for war as to material and personnel between 1914 and 1917, would we not have been able to throw our force into the war much more promptly than we did?

Capt. PRATT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. If these preparations had been made in those years previous to our entering the war would it not have freed our navy yards from congestion and left them free to undertake new construction?

Capt. PRATT. Yes; it would have freed them very much, and to this extent; it would have relieved the burden that the purely naval ships put upon those yards, and would have enabled us to have taken on the refitting of outside vessels like yachts, and so forth, much more readily than we did do it.

The CHAIRMAN. If the Navy as actually existing had been in all respects ready for war in 1914, would not a load have been taken off your shoulders in planning for naval operations?

Capt. PRATT. It would have relieved us of a certain amount of anxiety, due to the overload, you might say, which is placed on

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people who have to suddenly jump from peace-time activities to war-time activities.

The CHAIRMAN. And it would have changed your plans, of course, to a considerable extent?

Capt. PRATT. Not the general basic plan. The details of the plans would have been changed.

The CHAIRMAN. You did not draw up the basic plans, did you? These were detailed plans?

Capt. PRATT. Well, let us say the basic conception of the planning. The details could have been carried out more promptly.

The CHAIRMAN. You had been to the Naval War College, Capt. Pratt?

Capt. PRATT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In time of peace do you not think it would be wise to appoint a graduate of the Naval War College as Chief of Operations?

Capt. PRATT. I think the Chief of Naval Operations should always have been a graduate of our war college.

The CHAIRMAN. And especially so if there were a war impending?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. In your direct testimony you made the following statement:

"To administer this department, there is called a civilian—and under no circumstances should the supervisory head be other than a civilian—a splendid man, able, efficient, highly trained in some subjects, but not technically trained in the activities of the Navy nor a student in the art of war. This system functions after a fashion in peace, but it does not function when preparation for war becomes necessary, nor does it function in war. It is necessary that at the outbreak of hostilities the military head should assume the direction of and responsibility for the conduct of military operations for whose preparation he has had by law no direct control nor authority to coordinate in peace. Such is the system we work under to-day, and did at the outbreak of the war. Thanks to the voluntary cooperation of every district departmental organization, including the Secretary, the Navy was able to pull itself together and to work exceedingly well in war.

"If any lack of preparation existed within the Naval Service prior to our entry into the war, if any lack of harmony existed then or exists now within our Navy, it can be laid more justly to the system of organization the department labors under than upon the shoulders of any individual."

That is a quotation from your testimony?

Capt. PRATT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It would appear from this that the organization of the Navy Department prior to the World War was by no means perfect and should be changed. Is that your opinion?

Capt. PRATT. That is, sir. I think the organization is not fitted to conduct war efficiently.

The CHAIRMAN. And also prior to our going into the war?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you familiar with the general plan of organization proposed by the Mahan-Moody Commission and the Swift Board and the aid system, all of which sought to coordinate departmental agencies under the Secretary?

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Capt. PRATT. In a very general way, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you consider that those systems constituted a good beginning upon which to base an organization to prepare for and conduct a war?

Capt. PRATT. I think that is correct as far as it goes. The difference between that organization and the organization I would have in my mind, is this: Those aids are coordinated directly to the Secretary of the Navy. I would say those aids should be coordinated directly under the military head or Chief of Naval Operations under the Secretary. That would be the difference.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you repeat the first part of that? I could not hear it.

Capt. PRATT. As I understand the Moody plan, the various aids are coordinated directly under the Secretary. In other words, there might be exactly as much strife as regards the plan and policy under that system as there is under the present. Under the present system the bureau chiefs coordinate directly under the Secretary of the Navy. I would have the aids for material, personnel, and inspections coordinated directly under one military head, under the Secretary; in other words, I would provide that they should be coordinated under the Chief of Naval Operations instead of directly under the civilian head, but the civilian head always exercising that right and authority to discharge his policy man whenever his policies conflicted with the Secretary's.

Senator PITTMAN. Mr. Chairman, may I interrupt just a minute not to ask any questions, but, approximately, how long do you think it will be before you are through with Capt. Pratt?

The CHAIRMAN. I hope to get through this morning.

Senator PITTMAN. There is a meeting of the Naval Affairs Committee, as of course you know, at 10.30 this morning, and the chairman of the committee has asked that we be over there. He is trying to get a quorum and wants to act upon some amendments that have been agreed upon between the House committee and the Senate committee. If you will excuse me, I will go over to that meeting.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

(At this point Senator Pittman left the hearing.)

The CHAIRMAN. Capt. Pratt, do you think it was wise to destroy and discredit the Mahan system and return to the bureau system with only an aid for operations who had no authority to coordinate the bureaus?

Capt. PRATT. No, sir; it is a return to an older order of things which was not as wise.

The CHAIRMAN. You think it was not wise to do this?

Capt. PRATT. I do think it was not wise.

The CHAIRMAN. You have excused our lack of preparation for the World War by saying that such preparation would have been an overt act. Is there any principle in international law which forbids a neutral nation to prepare in anticipation of being forced into a war?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, no. The overt acts that I spoke of were those two that would have to be accomplished in order to make our Navy thoroughly efficient. I do not mean by that that the Navy itself should not be prepared to the minute, because I believe it should be. It is always good insurance.

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The CHAIRMAN. But you do not know of any principle of international law that would forbid a nation to increase its navy if it saw fit?

Capt. PRATT. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Without committing an act against neutrality?

Capt. PRATT. No, sir; I think it is perfectly legitimate, unless the increase is so evidently directed at a particular country that you can not avoid having that country make a protest.

The CHAIRMAN. But, Captain, as a student of international law, even in such a case you would not say that there was any rule of international law prohibiting it, would you?

Capt. PRATT. No; you are quite right; not in defense, but as an aggressive act there might be some question.

The CHAIRMAN. It is not an aggressive act simply to prepare and to build? The aggressive act would come afterwards, would it not, in using the prepared Navy?

Capt. PRATT. Well, let me perhaps note a difference. If Germany had built a navy and had created military forces sufficient to have guarded her own boundaries, no one could protest at that; but if she were to build up a military organization which she is evidently planning to use for some specific purpose, that I believe is going beyond the strict rights of a neutral nation.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you would say in every case that the building of a naval program should be practically agreed to by all friendly nations?

Capt. PRATT. By no means.

The CHAIRMAN. Or by any friendly nation?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, no. We have a perfect right to lay our cards right on the table and say what we will do. If we have made a statement to the effect that we will use everything in our power to preserve our rights of neutrality, then I believe we have a right to increase our power just so far as we will, if we have given advance notice of what we are going to do, to protect ourselves.

The CHAIRMAN. As a matter of fact, you would not have to give any advance notice at all. We have a perfect right to do anything we want to do in the line of building, and if another nation did not like it they could protest or not as they saw fit; but it is not an overt act, an act of war, is it?

Capt. PRATT. As I said before, I draw the line between preparation for defense and preparation which oversteps the mark and becomes an aggressive act. I suppose that is a hypothetical question, is it not; that is, it is one of these questions where you are assuming two countries at peace?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Capt. PRATT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I am assuming the state of affairs that existed before we went into the war.

Capt. PRATT. Oh, that is a little different, I think. Under those circumstances I think we had given ample notice to the effect that we would protect our neutrality to the utmost. It seems to me that we had very frequently stated so, and that being the case, I see no reason why we could not have——

The CHAIRMAN. Laid down any plans of a building program we wanted?

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Capt. PRATT. It looks to me as though we had given advance notice.

The CHAIRMAN. And we could have laid down any program we wanted without its constituting an overt act?

Capt. PRATT. I should think so.

The CHAIRMAN. You have said in your statement:

But behind all these details there must be the determination of a united people, expressed through the proper authorities, that they desire and will declare war within a certain specified limit of time, and that within this limit of time they will give, through the proper channels, to their military leaders the power and means to so prepare and organize that at the appointed time these organizations may strike.

Can you tell me exactly what that means? Do you think that Congress should declare war one year from date?

Capt. PRATT. Well, of course not; but take the history, compare the history of the British Empire and the German Empire. The German Empire does not say she is going to declare war, but a few of those who are on the inside probably know that that is exactly what they are preparing for, and when that spirit exists and when the power exists in the hands of the ruler or the heads to bring that spirit to pass, it is an easy matter to determine when and how you will strike. Now, they have never been able, so far as I know, to do that in Great Britain, and the history of our past wars, I think, bears out fairly well the fact that we are never quite ready at the beginning. We do not want to have that power. It is fundamentally a case of the spirit.

The CHAIRMAN. But you state that "behind all these details there must be the determination of a united people." That could take in this country, could it not?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And you continue, "expressed through the proper authorities." What would that mean in the case of this country?

Capt. PRATT. You gentlemen have a deciding head.

The CHAIRMAN. No; but I want you to explain to me just what the idea means. Whom do you mean when you say "expressed through the proper authorities"?

Capt. PRATT. I mean those authorities who have the right to declare war.

The CHAIRMAN. That is Congress?

Capt. PRATT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And you say "that they desire and will declare war within a certain specified limit of time." Say, one year?

Capt. PRATT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you would say that Congress should meet and declare war within one year from a specified date?

Capt. PRATT. Let me explain what I mean by that. Let us start right out with a nation in peace. We see that certain acts are being committed against us, because I do not think that the spirit of this country would ever permit us to say, "We will plan deliberately to absorb the territory of some country or to commit aggressive acts against her." But let us say that things have been running on to such a pass that we feel that we must, to support our honor, do certain definite things which amount or lead to war. Then, if we want to be thoroughly prepared, so that we strike at once, there must be that thorough understanding between all the Government depart-

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ments and the authorities who can declare war, so that there will be no indecision on the part of the Navy or the Army as to exactly what steps they must take to get ready, and those who provide the funds must give the funds for it.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you do not mean that they must declare war at any future time, or state that they intend to declare war?

Capt. PRATT. No; they must have such a thorough understanding.

The CHAIRMAN. That is, a secret understanding. An open understanding would give too much information to the enemy, would it not?

Capt. PRATT. An open understanding would; but I would rather do it in the open, myself.

The CHAIRMAN. Then what would happen under an open understanding, that the enemy with whom we proposed to fight, if we gave her a year's notice that we were preparing, would fight at a certain time?

Capt. PRATT. I have mentioned that contingency, or indirectly mentioned it once before, that to prepare ourselves I think our fleet must be so strong and so well prepared that we, behind it, can always develop our full power to wage war.

The CHAIRMAN. But even at that, the year's notice would give the other side quite an opportunity to get ready.

Capt. PRATT. You should not have a year's notice with the fleet. The fleet should be always ready.

The CHAIRMAN. No, I say a year's notice of your intention to declare war. It is rather an interesting idea. I wanted you to develop it, that is all.

Capt. PRATT. I understand; it is an interesting idea. Now, a great many people thought Germany was going to declare war. It was talked of abroad, and yet she went right on building up, and Great Britain had not increased her army, with all the warning she had. Her fleet was always ready, but the rest of her military resources were still undeveloped when she went into the war. That has been her history, and I think that is liable to be our history.

The CHAIRMAN. But in the World War there was no country that intended to make war or that gave notice through their proper authorities that they were to go to war, was there? Germany had a date fixed, but she did not make it public?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, that is true. I do not mean we should make our own dates public. I mean that if you want to have the Navy and the Army ready to go to war, it is not necessary for you to openly say so, but you have got to thoroughly understand that that is what you intend to do.

The CHAIRMAN. But this does not say to have your Army and Navy ready, necessarily. It says, "that they desire and will declare war within a certain specified limit of time." That is more than having their army and navy ready for defense.

Was Germany's submarine campaign developed in 1915 and 1916 sufficiently to indicate to naval experts the general lines along which preparations to meet it should be made?

Capt. PRATT. I do not believe I can answer that question definitely, because we had to learn as war progressed exactly how we would meet the necessity?

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The CHAIRMAN. Exactly how many tons of shipping had been sunk by submarines prior to January 1, 1917?

Capt. PRATT. I can give you, I think, the exact figures.

The CHAIRMAN. Several million tons, was it not?

Capt. PRATT. Several million, yes; 3,947,994 tons.

The CHAIRMAN. Could we not, bearing in mind this great loss from submarines, have had some plan ready for meeting the submarine menace at that time?

Capt. PRATT. I think it was fairly well understood by all naval men that practically the only useful type or the only type useful against the submarine, was the destroyer.

The CHAIRMAN. With the depth bomb?

Capt. PRATT. The depth bomb had not been developed that early.

The CHAIRMAN. When was the depth bomb developed?

Capt. PRATT. I do not know the date. It was developed some time, I think, before we came into the war. I do not know the date.

The CHAIRMAN. Some time in 1916, was it not?

Capt. PRATT. I think some time in 1916, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. On April 6, 1917, when we declared war, did we have many depth bombs ready in this country for use?

Capt. PRATT. I do not know, from fact. I will have to ask Admiral McKean to look that up, as it is a material matter. Could he be referred to? That is a matter of material and he could give a more definite answer than I can.

The CHAIRMAN. I wish you would ask Admiral McKean in his statement to give me the figures on that question.

Capt. PRATT. I will, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Because I may forget to ask him later on.

Germany's fleet was driven from the sea after the Battle of Jutland, was it not?

Capt. PRATT. Yes, sir; I think we can say that.

The CHAIRMAN. And the date of the Battle of Jutland was what?

Capt. PRATT. May 18, 1916; subject to correction if that is wrong.

The CHAIRMAN. Subsequent to the Battle of Jutland, in view of the fact that the German fleet was driven from the sea, should not our preparations for war have intelligently considered and have emphasized the submarine warfare, and should we not have concentrated upon the building of antisubmarine craft?

Capt. PRATT. Yes, sir; I think it would have been wise to have looked forward in that direction.

The CHAIRMAN. And if we had begun in 1916 by fitting out our existing ships and destroyers for war, and if we had built more destroyers and antisubmarine craft, could we not have quickly thrown a strong force against Germany's submarines in April, 1917?

Capt. PRATT. We could.

The CHAIRMAN. How many destroyers, under the new three-year program of 1916, did we use during the war prior to the armistice; how many submarines that were constructed under the three-year program did we use during the war?

Capt. PRATT. I will ask Admiral McKean to look that up. He is thoroughly familiar with material and the program, and he can give you facts.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know whether the Secretary of the Navy ever sought to impress upon Congress or the Navy Department the importance of getting ready for war?

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Capt. PRATT. I do not know that, sir. I know nothing about that.

The CHAIRMAN. Either the department or Congress?

Capt. PRATT. I know nothing about that, sir, because I did not come into the office at all in any active degree until after February, 1917. I had never been on duty in Washington before.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know anything about the plan submitted by Capt. Laning to Admiral Benson after the outbreak of the war?

Capt. PRATT. A plan about what, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. A general plan—war plan?

Capt. PRATT. No. Capt. Laning was in Admiral McKean's department. He would know about that. He can answer that.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know about that?

Capt. PRATT. I do not know about that, no, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know about any plan of Capt. Laning that Admiral Benson referred to Capt. Schofield to be amplified?

Capt. PRATT. No, sir; I do not recall any.

The CHAIRMAN. Did the office of operations have a plan when you went in as aid—a war plan?

Capt. PRATT. We had a number of plans which we evolved as it became necessary. If that means a basic plan, such a plan is of more use in preparing themselves for the war than it is for actually carrying war on, because the basic plan had to be altered continually as the conditions change.

The CHAIRMAN. You had no particular base plan that was altered as conditions changed?

Capt. PRATT. No, sir, not that I was familiar with.

The CHAIRMAN. Does not the law give to the Bureau of Operations the responsibility of preparing plans for war? Or, if you do not want to use the word "responsibility", is not that a part of the duty of the Bureau of Operations under the act of Congress?

Capt. PRATT. Yes, it is; and that is just exactly one of the points that I have never been able to quite settle in my mind. The general board is responsible for plans. The Office of Operations is responsible for plans. And there was not any real planning section in Operations; and that is why I say there is something the matter with the system.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, regardless of the general board or of what they should have done, should not Operations have had its plans, also?

Capt. PRATT. Yes, we should have had a planning section.

The CHAIRMAN. You did have a planning section.

Capt. PRATT. Yes, but it was a pretty small one.

The CHAIRMAN. When was the first general plan that Operations got out and put up to the Secretary for his approval?

Capt. PRATT. I personally do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. When was the first one that you know anything about?

Capt. PRATT. The first thing that I know anything about was, as I said, this letter of February 10th, written by Capt. Chase and asking the general board to prepare a plan or to modify the original plan.

The CHAIRMAN. That was lost, was it not?

Capt. PRATT. That was lost.

The CHAIRMAN. The plan that was made was lost.

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Capt. PRATT. And then the three of us who were in the planning department just went at it.

The CHAIRMAN. And made these memoranda that you have already referred to in your testimony?

Capt. PRATT. Yes, from our general knowledge of the situation.

The CHAIRMAN. But there was no specific plan that finally went to the Secretary for his approval?

Capt. PRATT. Not that I know of. I have never seen one.

The CHAIRMAN. Did all of the bureaus know exactly what to do and how to expend the money wisely, as soon as war was declared?

Capt. PRATT. I can not answer that question, because I do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. That would be part of the general plan, would it not?

Capt. PRATT. It should be.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, I want to take up the question of the sending of the letter by Admiral Sims. This letter was an official communication, was it not, from the admiral to the Secretary of the Navy?

Capt. PRATT. You mean the letter——

The CHAIRMAN. The letter of January 7, 1920.

Capt. PRATT. I suppose it was.

The CHAIRMAN. I think there is no question about that.

Capt. PRATT. I think there is no question about it.

The CHAIRMAN. And it was brought out at the request of the Subcommittee on Naval Awards.

Capt. PRATT. I believe that is true.

The CHAIRMAN. And was not made public by Admiral Sims except at the request of the subcommittee?

Capt. PRATT. I understand that is so.

The CHAIRMAN. There is no criticism in the letter, so far as you know, of the Navy itself or any officer of the Navy?

Capt. PRATT. I have read it carefully and I do not see any criticism.

The CHAIRMAN. But he does point out the magnificant achievements of the Navy during the war?

Capt. PRATT. Yes. I will correct that by saying no person by name; but of course there is a criticism of certain operations of the war which naturally reflects upon the officer in charge of operations; but no personal mention of anyone by name.

The CHAIRMAN. And he speaks specifically about the fine work that was done by the Navy after the department had organized and things were running along properly?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, yes; he speaks of that.

The CHAIRMAN. And what he finds fault with principally is the faulty principle of organization in the Navy, the lack of preparation, the indecision and procrastination by the department, which prevented officers from quickly using ships, men, and material against the enemy? I am simply asking you to see whether this is your idea of the letter.

Capt. PRATT. Yes; that is my idea.

The CHAIRMAN. And he did not indulge in personalities, as you say?

Capt. PRATT. No, sir; he did not.

The CHAIRMAN. And was not the purpose of the letter to insure a greater national security by preventing a future repetition of the errors and delays of 1916?

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Capt. PRATT. I have always accepted that myself as being the reason of the letter.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you not think that the admiral had the right to address such a letter to the Secretary of the Navy?

Capt. PRATT. I think he had a perfect right to address it to the Secretary of the Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. Is the Navy Department the Navy?

Capt. PRATT. No, sir; the Navy Department is the controlling head of the Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think it is possible to criticize the department without criticizing the Navy?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Might not the Navy Department or the Secretary of the Navy who rules the policies of the department prevent preparedness and prevent quick action in time of war if he saw fit to do so?

Capt. PRATT. I think, under the present system, it would be possible.

The CHAIRMAN. Might not a criticism of the Navy Department and its policies be a defense of the Navy, and the defense of its officers, against the possible charge of neglect on their part to prepare and act promptly?

Capt. PRATT. I suppose it could be looked at in that way.

The CHAIRMAN. Then where can you find any justification in the charge that has been made by certain of the witnesses who have come before us, that Admiral Sims had attacked the good name of the Navy or reflected upon its officers, when he merely points out the defects and errors of organization and administration of the Navy Department?

Capt. PRATT. Of course this is my opinion only.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; that is what I want.

Capt. PRATT. I feel that had he omitted that accusation which I pointed out as a grave one, that the Navy was responsible for the loss of so many ships and so many lives, there would not have been so much feeling aroused in the service. I can not help feeling that that was a loose statement.

The CHAIRMAN. If he had said "The Navy Department," would that have changed that, in your opinion?

Capt. PRATT. No, sir; because after all, we can not draw a line between the Navy Department and the rest of the Navy. We want to be one big service and we want to work thoroughly as a band of brothers; so that if you are going to draw a line of demarkation between the Navy Department and the Navy proper, there will always be lack of harmony.

The CHAIRMAN. But might the Navy not be itself all on tenterhooks, ready to do anything that they could, and the Department hold them back?

Capt. PRATT. Of course that is true.

The CHAIRMAN. In which case the men of the Navy who were ready would not be to blame, but the Department, who controlled its policy and held them back, would be responsible?

Capt. PRATT. Yes; if the Department held them back, that state of affairs would be true, naturally.

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The CHAIRMAN. And you yourselves have condemned the department's organization as it was at the beginning of the war?

Capt. PRATT. Yes; I do not think it is a good one.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you always consult the Secretary of the Navy and get his approval before an operating order was issued, or did you always issue orders on your own responsibility?

Capt. PRATT. Before we got into the war, it was necessary, I think, to secure the Secretary's approval of all movements; but after we got into the war, at least I will say at the time when I came in as aid for Operations, that system had been done away with. If it had been necessary to secure the Secretary's O. K. for every movement, things would have been held up very materially, due to the press of business. In general, the office issued all routine orders, and only when it was necessary to make any great changes, due to a change of policy, then, of course, the Secretary was consulted; but all routine matters of operation were handled by ourselves, and when I say "we" I always had to get my chief's approval, Admiral Benson's, for practically all movements.

The CHAIRMAN. You felt that you had the authority yourself on minor matters?

Capt. PRATT. We did after we got into the war.

The CHAIRMAN. After you got into the war?

Capt. PRATT. Yes. But I am inclined to believe, although I would not state that positively—the admiral knows more about that, but I think—that the Secretary approved almost all orders for operations before we came into the war.

The CHAIRMAN. In your work in Operations during the early stage of the war, and just before the war, did you find a general feeling of the department that the Secretary of the Navy was doing his utmost to get the Navy ready for war?

Capt. PRATT. As I have said before, I am not in a position to speak of that. I only came into the office shortly before we went into the war, and then in a planning capacity. What happened previous to our entry into the war, that is in executive matters, I can not speak of, and I can only speak with authority of things after June 25, when I became an executive officer in the Office of Operations. Admiral Benson, of course, knows very definitely, and my predecessor, Capt. Chase, would know if he were alive to speak for himself; and they are far more qualified than I am to give a definite statement.

The CHAIRMAN. But my question was, Captain, whether you found the general feeling in the department such as I spoke of? If you did not find any such feeling, it is very easy to say so.

Capt. PRATT. Well, I would not like to make any statement that I can not state actully I know, because by expressing an opinion now, some two or three years after the event has happened, I do not believe one gives absolutely the same opinion that he might give at the time, either one way or the other—I mean to give a perfectly impartial and fair expression. I would rather confine myself to statements of fact. I know, so far as my own work is concerned, I can state very definitely about that, and other officers have testified as to what they found. I think the facts speak for themselves, pretty well.

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The CHAIRMAN. I asked you the other day a question more or less of this same kind, and I think you stated that there were rumors about the matter, but you did not state what sort of rumors. Can you tell me what sort of rumors were around?

Capt. PRATT. Why, the Secretary has not always been popular in the service, and it is rumored that he has held up papers, and lost them. Admiral Benson is not altogether popular with many people, and you could hear those rumors; and I can not recall now, but I know such rumors existed. But for me to state as a fact that those things existed——

The CHAIRMAN. I did not ask you as a fact. I asked you if there was a general feeling in the department about the matter?

Capt. PRATT. I can not say that the feeling is general. I simply know that the things I have stated have been spoken of.

The CHAIRMAN. And you prefer not to answer the question whether there was a general feeling?

Capt. PRATT. Because I do not know that. It seemed to me that within the department the feeling was more or less cordial. It is outside of the department more than inside that that feeling existed, I thought.

The CHAIRMAN. It is not a question of cordiality. It was simply a question of fact, as to whether matters were being held up, and preparedness was going along slowly.

Capt. PRATT. That is just what I tried to confine myself to, is the question of fact. I was not, as I said, thrown into contact with the Secretary until I became Acting Chief of Naval Operations, and I tried to think up some cases where he had held me up, and he never held me up.

Senator TRAMMELL. Mr. Chairman, I think if you are going to inquire into rumors, or insist on his stating about rumors, he ought to be permitted to say what his own experience was and what his own idea was so far as his connection with the department himself was.

The CHAIRMAN. He has already done that. I have no objection in the world.

Senator TRAMMELL. I thought you objected to it. You said that it was not a matter of cordiality, congeniality, or courtesy at all.

The CHAIRMAN. That was purely explanatory.

Senator TRAMMELL. There is as much in courtesy and congeniality and cordiality as there is in rumors. Rumors are mighty bad things. If all rumors were true, all of us would be in the penitentiary, instead of being on this committee, I expect. I think I would.

The CHAIRMAN. Then, as far as you know, prior to your going in as aid for Operations, the Secretary was acting with the wisdom and foresight and force of a great executive?

Capt. PRATT. I would not say that, either. I will say I do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. When you came in did you find any feeling in the Bureau of Operations that indicated a failure of the secretary to realize the necessity of acting forcibly and quickly in an emergency?

Capt. PRATT. No; I am ignorant about that. Admiral Benson would not discuss with me those things; and he, of course, is the one man who knows just whether things were held up or whether they were not, and he would not discuss that with me.

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The CHAIRMAN. When you came in, who seemed to be the leading spirit in the department, the Secretary, or Admiral Benson, or who?

Capt. PRATT. Why, the Secretary must always be the head: and he must or ought to be guided by the advice that the Chief of Naval Operations would give him. Now, just to what extent he influenced the Secretary, I could not say.

The CHAIRMAN. When the question came up of acting, was it generally the Secretary that inspired action, or some officer of the department?

Capt. PRATT. To act as an inspiration requires a great deal of creative genius, and one must have a great deal of imagination to foresee these things. A departmental organization may be very sound and may run along well; but the heads have got to be free to work along broader lines. I have felt that if there was a lack, if there might be a lack of a broader point of view, it is due to a system which throws a great many of the details upon the responsible heads, not leaving them time enough to take up the broader point of view. I think that was the failing, perhaps—is the failing to-day—of the system, very much as ex-Secretary Lane has expressed it. I think that his criticism of the departmental organizations in Washington is very true, and that we all labored under—at least the department of the Navy labored under—certain disadvantages which he has set forth.

The CHAIRMAN. I hope that in the plan you are going to submit to us you will go into that question for future reference.

Capt. PRATT. Yes, sir; I have outlined it. I have not discussed it very much, but simply to arrive at a decision; but I will embody that.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you say that the statement of the Secretary of the Navy in his report for 1918, that the Navy was prepared from stem to stern when war was declared, was justified?

Capt. PRATT. That, I think, would be more in the nature of a figure of speech. No; as a naval man, having to handle an organization, say, to go out and fight the next day, I would hardly say that we were fit from stem to stern.

The CHAIRMAN. Was the Navy ready for war, would you say, as to personnel, when war was declared?

Capt. PRATT. Not the way I would like to see it.

The CHAIRMAN. In the early stages of the war, were operating plans ever delayed because of lack of personnel, or material conditions of the ships—poor material conditions of the ships?

Capt. PRATT. Well, I do not know, between April 6 and June 25. After that date I was not held up; but before that date Capt. Chase and Admiral Benson would have to speak for themselves, whether personnel and material held the sailing of the ships up. I do not know, between April 6 and June 25. But I was not held up for lack of personnel after that, to an extent that prohibited our operating.

The CHAIRMAN. But it would necessarily change the form of your operations, if you were short of personnel, would it not?

Capt. PRATT. It was necessary to make adjustments with personnel.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, if there was a lack of preparedness in personnel when the war started, whose fault was that?

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Capt. PRATT. As the system of organization stands to-day, the Secretary is responsible, sharing a degree of responsibility with whomsoever advises him to commit himself to a policy of inadequate personnel. I consider that any naval officer that advised the Secretary that it was efficient to have an insufficient personnel, must be held responsible for the advise he gives.

The CHAIRMAN. You would not lay the responsibility to Congress provided the Secretary had not put the matter up to them?

Capt. PRATT. I can not see how Congress is responsible.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think that the department did everything that could have been done after Ambassador Bernstorff had been given his passports, to prepare the Navy, and up to the time war was declared on April 6, 1917?

Capt. PRATT. I do not know enough about that to want to say. I could only give opinions in the matter. Admiral Benson, who, of course, must know definitely, I think could state as to facts.

The CHAIRMAN. What is your opinion: that everything was done that could have been done to prepare the Navy between those dates?

Capt. PRATT. Why, of course, if a man wants to get in and drive, nothing is impossible.

The CHAIRMAN. Was not that a time to drive?

Capt. PRATT. If you ask me personally, I certainly would.

The CHAIRMAN. And you do not think there was much driving?

Capt. PRATT. I do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. Or do you think there was much driving?

Capt. PRATT. It seems to me that the facts pretty well speak for themselves; that if we had intended to immediately dispatch our destroyers abroad, we could have had them in material shape, thoroughly manned to the minute. That is not an impossible thing to do; and if it was not done, it is because steps were not taken to get them ready for it. It could have been done, I believe.

The CHAIRMAN. And the same with other operations, or possible operations?

Capt. PRATT. Yes; I think we could have had our cruisers manned; but the question of getting the yachts and the other submarine craft was more difficult. They had to be commandeered and fitted out. I think the delay in fitting them out was harder to overcome than any personnel delay. They are boats that are not adapted to war purposes, and have to be altered very materially, and guns put on them.

The CHAIRMAN. Should we not have had the personnel of the fleet trained so that we would not have had to break into them for armed guards, or so that after we had broken in they would still have had an adequate personnel on board?

Capt. PRATT. If we had had enough personnel in the Navy, it would not have been necessary to have broken into the fleet. We could have drawn the armed guard from other sources, which was done to some extent later. We drew the armed guard from shore bases as well as from the fleet.

The CHAIRMAN. Was there any time in the early stages of the war when there was a lack of funds to provide types of vessels that were needed against submarines, after we had gone into the war?

Capt. PRATT. I do not know that. I did not handle funds. What is that? Was there any lack of funds?

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The CHAIRMAN. Was there any lack of funds in the early stages of the war to provide types of vessels that were needed against submarines? You say you do not know?

Capt. PRATT. I do not know. I think Admiral McKean can look that up.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know, either directly or indirectly, of any attitude of the Secretary of the Navy or any other Navy Department official that in any way tended to reduce the possible efficiency of the Navy in carrying on the war?

Capt. PRATT. Why, no: when we got into the war it seemed to me that the desire to wage it successfully was just as strong as the desire to keep out of war before we got in.

The CHAIRMAN. In your statement you have said that owing to previous lack of material and personnel it was not possible to place the naval forces in the war zone ready to operate as soon as desired. Who was responsible for this lack of preparation that rendered our forces incapable of quick action?

Capt. PRATT. The Secretary, of course, was the responsible head.

The CHAIRMAN. And had we no warning, you say, of war?

Capt. PRATT. Why, when you send an ambassador out of the country, that is always to my mind warning enough.

The CHAIRMAN. And also the sinking of the *Lusitania* was in the nature of a warning, was it not?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You also say that neither the organization nor the administration of the department was such that it lent itself to efficient handling of a great war at the beginning. Why was the organization and administration defective?

Capt. PRATT. I think I have explained that in the last part of my prepared statement. It was principally due, to my mind, to the lack of a coordinating military head upon whom definite responsibility is placed.

The CHAIRMAN. And who was responsible for that?

Capt. PRATT. The laws under which the department was organized.

The CHAIRMAN. And if the plan that was put up to Congress and which was finally enacted into law had been left as it was put up, with the responsibility on the Chief of Operations, would not that have been remedied?

Capt. PRATT. Yes, it would have helped a great deal.

The CHAIRMAN. So, if we had made an attempt to anticipate the war, the organization and the administration of the department would have been made ready to function?

Capt. PRATT. I think so, for this reason. The military head, say the Chief of Naval Operations, makes a definite study, or he has his studies submitted to him. He goes to the Secretary and he says, "Mr. Secretary, it is absolutely necessary that we do certain things." Then if the Secretary does not agree to that, he assumes that responsibility himself, and it is nothing more than proper for the Chief of Naval Operations to say, "I must leave, sir—leave office—and you must find another man." That, of course, would bring an immediate show-down, which is what is needed under all such cases.

The CHAIRMAN. You have stated that in order to make our organization effective under conditions as they were in the war, the entire building program would have had to be changed?

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Capt. PRATT. The 10-year program, I think, would have been held in abeyance.

The CHAIRMAN. The 3-year program, you mean, that was adopted?

Capt. PRATT. The 3-year program would have had to have been held in abeyance and more money placed toward the construction of destroyers.

The CHAIRMAN. That would require a certain amount of foresight; but, as we needed them anyway, it would not have been a bad idea to have started in somewhat earlier, immediately after the sinking of the *Lusitania*?

Capt. PRATT. Yes; it would have been foresight.

The CHAIRMAN. But you think it would have been an overt act?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, no; not within reasonable limits; no.

The CHAIRMAN. You stated that the Office of Operations had to be reorganized, and the bureaus coordinated with that office, etc., the methods of administration divested of conservatism, and more authority given to subordinates. From this it appears that the administration of the Navy Department was not prepared to pass from a state of peace to a state of war. Should it not be organized now on sound principles, in case we ever get into a war again?

Capt. PRATT. Absolutely, and I think the nucleus of the organization which we built up in war should be held pretty much along the same lines that existed at the end of the war. The department was not in shape at the very beginning to undertake war operations. We had been a great many years at peace. The heads naturally take upon themselves more details than they can possibly handle in time of war, and the tendency is to become far more interested in detail than in the broad aspect or the broad consideration of questions. Of course, that has to be dropped immediately that we get into war. I think we created a fair working organization. By the time the armistice was signed it was going pretty well. I think the nucleus of such an organization should be preserved.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think that a civilian Secretary of the Navy who has never studied nor had experience in naval warfare could reasonably be expected, without expert advice or assistance, to prepare a navy or a fleet for battle?

Capt. PRATT. No; I do not see how he possibly can.

The CHAIRMAN. He would have to depend upon expert advice?

Capt. PRATT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Should there be any difference between the general authority of the Chief of Operations during peace and during war?

Capt. PRATT. No; I think the same general conditions must prevail in peace and in war.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you would not for the future retain intact the present organization of the Navy Department?

Capt. PRATT. No; as I have said, I think the organization could be changed for the better.

The CHAIRMAN. And you would not repeat the policies and methods of handling the Navy that prevailed from 1914 to 1917?

Capt. PRATT. No, sir; not if I had to prepare for another war.

The CHAIRMAN. Is the Navy in all respects ready for war when its ships are not fully officered and manned?

Capt. PRATT. No, sir.

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The CHAIRMAN. Would you say that the Navy of the United States was fully officered or manned in 1917, when war was declared?

Capt. PRATT. It is my impression that it was not.

The CHAIRMAN. Were the reserve ships fully manned at that time?

Capt. PRATT. No, sir; they were not.

The CHAIRMAN. And there were not officers and men available to man them?

Capt. PRATT. I think not.

The CHAIRMAN. After Japan and China joined the Allies, was there any necessity for keeping the armored cruisers at the navy yards on the Pacific?

Capt. PRATT. Not unless there were certain material changes or work to be accomplished, in which case it might have been a good thing to keep them there, not to overtask the eastern yards.

The CHAIRMAN. Should they have been with the fleet at the declaration of war?

Capt. PRATT. I think it would have been a wise thing to have had them on the Atlantic side.

The CHAIRMAN. They were not, were they?

Capt. PRATT. They were not.

The CHAIRMAN. If we had had 10,000 or 15,000 more men when war broke out in 1917, could we not have manned all of these vessels?

Capt. PRATT. Yes; I think we could. I do not know the exact figures, but I think probably 15,000 would have accomplished the purpose.

The CHAIRMAN. How long would it take to prepare a half-manned ship for battle against a ship of the same class that has been in full commission for two years?

Capt. PRATT. If I were captain of that ship, I should want at least six months' intensive training. I do not believe that I could get a personnel ready for battle, say a ship that has been only half manned, inside of six months; because it is not only the question of the men finding themselves, but the daily drills and the steaming force all have to be thoroughly shaken down, and you have to hold so many battle practices with the guns that they have really got to go through the whole schedule at least once before you can say they are anyways trained. And, even then, they are not as good as men who have been under the stress of battle conditions for two years until they have had their first real trial. But I would not want them one day short of six months if I had to command the ship.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think we ought to keep ships that we may need for fairly immediate use in a half-manned condition and subject them to this risk if we can help it?

Capt. PRATT. I think, sir, in the ordinary times of peace it was wise to put ships in reserve on account of the expense entailed, but to take them out periodically for full training; possibly shift the crews. But if we are in danger of being drawn into war, I think it is wise to have them fully manned and drilled.

The CHAIRMAN. You said that Admiral Sims's forces were the only ones that were manned anywhere near the full complement, either in officers or men?

Capt. PRATT. Well, that is true when they first went over to him. That statement, of course, later on, must be qualified to this extent, fully manned with the more seasoned of the men. He was given

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more regular officers and more of the regular enlisted men in proportion than the other types in the service were.

The CHAIRMAN. That was at the commencement of the war?

Capt. PRATT. At the very commencement. Of course that is also true, in fact, because our cruisers were not manned, and the older battleships were not fully manned, and his vessels as they went over to him were fully manned, and throughout the war he had more trained officers and men in proportion to the other types in the service than existed elsewhere.

The CHAIRMAN. After Admiral Mayo's forces came north from the West Indies in 1917, was it not necessary to take nearly one-half of the officers and many of the men out of each of the battleships to man other vessels?

Capt. PRATT. I do not know the proportion, but it was necessary to take quite a number of the officers and men out of the battleships.

The CHAIRMAN. That made the battleship force unready for battle, did it not?

Capt. PRATT. They were not in the pink of condition, of course, after the trained officers and men were taken from them.

The CHAIRMAN. And such a condition should not be allowed to exist in the future, should it?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, no; it is not wise to allow a condition of that sort to exist?

The CHAIRMAN. After the *Lusitania* was sunk, would you not say that it would have been common prudence to man the ships of the Navy and mobilize the fleet in the Atlantic in 1916?

Capt. PRATT. Yes, I would like to have seen it done.

The CHAIRMAN. Did the Secretary give instructions to operations so far as you know, in 1916, to mobilize the fleet?

Capt. PRATT. I do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. Or to prepare the Navy for war?

Capt. PRATT. I do not know, sir. I was not in the department at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. Did the Secretary, to your knowledge, ever exert himself or urge others to exert themselves to prepare for war until war was practically upon us, so far as you know?

Capt. PRATT. I do not know that, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. He did not, so far as you know?

Capt. PRATT. He did not; and neither could I say that he did not. I do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. Is not an efficient air service important?

Capt. PRATT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did we have it?

Capt. PRATT. We did not.

The CHAIRMAN. Would not such a service have been of great use against submarines in protecting our coast and fleet?

Capt. PRATT. Better than protecting our coast and fleet. If we had had it we could have sent them abroad immediately. That is where they were needed. We did not need much on this coast. The place for all antisubmarine craft——

The CHAIRMAN. Was on the other side?

Capt. PRATT. Was on the other side, with very, very few exceptions. We were called upon through agreements with the Army to

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maintain a few antisubmarine craft on this side. We had to do that, even though they would have been tactically more efficient on the other side. That is because it was not——

The CHAIRMAN. You do not think that we ever had to make much preparation for submarines on this side?

Capt. PRATT. No, I do not think we needed to worry very much about that at all, except the question of being prepared for their mine layers.

The CHAIRMAN. What is that?

Capt. PRATT. The mine layers; the mine laying submarines. That was the only effective operation which they performed on this side, the laying of mines on our coast. We lost quite a number of our ships by mines.

The CHAIRMAN. That was the only thing we had to fear?

Capt. PRATT. That was the only thing we needed to worry about, so far as submarines were concerned.

The CHAIRMAN. And that was so at the beginning of the war; the only thing that we needed to fear?

Capt. PRATT. I looked upon that exactly the same way.

The CHAIRMAN. If an efficient air service was urged by Admiral Fiske and the General Board in 1913, who was responsible for the fact that we did not have it in 1917?

Capt. PRATT. I do not know that, sir. Admiral McKean says that he can answer that question.

The CHAIRMAN. If the Secretary of the Navy cut the estimates from $13,000,000 as recommended, to $2,000,000, would you not say that he was responsible rather than Congress?

Capt. PRATT. Of course; he is the deciding authority. He must accept the responsibility for all cuts that he makes in appropriations.

The CHAIRMAN. In your written statement you admitted that we were unprepared for war, and you stated that the German fleet, having been blockaded by the Grand Fleet, we were free to make preparations with little danger of attack, did you not?

Capt. PRATT. I did not hear the last part of your question, Mr. Chairman, on account of the noise.

The CHAIRMAN. In your original statement you admitted that we were unprepared for war. I can quote your statement if you would like me to.

Capt. PRATT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you want to have me quote it?

Capt. PRATT. I made so many of them, I would like to know which one you refer to. I made so many hypothetical statements.

The CHAIRMAN. It is paragraph 10 of your statement. It reads as follows:

> Statement of fact in the paragraph correct, but the statement of the conclusion drawn, "but without producing the desired result," misleading and subject to discussion. It produced the desired effect at once and every effort was made to put all the naval forces desired in the war zone, but owing to our previous lack of preparation in material and personnel, it was not possible to place them at the front, and ready to operate as soon as was desired. Nor was the organization or administration of the department at home, such that it lent itself to the most efficient handling of a great war, at the beginning.

Therefore I repeat that in your original statement you admitted, did you not, that we were unprepared for war, and you stated that the German fleet having been blockaded by the Grand Fleet, we were free to make preparations with little danger of attack, did you not?

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Capt. PRATT. Yes, sir; I think that is so.

The CHAIRMAN. Did not the Grand Fleet prevent an early succe[ss] of the Germans in the early stages of the war?

Capt. PRATT. Did not what, sir? I could not hear that.

The CHAIRMAN. Did not the Grand Fleet prevent the success [of] the Germans in the early stages of the war—the British Grand Fleet?

Capt. PRATT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Was it not of primary importance for the whol[e] world, including the United States, that the Grand Fleet should b[e] at all times prepared to smash the German fleet if it came out?

Capt. PRATT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You stated in your statement that Germany ha[d] 196 destroyers?

Capt. PRATT. Those totals I footed up from the London plans section. Yes, it was about 196; that is the total number they showed, the figures being taken from the London planning section.

The CHAIRMAN. Were not those destroyers available for duty solely with the German high seas fleet in case that fleet came out and attacked the Grand Fleet?

Capt. PRATT. Yes; she had a power of initiative of gathering them together for any particular purpose she chose.

The CHAIRMAN. They were all pretty well gathered together anyway, were they not?

Capt. PRATT. Yes, they were.

The CHAIRMAN. Was not England compelled to employ many of her destroyers on other duties than with the Grand Fleet?

Capt. PRATT. Yes; she had to employ a great many on other duties.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the maximum number that she held employed with the Grand Fleet?

Capt. PRATT. The figures that I have taken from the London planning section said 111.

The CHAIRMAN. No, the maximum number?

Capt. PRATT. The maximum that Great Britain could have gathered together was more than that, I believe.

The CHAIRMAN. Did she not habitually keep more than that number with the Grand Fleet?

Capt. PRATT. I could not state definitely exactly how many she kept, but I imagine that she did not keep as many as she would like to have kept with the Grand Fleet, because she was forced to put them into other operations.

The CHAIRMAN. The figures show that the maximum number England had with the Grand Fleet was something like 184.

Capt. PRATT. Yes, I believe that figure is so. She had 184. I think that is the figure.

The CHAIRMAN. And that number was less than the number the Germans had?

Capt. PRATT. Yes; that was less, but she had, I think, more light cruisers. She was considerably longer on light cruisers.

The CHAIRMAN. She had 9 more.

Capr. PRATT. Well, and then flotilla leaders, also. She had 22 flotilla leaders. They are cruisers of a light type. They are much better than any destroyer.

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The CHAIRMAN. But it would have been imprudent, would it not, have withdrawn many destroyers from the Grand Fleet for other rk in view of the fact that the German fleet might come out at r time to attack?

Capt. PRATT. No. You have got to adjust and veer and haul. course the British commander in chief would like to keep a number all ships which would insure him superiority over the German t, type for type; but in war that is an impossible condition. He s got to be satisfied, I think, with a 60 per cent superiority; so that ie has 60 per cent and the other man has 40 per cent, right straight ough, when you size up the fleet as a whole he has got to be satisd to engage. No matter how much he would like to have held his troyers—all of them—with the fleet, the Admiralty, of course, had make its estimate of the situation and require that the Grand Fleet e up certain destroyers. Undoubtedly they endeavored to have se destroyers operate in purely antisubmarine movements as se to the Grand Fleet as possible, in order that they would always on interior lines with reference to the German fleet; that is, if the rman fleet came out the British destroyers operating as antibmarine craft could, at a pinch, under hurry orders, join in with the e British Grand Fleet. I can not conceive of any other way in ich they would get the requisite number of destroyers in case of et action to cope with 198 of the Germans.

The CHAIRMAN. But, at least, would you not think that they ought keep as many as they could on hand to cope with them?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, yes; of course they should do that.

The CHAIRMAN. And if you had been in command of the British et you would have been very loath, in view of possible attacks by e German fleet, to let any of them go?

Capt. PRATT. Yes, naturally. That is the commander in chief's b.

The CHAIRMAN. Did not the destroyers of the Grand Fleet afford me protection to our battleship division and to the North Sea mine rrage operation also?

Capt. PRATT. Yes; to the mine barrage and also in convoy work. ey operated there wherever they could. The Grand Fleet proted the Norwegian convoys that went across. The protection forded was usually by a division of battleships and a certain number screening cruisers, and also screening destroyers had to go out with em; so that to a certain extent they did operate against the subarines.

The CHAIRMAN. I can not see, Captain, how you can justify the atement that you made in your testimony on Friday, that in view the fact that the Grand Fleet was the main defense of the world ainst the victory of the German fleet, the destroyers of the Grand leet should have been used elsewhere.

Capt. PRATT. No; I did not exactly put it that way. I put it this ay: We only held back on this coast, of destroyers, some 5 or 6 of e oil-burners, and a few of the smaller ones, and I put it this way, at if the submarine menace was so great, why, the British Grand leet, of course, would have had to have sacrificed 9 or 10, and they ould have done it.

The CHAIRMAN. That was late in the season of 1917?

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Capt. PRATT. Not so very late. We got our destroyers over—I submitted a table showing the time we got them over. Our destroyers were really the very first craft to go over there, and we had destroyers over there when we had nothing else.

The CHAIRMAN. We had some destroyers; yes.

Capt. PRATT. I have given the exact figures. I could read them over again. Those dates show that the destroyers went over fairly early.

The CHAIRMAN. They, of course, did not sail immediately on April 6, 1917?

Capt. PRATT. No; I think six of them arrived during the first few days of May.

The CHAIRMAN. May 4?

Capt. PRATT. Yes; six of them got there.

The CHAIRMAN. And 24 of them had arrived before the end of June?

Capt. PRATT. I had the exact figures and gave them.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, they arrived June 11.

Capt. PRATT. The point I made was that the British always held the balance of power, and could have adjusted their destroyer efforts.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that possibly has already been put in.

Capt. PRATT. That has already been put in; yes, sir. That shows, better than any opinion, exactly what we did, and the tables show the dates.

The CHAIRMAN. Then your idea is that the British could have used their destroyers?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, yes; could, and I think would have done it, if the situation had impressed them as being sufficiently grave to warrant it. I do not believe that the commander-in-chief of the grand fleet would have hesitated to go out into action, with the superiority of dreadnoughts and battle cruisers and light cruisers and flotilla leaders that he had. I do not think that he would have hesitated for one moment.

The CHAIRMAN. With very few destroyers?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, yes; he would not have hesitated even with few destroyers. He had the Germans right where he wanted them. He had their morale pretty well shattered by that time, I think.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; but the testimony of some of the witnesses, I think, has shown that in the spring of 1918 the Navy was looking for a great offensive on the part of the German Navy, was it not?

Capt. PRATT. We were looking for an offensive.

The CHAIRMAN. And that was after the date that you say we had their morale pretty well broken?

Capt. PRATT. Yes; but the fact remains that they never projected it.

The CHAIRMAN. No; they did not.

Capt. PRATT. All that is, to my mind, rather conclusive evidence that the German morale had been pretty well shot to pieces at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. But of course that was not known at that time?

Capt. PRATT. No; it was not known; but the Germans ran, after Jutland. They turned tail and went in and never came out afterwards.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you not think it was better to bunch our available destroyers at Queenstown and along the French coast in places rather than to put them in service with the mine-laying force?

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Capt. PRATT. Oh, yes: that was wise, I think, to keep them at Queenstown and those other ports.

The CHAIRMAN. And the best policy of cooperation did not demand that they be scattered?

Capt. PRATT. I think it was best to keep them together.

The CHAIRMAN. You have stated that because we furnished only one-seventeenth of the antisubmarine craft operating in European waters, our influence in downing the submarine and in shortening the war was very inconsiderable?

Capt. PRATT. Did I say inconsiderable?

The CHAIRMAN. Very inconsiderable in proportion to what the others did.

Capt. PRATT. Well, our forces were inconsiderable in comparison with theirs.

The CHAIRMAN. But you think that our coming in had a very inconsiderable effect on it, do you?

Capt. PRATT. No, sir; our entering the war had considerably more effect——

The CHAIRMAN. I mean on the submarine situation.

Capt. PRATT. Oh, it had more effect than an actual comparison of figures would show. It had a very appreciable material effect and was one of the contributing causes toward helping to down the submarine. Our destroyers, ship for ship, were in better shape, I think, than the British.

The CHAIRMAN. You think that the mere size of the reinforcement always determines its influence?

Capt. PRATT. No, sir; I do not think it does.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you not think, for instance, if you had two football teams that were practically even in strength, and one team was given an extra man, it would make a difference?

Capt. PRATT. It makes a great deal of difference.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you not think that would make a great deal of difference—much more than one-twelfth?

Capt. PRATT. Of course, it would; and I will tell you the reason why I drew that just exactly as I did. It was because Admiral Sims in his original paper had laid so much stress on all the types that we should have put in—submarines and yachts and all antisubmarine craft. So I treated the matter very much in the same manner as he treated it.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you not think that if we could have thrown all our destroyers and gunboats and antisubmarine craft that were available, or that might be available if they had been thoroughly prepared, in April, 1917, at the critical time, into the war over there, it would have contributed greatly to the moral effect?

Capt. PRATT. The moral effect?

The CHAIRMAN. Toward the ending of the war?

Capt. PRATT. The moral effect, I agree with you, would have been a stronger factor than possibly the material increase.

The CHAIRMAN. And the moral effect is to be reckoned with, is it not?

Capt. PRATT. It is one of the strongest things you have to reckon with in war.

The CHAIRMAN. Were all of the 1,700 British and allied destroyers and antisubmarine craft employed in British waters or along our main line in France?

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Capt. PRATT. No, sir; they were scattered.

The CHAIRMAN. Throughout the Mediterranean, some of them were they not?

Capt. PRATT. Throughout the Mediterranean; yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Something over 900 of them were along the British coast and in France, and 700 and some odd were in Mediterranean waters; so that if we had contributed these 100 antisubmarine vessels they would have been much more than one-seventeenth of the force that was around in British waters, operating in British waters and along the coast of France?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, yes; I only handled the subject that way because Admiral Sims handled it with us that way. He totaled up antisubmarine craft. A fairer comparison, of course, is destroyers against destroyers, because, after all, I believe the destroyer is the only real antisubmarine fighter. The experience of the war did not lead us to any particular confidence in the other types.

The CHAIRMAN. So that, destroyer against destroyer, in that particular zone, which was the zone of greatest importance to us, we had what proportion of the allied destroyer strength in that zone?

Capt. PRATT. I will have to do a little figuring on that.

The CHAIRMAN. It was a very large proportion, was it not?

Capt. PRATT. We had 51 destroyers, and they had a great many: over 300 or 400, I should think. I could give the exact number.

The CHAIRMAN. Three hundred or 400 operating in that zone?

Capt. PRATT. In British and French waters, I should think.

The CHAIRMAN. Not counting destroyers that were with the Grand Fleet?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, yes; I count those.

The CHAIRMAN. But they were adequately engaged on other duty. I am talking about destroyers that were engaged against the submarines.

Capt. PRATT. I think it is fair to consider all the figures.

The CHAIRMAN. So that you would say that our contribution toward the downing of the submarines in the Atlantic was greater than 1/17?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, yes. I have made a few figures with regard to that, Mr. Chairman, roughly, and calculating what the efforts would be, at the ratios of destroyers, and destroyers alone.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you give them?

Capt. PRATT. Yes, sir. If we were to throw over 51 destroyers, the ratio of those 51 to the total French and British destroyers operating in the North Sea and the Atlantic in antisubmarine work alone, and exclusive of those with the Grand Fleet, the ratio would be about as 1 is to 4½.

If we included in this calculation the destroyers in the British Grand Fleet, that is, comparing totals with totals, it would be about as 1 is to 6.8.

Now, if out of those 51 we had to deduct the 9 which we were more or less obligated to keep to use in convoying our troopships, and had neglected screening our fleet at all, the ratios then would be about as 1 is to 6, or as 1 is to 8½; so that, comparing destroyers alone, the ratio is considerably less than 1 to 17.

The CHAIRMAN. And the destroyers are the most efficient vessels?

Capt. PRATT. By all means; I consider them the only real antisubmarine fighters.

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The CHAIRMAN. Were only nine of our destroyers used to help protect our troops in going over?

Capt. PRATT. Only nine. As a matter of fact, the numbers that we had available were less than nine of the 750-ton craft. We used to use, as far as we could to piece out with, the 400-ton vessels on this side.

The CHAIRMAN. What other vessels did we use for the protection of the troops?

Capt. PRATT. We used the destroyers and our own submarines. We used to put our own submarines in convoy and let them tag on astern out of sight of the convoy, and we used them and the destroyers that we had.

The CHAIRMAN. And our battleships or cruisers?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, the cruisers were as a raider guard. But they, of course, were not really protection against the submarine. I was speaking more of the antisubmarine arm. That is all we gave them.

The CHAIRMAN. But our naval vessels that were used for the protection of troops consisted of these nine or less destroyers and a few submarines?

Capt. PRATT. And our cruisers.

The CHAIRMAN. And our cruisers. How many cruisers did we use for that?

Capt. PRATT. We used all of the *Denver* type and all of the armored cruisers.

The CHAIRMAN. But they were not particularly valuable as against submarines?

Capt. PRATT. Not valuable at all against submarines.

The CHAIRMAN. And yet you say that was the major job that was done by the Navy during the war?

Capt. PRATT. Yes, I can not help thinking so. You see, there is a difference between the convoy and the escort. When I say the major job, I refer to the chaps who handled our transports themselves, and went through the submarine zone day after day. They did not stop short of it. Our escort from this side stopped short of it, but the chaps with the convoy went through the submarine zone.

The CHAIRMAN. Armed guards?

Capt. PRATT. Not armed guards. On those ships, they were fully manned naval ships.

The CHAIRMAN. Fully manned naval ships?

Capt. PRATT. Fully manned naval ships. They consisted of the German liners that we took over, the *Leviathan* (the old *Vaterland*), and the *Mount Vernon*. They were manned from top to bottom with strict naval crews.

The CHAIRMAN. Were they frequently attacked?

Capt. PRATT. I do not know how frequently. The *Mount Vernon* was torpedoed.

The CHAIRMAN. On the return trip, however?

Capt. PRATT. Yes, on the return trip. Of course they would have preferred to take them on the trip over, because that would mean a loss of troops as well as the ship.

The CHAIRMAN. We lost none on the trip over?

Capt. PRATT. No, we lost none on the trip over. They were very well protected.

The CHAIRMAN. And that was a great record, of course.

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Capt. PRATT. That was fine work of the forces on the other side, to have had such a record as that.

The CHAIRMAN. Our second and third divisions, including marines at Belleau Wood and Chateau-Thierry, did not constitute more than one-fifth of the forces of the Allies. Can you say that the checking of the Germans by our Army there did not shorten the war and that it did not contribute more than one-fifth to the destruction of the German morale and bringing Germany to terms at that critical period?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, no; I do not think that the two cases are quite similar. The marines turned the tide of battle at that point. If it could be shown to me that our destroyers had turned the tide of battle in the same way that the marines did, of course those two cases would be comparable.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean, when you say the tide of battle was turned, the tide so far as the submarines were concerned?

Capt. PRATT. Yes; if they had turned it, of course the two cases would be comparable. But that is a difficult thing to prove. Apparently the tide of submarine sinkings had begun to ebb before we got over there in force, because you know the maximum amount of tonnage sunk was during the month of April.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; but even in May it only went down to, I think, five hundred and some odd thousand.

Capt. PRATT. Yes; and then it went up again.

The CHAIRMAN. It went up again.

Capt. PRATT. And it fluctuated thereafter, but never reached the figure that it had attained before.

The CHAIRMAN. No; it never got up to 800,000 again. You are familiar with Mahan's maxim that war, once declared, must be waged with vigor.

Capt. PRATT. Yes; I am fairly familiar with Mahan. That is quite true. You have got to wage war in the enemy's country. You can not wage it elsewhere.

The CHAIRMAN. Would there have been any sense in Germany's sending many submarines to our coast, 3,500 miles from her base, instead of concentrating them on that side of the coasts of England and France?

Capt. PRATT. None at all. It would have been folly for her to have done it; unless she had raided the oil lines. That was the weakest point that we had to contend with on this side.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you would not justify the holding back of any forces we had in the early part of 1917 to meet the submarine menace?

Capt. PRATT. For the question of defense; no; I do not think we had very much to worry about.

The CHAIRMAN. And it is conceivable that even an insignificant reinforcement might be sufficient to turn the tide?

Capt. PRATT. Might be; yes. All things are possible under those circumstances, and the moral factor is a particularly difficult one to reckon with.

The CHAIRMAN. And ours was not an insignificant reinforcement, from the figures you have just shown?

Capt. PRATT. No; the figures speak for themselves.

The CHAIRMAN. And still you think that that did not shorten the war a day or a week or a month?

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Capt. PRATT. No, sir; and I will tell you why. The submarine campaign was such that they had to win a complete victory, in which case they would have stopped the war immediately; but if they fell short of the ultimate decision, it did not have any effect in stopping the war.

The CHAIRMAN. How would they have stopped the war immediately?

Capt. PRATT. Why, the Allies would have had to sue for peace.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean if the campaign had succeeded?

Capt. PRATT. Yes; if the submarine campaign had succeeded they would have had to sue for peace. Then we would have been either out of it or in it alone.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Capt. PRATT. But as I said, I think that the submarine campaign had to win and gain the whole thing, and falling short of that it did not affect the result.

The CHAIRMAN. But do you not think that there was a possibility that they might win completely and drive England and France out of the war?

Capt. PRATT. I think that during that first month, of April, when the reports were coming in and we could not tell what would happen if they were to continue on with their scheme, there was very grave danger of their forcing such a situation. Of course we never knew how they felt in the German general staff. They had their own ideas in the matter, and I imagine that after the first drive of April, and then when the sinkings began to fall off, they had their own misgivings. Of course that is merely an opinion. The situation was undoubtedly grave.

The CHAIRMAN. But the situation was very critical?

Capt. PRATT. There is no question about that.

The CHAIRMAN. And it was up to us to do everything in our power to relieve it?

Capt. PRATT. There is no doubt about that.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is all for to-day, Captain. Senator Pittman and Senator Trammell, who are not here now, will have some questions to ask you to-morrow, I believe, so that if you will come to-morrow morning at 10 o'clock we will proceed then.

Capt. PRATT. Yes, sir.

(Thereupon, at 12.45 o'clock p. m., the subcommittee adjourned until to-morrow, Tuesday, April 27, 1920, at 10 o'clock a. m.)

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NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

TUESDAY, APRIL 27, 1920.

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON NAVAL AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 o'clock a. m., in room 235, Senate Office Building, Senator Frederick Hale presiding.

Present: Senators Hale (chairman), Ball, Keyes, and Trammell.

TESTIMONY OF CAPT. W. V. PRATT—Resumed.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. Have you any questions to ask, Senator Ball?

Senator BALL. No.

Senator KEYES. I have none.

Senator TRAMMELL. Captain, there were some questions asked here yesterday in regard to rumors—unfavorable rumors, I judged—in regard to the Secretary of the Navy. I believe you stated that so far as your relations were concerned with the Secretary of the Navy, they were pleasant and agreeable. Now, as far as any facts that you had in your mind are concerned, did you give any particular importance to any of those rumors that you might have heard, so far as any facts that you knew of yourself personally?

Capt. PRATT. I think I can best answer that question by telling you exactly what I told the Secretary of the Navy. I said to him "Mr. Daniels, I came into this office without knowing you, and you did not know me. You held a post. I regarded the post and not the man. As I have often told my chief, my loyalty is to the cause and not the man, and so long as he stands for the cause I am loyal to him."

I had no personal relations at all with the Secretary of the Navy until I acted as the relief of Admiral Benson when he went abroad, and my relations were entirely of an official character. When I put anything before him I presented it in a manner which possibly—he signed it; that is as far as it goes.

As far as rumors are concerned, it has been my policy to cut them out. I do not listen to them.

Senator TRAMMELL. I think that is ordinarily a very wise policy, is it not?

Capt. PRATT. I think it is the best thing for us all to do.

Senator TRAMMELL. Rumors do not amount to much, and more frequently they are falsehoods than they are truths. I did not attach any special importance to that. I have had men write

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letters jumping on me in the newspapers, and they would not even sign their names; and yet that would be the basis for a rumor, perhaps; and then when you would answer it and challenge the fellow to come out in the open with his name, he would not do it.

You were asked some questions in regard to Admiral Sims's letter, and I take it from the nature of the questions that they wanted to carry with them the idea that Admiral Sims's letter was entirely a criticism of the Secretary of the Navy and not of the Navy, drawing a distinction between the two. Did you so construe his letter?

Capt. PRATT. I must answer that exactly as I told my late chief, Admiral Benson; I accept the statement at its face value. I am not a partisan of Admiral Sims or of Admiral Benson or of the Secretary or of anyone. Admiral Sims said that letter meant a certain thing. On the face of it, of course it is a criticism; but I accept Admiral Sims's intent as he said it, as I would accept any other person's.

Senator TRAMMELL. When you consider the organization of the Navy Department and the procedure there in transacting the business of the department and of the Navy, does not his letter, if it is a criticism at all, reach further than the Secretary of the Navy?

Capt. PRATT. Of course, such a thing might be, and an officer's language might be construed to reach further. I can not say what was in Admiral Sims's mind, and his intent. I think he sometimes is very impulsive—I know he is from my experience with him—and I think it was exceedingly impulsive of him to say that we were responsible for the loss of ships. What was in his mind when he wrote that letter I can not say.

Senator TRAMMELL. The reason I am asking you questions about that is that you were queried upon the same subject yesterday by the chairman of the committee. If Admiral Sims centered out the Secretary of the Navy and attempted to point out that he had been guilty of various and sundry mistakes, and intended to relieve all of the department heads and all of the Navy officers from any criticism whatever, what do you suppose prompted him and actuated him, if he was laboring in the interest of the service, in not pointing out mistakes of Navy officers as well as of the Secretary of the Navy?

Capt. PRATT. I really think that the letter, as I think I stated in my testimony, was a drive directly at the office of Operations, of which Admiral Sims was a part. It seemed to me in reading his letter over that I found more the intent to criticize the office of Operations than the Secretary. I construed the letter, myself, as being a pretty general criticism. I do not think it was restricted to the Secretary of the Navy in particular, so far as I am concerned.

Senator TRAMMELL. The reason I am asking these questions, though, is that it looks a little as though some had construed the letter to be more a criticism of the Secretary of the Navy. If the Secretary of the Navy is responsible and answerable for all mistakes, and he is the one that the criticism is directed at in particular, would not the spirit of fairness give him the credit for all of the achievements of the Navy?

Capt. PRATT. Yes; that is fair.

Senator TRAMMELL. I say, if that is true.

Capt. PRATT. Yes; that is fair.

Senator TRAMMELL. A spirit of fairness would give him the credit, if there were any accomplishments, if you are going to condemn him for all alleged mistakes. Of course, I do not entertain that idea. I

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think that all of the Navy officers and heads of departments, etc., rendered a good service, and I think that the Secretary of the Navy rendered a good service. That is my view about it, from what we have heard before this committee.

You were asked the question whether the Secretary of the Navy, a civilian, was capable of preparing war plans—plans for naval battles. As a matter of fact, as far as any plans that might have been prepared, if they were prepared, do you know whether the Secretary of the Navy attempted to take the initiative in that, or did he leave the initiative to the naval officers in preparing and suggesting plans?

Capt. PRATT. I think that he expects the General Board to prepare plans.

Senator TRAMMELL. As a matter of fact, does not the record here disclose that he called upon the General Board to prepare plans, in one particular instance, at least?

Capt. PRATT. That is what they are there for.

The CHAIRMAN. February 17, was it not?

Capt. PRATT. I do not recall the date, quite.

Admiral MCKEAN. The letter was February 4. The report was February 17.

Senator TRAMMELL. That is one particular instance. I do not mean that that is the only instance in which he might have called upon them, but that has been made specific mention of, indicating that the Secretary of the Navy was not attempting to assume that he would make out all of the technical military plans of operation, and so on.

Capt. PRATT. Why, of course not. I do not believe anybody expects the Secretary to make out detailed plans.

Senator TRAMMELL. You take it in your planning section. Did the Secretary of the Navy attempt to act in the rôle of the initiative power in connection with the plans, and all, that were projected through your planning section?

Capt. PRATT. No, sir.

Senator TRAMMELL. He did not?

Capt. PRATT. He did not take any such steps. Those details would be rather out of his province. He would expect the planning section to attend to that.

Senator TRAMMELL. On the question of any lack of personnel, if any existed at the outbreak of the war, I do not believe you stated as to whom the responsibility was with, in regard to that; I mean, in regard to the facts in connection with it. Of course, technically speaking, I believe you stated that the Secretary of the Navy was responsible, but you did not attempt to state that the facts would indicate that he had not made an effort to increase the personnel.

Capt. PRATT. I do not know what attempts he made or did not make. That is none of my province. As the system of organization stands, we have not any actual military head who is responsible. The responsibility, in a degree, rests upon the Secretary, because he is the head. He is the head of a tremendous establishment. As a naval man, I consider that a man who wrongly advises him shares that responsibility, but you have got to get down to a more definite basis than that. The Secretary, no matter how wise a man he may be in his own particular affairs, must

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accept the advice of his naval counsellors; but if somebody is not charged with that responsibility for the advice he gives—for the head man does not know the details—the result is an indefinite state of affairs which, to my mind, is responsible largely for any unsatisfactory condition which we might say existed, if such were the case.

As a naval man, what I want to see is exactly as you would see in a business, the responsibility so fixed that nobody can dodge it. I do not mean wanting to dodge it, but rather loosely drawn, and the buck passes, you might say.

Senator TRAMMELL. In dealing with the question of the personnel, the General Board makes recommendation, or it has done it, and the chief of the Bureau of Navigation makes recommendations. It seems that in 1915 the General Board suggested an increase of 20,000 in the personnel. This recommendation was considered by the chief of the Bureau of Navigation and the chief of the Bureau of Navigation stated that they had sufficient men and personnel, and still had a surplus, I think, of some 300 men. Now, because the Secretary of the Navy might have accepted a report of the chief of Navigation and the views of the Bureau of Navigation, that being the division under which personnel came directly, would you consider that that was a question of the Secretary of the Navy not cooperating with the naval officers, and not giving consideration to advice of naval officers?

Capt. PRATT. Of course he did. That is just where we kick. He accepted the advice of Rear Admiral Blue, and almost every naval man who thought very much on the subject thought that Blue was dead wrong.

Senator TRAMMELL. Now Admiral Sims or anybody else, then, that criticizes the question, certainly criticizes naval officers as well as he criticizes the Secretary of the Navy, does he not?

Capt. PRATT. Of course he does, or should. I hold Blue very responsible for the advice he gave, and he ought to stand for it.

Senator TRAMMELL. Then in 1916 Rear Admiral Palmer was chief of the Bureau of Navigation, and he recommended certain increase in personnel, and the Secretary of the Navy might have differed with him, possibly, two or three or four thousand; but he did agree with him, he cooperated with him in going before the committee, and they got a very large increase in the personnel in 1916. Does that indicate, because they might have differed to the extent of 3,000 or 4,000, while they agreed in the main, that the Secretary of the Navy was not trying to cooperate with the naval officer that was in charge of personnel?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, no; of course that indicates that he is trying to cooperate with the naval officer. What I mean is this. The system is wrong where you can cooperate first with one naval officer, then with another naval officer, and another chief of bureau, and get just as many different ideas as you talk to men. That ought to be coordinated, I believe, under the head that is charged with the policy and plans, so that you do not get this diffusion of ideas, but get one concentrated effort.

Senator TRAMMELL. I appreciate that point, Captain, but the point I want to get some information on is whether the Secretary of the Navy was responsible for all of the inefficiency, if there was a great lot of inefficiency, or whether he was cooperating in trying to work

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harmoniously, in the main, with the naval officers who were experts each in their particular line, and were capable of giving technical military advice? That is what I want to find out, as a matter of fact. Of course I think that he could do that in the main; that is my view. But I want to find out whether he did or he did not. There seems to be the opinion of some that he did not give any consideration, practically at all, or very little, to the Navy officers.

Capt. PRATT. Naturally, I can not say what he did with Admiral Palmer or Admiral Blue, or even my own chief, on personnel. I know that when I had a business proposition to put to him I got an answer.

Senator TRAMMELL. That is a matter of record, this matter I am discussing now, of personnel.

Capt. PRATT. Yes.

Senator TRAMMELL. It has been testified to here before this committee, and in the main I have been impressed with the fact that he was trying to cooperate with the Navy officers in the matter of increasing and building up the personnel of the Navy, beginning back in 1915 and 1916. Of course, if he was not doing it, I would like to know, but that is the impression I have gotten—that he was doing that.

Capt. PRATT. I had no trouble with him.

Senator TRAMMELL. You testified more or less in regard to the latitude that was given to Admiral Sims, and the spirit of cooperation that you witnessed in regard to carrying on the operations with him. In your official connection there, did you know of any specific acts of any consequence where the Secretary of the Navy was attempting to, you might say, interfere with his jurisdiction or his discretion in regard to matters that came under his command abroad?

Capt. PRATT. No, sir; not after I came in the office in an executive capacity, June 25, 1917; I do not recall any specific instances now. Before that date, I should prefer to have Admiral Benson speak of it.

Senator TRAMMELL. As far as your knowledge, then, Admiral Sims was given such latitude and such authority as seemed to be necessary and proper in the position which he was occupying, was he not?

Capt. PRATT. Yes; in general, I think so.

Senator TRAMMELL. That was the impression I got from your testimony. I believe that in your direct testimony you disagreed with Admiral Sims that practically all of the operations should have been handled from London, did you not?

Capt. PRATT. If that was the intent of his letter.

Senator TRAMMELL. Yes.

Capt. PRATT. I must disagree. They could not have been handled from London entirely. Operations at the front must be handled from London, but there are a great many other operations which have to be handled and directed from the rear.

Senator TRAMMELL. The operations at the front were handled from London, were they not?

Capt. PRATT. In the main, yes. I think in certain minor instances we may have interfered with him in the details of ships; but I do not regard those interferences, if such existed, to have been material. They might have been vexatious, but they were not material.

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Senator TRAMMELL. Those interferences were largely caused on account of the officials here being more familiar with the question of the availability of ships, and probably having a more general knowledge of the entire situation than he had in London, were they not?

Capt. PRATT. Some of them may have been, but I think in one or two instances we issued direct orders to ships that were over there, when it would have been wiser to have turned them over to him bodily and said to him, "Order them where you please." Those, however, are mistakes that are liable to happen under all conditions. I do not think they were very material.

Senator TRAMMELL. Those are mistakes that are liable to happen; just like Admiral Sims might occasionally have made a mistake in requesting something or requesting you people on this side to do something that you could not do or that you did not think it was advisable to do on account of probably having a more general knowledge of the entire situation than he had, are they not?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, of course those things are liable to happen, yes.

Senator TRAMMELL. As a matter of fact, I suppose little differences like that always arise in connection with the operations of war.

Capt. PRATT. It would be impossible to avoid them, I dare say.

Senator TRAMMELL. Those little mistakes or differences within themselves do not indicate any lack of intensity of a desire to proceed and accomplish results, do they? Nor do they indicate any lack of a general spirit to cooperate and harmonize, do they?

Capt. PRATT. No.

Senator TRAMMELL. Because your particular branch of the service might have disagreed sometimes on matters of no such great importance, with Admiral Sims, did you construe that to mean that you were out of harmony, and that you were not trying to cooperate to the general end?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, no; I thought we were cooperating very successfully.

Senator TRAMMELL. I remember, in regard to one or two orders here, Admiral Sims said that the man who issued that order must never have seen the sea, and must never have been on a boat. If that order was issued at the suggestion of a naval officer, would not that kind of a criticism reach the naval officers as well as the Secretary of the Navy?

Capt. PRATT. Why, of course it does; but whoever the naval officer was that that hit, he would regard that as one of Sims's hyperboles of speech.

Senator TRAMMELL. I am not after arousing antagonisms. I do not want to do that. But I want to show that Admiral Sims can not pick out the Secretary of the Navy and try to bombard him, without hitting a good many naval officers.

Capt. PRATT. Oh, no; sir. I think Sims hit me in that, and I rather regarded it as a joke. He and I never had any quarrels over that.

Senator TRAMMELL. I do not think I have any further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Captain, was not Admiral Sims's letter principally a criticism of the policies that were followed out by the department in relation to his recommendations?

Capt. PRATT. I think it was.

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The CHAIRMAN. And in each case did not those policies have to be finally determined by the Secretary of the Navy?

Capt. PRATT. Yes.

Senator BALL. Subject to his approval?

Capt. PRATT. Subject to his approval; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Therefore he had the final say about the determination of the policy?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, he must, as the head. I feel, though, that his naval advisers must share in any degree of criticism, if such criticism exists.

The CHAIRMAN. That may well be; but if the purpose of the letter was criticism so that improvement could be made in the future, would it not be the best policy to follow to criticise the one who had the final determination? As far as the individual acts of officers of the Navy may be concerned, what they had done was over, and there was no particular advantage one way or the other in blaming or not blaming these men. If, as I interpret it, the letter was constructed and was written for the purpose of improving matters in the Navy, what we would want to get at would be the cause of the failures, and not the individual acts of officers of the Navy. I think I am right, am I not?

Capt. PRATT. Absolutely; that is what would be wanted; and the frankest and plainest exposition I believe is the best. A straight, honest way is always the best, no matter how direct it is.

The CHAIRMAN. And if the system proved faulty, and if a Secretary, under the then existing system, could tangle things up, would it not be well to revise the system.

Capt. PRATT. I think it would be right to revise the system.

The CHAIRMAN. And a letter that was written so as to improve matters in that respect would be a perfectly proper letter, would it not?

Capt. PRATT. Without doubt.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Trammell asked you whether the Secretary had written to the Planning Section asking to have a plan made, and you referred to one letter from him dated February 10, I believe.

Capt. PRATT. I do not know whether the Secretary originated that letter or not.

The CHAIRMAN. Was that a letter to the Planning Section of Operations or to the General Board?

Capt. PRATT No, sir, I refer to——

The CHAIRMAN. Was to the General Board?

Capt. PRATT (continuing). The letter of February 10 was prepared by Capt. Chase, was signed by the Secretary, and was to the General Board.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, then that was the letter the answer to which was lost?

Capt. PRATT. That is the letter the answer to which was lost.

The CHAIRMAN. So that it is not very material. If he did write such a letter to the General Board, apparently there was nothing done about it?

Capt. PRATT. They submitted an answer which has disappeared.

The CHAIRMAN. Then it was not used?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, no. I did not use it, and I do not know of any other persons who did.

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The CHAIRMAN. Do you recall any other instances where the Secretary wrote to the General Board or to the Planning Section asking for specific plans?

Capt. PRATT. No, sir, he never wrote to the Planning Section that I know of; but I would not know.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know whether he wrote to the General Board?

Capt. PRATT. I would not know that.

The CHAIRMAN. When Admiral Blue made up his list in 1914, showing, as he claimed, that the Navy had already had more men than it needed, do you know anything about that list?

Capt. PRATT. No, I do not know the details of that. I only know in a general way that it was an attempt to run our ships in full commission with less men than most naval officers believed to be the full complement quota. I believe they created a complement which was called the peace complement, which was supposed to work in peace, but it was not a war complement.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there not at all times in the naval personnel a large number of men who are not available?

Capt. PRATT. You mean on account of the specific duties they are performing?

The CHAIRMAN. No; because of sickness or otherwise?

Capt. PRATT. Oh, yes; sick men.

The CHAIRMAN. And others; running up to quite a large percentage at all times.

Capt. PRATT. Well, in personnel as in material there must always be a factor of safety to provide for casualties, sick men, etc.

The CHAIRMAN. Were not these sick men used in making up that list of Admiral Blue and other unavailables?

Capt. PRATT. I do not know, sir. Admiral McKean may know about that.

The CHAIRMAN. You have no further knowledge about that?

Capt. PRATT. No, sir.

Senator TRAMMELL. Now, in regard to this letter, whether or not it was the best policy to direct the entire criticism at the head of the Navy, as a matter of fact did the criticism as made apply only to the Secretary of the Navy?

Capt. PRATT. You mean his letter of January 7?

Senator TRAMMELL. Yes; that particular letter and its application.

Capt. PRATT. I did not take it quite that way. In my direct testimony, on page 4, I made the statement:

> Admiral Sims has presented his evidence against the department, and particularly against the Office of Operations, with a great array of facts.

Being in the Office of Operations, I naturally assumed that we were coming in for a full share of that, as we should if we had done anything wrong.

Senator TRAMMELL. Admiral Sims has taken the position that the Navy officers were much more competent to do the planning and to prepare, you might say, the military programs, and so on; and if that is true, and the men of the Navy that were called to these different positions of responsibility largely did make out the plans and direct matters, even though they might have done it under the Secretary of the Navy, and it had to have his final approval, would they not share in the responsibility for what was done?

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Capt. PRATT. Why, sir, there is not a naval officer who is worth his salt who want to duck one bit of responsibility.

Senator TRAMMELL. If the Chief of Operations, for instance, with his corps of able assistants, prepares a plan and takes it to the Secretary of the Navy, who is not a trained naval man, and not technical, and he gives that his approval, and somebody comes along and criticises it or alleges that it was a mistake, who is, you might say, the more responsible for the plan of the two, the naval officer or the Secretary of the Navy?

Capt. PRATT. Why, sir, as I said before, every naval officer is anxious to assume all the responsibility that he can, and even a little more, sometimes. Every naval officer who is worth his salt has got to assume responsibility, and wants to. That is our life. We can not go out and fight battles unless we have that spirit and are willing to do it.

Senator TRAMMELL. I am not trying to place any criticism.

Capt. PRATT. No; I know you are not.

Senator TRAMMELL. Because I have not any criticism to make, myself.

Capt. PRATT. But I am trying to tell you how we feel about it.

Senator TRAMMELL. There seems to be a disposition to want to place a great deal of criticism on the Secretary of the Navy in particular, but I have no disposition of the kind. I dare say, if we turned the searchlight onto the record of Admiral Sims, while in the main he rendered good service, I think we might find where Admiral Sims probably changed front or maybe made some mistakes, which would be perfectly natural; but I rather measure a man's service in the broader sense, not picking out some little technical mistake he might have made, and criticising it; so that I do not mean it as any criticism of naval officers at all; and I also realize he was in better position to give technical, expert advice than a civilian would be; naturally so. But if they are in that position, and the Secretary of the Navy follows their recommendation in the main and in a general way, I do not think that the Secretary is entirely the party to blame if the mistakes were made. That is my position in regard to that. I think that is all.

The CHAIRMAN. I suppose, Capt. Pratt, that if Admiral Sims had asked for six destroyers and had written the Secretary of the Navy to that effect and the Secretary of the Navy had turned the matter over to operations to decide upon it whether he should have the six destroyers or not, and operations should decide that he should have the six destroyers, the matter would then go to the Secretary of the Navy for his approval, would it not?

Capt. PRATT. Yes; when we started in this war, matters of detail did have to be arranged through the Secretary, that way; but later we used to handle operations a little more directly. The Secretary could not attend to all such matters of detail; it would be impossible. So I think in many cases we acted directly, after the policy was once established.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean that a cable would be received by you directly, before it would go to the Secretary?

Capt. PRATT. Well, if Admiral Sims made a specific request, say for a particular ship or so, I would take an answer approving it to my chief, Admiral Benson. If he approved it, the order would be issued.

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The CHAIRMAN. Without going to the Secretary?

Capt. PRATT. I think, in many cases, that is true.

The CHAIRMAN. But in a case of sending over a large number of destroyers or sending over destroyers for the first time, the Secretary would have to approve it?

Capt. PRATT. He would have to approve of the general policy.

The CHAIRMAN. Then, after he had approved the policy, if Operations unduly delayed the sending over of those ships, then the fault would be with Operations, would it not, and not with the Secretary?

Capt. PRATT. Quite so.

The CHAIRMAN. But if, on the other hand, when the question was put up to the Secretary, he delayed action on it, pigeonholed it and kept it waiting for some time before making the decision, the responsibility would then be to him?

Capt. PRATT. Necessarily so.

Senator BALL. All general policies had to be approved by the Secretary?

Capt. PRATT. They must be. He is the head of things.

Senator BALL. Those demands made by Admiral Sims for increases in personnel and ships, and so forth, had to be approved—that general operation plan had to be approved—by the Secretary?

The CHAIRMAN. They were all questions of policy?

Capt. PRATT. Naturally so. He must approve all general policies.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all.

Senator BALL. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be all, Capt. Pratt, and you will be excused.

Capt. PRATT. Aye, aye, sir.

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL JOSIAH S. McKEAN, UNITED STATES NAVY.

(The witness was sworn by the chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral McKean, have you a statement to make about matters pertaining to this investigation?

Admiral McKEAN. Yes; I have a statement, and I will submit from time to time in different sections the official documents, copied from the records of the Navy Department, to illustrate and substantiate the contentions; and I have here several complete copies of these documents.

Following the procedure that has heretofore been followed by the committee, I have prepared a memorandum showing what duty I was doing from time to time from the outbreak of the world war in 1914 [reading]:

MEMORANDUM.

MARCH 30, 1920.

Service from beginning of the World War to date:

From August, 1914, to December 26, 1914, commanding U. S. S. *West Virginia*, Pacific Fleet.

From January 5, 1915, to July 1, 1915, Commanding U. S. S. *North Dakota*, North Atlantic Fleet.

From July 1, 1915, to February 15, 1918, assistant for material in the Office of Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

From February 15, 1918, to September 15, 1918, commanding U. S. S. *Arizona*, North Atlantic Fleet.

From September 15, 1918, to January 5, 1919, assistant for material, Office of Chief of Naval operations, Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

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From January 5, 1919, to June 21, 1919, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations and Acting Chief of Naval Operations during absence of Admiral Benson in Europe.
From June 21, 1919, to September 25, 1919, date of Admiral Benson's retirement, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations.
From September 25, 1919, to November 8, 1919, Acting Chief of Naval Operations.
From November 8, 1919, to date, commanding Battleship Division 6, Pacific Fleet.

The absence of Admiral Benson continued up to June 21, 1919. Upon his return, and up to the date of his retirement, I was dropped back to my normal job of Assistant Chief of Naval Operations. Then on Admiral Benson's retirement, when Admiral Coontz became Chief of Operations, I was again acting chief.

Since November 8, 1919, I have been in command of Battleship Division 6, Pacific Fleet.

The CHAIRMAN. Where was the *Arizona* stationed?

Admiral McKEAN. It was in the North Atlantic Fleet, mostly based on Yorktown. In the early stages of my sea tour we went to sea several times, and after that we limited our activities to the bay, and then just before I was detached, I took her to the navy yard, New York.

The CHAIRMAN. She did not get across the water?

Admiral McKEAN. She did not, with me. I was fortunate enough to be able to arrange that after I got in the department.

From a study of the original letter on which this investigation is based, and from listening to the testimony given be various witnesses, I have arrived at the conclusion that this whole controversy can be reduced to two main issues.

First, neglect of preparation before the United States went into the war; and, second, not putting the whole or not concentrating the whole efforts of the Navy Department and the fleet, ships, officers, and men on the antisubmarine menace in European waters, on April 6, 1917, on the declaration of war.

As to the first charge, neglect of preparation before the United States went into the war, this may be divided under three heads:

(*a*) That there were no plans.
(*b*) That the personnel was not ready.
(*c*) That the material was not ready.

The first requirement in war plan making is trained plan makers. That this was appreciated by the Secretary of the Navy the following incident will show. In late May or early June, 1913, shortly after the present secretary came into office, he visited the Naval War College, Newport, R. I., and at a dinner he was, at his own request, literally swamped with advice in reference to his duties and opportunities by all the officers present, among them Capt. W. S. Sims and myself, both at the time students at the college, and we contributed at least our share.

After a long session at the table, we adjourned to the drawing room, and thus the Secretary had his first opportunity to face the whole of his numerous advisers; whereupon he said in substance: "Gentlemen, you have given me a great quantity of valuable advice, which will take me a long time to digest. I have no doubt it is all good, but it is like a great deal of the advice given me by my official aides in Washington. It is not sufficiently concrete to put into immediate use. What I wish you would tell me is the first and most important single act, which I can perform to most help the Navy." Captain, now Rear Admiral Sims, immediately replied, "What you want to do, Mr. Secretary, is to appoint a board." I rudely inter-

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rupted Sims, with apologies, I hope, saying, "Pardon, me, Mr. Secretary, you do not want to appoint a board. The Navy Department cellars are full of boards' reports never acted upon. As I understand it, you wish to know now what single executive act of yours will do the most good to the Navy. My recommendation is that you send a wire to the aide for operations, informing him that hereafter he, the aide for operations, will be your sole military adviser, and that his duties will be to coordinate the activities of the other aides, for personnel, material, and inspections, in the same way that they coordinate the activities of the various bureaus and divisions under each of them."

This recommendation met the approval of the officers present, but the Secretary demurred; said he could not do that without great consideration, as he feared he would be giving up too much of his authority and avoiding what should be his responsibilities. After some discussion in an attempt to show the Secretary that he was not giving up any authority and that he could not possibly avoid his responsibilities, this recommendation was passed over, and he asked what next we had to offer. In reply it was suggested, by myself, or some other officer, that he send an order to the Bureau of Navigation directing that at all times thereafter, they were to have two classes, of not less than 20 officers each at the War College under training at all times. He agreed to this and since that time, except during the war this condition has been maintained, and thus for the first time in the history of our Navy, we are providing for the training of something like an adequate number of officers for the duty of making war plans.

The second step in plan making is to collect the necessary information on which to base plans. This is the duty of the Office of Naval Intelligence, a division of the Office of Operations.

Once again, we have never had sufficient personnel to have an adequate staff of officers abroad collecting information, and of the small number we have had, few of them were selected solely because of their superior training for the job.

The War College must provide these trained officers in addition to the plan makers.

The third element in plan making is that there must be some head to the plan-making body. This head was provided under law of March 3, 1915, establishing the office of Chief of Naval Operations [reading]:

> There shall be a Chief of Naval Operations, who shall be an officer on the active list of the Navy appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, from among the officers of the line of the Navy not below the grade of captain, for a period of four years, who shall, under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy, be charged with the operations of the fleet and with the preparation and readiness of plans for its use in war: *Provided*, That if an officer of the grade of captain be appointed Chief of Naval Operations, he shall have the rank, title, and emoluments of a rear admiral while holding that position.
>
> During the temporary absence of the Secretary and the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations shall be next in succession to act as Secretary of the Navy.

As will be seen from this law, the Chief of Naval Operations was given two duties:

(*a*) He was charged with the operations of the fleet and (*b*) with the preparation and readiness of plans for its use in war, which, put

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in another way, would be that he was responsible, first, for the preparation of plans; second, for the preparation of the fleet to carry out the plans; and, third, the execution of the plans.

This essential step was, I believe, made law under the urgency of the Hon. Richmond P. Hobson, Member of Congress from Alabama.

This law, while absolutely essential and filling a long-felt want in Navy Department organization, did not fully meet the situation. The law defines the responsibilities of the Chief of Naval Operations, but does not confer adequate authority on him to meet his responsibilities.

Now, to come to the statement that there were no plans. There were general plans made by the general board as to the composition and numbers of the peace or A fleet, also of the war or C fleet. There was an intermediate plan, B. These gave the vessels to be used under the two conditions.

These general plans were first submitted in 1913, were brought up to date in 1915, and, with the World War going on and our entrance therein probable, were again revised in February, 1917.

They were the general basic plans with which we worked and, taken with the base plan and the mobilization plan, were sufficient for the general guidance of all concerned at the dates they were issued.

They were not detailed complete paper plans for the meeting of all possible conditions because the trained personnel to work out such detailed plans was not available, nor was the information. The General Board's plans were of necessity general plans, and it was necessary to add to and modify these by detailed plans for different operations from time to time.

In this connection I would like to say that there has been a good deal of discussion by different witnesses about complete detailed plans. That is pure theory. As Capt. Pratt showed, that is all right for an aggressive nation that is planning to take its neighbor's territory, or to operate at the expense of somebody. They have got a definite objective. They have got a definite idea in their heads. They organize definitely for that purpose. They can work out to the last button on the gaiters, as somebody said, the army and navy, and the supplies, munitions, and the whole business. They can put it down in infinite detail, and sublet from one planning section to the next and to the next and to the next. and it goes into detail until all the "i's" are dotted and all the "t's" are crossed. Von Moltke is the model of that, in the Franco-Prussian war, and that is the plan that most of these people are talking about. Von Moltke had such a plan, we believe. He worked it out very successfully, as we know.

His successor in 1914 undoubtedly had a plan similar to that. He did not work it out. The Belgians delayed him two weeks; the Battle of the Marne turned him back; and his plans were gone; they were useless; they had been projected too far in advance and in too much detail; and when they broke down, when one part of the detailed plan broke down, the machine went to pieces.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it not possible to have a detailed plan of defense the same as of aggression?

Admiral MCKEAN. Yes; that is the first thing you should prepare for, the defense, before you launch the offensive.

We built up a Planning Division in Operations to work out these detailed plans as soon as the officer selected for the head of this divi-

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sion. Capt. F. H. Schofield, came back from sea and was available. We added personnel as it became available from time to time until we had a very efficient but small Planning Division, and even this we were finally compelled to transfer bodily to the London office, doing similar work for Admiral Sims.

The first break in it, or the first addition to the Planning Section, was after Capt. Schofield was with Capt. Pratt for half time—a sort of volunteer. Then we got him on full time. Then, on Chase's death, we took Pratt and put him in as assistant chief. Then we sent the rest of it over to Sims in London.

The committee's attention is here called to the fine compliments paid this Planning Division by Admiral Sims for the work they did in London. I believe they deserved all that he said of them for the work they did in London. I do not agree with Admiral Sims's estimate of the work the same men did in Washington being stupid or worse than worthless. I do not know what could have changed the mental capacity of these officers so suddenly. It has been suggested that it may have been afternoon tea or London fog. Some people thought it was Scotch mist. I do not know.

Now, as to personnel.

The CHAIRMAN. You had best keep all personalities out of it as much as possible.

Admiral McKEAN. I have not mentioned any names, and I do not think, Senator—I am not intending to go any further in personalities than I interpret the letter to be coming toward us as personal. I am not a partisan for either side. I am not an attorney for the Secretary of the Navy. I am not trying to damn Admiral Sims. I am an officer of the Navy; I worked in Operations; and this letter to me is aimed at Operations. It may have been aimed at the Secretary. The shooting was bad, and it hit Operations; and personally I feel that I am justified in defending in the same line that I was attacked.

The CHAIRMAN. However, we will have no personalities.

Admiral McKEAN. No, sir; there are no personalities. I have none.

Senator TRAMMELL. I do not think that borders on personality. I remember Admiral Sims provoked the applause of the audience on several occasions by some very snappy, witty observations, and I did not hear anybody object to that. The testimony is full of his snappy, witty expressions.

The CHAIRMAN. What we are trying to get is information here, and not snappy wit.

Senator TRAMMELL. You ought to have started on Admiral Sims. I wish you had started on Admiral Sims.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not think he criticised anybody.

Senator TRAMMELL. He said such things as that. Speaking of an order he said that the fellow that sent out that order could never have seen the sea or a ship. I think that is about as critical and personal as this.

The CHAIRMAN. If he thought that, that was a proper remark to make.

Senator TRAMMELL. The witness has a right to give his ideas here. I want them all treated alike.

The CHAIRMAN. I think everybody will have fair treatment.

Admiral McKEAN. I am not complaining, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Now if you will proceed, Admiral.

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Admiral McKEAN. Proceeding to the matter of personnel, the second subhead was that the personnel was not ready. There is no question that we were short of both officers and men; the Navy personnel was too small for its job. The fleet had been built up materially, but neither the commissioned or enlisted personnel had kept step with the material. The officer shortage dates back, in my opinion, to the act of August 5, 1882, which law provided for the honorable discharge of a large number of graduates of the classes of 1881, 1882, 1883, 1884, 1885, 1886, and 1887. At the same time and by the same law, through the elimination of cadet engineering appointments, the number of appointments to the Naval Academy were reduced by 25 each year. The total effect of this law in the 35 years of its operation undoubtedly reduced the number of commissioned officers available at the time we entered the World War by about 750. The shortage of officers commenced to be felt in the service about 1893. It grew progressively worse in spite of increases in appointments to the Academy from time to time. There is no doubt that we did not have more than 40 per cent of the officers needed when we entered the war, but the responsibility for this condition dates back through many years and through numerous administrations.

The question of the shortage of enlisted personnel has been fully gone into. We were short; I believe the primary causes of incorrect recommendations of the then Chief of the Bureau of Navigation were due to the use of that old delusion, "Peace complements for fighting ships." Although the expression "peace complement" has been used for years in congressional hearings and by some officers of the Navy, I have never been able to understand what was meant by a "peace complement" on a fighting ship. In my mind there are only two complements. These complements being based on the condition of the ship.

(*a*) What we usually mean by complement, that is, full crew for fighting. This is the only complement suitable for a man-of-war in full commission.

(*b*) "Reserve" complement, that is, the complement of a ship in reserve. We have at various times tried varying numbers for a reserve complement. My experience as commanding officer of ships which had been in reserve and especially my experience as Assistant for Material, has most entirely and completely convinced me that the minimum complement to keep a ship in reserve so that she may on the approach of war be put in commission in time and in condition to use in the war, is 50 per cent of all lower ratings and in addition all chief petty officers, making a total reserve complement about 60 per cent of the full or fighting complement. This is the minimum necessary first to keep the ship in proper material condition, second, to properly train the reserve, militia, or other personnel which is assigned to her on going into full commission to complete her full complement. This will give each reserve or other rookie a running mate in the same duties to coach him rapidly for his job. The full complement of warrant officers should be on board. The commanding officer, executive officer, other heads of the departments should be on board. This is, in my opinion necessary so that the ship may be taken to sea from time to time to train her own complement to train her recruits and reserves, and more important, to test out her machinery, mechanical and electrical devices, and by

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limited target practice and cruising to prove her actual material readiness for war.

From a conversation I had with Admiral Blue in January, 1915, I am convinced that his error in estimating the total number of men required in the Navy were due to the fact that he took the ships as listed in the General Board's plans and figured them with what he called "peace complements," about the same complement that is used by the bureaus in arranging for berthing and other accommodations for the crews when the ship is designed. This last practice should also be changed, as we know now, and have known for some time, that owing to additions made from time to time in the mechanical devices on board ship, communication systems, signalling systems, fire control, etc., that the complement of a ship necessary to train her for war and to fight her in war, always increases with every new development in the art of war at sea.

Now there was a question, to clear up the question of the chairman this morning to Capt. Pratt about the mistakes in Admiral Blue's estimate. I know that he did not make any allowance for sickness or short time or shore station, and so on. His estimate was entirely wrong. I tried to convince him of it in his own office—he asked me what I thought of his business—and I said "You are wrong;" and I tried to show him why. He defended it and he believed in it at the time, and I suppose he so advised the Secretary.

You can train and you can fight a ship with a "peace complement," or you can train with a "peace complement" and then throw a lot of recruits on board and go out to fight, but you won't either train or fight anywhere near the capacity of your ship. To make it plain to a layman just what I mean, a fighting ship's crew is the largest, most complicated, and should be the highest skilled and highest trained team known to anybody. There is more real "inside ball" and more "inside dope" in the training and handling of this team of about 1,500 men and officers than can even be dreamed of by anyone who has not had a hand in training of and developing at least a part of such a team. As you gentlemen know, you could train a baseball team of seven men and play at the game, but God help your score if you are playing against a nine-man team of the same quality.

Third subhead under lack of preparedness is that the material was not ready. This is the particular part that I am, through association and duty as assistant for material, most familiar with and most responsible for; and at the outset I will say that the fleet was not 100 per cent ready, is not 100 per cent ready now, and that it never will be 100 per cent ready at the outbreak of war.

The navy yards were not 100 per cent ready; they are not now, although the Atlantic coast yards are much better prepared than they have ever been before. The Pacific bases are not as near ready as were the Atlantic in 1917, and for the same reason—Congress has not appropriated the money, though complete plans with estimates have been submitted. In this connection the committee's attention is called to the work done by the so-called "Helm Commission," appointed by the President in accordance with a resolution of Congress, not by the Navy Department.

I bring this in here, although it sounds extraneous; but the base and the yards from which the fleet operates with me is the basis of

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this whole trouble. That is where we start wrong; and, as I believe the purpose of the committee is to correct it, I speak of this commission and its report. This commission has submitted a series of the most valuable reports to Congress and the department of which I have any knowledge. It has completely covered the coast from Hatteras down to Key West, and then along the whole of the Gulf in the Atlantic. It has also covered from San Diego to and including Puget Sound on the Pacific. It has not covered the West Indies, the Panama Canal, the Hawaiian Islands, Guam, or the Philippines. I believe that there is nothing more fundamental than the selection of proper bases, and I recommend for the consideration of the committee that the Helm Commission be continued and that it cover the remaining part of our coast and the outlying stations, so that Congress may have before it for future reference a complete systematic and scientific study of our needs in this respect. I noted in the Washington Post of April 22 that a member of your committee had returned from a trip to the West Indies with a recommendation, so the paper said, that Port au Prince should be developed as a naval base for our fleet in lieu of Guantanamo, Cuba. This recommendation may be correct, but of the dozen or more complete studies made by boards of officers at different times and in different connections of bases in the West Indies, of all the studies that Admiral Mahan and other writers on the strategy of the Caribbean, this is the first and only one that I ever heard even suggest that Port au Prince, Haiti, would be of any value whatever to us as a naval base.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, I think you are mistaken about a member of our committee having done that.

Admiral MCKEAN. I am just speaking of what I saw in the Washington Post.

The CHAIRMAN. Posssibly it was a member of the general Naval Committee of the Senate.

Admiral MCKEAN. I do not know, sir, but I was just pointing out that I hoped somebody would be sent to study this thing, and that we would not get in wrong.

Senator BALL. The Helm Commission intends to continue its investigations.

Admiral MCKEAN. I do not know, sir. It has never been dissolved, to my knowledge. It is a congressional commission, now, I understand.

Senator BALL. I know it has not been dissolved, and it expects to continue. We had them before a subcommittee of ours with reference to the Atlantic coast.

Admiral MCKEAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. But I think you are mistaken in saying that it was a member of the Naval Affairs Committee that made such a report.

Admiral MCKEAN. I do not know that the Post quoted the name, but I think it said that it was a member of the committee. That is subject to correction.

Senator KEYES. I think it ought to be made clear in the record, as your testimony would indicate that some member of this committee was referred to.

Admiral MCKEAN. Your committee here?

Senator KEYES. Yes.

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Admiral McKEAN. Oh, I meant the Naval Committee.

Senator KEYES. Very well.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it is a mistake.

Admiral McKEAN. I will make a note of that, and if it is incorrect, I will correct it in the revision of my testimony.

(Senator King, of Utah, was the name in the article.)

There are plenty of officers and boards who doubt the present utility of Guantanamo. There are different reports recommending numerous places such as Samana Bay, Culebra Island, Fajardo Passage, St. Thomas, etc., but this is the first I have heard of Port au Prince in this connection. This is a big subject, gentlemen, and it would take weeks of as thoroughly competent a commission as the Helm Commission to cover this ground properly, making the necessary studies and thoroughly considered recommendations. It can't be done too soon.

The industrial supplies and ship supplies on hand were not adequate when I became assistant for material, July 1, 1915, but from that date on, the shortage of these supplies was in progress of correction, and we were in much better shape on April 6, 1917, than we had been for some years previous.

Now, to show what point of view I am testifying from, I say this in explanation of my duties and point of view, it was my understanding as assistant for material, that the functions of my office were to coordinate, under the direction of the Chief of Naval Operations, the efforts of the material bureaus, the navy yards and the fleet, so as to maintain the fleet in condition to carry out the military plans of the Chief of Naval Operations for the use of the fleet in war.

Very early in my duties my investigations confirmed my previous opinions acquired with the fleet, that our shore establishments, navy yards, supply bases, etc., had not been developed as rapidly as the fleet had been built up, and that they were not capable of maintaining the fleet materially fit for war.

To meet this condition the following steps were recommended by me and approved by the Chief of Naval Operations and the Secretary of the Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the date?

Capt. PRATT. I have those different things here, and they each have the date on them. They came at different dates. I started in shortly after I reached the department, July 1, 1915, and I was pretty constantly at it. For instance, here is the regular overhaul period, August 10, 1915. That is the first one of those, and I cite and will take up these policies later and explain each one of them and show when they were established and what I was trying to do in the way of general preparation.

The CHAIRMAN. Then, this is the synopsis of what is here?

Admiral McKEAN. Yes, the synopsis of what will follow here. These are the steps that were recommended by me and approved by the Chief of Naval Operations and the Secretary of the Navy:

(*a*) The doing away with the repair period, through which the fleet had come to depend upon the yards for too many of its repairs and was losing its capacity, so economical in peace and so essential in war, of "self-maintenance."

(*b*) The increase of the number of repair and mother ships capable of making large repairs, which would otherwise require the vessel's return to a navy yard.

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(*c*) The development and equipment of the various navy yards to enable them to promptly and efficiently make such repairs as the ships themselves, assisted by the repair ships, could not make.

(*d*) The board of inspection and survey was directed to thoroughly inspect all vessels on the Navy list, with the purpose of:

First, determining those having no military value or so little military value as to no longer justify expenditures to maintain them, thus eliminating them from the list and using the money for useful craft; and, second, to determine the needed repairs on useful craft with estimates of cost and time; to determine the charges against appropriations and the amount of work that would be required of the navy yards.

(*e*) To determine to what extent the yards should be developed. The General Board, at the request of the Chief of Naval Operations, drew up a base plan adequate for a fleet such as was contemplated in the general war plans.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the base plan for the yards?

Admiral MCKEAN. That is the base plan for the whole fleet. That included navy yards, fueling stations, other supply stations, and bases: everything that the fleet needed on shore to successfully operate. The principal thing was the navy yards.

(*f*) At my request the navy-yard development board was organized to work out detailed plans for each navy yard and shore station to enable it to meet the demands of the General Board's base plan.

In explanation of the navy yard development board, that was, although we did not call it that, really the plans section for bases. I was chairman. The assistant chiefs of bureaus were the bureau representatives, and we took the demands made by the base plan of the General Board, took the yard as it was and then tried to develop it most economically and efficiently to meet the demands made in the base plan of the General Board. That board is still functioning, and the idea fundamentally was that we would get what we needed in navy yards. The old way was that navy yards grew, just like Topsy, and depended on local favor, etc., more than on the demands of the fleet. The fleet was used to keep up the yards, instead of the yards being used to keep up the fleet, and that was not either economical or efficient.

Senator BALL. What year was this that you made these recommendations?

Admiral MCKEAN. 1915, in the fall; and the navy yard development board was the spring of 1916, I think.

The CHARMAN. It would be much better if you would give the dates of these recommendations, so that we will not have to look them up in the papers filed.

Admiral MCKEAN. I thought that I would make just a general statement, and then I will take them up in sequence.

The CHAIRMAN. You are going to take them up in sequence later?

Admiral MCKEAN. Yes, to take them up in sequence; and give the headings, and the dates, so that the committee will know what they are, beforehand.

The logistic committee was formed with a representative from each bureau to determine what the minimum stock of industrial and consumable stores on hand should be, to enable the yards and supply bases to promptly meet the demands of the fleet, as contemplated in

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the General Board's war plans, and quarterly reports as to progress were made by each of the bureaus to Operations.

To show that we were not only putting stuff on paper, when fleet evolutions took place in 1915 and 1916 the Navy Department and navy yard organizations were mobilized and were tested out along with our communication system, supply system, etc., as to their adequacy and their readiness for war.

We actually sent fake orders for supplies, we sent ships in for oil, and we had actions, and we had docks blown up, and we had shops burned down and all that sort of thing, trying to get the people interested and to get them trained for what they might expect in war, and to prepare for it; and the fleet were having practice maneuvers off the coast as against an enemy, while we were having our practices here in the department and in the navy yards, simulating war as nearly as we could at that time, with the idea not that we were anywhere near ready, but to find out where we were not ready; and it was putting in practice the efforts that we were making, theoretically.

One of the big things was the consolidation of radio, telephone, cable, and telegraph communications into the Communication Division of Operations.

The foundation of all success is communications.

This division handled 1,000,000 messages, averaging 30 words each, for all departments and all activities of the Government and Commerce during 1918, and controlled the censorship of cables, etc., for the United States in all parts of the world.

The above preparations of the fleet for war were undertaken simultaneously in the fall and winter of 1915. It progressed as rapidly as the appropriations would permit. After the declaration of war, regular appropriations and allotments from emergency funds were obtained without difficulty, so that development of existing facilities and the addition of other needed facilities to the amount of about $80,000,000 in Government-owned plants and about $60,000,000 in private-owned plants to permit of their expansion to meet our demands, was secured.

There has been in addition to funds obtained previously for the development of the navy yards, and there has been before and during the war, a total of about $300,000,000 spent on navy yards, shore stations, bases of various kinds, and industrial plants outside of navy yards.

All of those developments are not completed yet, but they were coming along fine, and if we had been a little earlier with them we would have been in better shape.

Along with the physical developments of the yards, bases, station, etc., went the increase of navy-yard personnel. The employees of navy yards on January 1, 1916, numbered about 29,000. On November 1, 1918, about 75,000. The attention of the committee is here called to the fact that this increase of numbers did not mean a relative increase of production, owing to the fact that a large number of the additional employees were of necessity unskilled and had to be trained.

You remember the demands at that time on skilled labor.

The CHAIRMAN. The navy yards' personnel would be considered as a part of material of the Navy, would it?

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Admiral McKEAN. Personnel in the navy yards is more closely related to material than anything else. I sometimes think it is aboard ship.

This can well be understood when it is realized that the total of the shipbuilding and ship repair trades at the beginning of the war amounted to an estimated 50,000: that the Shipping Board alone had in its employ at one time a maximum of 500,000. We were competing for this labor in the same market as the Shipping Board. Further, the committee's attention is called to the fact that this total of 75,000 mechanics in navy yards was all that, in my opinion, could be advantageously and efficiently used in these yards.

Our investigation of navy yards showed in the fall of 1915 that it was necessary for the Navy Department to establish separate bases for men, fuel ships' stores, etc., outside of the navy yards, and to use these yards exclusively for their primary purpose of docking, repairing, and building ships.

The Navy had grown, and the navy yard that used to be a training station, receiving ship, and supply base and fuel base and everything else could not handle the job any more.

The establishment of these supply bases was undertaken and proceeded with as rapidly as congressional appropriations permitted.

The General Board had revised and brought up to date the supplies they considered necessary to be carried in fuel bases, both coal and oil, and how much should be carried in each of the fuel stations. This revised plan required expansion of all the fuel stations to carry more coal; the building of tanks to hold more oil; coal and oil barges to transport this fuel and to carry a certain minimum stock afloat ready for emergency use.

This fuel problem was an expanding and difficult one, one of the most difficult of the war, but it was met by the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts successfully. And early in the war we had reached an enviable position as to fuel, for we had not only what vessels then operating from each port required, but we had sufficient reserve to take care of any movement of vessels that might be switched to any port up to the full capacity of the port.

This should be limited to the Atlantic coast.

Senator KEYES. Just to make it clear: You say "early in the war." Do you mean when we entered the war, or what date?

Admiral McKEAN. I mean early in the war so far as we were concerned.

Senator KEYES. When you speak of the war, you mean when we entered the war?

Admiral McKEAN. Soon after our entrance into the war. No, sir; not at the beginning of the European war. We did not have the money at that time—could not get it.

No vessel to my knowledge was delayed on this side of the ocean for lack of fuel during the whole of the war. In addition, in the period of fuel shortage, a number of essential activities, such as light and power plants of cities and munitions plants working for the Army, the Navy, and the Allies were only kept going by the use of the Navy's fuel reserves.

On our going into the war, the naval district organizations were expanded wherever needed and to the extent needed to undertake their war functions; among these functions in addition to the polic-

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ing and protecting of the port, was the taking over and altering for governmental uses, repairing, fueling, and supplying of vessels assigned to the districts of which came into the ports within the district and the district authorities utilized for these purposes whatever private facilities were necessary to supplement those owned or commandeered by the Government. Thus at the maximum war load, we were utilizing, in addition to our own navy yards, what has been estimated at 70 per cent of the total private ship building and ship repair facilities in our country.

The progress made in development of bases and the accumulation of supplies did not proceed as rapidly as it would have done under normal conditions, but it will be remembered that even in 1915 our material markets and labor markets were already meeting the demands of the Allies for a large amount of munitions and that these demands, with all prices for material and labor were increasing.

We did not pay so much attention to prices. We got them as reasonably as we could, but what I mean is the trouble about prices was that we could not get so much for the dollars that you gentlemen appropriated.

After we entered the war and practically unlimited funds became available, the markets for material of all sorts were swamped with new orders from the War Department, the Navy Department, the Shipping Board, the Railroad Administration, Food Administration, Fuel Administration, etc.; in addition to the already existing demands of the Allies, which were largely increased on our changing from a neutral to a belligerent. These conflicting demands could not all be met simultaneously and the supplying of many of them was delayed necessarily until facilities could be provided for their manufacture.

In addition to the shortage of material, of factories, of power, ship repair, and ship building plants, was the shortage of the prime essential—labor. As shown above, we did not have the supply of skilled labor called for in the whole country, and at first it was not distributed so as to best meet the demands. Most serious of all, the draft drew a large number entirely out of industrial life, put them on the Army, Navy, and Shipping Board ships as operating and consuming forces instead of producing forces.

We took men out of the navy yards, even.

The conflicting demands of different interests were met in so far as they could be met and as rapidly as they could be met by the various activities of the War Industries Board, primarily by the priorities division, which determined after full presentation of the claims of the various interests which should have priority on certain items, certain plants, certain power, etc., and what claim of priority each item should have. It was necessary to determine priorities, even as to fuel and transportation, sand, gravel, and cement for construction purposes.

This priority situation involved a number of officers working on the War Industries Board, at least one representative from each bureau a large part of his time, and I, as general liaison officer of the Navy Department, representing all the bureaus and the military policy of the department at the same time, spent on an average two hours each day in pushing our claims and securing the priorities required by the items that day before the board.

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I am putting this in to show the difficulty that we had, and why we could not instantaneously respond to all requests for material.

To give me an unquestioned official foundation for my claims before the priority board, I made out a list of types of craft in the order of their then importance in the war program of the Navy, and the first three of these items were destroyers, aircraft for antisubmarine use, submarines for use in the war zone in antisubmarine operations. I had no difficulty in securing the approval of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Secretary of the Navy to this list and presented it as the official Navy Department policy.

I had many contentions before the board with the Army and the Shipping Board to hold these priorities, and as an illustration of the attitude of the department, I met the claims of the Shipping Board for priority in securing of turbines for their ships over turbines for destroyers. Their plea was that the only way to defeat the submarine was to build tonnage faster than the enemy could sink it. I argued that this was a purely defensive measure, necessary to be sure, but that the Navy insisted on the offensive at all times, and that while their (the Shipping Board) system was in effect, a scheme to "feed the submarines to death," the Navy's was to "poison" them and be done with them once and for all, besides saving the goods and guns which would be lost by the Shipping Board's system. Our system would, in addition, decrease the enemy morale. We won, and destroyer material, labor, power, fuel, transportation, were given precedence over everything else for ourselves and everything else for our Allies, except what was shown by them to be actually needed at the front to enable their troops to hold on until we could get into the game in sufficient numbers to be of assistance.

I wish here to say that the same priority was given to the alterations and repairs of destroyers, yachts, chasers, etc., being fitted for duty overseas. This gave them precedence over capital ships of the fleet for repairs in the same way, and for the same reasons, that our whole building program for capital ships was absolutely stopped, so that men, materials, etc., could be concentrated for building destroyers, tugs, mine planters, chasers, etc., for use overseas against enemy submarines.

I wish to accent "overseas," for until this discussion came up, I never thought anyone had any doubt of the policy of the Navy Department that the war was in Europe and that Operations intended to keep it there.

The preceding narrative is intended to show:

First. That Operations was awake to the situation before the war and was doing its best within the appropriations to prepare the fleet for war, and to prepare the shore bases to maintain it in fighting trim during the war;

Second. That even before we became a belligerent the difficulties and prices were increasing daily, making progress slow and getting us less for every dollar appropriated; and

Third. That when funds became available practically without limit, the demands on the material and labor markets were such that new facilities had to be built up to provide the material, and that unskilled labor had to be trained by hundreds of thousands to perform jobs calling for high skill and long training.

The above explains why it was impossible for the Navy Department or any other department to instantaneously or even in what

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under normal conditions would be considered a reasonable time to meet the infinite numbers of demands made upon it.

As to the extent of these demands, there is submitted herewith a list of all types of vessels, completed and authorized or building on April 6, 1917, and a corresponding list of the date November 1, 1918, which shows that at the beginning of the war, April 6, 1917, we had 344 vessels of all types completed, 204 authorized or building, making a total of 548; that we had completed on November 1, 1918, 1,594 vessels of all types, that we had authorized or building 655, making a total of 2,249 vessels on November 1, 1918; that of this total there were on December 1, 1918, 463 vessels abroad, and in addition there were 100 other vessels traveling back and forth from Europe to the United States.

There is also submitted a memorandum of the head of the Division of Naval Districts, Rear Admiral Osterhaus, showing that we took over through commandeering, purchase, charter, or lease, 1,110 private vessels, motor boats, yachts, tugs, steamers, lighters, trawlers, and fishing boats, schooners, tankers, ferry and houseboats and barges; that in addition to this 1,110 we took over from other Government departments, Coast Guards, Lighthouse Service, Coast and Geodetic Survey, Immigration Service, Public Health Service, Bureau of Fisheries, Panama Canal, and borrowed from the Canadian Government a total of 135, making a grand total of vessels taken over, converted to Government use and equipped for Government service, 1,245 craft of all types, sizes, and kinds.

The CHAIRMAN. These were all taken over after war was declared?

Admiral McKEAN. Yes, sir; we had no authority to take them over before.

The CHAIRMAN. We had not purchased or authorized any of them before?

Admiral McKEAN. No, sir; none of these.

That in addition to the above, we converted to troop transports and the Navy operated for the Army a total of 149 transports. This includes 25 of the Navy's battleships and cruisers; but even then we had to add some conversion work on them to fit them for troops.

That, in addition to the above commencing in February, 1917, we remodeled for armed guard and the carrying of guns 384 merchant vessels; including vessels for our allies as well as our own.

That, during the later part of the war, in addition to the fighting fleet and vessels given above, the Navy Department operated and maintained 378 vessels in the Naval Overseas Transportation Service.

Each and every one of these vessels referred to above required some alteration to adapt her to the new service. A great many required extensive repairs. All made demands on material and labor for maintenance throughout the time of their service. This was in addition to the building, repair and maintenance of vessels of the regular Navy, and these activities were carried on at the same time as the others, involving the building of new types and the repair of the main fleet units, but the work of the various classes was kept separate in so far as possible and placed in different yards, and when in the same yard, priorities were given in the order of relative importance and the urgency for each type, and the highest priority was, as previously stated, always given to craft for overseas, and first of these craft, to destroyers.

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Now I give a list of activities that fall under material, but that has been covered before in general, except paragraph (*g*).

Among the activities requiring material, the following may be mentioned:

(*a*) The preparation, placing, and patrolling of mine fields, submarine nets, etc., for the protection of our own important home ports and bases.

(*b*) The alterations and items on Coast Guard craft, etc., for service.

(*c*) The building of a large number of submarine chasers, total order 450, including 30 for the French and 5 for Italy; the first of this type of craft being ordered at the Navy yard, Norfolk, before this country went into the war at all.

(*d*) The alterations of merchant vessels to fit them to carry guns and armed guard.

(*e*) The repair of German ships and their conversion into troop transports; the 16 large passenger craft most successful of all troop transports.

(*f*) The conversion of Shipping Board ships to carry troops.

(*g*) The supply of material for construction and operation of bases abroad.

In this connection a reference is made in previous testimony that carried the suggestion that officers were sent to Brest and Bordeaux to establish bases without detailed plans and instructions. This was undoubtedly true. How anyone in Washington could work up detailed plans and instructions and furnish detailed supplies for the establishment of bases in locations with which they were not familiar, I do not know. These officers were given whatever material the conditions at the time they left indicated would be necessary, and it was on their reports and at their requests that these bases grew from small units for the maintenance of the few yachts and destroyers we then had on the French coast, into bases that handled a very large percentage of our troop transports, convoys, etc., through the war; and while no doubt the people on the ground would have liked to have had the material and personnel to develop these bases faster, both the material and personnel were furnished from Washington as rapidly as we could get hold of it and get the tonnage to take it across.

I would like to say that they were not in a bit bigger hurry than we were.

One of the big items of material was the equipping of all ships used in our war activities with radio. That looks easy, but the electrical supplies were short, and early in the matter we had great difficulty, and we could not operate those ships in convoy or singly without complete radio outfits or without completely trained operators on board.

(*h*) The development of submarine-detecting devices and testing out of all the submarine schemes proposed.

That called for new material, new inventions; and we employed the best talent there was in our country, or they volunteered for it; but this was not with the hope of finding any "royal road to victory," but having in mind the failure of our Allies in over two years of war to overcome the submarine menace by the methods then in use, we were doing everything within the capacity of our material and personnel along every line that had proven even partially successful, and at the same time we were trying to improve on old methods and develop new ones.

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(i) The material, labor, and tonnage required for the northern mine barrage, one of the greatest and most successful undertakings of the war, and one that had its share in breaking German morale.

No one supposed that any one scheme in operation or contemplated would prove 100 per cent efficient; but we did expect that with destroyers, armed guards, mine barrages, air patrols, subchasers, etc., we would reduce the submarine menace below the danger point, and we did hope these various methods combined would, in the end, break the enemy's morale; or, in slang, that we would "get the Hun's goat." We did, and the final smash of Hun morale started in Kiel, the home port of a large number of German submarines.

While there were and always will be delays, delays of subordinates in coming to conclusions on which to base their recommendations; delays in convincing superiors of the desirability or necessity of approving these recommendations; delays in getting the necessary appropriations; delays in obtaining material and men with which to carry out the plans. While each and every one of these delays is annoying to the man waiting for the completed results, as well as to the one in immediate charge of pushing the plan through, it is a fact that responsible authorities, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Secretary of the Navy, the committees of Congress must each be given time for consideration and deliberation to enable them to act wisely.

I do not believe that the sum total of all these delays prior to our entering the war, or after our entering into the war, gives the slightest foundation for anyone to justly make the charge against the Navy Department that it was responsible for delaying the end of the war four months.

Nor do I believe that anyone, short of the good God Himself, has sufficient knowledge of the various elements and factors entering into the war and the causes of its conclusion to justify him for one moment in charging that the Navy or any of its officers were responsible for the loss of any part of the two and one-half million tons of allied shipping claimed to have been unnecessarily lost; nor for any part of the $15,000,000,000 of the Allies' money claimed to have been unnecessarily spent; nor, least of all, do I believe that there is any human being with sufficient information and sufficient knowledge to justify him in charging the unnecessary loss of the life of one of the 500,000 allied soldiers charged to have been due to the errors of the Navy.

This monstrous charge has been or will be disproved in every item. Had it been made by any foreign official, allied or enemy, it would have aroused the indignation of the whole American people. Had it been invented by the inflamed, exaggerated, diseased ego of a patient in St. Elizabeth's, the Government Hospital for the Insane, no one would have been surprised. That it was made under oath by a Rear Admiral of the United States Navy on the active list, president of our Naval War College, in a hearing before a committee of the United States Senate, is, in my opinion, an insult to every officer and man now in the Navy, or who served in the Navy during the World War.

At this point the subcommittee adjourned until to-morrow, Wednesday, April 28, 1920, at 10 o'clock a. m.

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NAVAL INVESTIGATION.

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 28, 1920.

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON NAVAL AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 o'clock a. m., in Room 235, Senate Office Building, Senator Frederick Hale presiding.

Present: Senators Hale (chairman), Keys, and Trammell.

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL JOSIAH S. McKEAN—Resumed.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. Admiral McKean, will you proceed?

Admiral McKEAN. As I stated yesterday, Mr. Chairman, I propose to introduce a series of papers from the files of the Navy Department, commencing from the period when I became assistant for material, to the Chief of Operations, on July 1, 1917.

The first paper is, however, a letter from the Secretary of the Navy or an order from the Secretary of the Navy to me covering the same correspondence that was covered in the case of Capt. Pratt, directing in so far as my work comes under your request for documents, those documents asked for. You remember Capt. Pratt's case?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral McKEAN. It is the same letter.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you submitting documents to cover everything in that letter?

Admiral McKEAN. I have not all those dispatches, but they are being gotten together. I cover a certain part of it. Capt. Pratt covered certain other papers, and his dispatches, in so far as they could get them, are being collected now, I believe, in the department.

The first paper I wish to submit is the report of April 6, 1917, covering every vessel then in the Navy, giving her location on February 6, 1917, March 6, 1917, and April 6, 1917, and in two columns, the status of readiness, being readiness for distant service. The two columns are "Yes" and "No." And then in the remark column, where the vessel was unready, the reason for such unreadiness, whether from personnel or material, or both, as to every ship we had, taking the battleships first.

The CHAIRMAN. That statement does not give to what extent they were ready, does it?

Admiral McKEAN. No; except in certain cases of the destroyers some of them are marked "Unsuitable," and then in cases of tugs, some of them are yard tugs, which means that they are not available for distant service at all, are not of the right type, and some of them are too old.

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Then in the list of destroyers the date is given of repairs, "Under repairs until April 12th," in the case of one, for instance; and another one would be under repairs up to a certain other date. That is when she was completed and her status changed. "Machinery repairs until May 19, 1917," for instance. That gives the date when she was finally completed and her status changed from the unready to the ready. It is a long list, and I think we have covered there every vessel in the Government service on April 6, showing her location at three different periods so that you can tell by the movement of those vessels what we were doing. Some of them went to the yards to get ready; some of them pulled out of the yards, and went to Yorktown and elsewhere. That shows the whole story in a table as nearly as you can put it, and for reference it will cover the whole ground.

The table marked "A," above referred to, is here printed in full in the record as follows:

TABLE A.—*Report of readiness, Apr. 6, 1917.*

Vessels.	Feb. 6, 1917.	Mar. 6, 1917.	Apr. 6, 1917.	Status of readiness—Ready for distant service.	Reason for state of unreadiness.
BATTLESHIPS.					
Arizona	New York	New York	New York	Yes	
Arkansas	Guacanaybo Bay, Cuba.	Guacanaybo Bay.	Yorktown	Yes	
Delaware	do	do	do	Yes	
Florida	do	do	do	Yes	
Michigan	do	do	do	Yes	
Nevada	do	do	do	Yes	
New York	do	do	do	Yes	
Oklahoma	do	do	do	Yes	
Pennsylvania	do	do	do	Yes	
South Carolina	do	do	do	Yes	
Texas	do	do	do	Yes	
Utah	do	do	do	Yes	
Wyoming	do	do	do	Yes	
Connecticut	do	do	do	Yes	
Rhode Island	Boston	Boston	Tangier Sound	Yes	
North Dakota	Philadelphia	Norfolk	Yorktown	No	Material.
Alabama	do	do	Tangier Sound	No	Personnel.
Georgia	Boston	Boston	Boston	No	Material and personnel.
Illinois	Vera Cruz	Guacanaybo Bay.	New York	No	Do.
Indiana	Philadelphia	Philadelphia	Philadelphia	No	Personnel.
Iowa	do	do	do	No	Do.
Kansas	do	do	do	No	Material and personnel.
Kearsarge	Boston	Boston	Boston	No	Do.
Kentucky	New York	New York	New York	No	Do.
Louisiana	Norfolk	Norfolk	Tangier Sound	No	Personnel.
Maine	Savannah to Mobile.	Guacanaybo Bay.	New York	No	Material and personnel.
Massachusetts	Philadelphia	Philadelphia	Philadelphia	No	Personnel.
Minnesota	do	do	Tangier Sound	No	Do.
Missouri	do	do	do	No	Do.
Nebraska	Boston	Boston	Boston	No	Material and personnel.
New Hampshire	West Indies	Guacanaybo Bay.	Norfolk	No	Personnel.
New Jersey	New York	New York	New York	No	Do.
Ohio	Philadelphia	Philadelphia	Philadelphia	No	Do.
Oregon	San Diego	San Diego	San Francisco	No	Do.
Vermont	Guacanaybo Bay.	Guacanaybo Bay.	Philadelphia	No	Material and personnel.
Virginia	Boston	Boston	Boston	No	Do.
Wisconsin	Philadelphia	Philadelphia	Philadelphia	No	Personnel.

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TABLE A.—*Report of readiness, Apr. 6, 1917*—Continued.

Vessels.	Feb. 6, 1917.	Mar. 6, 1917.	Apr. 6, 1917.	Status of readiness—Ready for distant service.	Reason for state of unreadiness.
ARMORED CRUISERS.					
Pueblo	San Francisco	San Francisco	Pichilinque	No	Personnel.
Frederick	Puget Sound	Puget Sound	Enroute San Francisco.	No	Do.
North Carolina	Portsmouth	Portsmouth	Portsmouth	No	Personnel and material.
Huntington	San Diego	Mare Island	Mare Island	No	Material.
San Diego	do	do	do	No	Do.
South Dakota	Puget Sound	Puget Sound	Puget Sound	No	Personnel.
Montana	Guantanamo	Guantanamo	Wynne, Md	Yes	
Pittsburgh	Enroute San Diego.	San Diego	San Diego	Yes	
Seattle	Guacanayabo Bay.	Guacanayabo Bay.	Yorktown	Yes	
CRUISERS, FIRST CLASS.					
Charleston	Canal Zone	Canal Zone	Canal Zone	No	Do.
St. Louis	Honolulu	Honolulu	Honolulu	No	Do.
Saratoga	Puget Sound	Puget Sound	Puget Sound	No	Material.
Brooklyn	Manila	Manila	Manila	Yes	
CRUISERS, SECOND CLASS.					
Chicago	Philadelphia	Philadelphia	Philadelphia	No	Personnel.
Minneapolis	do	do	do	No	Personnel and material.
Columbia	Pensacola	Pensacola	Hampton Roads	Yes	
CRUISERS, THIRD CLASS.					
Marblehead	Puget Sound	Puget Sound	Puget Sound	No	Personnel and material.
Montgomery	Baltimore	Norfolk	Norfolk	No	Personnel.
New Orleans	Guaymas	Guaymas	Puget Sound	No	Personnel and material.
Salem	Boston	Boston	Boston	No	Do.
Albany	Puget Sound	En route Canal Zone.	Newport	Yes	
Birmingham	New York	New York	New York	Yes	
Chester	Boston	Boston	Boston	Yes	
Cleveland	Mare Island	San Diego	En route Hampton Roads.	Yes	
Cincinnati	Shanghai	Shanghai	Shanghai	Yes	
Chattanooga	Mare Island	Mare Island	Mare Island	Yes	
Denver	Gulf of Fonseca	Corinto	Canal Zone to Key West.	Yes	
Des Moines	Alexandria, Egypt.	Alexandria, Egypt.	Alexandria, Egypt.	Yes	
Galveston	Manila	Manila	Manila	Yes	
GUNBOATS.					
Annapolis	Topolobampo	Topolobanpo	En route Charleston.	Yes	
Castine	New Orleans	Vera Cruz	Vera Cruz	Yes	
Dolphin	Washington, D. C.	Washington, D. C.	En route St. Thomas.	Yes	
Elcano	Asiatic station	Asiatic station	Asiatic station	Yes	
Helena	Shanghai	do	do	Yes	
Machias	Guantanamo	Santiago	Nipe Bay	Yes	
Monocacy	Asiatic station	Asiatic station	Asiatic station	Yes	
Nashville	Tampico	Tampico	Tampico	Yes	
Paducah	Tunis de Zaza,	Tunis de Zaza,	Santiago	Yes	
Palos	Asiatic station	Asiatic station	Asiatic station	Yes	
Pampanga	do	do	do	Yes	
IN COMMISSION IN ORDINARY.					
TRANSPORTS.					
General Alava	Asiatic station			No	Not suited.

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TABLE A.—*Report of readiness, Apr. 6, 1917*—Continued.

Vessels.	Feb. 6, 1917.	Mar. 6, 1917.	Apr. 6, 1917.	Status of readiness—Ready for distant service.	Reason for state of unreadiness.
FUEL SHIPS.					
Hector	Aground on coast of South Carolina.			No	Aground, coast of South Carolina.
TENDERS TO TORPEDO VESSELS.					
Iris	Mare Island			No	Old.
Pompey	Olongapo			No	Not suited.
CONVERTED YACHTS.					
Aileen	Providence, R. I.			No	Material and personnel.
Dorothea	Cleveland, Ohio.			No	Do.
Elfrida	North Carolina Naval Militia.			No	Do.
Gloucester	New York			No	Do.
Hawk	Great Lakes			No	Do.
Huntress	Naval Militia			No	Do.
Sylvia	Norfolk			No	Do.
Vixen	Philadelphia			No	Do.
Wasp	New York			No	Do.
IN FULL COMMISSION.					
TRANSPORTS.					
Buffalo	Masatlan, Mexico.	San Diego	San Jose del Cuba.	No	Repairs required.
Hancock	Guantanamo	Guantanamo	St. Thomas	Yes	
Prairie	Philadelphia	Washington, D. C.	Philadelphia	Yes	
GUNBOATS.					
Quiros	Asiatic station	Asiatic station	Asiatic station	Yes	
Sacramento	Vera Cruz	En route New Orleans	New Orleans	Yes	
Samar	Asiatic station	Asiatic station	Asiatic station	Yes	
Villalobos	do	do	do	Yes	
Wheeling	New Orleans	Gulf of Mexico	Vera Cruz	Yes	
Wilmington	Asiatic station	Asiatic station	Asiatic station	Yes	
Yorktown	San Diego	San Diego	Mare Island	Yes	
SUPPLY SHIPS.					
Celtic	En route New York.	Guacanayabo	En route St. Thomas.	Yes	
Culgoa	New York	New York	New York	No	Under repairs.
Glacier	Mare Island	En route Acapulco, Mexico.	San Diego	No	Age: hull structure considered weak by board of inspection and survey.
Supply	Cavite	Cavite	Guam	No	Material.
FUEL SHIPS.					
Abarenda	Asiatic station	Manila	En route Shanghai.	Yes	
Ajax	do	Asiatic station	Nagasaki	No	Do.
Arethusa	En route Charleston, S. C.	Charleston	Charleston	Yes	
Brutus	Mare Island	San Diego	San Diego	Yes	
Caesar	Alexandria, Egypt.	Alexandria, Egypt.	Alexandria, Egypt.	Yes	
Cyclops	Guantanamo	Guacanayabo	Norfolk	Yes [1]	
Jason	Norfolk	Norfolk	do	Yes	
Jupiter	En route Norfolk.	Guacanayabo	Norfolk	No	Do.
Kanawha	Port Arthur, Tex	do	Hampton Roads	Yes	Repairs to boiler.
Mars	En route Chile	Christobal	Norfolk	No	

NOTE.—In all cases in which only one location is shown, the vessel was at that place at all three dates.

[1] For three months.

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TABLE A.—*Report of readiness, Apr. 6, 1917*—Continued.

Vessels.	Feb. 6, 1917.	Mar. 6, 1917.	Apr. 6, 1917.	Status of readiness—Ready for distant service.	Reason for state of unreadiness.
FUEL SHIPS—con.					
Maumee	Guantanamo	Guacanayabo	Norfolk	No	Cracked cylinder jackets, main engines.
Nanshan	San Diego	Corinto	Mare Island	No	Under repairs.
Neptune	En route Norfolk.	Norfolk	Norfolk	No	Under repairs to Apr. 24, 1917.
Nereus	Vera Cruz	En route Key West.	Hampton Roads	Yes	
Nero	En route San Diego.	La Paz, Mexico	La Paz, Mexico	Yes	
Orion	Olongapo	En route Nagasaki.	En route Canal Zone.	Yes	
Proteus	En route Hawaii	En route Guam.	Guam	Yes	
Saturn	Mare Island	Mare Island	En route Cordona, Alaska.	Yes	
Sterling	Norfolk	Newport News	New York	No	Age; general unsuitability.
Vulcan	Portsmouth	Port au Prince	En route Philadelphia.	No	Material.
CONVERTED YACHTS.					
Eagle	Whitehorse Point, Long Island.	Nipe Bay, Cuba	Manita, Cuba	No	Old; not suited.
Mayflower	Washington, D. C.	Washington, D. C.	Washington, D. C.	Yes	
Scorpion	Constantinople	Constantinople	Constantinople	No	Repairs required.
Sylph	Washington, D. C.	Washington, D. C.	Washington, D. C.	No	Not suited.
Yankton	Guantanamo	Guacanayabo	Key West	No	In need S. B. repairs.
TUGS.					
Accomac	Boston	Boston	Boston	No	Yard tug.
Active	Mare Island	Mare Island	Mare Island	No	Do.
Apache	Norfolk	Norfolk	Norfolk	No	Do.
Arapaho	Mare Island	Mare Island	Mare Island	No	Not suited.
Choctaw	Washington, D. C.	Washington, D. C.	Washington, D. C.	No	Yard tug.
Fortune	Tutuila	Tutuila	Tutuila	No	Old Samoa.
Hercules	Washington, D. C.	Washington, D. C.	Washington, D. C.	No	Yard tug.
Iroquois	Mare Island	Ensanada	Ensanada	Yes	
Iwana	Boston	Boston	Boston	No	Navy-yard tug.
Massasoit	Norfolk	Norfolk	Norfolk	No	Do.
Modoc	Philadelphia	Philadelphia	Philadelphia	No	Do.
Mohawk	Norfolk	Norfolk	Norfolk	No	Do.
Narkeeta	New York	New York	New York	No	Do.
Navajo	Honolulu	Honolulu	Honolulu	No	Not suited; under repair.
Ontario	Guacanayabo	Guantanamo	Norfolk	No	Repairs required.
Osceola	Guantanamo	do	Guantanamo	No	Old; in need of repairs.
Patapsco	Guacanayabo	Guacanayabo	Norfolk	Yes	
Patuxent	do	do	Hampton Roads	No	Uncompleted boiler work.
Pawnee	New York	New York	New York	No	Yard tug.
Pawtucket	Bremerton	Bremerton	Bremerton	No	Do.
Penacook	Portsmouth	Portsmouth	Portsmouth	No	Do.
Pentucket	New York	New York	New York	No	Do.
Peoria	Key West	Key West	Key West	No	Old; not suited.
Piscatagua	Asiatic station	Asiatic station	Asiatic station	No	Tug; Asiatic station.
Pocahontas	Norfolk	Norfolk	Norfolk	No	Yard tug.
Pontiac	New York	New York	New York	No	Navy-yard tug.
Potomac	Port au Prince	Port au Prince	Port au Prince	No	Material condition.
Powhatan	New York	New York	New York	No	Navy-yard tug.
Rapid	Cavite	Cavite	Cavite	No	Do.
Rocket	Norfolk	Norfolk	Norfolk	No	Do.
Samoset	Philadelphia	Philadelphia	Philadelphia	No	Do.
Sebago	Charleston	Charleston	Charleston	No	Do.
Sioux	Boston	Boston	Boston	No	Do.
Sonoma	Guayacanabo	Guayacanabo	Hampton Roads	Yes	
Sotoyoko	Bremerton	Bremerton	Bremerton	No	Do.
Standish	Annapolis	Annapolis	Annapolis	No	Old boilers.

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TABLE A.—*Report of readiness, Apr. 6, 1917*—Continued.

Vessels.	Feb. 6, 1917.	Mar. 6, 1917.	Apr. 6, 1917.	Status of readiness—Ready for distant service.	Reason for state of unreadiness.
TUGS—contd.					
Tecumseh	Washington, D. C.	Washington, D. C.	Washington, D. C.	No	Navy-yard tug.
Tillamook	San Diego	Mare Island	Mare Island	No	Not suited.
Traffic	New York	New York	New York	No	Yard tug.
Transfer	do	do	do	No	Do.
Triton	Washington, D. C.	Washington, D. C.	Washington, D. C.	No	Do.
Unadilla	Mare Island	Mare Island	Mare Island	No	Do.
Uncas	Indianhead	Indianhead	Indianhead	No	Not suited.
Vigilant	Training station, San Francisco.	Training station, San Francisco.	Training station, San Francisco.	No	Do.
Waban	Guantanamo	Guantanamo	Guantanamo	No	Old.
Wahneta	Norfolk	Norfolk	Norfolk	No	Old yard tug.
Wompatuck	Asiatic station	Asiatic station	Asiatic station	No	Old: Asiatic station.
TENDERS TO TORPEDO VESSELS.					
Alert	Pearl Harbor	Pearl Harbor	Pearl Harbor	No	Not suitable for distant service.
Bushnell	Pensacola	Pensacola	Norfolk	Yes	
Dixie	Guaycanayabo	Habana	Hampton Roads	No	Under repairs until May 29, 1917.
Fulton	Newport	Newport	Newport	No	Not suitable for distant service.
Melville	Guaycanayabo	Yorktown	Yorktown	Yes	
SPECIAL TYPES.					
Baltimore, mine depot ship.	Guaycanayabo	Guaycanayabo	Yorktown	No	Under extensive repairs.
Dubuque, mine training ship.	do	do	Hampton Roads	Yes	
Hannibal, surveying ship.	Gulf of Mexico	General American waters.	En route Cristobal.	Yes	
Lebanon, ammunition ship.	Guaycanayabo	Guantanamo	Yorktown	No	Age and need of general overhauling.
Leonidas, surveying ship.	San Blas, Panama.	San Blas, Panama.	Cristobal	No	Poor condition of boilers, converted into sub-chaser tender November, 1917.
Prometheus, repair ship.	Guaycanayabo	Guantanamo	Yorktown	Yes	
San Francisco, mine depot ship.	do	Santiago	Hampton Roads	No	In need of general overhauling.
Solace, hospital ship.	do	Guaycanayabo	Yorktown	Yes	
Vestal, repair ship.	Guantanamo	do	do	Yes	
SUBMARINES.					
Ozark	Pensacola	Pensacola	Norfolk	No	Broken propeller shaft.
Tallahassee	Tampa	do	Hampton Roads	Yes	
A-2	Asiatic station	Asiatic station	Asiatic station	No	Not suitable, due to age and type.
A-3	do	do	do	No	Do.
A-4	do	do	do	No	Do.
A-5	do	do	do	No	Do.
A-6	do	do	do	No	Do.
A-7	do	do	do	No	Do.
B-1	do	do	do	No	Do.
B-2	do	do	do	No	Do.
B-3	do	do	do	No	Do.
C-1	Canal Zone	Canal Zone	Canal Zone	No	Do.
C-2	do	do	do	No	Do.
C-3	do	do	do	No	Not suitable due to undergoing overhauling.
C-4	do	do	do	No	Not suitable due to age and type.
C-5	do	do	do	No	Do.
D-1	New York	New York	New London	No	Do.
D-2	do	do	New York	No	Do.
D-3	do	do	New London	No	Do.

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TABLE A.—*Report of readiness, Apr. 6, 1917*—Continued.

Vessels.	Feb. 6, 1917.	Mar. 6, 1917.	Apr. 6, 1917.	Status of readiness—Ready for distant service.	Reason for state of unreadiness.
SUBMARINES—con.					
E–1	New London	New London	Newport	No	Defective battery.
G–1	do	do	New London	No	Not suitable due to age and type.
G–4	New York yard.	New York yard.	New York yard.	No	Undergoing overhauling; not suitable due to type.
H–1	San Pedro	San Pedro	San Pedro	No	Material condition good, but not for distant service, due to type of engine and age of battery.
H–2	do	do	do	No	Do.
K–1	Pensacola	Pensacola	Hampton Roads	No	Engine in bad condition; need of battery overhauling.
K–2	Charleston	do	do	No	Engine in bad condition.
K–3	Hawaiian Islands.	Hawaiian Islands.	Hawaiian Islands.	No	Batteries in need of renewal.
K–4	do	do	do	No	Do.
K–5	Tampa, Fla	Pensacola	Hampton Roads	No	Need of battery overhaul.
K–6	do	do	do	No	Do.
K–7	Hawaiian Islands.	Hawaiian Islands.	Hawaiian Islands.	No	Batteries in need of renewal.
K–8	do	do	do	No	Do.
L–1	Pensacola	Pensacola	Norfolk	No	Defective battery.
L–2	Mobile	do	do	No	Do.
L–3	Pensacola	do	do	No	Do.
L–4	do	do	do	No	Do.
L–9	do	do	do	No	Need of yard work for various alterations before being ready.
L–10	do	do	do	No	Do.
L–11	do	do	do	No	Do.
DESTROYERS.					
Allen	Boston	Guantanamo	Yorktown	Yes	
Ammen	Philadelphia	Philadelphia	New York	No	Under repair until June 8, 1917.
Aylwin	Guacanayabo Bay.	Entrance, Key West.	Charleston	No	Under repairs.
Bagley (torpedo boat).	Charleston	Charleston	do	No	Under repairs; not suitable.
Bailey (torpedo boat).	Annapolis	Newport News	Newport News	No	Do.
Bainbridge	Asiatic station	Asiatic station	Asiatic station	Yes	
Balch	Guacanayabo Bay.	Guacanayabo Bay.	Norfolk	No	Under repairs to turbines.
Barry	Asiatic station	Asiatic station	Asiatic station	Yes	
Beale	Philadelphia	Delaware Breakwater.	Philadelphia	No	External boiler repairs.
Benham	Norfolk	Newport News	Yorktown	Yes	
Burrows	New York	New York	New York	No	Under repairs until May 31, 1917.
Cassin	Guacanayabo Bay.	Guacanayabo Bay.	Norfolk	No	In need of repairs to maneuvering valves.
Chauncey	Asiatic station	Asiatic station	Asiatic station	Yes	
Cummings	Guacanayabo Bay.	Guacanayabo Bay.	Yorktown	No	Repairs to maneuvering valves; completed May 10.
Conyngham	do	Boston	Norfolk	Yes	
Cushing	Guantanamo	Guacanayabo to New York.	New York	No	Under repairs; completed May 9, 1916.
Dale	Asiatic station	Asiatic station	Asiatic station	Yes	
Davis	Guacanayabo Bay.	Guacanayabo Bay.	New York	Yes	
Decatur	Asiatic station	Asiatic station	Asiatic station	Yes	

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TABLE A.—*Report of readiness, Apr. 6, 1917*—Continued.

Vessels.	Feb. 6, 1917.	Mar. 6, 1917.	Apr. 6, 1917.	Status of readiness—Ready for distant service.	Reason for state of unreadiness.
DESTROYERS—con.					
Drayton	Guacanayabo Bay.	Entrance, Key West.	Jacksonville	Yes	
Duncan	do	Guacanayabo to Boston.	Boston	Yes	
Ericsson	do	Guacanayabo to New York.	Yorktown	Yes	
Fanning	do	Guacanayabo Bay.	do	No	In need of repairs; destroyer force letter R-34 (6) of Apr. 7, 1917.
Flusser	Charleston	New Orleans	New Orleans	No	Under repairs until Apr. 12, 1917.
Henley	New York	New York	New York	No	Under repairs to machine.
Jacob Jones	Philadelphia	Philadelphia	Hampton Roads	Yes	
Jarvis	Guacanayabo Bay.	Guacanayabo Bay.	Philadelphia	No	Condenser bad; completed May 15, 1917.
Jenkins	Boston	Pensacola	New York	No	Under repairs.
Jouett	Philadelphia	Philadelphia	Philadelphia	No	Bad boilers; repairs to June 6, 1917.
Lamson	Baton Rouge	Beaumont	Norfolk	No	Machinery repairs until May 19, 1917.
McCall	Guacanayabo Bay.	Guacanayabo Bay.	Philadelphia	No	Repairs until May 22, 1917.
McDougal	Guacanayabo	Guacanayabo	York River	Yes	
Monoghan	Cookland	Beaumont	Key West	No	In operation, but in need of repairs; required from May 4 to June 14 to fit out.
Nicholson	Guacanayabo	Guacanayabo	York River	No	In need of repairs; ready by May 12.
O'Brien	do	do	do	No	In need of repairs to main air pumps; ready May 12.
Parker	do	do	do	No	In need of repairs.
Patterson	Boston	Boston	Boston	Yes	
Paulding	Philadelphia	Philadelphia	do	Yes	
Porter	Guacanayabo	Guacanayabo	York River	Yes	
Preston	New York	New York	New York	No	Required new blowers; completed in June, 1917.
Reid	Charleston	Brunswick	Key West	Yes	
Roe	do	Charleston	Savannah	Yes	
Rowan	Pensacola	Guacanayabo	York River	Yes	
Sampson	New York	New York	Norfolk	Yes	
Smith	New Orleans	do	New York	No	In need of 60 days' work on Mar. 1, overhauling begun in Charleston; completed June 30, 1917.
Sterrett	Baton Rouge	Beaumont	Charleston	No	Under repairs.
Stewart	Mare Island	Cristobal	At sea, Central American waters.	Yes	
Terry	Charleston	Charleston	Charleston	No	Repairs to condensers; completed May 22, 1917.
Trippe	Boston	New York	New York	Yes	
Truxtun	Puget Sound	Cristobal	Cristobal	No	In need of repairs completed Aug. 9, 1917.
Tucker	Guacanayabo Bay.	Guacanayabo Bay.	At sea, North Atlantic.	Yes	
Wadsworth	do	Guantanamo	York River	Yes	
Wainwright	do	Guacanayabo	do	Yes	
Walker	Norfolk	Norfolk	New York	No	Under repairs to June 9, 1917.
Warrington	Boston	Boston	Boston	No	Under repairs to May 23, 1917.

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TABLE A.—*Report of readiness, Apr. 6, 1917*—Continued.

Vessels.	Feb. 6, 1917.	Mar. 6, 1917.	Apr. 6, 1917.	Status of readiness—Ready for distant service.	Reason for state of unreadiness.
DESTROYERS—con.					
Whipple	San Diego	Cristobal	Balboa	No	Under repairs.
Wilkes	Guacanayabo	Guacanayabo	York River	No	Required new evaporators; completed June 6, 1917.
Winslow	do	do	do	Yes	
CRUISERS, THIRD CLASS.					
Raleigh	Salina Cruz	Salina Cruz, Mexico.	Mare Island	No	Material.
Tacoma	Tampico	Tampico	Tampico	Yes	
Yorktown	Mare Island	Mare Island	Mare Island	Yes	
MONITORS.					
Cheyenne	San Francisco	San Pedro	San Pedro	No	Repairs needed to propeller and stern tube.
Monadnock	Asiatic station	Asiatic station	Asiatic station	No	Unserviceable.
IN COMMISSION IN RESERVE.					
DESTROYERS.					
Hopkins	San Francisco	San Pedro	San Pedro	No	In reserve; no limited duty; bad shafting.
Hull	Mare Island	Mare Island	Mare Island	No	In reserve; under repairs until Apr. 25.
Lawrence	do	do	do	No	In reserve; bad condensers.
MacDonough	Pensacola	Pensacola	Galveston	No	In reserve.
Paul Jones	San Diego	San Diego	San Francisco	No	Reserve.
Perry	Key Port, Wash.	Key Port	Key Port	No	In reserve; repairs; new shafts required.
Preble	Mare Island	Mare Island	Mare Island	No	In reserve; bad condensers.
Warden	Charleston	Pensacola	Galveston	No	In reserve.
TORPEDO BOAT.					
Farragut	San Pedro	San Pedro	San Pedro	No	In need of repairs; reserve.
MONITORS.					
Amphitrite	New York	New York	New Haven	No	Not suitable.
Monterey	Cavite	Cavite	Cavite	No	Do.
GUNBOATS.					
Petrel	Guantanamo	Guantanamo	Guantanamo	No	
Vicksburg	Seattle	Seattle	Bremerton	No	
SPECIAL TYPE.					
Panther (tender)	Breton Channel, Cuba.	New York	New York	No	Repairs.
Vesuvius (torpedo practice ship).	Newport	Newport	Newport	No	Not suitable.
IN COMMISSION IN ORDINARY.					
MONITOR.					
Tonopah	New York	New York	New York	No	Need of new boilers.

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TABLE A.—*Report of readiness, Apr. 6, 1917*—Continued.

Vessels.	Feb. 6, 1917.	Mar. 6, 1917.	Apr. 6, 1917.	Status of readiness—Ready for distant service.	Reason for state of unreadiness.
TORPEDO BOATS.					
Barney	Philadelphia	Philadelphia	Philadelphia	No	In need of repairs, ordinary.
Biddle	Annapolis	Annapolis	Annapolis	No	Do.
Blakely	Newport	Newport	Newport	No	Ordinary.
Bahlgren	Charleston	Charleston	Charleston	No	Repairs, ordinary.
De Long	do	do	do	No	In need of repairs, ordinary.
Dupont	Boston	Boston	Boston	No	Under repairs, ordinary.
Foote	Charleston	Charleston	Charleston	No	In need of repairs, ordinary.
Goldsborough	Puget Sound	Astoria	Entrance, Puget Sound.	No	Do.
Morris	Newport	New York	Newport	No	Ordinary.
Rodgers	Boston	Boston	Boston	No	In need of repairs, ordinary.
Shubrick	Charleston	Charleston	Charleston	No	Do.
Somers	Illinois Naval Militia.			No	Do.
SUBMARINES.					
E-2	New York	New York	Newport	No	Installing new machinery.
F-1	Mare Island	Mare Island	Mare Island	No	Need of new engines.
F-2	do	do	do	No	Do.
F-3	do	do	do	No	Do.
H-3	Aground on Humblot Bar.		California	No	Aground; need of refit.
GUNBOATS.					
Don Juan de Austria.	Detroit	Detroit	Detroit	No	Out of commission.
Isla de Luzon	Rochester, N.Y.	Rochester, N.Y.	Rochester, N.Y.	No	Do.
Marietta	Boston	Boston	Boston	No	Do.
Newport (New State school ship).	New York	New York	New York	No	Do.
Princeton	Bremerton	Bremerton	Bremerton	No	Do.
Ranger (Massachusetts State school ship).				No	Do.
Sandoval	Great Lakes	Great Lakes	Great Lakes	No	Do.

B is a table that I referred to in my statement, showing the vessels by types, battleships, and so on, the number of vessels completed on April 6, 1917, the number authorized or building, and the total. The same figures are given for November 1, 1918. And in another column is given the number of vessels of each type abroad on December 1, 1918. That is just taken as completing the turnaround, because we had the data of that date. That was after the armistice, but it was still the carrying on, bringing the troops home and that sort of thing. On December 1, 1918, we had not gotten much stuff back then. This shows the number that were running back and forth in the transport of troops, etc.

The table B last referred to is here printed in full in the record, as follows:

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TABLE B.

Type.	Apr. 6, 1917.			Nov. 1, 1918.			
	Completed.	Authorized or building.	Total.	Completed.	Authorized or building.	Total.	Abroad on Dec. 1, 1918.
Battleships, single caliber	14	15	29	16	13	29	10
Battleships, mixed caliber	23		23	23		23	
Battle cruisers		6	6		6	6	
Armored cruisers	9		9	8		8	(1)
Monitors	7		7	7		7	
Cruisers, first-class	5		5	4		4	3
Cruisers, second-class	4	10	14	4	10	14	3
Cruisers, third-class	16		16	15		15	10
Destroyers	51	57	108	92	250	342	90
Coast torpedo vessels	16		16	15		15	10
Torpedo boats	17		17	17		17	
Submarines	44	99	143	79	102	181	30
Tenders	8	3	11	17	3	20	10
Gunboats	28	2	30	37	2	39	25
Transports	4	2	6	56	1	57	(1)
Supply ships	4	1	5	5		5	(1)
Hospital ships	1	1	2	6	1	7	(1)
Fuel ships	22	3	25	21	3	24	(1)
Miscellaneous steam and motor patrol vessels	14		14	602		602	125
Patrol boats (Eagle)				2	98	100	
Submarine chasers				300	42	342	135
Mine sweepers				88	40	128	
Tugs	49	2	51	77	81	158	
Special types	8	3	11	13	3	16	12
Total	344	204	548	1,594	655	2,249	463

[1] Back and forth.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, I made several requests to the Secretary for this information about the condition of the ships on April 6, and on dates prior thereto, and I did not get the information that I wanted. However, recently the Secretary has told me that you and Capt. Pratt would give me information on this matter.

Admiral MCKEAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. On April 21 I wrote a letter to the Secretary, which I will show you now, and which I will put in the record at this point, as well as his reply.

(The letters referred to, which were here handed to Admiral McKean and examined by him, are as follows:)

APRIL 21, 1920.

To Hon. JOSEPHUS DANIELS,
Secretary of the Navy.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: It is requested that the Navy Department furnish the following information to the Senate Subcommittee on Naval Affairs on or before Wednesday next, the 28th of April:

I. For each and every individual battleship on the Navy list on the 2d of February, 1917—

(*a*) State whether in full commission, in commission in reserve, in commission in ordinary, or out of commission.

(*b*) State exactly where located then.

(*c*) State number of days then necessary to make material repairs essential for war service.

(*d*) State number of rounds of shells then on board for main battery.

(*e*) State percentage of personnel then on board in terms of per cent of full war complements as 100 per cent.

II. For each and every individual battleship on the Navy list on the 6th of April, 1917—

(*a*) State whether in full commission, in commission in reserve, in commission, in ordinary, or out of commission.

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(*b*) State exactly where located then.
(*c*) State number of days then necessary to make material repairs essential for war service.
(*d*) State number of rounds of shells then on board for main battery.
(*e*) State percentage of personnel then on board in terms of per cent of full war complements as 100 per cent.

III. For each and every individual battleship on the Navy list on the 7th of April, 1917, which was then not in proper material condition for instant war service overseas and which then had not on board its full complement of officers and men:
(*a*) State date upon which the making of necessary repairs was started.
(*b*) State date upon which the making of necessary repairs was completed.
(*c*) State yard (or other place) where repairs were made.
(*d*) State date upon which each ship obtained its full war complement of officers and men.

IV. State for each and every individual battleship its apportionment of reserve shells for its main battery in terms of rounds for each ship calculated from the tctal reserve of shells ready but not on board on the 7th of April, 1917.

V. For each and every individual cruiser on the Navy list on the 2d of February, 1917:
(*a*) State whether in full commission, in commission in reserve, in commission in ordinary, or out of commission.
(*b*) State exactly where located then.
(*c*) State number of days then necessary to make material repairs essential for war service.
(*d*) State number of rounds of shells then on board for main battery.
(*e*) State percentage of personnel then on board, full war complement being taken as 100 per cent.

VI. For each and every individual cruiser on the Navy list on the 6th of April, 1917:
(*a*) State whether in full commission, in commission in reserve, in commission in ordinary, or out of commission.
(*b*) State exactly where located then.
(*c*) State number of days then necessary to make material repairs essential for war service.
(*d*) State number of rounds of shells then on board for main battery.
(*e*) State percentage of personnel then on board, full war complements being taken as 100 per cent.

VII. For each and every individual cruiser on the Navy list on the 7th of April, 1917, which was then not in proper material condition for instant war service overseas and which then had not on board its full war complement of officers and men:
(*a*) State date upon which the making of necessary repairs was started.
(*b*) State date upon which the making of necessary repairs was completed.
(*c*) State yard (or other place) where repairs were made.
(*d*) State date upon which each ship obtained its full war complement of officers and men.

VIII. State for each and every individual cruiser its apportionment of reserve shells for its main battery in terms of rounds for each cruiser calculated from the total reserve of shells ready but not on board on the 7th of April, 1917.

IX. For each and every individual destroyer on the Navy list on the 2d of February, 1917.
(*a*) State whether in full commission, in commission in reserve, in commission in ordinary, or out of commission.
(*b*) State exactly where located then.
(*c*) State number of days when necessary to make material repairs essential for war service.
(*d*) State percentage of personnel then on board, full war complements being taken as 100 per cent.

X. For each and every individual destroyer on the Navy list on the 6th of April, 1917
(*a*) State whether in full commission, in commission in reserve, in commission in ordinary, or out of commission.
(*b*) State exactly where located then.
(*c*) State number of days when necessary to make material repairs essential for war service.
(*d*) State percentage of personnel then on board, full war complements being taken as 100 per cent.

XI. For each and every individual destroyer on the Navy list on the 7th of April, 1917, which was then not in proper material condition for instant war service overseas and which then had not on board its full war complement of officers and men.

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(*a*) State date upon which the making of necessary repairs was started.
(*b*) State date upon which the making of necessary repairs was completed.
(*c*) State yard (or other place) where repairs were made.
(*d*) State date upon which each destroyer obtained its full war complement of officers and men.

XII. State number of depth bombs for use on destroyers on hand and ready 7th of April, 1917.

It is requested that the Navy Department's report in reply be accompanied by separate tabulation for battleships, cruisers, and destroyers as per the inclosed forms.

Yours truly,

FREDERICK HALE.

DESTROYERS.

Name of destroyer.	Par. I.					Par. II.					Par. III.				Par. V.
	a	b	c	d	e	a	b	c	d	e	a	b	c	d	
A															
B															
C															
D															
E															
F															

CRUISERS.

A															
B															
C															
D															
E															
F															

BATTLESHIPS.

A															
B															
C															
D															
E															
F															

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
Washington, D. C., April 23, 1920.

MY DEAR SENATOR:

I am in receipt of your favor asking for certain information, and in reply I have to state that I have asked the Office of Naval Operations to prepare a statement which will give you the information requested.

Sincerely, yours,

JOSEPHUS DANIELS.

Hon. FREDERICK HALE,
United States Senate, Washington.

Admiral MCKEAN. This is the first time I have seen this letter, Mr. Chairman. I think that it is possible that I have submitted here what will answer your questions for each type of ship, under subheads "A" and "B," but as to the others, it will take the various bureaus of the department concerned some time, and in some cases it will have to be referred to the yards to collect that data, and I suppose that it is being done. I had not seen this before, but your letter would be rather to the bureaus. For instance, as to ammunition, it would have to go to the Bureau of Ordnance. Second, it would have to go to the Bureau of Navigation, and they will have to go through a great many files.

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Then, as to the repairs, the two bureaus of Construction and Repair and of Steam Engineering may be able to answer that in the office of material, but in some cases they would have to refer to yards. I have some other tables taken in connection with this, and that will show for the battleships, the dreadnoughts, and the predreadnoughts, and the battle cruisers, the number of days repair in each of three years, 1917, 1918, and 1919. I got that up as illustrative material independent of this. I got the officers in the department to get it together for me.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee would like to have some table that represents the whole matter clearly, so that we will not have to refer to different papers.

Admiral McKEAN. I understand, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you see that it is made up in the form requested in this letter?

Admiral McKEAN. Will you let me have this copy?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; and submit it to the committee as soon as possible, because we want to wind up the record.

Admiral McKEAN. It is going to take some time unless they have been working on it from the jump off. It will take some little time to get that data together and get it tabulated; but the department can do it, I am sure, and I will take it up.

As to the figures I have just cited, I gave those in my direct testimony yesterday.

Memorandum C is the memorandum I also referred to in yesterday's testimony from Admiral Osterhaus, showing the vessels taken over through the naval districts division during the whole period of the war through commandeering, purchase, charter, and lease, and also the total number of vessels taken over during the war from other governmental departments. That includes all sorts of vessels, motor boats, yachts, tugs, steamers, steam lighters, trawlers, and fish boats and barges, and so on, while the vessels taken from other Government departments include Coast Guard, Lighthouse Service, and other vessels; cargo vessels converted to troop transports and operated by the Navy for the Army.

The list C last referred to is here printed as follows:

C.

MARCH 19, 1920.

MEMORANDUM.

1. The following gives a grand summary of the total number of vessels of various types which were taken over through the naval districts division during the whole period of war, either through commandeering, purchase, charter, or lease; also the total number of vessels taken over during the war from other governmental departments:

1. Private vessels taken over by the Navy (through commandeering, purchase, charter, or lease):

Motorboats	447
Yachts	203
Tugs	90
Steamers	65
Steam lighters and lighters	23
Trawlers and fishboats	60
Tanker (oil)	1
Ferry and house boats	4
Barges	198
Total	1,110

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2. Taken over by Navy from other Government departments and assigned duty in naval districts during war:

Coast Guard	41
Lighthouse Service	50
Coast and Geodetic Survey	4
Immigration Service	2
Public Health Service	1
Bureau of Fisheries	4
Panama Canal	6
Canadian Government (loaned) (drifters and trawlers)	27
Total	135
Grand total	1,245

H. OSTERHAUS.

Total number of cargo vessels, etc., converted to troop transports and operated by the Navy for the Army:

Cargo vessels	70
Battleships and cruisers	25
Ex-German	9
Ex-German and American passenger vessels carrying troops previous to armistice	45
Total	149

Total number of merchant ships remodeled for armed guards and guns, 384.
Total (highest) number of N. O. T. S. ships, 378.
December 10, 1918.

Appendix D is the first of a number of departmental policies which I succeeded in having established as assistant for personnel, and which I referred to yesterday, and my effort was wherever I could establish a general policy that was applicable to a great many conditions and circumstances, I would write out this policy, that is, as to material, get my chief's approval and the Secretary's approval, so that we would not have to take up every individual case of every individual ship, and thereby cause delay with the bureaus or yards, and the fleet as well as the Secretary and the Chief of Operations; so that having established these policies, everybody would know the plans along which we were working and the effort was to reduce correspondence, reduce detailed orders, and reduce the time that I had to spend in getting signatures to separate papers. [Reading:]

D.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, August 10, 1915.

To: All bureaus and navy yards and stations, commandant Marine Corps, commander in chief, and board of inspection and survey.
Subject: Regular overhaul periods of vessels abolished.

1. The department announces the abolition of the regular three months overhaul periods for all ships. There will be two docking periods yearly, not to exceed two weeks each.

2. Only necessary repairs, beyond the capacity of the fleet, previously authorized and which can be done within the docking period, shall be performed by the navy yard.

3. Vessels will go to navy yards for yard work at other than docking times only when absolutely necessary to maintain their military efficiency, after recommendation by the board of inspection. The ship will not be ordered to the yard until the yard reports all plans and material ready to begin actual work, after approval of estimates, and work will be pushed to completion by ship and yard forces. In this connection the following is quoted from department's letter No. 28024–161 of July 29, 1915, relative to repairs on *Delaware*.

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Then I quote an illustrative letter in regard to the *Delaware*. The ships had been going to the yards once every 15 months for a three months overhaul period, whether they needed the overhaul or not. The men were given leave, the officers got their leave, and it meant that your ship was in the yard at least for that 3 months out of every 15 months, besides the other docking period. We attempted to increase the number of available days for operating with the fleet, to reduce the number of days in the navy yard, to reduce the cost by making the ship's force do all they could, and the repair ship do all she could, before the ship went to the yard, and to keep ships out of the yards, because our yards were inadequate to sustain the fleet even in 1915; and it was along that line we were working in establishing that system. This letter is as follows: [Continuing reading:]

4. The *Delaware* is at that stage of her career where a complete and thorough overhaul is absolutely necessary to secure the safety of the personnel and the life of the metal and equipment. Owing to the service which she has been called upon to perform, the readiness in which she had been held, and the continual shortening of overhaul and docking periods, items of overhaul have been postponed until attention to them is imperative.

The department does not desire that any vessel be permitted to leave a navy yard after an overhaul in a condition that allows any doubt to exist as to the ability of the vessel to maintain its position in the fleet or respond to any full-power trial. The object of an overhaul is to place the vessel in the best material condition for battle, and while it is desirable to limit the stay of a vessel at a navy yard so far as possible, this should not be done at the expense of military efficiency.

We were preparing the fleet all the time, from my desk point of view, for fighting. That is the only reason we sent ships to the navy yards. [Continuing reading:]

4. Only such alterations will be approved as are clearly necessary to definitely and directly increase her military efficiency, either by increasing her "h. p. g. p. m."; her knots p[illegible] hour or per pound of fuel, or by increasing the health and vigor of the crew, or decreasing their necessary routine labors which will increase their military efficiency.

5. All ship's spare parts and equipment at yards and on board should be immediately replaced when used or old ones repaired if advisable for replacement.

6. An "availability factor" is to be introduced in the "battle efficiency" computation.

That was to introduce the competitive business we had in target practice, a ship being self-maintaining, and being of use for more days in the year. I made up a table for the three previous years, which showed that the average ship had been 33⅓ per cent of her time in the navy yard, although the average steaming at that time was only, for a battleship, about 10,000 miles a year. Our effort was to increase her military efficiency and reduce that percentage of time in the navy yard, and we were getting along fine up to the time the war broke out. [Continuing reading:]

7. Leave periods will not be coincident with docking or repair periods for following reasons.

That was prolonging the stay in navy yards. The men got the idea—and the officers, too—that they could put off jobs that would last until they got their overhaul period, and then the yard would do it and they would not have to do it. [Continuing reading:]

7. Leave periods will not be coincident with docking and repair periods for following reasons:

(*a*) Navy yard inspection now reduced to that done by ship's officers.

(*b*) Ship's force should do all work within their capacity according to the provisions of law.

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(c) Time in yard will be reduced and consequent disorganization of crew minimized.
(d) Leave period should follow overhaul to encourage everybody, officers and men, to reduce stay in yard to minimum.

Then, here is another policy which is important:

8. New construction will be used by the yards in endeavoring to maintain a uniform labor roll. In this connection attention is invited to policy already announced in department's letter No. 8557-167, of July 29, 1915, pertaining to work on *Tacoma*, which reads in part as follows:

"The industrial manager, Portsmouth Navy Yard, has requested that work on the *Tacoma* be postponed as necessary, partly in order to maintain a uniform labor roll at the yard, and partly due to insufficient money allotments.

"The department takes this occasion to announce the following policy: When a vessel suitable for war service arrives at a yard to be placed out of commission, in reserve or in ordinary, her full crew of officers and men will be kept intact until all authorized work is completed and the vessel is placed in the best possible material condition for battle. Work to this end will proceed with the utmost dispatch following approval of estimates after inspection by the board of inspection and survey. Such vessel will not be used for the purpose of maintaining a uniform labor roll (new vessels under construction should be used for this purpose); and such money allotments should be requested as necessary to carry out the general policy outlined above."

That was to provide for ships going into reserve being put into fit condition before they went into reserve, so that the reserve complement I spoke of yesterday could keep them fit, and so that we would know that when we called on them, they would be efficient for business. [Continuing reading:]

9. Sufficient time must be allowed officers and crew to perform routine overhaul and necessary repairs on board, as required, to the end that each ship will at all times be in first-class condition and able to properly maintain station in battle line.

That was necessary because always, when we get to sea, especially flag officers, we want all our ships all the time. That is the only training that a flag officer gets and he hates to see one of his ships drop out of his division, because then he only has three; and it is a good deal like an old hen with her chickens, he wants the whole crowd there all the time, because that is where he gets his training for fighting, and if you do not watch for and catch them, they are unconsciously and unintentionally liable to sacrifice the opportunities for repairs and improvement to their own training and operations. I am now looking at it from a different point of view from that at the time when I wrote that letter. I will probably have to be posted myself, now, to give the ships a chance. [Continuing reading:]

10. The department believes that the policy above outlined will materially increase the military efficiency of the fleet, and was largely influenced in its decision by the following favorable resultant items:
(1) The military efficiency of the "fleet" becomes of first importance and yard activities supplemental thereto.
(2) All officers and men on board to assist in and inspect work at yards.
(3) Reduced expenditures for alterations which do not increase efficiency of ships.
(4) Maintain continuous efficiency of each ship.

There is a thing that we had to watch all the time. Every captain and every officer of a ship wants for his ship—never mind what her vintage was—all the latest fittings, target practice and signals and all that. He wants his ship just as good as anybody else's, and it is very proper that he should feel that way; but we had to put time limits on some of them, and we could not take the *Kearsarge*, for instance, and remodel her to bring her up to the efficiency of the

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Pennsylvania, because we would have had to rebuild a ship under the name of repairs and then we would not have had anything but an old one-horse shay, anyway; so that we limit and classify the repairs that can go on ships. One class we will bring up to date and another class up to another date, depending on their age, and we will save money and save the navy yards. [Continuing reading:]

11. The docking periods for the battleships of the Atlantic Fleet will be as follows: All ships at home yards October 1 to 15, 1915; April 15 to 30, 1916; and October 1 to 15, 1916.

12. Exceptions to the above policy will only be made on approval of the department. Work already authorized on ships for overhaul period October–December, 1915, will be carried out, but should be pushed to prompt completion.

JOSEPHUS DANIELS.

That was the previous overhaul period set for the ships before their going south to the southern drill ground in the winter of 1915–16.

Senator TRAMMELL. The date of that letter is August 10, 1915?

Admiral MCKEAN. August 10, 1915; yes sir. I think I said that was the first policy, but I notice that the one previous to that was July 29, 1915.

The next memorandum is dated August 24, 1915. [Reading:]

E.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, August 24, 1915.

Memorandum for Chief of Operations.

Policy as to preparation of the fleet materially for war and its maintenance in readiness at all times.

(1) Active fleet: All vessels in commission with the active fleets in the Atlantic Fleet, Pacific Fleet, Asiatic Fleet.

(2) Reserve fleet: All vessels in reserve, ready materially but with only reserve complements of officers and men on board.

(3) Coast-defense fleet (includes advance bases): (1) Coast-defense battleships, (2) coast-defense monitors, (3) coast-defense submarines, (4) coast-defense surface torpedo craft, (5) coast-defense hydroplanes, (6) coast-defense dirigibles, (7) coast guard patrols, (8) lighthouse tenders (patrols), (10) coast mine planters, (11) coast mine trawlers, (12) converted yachts, (13) gas power boats for offensive against subs.

Those are vessels that are not intended for foreign service under any conditions. They had been relegated to the rear rank, for coast defense pure and simple. [Continuing reading:]

1. The active fleet: All units of the active fleet to be kept in first-class condition at all times by the crews. Whenever repairs beyond the capacity of ship's force are found necessary, then the procedure laid down in department's letter No. 20392–560 to be followed.

2. The reserve fleet: All ships now in reserve to be immediately placed in first-class condition and then to be so maintained by the reserve complements assigned to them. To be at all times ready for immediate commissioning for service with the active fleet. Vessels hereafter going into reserve will follow the procedure laid down in department's letter No. 8557–167 of July 29, 1915.

3. Ships in ordinary: These vessels will be at once put in material condition to permit them to perform their war duties as coast defense vessels. The nucleus crews assisted by the organizations—Naval Militia and Naval Reserves—who will constitute the crews of these vessels in war will maintain them in efficient condition. They will only be sent to navy yards for docking repairs beyond the capacity of ship's force.

That is, we were not going to spend any more money on those ships than was necessary to keep them fit for that duty alone, of coast defense.

Next is the policy letter which I have marked "F." [Reading:]

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F.

POLICY.

No. 20392-560. NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, August 27, 1915.

To: Commanders in Chief Atlantic Fleet, Pacific Fleet, Asiatic Fleet, Atlantic Reserve Fleet, Pacific Reserve Fleet.

Subject: Overhaul of ships.

Reference: (*a*) Department letter 20392-560 of August 10, 1915, regular overhaul periods abolished.

1. In order to assist in carrying out the provisions of reference (*a*), the commander in chief will report to the department when it becomes evident that a ship will, in the near future, require considerable navy-yard work.

That is to give us notice in the yards.

2. Date when the ship can best be spared for overhaul should be noted. Also inform the department when the ship will be at her home yard for inspection, in order that the board of inspection and survey may be instructed.

3. The inspection should be held sufficiently in advance of time proposed for beginning work, to enable the yard to make its plans and provide material after receipt of approved estimates based on report of inspection.

FRANLKIN D. ROOSEVELT, *Acting.*

You can see, there, the policy was to send the ships and to have them inspected, and based on that inspection to send them to the navy yard, and to make those plans and estimates and collect the material and as soon as the inspection was completed of a ship she went back to the fleet, and then she would not go to the yard until the yard reported to the commander in chief that they were ready to go ahead with her. Our plan was that when she came into the navy yard and the gangplank went out, the workmen came aboard ready to go to work.

The CHAIRMAN. What would become of her if the yard was not ready?

Admiral MCKEAN. They would not let the commander in chief know, and if they did not make their dates, I or some one in my office went up to find out why.

The CHAIRMAN. But after a ship was reported ready for repairs, provided the yard was not ready to take her in, what would happen to the vessel? She would stay at the yard?

Admiral MCKEAN. You see, she would first go to the yard for inspection, and then she would go back to the fleet and work with the fleet so as not to interfere with her drill and training of the men, until the yard was ready for her. Often the yard was not ready for her as quickly as we would have liked, because of lack of capacity to do the work that was to be done.

Here is a circular letter which I have marked "G," of September 3, 1915. [Reading:]

G.

CIRCULAR LETTER.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C., September 3, 1915.

To: Commandants of navy yards and stations; all bureaus and commanders in chief.

Subject: Docking of vessels during overhaul.

1. Hereafter when a vessel is to be docked during an overhaul period, the docking should take place as early as possible during the period in order that any defects developing from an inspection while in dock may be noted and full information pertaining thereto be available for the completion of any necessary work entailed within the period set for that overhaul.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, *Acting.*

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The purpose of that was, we had a particular case; a ship had been in a yard for a month or two months, I have forgotten just the time, and we always liked to have her go out with as clean a bottom as possible. The next docking will be dated from the last. We had had this ship there for two months. We put her in the dock and pumped it out and found a defective shaft which we had to remove. We had expected her to go out in four or five days, but she was as long getting this shaft repaired as it took to do the other work. To avoid such things as that, we would put her in and clean her bottom, inspect it and inspect the fittings, and if there was work to be done on her of that sort we did it at the same time we did this other work above water, so as to save time. That was the beauty about having this policy developed. Everybody knew about it. I do not mean that it is a completely developed system yet, but it is better than none.

Here is a series of memorandums which I have marked "H." There is a good deal of this particular thing, but it is illustrative of what we were doing toward developing shore stations and navy yards to take care of ships, and, as I stated in my narrative yesterday, the first thing that I discovered was the absolute inability of the navy yards to take care of the fleet, and I was trying from the beginning to build up these bases so that they could. The policy had been that every dollar of appropriation should be spent and go to sea; and I have heard it very thoroughly approved of by members of both the majority and the minority of the House Naval Committee; and I had a hard time getting them to see it the other way; that we had to have our yards, and that you could not operate ships without bases to work them from. I was decidedly in the minority in the hearings for some time. This first memorandum is dated September 25, 1915. [Reading:]

H.

[Ref. A.]

NAVY DEPARTMENT.
Washington, September 25, 1915.

Memorandum for Chief of Naval Operations.
Subject: Navy yard, Norfolk, training station, St. Helena, etc.

1. The department now has before it for consideration several propositions affecting the whole future of this yard and station. They are interdependent and should be considered together and a final definite scheme for the development of this most important yard and station should be adopted and hereafter followed until the yard has reached the full limit of its usefulness.

2. The various subjects in the order of their importance are as follows:

1. The location of a new dry dock.
2. The location of torpedo-boat building ways.
3. The provision of the necessary fuel-oil storage.
4. The remodeling or abandonment of St. Helena as a training station, doing away with receiving ships, etc.
5. The location of a submarine shore base.
6. The widening of the channel between the yard and training station to permit of the safe handling of large ships.

3. In order that this whole question may be settled satisfactorily and a consistent plan be developed, it is recommended that a board, consisting of the Chiefs of Bureaus of Navigation, Construction and Repair, Yards and Docks, and the assistant for material in the Office of Chief of Naval Operations, with the Assistant Secretary of the Navy as chairman, be ordered to meet at once and consider and report on the whole subject and submit a definite plan at the earliest practicable date.

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This was done. The report of the board is attached, dated October 12, 1915. It gives the general recommendations with reference to the development of the Norfolk yard. [Reading:]

[Ref. B.]

OCTOBER 12, 1915.

To: The Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: Report of the board submitting a definite plan for the future development of the Norfolk Navy Yard and Station.

1. In obedience to your order of October 6, 1915, the board met in the office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy on Saturday, October 9, 1915, and considered all the previous reports, blue prints, and correspondence in connection with the various subjects before it.

2. In view of the ships built, building, and planned and the growing importance of the Norfolk Navy Yard to the fleet, the board considers it absolutely necessary to begin immediately the development of the Norfolk Navy Yard to meet modern conditions.

3. To make such development economically and efficiently, the board is of the opinion that the layout of the water front and its development is the first logical step.

4. There is attached hereto a blue print showing the general layout of the Schmoele tract water front, the location of the dry docks, the location of the building ways, the general location of the working basin, principal sheps, and the turning basin.

5. The board took up for consideration the various subjects referred to it in the order given and submits recommendations thereon as follows:

(1) The location of the first new dry dock. The board recommends the location adopted by the department in its seventh indorsement of July 23, 1915 (No. 5267–479), as shown on Yards and Docks blue print 64669; also shown on the attached blue print.

(2) The location of torpedo boat building ways. The board recommends the location adopted by the department in its seventh indorsement of July 23, 1915 (No. 5267–479), as shown on Yards and Docks blue print No. 64669; also shown on the attached blue print.

(3) The provision of the necessary fuel-oil storage. In view of the interference with other more important developments and the danger of fire to shops, buildings, and ships at the yard, the board recommends:

(*a*) That there be no further oil storage located on the Schmoele tract.

(*b*) That there be no further oil-fuel storage located on St. Helena.

(*c*) That future oil storage be underground on a convenient site located on Hampton Roads, the James River, or the York River.

(*d*) That the oil-fuel storage be located on the new site selected for the training station, if there be sufficient room, and it can be made sufficiently accessible to ships, barges, etc., by piers or pipe lines.

(4) The remodeling or abondonment of St. Helena as a training station, doing away with receiving ships, etc.

After considering fully all the features of the training station, its defects and limitations, and having in mind the importance of this station to the fleet, the board submits the following recommendations:

(*a*) Abandon St. Helena as a training station as being inadequate and unsatisfactory in every way even for present conditions and numbers. Also do away with receiving ships and substitute therefor barracks. (The above with a view of economy of maintenance and efficiency.) The present station interferes materially with the full utilization of the navy yard for industrial purposes and military use as a submarine base.

(*b*) The purchase of a new site and the transfer thereto of the present training station as soon as possible. This new site to be located either:

First. On Hampton Roads, where in addition to serving as training station, it could be used for recreation grounds for the fleet, and as oil fuel station;

Second. On the James River; or

Third. On the York River, in the vicinity of Yorktown.

(5) The location of a submarine shore base. The board recommends that the water front of St. Helena be dredged back to give a minimum of channel of 800 feet between the present yard sea wall and the pierhead line on St. Helena and that the remainder of the St. Helena tract be filled, graded, and developed as a submarine shore base; that this work be provided for in the present appropriation bill, and executed as promptly as possible, all work except dredging and filling to be charged to appropriation for submarine shore base.

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(6) The widening of the channel between the yard and the training station. Provided for as above in paragraph 5, by dredging the shore line of St. Helena, so as to give a minimum width of 800 feet between the yard and the pierhead on St. Helena.

(7) The board recommends that the development of the Schmoele tract be as outlined in the attached blue print, commencing with the dry dock and building ship and working toward the south. That coincident with this development the turning basin be dredged to a diameter of 1,500 feet (see blue print), and that the widening of the channel along the front of St. Helena and between St. Helena and the turning basin be proceeded with as soon as possible, this with the idea that the water front and channel development shall be entirely completed prior to the completion of the new Dry Dock No. 4, to permit its immediate use by the largest ships.

7. The board recommends that the following estimates be included in this year's appropriation bill to permit the undertaking of the most urgent of the above recommendations:

(*a*) Five hundred thousand dollars for—

(1) Development of the water front in the vicinity of the new dry dock and building ways.

(2) The dredging of the turning circle.

(3) Dredging of the channel and water front at St. Helena.

(*b*) Four hundred thousand dollars for the purchase of the new site for the training station and the removal of the station to such new site. The board recommends that this appropriation be made immediately available in order that the new station may be put in full commission as early as practicable to take care of the increased enlistments which will be called for by increased personnel provided in the present bill.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT,
Assistant Secretary of the Navy.
VICTOR BLUE,
Chief of Bureau of Navigation.
D. W. TAYLOR,
Chief of Bureau of Construction and Repair.
H. R. STANFORD,
Chief of Bureau of Yards and Docks.
J. S. MCKEAN,
Captain, United States Navy, Assistant for Material.

That was followed by a memorandum of January 14, 1916 [reading]:

JANUARY 14, 1916.

Memorandum for Chief of Naval Operations.
Subject: Development of navy yard plans.

Mission—to make plans for the development of the various necessary navy yards to their full capacity and greatest efficiency at the least cost of time and money, so that they may be adquate for the use of the fleet in preparation for war and its maintenance in war.

That was our gospel in reference to maintenance and material, in reference to yards [reading]:

The necessary steps in the order of excution for the above are:

1. *A base plan.*—To be developed by the General Board showing all the naval bases necessary in war; the various duties of each of these bases to the fleet; what part of the fleet is to be based thereon; the functions of each arranged in the order of their importance.

2. *An ideal navy yard plan.*—This to be a complete general plan of an ideal navy yard, such as could and should be developed on a new site which had no limitations as to area, depth of water, currents, lack of railroad or other necessary facilities.

3. A general plan (lay-out) of each yard showing its individual best development, giving consideration first to the use of the yard as ordered in the approved base plan, and second to the approved ideal standard plan provided under paragraph 2.

(*a*) After the approval of the general plan of any yard the sequence of its development should be determined by stages which should be so selected that each stage would be complete in itself and could properly be provided for in the annual appropriation bill. There should be given stages to correspond to the approved building pro-

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gram, so that the yards, with all their facilities, would keep step with the growth and development of the fleet and all should be completed by the time the approved building program is completed.

4. *Detailed plans of each yard.*—After the general plan for a yard, with the layout of water front, docks, dry docks, shops, and transportation facilities, has been approved by the department, a set of detailed plans for each dry dock, shop, storehouse, railroad track, etc., should be worked out, with all the specifications for their construction, with bills of material and new machines, and complete and detailed estimates of the costs involved. This set of plans should be grouped under the various annual "stages of development" decided on in accordance with paragraph 3, subhead (*a*), and each stage should be included in the annual estimate for the year to which it belongs.

5. After the development of the detailed plans and their division and classification into logical and complete annual stages, the department will at any time have at hand exact plans and estimates necessary to complete the development of the yard up to its limit of availability in the maintenance of the fleet in war.

6. To carry out the above scheme it is recommended:

(*a*) That the General Board be called upon to submit at the earliest date practicable the base plan called for in paragraph 1. This plan to show in detail all the activities of each yard arranged in the order of their importance, and classified under two headings: (1) Activities in preparation for war; (2) activities during war.

(*b*) That the base plan under (*a*) when approved by the department be referred to a board to consist of one representative from each of the following bureaus: Navigation, Yards and Docks, Construction and Repair, Steam Engineering, Supplies and Accounts, Ordnance, Medicine and Surgery and a representative of the Major General Commandant, with the assistant for material as chairman, whose duty it will be to provide the ideal or standard navy yard plan and general plans of development (layout) of each yard. The above board would be too numerous to be effective except as an executive board, so that it would be necessary to designate, as recommended in the letter of the Chief of the Bureau of Construction and Repair, a subboard or working committee consisting of the representatives of the Bureaus of Construction and Repair and Yards and Docks to do the actual work on development of the above plans ready to submit to the full board for final decision and approval. (The above to make certain that the necessities of no bureau have been overlooked or too much limited by the especial interest and appreciation of the activities of the bureaus represented by the working subboard).

(*c*) On the approval by the department of the general plan for any yard, this general plan to be referred to the commandant of such yard, who will order a yard board to work out the detailed development in accordance with the approved general plan. This yard board will list the materials, new machines, cranes, locomotives, and various facilities needed; write the detailed specifications and make the itemized estimates to fulfill the detailed plans. When the above is completed it will be forwarded to the department board, which, if it meets their approval, will submit it to the department, and when approved by the department these detailed plans, specifications, and estimates will become a part of the approved base plans and be included in the portfolio of base plans covering this particular navy yard and will constitute a continuing policy on which the various bureaus will base their annual estimates for such yard.

J. S. McKEAN.

That is the navy yard development board. That is still working. It started at that time, and taking the most important yards, one at a time, we worked out the details for their development, what it would cost, and then we asked for the items to be put in the estimates each year, and got the appropriations and applied them; and if we had not started something of that kind we would have been less ready, by far, than we were.

Then here is a communication to the Secretary of the Navy as to a base plan for development of navy yards. It gives the thought as to what a base plan should include, and it is very complete. I will put it in the record for the consideration of the committee.

They even assigned ships to home yards by classification, and it was all approved and adopted, and we were working on this fixed plan quite a little while before the war; long enough to establish the habit.

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The communication is as follows:

[Ref. D.]

G. D. No. 404–A (Serial No. 480).

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
GENERAL BOARD,
Washington, March 4, 1916.

To: Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: Base plan for development of navy yards.

References: (*a*) Navy Department's letter No. 20857–6, of January 20, 1916; (*b*) G. B. No. 414–1, May 29, 1913, development of fuel depots; (*c*) G. B. No. 404, December 30, 1913, comment on reports of inspection of Atlantic coast navy yards; (*d*) G. B. No. 425, January 3, 1916, berthing facilities at navy yards; (*e*) G. B. No. 404, January 12, 1916, new sites for naval stations at New York and San Francisco Bay; (*f*) Bureau of Supplies and Accounts; report on preparedness quarter ending December 31, 1915, Exhibit No. 4.

Inclosure: (*a*) Base plan.

1. The General Board believes that a base plan to be of value in the immediate future should contemplate the use to their greatest capacity of all Government and commercial facilities now available which are required to prepare the fleet for war in accordance with mobilization plans already approved by the department (14 days), and maintain this fleet during war.

2. The immediate development of Government facilities should be to meet these requirements, on lines best adapted to develop ideal conditions in the future, while not diminishing any of the present needed facilities until the ideal has been attained.

3. The navy yards of the country have grown up to meet the needs arising from time to time and their location and equipment is not such as would be now provided if the problem was one to be solved from the beginning at the present time. The consequence is that there is much duplication, stations are established close together, and there is a diffusion of effort, and consequent increase of overhead cost. Economy of administration demands as few naval stations as practicable to accomplish necessary results. This is the theoretical consideration, but the practical consideration which must govern at the present time and probably for some years to come, is that in time of war all the naval facilities that the country possesses will be needed.

4. Before proceeding with the development of the details of such a base plan, the General Board will, in order to avoid a confusion of terms, define certain terms which are used in the plan:

(*a*) A naval base is generically a center from which a fleet can operate and be maintained.

(*b*) Permanent naval bases are the fixed naval bases of the country; their numbers, location and character are questions of policy and grand strategy.

(*c*) Permanent naval bases divide themselves naturally into two classes: Home bases and outlying bases.

(*d*) Home bases are themselves divided into two classes, main and subsidiary.

(*e*) A main home base is a base within the continental territory of the country from which the fleet can operate at all times, and which is designed to maintain, supply, and upkeep the fleet at all times, both in peace and war. The base, in this sense, consists not only of the port harbor or estuary from which the fleet may act, but of all the territory and resources tributary to this port or harbor; and must contain all the elements necessary to the maintenance and upkeep of the fleet and for its own defense. A city, harbor, or a navy yard or arsenal in itself in no sense, singly or collectively, constitutes a naval base, though all are elements of such a base. If to a harbor giving sufficient anchorage we add a city or population giving a sufficient supply of labor, a navy yard or arsenal with the requisite docks, shops, etc., giving a sufficient means for repair and upkeep, a tributary territory with efficient means of communication furnishing the requisite supply and resources, and all behind a defense independent of the fleet, then we have a main naval home base.

(*f*) A subsidiary base is a base that contains elements of a main base in lesser degree; and which, while not capable of supporting and being the home of the whole fleet, may be such for lesser elements and portions of it.

(*g*) An outlying permanent naval base is one without the continental limits of the country, situated in outlying possessions and designed to be a strong point of support, from which the fleet can operate in war and from which it can be subsisted for limited periods in war.

(*h*) A navy yard is a docking, repair, and supply station and is always a necessary part of a permanent naval base, but it does not and can not of itself constitute a naval base of any kind, though so generally confused with one.

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(*i*) Advanced bases are outlying naval bases of a temporary character; their location and strength being decided by questions of the immediate strategy and tactics of the campaign requiring them.

5. The General Board submits herewith inclosure A, a base plan in accordance with the foregoing, showing the present assignment and future development recommended.

6. The assignment of ships to home yards by squadrons, divisions, etc., has been considered, but the General Board believes that owing to the present divided navy yard facilities the assignment can be best made at the present time by name (as is now done in G. O. No. 137), on the advice of the technical bureaus as to the present facilities of navy yards, on the following general lines:

(*a*) Largest ships to New York yard.
(*b*) Next largest ships to Norfolk yard.
(*c*) Next largest ships to Boston yard.
(*d*) Next largest ships and all ships in reserve to Philadelphia yard.
(*e*) Large cruisers to Portsmouth yard.
(*f*) Largest vessels on Pacific coast to Puget Sound yard.
(*g*) Supply ships to New York yard as far as practicable.
(*h*) Colliers to Norfolk yard as far as practicable.
(*i*) Oil fuel ships and transports to Philadelphia yard.
(*j*) Small cruisers, destroyers, fleet submarines, fleet tugs, and auxiliaries not mentioned above according to yard best fitted at present to look after these vessels in addition to those assigned above.
(*k*) Coast patrol ships to yard in or nearest district to which these ships are assigned in war.

7. In reviewing the reports of inspection of merchant vessels the General Board will recommend that repairs and alterations to merchant vessels required for war be undertaken at commercial yards (building or repair yard of ship when practicable) under the supervision of navy-yard authorities in that base, and to be made by such navy yard itself if facilities permit at the time.

8. The items of naval material to be manufactured at any navy yard or commercial articles supplied from any base should be decided by the particular facilities of the yard and market, according to the recommendation of the bureaus concerned as indicated in reference (*f*).

9. The General Board does not believe that an entire outfit of supplies should be carried at any base for all the ships based at that yard, as some stores will always be on board, and the amount carried should be the probable amount required to complete outfits (Title B, Title X, Provisions and clothing) for six months, as shown by experience.

10. For further detailed recommendations as to future development of navy yards, stations and fuel depots, attention is invited to references (*b*), (*c*), (*d*), and (*e*), the principles of which are summarized in the following:

(*a*) The establishment and development to completion of four great naval home bases, two on the Atlantic and two on the Pacific coast.

(*b*) That these four bases shall be at New York, the lower Chesapeake, Puget Sound, and San Francisco Bay.

(*c*) That, for naval control in war over the western North Atlantic (including the Caribbean Sea and Gulf of Mexico) and northern Pacific, there shall be established two naval outlying bases, which shall be developed into permanent naval bases (arsenals) capable of self-defense against major attack by a strong enemy.

(*d*) That these two bases shall be Guantanamo and Pearl Harbor.

(*e*) The Isthmus of Panama may be considered as practically a naval base; for all Government facilities such as drydocks, repair shops, fuel, and other supplies will always be available to the Navy, but no regular naval station need be established there. The question of establishing an outlying base at Guam is left in abeyance pending the disposition of the Philippines.

(*f*) That Philadelphia be continued as a subsidiary base, and developed as the principal ship construction navy yard.

(*g*) That Key West be continued and developed as a subsidiary base for torpedo craft.

(*h*) That Pensacola be continued as a subsidiary base and developed as an aircraft training and experimental station.

(*i*) That for the time being, until the two great home bases on the Atlantic coast are developed to the point of maintaining the whole fleet, the naval stations at Boston, Portsmouth, and Charleston be continued as subsidiary bases.

(*j*) That all other naval bases, navy yards, and naval stations be continued until such time as the development of the four main home bases and two outlying permanent bases, prove that any of these subsidiary bases, or stations, are no longer needed for the maintenance of the fleet in peace and war.

GEORGE DEWEY.

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[First indorsement.]

AUGUST 28, 1916.

From: Secretary of the Navy.
To: General Board.
Subject: Base plan for development of navy yards.

1. The base plan for the development of navy yards, submitted by the General Board with its letter 404–A (serial No. 480), of March 4, 1916, is approved, except that in the respect of the designation and development of the outlying permanent repair and supply base in the Caribbean, the department's decision will, for the present, be deferred.

W. S. BENSON, *Acting.*

[Second indorsement.]

SEPTEMBER 6, 1916.

From: Secretary General Board.
To: Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: Base plan for development of navy yards.

Returned, by direction of the General Board; contents of the preceding indorsement noted.

H. J. ZIEGEMEIER.

The next is dated June 21, 1916, from the board for the development of navy-yard plans to the Navy Department. I put that in as an illustration of the way that the Navy Yard Development Board made studies and estimates. This communication is as follows:

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C., June 21, 1916.

From: Board for the development of navy-yard plans.
To: The Navy Department.
Subject: Development of Norfolk.
References: (*a*) Joint letter of Naval Operations, Bureaus of C. and R. and Y. and D., April 29, 1916, C. and R. No. 7352–a–43–F.
(*b*) Report of Roosevelt Board dated October 12, 1915.
Inclosures: (*a*) Blue print showing land areas and tentative allotment of space.
(*b*) Chart showing site in relation to Hampton Roads.

1. It is considered of great importance that the development of the Norfolk Navy Yard should be undertaken at the earliest possible time, and in submitting the following recommendations the board considers that provision has been made for the commencement of the most important elements of its development along lines which will be consistent with the final arrangement of the station as a main naval base.

2. The recommendation contained in the joint letter of the Chief of Operations and the Bureaus of Construction and Repair and Yards and Docks, contained in reference (*a*), is concurred in, as well as the report of the Roosevelt Board, reference (*b*).

3. In view of the recommendations contained in reference (*b*), the board has considered the question of the removal of the training station to the property on Hampton Roads known as the Jamestown Exposition Grounds. Careful investigation of the subject points to the necessity of a naval base at Hampton Roads adequate not only for the training station but for the following activities as well:

(*a*) Fuel-oil storage.
(*b*) Fleet stores, mines and mine sweeping stores and equipment.
(*c*) Primary submarine base for the fifth naval district.
(*d*) Fuel supply.
(*e*) Berthing facilities for both large and small ships, for receiving and discharging fuel and stores.
(*f*) Fleet drill, camp and recreation grounds.
(*g*) Mobilization camp and drill grounds for Marine Corps Expeditionary Forces.
(*h*) Primary aviation base and training camp for fifth naval district.

Inclosures (*a*) and (*b*) show the proposed site of such a naval base with a tentative distribution of grounds for the above activities, and indicates the various extensions which could be obtained by filling in the flats around the shore line.

Nine large piers are shown fronting on the dredged channel to Norfolk, where coal for the fleet in lighters could be secured and from which supplies, fuel oil, etc., could be delivered direct to the fleet, these piers being of sufficient size to accommodate the largest vessels of the Navy. Ample room on the hard ground inside the shore line is available for underground fuel-oil tanks, storage houses for fleet stores, and barracks for submarine crews.

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The ground allotted to the training station is slightly greater than that at the Great Lakes Training Station and should be ample for the accommodation of 5,000 or more apprentices.

The board is informed that many of the buildings now on this property can be adapted to Government use. The board is also informed that the waters of Willoughby Bay are very suitable for aviation training. Hangars can be stationed along the present shore line and the buildings already erected on the plat in yellow assigned to aviation can be used for the accommodation of the personnel. By filling in the extension of 212 acres a level tract of ground can be obtained entirely bare of trees or other obstructions and suitable for airship sheds, aeroplanes, etc., necessary to a well-equipped aviation base for the fifth naval district.

Estimates received from the Fidelity Land & Investment Corporation of Norfolk, Va., place a value on this property as follows:

All buildings and grounds north of Ninety-ninth Street and east of Maryland Avenue	$923,187
Pine Grove section north of One hundred and fourth Street and west of Maryland Avenue	45,000
Deep-water pier, extending to the westward from Pine Grove	10,000
Block of land bounded by Maryland Avenue, One hundred and fourth Street, Virginia Avenue, and One hundred and second Street	78,500
Pine Beach Hotel property and riparian rights to the westward	190,000
Property bounded by One hundred and first Street, Maryland Avenue, One hundred and second Street, and Maryland Circle	42,500
Block No. 44, to the westward of Maryland Circle, and riparian rights to the westward	67,500
Blocks No. 55, 56, 57, and 58	115,000
Virginia Railway & Power Co. property between One hundred and first Street on the north, boundary line in red to the southward, and to the westward of blocks 56 and 57, including riparian rights	20,000
Total	1,491,687

4. The naval bill now under consideration includes the two most important items, namely, a new dry dock and structural shops. The additional projects which should be provided for at this session of Congress are as follows:

	Authorized cost.	Appropriation, 1917.
Water-front improvements	$3,300,000	$2,250,000
Building ways for large ships	600,000	600,000
Purchase land for training station, etc	1,500,000	1,500,000

5. The board, therefore, recommends that the following items be inserted in the naval appropriation bill as reported to Senate June 8, 1916, under Public Works, Bureau of Yards and Docks.

Page 22, line 20, insert after the semicolon the following items:

Water-front improvements (limit of cost, $3,300,000), $2,250,000.

Building ways for large ships, $600,000.

"That the Secretary of the Navy is hereby authorized to acquire by gift, purchase, or condemnation such site or sites in the vicinity of Hampton Roads, Va., as shall in his judgment be deemed necessary or expedient for naval purposes, and the sum of $1,500,000, or so much thereof as may be necessary, is hereby appropriated for said purposes: *Provided*, That any unexpended balance of said appropriation may be used toward improving the site or sites so acquired."

I next present a memorandum dated March 30, 1917, which covers the bases. This is submitted with the purpose of showing that the material end of Operations, which as set forth, included the coordination of bureaus with the yards and fleet to maintain the fleet in war was at work. We were working along consistent, well-considered plans, and we knew what we wanted, we knew what we wanted to do with it, and we did it as fast as Congress gave us the money.

The CHAIRMAN. What are these; peace plans or war plans?

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Admiral McKEAN. These are both. They are peace plans, fundamental plans necessary to get the fleet ready for war and to maintain it in war.

The CHAIRMAN. Were not most of these things that were in these plans also desirable in peace?

Admiral McLEAN. Absolutely necessary. This was peace, so far as we were concerned as a nation. But as I stated yesterday, Mr. Chairman, navy yards had grown rather haphazard. It depended largely on the commandant, for instance, his forcefulness and farsightedness in planning yards. And then, if he got in touch with a good, strong Congressman in that district, or with a Senator who would back him up, they could come down here to Congress and talk their navy yard and get away with it; but when you came to consider the whole fleet and its preparation in peace and maintenance in war, it was largely a matter of luck. You understand that just as well as I do. The yards grew. One would get a start and then the next one would get a start. But there was not any system about it.

The CHAIRMAN. This was a comprehensive plan to cover all the yards?

Admiral McKEAN. Yes; based on the military needs and not on local interests or desires. What the fleet needed is what we were trying to get.

Senator TRAMMELL. They were necessary in peace and more necessary in time of war, were they not?

Admiral McKEAN. Absolutely necessary at both times; and we did not ask for anything that was not necessary.

This last communication is as follows:

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, March 30, 1917.

Memorandum.
Subject: Special estimates for appropriations.

DESTROYER TENDERS.

1. There are building and in service the following destroyer tenders: In service, *Panther*, *Dixie*, and *Melville;* authorized, 2; total provided for, 5. Allowing one tender for each flotilla of 18 destroyers, the authorized program shows a shortage of 1½ tenders. Assuming that 50 additional destroyers may be authorized under emergency programs we would have a total of 176 destroyers, which would require 10 tenders. Therefore this emergency program should provide for the construction of at least two destroyer tenders. The cost of the *Melville* was $1,310,000, and adding 10 per cent for increased cost due to increased cost of material and labor and rush work, makes the present cost $1,441,000 per unit; and for the five additional tenders required, $7,205,000.

SUBMARINE TENDERS.

2. All submarines now in commission are based on tenders and no other vessels are available for this duty. A submarine base at New London, sufficient to accommodate 20 submarines has been appropriated for. A submarine base accommodating 20 submarines will cost not to exceed $1,500,000. A submarine tender to accommodate 6 submarines will cost $1,000,000. The maintenance cost of the base for 20 boats would be about $100,000 while that of a tender for 6 boats is $195,000 per year. It is expected that the sundry civil bill will provide for a submarine base of 20 units at Coco Solo, Colon Harbor. Under present conditions and without hastening the building program it will be necessary to provide tenders for at least 11 submarines: in 1918 for at least 14 more; in 1919 at least 30. All fleet submarines require tenders. The navy yard commission recommends a large training base at Los Angeles and an advance base for submarines attached to the aviation base at San Diego.

Owing to the inadequacy of the present navy yards and their shop facilities to care for submarines, the fact that their presence at a yard repairing other ships is undesirable, that all navy-yard fronts have a very limited water front, and that experience has shown that submarines in the ordinary yard are very liable to damage by the movement of other ships, the flotilla commander has earnestly recommended that a

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submarine repair station for all the submarines on the Atlantic coast be established at Philadelphia, where there can be provided adequate water front, fresh-water storage, with sufficient room for special shops, storehouses for batteries and torpedoes, barracks for crews, etc. This to the west of the causeway in the back channel.

Having in view the recommendations of the General Board, the flotilla commander, navy yard commission's recommendations, and the department's previous decisions, the following will be needed:

West coast:	
3 main bases (exclusive of land)	$3,000,000
2 tenders (6 boats each)	2,000,000
Atlantic coast: 3 main bases (1 to be a repair base at Philadelphia, with a capacity for caring for 20 submarines)	3,000,000
Pearl Harbor: 1 main base	1,000,000

AVIATION.

3. There is now available and unallotted $4,453,487.79. Of this sum $750,000 is intended for station at San Diego, and $500,000 at Pearl Harbor, leaving balance of $3,203,487.79.

The following is a detailed estimate for expenditure under aviation to April 1, 1918:

New aircraft:	
326 seaplanes	$3,912,000.00
54 dirigibles	2,160,000.00
16 kite balloons	64,000.00
13 airplanes	204,000.00
4 free balloons	12,000.00
1 experimental rigid airship (one-half of cost)	750,000.00
Total	7,102,000.00
Spare parts	2,000,000.00
Coastal stations: 11 coastal stations, including land, construction, preparation, and equipment (except aircraft)—Maine coast, Provincetown, Block Island vicinity, New York, Cape May, Hampton, Key West, West Indies, Galveston vicinity, San Francisco vicinity, Puget Sound vicinity, $300,000 per station	3,300,000.00
Establishment of school at North Island, including land, construction, and equipment (except aircraft) additional to $750,000 already appropriated	250,000.00
Establishment of station on exposition site for fleet aviation base, and experimental and development purposes, including construction, preparation, land, and equipment (except aircraft)	1,000,000.00
Establishment of permanent station at Pearl Harbor, including land, construction, and equipment (except aircraft), additional to $500,000 already appropriated	250,000.00
Maintenance and operation of all stations	2,500,000.00
Total	16,402,000.00
Available	3,203,487.79
Required	13,198,512.21

The following paragraph is submitted for incorporation in the emergency naval appropriation bill:

"Aviation: For aviation, to be expended under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy for procuring, producing, constructing, operating, preserving, storing, and handling aircraft and appurtenances; construction, equipment, maintenance of aircraft stations, and experimental work in development of aviation for naval purposes, $13,198,512.21: *Provided*, That the sum to be paid out of this appropriation under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy for drafting, clerical, inspection, and messenger service shall not exceed $100,000: *Provided further*, That the Secretary of the Navy is hereby authorized to acquire by purchase, lease, donation, or by condemnation, such land sites in the United States or any of its possessions as are immediately necessary for the establishment of school, experimental, and coastal air stations, the cost of such land not to exceed $2,000,000 and to be paid from this appropriation."

FLEET OPERATING BASE.

4. Demands on Norfolk Navy Yard and Training Station are making more and more urgent daily the establishment of a complete operating base for the fleet in the immediate vicinity of Hampton Roads. Such a base will relieve the yard of a large number of activities that now occupy space on a limited but valuable water front,

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valuable areas and storehouses, and will permit the proper development and utilization of all these for their primary use—the repair and building of ships. The yard can not now properly care for the repairs allotted to it, and when the building of capital ships, as planned, is undertaken the necessity for the removal of these secondary activities from the yard will be imperative.

The fleet will of necessity be based on Hampton Roads and the lower Chesapeake a large part of the time, both in peace and war, and the Norfolk Navy Yard will be the primary repair base on the Atlantic.

The proposed operating base, located on the only available satisfactory site, i. e., the so-called Jamestown Exposition ground, extended to deep water on a 35-foot channel leading to Norfolk, should provide for the following activities:

FLEET OPERATING BASE (ACTIVITIES).

1. Training station for 8,000 men.
2. Submarine base for 20 submarines.
3. Aviation operating base for a double coastal unit and for the operation of Zeppelins when we have produced this type.
4. Coal piers, for berthing coal barges loaded and awaiting fleet's demands.
5. Oil fuel storage, for oil fuel, gas oil, gasoline and lubricating oil for fleet use, with piers piped for discharging cargo for fueling battleships, destroyers, submarines, and barges.
6. Fleet storehouses, to accommodate all fleet stores ready for delivery and thus permit the very limited navy yard storehouses and space to be used for the storage of yard material exclusively and avoid the expense and unnecessary rehandling of fleet stores in and out of the yard and yard storehouses, and at the same time avoid the now unavoidable delay in the delivery of such stores to the fleet.
7. Mine and net storehouses: There will of necessity be a large number of mines and nets used in the defense of the Chesapeake. These should be of course stowed somewhere in this region. The most convenient and accessible place would be at this place, where piers, tracks, cars, men, etc., would be available for handling this heavy and bulky material.
8. Torpedo storehouses: To store the spare and reserve torpedoes for the fleet in very large numbers, the storage of which and room for their proper handling and care will require a large storehouse located near deep water, with piers available for vessels to lie alongside when taking on board torpedoes or turning them in for overhaul.
9. Medical storehouse: A storehouse capable of storing sufficient hospital equipment and hospital stores to completely equip an advance base hospital, at least one hospital transport, and in addition a large reserve of these supplies for the fleet and hospital ships.
10. Recreation and drill grounds for men of the fleet, with athletic fields for all sports, swimming pool, clubhouse, etc., a crying need that the fleet has recognized for years. This same field would serve admirably for a fleet drill ground for shore drills and as a mobilization camp for marines or other troops who are to be transported overseas on transports convoyed by the fleet. The piers provided for would permit of the transports coming alongside, being loaded and unloaded, and taking or discharging their men directly to this field. The space allotted for the above purposes would accommodate 10,000 troops.

The whole site referred to above can be purchased for the sum of	$1,300,000
The training station can be equipped for its purposes at an additional cost of	1,000,000
Submarine base, with barracks, shops and equipment	1,250,000
Aviation operating base, grounds therefor, barracks, shops, etc., equipped for double unit	1,000,000
Coal piers, 10, untimately needed, including necessary grading, dredging, etc. (which would incidentally provide an extension for the plotted area)	5,000,000
Oil-fuel storage, piping of piers, etc	500,000
Fleet storehouse (at least 1 double unit)	800,000
Mine and net storehouses	100,000
Torpedo storehouses	100,000
Medical storehouse	250,000
Recreation and drill grounds (grading and preparation of grounds, swimming pool, clubhouse, etc., all of which utilities would be available for the regular use of the training station, as well as for the fleet)	500,000
Total cost of completed fleet operating base	11,800,000

This sum, $11,800,000, could not all be utilized immediately, but there should be appropriated and made available until expended not less than $6,000,000.

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General summary.

Destroyer tenders	$7,205,000.00
Submarine tenders and bases	13,085,000.00
Aviation	13,198,512.21
Fleet operating base	11,800,000.00
Grand total	45,288,512.21

The next is a letter, which I have marked "I," from the Secretary of the Navy to the commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet. [Reading:]

I.

FOR POLICY FILES.

[Third indorsement.]

NAVY DEPARTMENT, *October 4, 1915.*

To: Commander in chief Atlantic Fleet, via Board of Inspection and Survey.
Subject: Inspection methods; proposed augmenting of board and classification of items; battleship inspections.

1. The department concurs in the recommendations contained in paragraph 1 of the commander in chief's letter as amended by paragraphs 4 and 5 of the first indorsement—that is, the fleet officers become members, but do not vote—this with the idea that the Board of Inspection and Survey is the department's agents and must be kept independent of both the fleet and the yards.

2. For the reasons stated above, the department concurs in the recommendation of the president of the Board of Inspection and Survey as to changes in articles 4305, 4307, and 4309, Naval Instructions, changing the word "augmented" to "assisted," and the representatives of the navy yards become members but have no vote.

3. It is directed that hereafter the commander in chief be notified by the president of the board and the opportunity given for the detail of such officers of the fleet as may be available for duty in connection with the inspection as recommended in paragraph 3 of the first indorsement.

We were trying to revise and improve the inspection methods by adding to the board of inspection from the Navy Department certain officers from the fleet who, through familiarity with the conditions when the ships were at sea and in the fleet and matters came up there, could immediately give the Board of Inspection and Survey information in regard thereto, and call their attention to defects, so that well-considered recommendations came to them when the board got there; so that we put these officers from the fleet on the board to keep the fleet's advice constantly before the department, so that we would not get to be purely theoretical, and so that the bureaus of shore command or yards would not control the fleet's needs; and while it looks like a matter of rather minor importance, it is not. Paragraph 4, continuing, is as follows:

4. Referring to paragraph 2, the department's view is that the repairs on board ship come under three headings rather than two:

First. Those that can be done by the ship's force.

Second. Those that can be done within the fleet, with the assistance of the repair ship.

Third. Those that can only be done at a navy yard. It is the department's view that all repairs of the first class should be kept up to date and that the ship should be given opportunity for such repairs and the commanding officer should be held responsible for their being cared for; that repairs of class 2 should be brought to the attention of the commander in chief by the commanding officer of the vessel concerned, according to regulations established in the fleet, and that opportunity for repairs that can only be done by the repair ship would be afforded by the commander in chief. The Board of Inspection and Survey would then properly have only those repairs which could not be done by the fleet or the ship's force, but by a navy yard. (This, of course, does not include certain work on underwater body, etc., that can only be done by the ship's force when the ship is in dock.)

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5. With the above procedure in view, the department adopted the policy announced of having a ship sent to the yard and inspected in sufficient time before her repair would take place, to permit the yard to assemble all materials and make the necessary plans for the repairs; and when this preparation had been completed, the commander in chief to be informed and he to direct the vessel concerned to be at the navy yard on the date set.

Then, here is another one [continuing reading]:

6. Should the Board of Inspection and Survey find work that they consider belongs to the ship's force or should properly be done by the repair ship, there would be an opportunity for this work to be done between the time of inspection and the return of the ship to the yard for navy yard repairs.

A commanding officer is kept up to his job through the inspection of his division commander. The repair ship is in the force commander's hands, or in the commander in chief's hands, and if the Board of Inspection and Survey says there is a job that could and should be done by the repair ship, that is up to the commander in chief. This is all for the purpose of relieving the yards of unnecessary work. [Continuing reading:]

7. The above is not to be understood as in any way reducing the assistance which the ship's force should lend the yard (within the limits of the law) while navy yard repairs are being made.

JOSEPHUS DANIELS.

Next is a memorandum, "J," dated October 5, 1916, from myself to the Chief of Operations. [Reading:]

J.

OCTOBER 5, 1916.

Memorandum.
For: Chief of Naval Operations.
Subject: Inability of the navy yards as at present developed and organized, and with their present forces, to maintain the fleet in the proper condition of readiness for war.

1. I have, through my experience at the material desk in Operations, become convinced of the following:

(*a*) Our navy yards are not properly developed and equipped as to shops in general, foundries, storehouses, power plants, and transportation facilities, to properly care for the fleet as it was a year ago, much less as it is now and will be in the immediate future.

(*b*) It is my belief that the present variety of organizations for administrative purposes, for manufacture and repairs, and for yard maintenance are too varied (to insure a proper standard) for the department to efficiently administer them or for the fleet to understand them.

Then I make recommendations as to how to correct the above conditions. There is a question of navy-yard organization. I have very distinct views on that, which I have stated in that paper. That memorandum was submitted and, in general, approved. The organization of the yards was not changed, and has not been yet.

The CHAIRMAN. That was signed by you?

Admiral MCKEAN. That was signed by me; addressed to the Chief of Naval Operations.

The CHAIRMAN. Where these memoranda are not signed, I think it would be well to put the name on, possibly.

Admiral MCKEAN. Yes, sir. Whenever they are material, and I read them as a memorandum to the Chief of Naval Operations, that means that I signed them.

The CHAIRMAN. Any memorandum to the Chief of Naval Operations not signed is signed by you?

Admiral MCKEAN. Yes; I forwarded it to my chief or took it in person.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

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Admiral McKEAN (continuing reading):

2. To correct the above conditions, which to-day unquestionably exist as shown by the futile efforts of the department to arrange for the completion of the required repairs and alterations in the fleet within a reasonable time and the necessity it has been under of accepting repeated postponements of repairs and alterations necessary to put the fleet in efficient fighting condition, the following departmental actions should be taken at once:

(*a*) Give the Board on Navy Yard Development the necessary drafting force, clerical force, and the relief of certain members from other duties, to permit that board to proceed as rapidly as possible in the development of plans for the rehabilitation and bringing up of the material side of the present navy yards to fit them to meet the fleet's demands.

(*b*) Develop immediately a standard navy-yard organization.

(*c*) That the necessary officers to efficiently administer the above recommended organization be ordered to the navy yards to undertake the work which those yards should do. This to include the administrative officers, superintending officers, that is, heads of the department subdivisions with their necessary subordinates and an adequate number of inspectors to insure the yard work being done in the best way, at the least cost, and in the least time. (This on the principle that self-inspection is a delusion.)

(*d*) That the yards be directed to immediately recommend methods of increasing the present available force of mechanics, laborers, etc., of all classes. Whether this be by an increase of wages, the establishment of apprentice or training systems to train boys in the various trades, a system of using the enlisted men, or whatever method they have to suggest. The above is recommended because it is and has been apparent for some time that the repair forces in the navy yards are utterly inadequate to take care of the fleet's work; that the wages paid on the outside are hardly practicable for Government work; that outside firms are now training numbers of boys and young men in the trades and that the Government is not doing its share in the training of skilled labor to meet the present and probably future shipbuilding demands of our country.

3. The several remedies in the order of importance and briefly stated are:

(*a*) Expansion of number of employees beginning with the drafting force.

(*b*) Expansion and proper equipment of the yard plants beginning with increased storage space to provide for present stores and the necessary large increase of reserve stores. After this, power plants, dry docks, additional piers, etc.

(*c*) Reorganization.

(*d*) A section of the Board of Inspection and Survey, who shall, on orders from the department, visit yards whose output is unsatisfactory from either the department's or the fleet's point of view, make the necessary investigations and recommendations as to remedies to the department. This is a necessity to produce the highest efficiency, and will increase the general efficiency of the yards in the same way and to the same extent that inspections have increased the efficiency of ships, and for the same reasons.

McKEAN.

The next is a communication of October 13, 1917. [Reading:]

K.

[Second indorsement.]

NAVY DEPARTMENT, *October 13, 1917.*

To: Bureau of Construction and Repair.
Subject: Submarine construction, Portsmouth, N. H.

1. Returned, contents noted.

2. The recommendation in paragraph 3 of the first indorsement is approved in so far as and only so far as it applies to submarine *No. 107.*

That belongs really to submarines, and it is brought in here to show the policy. Submarine *No. 107* was a fleet type of submarine that Admiral Grant told the committee about. There were two built by each of the submarine companies, and one built by the Government. This *No. 107* was the one built by the Government, and we were very anxious to get that type of boat, each of the three, out, so that we could test them, make comparative tests, and so on, to determine which was the best, and which parts of which were

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better, and then from that data to get out a standardized type of fleet submarine. [Continuing reading:]

As the department has previously stated, the primary function of navy yards is the repair and maintenance of the fleet in commission. All building activities and manufacturing activities, except in emergency cases such as submarine *107*, which will be indicated by the department, must give way to the repair and maintenance of the vessels of the active fleet.

3. The recommendations contained in paragraph 4, first indorsement, are approved.

JOSEPHUS DANIELS.

Copies: All bureaus, all yards, C. in. C. (fleet).

There was where we had to keep pressure on the yards. They like to work on new work, the men like to work on new work. They can see their progress there and the yard can see it. Everybody is anxious for it. They hate a repair job, because it is never done and they are doing the same thing every day. But the importance of the navy yard to the fleet is in repairs. Private yards can do the building.

Here is another policy letter dated October 22, 1915, as to vessels of doubtful military value. [Reading:]

L.

POLICY.

OCTOBER 22, 1915.

Circular letter.
To: Commandants of all navy yards and naval stations, and to all bureaus.
Subject: Vessels of doubtful military value, procedure in authorizing urgent repairs.
Reference: (*a*) Article I–4335 (a).

1. The following addition will be made to reference (*a*):

"When requests for urgent repairs are received from vessels whose condition is such as makes it doubtful whether they are worth the expenditures necessary to make complete repairs, the commandant, before authorizing any work, shall immediately notify the department of the amount of work desired by such vessel, and request an inspection of the vessel by the Board of Inspection and Survey. No work will be undertaken without specific authority of the department."

JOSEPHUS DANIELS.

That was to save spending money on useless stuff.

Here is another communication, dated October 23, 1915, from the Secretary of the Navy, on the subject of opportunity for the overhaul of machinery. Here was the urge put up to the commander in chief. [Reading:]

M.

POLICY.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, October 23, 1915.

To: Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet; Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet; Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet.
Subject: Opportunity for overhaul of machinery.

1. The following recommendation has been made by the Bureau of Steam Engineering:

"The bureau desires to invite attention to the numerous comments on the Report of Engineering Competition, 1914–15, relating to the matter of adequate time and opportunity for overhaul of machinery during times vessels are away from navy yards. If overhaul periods at navy yards are to be reduced, considerable progress in this direction can be made by affording better opportunities for doing overhaul work by the ship's force. In this connection it is emphasized that an occasional period of several weeks will be of much more value than double or treble this time divided up into many periods of a few days' duration.

"It is suggested that this matter be called to the attention of commanders in chief and others in authority who may determine or direct the readiness of vessels for service. A proper consideration of this matter will, in the opinion of the bureau, result in great improvement in upkeep, reduction in repairs, and actual availability of vessels' machinery for continued service."

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2. It is directed that the above recommendation be carefully borne in mind and that the work of the fleets be so laid out as to permit suitable time for the upkeep of machinery.

JOSEPHUS DANIELS.

There is an illustration of trying to accomplish something by indirection. I had quoted that so often that I was afraid they would get a little bit impatient, so that I got one of the bureaus to start the ball rolling and to put it through the commanders of the fleets. I was going to sea later on, I hoped, and I was afraid that I would not get a very warm reception if I kept disturbing their peace of mind so much.

The next is "N," dated December 3, 1915, in relation to vessels in reserve. This refers to the painful conditions shown by Admiral Fullam. I am going to refer to the admiral's letter in the statement; but the admiral's complaints were just, and to show that we had tried to do our part, he gave material credit for a policy being established in 1917. I do not know whether the admiral found this letter on his files or not, but it was addressed to all bureaus and commanders in chief of fleets, to the commander of the reserve torpedo flotilla of the Atlantic Fleet, to the commandants of all navy yards and naval stations, to the office of target practice and the division of naval militia affairs. [Reading:]

N.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, December 3, 1915.

To: Bureaus of Navigation, Construction and Repair, Steam Engineering, Ordnance, Supplies and Accounts, Medicine and Surgery; Commanders in Chief, Atlantic Fleet, Pacific Fleet, Asiatic Fleet, Atlantic Reserve Fleet, Pacific Reserve Fleet; commander, reserve torpedo flotilla, Atlantic Fleet; commandants of all navy yards and naval stations; office of target practice; and division of naval militia affairs.

Subject: Vessels in reserve.

1. The department announces the following policy relative to vessels in reserve:

2. The condition of all vessels in reserve commission shall be one of complete readiness in all matters of material and equipment to perform all their assigned duties in war as soon as their complements are filled.

3. When vessels are to be placed in reserve, all work necessary to put them in reserve condition shall at once be undertaken and pushed to completion.

4. The crews will be retained on board until the work incident to placing the vessels in reserve, required of the crews, shall have been performed.

5. All equipment for each ship shall be kept on board or in store and not diverted at any time for use on other ships.

6. In reducing the complements, great care will be exercised that the men selected for reserve crews shall include a sufficient number of trained petty officers and men to maintain alive the ship's organization and to insure that when strange men are added to fill the complements, the vessels will be ready for efficient service with the fleet after a short "shakedown."

7. Reserve crews will be expected to maintain the vessels constantly in efficient material condition and, as well, to exercise weekly at military drills.

8. Vessels in reserve should exercise underway at intervals, singly or in group, to demonstrate the preparedness of their machinery and mechanical devices.

9. Watch, quarter and station bills and detailed organization bills should be kept up to date and station bills be ready for issue.

That is the station for each man. When he goes aboard you will hand him his ticket and tell him where he eats and sleeps and where he works and what he does. [Continuing reading:]

10. Reserve torpedo vessels will be treated as other reserve vessels and will not cruise for long periods with the fleet. They will have periodic tests at sea to ascertain the preparedness of their machinery, and will hold such proving and torpedo practice and elementary gun practice as may be found practicable and may be required of them.

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That was necessary. We have found flag officers wanting the whole bunch. They would forget that the vessels in reserve only had partial crews, and they would take them out and they would work the crews to death and would run the machinery to death. It was enthusiasm and ambitious effort on their part to train the crews, but they could not see the material. That was inside. [Continuing reading:]

11. Reserve crews of torpedo vessels will be expected to maintain their vessels in efficient military condition when treated in accordance with the foregoing plan. They can not maintain this condition when cruising extensively with the fleet without incurring excessive repair bills and requiring extended periods of overhaul, thereby withdrawing them from availability for immediate service.

As will be noted in the delay of getting destroyers, that was exactly what followed. We could not keep their hands off, and we had to use these vessels in neutrality duty. [Continuing reading:]

12. All ships in reserve shall be docked annually.

13. Reserve ships shall be held in readiness to participate in annual fleet maneuvers, and those carrying guns will hold some form of target practice annually. (This applies to reserve ships assigned to receiving-ship duty.)

14. Every vessel in reserve will be considered subject to be drafted into active service in the fleet to replace an active ship withdrawn.

That is, in case of emergency or breakdown we would take a sister ship that was in reserve and swap crews and send her out to take her place in the fleet as soon as we could. [Continuing reading:]

15. Provisions will be made by the Bureau of Navigation to fill the complement of all reserve ships from designated sources.

That is, the Naval Militia, Naval Reserves, or wherever her war complement came from. [Continuing reading:]

16. Ships loaned to Naval Militia and receiving ships (and all other vessels not attached to the active fleet) will be under the control of the commanders in chief of reserve fleets, who will from time to time inspect them to assure their being maintained in satisfactory condition.

JOSEPHUS DANIELS.

That is the policy, wholly and completely stated, of the vessels in reserve, and we did our best, with the material that we had, with the yards we had, with the personnel we had, from the material side, to carry it out.

Here is a memorandum dated February 3, 1917, on the subject of material, repairs, building. I think this was just about the time Mr. Bernstorff was invited to leave Washington.

The CHAIRMAN. This was your memorandum?

Admiral MCKEAN. Yes, sir. [Reading:]

O.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, February 3, 1917.

Memorandum for Chief of Naval Operations.
Subject: Material, repairs, building.

1. From a material point of view our mission under present conditions is:
(*a*) Prepare all ships now built for war service at once.
(*b*) Complete new ships as rapidly as possible.

2. There are a large number of ships now being built in our yards on foreign orders. There is a much greater number being built on home orders. The above calls for a large amount of material and employs a large number of ship mechanics. Our navy yards are short of men, material, and machines. Our next difficulty will be the transportation of material and machines.

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3. To secure the above men, machines, and material will require legislation. It is suggested that this legislation should authorize the Navy Department to—

(1) (*a*) Work overtime. (*b*) Pay double wages for overtime. (*c*) Increase all wages in navy yards and at other Government plants at once.

That is because we had to compete with the shipbuilding plants and the Shipping Corporation. [Continuing reading:]

(2) (*a*) Stop all foreign delivery of vessels, materials, or machines needed by us in the Navy or in our own merchant marine, and to compel the firms having such contracts to center their efforts on vessels needed by us, their surplus material, men, and machines to be available for transfer to Government plants or to private plants doing Government work.

4. Have all yards and bureaus list all machines and material needed and give them authority to commandeer them when not employed on other equally important Government work.

We got a good many tools and a good many ships, and we got a good many thousand tons of steel by doing that very thing, but it took legislation to do it. [Continuing reading:]

5. Have all mechanics employed in navy yards or private yards or plants on Government work released from all military service and listed as Government Service Corps.

6. Authorize Government inspectors to compel all yards and plants to give Government orders for material, machines, or parts right of way over all other orders, foreign or domestic.

7. Give Government materials, munitions, mechanics, or troops right of way over all other kinds of freight, express, or passenger.

8. Procure any submarines built for foreign Governments now in the United States. Take over any contracts for foreign Governments for parts to be assembled outside of the United States.

We did that.

9. Make arrangements with the English Government for obtaining heavy shells from Hadfields, or procure the method of manufacture.

They had been more successful in producing armor-piercing projectiles after that time than we had, by some process unknown to us, and that is a suggestion to get quickly that ammunition, which our producers had failed to produce, or the quality that would pass test. [Continuing reading:]

10. Procure from the English and French Governments rights and plans of their best types of aeroplanes and aeroplane motors; also all information they may have in reference to the Zeppelin type of dirigible.

The committee has asked about why we did not have some information before the war—before we went into the war—and why we did not send expert agents over. We tried. The Allies were closed up, tight. They would not tell us anything; and the further it went along the worse it got. They were sore at our not getting in, and they had the attitude, "Well, if you play the game we will tell you the rules;" and they did not loosen up on information to us until we did get in. Then they gave us everything. You can not blame them much for playing clam before, and they certainly did it. [Continuing reading:]

11. Select and equip the necessary bases for the operation of coastal patrol with dirigibles and aeroplanes.

12. Urge immediately on Congress the necessity of immediate appropriation of funds for the equipment of submarine and aviation base at Coco Solo Point.

That was a plan we had for the naval protection of the Panama Canal at this end, and it was important, as that was one of the foci of shipping that, in submarine raid or surface raid, they might

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think a good place to hit, and disjoint our shipping from one coast to the other, and we had the plans and the canal authorities had the labor, etc., and we could go ahead and do it. [Continuing reading:]

13. Secure appropriation of $1,400,000 for the purchase of the Jamestown Exposition site and $5,000,000 for its immediate development—

That was to give us an operating base at Hampton Roads, which we needed very badly to get the supplies and personnel out of the way of the repair work. That is where I came in on it, on the material side. What I was trying to do was, I was trying to throw these other activities out of the navy yards, so that we could use them to capacity for material, and maintenance of the fleet materially and while some of these questions are not material questions, the motive behind them was to get room to handle material. [Continuing reading:]

13. Secure appropriation of $1,400,000 for the purchase of the Jamestown Exposition site and $5,000,000 for its immediate development, i. e., the building of piers, storehouses, oil fuel storage, fleet facilities of all kinds, and the equipment of part of the grounds of the training station site and submarine base for the handling of a large number of recruits, the money to be made available at once. This would provide the necessary aeronautic base on Hampton Roads. It is not believed that the Army base will be satisfactory for naval operations.

14. Authorize the construction, purchase, lease or rental, including the purchase of land if necessary, of the facilities for the receipt, storage, inspection, and shipment of material and stores of all kinds; also coal and fuel oil.

15. Secure necessary legislation and appropriation to authorize the purchase of material, reserve stores, equipage, and plans previously recommended.

16. $1,200,000 for complete equipment of submarine base, New London.

17. $5,000,000, rental, sites, and equipment, coast patrol stations.

That was for aviation.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, what became of these memoranda of yours? Were they necessarily approved?

Admiral MCKEAN. They were not always approved in toto; but, like other things, the suggestions came from different sources of what we should do to get ready for the war, and they were taken to the chief, the chief took them up or took them up with the Secretary; and I only cite those to show what we were thinking about and what we were trying to do, and I want to say that I succeeded in getting most of them done in time. We would take them up with the chief and we would discuss them in conference, some of them would be changed a bit, but we did get most of it through. And this is illustrative of the lines we were working along, and I did have the sympathetic support of my chief in this business and, within limits, also of the Secretary. He thought that I was a very extravagant individual, and so did Congress.

The CHAIRMAN. But no action was taken, necessarily, at once on these memoranda?

Admiral MCKEAN. Well, if I did not get some action on a memorandum at that time, Senator, I followed it up pretty close.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you inform the committee when action was taken on these memorandums?

Admiral MCKEAN. These things were appropriated for. For instance, we got Hampton Roads and we got Coco Solo and we got New London and we got the coastal bases.

The CHAIRMAN. How about A, "To buy all ships now built for war service at once"?

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Admiral McKEAN. The precedents I will give you right away, in the next paper.

The CHAIRMAN. That may be, but they were not prepared.

Admiral McKEAN. They could not have been instantaneously, and it could not have been anything like as fast as we wanted it. The yards could not do it. I think the following memorandum will show that. But these were the lines along which we were working, and the department was sympathetically supporting us. It went through from top to bottom. We had to push.

The CHAIRMAN. Take suggestion No. 3 (reading):

3. To secure the above men, machines, and material will require legislation. It is suggested that this legislation should authorize the Navy Department to:
(1) (*a*) Work overtime; (*b*) pay double wages for overtime; (*c*) increase all wages in navy yards and at other Government plants at once, etc.

When was that legislation passed?

Admiral McKEAN. When war came it was done. We were authorized to work overtime.

The CHAIRMAN. After war was declared?

Admiral McKEAN. Then we paid time and a half for overtime. That was within our own capacity——

The CHAIRMAN. You did not pay double wages for overtime?

Admiral McKEAN. No, sir; they did not. I am very glad they did not. They paid too much as it was.

We recommended to "increase all wages in navy yards and at other Government plants at once." That was done by the wage board and the Assistant Secretary of the Navy in conference with the Shipping Board, and the other interests tried to stabilize wages on certain standards, and they all got together on that.

The foreign delivery of vessels was stopped.

The CHAIRMAN. What I am trying to find out, in general, is whether because memoranda were made through the Chief of Naval Operations, they were of necessity followed out according to the recommendations?

Admiral McKEAN. No, sir; never in toto.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course the memorandum indicates activity on your part in trying to get some things.

Admiral McKEAN. I am sure that I have not a thing here that did not meet my chief's approval, and there is not a recommendation, not a single paragraph there, that ultimately was not in some form or other adopted, I think.

The CHAIRMAN. But not according to the recommendation in the memorandum?

Admiral McKEAN. Practically, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, no. You recommended that they pay double wages for overtime instead of time and a half.

Admiral McKEAN. No, sir; there is a variance; but it was along the line recommended in the memorandum. I am very glad, as I said before, that they did not. I think that I was too enthusiastic.

The CHAIRMAN. But the point is that because the memorandum was there, that does not mean that it of necessity was followed?

Admiral McKEAN. No, sir; it does not.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I wanted to get.

Admiral McKEAN. But in this particular one it was practically followed.

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Senator TRAMMELL. Your main object was to pay increased wages to stimulate and encourage people to come to the navy yards?

Admiral McKEAN. Yes, sir.

Senator TRAMMELL. You were emphasizing that more than you meant to emphasize double wages, were you not?

Admiral McKEAN. Yes.

Senator TRAMMELL. If time and a half was sufficient, that was all you wanted?

Admiral McKEAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I am talking about the memorandum as it exists as a fact, with the recommendations it stated; and the recommendations in the memorandum were not of necessity followed exactly as they were there?

Admiral McKEAN. Oh, no, sir; that took the approval of the Chief of Naval Operations first, before I could even present them to the Secretary; and then it took the Secretary's approval before we could get Congress to act; and then it took the approval of Congress before we could do it.

Here is a communication of May 15, 1917 [reading]:

P.

MAY 15, 1917.

GENTLEMEN: The Navy Department announces, for your information, and guidance, the following order of precedence of work involved in the preparation for war, under its cognizance:

(1) Delivery of material to vessels completed and undergoing overhaul or authorized alterations.
(2) Repair work for vessels of the fleet.
(3) Arming merchantmen.
(4) Arming merchant auxiliaries.
(5) Submarine chasers.
(6) Destroyers.
(7) Scout cruisers.
(8) Aircraft and their equipment.
(9) Submarines (large and small).
(10) Battleships.
(11) Fuel ships.
(12) Destroyer tenders.
(13) Submarine tenders.
(14) Hospital ships.
(15) Ammunition ships.
16) Repair ships.
(17) Transports.
(18) Gunboats.
(19) Battle cruisers.

Very truly, yours,

JOSEPHUS DANIELS,
Secretary of the Navy.

CHAIRMAN GENERAL MUNITIONS BOARD,
Munsey Building, Washington, D. C.

NOTE.—Similar letter was also addressed to the following: Chief of Naval Operations. Bureaus of Construction and Repair, Steam Engineering, Ordnance, Navigation Supplies and Accounts, Medicine and Surgery, Yards and Docks, General Board, Commandant, Coast Guard Service, Council of National Defense, The Secretary of War, United States Shipping Board.

That priority list was changed from time to time as the situation developed.

Here is an estimate of the situation made about June 1—a memorandum. Other officers recommended certain things. This was the material side, for the Chief of Operations, and along the lines you spoke of. It was not accepted in toto, but we ultimately got the

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plan suggested worked out, not exactly along the lines of the memorandum, but in effect. [Reading:]

Q.

(About JUNE 1, 1917.)

THE RAPID BUILDING OF A LARGE FLOTILLA OF DESTROYERS.

1. From the general estimate of the situation the decision was reached to build as rapidly as possible:
(*a*) A large number of submarine chasers.
(*b*) A large number of destroyers.

That had already been done. That was a part of the decision. [Continuing reading:]

In carrying out the above plan the following steps have been taken:
(1) A large number of small craft have been and are being purchased for use in harbor patrol and out to the 50-fathom curve.
(2) A number of yachts are being taken over and equipped for coast patrols under the commandant of the coast patrol force.
(3) Some 340 submarine chasers have been contracted for. These craft are of wood, 110 feet long, 660 tons, and it is hoped that they will prove satisfactory sea-patrol boats.

They were the ones that we were putting the listening devices on and used for developing that, and there were some of those contracted for before we went into the war. We did not give the order to a private yard, because we did not want the plans, etc., to get out, but we did order some at the Norfolk Navy Yard before we declared war, and as soon as war was declared we had the plans complete and ordered them in large numbers for ourselves and for the French. [Continuing reading:]

(4) A small number of tugs and steam trawlers have been purchased or chartered for sweeping, etc.
(5) A number of the fleet destroyers and coastal torpedo boats have been assigned to the coastal patrol force.
(6) We have now under contract some 52 destroyers, which is about the capacity of the firms heretofore engaged in building destroyers, and this source of supply can of course be speeded up, but can not be counted on for a large additional number at any one time.
To meet the above conditions and our excessive demands at the present time, the following plan is suggested:
Build the required number, whatever it may be—say 200—on the assembling plan, viz, build the hulls in one place, boilers in another, engines in another, and "assemble" them at certain navy yards or private yards.
The plan would call for complete standardization of hulls, motive machinery, boilers, pumps, lighting systems, etc.
The department would select standards from the most successful practice and would make complete detailed plans, write complete detailed specifications for each component, make contracts with the various works best fitted to undertake quantity production of each part, viz.: one group to furnish all hulls (all duplicates); another all boilers (all duplicates); all turbines and reduction gears (all duplicates); all auxiliaries (each class to be exact duplicates); no changes or variations to be permitted, so that when parts reach assembly yards any and all will fit, contracts to be made on the basis of cost plus percentage of profit, all works to be run in two shifts of 10 hours, with time and one-half for overtime, etc.
The details of inspection, transportation, etc., would have to be worked out so that the whole business would be taken over by the people on the ground, and only questions on appeal to be taken up through the general inspector with the department.
The assembling could probably best be taken over by the navy yards with forces organized at each, so as to carry on the simultaneous assembly of a division (6) at a time.
It might, and probably would, be necessary for the Government to advance the necessary capital to expand certain already organized producers' plants to provide for maximum production.

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It is believed that under the above plan the first division of destroyers could be turned out in six months from date of completion of organization and plans, and that after that each assembly yard could complete one division (6) per month, or through yards one complete flotilla per month.

In the meantime, every destroyer possible to spare should be sent to the other side, for from information received to date, the most effective answers to the submarine so far formed are:

(*a*) Armed merchant ships to keep them submerged.

(*b*) Submarine chasers—and the best chaser under all conditions is the destroyer

Here is a memorandum dated June 2, 1917, for the Secretary of the Navy, a confidential memorandum. [Reading:]

R.

Confidential.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
BUREAU OF CONSTRUCTION AND REPAIR,
Washington, D. C., June 2, 1917.

Memorandum for the Secretary of the Navy.

In reference to the Secretary's memorandum of May 31, the following is a summary of important work under the bureau since the declaration of war. Some of this work was inaugurated prior to the declaration of war, and some is still in hand.

The usual routine work of the bureau has shown an enormous increase in volume. The amount of correspondence handled had increased about 100 per cent over a similar period the previous year. The expenditures under the bureau's current appropriation have likewise increased by about 100 per cent.

Before the declaration of war the bureau started the necessary arrangements for increasing its force to handle the increase in work. The force in the bureau in all branches is now 229, as against 143 a year ago. Further additional increases in this force must be made and arrangements with this end in view are now in hand. In the navy yards there has been an increase in force since January 1 from 25,000 to more than 32,000 men. Further increases in these forces also must be made.

Contracts have been placed for all the vessels authorized in the naval appropriation bill for the fiscal year 1918, with the exception of three battleships, one destroyer tender, and one submarine tender. In connection with the placing of these contracts there has been developed and perfected an entirely new method of payment, namely, on the basis of actual cost plus a percentage of profit. This has involved a complete reconsideration and revision of the department's usual forms of contracts and has required the establishment of completely new machinery for handling matters of procedure in payment under the new form of contract. Arrangements have also been made with various contractors for these and previous vessels to speed up construction. Arrangements have also been made with the manufacturers of certain varieties of materials, notably steel materials, for the earliest possible delivery of all necessary materials for the construction of these vessels.

In addition to the vessels authorized in the naval appropriation bill for the fiscal year 1918, additional contracts have been placed for the construction of 355 submarine chasers, 15 destroyers, 24 mine sweepers, and 2 seagoing tugs.

The bureau has performed its part of the work of placing in active commission practically all vessels on the Navy list.

The bureau has performed the proportion of work under its cognizance in connection with the enrollment of about 600 patrol vessels and the assignment of battery to about 250 of these. In addition, although no merchant auxiliaries have as yet been taken over by the Navy, the bureau has accomplished a large volume of work in connection with the examination of plans of merchant vessels and the preparation of plans for their conversion into naval auxiliaries in case such action becomes necessary.

The bureau has performed a proportion of the work under its cognizance in connection with the arming of about 80 American merchantmen, 11 British merchantmen, and 10 Russian merchant vessels.

In addition to the purchase of the necessary materials under its cognizance for the prosecution of the increased volume of current work at navy yards, the following special material purchases have been made.

(*a*) Special plans have been made, and consultations are still in progress, in cooperation with the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, and other bureaus of the department, in connection with the purchase of large quantities of materials which are desirable to carry in stock during times of emergency.

(*b*) The necessary schedules have been prepared and contracts placed for about 50,000 tons of structural steel for special purposes in navy yards.

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(NOTE.—This does not include structural steel purchased direct by ship constructors for incorporation in new vessels.)

(*c*) Schedules have been prepared and contracts placed for a large amount of auxiliary machinery and special appliances for stock purposes so as to be ready to meet all emergencies.

(*d*) In cooperation with the Bureau of Forestry, and the Lumber Committee of the Munition Board, an investigation of large scope has been carried on with regard to the immediate and future lumber requirements of the Navy.

(*e*) Large purchases have been made of mattresses, hammocks, clothes bags, and other equipment, to keep abreast of the constantly increasing enlisted personnel.

(*f*) A satisfactory type of gas mask has been designed, and manufacturing facilities for the same have been developed and contracts have been placed for 50,000.

(*g*) A type of rescue breathing apparatus which can be produced commercially in large quantities has been developed, and all arrangements completed for placing large orders for such apparatus.

(*h*) The necessary manufacturing facilities have been developed and contracts placed for 5,000 sets of Very's night signal apparatus.

The designs and specifications for new vessels as referred to under previous paragraphs have been developed and completed. Work is still progressing on other designs. In addition a very large amount of special design work has been carried on in connection with special schemes and proposals. Suggestions from many sources in regard to matters in connection with the prosecution of the war are received in large numbers. The careful and intelligent consideration of these requires an enormous amount of careful investigation and thought by highly qualified technical employees. In addition, the bureau is continuing in increased volume its usual program of experimental work, especially in the model tank, and in connection with the development of protection of the stability and buoyancy of ships from torpedo attack, both for vessels of the Navy and the merchant marine.

In aeronautics the bureau has prepared specifications for 160 sea planes, and has placed contracts for 90 of these. In cooperation with the builders, designs and specifications have been developed for small dirigibles, and contracts for 16 of these have been placed. The necessary arrangements have been made for placing orders for 24 additional dirigibles of this type as soon as the necessary information has been obtained from the trials of the first ones. There have been prepared and are now practically ready for issue, complete designs and specifications for new type of small seaplane, suitable for use aboard ship. There has been developed, in conjunction with the manufacturers, the design of small kite balloons, suitable for use on board ship. In conjunction with joint Army and Navy Airship Board, there is being prepared preliminary designs and estimates for a large rigid dirigible, and when approved by the department arrangements will be made for its construction, and it will probably be completed at an early date.

In connection with the special appropriations in the last two naval bills, totaling $18,000,000, the bureau has, in conjunction with the other bureaus involved, completed plans for the development of the Puget Sound, Norfolk, and Philadelphia Navy Yards. The necessary investigations have been made for the allotment of this sum between these and the other navy yards. The actual work in this connection has been started for the yards. Arrangements have been completed after much difficulty for the purchase and equipping of the machine tools necessary for the contemplated development of the various yards. In order to provide the increase in working force as referred to above, and for the probable further increases in these forces, large purchases of small tools, other equipment, etc., have already been made, and orders placed for additional quantities in order to obviate any possibility of delay from shortage of such equipment. The necessary forces at navy yards and arrangements are in hand to still further increase these forces in order to keep abreast of the increased number of workmen and the increased amount of work handled by the yards.

In special reference to work undertaken under the emergency fund of $115,000,000, carried in the appropriation bill of March 3, 1917, the bureau's letters, No. 13516–A106 of May 31 and No. 16660–A–1 of June 1, contained complete statement of the obligations under the cognizance of this bureau against that fund. Briefly, the work in hand under that fund is as follows:

Three hundred and fifty-five submarine chasers, 15 torpedo boat destroyers, 2 sea-going tugs, 24 sea-going mine sweepers, aircraft, and Very's night signal sets; also the measures taken with various ship contractors for expediting work on contracts in hand form an obligation against this fund estimated at a minimum of $20,000,000.

D. W. TAYLOR.

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Here is another confidential memorandum for the Secretary dated June 2, 1917. This begins:

In compliance with your memorandum of May 31, 1917, I submit the following summary of the work in the office of Naval Operations since the declaration of war.

It gives different things. They both of them have been referred to here at different times. It shows the organization of the different forces and their distribution. It shows the organization and the development of the districts, and the work that they had done up to that time. I want to call attention particularly to this:

Repair work on battleships left unfinished before the movement of the fleet south has been taken up and practically all naval vessels have been made materially ready and put in service.

That is June 7, 1917.

Also under the heading of aeronautics, here is the following:

Contracts were authorized for such aircraft as could be turned out for the Navy by July 1, including in this number 16 coastal dirigibles, and contracts are being made for additional aircraft as fast as they can be accepted by the manufacturers. Two hundred and eight (208) aircraft have been ordered but not yet delivered. There are under construction at Pensacola 12 temporary hangars, a dirigible shed, and a large hydrogen plant.

There is a very significant thing that I will refer to again in the memorandum on aeronautics. It was not because of the lack of desire or intent or appreciation on the part of the Navy Department that we did not have a complete air force, completely trained and complete in material and every respect. You did not have the manufacturers; you did not have the plants to produce it; you could not get it, it did not make any difference how much money you had. We were behind. We had ordered from everybody that gave us even a fair promise.

I happened to have aeronautics wished off on me for a time, and it was a strenuous time, and I worked with every man that had a feasible practicable idea. I would get an engineering and building and construction plan, and if they could produce drawings, plans, or anything that even gave us promise of success, we would give them an order for three machines, because we wanted to find out for sure whether there was anything in it, and we wanted to develop a new source of supply. We would give a man an order for three machines or engines in order to cover his expenses of development and work. His first one would cost him five times as much, and we would obligate the Government for three of them, and let him take the other two.

The CHAIRMAN. This was during the early period of the war?

Admiral McKEAN. Yes; during and before. I took over aviation about the 1st of March, 1917; but they had been going on the same way under my predecessor.

The CHAIRMAN. This has nothing to do with the recommendation that was made in 1913, has it?

Admiral McKEAN. No, sir; but I will explain that when I take up the regular subject of that.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Admiral McKEAN. But that shows what Operations had done, and that is an illustration; and they had spent $7,900,000 in the districts, taking over patrol vessels, and so on. Those vessels had to be

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inspected and evaluated by boards, and their spending $8,000,000 in that time on these little craft shows that they were pretty busy.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you say, "in the district"?

Admiral McKEAN. No; in the districts; in all the districts. They were mostly in the third and——

The CHAIRMAN. I thought you said, "the district."

Admiral McKEAN. No; in all the districts.

The memorandum last referred to is as follows:

S.

Confidential.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, June 2, 1917.

Memorandum for the Secretary of the Navy.

In compliance with your memorandum of May 31, 1917, I submit the following summary of the work in the office of Naval Operations since the declaration of war.

OPERATIONS.

On April 1 all naval vessels were mobilized and immediate steps taken to fit them for war service as fast as their crews for full commissioning could be supplied. All naval districts were mobilized and their skeleton organizations are being filled as rapidly as personnel becomes available.

The Coast Guard, transferred to the Navy, have been operated by the Navy Department and all vessels belonging to that service have been repaired and refitted.

German refugee ships have been seized in cooperation with the Treasury Department, and the interned German vessels have been taken over for naval service and are being rapidly put in shape for active service. Refugee German vessels in Samoa, Honolulu, and Porto Rico are being towed to the United States for overhaul and fitting out for service.

There has been organized and put in operation a patrol force with the Atlantic fleet, under the command of Capt. H. B. Wilson, which patrols the offshore waters of the Atlantic and Gulf coasts from Eastport, Me., to the Rio Grande. Suitable vessels of this force are held in readiness to operate against enemy raiders that may be reported in the North Atlantic.

There has been established in European waters a destroyer force under the command of Vice Admiral W. S. Sims, and 28 destroyers have been dispatched abroad for this service, together with two destroyer tenders. Two supply ships, under destroyer escort, have been dispatched to France, carrying cargoes of much needed material for that country.

By agreement with the allied powers definite areas of patrol in the North Atlantic and off the east coast of Brazil have been taken over by the United States Navy and a scout force has been despatched to cover the area assigned our forces in the South Atlantic, under the command of Admiral W. B. Caperton.

There has been established in the Pacific a patrol of the Pacific coast, including Mexico and Central America as far south as Panama Canal, under Rear Admiral C. F. Fullam,

There has been organized a force of small craft designated for patrol service in waters adjacent to the coast of France, and Capt. W. B. Fletcher has been placed in command of the first contingent of this force, which will complete its fitting out in a few days and start for its field of operations.

There has been organized a system of convoy service under general charge of Rear Admiral Albert Gleaves, in readiness for the convoy of any troops which may be dispatched to France.

In addition to the foregoing armed guards have been or are in process of being placed on all vessels, about 150 in number, plying between the United States and Europe, and the Atlantic Fleet has been given the duty of training the crews for the armed guards of merchantmen and transports.

The organization of the several forces, the regulations for convoy service, the instructions for the operation of merchant vessels supplied with armed guards, and war instructions for United States merchant vessels have all been prepared and issued by the Planning Section of the Office of Operations.

A board, of which Capt. Pratt of the Office of Operations, is chairman, has been appointed to consider plans and devices connected with submarine warfare, and is in almost daily session and conference with the research committee of the Council of National Defense.

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Definite and effective steps have been taken toward the organization of machinery to take over the control of the routing of all merchant vessels leaving United States ports. At present this function is being exercised by representatives of the British Admiralty stationed in our ports.

Preparation and distribution of various publications and ciphers for use in communication between merchant vessels and men-of-war of the United States and of the allied powers is well advanced. The communication office has been greatly enlarged to meet the demands of the increased work brought about by the state of war, the taking over all radio service, and the establishment of the censorship over cables. It is contemplated to establish a service of officer-messengers for the distribution of secret orders, confidential publications, and ciphers.

NAVAL DISTRICTS.

The work of the naval districts has been extremely active, especially in districts 1 to 5, inclusive, because of their greater strategic importance and because of the great trans-Atlantic traffic passing to and from the ports within their limits. The sixth, seventh, and eighth naval districts are filling up their organization, but are not developed to the same extent. Those districts on the Pacific coast and in Hawaii have not yet been fully organized. Defensive sea areas have been declared and have been enforced in Boston, Newport, New York, Philadelphia, Cape Henry, Hampton Roads, and Charleston as fast as the number of patrol boats become available efficiently to enforce control over the areas. Other areas will be enforced as the organizations grow.

Six hundred and twelve small vessels have been inspected and found suitable for naval use. One hundred and fifty-two have been taken into the naval service and assigned to scout patrol service and as mine sweepers. One hundred and thirty-eight have been ordered taken over but have not yet been delivered. Those accepted are now actively at work patrolling and mine sweeping or are being fitted out as rapidly as possible for work. All the small craft acquired by the naval district commandants have been manned by enrollment of Naval Reserves within the districts, and the personnel by active employment are rapidly being trained and accustomed to the line of work which the defense of the district demands. Mine sweeping is being carried out at Boston, New York, Delaware Bay and in the Chesapeake.

The obligations under the emergency appropriation of $115,000,000 incurred in equipping the naval districts is indicated in the attached table.

OPERATIONS ON SHORE.

The Naval Government of the Virgin Islands of the United States has been established under the governorship of Rear Admiral J. H. Oliver, and steps have been taken to supply at least a partial land defense of the islands by mounting eight 5-inch guns distributed between the Islands of St. Thomas and St. Croix. Steps have been taken having in view the establishment of quarantine services, medical research services, and agricultural services in the islands.

Affairs in the Island of Haiti, involving the peace of the Republic of Santo Domingo and Haiti, have progressed satisfactorily, and the authority of the established Governments of these Republics has been maintained. In the two Republics there are now forces of marines aggregating 2,000. In Santo Domingo a guardo nacional under the military governor and under the direction of United States marines has been formed and is undergoing a course of training while in the Island of Haiti and the gendarmerie is reported to be in a very efficient condition. A small coast guard service has been established in Haiti and vessels repaired in ports of the United States assigned to this service have recently been delivered under United States naval escort.

In addition, there have been employed in the disturbed districts of Cuba, caused by the recent revolution in that country, a varying force of marines for the protection of American interests there. There are at present about 450 marines maintained in the island. An information service throughout the island has been organized.

We have maintained constantly in Mexican ports and along the coast, a patrol by our vessels, giving especial interest to the port of Tampico in the vicinity of which are vast oil fields constituting a large and important source of the world's supply of oil. From two to four vessels have been maintained continuously at this port.

MATERIAL.

The vast work of equipping and repairing the fleet has brought upon our various navy yards and shore establishments demands which have taxed their utmost capacity. Not only has it been necessary to complete the overhaul and repairs of our regular

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naval vessels, but repairs to the seized German merchant vessels, and the fitting out and equipping of ships taken over for service have multiplied the work required to be done.

Repair work on battleships left unfinished before the movement of the fleet south has been taken up and practically all naval vessels have been made materially ready and put in service. The fitting out of vessels for distant service is nearly completed, 15 German ships badly damaged by their crews before seizure by this Government are being fitted out for naval purposes and eight German ships are being repaired for the Shipping Board.

AERONAUTICS.

The naval aeronautics program was considerably accelerated upon the severance of diplomatic relations February 3, 1917, and the present program of naval aeronautic expansion may be considered to have begun on that date.

Enrollments in the Naval Reserve Flying Corps were begun under definite standards supplied to commandants of the various naval districts, and arrangements for accelerating the training of personnel at Pensacola and for establishing various other schools of training were made. There are five such schools now in operation.

Contracts were authorized for such aircraft as could be turned out for the Navy by July 1, including in this number 16 coastal dirigibles, and contracts are being made for additional aircraft as fast as they can be accepted by the manufacturers. Two hundred and eight aircraft have been ordered, but not yet delivered. There are under construction at Pensacola 12 temporary hangars, a dirigible shed, and a large hydrogen plant.

In accordance with the recommendation of the Joint Army and Navy Board on Aeronautic Cognizance, sites for coastal air stations were examined and selected, and complete plans for the development of such stations were drawn up. Money for the acquisition of these stations is not available, but is included in an appropriation now pending. One site, however, has been obtained through permission of the use of land from the City of New York, and the construction of an air station there is now under way.

An allotment for the emergency fund of $3,000,000 was made to aeronautics. Of this sum $1,025,000 has been obligated and the expenditure of a further sum for the purchase of aircraft equipment costing approximately $1,244,000 has been authorized. The balance of approximately $731,000 remains available.

W. S. BENSON.

EXPENDITURES FOR PATROL VESSELS, MINE SWEEPERS, ETC., IN NAVAL DISTRICT.

[Referred to in page 3.]

Vessels taken over:	
Patrols	$1,821,868
Sweepers	3,064,260
Vessels ordered taken over	1,555,001
Vessels taken over by special board	1,475,500
Total	7,916,629

I have here a report from the Bureau of Yards and Docks which shows what they were doing in hospital buildings, Marine Corps, aviation stations, and miscellaneous yard improvements, ordnance plants, dry docks, storage facilities, etc., and what had been done between the declaration of war and the date of the report, June 4, 1917.

In this connection I wish to submit a table that is, I think, illuminating. This is on the work of the Bureau of Yards and Docks appropriations.

For yards and docks and shore stations their appropriation for 1916 was $4,500,000; in 1917 it was $11,000,000; in 1918—that is the fiscal year that I speak of—it was $103,000,000; in 1919 it was $119,000,000. That is their own appropriations.

In addition, they expended for building for other bureaus and from the allotments of other bureau's appropriations, in the fiscal year 1916 only $42,000; in the year 1917, $32,700,000; in the fiscal year 1918, $77,000,000; and in the fiscal year 1919, $17,000,000.

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Now, there is a fair illustration of the activities and about their ratio of increase in the shore stations, bases, aviation stations, etc., the material and land activities.

(The memorandum last referred to, together with the table referred to, are here printed in full in the record as follows:)

T.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
BUREAU OF YARDS AND DOCKS,
Washington, D. C., June 4, 1917.

Confidential.
From: Bureau of Yards and Docks.
To: Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: Work in progress under the bureau and its activities since the declaration of war.
Reference: Department's letter of May 31, 1917.

1. The following statement describes briefly the work of the bureau:

SHIPBUILDING.

Covered by $18,000,000 appropriation and specific appropriation of $1,000,000 for a structural shop at Norfolk, Va., making a total of $19,000,000. Work under Bureau of Yards and Docks approximates $16,000,000, distributed as follows:

Portsmouth, N. H.: $350,000. All work is now under way mainly by yard labor. Yard will be equipped to build submarines with seven boats on ways at one time.

Boston, Mass.: $50,000. This includes only work of a minior nature practically completed.

New York, N. Y.: $2,500,000. This includes new ways for new type battleship and a new structural shop. Contract for part of the work has been let. Completion of project dependent on the transfer of storage facilities to new building now under construction. Extension machine shop specific appropriation $400,000 nearly ready for advertisement.

Philadelphia, Pa.: $5,500,000. This includes ways for the construction of one battle cruiser and one battleship. It includes new structural shop, new foundry, new machine shop, fitting out pier, 350 feet long-ton fitting-out crane, new power plant, two building ships with overhead crane runways, galvanizing plant, together with the necessary distributing circuits, road, pavements, etc. Yard has now one small ways.

Contracts have been let for all shops and part of the power plant equipment; also crane runways and building slips. Plans for the power plant building, fitting out pier, and fitting out crane are nearly completed. The remainder of the power plant equipment is either under advertisement or will be advertised shortly.

Norfolk, Va.: $5,225,000 including $1,000,000 specific appropriation for structural shop. When completed there will be provided one ways for the construction of a battle cruiser. At the present time the yard has a destroyer ways.

This includes a new structural shop, foundry, machine shop, new power plant, shipbuilding, slip with overhead crane runway, fitting out slip, together with the necessary power distributing systems, railroad tracks, streets, pavements, sewers, etc. The structural shop is nearly completed, contracts having been awarded for the machine shop, foundry, building slip and crane runway, and for part of the power plant equipment. Accessory work is under way by yard labor and is progressing satisfactorily. Plans and specifications for the water front improvement, power plant building, additional power plant equipment, and other accessories, are well advanced and will be advertised or contracted for shortly.

Charleston, S. C.: $400,000. With the torpedo destroyer ways which were constructed previously at the yard, the expenditure of this money will provide for 4 ways for destroyers, so that 4 vessels can be laid down at one time. The work includes, besides the 3 additional destroyer ways, a pattern shop, extension to the existing machine shop, public works building, a machinist mates' school to release space now occupied by same in machine shop, and miscellaneous distributing lines, railroad tracks, streets, etc. More than half of this work is now under active construction by the yard, plans for the remainder being practically complete and work will be started or contracted for by the yard shortly. Cranes for the additional shipbuilding ways have been placed under contract.

Mare Island, Calif.: $500,000. The department has just authorized the expenditure of this amount at the Mare Island yard, which will include the extending and widen-

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ing of the present slip to take care of the new type battleship, and minor changes and extensions to existing structures, additional railroad tracks, and street work, and the equipping of the machine-shop extension, which was provided for from funds of last year. This machine shop is under contract, and construction work is actively under way.

Puget Sound, Wash.: $1,500,000. This will provide ways for the construction of a fuel ship and one scout cruiser. The construction of the building slip is under advertisement; contract for the shipbuilding cranes has been entered into. The remainder of the work to be carried out includes extensions to existing buildings, remodeling of buildings, additional distributing systems, railroad tracks, paving, etc. The majority of this work will be undertaken by the yard, and in most cases work has either been started or is about to commence.

Improvements to central power plants and distributing systems: The appropriation for the fiscal year of 1918 provides approximately $2,400,000 for power plants for various yards and stations. In addition to this the urgent deficiency bill will provide $750,000 more. Approximately $850,000 from the $18,000,000 appropriation will be devoted to the power plants at Philadelphia and Norfolk, making a total for power plant construction of approximately $4,000,000.

The principal work is at Philadelphia, Norfolk, and Washington. At Philadelphia and Norfolk entire new power plants are being provided of large capacity to provide for the demand caused by the development of these yards. At the Washington yard the plant is being more than doubled to take care of the new gun shop and the additional facilities included in the expansion of the ordnance plant. The remainder of the funds will be expended in extending the power-plant facilities at the other yards and to take care of the greatly increased activities on account of the development of these yards by reason of the war, and also in providing emergency connections to commercial points.

WORK FOR THE BUREAU OF MEDICINE AND SURGERY.

Work is under way for the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery on temporary hospitals and dispensaries and on permanent extensions to the supply depots at Mare Island and New York, aggregating $2,700,000. All this construction is being defrayed from annual appropriations or from funds to be provided from the urgent deficiency bill.

Emergency-hospital construction: The work in progress contemplates the construction of temporary hospitals, with total capacity of 2,700 beds, at the following stations: Portsmouth, N. H.; Newport, R. I.; New York, N. Y.; Philadelphia, Pa.; Norfolk, Va.; Charleston, S. C.; Key West, Fla.; Pensacola, Fla.; New Orleans, La.; Great Lakes, Ill,; Mare Island, Calif.; and Puget Sound, Wash.

This temporary construction aggregates $1,500,000. Two-thirds of this construction has already been awarded and is under construction. The remainder will be placed under contract within 10 days to three weeks.

Extension of medical supply depots: The urgent deficiency will provide for permanent extension to the medical supply depots at Mare Island, Calif., and New York, N. Y., estimated to cost $350,000. A sketch layout has been made and the work will be started as soon as the deficiency bill passes.

Dispensaries, etc.: Buildings are under construction at Charleston, Newport, and Philadelphia. A sterilizing plant is being erected at Boston, and repairs and alterations are being made at various hospital reservations, together with a training school for hospital corps men at San Francisco. The value of the work is approximately $170,000.

Contagious units: Contagious units are under construction at Newport, R. I., Portsmouth, N. H., Great Lakes, Ill., and Norfolk, Va., aggregating $103,000. The work is well advanced.

SUBMARINE BASES.

New London, Conn.: $1,250,000. This work is well under way and should be placed under contract within a few weeks. The general layout for the station has been decided upon. The work contemplates a complete base for training the personnel, as well as for basing approximately 10 boats.

Philadelphia, Pa.: Work has been started on a shop for overhauling batteries on Pier D, which will include as a part of its equipment motor-generator sets for charging submarines.

Other bases: The urgent deficiency bill provides $1,500,000 for equipping certain yards to charge submarines. The general requirements for the various yards have been worked out, and work will be in active prosecution soon after the deficiency bill passes.

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AVIATION STATIONS.

Allotments have been made or requested from "Aviation" aggregating $2,000,000. There is also being utilized for aviation development at Pensacola, an appropriation of $420,000 for repairs on account of hurricanes, and also $235,000 from "Engineering" for a hydrogen plant, making a total for aviation stations of approximately $2,600,000. Work is being carried out mainly at Pensacola, for which approximately $750,000 has been allotted, and at eight coastal stations.

Coastal stations: Eight of these stations are contemplated, but the sites for only two stations have been definitely determined. Contracts for the steelwork for the dirigible hangars have been entered into; also contracts for the erection of these hangars, providing of aeroplane hangars and miscellaneous other work for fitting up stations at two places—Rockaway Beach and Montauk Point. Plans are well under way for the other stations, and work will be proceeded with as soon as the locations are determined.

Pensacola, Fla.: The work at Pensacola includes a dirigible hangar, 9 permanent sea plane hangars, erection shop, 8 wooden hangars, bulkhead, dirigible shed, aeroplane piers and miscellaneous additional facilities. In addition to this, permanent piers for large vessels, additional power plant equipment, and general station improvements are being provided out of the $420,000 appropriation to repair the hurricane damage. With the exception of the permanent pier, all projects are either under construction or have been recently contracted for.

In addition, a hydrogen gas plant, to be charged to "Engineering", and to cost $235,000, has been contracted for and is well under way.

MARINE CORPS WORK.

Permanent construction: The work in hand for the Marine Corps approximates $2,700,000. This includes $200,000 in the urgent deficiency bill for additional storage facilities at the quartermaster's depot, Philadelphia. The major items include the following:

Peking, China: Barracks and miscellaneous equipment, $60,000. Plans and specifications are ready for advertisement.

Philadelphia, Pa.: Additional barracks, advance base storage, and extension to clothing depot, approximately $850,000. Preliminary plans for the barracks and clothing depot have been completed and the final plans are under way. Plans for the advance base storehouse are nearly ready for advertisement. The necessary steps are being taken to secure land for the Marine Corps depot in the city.

Miscellaneous minor work is in progress at Guam, Mare Island, Norfolk, Port Royal, Tutuila, and Winthrop.

San Diego: $600,000 is available for construction of Marine Corps base. Test piles and borings are being taken on the proposed site and steps are under way toward purchase of the land and the securing of adjacent tidelands from the city. Active work on plans has not been started.

MISCELLANEOUS YARD IMPROVEMENTS.

Various improvements of more or less minor nature, aggregating $3,000,000 are in progress at the various yards and stations. In general, the majority of this work is either under contract or advertisement. Major items are as follows:

Mare Island: Floating crane. Work on superstructure well advanced. Material for pontoon purchased and contract for fabrication about to be awarded.

Lighting facilities: $200,000. This is applicable to all yards. In general, different amounts have been allotted and work is being proceeded with by yard labor.

Boston: Chain shop extension, $60,000. This is under construction by yard labor.

Newport: Power plant, $315,000. Plans and specifications have been started and early advertisement is expected. Seamen gunners' quarters and sea wall, $140,000, under contract.

New Orleans: Extension of wharf, $30,000, under construction by yard labor. Storage shed, $40,000, under contract.

New York: Dredging, $125,000, under contract.

Philadelphia: Fifty-ton locomotive crane, $100,000, under contract.

TEMPORARY BARRACKS, MARINE CORPS.

Port Royal, S. C.: A contract has been awarded for temporary barracks at the Marine Corps Recruiting Depot at Port Royal, S. C., and this work is well advanced and in a great measure is completed.

Quantico, Va.: Construction has been started on a camp at this place to accommodate at least 10,000 men, and preliminary work is well advanced.

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DRY DOCKS.

Two dry docks of maximum size are under construction at Philadelphia and Norfolk. These docks, when completed, will take the largest vessel which can go through the Panama Canal. Work on both dry docks is well under way and steps are being taken to secure their completion at the earliest possible date. Cost $7,000,000.

WASHINGTON ORDNANCE PLANT.

A contract has been let and work is well under way for a gun shop of large capacity, to cost $1,000,000; also shrinkage pit, $250,000, power plant improvements described under power plant heading, $770,000, and improvements and changes in existing shops amounting to $212,000. All this work, with the exception of the two smaller shops, is under construction. Plans and specifications for the remaining jobs will be ready for advertisement shortly.

Studies are being made and report is nearly prepared covering permanent extensions to the Washington Navy Yard to provide increased facilities for the manufacture of torpedoes and other ordnance. This will include greatly increased storage facilities, a very large machine shop, extension to the foundry, optical shop, and other improvements which will probably aggregate $4,000,000.

GENERAL STORAGE FACILITIES.

Permanent construction: For permanent structures $3,523,000 has been allotted from the emergency fund, which with the $1,000,000 provided for under specific appropriations, makes a total of approximately $4,500,000. There are included in this program permanent storehouses for Boston, Philadelphia, Norfolk, Mare Island, Puget Sound, Charleston, New York, and also at New York a building for provisions and clothing. Construction work is well under way at New York on both projects and it is expected that they will be completed in the late fall. Contract for the work at Philadelphia has been awarded. The storehouse at Boston is under advertisement, and plans and specifications for the other work are nearly completed.

Temporary construction: Temporary and emergency storehouses, aggregating approximately $400,000, are now being authorized out of the emergency appropriation. Work is under way at all stations where allotments have been made. The individual projects at each yard are in general under $50,000.

ORDNANCE AMMUNITION STORAGE.

Approximately $1,500,000 has been allotted from the emergency fund, the emergency deficiency bill contains $3,000,000, and the appropriation act for the fiscal year of 1918 provides $1,000,000, making a total available from all sources for these purposes $5,500,000.

These projects are distributed between 16 stations. Minor projects amounting to approximately $120,000 are now under construction by yard labor. This work is well underway, and in some cases has been completed.

At the present time work under contract or advertised amounts to nearly $3,000,000. Standard plans and specifications have been prepared for the buildings to be provided for out of the remainder of the funds available. It is expected that all of this work will be advertised within three weeks. These structures provide storage for powder, shells, torpedoes, and mines.

WEIGHT HANDLING AND TRANSPORTATION FACILITIES.

There has been allotted from the emergency fund for this purpose approximately $1,070,000. This amount is entirely obligated for equipment at the various yards and stations. A large part of this equipment has already been delivered and the remainder will be available shortly.

NAVAL ACADEMY IMPROVEMENTS.

The naval appropriation bill for the fiscal year of 1918 provides approximately $2,500,000 for extension to Bancroft Hall and improvements to the power plant, and the urgent deficiency bill provides $300,000 for extension to Isherwood Hall. Bids will be opened on Bancroft Hall and Isherwood Hall on the 1st of July. Part of the power plant equipment has already been contracted for and the remainder of the work is well in hand.

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PROJECTILE AND ARMOR PLANTS.

Work is progressing on the plans for the projectile plant, but very little has been done on the plans for the armor plant. Survey of the site is now in progress.

EXPERIMENTAL LABORATORIES.

No work has been done on this project.

JAMESTOWN PROJECT.

Tentative studies have been made of this project and it will be possible to start work as soon as funds are provided in the urgent deficiency bill.

TEMPORARY BARRACKS—NAVY.

It seems probable that the need for camps for training enlisted men of the Navy may easily aggregate over 50,000 men, requiring an expenditure of over $7,000,000.

At the present time contracts have been let and construction is well under way, and in some cases nearly completed, for camps to accommodate approximately 5,000 men each, at Philadelphia, Charleston, S. C., Mare Island, and Puget Sound.

Great Lakes, Ill.: Work has already been started on a camp which may develop so as to accommodate 20,000 men. This particular location will require extensive equipment and structures to provide for water supply, sewage disposal, etc.

Newport, R. I.: Contract has been entered into and work is under way for housing 2,000 men; extensive developments of the stations to care for 10,000 men eventually are being developed and plans are well under way.

Pensacola, Fla.: Plans have been completed for camp of 1,000 men and contract will be made shortly. This camp is designed so as to be expanded to accommodate 2,000 men.

Miscellaneous: Tentative studies are in progress for possible additional camps at other places.

RADIO STATIONS FOR BUREAU OF STEAM ENGINEERING.

Radio work in progress aggregates $600,000 and includes three 600-foot towers at Porto Rico, one 500-foot tower at Radio, Va., and one 200-foot tower at Norfolk, Va.

The work covers miscellaneous buildings for various radio stations located from Portland, Me., to Alaska, covering approximately 29 separate buildings. In addition, there are minor changes and improvements at the same stations.

Of the main projects the radio towers at Porto Rico, aggregating $250,000, contract has been awarded. Plans are in preparation for the new towers at Radio, Va., and these will be out in a few weeks. Of the entire project, over two-thirds of the work is under active construction under contract, or advertised. The remaining work will be out within a month.

FUEL OIL INSTALLATION.

The work in progress under various appropriations including $1,500,000 in deficiency bill for reserve fuel oil storage in Chesapeake Bay, aggregates $3,500,000.

Contracts amounting to approximately $400,000 have been entered into for work at Guantanamo.

Work at Melville, Puget Sound, San Diego, Mare Island, and Pearl Harbor, aggregating $1,500,000, will be advertised within the next few weeks. The fuel oil reservoir at Pearl Harbor, aggregating $100,000, is now under construction by yard labor.

PARSONS, *Acting.*

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EXHIBIT T-1.

Bureau of Yards and Docks appropriations.

	1916	1917	1918	1919
Maintenance, yards and docks	$1,647,496.00	$2,206,000.00	$14,288,000.00	$16,500,000.00
Contingent, yards and docks	50,000.00	50,000.00	4,090,000.00	350,000.00
Emergency expenses				4,750,000.00
Navy yards, public works:				
Portsmouth, N. H		3,000.00	134,000.00	480,000.00
Boston, Mass	25,000.00	64,500.00	256,500.00	1,895,000.00
New York, N. Y	135,000.00	108,900.00	1,219,000.00	1,250,000.00
Philadelphia, Pa	55,000.00	713,000.00	1,420,000.00	2,435,000.00
Washington, D. C	145,000.00	616,000.00	6,728,000.00	1,933,600.00
Norfolk, Va	130,000.00	1,242,000.00	2,400,000.00	4,306,508.69
Charleston, S. C	95,000.00	195,000.00	257,000.00	1,650,000.00
Mare Island, Calif	65,000.00	384,000.00	605,000.00	2,850,000.00
Pensacola, Fla	15,000.00			
Puget Sound, Wash	60,000.00	18,000.00	670,500.00	1,025,000.00
Naval stations:				
Key West, Fla	5,000.00			1,025,000.00
New Orleans, La		150,000.00	60,000.00	450,000.00
Guam, M. I		1,000.00	60,000.00	100,000.00
Pearl Harbor, T. H		700,000.00	1,036,500.00	119,275.00
Tutuila, Samoa		4,000.00	40,000.00	50,000.00
Guantanamo, Cuba			34,000.00	200,000.00
Naval training station, Great Lakes (buildings)				922,500.00
Naval aeronautic station, Pensacola, Fla		420,000.00	245,000.00	100,000.00
Naval operating base, Hampton Roads, Va			3,155,072.25	4,174,556.68
Submarine base, New London, Conn			1,340,000.00	1,224,407.64
Torpedo station, Newport, R. I. (buildings)		141,000.00	47,000.00	1,150,000.00
Torpedo station, Keyport, Wash		11,000.00	16,000.00	
Naval proving ground, Indianhead, Md	158,380.00	106,000.00	150,000.00	1,010,000.00
Naval training station, California (buildings)	16,000.00	32,475.00	25,000.00	130,000.00
Naval training station, Rhode Island (buildings)			33,000.00	390,000.00
Naval coal depot, Melville Station, R. I		35,000.00		
Naval magazines:				
New England coast		6,300.00	105,000.00	30,000.00
New York Harbor		5,000.00	50,000.00	18,000.00
Dover, N. J		10,000.00	100,000.00	18,000.00
Fort Mifflin, Pa	64,000.00	5,000.00	142,700.00	360,000.00
Norfolk, Va	20,000.00	78,000.00	117,000.00	
Charleston, S. C			120,000.00	
Mare Island, Calif		3,000.00	16,000.00	
Puget Sound, Wash	58,000.00	7,000.00	49,600.00	
Kuahua, Hawaii		5,000.00		
Fort Lafayette				26,000.00
Buildings and grounds, Naval Academy		70,000.00	1,615,000.00	4,055,000.00
Depots for coal	500,000.00	500,000.00	2,500,000.00	1,072,500.00
Repairs and preservation at navy yards	1,097,436.00	1,414,000.00	6,225,000.00	4,750,000.00
Naval hospitals:				
Portsmouth, N. H			20,000.00	331.29
Chelsea, Mass		14,700.00		
Newport, R. I		18,000.00		
New York, N. Y	15,000.00	10,000.00		
Mare Island, Calif		15,000.00		
Canacao, P. I		3,600.00		
Great Lakes, Ill			20,000.00	
Torpedo storage facilities, Navy				250,000.00
Marine barracks:				
Island of Guam		10,000.00		
Philadelphia, Pa			280,000.00	
Norfolk, Va			25,700.00	
Mare Island, Calif			55,000.00	
San Diego, Calif			600,000.00	1,500,000.00
Pekin, China			62,000.00	110,000.00
Puget Sound, Wash	200,000.00			475,000.00
Marine recruiting station, Port Royal, S. C		15,000.00	49,500.00	320,000.00
Marine Corps rifle range, Winthrop, Md			10,000.00	
Commission on additional navy yards and stations		10,000.00	4,985.80	
Experimental and research laboratory		1,000,000.00	500,000.00	
Guns and munitions storage at navy yards and stations		280,400.00		
Land for naval base, San Diego, Calif		250,000.00		
Hospitals and medical supply depots			6,100,000.00	15,495,000.00

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Bureau of Yards and Docks appropriations—Continued.

	1916	1917	1918	1919
Lighting facilities, navy yards and stations			$200,000.00	
Ordnance storage			3,000,000.00	
Power plants and distributing systems, navy yards and stations			4,250,000.00	
Reimbursements, property damaged, Indianhead, Md			755.01	
Quarters for marine guards at naval magazines			100,000.00	
Submarine facilities, navy yards and stations			1,500,000.00	
Handling appliances at navy yards			450,000.00	
Improvement at ordnance stations			4,750,000.00	$1,727,000.00
Marine railways at navy yards			375,000.00	
Naval training camps			29,000,000.00	29,810,807.61
Temporary storage facilities, Navy			1,500,000.00	4,200,000.00
Purchase of dry dock, Boston, Mass				4,550,000.00
Naval air station, Cape May, N. J. (purchase of land)			150,000.00	
Land for naval warehouses, South Brooklyn, N. Y			560,000.00	99,085.90
Temporary naval prison			200,000.00	
Naval fuel depot, San Diego, Calif				175,000.00
Total	$4,556,312.00	$10,930,875.00	103,112,813.06	119,512,572.81
ALLOTMENTS FROM OTHER BUREAUS.				
Secretary's office:				
Improving and equipping navy yards for the construction of ships		15,475,117.00	11,050,000.00	138,800.29
Aviation, Navy		6,982,500.00	25,004,200.42	8,173,781.00
Naval emergency fund		6,657,000.00	17,111,742.06	3,207,238.41
Bureau of Navigation:				
Aviation, Navy (navigation allotment)			1,559,959.17	
Naval emergency fund (navigation allotment)			141,080.00	2,100.00
Arming and equipping Naval Militia		65,822.65	236,003.80	
Schools or camps of instruction				266,397.73
Recreation of enlisted men				3,500.00
Gunnery and engineering exercises		10,000.00		
Instruments and supplies			36,000.00	
Naval Home, Philadelphia			1,688.50	2,497.50
Bureau of Ordnance:				
Ordnance and ordnance stores			656,505.82	1,258,112.26
Armor plant, Navy		88,700.00	7,352,400.00	37,500.00
Navy mine depot			2,000,000.00	117,300.09
Increase of the Navy			1,160,000.00	212,037.65
Navy Gun Factory		67,500.00	10,820.00	73,537.98
Reserve ordnance supplies		350,000.00	12,000.00	
Projectile plant, Navy		910,000.00		7,000.00
National security and defense				168,000.00
Bureau of Steam Engineering:				
Aviation, Navy (engineering allotment)			2,583,092.00	
Naval emergency fund (engineering allotment)			55,836.02	66,257.00
Engineering		48,950.00	1,927,431.72	1,740,900.00
High-power radio stations		23,090.30	374,794.23	
Bureau of Medicine and Surgery:				
Contingent		89,273.42	418,896.66	44,160.00
Care of hospital patients		14,000.00	427,686.52	16,825.55
Naval hospital fund		27,086.00	47,585.54	35,299.82
Bureau of Supplies and Accounts:				
Maintenance, Supplies and Accounts		12,100.00	143,000.00	58,700.00
Fuel and transportation		4,600.00	2,041,413.73	449,076.14
Bureau of Construction and Repair:				
Construction and Repair		3,500.00	99,400.00	82,326.34
Marine Corps:				
Maintenance, Marine Corps	42,120.00	1,928,436.26	2,980,000.00	1,089,673.01
Total allotments from other bureaus	42,120.00	32,757,675.63	77,431,536.13	17,251,219.68
Grand total	4,598,432.00	43,687,550.63	180,543,349.19	136,763,792.49

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Admiral McKEAN. That finishes the policy lines and the reports up to the separate subjects that have been referred to in the testimony of other witnesses, and I have tried to give data, tabulated, showing the actual figures covering in each case 1917, 1918, and 1919. The first is the dreadnoughts.

The testimony of the commander in chief covers this question very completely, showing that the winter training in 1916–17 was more important than the immediate overhaul of these ships; that as conditions permitted and the necessity arose they were from time to time sent to the yards and put in condition and kept in condition for service.

A table showing the repair period is attached; every time the ship was at a navy yard, the length of time she was there, and also the total miles that each vessel steamed during each of these three years, which as to her final condition and fitness to move, etc., is a pretty good guide.

(The table last referred to is as follows:)

Name of vessel.	Days at navy yard for overhaul during—			Total miles steamed—		
	1917	1918	1919	1917	1918	1919
Wyoming	Jan. 9; Jan. 27 to Feb. 3.	May 9 to 16	Jan. 5 to Feb. 1; July 1 to 17; Oct. 1 to Dec. 31.	17,701.24	17,172.6	17,095.0
Utah	May 28 to Oct. 9.	Jan. 1 to 24; July 21 to Aug. 19.	June 16 to 19; July 9 to Dec. 31.	11,709.2	20,532.9	37,081.6
Texas	Aug. 22 to Sept. 26; Oct. 4 to Dec. 5.	Jan. 19 to Feb. 12.		14,037.7	14,498.7	5,773.0
Pennsylvania	Jan. 9; May 14 to 19; May 31 to July 20.		May 1 to 16	9,818.7	21,296.1	21,737.0
Oklahoma	Jan. 27 to Feb. 5; Mar. 29 to June 10; Oct. 29 to Dec. 31.	Jan. 1 to Mar. 10.	Apr. 14 to May 6; July 30 to Dec. 31.	15,609.3	17,169.9	15,393.0
New York	Jan. 27 to Feb. 3; May 6 to 9.	Oct. 16 to 19	June 19 to Dec. 15.	20,158.4	18,346.0	22,382.4
Nevada	Mar. 29 to Apr. 24; May 28 to 31; July 6 to 11; Nov. 1 to Dec. 31.	July 29 to 31	June 15 to Dec. 31.	14,800.1	19,826.7	11,529.2
Michigan	Mar. 27 to Apr. 3.	Jan. 31 to Mar. 31; Dec. 22 to 31.	Mar. 4 to 12; Mar. 31 to Apr. 7; Apr. 26 to July 7.	19,554.9	17,430.1	14,619.0
Delaware	Jan. 1 to 15; May 22 to 15; Dec. 15 to 31.	Nov. 14 to Dec. 31.	Jan. 4 to Feb. 1; Apr. 23 to 25; Sept. 19 to Dec. 31.	17,695.8	17,009.5	20,660.8
Arizona	Jan. 1 to Apr. 3; Oct. 27 to Dec. 7.	Aug. 11 to Sept. 30.	Jan. 23 to 27; June 30 to Dec. 31.	8,783.3	23,027.4	19,005.0
Arkansas	Jan. 10 to Feb. 1; Oct. 27 to Dec. 7; Dec. 15 to 31	Mar. 26	Jan. 4 to Feb. 1; June 30 to Dec. 31; Sept. 19 to Dec. 31.	17,695.8	17,009.5	20,660.8
Mississippi		Jan. 1 to Mar. 10; May 4 to July 28; Oct. 13 to 14.	Jan. 1 to 31; Feb. 28 to Mar. 4; Sept. 22 to 28.		10,435.5	14,556.9
New Mexico		May 20 to Aug. 15; Nov. 3 to Dec. 13.	Jan. 1 to 15; Mar. 1 to July 1.		2,681.31	17,571.3

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In this connection the attention of the committee is called to the shortage of dry docks at the beginning of the war; that the following docks have been added since that time: One 1,000-foot dock at Norfolk, Va., completed; two 650-foot docks at Norfolk, Va., completed; one 1,100-foot dock at Boston, purchased; one 1,100-foot dock at Philadelphia, building; one 1,100-foot dock at Pearl Harbor, completed; one 1,000-foot dock, private, San Francisco, completed—that is a private dock, and we obligated the Navy Department to use it each year up to the $50,000, or hire it and pay them that amount of money each year, to get them to undertake it. So that we are five big docks better off and two small docks better off than we were before the war, and that was one of the greatest reasons of delay in providing ships. For instance, at one time at the New York yard we had the *Texas* in the big dock and the *Olympia* in another dock and a transport in another dock, all of them under repair to their bottoms, and we could not send any more ships to that yard; and even when we wanted to send ships to a yard we were up against the docking question first. The shortage of docks is our weakest point, both from a naval and commercial point of view. For maintaining the present fleet, and much more for the new additions to the fleet now building, we need a number of additional docks on both coasts.

The CHAIRMAN. We will need still more docks now?

Admiral MCKEAN. Yes, sir; you do, on both coasts.

Now, as to the old battleships; that is, predreadnoughts or old battleships, referred to in Admiral Grant's testimony. In addition to the general statements of policy as to ships in reserve, and the older type of ships previously submitted to the committee, there is attached hereto a table showing the number of days at navy yards for overhaul of each of these 24 old battleships during the years 1917, 1918, and 1919. This table also shows the mileage steamed in each of these years, gives the date of assignment to transport duty and the date this duty was completed; and also number of troops carried by each of the ships. This table is submitted to show that, while these old ships varied in their date of building, from the *Indiana* in 1893 to the *Michigan*, first commissioned in 1910, where the oldest was 27 years old and the newest was 7 years from date of first commissioning when the war was commenced. Under "mileage steamed" it shows that, while old and out of date, they had been kept and were then in condition to do a large amount of cruising.

This data is to be taken in connection with the average under peace conditions, when, as I have found by previous investigations, each ship averaged one-third of her time in navy yards under repair, and the average cruising of a battleship in the fleet was about 10,000 miles per year. That was the normal peace cruising. Now, when you consider that under the rules of the game of most nations about one-half of these ships would have been junked and sold—scrapped—before we went into the war, they did pretty well. Here is 32,000 miles that the *Nebraska* steamed, for instance. The *Georgia* steamed 35,000 miles in 1919. And they carried troops, anywhere from 500 up to, on one trip that the *Virginia* made, 5,800. Their efficiency was fairly measured by their age and how long they had been in the reserve.

The *Indiana*, *Massachusetts*, and *Iowa* we have since expened—that is, stricken them from the list—and there will be new ships named in their places.

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There are numbers of others that in my opinion have no military value any more. But we had to do pretty nearly as much work on them. We would not do any alterations. We had to do more repairs relatively on old ships than on new; they cost us more for upkeep and more time and money at navy yards. But without those ships we could not have trained the personnel we trained during the war at all; and Admiral Grant, in spite of his complaints about his old ships, if he did not hammer the people and the material both pretty near their limit in training, I never saw it done.

(The table last referred to is here printed in full in the record as follows:)

TABLE V.

Name of vessel.	Days at yard for overhaul.			Date of assignment of transport duty.	Date of completion of transport duty.	Number of troops carried.
	a 1917	b 1918	c 1919			
Virginia	237	.....	90	Nov. 2, 1918	June 30, 1919	578
Wisconsin	19	.....	56	.....	.....	.....
Vermont	141	16	101	Jan. 20, 1919	June 20, 1919	4,795
Oregon	30	34	14	.....	.....	.....
Ohio	43	34	268	.....	.....	.....
New Jersey	.....	55	203	Dec. 28, 1918	May 28, 1919	4,675
Nebraska	90	.....	27	Dec. 31, 1918	June 23, 1919	4,530
Missouri	30	.....	42	Mar. 19, 1919	July 28, 1919	3,278
Minnesota	94	17	132	Apr. 12, 1919	.....do.....	3,955
New Hampshire	107	54	235	Dec. 31, 1918	June 22, 1919	4,900
Maine	121	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Louisiana	.....	47	205	Sept. 19, 1918	June 18, 1919	4,717
Kentucky	90	10	.....	.....	.....	.....
Kearsarge	115	36	.....	.....	.....	.....
Kansas	180	39	51	Oct. 17, 1918	June 27, 1918	7,486
Indiana	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Illinois	87	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
Georgia	90	14	16	Sept. 30, 1918	June 29, 1919	5,869
Alabama	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
North Dakota	33	99	11	.....	.....	.....
Rhode Island	.....	47	120	Dec. 6, 1918	July 4, 1919	5,303
Connecticut	28	9	6	Jan. 17, 1919	June 22, 1919	4,861
Michigan	32	96	28	Jan. 28, 1919	Apr. 26, 1919	1,062
South Carolina	29	41	40	Feb. 18, 1919	July 27, 1919	4,501

Name of vessel.	Total distance steamed.			Midshipman's cruise.		
	a 1917	b 1918	c 1919	a 1917	b 1918	c 1919
	Miles.	*Miles.*	*Miles.*			
Virginia	7,397.6	16,609	31,333.1	.....	June 7 to Sept. 1..	
Wisconsin	9,350.9	12,295.3	14,978.9	.....	June 7 to Aug. 29..	
Vermont	6,647.4	20,407	34,653.3	.....	.....	
Oregon	15,801.9	14,311.2	8,176.3	.....	.....	
Ohio	8,171.2	21,652.3	14,840.2	.....	.....	
New Jersey	8,661	19,354.9	30,355	.....	.....	
Nebraska	8,205.6	23,443	32,255	.....	.....	
Missouri	11,810.6	23,856.46	8,887.43	.....	June 6 to Aug. 29.	
Minnesota	12,813.46	15,492.5	21,513.6	.....	June 6 to Aug. 28.	
New Hampshire	10,486.7	27,747.9	26,718	.....	.....	
Maine	22,237.3	18,855.3	14,719.4	.....	June 8 to Aug. 29.	June to Aug. 27.
Louisiana	11,598.3	26,790.1	27,470.9	.....	.....	
Kentucky	12,518.3	16,624.2	11,668	.....	.....	June to Aug. 27.
Kearsarge	12,445.7	21,701	9,602.9	.....	.....	
Kansas	5,818.5	26,760	28,822	.....	June to Aug. 28...	
Indiana	.....	4,759	.....	.....	.....	
Illinois	12,947.5	17,664.8	15,235.9	.....	.....	May 28 to Aug. 27.
Georgia	7,092	28,848	35,479	.....	.....	
Alabama	10,588	16,686	14,513	.....	.....	May to Aug. 28.
North Dakota	5,941	9,912.98	24,991.6	.....	.....	
Rhode Island	13,390.2	18,959.6	32,926.6	.....	.....	
Connecticut	16,894.8	13,546.4	27,877.1	.....	.....	
Michigan	19,554.9	17,430.1	14,619	.....	.....	
South Carolina	16,274.1	17,225.6	28,717.2	.....	.....	

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Admiral McKEAN. Next, armored cruisers. Referring to Admiral Fullam's testimony, that is with reference to reserve ships, which we did try to carry out, as to the condition of the armored and protected cruisers in the reserve force of the Pacific Fleet, in addition to the policies heretofore submitted, there is attached hereto a table showing the dates of overhaul at the navy yards of these ships, in 1917, 1918, and 1919; also showing the date of their assignment to transport duty; the date of the completion of their transport duty, the total distance steamed by each in the years 1917, 1918, and 1919, and the number of troops transported by each. As will be seen at a glance from this table, that although these ships were not in perfect condition at any time, it is also shown that sufficient attention was given to their repairs to put them in condition for convoy and transport duty; and the miles steamed during these three years will show that they were not in such bad condition as might have been expected from the testimony given.

In considering this data, attention of the committee is called to the fact that these ships were no longer new ships. They were from 29 years of age, in the case of the *Rochester*—the old *New York*—and the *Seattle*, 28 years old, down to the newest ones, *Charleston* and *St. Louis*, which were completed in 1905 and 1906, respectively, and were therefore, respectively, 12 and 11 years old.

Here I wish to say that I had commanded one of those ships in the latter part of 1914, and taken her out of the reserve fleet where she had been at Bremerton for a number of years; I put her in commission, and went to the Mexican coast, and brought her back, and was ordered to take her to reserve, when I was detached at San Francisco. Their condition was unsatisfactory. I knew it from my experience of the *West Virginia*. That is one of the reasons for that policy on reserve ships.

Before Admiral Fullam went to the Pacific coast I was personally interested, from my personal experience, in these armored cruisers. I pushed all I could on the various yards and on the appropriations to get them repaired. I never would have succeeded in the world in getting them fit for this war if it had not been for Fullam, and I take off my hat to him, as I always do with pleasure. It was fine work, and it took energy and push to do it. But I want to say that we were helpful, that is all.

(The table last referred to is here printed in full in the record as follows:)

TABLE W.

Name of vessel.	Days at yard for overhaul.			Date of assignment of transport duty.	Date of completion of transport duty.	Total distance steamed.			Number of troops transported.
	a 1917	*b* 1918	*c* 1919			*a* 1917	*b* 1918	*c* 1919	
Charleston	32	.....	.....	Jan. 17, 1919	July 2, 1919	30,699.6	41,804	40,358.4	7,704
Frederick	.....	94	.....	Jan. 2, 1919	July 14, 1919	27,893	45,449.8	40,370.7	9,661
Huntington	95	39	232	Dec. 14, 1918	July 8, 1919	30,789.7	64,781.1	15,721.7	11,913
Montana	68	12	90	Jan. 12, 1919	July 3, 1919	18,051.7	57,599	41,531.7	8,800
North Carolina	125	45	.....	Dec. 23, 1918	July 3, 1919	24,539.9	45,007.1	44,272.3	8,962
Pueblo	10	56	15	Jan. 18, 1919	July 15, 1919	25,693.7	69,605.8	36,999.4	10,136
Rochester	180	53	56	Jan. 14, 1919	Mar. 4, 1919	21,308	44,707.2	29,160.4	317
Seattle	24	22	.....	Dec. 21, 1918	July 6, 1919	37,453.2	46,939	37,621	9,397
South Dakota	102	67	119	Dec. 26, 1918	July 20, 1919	24,954.7	50,665	31,297.9	3,460
St. Louis	61	71	.....	Dec. 18, 1918	July 14, 1919	19,169.6	40,212.6	36,720.5	8,437

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Admiral McKEAN. The next subject is submarines.

Admiral Grant's testimony shows the details of the submarine situation before and during the early part of the war.

It shows that the department appreciated the situation and its unsatisfactory condition, and sent Admiral Grant to find out what the trouble was and to advise it, the department, how to correct it.

Admiral Grant saw all the difficulties and recommended various cures for the various troubles, in most cases calling for the scrapping of the engines in the boats on hand.

The CHAIRMAN. When was it that Admiral Grant was sent on this duty?

Admiral McKEAN. The spring of 1915, just before I went to Operations, I think. No, it must have been the latter part of May or June, because Admiral Benson went in as Chief of Operations there, and he took office on May 11.

There were no substitutes for the engines. The Bureau of Steam Engineering had sent officers abroad to study all types of foreign engines and was trying to secure and produce the best, with very poor success.

Our early types had gas engines that were pretty nearly suicide. They were trying to develop an internal-combustion type of engine founded on the Diesel, but our people were not up to it. But they did send officers abroad and had them learning all they could. They were buying sample engines where they could, and it was a case of development, and we were behind, the same as we were in airplane engines later.

It was necessary that we use the old craft for training officers and men to man the new, so that all sorts of alterations and repairs were made from time to time in an effort to keep them operating.

That is, in the troubles that Admiral Grant had, he brought them to our attention and we did everything we could.

The navy yards were devoting a large amount of time, money, and labor to the subs, but we did not give up all of the navy-yard facilities to this class as Admiral Grant would have liked at that time, and as later, when his job had changed, and therefore his point of view, he wanted to put his whole battleship force No. 1, 24 ships, into the yard to the exclusion of everything else—even submarines. That was later, when his job changed. We compromised, as is usually necessary in meeting opposing demands.

The department had to consider all classes and their relative importance in the plans made to carry out our mission.

Each officer responsible for each of the jobs saw his job magnified relatively by its immediate proximity—some of them failed entirely to see the other jobs at all. Now, that is not a criticism. I would not give a hoot for a naval officer who did not think his job was the biggest one in the Navy. If he did not think that—except one higher up that he was working for—it was the biggest job around, and that he had the best division or the best ship, and so on, I would get another officer right away who did think that, because that is the only way. The man with the enthusiasm behind the job is the only one that gets the work out of it.

Had we listened only to Sims, and we did listen to him hardest, it would have been all destroyers. Had we listened only to Gleaves, it would have been cruisers and transports. Had we listened only

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to Cone, the whole Navy and Navy Department would have been in the air. Had we listened to Fullam only, the navy yards and appropriations would have been devoted to his old armored cruisers. Had we listened to Grant only, it would all have been subs at one time and old battleships at another.

Admiral Grant was right in his demands for the larger sub, as the war proved. I took a compromise position in those hearings between Grant and what was the official, departmental, view. I was wrong; I believe that the department was wrong. The department's view was based on shore stations and the operation therefrom, more or less limiting the submarine to defensive uses. Our coast is such and the depth of water that the smaller submarine for purely defensive work is probably the more efficient. But Grant insisted that the larger would do the fleet work and could also do the inshore work. The department wanted to limit the larger ones to the development of a type and prove its efficiency before it gave large orders. Grant was willing to gamble on the big one right from the start.

The CHAIRMAN. So far as the future is concerned, you believe we should now build large submarines?

Admiral MCKEAN. We have little ones enough to last us for a long time.

The CHAIRMAN. But we will need large ones?

Admiral MCKEAN. We will need large ones. Admiral Grant analyzed the material difficulties, but even more important, trained the personnel, officers and men, so that they, in spite of the defective material he describes, succeeded in doing effective work against the enemy from December 1, 1917, to November 1, 1918.

I submit herewith a table in this connection, marked "X."

(The table referred to is here printed in full as follows:)

TABLE X.—*Submarine division 5, performances from Dec. 1, 1917, to Nov. 1, 1918.*

	AL-1.	AL-2.	AL-3.	AL-4.	AL-9.	AL-10.	AL-11.
Number of days at sea	115.9	125.4	134.0	90.2	108.0	136.6	106.2
Number of days on patrol	76.5	83.0	89.0	60.0	62.0	95.0	78.0
Miles on surface	12,072.3	17,562.3	12,093.8	10,871.6	12,251.8	15,617.3	13,066.3
Miles submerged	2,353.0	1,879.0	3,120.0	2,126.0	2,058.6	2,891.8	1,906.8
Hours submerged	1,245.4	1,163.1	1,669.2	1,285.1	954.8	1,794.5	1,587.0
Hours charging batteries (starboard)	265.6	343.6	368.0	207.1	214.7	287.7	227.6
Hours charging batteries (port)	312.2	306.1	332.0	237.4	181.3	275.9	227.3
Fuel used, gallons	50,413	66,076	55,373	42,216	52,008	58,749	57,545
Lubricating oil used, gallons [1]	12,956	15,379	12,767	10,944	16,084	19,765	13,272
Exercise torpedo runs	12	10	11	14	8	15	12
Torpedoes lost	1	1	.....	.....	.....	2	.....
Torpedoes wrecked	.....	1	.....	.....	1	.....	.....
Number times enemy sighted	3	5	2	5	1	2	3
Times enemy attacked with torpedoes	1	.....	.....	2	.....	.....	1
Number torpedoes expended	4	.....	.....	5	.....	.....	2

[1] 3.78 gallons fuel to 1 gallon oil.

Admiral MCKEAN. That trouble book or black book of Admiral Grant's I used to hate to see come into the office, because he had you nailed every time. He trained the personnel. That was the big one. He trained the officers and the men in a way that our submarine people had never been trained before. He got those people ready at that station in New London, out of his school, to take over the subs as they came in, and we had a good deal better submarine force

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through Admiral Grant's tackling of submarine training than we would have had without it; but he used to make me very uncomfortable, frequently.

In my opinion, Admiral Grant is absolutely correct in stating that the fundamental cause of our submarine difficulties and failures is that we have permitted the contractors to dictate more or less completely our submarine design instead of doing the designing ourselves, developing standard types, proving them, and then having them built according to specifications drawn up by the department to meet the military use it proposes to make of them.

As you know, we have two companies that have patents, and their types originally were very different. As a matter of fact, all submarines look alike a good deal, now, and I think that we should have before this been doing our own designing. The fundamental reason we have not—and I think this same thing is true with regard to other things, with regard to many other desirable improvements of the same character—is that they will be impossible until the Congress gives the various bureaus much larger drafting forces here in Washington.

I think that is one of the most important material aids we can get. We now build ships the large-scale plans for which are made here in Washington. The plan is sent to a lot of contractors and builders, the navy yards, etc., and their designing and drafting forces work out all the details. Now, although they are sister ships absolutely, intended to do the same thing, when they come out they are twins, but one of them may be a blonde and the other a brunette, just the same, because the two designing forces have worked them out in a different way; and officers and men who are familiar with one can not go to another and handle her and her machinery as they should be able to do in duplicate ships. The only way I can see to get that is for the department to do its own complete designing, run off the blue prints and details, and send them to the contractors, and then you will get two ships that are duplicates, and not that just look alike; and your spare parts of one will fit the other. It will reduce the number of spares you have to keep in store; it will reduce the cost materially; but it will increase the number of people in Washington. But I believe it is real economy and real efficiency.

Now, to show that the submarine might have been worse, at least, Capt. Pratt submitted this performance of submarine division 5. I am perfectly willing to admit that that surprised me as much as it did you; but the personnel factor in submarines, like everything else, is a good 65 per cent anyhow, and with our personnel we had there, trained by Grant, they could make anything go.

The next subject is the German ships converted into Army transports. As the committee will recall, shortly after we entered the war we seized a number of German ships which had been interned in our ports. Among these were 16 large, fast passenger ships, commencing with the *Vaterland*, afterwards renamed the *Leviathan*. These ships were, at first, turned over to the Shipping Board, but early in July, 1917, 16 of them were, by Executive order, transferred to the Navy for equipment and operation as Army transports, and although the Hun had done his best, or worst, within his engineering ability, to disable these ships so that they could not possibly be made of any use to us during the war, they were each and every one completely repaired and the last one was in commission within 5½

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months from the date they were turned over to the Navy. T engineering problems solved in overcoming the damage done by Hun were solved by naval officers. The work was done either navy yards or in private yards according to naval plans and un naval inspection and supervision, and these vessels were utili from the beginning and until the last of our troops were retur in the transportation of soldiers and were a very large factor in transportation to France of 2,000,000 soldiers and their safe ret to their homes.

This particular case is cited because it was naturally an entir unexpected job of repair work, entirely out of the usual line, a was, in addition to our own fleet, work whose demands upon o limited yard facilities were already excessive.

I submit herewith a table giving the name of the vessel, the da of transfer to the Navy Department, the date of completion of r pairs, the date of the first sailing, and the date of the arrival in t United States on the last voyage, with the number of troops carri over, and the number of troops brought back.

(The table last referred to, together with attached memorandum is here printed in full in the record, as follows:)

Y and 2–Y.

Name of vessel.	Date of transfer to Navy Department.	Date of completion of repairs.[1]	Date of first sailing.	Date of arrival in United States on last voyage.	Number of troops carried over.	Number troops brought back.
America	Aug. 7, 1917	.....	Oct. 31, 1917	Sept. 15, 1919	39,768	46,923
Mercury	Aug. 3, 1917	.....	Jan. 4, 1918	.....do.....	18,542	20,871
Covington[2]	July 28, 1917	.....	Oct. 19, 1917	.....	21,628	.....
Huron	May 24, 1917	.....	Sept. 8, 1917	Aug. 23, 1919	20,871	20,582
George Washington	Sept. 6, 1917	.....	Dec. 4, 1917	Aug. 26, 1919	48,373	34,142
Aeolus	Aug. 4, 1917	.....	Nov. 27, 1917	Sept. 5, 1919	24,770	22,080
Powhatan	Aug. 16, 1917	.....	Nov. 12, 1917	Aug. 23, 1919	14,613	15,392
Agamemnon	Aug. 21, 1917	.....	Oct. 31, 1917	Aug. 18, 1919	36,097	41,179
Madawaska	Aug. 27, 1917	.....	Nov. 12, 1919	Aug. 23, 1919	17,931	16,978
Mount Vernon	July 28, 1917	.....	Oct. 31, 1917	Sept. 11, 1919	33,692	42,500
Antigone	Sept. 5, 1917	.....	Dec. 15, 1917	Sept. 15, 1919	16,526	22,065
President Grant	Aug. 2, 1917	.....	Dec. 26, 1917	Sept. 22, 1919	39,974	37,025
President Lincoln[3]	July 25, 1917	.....	Oct. 18, 1917	.....	20,143	.....
Pocahontas	.....do.....	.....	Dec. 14, 1917	Oct. 31, 1919	20,503	20,663
Susquehanna	Sept. 5, 1917	.....	.....do.....	Aug. 27, 1919	18,345	15,537
Leviathan	July 25, 1917	.....	Dec. 17, 1917	Sept. 8, 1919	98,804	93,746

[1] Vessel sailed on first voyage within a week from date of completion of repairs.
[2] Sunk July 1, 1918.
[3] Sunk May 13, 1918.

MEMORANDUM—TRANSPORTS—EX-GERMAN.

When these ships were seized by the United States authorities, all records, scraps of paper, etc., found on board were carefully collected and translated. On one ship the following memorandum in German was found: "Commended wrecking engines January 31, 1917." It is to be noted that this is the day before the notice by Germany that she would on February 1, 1917, resume unrestricted submarine warfare.

It is to be noted that the principal parts of the machinery that were attacked were the main engines and that the broken parts were practically all of cast iron. The intentions of the Germans were evidently to keep these vessels out of service for from 12 to 18 months, believing that every broken cylinder, etc., would require renewal before the vessels could again operate. They evidently didn't know that cast iron could be successfully welded. Their plans were not to completely wreck the ships, but to damage the machinery to such an extent that they could not be placed in service for from 12 to 18 months, believing that new cylinders, etc., would have to be installed. I have reliable information to the effect that arrangements had been made in Germany to manufacture new cylinders, etc., and have them ready for installation at the end of the war, which the Germans had planned to win in from 6 to 8 months by means

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of their unrestricted submarine warfare. They were confident that England would be isolated and starved out by that time.

Submarine warfare, as practiced by the Germans, had, it must be admitted, greatly reduced shipping on the sea, and if the war were to be carried on to a successful conclusion, ships had to be immediately placed in service to supply the allied armies with their enormous necessities and also to transport our own Army and its vast equipment and supplies to the front. Hence, the vital necessity of getting these ex-German and ex-Austrian vessels into service at the earliest possible moment.

The vessels taken over by the United States, as stated above, were 104 German and 8 Austrian. In addition to these 112 vessels, 4 were obtained from Cuba, that country having declared war on Germany. Cuba had no facilities for repairing these vessels and they were consequently given to the United States. In order that you may realize what these vessels meant to the United States I will state that they aggregated 635,656 gross tons.

Upon the seizure of the vessels by the United States customs' officials, they were turned over to the United States Shipping Board, which board had, as you know, been organized for the purpose of handling all new merchant shipping under the United States flag.

The Shipping Board, after thorough inspections of the vessels, decided that all broken parts should be renewed, which, by the way, was in accord with the usual commercial practices and also with the requirements laid down by marine underwriterf.

Considering the number of the ships and the vast quantity of damaged machinery, together with the fact that all plans, drawings, and records had been destroyed, it can be readily seen what an undertaking this would have been and the time it would have taken, especially at a period when the world was calling for more shipping, and the Allies were calling for men and supplies.

In this connection, attention must be invited to the fact that our Atlantic coast navy yards and private shipyards were already congested with work on vessels to meet the deficiencies caused by submarine warfare, and the building of destroyers for use in driving the German submarine off the sea.

The Navy Department speedily realizing that the larger ex-German passenger ships must be one of our chief factors in placing our Army on French soil, their quick repair became a matter of the greatest national, or I might say, international interest.

It was decided that the time required to build new machinery was prohibitive, and as the Navy was not bound by previous practices, nor by the rules and regulations laid down by marine underwriters, these larger passenger ships were turned over to the Navy for repair and operation.

The Bureau of Steam Engineering, Navy Department, after a thorough investigation of the subject, decided that it was not necessary to build new machinery and directed that broken parts be repaired by electric welding, patching, etc., thereby saving time, which was the vital factor, and at the same time avoiding congestion of foundry and machine work, as would be necessary with new castings, in the navy yards and private plants.

This decision, so far-reaching in its application and so fraught with danger to the professional reputations of the persons directly concerned in carrying out this work, was made in the face of opposition by engine builders and marine underwriters, but with such confidence in the ultimate result as left no room for doubt of its success.

1. U. S. S. *Leviathan*, ex-*Vaterland*.
2. U. S. S. *George Washington*, ex-*George Washington*.
3. U. S. S. *America*, ex-*America*.
4. U. S. S. *Agamemnon*, ex-*Kaiser Wilhelm II*.
5. U. S. S. *Mount Vernon*, ex-*Kronprinzessin Cecilie*.
6. U. S. S. *President Lincoln*, ex-*President Lincoln*.
7. U. S. S. *President Grant*, ex-*President Grant*.
8. U. S. S. *Covington*, ex-*Cincinnati*.
9. U. S. S. *Aelous*, ex-*Grosser Kurfurst*.
10. U. S. S. *Mercury*, ex-*Barbarossa*.
11. U. S. S. *Pocahontas*, ex-*Princess Irene*.
12. U. S. S. *Princess Matoika*, ex-*Princess Alice*.
13. U. S. S. *Huron*, ex-*Frederich der Grosse*.
14. U. S. S. *Powhatan*, ex-*Hamburg*.
15. U. S. S. *Susquehanna*, ex-*Rhein*.
16. U. S. S. *Antigone*, ex-*Neckar*.
17. U. S. S. *De Kalb*, ex-*Prinz Eitel Frederich*.
18. U. S. S. *Von Steuben*, ex-*Kronprinz Wilhelm*.
19. U. S. S. *Madawaska*, ex-*Koenig Wilhelm II*.
20. U. S. S. *Martha Washington*, ex-*Martha Washington* (Austrian).

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In order to show what importance the Secretary of the Navy attached to this work, I will quote from his annual report for the fiscal year 1918.

I have entered upon so full a statement of this case because I think it stands out as one of the greatest engineering achievements of the period. The perpetrators of this sabotage were confident that they had damaged the machinery of ships beyond repair, which fact is evidenced by a memorandum, in which each case is carefully noted, followed by the significant remark "Can not be repaired," and the speedy rehabilitation is a splendid triumph of American ingenuity and an evidence of American engineering accomplishment that is deserving of the highest commendation. The restoration of these magnificent ships to service reflects the greatest credit upon the naval officers concerned and upon the officers and employees of the welding and engineering companies who carried out the work. It is an illustration of the part played in winning the war by the men who handled the electric torch or who fashioned and secured mechanical patches to these damaged cylinders. Without these ships, we could not have transported our troops to France as rapidly as was done.

JANUARY 8, 1918.

Repairs, alterations, and fitting out of German vessels—Repairs and alterations.

German name.	Renamed.	Hull.	Machinery.	Total.
Vaterland	Leviathan	$959,596.98	$317,261.84	$1,276,958.82
President Lincoln		148,017.92	67,486.56	215,504.48
Cincinnati	Covington	383,051.42	182,264.13	575,315.55
Koenig Wilhelm II	Madawaska	446,006.94	129,786.81	575,793.75
Kr. Prisn. Cecilia	Mount Vernon	392,197.14	269,013.05	661,210.19
Grosser Kurfurst	Aeoleus	521,722.21	177,226.95	698,949.16
Princess Irene	Pocahontas	97,696.15	151,707.71	249,403.86
Neckar	Antigone	212,658.15	163,536.57	376,194.72
Amerika	America	420,764.43	142,383.89	563,148.32
President Grant	(Same)	149,196.78	90,525.33	239,722.11
Hamburg	Powhatan	731,184.08	259,616.82	990,800.90
George Washington	(Same)	27,954.25	19,310.04	47,264.29
Kaiser Wilhelm II	Agamemnon	87,036.20	119,697.68	206,733.88
Fredk. der Grosse	Huron	138,209.30	115,164.57	253,373.87
Barbarossa	Mercury	79,621.27	62,885.21	142,506.48
Rhein	Susquehanna	220,886.17	148,469.85	369,356.02
		5,015,799.39	2,416,437.01	7,432,236.40

Cost of cutting and electric welding German vessels.

Leviathan	$42,856.20
President Lincoln	15,759.50
Covington	21,476.39
Madawaska	40,634.91
Mount Vernon	3,405.07
Aeolus	33,228.36
Pocahontas	19,683.30
Antigone	6,560.00
America	12,199.21
President Grant	26,386.33
Powhatan	3,892.35
George Washington	41,810.00
Agamemnon	24,530.00
Huron	25,122.33
Mercury	61,303.50
Susquehanna	1,712.75
	380,560.20

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Complete data of all of the German and Austrian vessels taken over by the United States is on file in the Navy Department.

Admiral MCKEAN. It will be noted that two of these ships were sunk on the return trip. The attached memorandum from the Bureau of Steam Engineering covers more or less the details of cost, etc., of conversion of those ships and their adaptation to troop transport work.

(Thereupon at 12.45 o'clock p. m., the subcommittee adjourned until to-morrow, Thursday, April 29, 1920, at 10 o'clock a. m.)

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